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

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1ste Kwartaal
1st Quarter

An analysis of the motifs of defilement and holiness in light of God's actions relative to His Name, the land and the nations:

An exegesis of Eze 36:20-23 within the broader context of Eze 36:17-38

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Abstract

The name of God is as constitutive of His being as His being—there is no dichotomy. The Scripture presents God as jealously guarding his name in the same way He guards His holiness. Throughout God's dealings with Israel He often demonstrated a keen interest in the influence exerted on behalf of His name especially in relation to non-Israelites. Honoring God's name is exemplified through a life of obedience. The judgment and restoration of God's people are intricately associated with the honor of His name. Defamation of God's name results not only in personal consequences to the individual but the land and those associated with it are also adversely affected. Often times as it is the case in Ezek 36 God's decision to save His people emanates from His unwavering commitment to the holiness of His name.

Key Words:

Holiness, Defilement, Profanation, Sanctuary, Name of God

The old adage "what's in a name" is not only meant to be an ironic innuendo, it also highlights the importance accrued to a given name. In the Ancient Near East, honor, shame, reputation, expectations,[1] and one's duty, are associated with a given name (cf. 1 Sam 25:25; Deut 7:24; 9:14; 1 Sam 24:21; Gen 35:10).[2] In scripture the names of God revealed pertinent aspects of His Character to humanity, and thus, it was accorded the same reverence given to God.[3] Hence, the motifs of defilement and holiness quite often resonated around the name of God. In Eze 36:17-38 these two motifs are elucidated as both the dividends of honoring God's name, and the sordid repercussions associated with its defamation, experienced by both the people and the land.[4]

There are several views that are advanced relative to God's action in sanctifying His name, and restoring the land and clarifying His image among the nations (Eze 36:17-38). First, it is posited that the honor and glory of God was perceived by the heathens as enfeebled, therefore, in redeeming Israel He was restoring His honor both in their sight and that of His people.[5]

1 Walter C. Kaiser, "שֵׁם" *Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament*, edited by R. Laird Harris, Gleason L. Archer, Jr., and Bruce K. Waltke, (Chicago: Moody Press, 1980), 2: 934.

2 F. V. Reiterer, "שֵׁם" *Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament*, edited by G. Johannes Botterweck, Helmer Ringgren, and Heinz-Josef Fabry (Grand Rapids and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2006), 15:135-136.

3 Lewis S. Chafer, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 1, *Prolegomena, Bibliology, and Theology Proper*, (Dallas, TX: Dallas Seminary Press, 1947-1948; Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 1978), 1:262-265.

4 Walter Zimmerli, *Ezekiel 2: A Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Ezekiel Chapters 25-48*, trans. James Martin, ed., Paul D. Hanson & Leonard Greenspoon (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), 247f. God's action for Him was warranted on account of His holiness. Furthermore, the act of salvation becomes an initiative that resonates as a consequence of the holiness of God. See also, Donald E. Gowan, *Ezekiel*, *Knox Preaching Guides*, ed. by John Hayes (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1985), 118. Several poignant questions beckons clarification from the context of Eze 36:17-38: how can a holy God forgive and restore a sinful people whom He has allowed to be held captive, and who by virtue of their own iniquity disqualified themselves from standing in His presence? Is the fulfillment of God's plan to restore Israel unconditional, irrespective of their impetuosity? Was the holiness of God's name contingent upon His ability to keep Israel from falling into captivity? How was God vindicated in the redemption of Israel from captivity, or in their obedience to His command?

5 C.F. Keil and F. Delitzsch, *Commentary on the Old Testament*, vol 9, *Ezekiel*, Daniel (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), 110; Leslie Allen, *Ezekiel 20-48*, Word Biblical Commentary 29 (Waco, TX: Word, 1990), 178-179; Moshe Greenberg, Ezekiel 21-37: A New Translation with

Secondly, some see the vindication of God's name as constitutive of His righteousness and justice.[6] Third, a few see the action of God as a missional initiative that allows Him to ultimately fulfill His purpose of revealing himself to the world.[7] Fourth, others argue that His actions were emblematic of the sovereign pronouncement of the plan of salvation, and the subsequent Spirit-generated obedience to God's will.[8] Fifthly, some believe that the passage shows how God's character is exemplified through the lives of His covenant people.[9]

This study will attempt through a broad exegetical, intertextual and microstructural analysis of Eze 36:17-38 to explicate the relationship existing between Israel's defamation of Yahweh's name, His subsequent attempt to sanctify His name, and the effect of Israel profanation on the land

Introduction and Commentary, The Anchor Yale Bible (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2008), 729; Ralph H. Alexander, "Ezekiel," The Expositor's Bible Commentary, vol 6, ed. By Frank Gaebelein (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1986), 920; L. E. Cooper, Ezekiel, The New American Commentary, vol 17 (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1994), 315

6 Andrew W. Blackwood, Jr. *Ezekiel: Prophecy of Hope* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1965), 217-220.

7 G.A. Cooke, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Ezekiel, The International Critical Commentary (Edingburgh: T & T Clark, 1970), 390; K. B. Kuschel, Ezekiel, The People's Bible (Milwaukee, WI: Northwestern Publishers, (1986), 211. Kuschel contends that the focus here is not so much on God's covenant people as it is upon those whom God wants to reach through His people; Keith B. Kuschel, *Ezekiel*, The People's Bible Milwaukee, WI: Northwestern Publishing, 1986), 212. God's concern for the holiness of His name was not so much for the sake of Israel as it was for the witness His reputation would have among the heathens; Moshe Greenberg, *Ezekiel 21-37*, vol. 22 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), 728. Even though Israel flouted God's decrees in flagrant defiance, it was the influence exerted on the heathens by her recalcitrance that profaned God's name.

8 Bruce Vawter and Leslie Hoppe, Ezekiel: A New Heart, International Theological Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 163; Arnos C. Gaebelein, The Annotated Bible, Volume 4, Proverbs to Ezekiel (Neptune: NJ:Loizeuax Brothers, 1970), 314; Robert K. Mciver, Ezekiel:Through Crisis to Glory, The Abundant Life Bible Amplifier (Boise, ID: Pacific Press, 1997), 184-185; Lamar E. Cooper, Sr. Ezekiel, The New American Commentary (Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman, 1994), 314-316; Ralph H. Alexander, Ezekiel, The Expositor's Bible Commentary, vol 6, edited by Frank E. Gaebelein (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1986), 920f. Ralph Alexander believe that God's actions in Ezekiel was not so much about His honor as it is about Israel being restored to a right relationship with Him, and developing within them a greater sense of appreciation of benefits in their lives; Victor P. Hamilton, Ezekiel, Evangelical Commentary on the Bible, edited by Walter Elwell (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1989), 582. Hamilton accedes to a Calvinistic stance; he exclaims that it is not the behavior of Israel that evokes the judgment or compassion of God, but rather the divine sovereign purpose.

9 Charles L. Feinberg, The Prophecy of Ezekiel: The Glory of God (Chicago: Moody Press, 1969), 208-209.

and surrounding nations. Methodologically, it will first seek to intertextually interface the motif of holiness in Ezekiel with the Pentateuch and the other parts of scripture, so as to establish the broader picture of holiness and defilement. Finally, a microstrutural analysis of Eze 36:17-38 relative to motifs of holiness and defilement will be undertaken.

In Ezekiel, Israel's defilement is associated with their conduct, actions and attitudes (36:17,18),[10] a theme that is explicated throughout the Prophets.[11] The Pi'ēl forms of טמא[12] and חלל[13] occurs mostly in Leviticus and Ezekiel where the emphasis pertains to actions that are in open defiance to establish norms, or that bring open reproach to the offended.[14] Quite often these actions tarnish both the character of the offender, the offended, and the land in which the defilement occurs (see Jer 2:7). While it easy to rationalize iniquity implicating the offender and offended, its ubiquitous nature is seen in the fact that its defilement can extend even to the land.[15]

10 Defilement is in Ezekiel is denoted by two principal verbs, טמא (36:17-18), and חלל (36:20-23). As an adjective the primary emphasis of טמא pertains to persons, things or food ascribed as culticly unclean and thus religiously and ceremoniously unfit (see Lev 5:2; 7:19,21; 10:10; 11:4-8, 26; 47; 13:15,36,44,35,51; 14:40,41,44,57; Num 9:7,10; 18:15; 19:13,15,17,19; Deut 12:15,22; 14:7,8,10,19). The Niphal נחל is also used in Eze 21:4,9; 25:3; Isa 48:11; Eze 7:24; 20:9,14,22; 22:16,26

11 see Isa 35:8; 52:1,11; 64:5; Jer 19:13; Lam 4:15; Eze 4:14; 22:5,10,26; Hos 9:3; Amos 7:17; Hag 2:13,14).

12 see Lev 11:44; 18:28; 20:13; Eze 5:11; 9:7; 18:11,15; 20:26; 22:11; 23:17,38; 33:26

13 see Lev 18:21; 19:8,12,29; 21:6,9,12,15,23; 22:15,32; Eze 7:21,22; 20:13,16,21; 20:24,39; 22:26; 23:38,39; 24:21

14 Israel for the most part, engaged in the profanation of God's name that resulted in their eventual servitude. By offering their children to Molech (Lev 20:3), handling holy gifts with unholy hands (Lev 22:2), unfaithfulness to the commandments (Lev 22:23), repeated idolatry (Eze 20:39), and their unrelenting apostasy and captivity (36:21, 22; 39:7; 43:7,8; Amos 2:7) God's name and its character was vilified. Yet, in Ezekiel 36:17-27 God bases His redemption of Israel upon the holiness of His name.

15 Scripture is replete with examples of nefarious actions that resulted in grueling implications on the land. The land was often defiled through disobedience (Lev 18:28), sacrificing children to Molech (Lev 20:3; 2 Kgs 23:10), bloodshed (Num 35:33,34), and the unburied corpse of a flagrant sinner (Deut 21:23). Defilement that pertained to the land instinctively affected the sanctuary (Num 19:13,20; 2 Kgs 23:8; 2 Chron 36:14; Psa 79:1; Jer 7:30; 32:34). Apart from the repugnance of Israel's acts of defilement to God, the already marred land was further plunged into oblivion. The defilement of the land while it accrues a literal connotation; in Ezekiel it appears mainly as symptomatic. The scripture posits the land as subject to defiltment and exploitation. For instance, a leprous person was to be isolated both from people and also the camp so as to avoid contamination (Lev 13:46; Num 5:3). Also in Gen 34:10 Hamor offered land in exchange for Dinah's defilement by his son Shechem so as to pacify the gravity of his iniquitous actions (34:27).

The verb חלל is used to denote the profanity of the land (Eze 7:22), against God (Eze 13:19), God's name (20:39; 36:20-23; the Sabbath (Eze 20:13,16,21,24; 22:8,26; Amos 2:7; Mal 1:12), the sanctuary (Eze 23:38,39; 24:21; 44:7; Dan 11:31; Zeph 3:4; Mal 2:11), human beings and their prowess (Eze 28:7,9,16), and the covenant (Mal 2:10).[16] While Israel's profanation cast aspersion God's character and His sovereignty, it most adversely impacted upon their status as His holy people, and the institutions that facilitated communion and harmony with Him (such as the Sabbath, sanctuary, covenant). Moreover, the usage of the Pi'ēl forms of חלל in conjunction with שם,[17] attest to the act of profanity involving not just a mere mental ascent, but also corroborative actions.[18]

The nominal construction שם קדש / שם קדש occurs substantially throughout scripture, especially in Ezekiel.[19] The repeated connotation apart from ascribing of honor to God's name (1 Chron 16:29), pertains to an injunction against its sacrilege (see Lev 20:3; 21:1; 22:2).[20] The general sense in which the expression קדש שם found in Eze 36 pertains to the indulgence of behavior that recriminated and castigated the character of God (36:20-22).[21]

16 In the Pentateuch the overarching sense in which the Pi'ēl form of חלל occurs pertains to that of cultic defilement that religiously disqualifies the offender to stand in the presence of God (Exo 20:25; Lev 19: 8,12,29; 21:6,9,12; 22:2,9,15,32; Num 18:32), actions of open defiance against the will of God (Exo 31:14; Lev 18:21; 19:8).

17 Another interesting aspect of defilement is elucidated by the Pual form of חלל (used only Ezekiel). Whereas its lexical range includes the meaning of defilement as is used in Eze 36:23, the alternative rendering "to pierce, put to death, slain" in 32:26 can also contextually be used in 36:23. This implies that the actions of Israel not only defiled the name of God was (as indicated by the Pi'ēl), or the land, but its influence was nullified among the nations which proverbially speaking is "as good as dead." Therefore, in some ways God's action of sanctifying His name was a reversal not only from the sacrilegious to the sacred, but also from its "death to life." In this context the need to sanctify His name was both a redemptive and theological necessity

18 According to scripture God's name is profaned through children sacrifice (Lev 18:21; 20:3), swearing falsely (Lev 19:12), unholiness (Lev 21:6; 22:2), disobedience to God's commands (Lev 22:32; Jer 34:16); disrespecting His dwelling place (Psa 74:7), immorality (Amos 2:7), gifts and idols (Eze 20:39), loss of His land (Eze 36:20).When חלל is used together with יהוה it is most times in reference to profaning God's name (Eze 20:39; 36:22), His Sabbath (Isa 56:6), the sanctuary (Eze 24:21), sacrifices offered to Him (Lev 19:8).

19 See Eze 20:39,40; 36:20-23; 39:7,25; 42:13,14; 43:7,8; 44:8; 46:19; 44:24; 46:20

20 The expression שם קדש as is used in scripture relates either to a warning against profaning God's name (Exo 30:36; Lev 20:3; 22:2), ascribing adoration/honor to God's name (1 Chron 16:10,35; 29:16; Psa 33:21; 88:21; 1-3:1; 105:3, 106:47; 145:21).

21 In a survey of the verbs that govern the name of YWH it was found that there are more verbs

God, in Ezekiel (especially Eze 36) takes an apologetic stance in defense of the profaning of His name. He [God] prior indicated (Eze 20:9-22) that it was because of His name that Israel was brought out of Egypt (vs 9), or spared from His wrath in the wilderness, despite their callous disregard for His will (14, 22). Although swearing not to allow them to see the promise land (vs 15), yet, He allowed them to enter (vs 28). Again, although allowing them to go into exile due to their disobedience (vv 23-27), He is about to redeem them (36:21) on account of Holy name (cf. Num 14:11-23).

In Lev 22:32 Israel was admonished if they refrain from profaning God's name He will be sanctified among them, and concomitantly they would be sanctified. Similarly in Ezekiel 36:23, the verbs חלל and קדשׁ are used, except that Ezekiel acts like the reversal to the dictum in Leviticus, in that, God's name is profaned by His people, but sanctified by Him. Nonetheless, in either case, the repercussions of profanity remained the same- a diminished status of His people, and the land and relationships with others are tarnished. Therefore, by profaning the name of God, they essentially excoriate their standing as a "holy people," while also casting reproach on the covenant faithfulness of YHWH to fulfill what He has promise.[22]

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that expresses God's ideal for His people with respect to their positive attitude towards His name. Individuals are encouraged to קרא "call"(Gen 4:26; 2 Sam 22:4), ברך "bless" (Job 1:21; Gen 9:26), זכר "remember" (Psa 20:7; Deut 8:18), ירא "fear" (Psa 102:15; Deut 6:2), חללא "praise" (Psa 113:1; 1 Chron 16:4), כבד "glorify" (Isa 24:15), אהב "love" (Isa 56:6; Deut 6:5), בטח "trust" (Isa 50:10; Psa 4:5), חסה "seek refuge" (Zeph 3:12; 2 Sam 22:31). On the contrary the verbs prohibiting transgressing God's name include: נקב "blaspheme" (Lev 24:11; 2 Kgs 19:6), חלל "profane" (Lev 18:21; 20:3), נקב "curse" (Lev 24:11; Psa 74:10,18), טמא "defile" (Eze 43:8), and בזה "regard with contempt" (Mal 1:7). The stronger emphasis on affirmative actions towards the divine appellative is indicative of God's expectation from His people in their relation to Him. See Deepati Vera Prasad, "Šem YHWH and it Being Taken in Vain in Exo 20:7," PhD Diss., (Adventist International Institute of Advanced Studies, Silang, Cavite, 2010), 144,145,164,165.

22 The expression ליהוה קרשׁ is used sixteen times in scripture referring to the sabbath (Exo 16:23; 31:15), High Priest (Exo 28:36; 39:30); house dedicated to God (Lev 27:14), land sold at Jubilee (Lev 21:21, 23), tithe (27:30,32), Israel (Deut 26:19; Ezra 8:28); vessels and offerings to God (Ezra 8:28; Zec 14:21), spoils of Tyre (Jer 23:18), devastation of Jerusalem (Jer 31:40), Levite's possession (Eze 48:14). In scripture the Sabbath, tithe, God's people, the High Priest, among others, are demarked as ליהוה קרשׁ "holy to the Lord." In Deut 26:18,19 God promises to make for Israel ולשׁם "a name," עם־קרשׁ "holy people," as well as praise and honor, providing that they are obedient to His commands. This seems as periphrastic way of telling Israel that He wants them to bear His קרשׁ שׁם "holy name" (cf. Exo 19:6) and participate in His divine prerogatives of honor and praise. This implies that Israel in being holy, Israel epitomizes the very name of God.

A closer look at the syntactical microstructure of Ezekiel 36:17-38[23] further explicates the central axiom of Ezekiel 36. The preponderance of the qatal forms[24] over the wayyiqtol[25] suggests that the author is merely providing background details relative to the thrust of the theme.[26] The qatal and wayyiqtol forms in Ezekiel 36:17-38 syntactically can denote actions that are either, or altogether stative, sequential, or even consequential.[27] All of these nuances though different are not necessarily mutually exclusive to the other. The use of the Pi'ēl יטמאו "defile" (vs 17), טמאוה (vs 18), ויחללו "profane/ defile" (vs 20), חללוהו (vs 21), חללתם (vs 22), and חללתם (vs 23), describes the frequentative aspect of Israel's profanity, as well as the facticity of the state incurred as result of actions.[28] In order words, Israel's actions were both habituated and also emanated from inherent disposition (Eze 36:17, 20).[29]

On the contrary the use of the wayyiqtol forms in reference to God's activity appears to be emphasizing the consequential aspect of God's wrath and pity

23 Ibid., 196. The temporal modifier וַיְהִי (36:16) often marks the recollection of past events, as well as the beginning an independent narrative unit. For more uses on the verb וַיְהִי B eginning narrative unit see Eze 25:1;26:1;30:1;31:1:32:1;34:1;35:1

24 Examples of the qatal forms in Eze 36 are: הָיָה (vs17), שָׁפַךְ "to pour," טמא "to defile" (vs 18), שׁפט "judge" (vs 19) בוא "to enter/go" (vs 20), חלל "to profane" (vs 21), נחך "to give" (vs 28), בנה "to build," נטע "to plant" (vs 36). See John H. Dobson, *Learn Biblical Hebrew* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1999), 45; see also Practico and Van Pelt, *Basics of Biblical Hebrew*, 129. For usages of the Qal see Eze 36:17-22,28,33-37, and the Pi'ēl see 36:17,18,20-23,36. The perfect is used eight times in the first person, twice as second person and seventeen as third person. The Qal and Pi'ēl occupy the predominant usage (19x and 7x respectively), with the Niphal and Hiphil being used once.

25 Some of the wayyiqtol forms in Exe 36 include: טמא (vs 17), שׁפך (vs 18), פוץ "to scatter," זרה "to scatter" (vs 19), חמל "to spare" (vs 21). See, Oliver Niccacci, *The Syntax of the Verb in the Classical Hebrew Prose*, trans. by W.G.E. Watson (Sheffiedl: Sheffield Academic Press, 1990), 35-45; see also D. Practico and Miles V. Van Pelt, *Basics of Biblical Hebrew: Grammar* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001), 129. The lexical range of the future can incorporate the aorist, perfect, pluperfect, and futuristic perfect tenses.

26 D. Practico and Miles V. Van Pelt, *Basics of Biblical Hebrew: Grammar* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001), 129. The lexical range of the future can incorporate the aorist, perfect, pluperfect, and futuristic perfect tenses; see also Bill T. Arnold and John H. Choi, *A Guide to Biblical Hebrew Syntax* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2003), 85, 86.

27 Ibid., 55,84-86. In a sense Israel's action of going into captivity fits the cognomen of proleptic future, having not yet occurred, yet, its fulfillment is certain (v 20).

28 For more on stative and fientive verbs, see John Lyons, *Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1968), 350.

29 Arnold and Choi, *A Guide to Biblical Hebrew Syntax*, 44,45.

on His name (see 36:18,19,21,23).[30] His actions stemmed from a logical consequence of Israel's frequent recalcitrance, and not as a constitutive part of His being.[31] Israel's profanation apart from being frequentative,[32] it had immense consequence upon God's name, the land and other nations.[33] Thus in sanctifying His name God shows a commitment to His covenantal fidelity, the spiritual wellbeing of His people, and witness of the nations.

Whereas the provenance and fruition of the action indicated by qatal and wayyiqtol are predominantly past, the effects may perpetuate axiomatically as a state of being, becoming the inevitable terminus of actions.[34] Thus, by implication God's act of pouring out His wrath and scattering was upon the totality of an "enduring act"[35] which threatened His sovereignty in the world. Whilst the second and third person plural is used most cases to refer Israel's profanity (except in 36:35 where ישב is used in reference to the city being rebuilt);[36] the first person is used only in reference to God's actions of judging, giving land, planting back the desolate, speaking, pouring out His wrath, scattering Israel, and having pity on His name.[37] God's actions here are not only punitory, but also palliative-the end is restorative. Interestingly God is engaged in seven activities/actions, indicative of the completeness or totality of His involvement in restoring the status of His people, the nations, the land, and by implications His name.[38]

30 Ibid., 88.

31 The only exception is the usage of the Hiphil and niphal to refer to His scattering of Israel (Eze 36:20). The Hiphil often takes takes a double object one that is the causative object and other the object of the verbal idea, in Eze 36:19 it seems reasonable to assume that whereas Israel sin might have precipitated God's action, the true object of the verbal idea is that of the nations (cf. Arnold and Choi, *A Guide to Biblical Hebrew Syntax*, 39,40, 49,50).

32 Ibid., 44,45; Waltke and O'Connor, *An Introduction to Biblical Syntax*, 363,364.

33 Ibid

34 John Adam, *Studies in the Hebrew Text* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1908), 50-54.

35 J.D. Wignkoop, *Manual of Hebrew Syntax*, trans. form the Dutch by C. Van Den Biesen (London: Luzac, 1897), 38.

36 See Eze 36:17,18,19, 20,21,35

37 See Eze 36:18,19,21,28,36

38 The use of the Hiphil ופאי, based on Qal transitive takes a double object one that is the causative object and other the object of the verbal idea, in Eze 36:19 it seems reasonable to assume that whereas Israel's sin might have precipitated God's action, the true object of the verbal idea is that of the nations

Unlike the qatal and wayyiqtol forms, the yiqtol[39] and weqatal[40] occurs forty times in Eze 36:17-38 (14 and 26 times respectively).[41] In these, twenty-two times in the first person God speaks to Israel, nine times Israel is referred to in the second person, and four times in the third person to the land and nations respectively. The frequency of God as the subject in first person in comparison to the second and third persons suggest that there is stronger focus on the action of the doer that on what is expected from beneficiaries of God's actions. Furthermore, the usage of the yiqtol forms is typical when the emphasis is placed on the doer.[42] The action to be performed is regarded as either future, customary, progressive, or even contingent.[43] This implies that God's actions of cleansing His people (36:25), giving a new heart (36:26) and Israel's walking in His statutes (36:27), are to be understood as events that are both future and circumstantial.[44] It can further be extrapolated that the materializing of what God does on behalf of His name, while a guarantee, it is subject to certain conditions being fulfilled.

The weqatal forms not only typifies actions that are sequential and consequential, but also, those that are apodictic,[45] emphatic, imperatival,[46] and prophetic.[47] Thus, the proclamation by God of sprinkling clean water, and cleansing His people (36:25), removing their heart of stone (36:26), saving, and multiplying (36:29), while futuristic, its certitude is absolute. Moreover, the preponderance at which the first person in used relative to the actions

39 Some of the yiqtol forms used include: טהר "to cleanse" (vs 25), נתן "to give" (vv 26,29), חלך "to walk" (vs 27), לקח "to take" (vs 30), ידע "to know" (vs 32), עבד "to work" (vs 34), שׁאר "to be left" (vs 36), דרשׁ "to seek" (vs 36), רבה "to multiply" (vs 37)

40 The following are some of the weqatal forms used: קדשׁ "to be holy" (vs 23), ידע "to know" (vs 24), זרק "to sprinkle," טהר to be clean," (vs 25), סור "to take away" (vs 26), עשׂה "to do" (vs 27), ישׁב "to dwell" (vs 28), ישׁע "to save," קרא "to call," רבה "to multiply" (vs 29), זכר "to remember," קוט "to feel disgust" (vs 31)

41 Oftentimes in Hebrew in the narration of a series of future events, the imperfect tense is used initially followed by the perfect tense prefixed by the waw conversive, see E. Kautzsch (ed), *Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar*, trans. by A. E. Cowley (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 132,133

42 Jacob Winegreen, *A Practical Grammar for Classical Hebrew* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 75,76.

43 Arnold and Choi, *A Guide to Biblical Hebrew Syntax*, 58,59

44 Ibid., 56-59, 88,89

45 Ibid., 88,89.

46 Niccacci, *The Syntax of the Verb in the Classical Hebrew Prose*, 82,83.

47 S.R. Driver, *A Treatise on the Use of the Tenses in the Hebrew: And Some other Syntactical Questions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 116.

of God, and in comparison to what is expected from Israel and the nations, suggest that God is doing far more comparatively for His people than what was done in the profanation of His name. The table beneath further illustrates this.

First Person	Second Person	Third Person
I will sanctify… (vs 23) I will take you from… (vs 24) I will gather together… I will bring… I will sprinkle …(vs 25) I will cleanse… I will give a new heart (vs 26) I will give my spirit I will take away away the heart of stone I will give a heart of flesh I will do this…(vs 27) I will be your God (vs 28) I will save (vs 29) I will not give famine I will call to the grain I will multiply the grain I will multiply the fruit of the tree (vs 30) I will cause to be inhabited (vs 33) I will do it (vs 36) I will be sought (vs 37) I will multiply	You will be clean (vs25) You will keep my Judgments (vs27) You will walk in my statues You will do my ordinances You will dwell in the land (vs 28) You will be my people You will remember your former ways You will be regretful You will not receive any reproach (vs30)	The land shall be tilled (32) The waste cities shall be rebuilt (vs33) The waste cities shall be filled (vs34) The nations will know (vs23) They will say (vs 35) They will a know (vs 36) They will know (38)

In column 1 the first person is used seven times in the yiqtol, and fifteen in the weqatal. The regnant usage of the weqatal forms as was mentioned is indicative of the consequential and apodictic basis upon which the actions of God are based.[48] This means, that whereas God promises to sanctify His name, to change the status of His people, and restore the land, its fulfillment though certain on His part, yet its reality is contingent upon the actions of the people. The second column enumerates God's desire for His people, which is predicated on what He promises (column 1). The incidence of the weqatal

48 Niccacci, *The Syntax of the Verb in the Classical Hebrew Prose*, 59, 89,90,94.

forms serves to consolidate the apodictic tenor of the divine dictum, while still affirming its consequentiality. Finally, the usage of the weqatal in the third person referring to the land and the nations suggest that its fulfillment is dependent both upon Israel's faithfulness, and God's commitment to His promises. Although sanctifying His name, the result benefits His people, the nations and the land. Thus, His act of sanctifying His name is more for the benefit of restoring, than merely affirming His identity.

Theological Application & Conclusion

Holiness as is shown in Ezekiel 36 is all about God's reversal of the havoc wrought by the sins of His people upon themselves, the land, and the nations. Holiness therefore, is highlighted as the redemptive and restorative aspects of God. The act of sanctifying His name is not an attempt by God to affirm His identity, but rather, its a restoration of His character in the lives of His people, the redemption of His creation, and clarification of His persona to the nations.

For instance, in Exo 20:7 Moses ask God for His name (מה־שמו),[49] having been given ample evidences that God was the one speaking to Him.[50] The use of the interrogative pronoun מה with שם in the question of Moses appears to be an idiomatic expression meant to highlight "circumstances rather than the person."[51] The Israelites no doubt had a cognitive knowledge of God, however, haven't spent over four hundred years in Egypt,[52] they needed to

49 see Vera Prasad, "Šem YHWH and it Being Taken in Vain in Exo 20:7," 69-75.

50 The evidences suggest that Moses was not asking God for a mere name to be called, first, God introduced Himself to Moses as the "God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob" (Exo 3:6); second, the buring bush was indicative of a theophanic manifestation (3:2); thirdly, the verb קרב "draw near" used with the negative particle אל (3:5) is used repeatedly in the context of the people drawing near to YWHW or His presence (see Exo 16:9; 40:32; Lev 9:5,7,8; 16:1; Num 18:22; Deut 5:23,27), finally, Moses was assured that the ground upon which he was standing was אדמת־קדש "holy ground"

51 Bruce K. Waltke and Michael P. O'Connor, *An Introduction to Biblical Syntax* (Winoa Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 320

52 The Exodus experience parallels in many ways the present experience of the Israelites in Babylon who probably was asking the same questions of their predecessors- what is the name of this God who promise our forefathers that He will protect them? In Eze 20:9,14 God reminded Israel that they were delivered from Egypt and brought into the promised land in spite of their reproach and absolute disregard to the name of God (20:21,22), yet for the sake of His name He fulfilled His promise. Having failed to learn from the past Israel now finds herself destitute and helpless as captives in Babylon, and God is about to perform another stupendous act again for the sake His holy name. As in the other instances, God's

be assured of God's "essential quality and nature."[53] Moses' question focalize on whether the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob had the adeptness and rectitude to deliver Israel from Egypt after allowing them to remain so long in subjection.[54] Most importantly, it was aimed at explicating the condition of Israelites[55] and Egyptians.[56]

Also, in Gen 32:28 God ask Jacob his name not due to ignorance, but rather to accentuate the new status in his relationship with God (Gen 32:30).[57] Finally, in Isa 7:14 the Messiah is prophesied called Immanuel "God with Us," however, the New Testament He is called "Jesus" (Matt 1:20-21). It seems Isaiah was concerned with the life and mission of the Messiah-one who is to reveal the character/name of God (John 17:6).[58] A similar parallel is at work in Ezekiel 36, God is about to reveal who He is, through His act of redemption.

In Eze 36:17-38, holiness is not presented within the nominal connotation of "otherness," rather, it entails a sustainable relationship between God and His creation.[59] God's concern for His relationship with His people, the nations, and even the land resonates as the central focus of Ezekiel 36. Through sanctifying His name, God reasserts His enduring covenantal faithfulness and the certainty of His promises, while equally emphasizing the conditionality of its actualization in the lives of his people. The notion that God unconditionally bestows covenantal benefits to people, without any regard to their covenantal obligation, is disputed in Ezekiel 36.

The definitive message therefore of Ezekiel 36:17-38 revolves around God's unwavering commitment to salvation, in spite of Israel's incessant perversity and noncompliance. Just as He demonstrated His mercy in their Egyptian bondage and during the wilderness sojourn on account of His holy name, God was again about to demonstrate that His dealings with man is never

action was elicited as result of spiritual destitution of His people.

53 Ferederick B. Meyer, Devotional Commentary on Exodus (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1978), 51

54 Vera Prasad, "Šem YHWH and it Being Taken in Vain in Exo 20:7," 75.

55 Ibid., 74; see also Arthur W. Pink, Gleanings in Exodus (Chicago, IL: Moody, 1952), 29.

56 see John I. Durham, Exodus, WBC, vol. 3 (Dallas, TX: Word, 1987), 38.

57 Gordon J. Wenham, *Genesis 16-50*, WBC, vol. 2 (Dallas, TX: Word, 1994), 296; see also Herbert C. Leupold, *Expostion of Genesis* [Leupold on the Old Testament] (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1942), 2:878

58 Rober Kyser, John, *Augsburg Commentary on the New Testament* (Minneaplis, MN: Augsburg, 1986), 256.

59 Ida Glaser, "The Concept of Relationship as a Key to the Comparative Understanding of Christianity and Islam," *Themelios* 11/2 (1986): 57 (57-60).

dependent on human worthiness, but rather on His commitment to the restoration of His image in fallen man and the witness to the nations of His sovereignty. God's sanctifying of His name thus is an attempt to salvage any possibility of the nations being saved, as well as His people being reinstated into covenant relationship.

William Blackstone and the natural law tradition

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Opsomming

William Blackstone en die natuurregtradisie

Die Engelse regskrywer, William Blackstone, veral bekend om sy werk Commentaries on the laws of England, het 'n groot invloed op die regsdenke (en -praktyk) van die Verenigde State van Amerika, Engeland en Suid-Afrika uitgeoefen. Onderliggend tot sy regsdenke en regsistematiek figureer 'n eksplisiete natuurregsbeskouing wat sy standpunte oor regte, regsnorme en die beginsels van die publiekreg onderlê. Blackstone se regsdenke gryp terug op twee onderskeie tradisies van die natuurreg in die Westerse regsteorie: enersyds die "revolusionêre" natuurregstandpunte van Thomas Hobbes en John Locke; andersyds die metafisiese begronding van natuurregnorme in die natuurregtradisie vanaf Heraclitus tot en met Thomas Aquinas. Alhoewel verskeie punte van immanente kritiek teen Blackstone se benadering tot die natuurstaat, die sosiale kontrak en die rol van die geïsoleerde individu in die regslewe gestel kan word, moet aspekte van sy benadering tot formele regstaatlikheid as belangrike winspunte vir die Engelse common law-tradisie aangemerk word.

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1. Introduction

William Blackstone's *Commentaries on the laws of England* is credited with systemizing the English common law[3] and by organizing the mass of common law precepts and practices according to a system of rights derived from natural law.[4] His work enjoyed immediate popularity, and his conception of rights continued to give guidance to courts in Britain, the United States, Europe, and South Africa.[5]

Blackstone's theory of natural law is foundational for his views on rights, justice and the principles of public law. Therefore, an appreciation of Blackstone's theory of rights and justice demands a deeper investigation of his views on and his position in the natural law tradition of Western legal philosophy.[6] Concepts like right, justice and liberty in Blackstone's views on public law can, therefore, only be studied meaningfully from the basis of his natural law theory.

3 Sir William Blackstone's (1723-1780) four volumes *Commentaries on the laws of England* assured him a place in history as one of the greatest scholars of English common law. Cf. http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?Itemid=269&id=320&option=com... (accessed 2010/04/08).

4 For the structure of Blackstone's *Commentaries* cf. Kennedy, "The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries", 28 *Buffalo Law Review*, 205 (1979). Blackstone is credited for the first unprecedented attempt to interpret and codify English common law (Delahunt, "Sir William Blackstone, legal commentator", http://historicalbiographies.suite101.com/article.cfm/thehonourable_william_blackst... (accessed 2010/04/14) at 3. Also cf. Brainard, "18th Century history" http://www.history1700s.com/articles/article1121.shtml at 1 (accessed 2010/04/08).

5 Cf. Nydham & Raath, "Celebrating the common law rights of man – a note on Blackstone's work on natural law and natural rights", 119-133. His clear, lucid style and completeness of his work made his lectures and later writings important sources of the English common law. His *Commentaries* served as a primary instruction toll in England and America well into the nineteenth century and exerted a pronounced influence on the development of the American legal tradition. For Blackstone's influence on the American legal system cf. Schmidt, "Blackstone's View of Natural Law and Its Influence on the Formation of the American Declaration of Independence and the Constitution" at http://www.sullivan-county.com/deism/blackstone.htm (accessed 2010/04/08) and Blackstone Institute, "Bashing Blackstone: The reconstructionists' attack in America's culture war" at http://www.blackstoneinstitute.org/sirwilliamblackstone.html (accessed 2010/04/08). Wortley observes: "The spread of the common law in America was undoubtedly aided by the publication in 1765-9 of Blackstone's *Commentaries*, just as the draftsmen of the Constitution of the U.S.A. found great help from John Locke's philosophical treatises" (*Jurisprudence*, at 39).

6 In opposition to Alschuler, "Rediscovering Blackstone", *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, 145(1), November 1996:1-55, at 54: "Nothing in William Blackstone's writings ... proposed 'deducing' anything at all from the principles of natural law' and "perhaps Blackstone's description of natural law was merely a pleasing fiction ..."

In spite of the novelties in Blackstone's natural law views, the continuity in his natural law pronouncements can to a large measure be explained from the strands of natural law in the English common law tradition prior to Blackstone – particularly the Judeo-Christian undertones in Blackstone's views dating back to Bracton and Coke. The supremacy of natural law was solidly embedded in English common law by the time Blackstone's *Commentaries* were compiled. Already in 1610 Sir Edward Coke in *Bonham's Case* upheld the general principle that statutes are void if they do not conform to natural law. It is therefore not surprising that Sir William Blackstone in the following century laid down explicitly that "the law of nature being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself," is superior in obligation to any other law.; that it is binding "over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times" and that "no human laws are of any validity if contrary to this; and so much of them as are valid derive all their force and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original (law)".[7] Blackstone's contribution to natural law philosophy, however, strengthened natural law ideas inimical to arbitrary power, unlimited governmental prerogatives and opposed to the rugged individualism following in the wake of John Locke's views on the isolated individual and the upcoming *Zeitgeist* of sensualism and positivism. Blackstone's contribution to natural law philosophy, is, therefore, of importance not only for understanding his legal theory but also for appreciating the development of formal and material elements of the idea of the state subject to law in the English Common Law.

2. Blackstone's position in natural law theory

2.1 Natural law theory in Western legal philosophy prior to Blackstone

2.1.1 Hobbes' and Locke's conceptions of natural law

The origin and progress of natural law doctrine in Western legal thought point towards a divergence in the idea of a system of law, universal in its application, immutable in its content and rational in its essence and fundamental structure. One stream of natural law thought proceeded along the lines of a revolutionary and individualistic natural law essentially bound up with the basic doctrine of the state of nature as well as with the concept of the state as a social unit based on free contract, constructed arbitrarily and artificially, determined by utility and isolated from metaphysical considerations.

7 1 Comm., 41.

The sharpest deviation from the divine basis of law occurred in Thomas Hobbes' alteration of the words "nature" and "natural", to become the opposite of *civitas*, "reason" and "order". In the philosophy of Hobbes human nature is basically governed by the passions and not by reason. The *status naturalis* is a condition without any obligation or duty – it is a state in which might is right.[8] Hobbes explicitly denies that man has a natural inclination toward help and love – notions which St. Thomas Aquinas frequently mentions. Law does not derive from human nature but is the work of the sovereign maker of the law. The state and its law originate from the absolute will of the sovereign; it affords security and protection by monopolizing all power.[9] It demands strict obedience and subordination through identification of natural law with the positive law of the state. Consequently the state becomes, according to Hobbes, the "Mortal God" which directs all human private and public affairs.[10]

The tension between legal norms and rights in Hobbes' theory has important implications: Firstly, utility alone and in particular the fear of evil (as stated by Hobbes), does not impart force to an agreement; this kind of restriction is insufficient for the powerful who have nothing to fear from the weak. Secondly, Hobbes' views on law, right and duty ultimately undermine (and negate) the intrinsic nature of right: if rights (R) exists prior to violated rights (R1), and if violated right (R1) is what forms fault, and if force (F) can be overcome only by a greater force (F1), R (=F1) can only be violated by a greater right (R2); R2 = F1 = R, which in effect means that R would never be violated.

John Locke's individualist social philosophy followed Hobbes, though he rejected Hobbes' divination of the state as the "Mortal God"; he denied that the Leviathan is the exclusive source of law and he sought means to overcome Hobbes' views on force and right (R2 = F1 = R) by binding the state to more basic structure of law and rights.[11]

8 Cf. Mariàs, *History of philosophy*, 252.

9 In *De cive*, VI, 18, Hobbes describes absolute power as the power of "one man, or council, or court, who by right hath as great a power over each single citizen, as each man hath over himself considered out of that civil state; that is, supreme and absolute ... For if this power were limited, that limitation must necessarily proceed from some greater power than he who is confined by them."

10 Cf. *Leviathan*, Ii, 17: "This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that *Mortal God*, to which wee owe under the *Immortal God*, our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie, give him by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is inabled to forme the wills of them all ..."

11 To Locke, absolute monarchy is "no form of civil government at all: (*Second treatise of civil government*, par 90).

Although Locke, different to Hobbes, depicts the state of nature as idyllic, as a condition of peace, good will and mutual assistance, he also contends that state government is indispensible. For Locke the function of the state of nature and of the idea of natural law is to establish the inalienable rights of the individual. These innate rights of individuals afford an ultimate criterion for judging all acts of government and all laws of the state – the rights to life, liberty and property make the law; the law does not create them.[12] However, Locke's conception of the legislative power hews to Hobbes' approach to legal norms: the supreme and original law-forming power within the state is supposedly bound only to natural law; every specific legal power – also in the private spheres of law – is derived from it. Hence Locke observes: "Nor can any edict of anybody else, in what form so ever conceived, nor by what power so ever be backed, have the force and obligation of law which has not its sanction from the legislative which the public has chosen and appointed."[13] He does, however, introduce the limitation that there still remains in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative power, when the people find the legislative act contrary "to the trust reposed in them".[14]

Because of Locke's profound individualism the legal order arises from contracts between individuals, who are induced by their rather selfish interests to enter into these contractual relationships, cloaked in the solemn and venerable language of the traditional philosophy of natural law.[15] The characteristic tone of individualism and its related preponderance of commutative justice and of self-interest over distributive justice and the common good was the logical outcome of the revolutionary individualist trend in natural law philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

12 The sequence of Locke's reasoning seems to be: The law of nature is the decree of the divine will discernibly by the light of nature and indicating what is and what is not in conformity with man's rational nature, and for this very reason commanding or prohibiting; the natural rights of man take their origin from the law of nature; the natural rights are the origins of all manmade laws. In his *Essays on the law of nature*, Locke observes that it is clear that all the requisites of a law are found in natural law. For, in the first place, it is the decree of a superior will, wherein the formal cause of law appears to consist; secondly, it lays down what is and what is not to be done, which is the proper function of a law (113).

13 *Second Treatise*, VI, 134.

14 *Second Treatise*, XIII, 149.

15 Cf. Rommen, *The natural law. A study in legal and social history and philosophy*, 89.

2.1.2 Metaphysically grounded theories of natural law

2.1.2.1 Ancient Greek and Roman conceptions of natural law

The second stream of natural law thought is represented by the more conservative idea of natural law grounded in metaphysical reality, it rejects the idea of a mythical state of nature and takes its origin from God as the supreme Lawgiver and the grounding of the jural duties of the human person in a divine metaphysical order. This line of thinking was already manifest in Heraclitus of Ephesus' (cir. 536-470 B.C.) views on a fundamental and eternal law of harmony, which exists unchanged amid the continual variation of phenomena: not chance, lawlessness, or irrational change, but a fundamental law, a divine *logos*,[16] a universal reason holds sway and guides the processes of nature.[17] The primordial norm of moral being and conduct emanates from a divine mind and all human laws are fed by one divine law.[18] At the basis of Heraclitus' philosophy there is the idea of an eternal law of nature that corresponds to man's reason as sharing in the eternal *logos*.[19] There is a natural, unchangeable law, rationally perceivable, from which all human laws draw their force – not the whims and fancies and fickleness of the uncertain masses, but the eternal law of nature has binding force and validity.[20]

In Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy of law the idea of a universal, immutable and rationally perceivable system of natural law precepts manifests even stronger. In Plato's *Laws* the constitutive force of natural law norms is explained by the Athenian: "When there has been a contest for power, those who gain the upper hand so entirely monopolize the government as to refuse all share to the defeated party and their descendents ... Now, according to our view, such governments are not polities at all, nor are laws rights which are passed for the good of particular classes and not for the good of the whole

16 Cf. Vollenhoven, *Geschiedenis der wijsbegeerte*, 76.

17 A double harmony: "harmoniè aphanès" and "harmoniè phanarè".

18 Heraclitus states: "Wisdom is the foremost virtue, and wisdom consists in speaking the truth, and in lending an ear to nature and acting according to her. Wisdom is common to all ... They who would speak with intelligence must hold fast to the [wisdom] that is common to all, a city holds fast to its laws, and even more strongly. For all human laws are fed by one divine law (Fragments 112-114, in Bakewell, *Source book in ancient philosophy*, 34.

19 To Heraclitus "all human laws are sustained by one divine law, which is infinitely strong, and suffices, and more than suffices, for them all" (in Baker, *The political thought of Plato and Aristotle*, 23).

20 Rommen, *The natural law*, 6.

state. States which have such laws are not polities but parties and their notions of justice are simply unmeaning."[21]

All human positive law should reflect the true natural law: law that serves the common weal. There is a marked difference between the true and proper natural law and human positive law; natural law sets the standards of justice for positive law. Whereas natural law is the true law, true right and remains the same, positive law change and may claim legal force only in so far as it partake of natural law.[22]

In Aristotle's legal theory the differences between natural law and positive law are even more distinct: natural law has its source in the essence of the just in nature; positive law originates in the will of the lawmaker or in an act of an assembly. That which is naturally rights is unalterable; it has everywhere the same force, quite apart from any positive law that may embody it.[23] Statutory law varies with every people and changes with the times. The application of the universal idea of justice to the variable circumstances of life demands that natural law has to be concretized *in* the changing and mutable positive law. Natural law maintains its binding force for positive law and its ethically grounded norm. Because positive law is variable and imperfect equity has to be applied to ensure justice is particular circumstances.[24]

Cicero grounded jural duties and rights on natural law and thus prepared the way for the Christian approaches to these concepts. Cicero appealed to the Stoic emphasis on right reason and the universal law of nature, which holds sway throughout the universe.[25] To Cicero the *lex nata* (the law within us) is the foundation of law in general; natural law is identical with right reason, it is universally valid, un-

21 Plato, *Laws*, IV, 715.

22 The conflict between man's duties to human laws and the duties owing to the law of God surfaced in Greek literature e.g. the *Antigone* of Sophocles (cf. Sabine & Thorston, *A history of political theory* (1973)).

23 Aristotle in his *Ethics*, V, 7, distinguishes between natural and conventional justice: "It is natural when it has the same validity everywhere and is unaffected by any view we may take about the justice of it. It is conventional when there is no original reason why it should take one form rather than another and the rule it imposes is reached by agreement, after which it holds good."

24 Cf. Barker, *The political thought of Plato and Aristotle*, 327f.

25 No person shall be allowed for the sake of his own advantage to injure his neighbour; this principle follows directly from Reason which is in Nature, "which is the laws of gods and men" (*De officiis*, III, 291).

changeable and incapable of being abrogated; it is the eternal law.[26] Cicero motivates the immutable and universally validity of natural law as follows: "If the principle of Justice were founded on the decrees of peoples, the edicts of princes, or the decisions of judges, then Justice would sanction robbery and adultery and forgery of wills, in case these acts were approved by the votes or decrees of the populace. But is so great a power belongs to the decisions and decrees of fools that the laws of nature can be changed by their votes, then why do they not ordain that which is bad and baneful shall be considered good or salutary? Or, if a law can make Justice out of Injustice, can it also make good out of bad? But in fact we can perceive the difference between good laws and bad by referring them to no other standard than Nature: indeed, it is not merely Justice and Injustice which are distinguishable by Nature, but also and without exception things which are honourable and dishonourable." Cicero adds: "For since an intelligence common to us all makes things known to us and formulates them in our minds, honourable actions are ascribed by us to virtue, and dishonourable actions to vice; and only a madman would conclude that these judgments are matters of opinion, and not fixed by Nature."[27] The pattern in Cicero's thought is the contrast of the law of nature, as the measure and inner source of validity with positive law, which, to him, is merely a shadow and image of the true law.[28]

The idea of a fundamental divine orderliness underlying all manifestations of law, received its first comprehensive treatment in the legal philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Thomas' treatment of law in general proceeds from the perspective that God's providential government of the world reflects a deeper structure of and a fundamental basis for all other manifestations of law.[29] The idea of law takes its roots from the principles by which God made and governs the universe.[30] The whole universe reflects a divine order and provi-

26 Justice binds all human society and is based on one law, namely right reason (*De legibus*, I, 345).

27 *Laws*, I, xvi & I, x, xvii ff.

28 In *The republic*, III, xxii, Cicero stresses the fact that true law is right reason in agreement with nature.

29 Cf. *ST*., I-II, Question 91, Article 1.

30 The eternal law is identical with the reason of God; it is the eternal plan of divine wisdom by which the whole creation is ordered. Although this law is beyond human comprehension, it is not contrary to human reason.

dence as it is in the mind of God Himself.[31] Although the human mind with its limited capacities cannot know the eternal law as it is in the mind of God Himself, God has offered us two reflections from which the orderly and providential government of God's works can be made known: natural law and divine law.[32]

In St. Thomas' synthesis of biblical truths with ancient natural law theory, he also grounds his natural law views and its accompanying duties in the "architecture" of universal law – the order of which all of the various categories and dimensions of law fit together, beginning with their origin in God, reaching all the way down to man.

In St. Thomas' biblically grounded natural law theory, eternal law as it is in the mind of God Himself is the apex of all law. The natural law and the divine law are the respective manifestations of the eternal law. Natural law is the reflection of eternal law in the created rational mind, whilst divine law is the reflection of eternal law in special revelation. Both natural law and divine law flow down to human law, which includes both written law and the "unwritten law" of sound custom.[33]

Natural law needs and must be supplemented by human law – the human laws are themselves derived from the natural law either by way of specific determinations of a general rule or of conclusions from indemonstrable principles (e.g. from the general principle that one should refrain from harming others, reason infers that one should not murder, steal, or commit adultery).[34]

To St. Thomas the natural law is a reflection of a deeper orderliness permeating the whole of creation. This orderliness is an imprint of the divine light on the human being and forms the basis of man's rational nature participating in the eternal law.[35] The natural law is a general revelation in the deeper structures of the created human intellect, that which can also be called the "deep conscience" of the human

31 St. Thomas relies on Proverbs 8:23.

32 Natural law is a reflection of divine reason in created things; divine law is revelation. To St. Thomas reason and faith is consolidated into one harmonious structure. Cf. *ST*., I-II, Question 93, Article 2.

33 St. Thomas' four kinds of law are four norms of reason, manifesting themselves at four levels of cosmic reality, but remaining one reason throughout.

34 *ST*., I-II, Question 95 a. 1-2; Question 91 a. 2.

35 *ST*., I-II, Question 91, Article 2.

person. The imprint of divine law on the deeper conscience of man St. Paul calls "the law written on our hearts".[36] This imprint on the innermost selves of human persons is the foundation of everything the human person knows about right and wrong. To the measure that the human person is a rational creature, it has a share of the eternal Reason and this participation is called the natural law.[37]

St. Thomas furthermore distinguishes between various levels, or grades, of natural law precepts. First level precepts are completely transparent; second level precepts are slightly less transparent, and third level precepts are rather difficult. For the reason, St. Thomas Explains, second and third level precepts are also promulgated in the Law of Moses.[38]

Besides the natural and the human law in St. Thomas' theory of law, it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a divine law. St. Thomas mentions four reasons for this: firstly, besides the natural and the human law, man should be directed towards his end by a law given by God; secondly, it is necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err; thirdly, human law cannot sufficiently curb and direct interior acts, and, therefore, it is necessary for this purpose that a divine law should supervene, and fourthly, in order that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished, it is necessary for the divine law to supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden.

2.2 Blackstone's views on natural law and the deeper structure of law in the universe

2.2.1 Blackstone's treatment of the divine source of law

Most post-medieval legal theories are indebted to St. Thomas' structural treatment of natural law and its relatedness to other normative expressions

36 Romans 2:14-15.

37 *ST*., I-II, Question 91, Article 2.

38 *ST*., I-II, Question 100, Article 11. Compare Article 1: "For there are certain things which the natural reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges to be done or not to be done: e.g. 'honor thy father and thy mother', and 'Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal': and these belong to the law of nature absolutely. And there are certain things which, after a more careful consideration, wise men deem obligatory. Such belong to the law of nature, yet so that they need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching the less wise: e.g. 'Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of aged men', and the like. And there are some things, to judge of which human reason needs Divine instruction, whereby we are taught about the things of God: e.g. 'Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything; Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.'"

of law. Blackstone's theory of law is no exception. He also incorporates the main distinctions of divine, natural and positive (or municipal) law into his theory of law. He substitutes Thomas' idea of the Eternal Law for a broad perspective of the divine providence guiding the universe towards its ultimate end.

Although Blackstone nowhere specifically mentions the Eternal Law as God's providential government of the world, his treatment of the natural law and divine law both reflect a deeper and more basic divine source from which all law and jural obligations spring. Such a deeper law has parallels with St. Thomas' treatment of the Eternal Law underlying all other normative expressions of law in the universe. To Blackstone God's providential government of the universe is an encompassing whole. The human faculties and powers are all "spectators" in the works of God's divine providence – also the human ability to know and interpret God's physical and moral universe.[39] Through God's providential government of the world he established the law of nature; in His infinite wisdom He laid down only such laws as were founded in those relations of justice that existed in the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept of law.[40] God also provided human beings with rational abilities to know the precepts of divine law; God also gave human beings the ability to apply the precepts of natural law to the practical circumstances of daily life.[41]

2.2.2 Blackstone's theory of natural law

2.2.2.1 The law of nature

To understand Blackstone's use of natural law ideas to structure and justify his rights system, it is useful to know the substance of his theory.[42] Although Blackstone's work is far from a theological or philosophical treatise, he does premise his interaction with the laws of England with a thorough theoretical introduction. In this introduction, which he designates *Of the nature of laws in general*, he lays out his conception of the various types of law, their source, their proper aims, the ways they are known, and how they relate to each other.[43]

39 1 Comm., 10.

40 1 Comm., 40.

41 Cf. 1 Comm., 10.

42 Some scholars argue that his appeals to natural law are superficial custom, but are still helpful to know what he says he believes before denying that he actually holds to those beliefs. For the purposes of this discussion, Blackstone will be taken at his word with regard to his philosophical framework.

43 Blackstone's *Commentaries* proposed to lay down a general and comprehensive plan of the laws of England; to deduce their history; to enforce and illustrate their leading rules and fundamental principles; and to compare them with the laws of nature and other nations (cf.

In each of these categories, Blackstone demonstrates continuity with the traditional natural law theory of his time.[44]

Blackstone opens his discussion of law in the same manner he approaches the whole of the common law later in his work, moving from the general to the specific. He begins with a definition of law in its broadest sense, defining it as a "rule of action which is prescribed by some superior and which the inferior is bound to obey".[45] Still speaking of law generally, he writes that "when the Supreme Being formed the universe ... he impressed certain principles upon that matter, from which it can never depart".[46] Blackstone then addresses the law specifically applicable to human action, calling this the law of nature.[47] Because man is dependent on God, he is obliged to submit to his will, the law of nature.[48]

According to Blackstone, God, in His "infinite *goodness*", gave man an effective motivator to pursue knowledge of the natural law he obliged to follow.[49] That "prompter to enquire after and pursue the rule of right" is "our own self-love".[50] For God has "so inseparably interwoven the laws of eternal justice with the happiness of each individual, that the latter cannot be attained but by observing the former; and, if the former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter".[51] Because of this relationship, knowledge of the law of nature can be approached from different angles. A.W. Alschuler

Orth, "Sir William Blackstone: Hero of the Common Law", 156).

44 Blackstone sought to provide the English common law with the same systematic, rational treatment that Newton and others had given to the natural sciences. He felt the common law should be complete and independent, as if it were a uniform system of logic.

45 All references to Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries are to his Commentaries on the Laws of England. Oxford: The Clarendon Press (1765), (a reprint of the first edition with supplement (1966)), cited as 1 Comm., 38.

46 I Comm., 38. Blackstone's views on the law "impressed' on the universe, is reminiscent of Aquinas' theory of the Eternal Law.

47 I Comm., 38.

48 For Blackstone's natural law theory cf. Nydham & Raath, "Blackstone, natural law and the future", 77-94 and "Celebrating the common law rights of man – a note on Blackstone's work on natural law and natural rights", 119-133. According to Blackstone the law of nature is co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, it is superior in obligation to any other law; it is binding all over the world, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to natural law (I Comm., 41).

49 I Comm., 40.

50 I Comm., 40.

51 I Comm., 40.

characterizes Blackstone's perspective as an assertion that, "(t)he study of God and of human nature led to the same understanding".[52] Indeed, rather than viewing the natural law as an amalgam of complicated, much less arbitrary, principles, Blackstone insisted that God "has graciously reduced the rule of obedience to this one paternal precept, 'that man should pursue his own happiness'".[53] Once man has thus been propelled to seek the precepts of the natural law, he faces the task of discovering them. Here, too, Blackstone expresses the view that God has shown grace to man after man's fall into sin.

Blackstone reverts to the idea of the social contract as a mechanism to integrate the interests (and happiness) of the individual and the social body in the quest to serve the common good. The "original contract of society" demands that the whole should protect all its parts, and that every part should pay obedience to the will of the whole; or, in other words, that the community should guard the rights of each individual member, and that (in return for this protection) each individual member should submit to the laws of the community; "without which submission of all it was impossible that protection could be certainly extended to any".[54]

The state of nature is not a historical state of affairs, but the condition of man considered as an individual, in abstraction from all social relations.[55] Reflection on this state of nature is the source of most of the rules of natural law identified by Blackstone. The state of nature is one of equality, liberty and community of property, where every person has the right to punish infringements of these natural rights.[56] Blackstone's treatment of the original contract begs the question: what is the relation between the state of nature and the single foundation of natural law – man's "true and substantial happiness"? Blackstone leans in favour of the individual good and happiness. The only natural good is individual and pre-social, and the ends of the law are the protection of pre-existing individual rights.[57] Therefore, natural law looks back to the individual in his state of nature as a standard

52 Alschuler, "Rediscovering Blackstone", 22.

53 I Comm., 41.

54 I Comm., 47-48.

55 I Comm., 123.

56 IV Comm., 7.

57 I Comm., 48, 124 & II Comm., 15.

and the end of the law is the protection of individual rights.[58]

The original contract, to Blackstone, is composed of two stages: firstly, the implied contract of society (*pactum unionis*) and the implied contract of government (*pactum subjectionis*). This distinction permeates the whole of Book Four of Blackstone's *Commentaries*. Blackstone's exposition of crimes proceeds from the individual to society to government; all crimes are arranged after those against divine law and the law of nations: crimes against the king and government (Book IV, cc. Vi-ix), against the commonwealth (Book IV, cc. X-xiii), and against the individual (Book IV, cc. Xiv-xvii). In the process Blackstone admits natural law as a source of law while the autonomy of municipal law is strictly insisted upon.

2.2.2.2 Blackstone on the relatedness of the law of nature and divine law

One way that mankind can come to know the law of nature is through the application of reason. Blackstone emphasizes that as a creature of rationality and free will, man was given not only the moral obligation but also the rational ability to "discover the purport of those laws" of nature.[59] However, Blackstone explains, with logic consistent with the Christian doctrine of the fall of mankind, that reason alone is inadequate to discover Gods commands. For, "every man now finds ...; that his reason is corrupt, and his understanding full of ignorance and error".[60] In light of this, God graciously gave Scripture, divine law, to mankind. The precepts contained therein are "really a part of the original law of nature" and therefore the two laws, divine (which Blackstone here terms "direct revelation") and "natural", are theoretically equally authoritative, though due to man's fallen reason, divine law must be regarded as superior.[61]

Blackstone's treatment of divine law is brief, but it is nonetheless significant. First, he acknowledges it as the ultimate authority on discerning natural law. This carries great weight, for as will be demonstrated in the discussion on the relationship between natural law

58 I Comm., 48, 125 & II Comm., 15.

59 I Comm., 40.

60 I Comm., 41.

61 I Comm., 42. According to Blackstone the law of nature is binding upon all human beings because it is dictated by God Himself. Cf. Schmidt, "Blackstone's View of Natural Law and Its Influence on the Formation of the American Declaration of Independence and the Constitution", at 1.

and municipal law, municipal laws that violate the law of nature are not truly law.[62] Blackstone's view of this principle is quite nuanced; for instance he refrained from drawing the common conclusion from these premises that judicial review is therefore necessary. However, his assertion of municipal law's subjection to natural law, and thus to divine law as an express articulation of natural law realties, is still significant; Scripture "is the basis of Christianity, and 'Christianity is part of the laws of England'".[63]

2.2.2.3 Natural law and the human law

In St. Thomas' treatment of natural law, human reason has a distinct role and function. From the precepts of the natural law, the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determinations of certain matters. These particular determinations devised by human reason, are called human laws, provided that the other essential conditions of law be observed. By the human law is meant the application of the natural law, by public authority, to the circumstances of particular human societies; natural law is the product of correct reasoning from the general considerations of what is good and right.

The human law depends on the natural law for its authority. If human legislators refuse to enact what is good and right, they are not true laws, but frauds and acts of violence. The relationship between natural law and the human law involves enforcement. However, the enforcement of positive law demanded by the natural law can take two forms. The first is the enforcement universally demanded by the natural law, called conclusion, for example the punishment for murder. The second is the prohibition by way of determination because it requires choice among possible responses and because it *makes* something wrong which was not previously wrong.

The enforcement in the case of "conclusions" are the same in all cultures – they are ingrained in the legal cultures of all peoples in all times and places. Determinations are not cultural universals but do vary widely among legal cultures and from place to place.

62 The authority of divine law also impacts Blackstone's theory, as he recognizes that not only laws, but theories about law must comply with revealed truth, as evidenced by his dismissal of the idea of an actual, historical social contract in part on the grounds of an incompatible biblical account of social history (I Comm., 41, 70).

63 Finnis, "Blackstone's theoretical intentions", 176, quoting I Comm., 59.

Aquinas' distinction between *conclusion* and *determination* in the relationship between natural law and positive law is, therefore, accepted and applied in Blackstone's Commentaries. Blackstone also holds that conclusion and determination are ways of grounding human law in natural law. To Blackstone there are a great number of different points in which both the divine law and natural law leave a man at his own liberty, but which are found necessary for the benefit of society to be restrained within certain limits. Murder is expressly forbidden by the divine law, and demonstrably by the natural law; and from these prohibitions arise the true unlawfulness of this crime. Those human laws that add a punishment to it, do not at all increase its moral guilt, or add any obligation *in foro conscientiae* to abstain from its perpetration. If any human law should allow or enjoin us to commit it, we are bound to transgress that human law or else we must offend both the natural and the divine law. However, with regard to matters that are themselves indifferent, and are not commanded or forbidden by those superior laws; such for example as exporting wool into foreign countries, the inferior legislature has scope and opportunity to interpose, and to make that action unlawful which before was not so.[64]

2.2.2.3.1 Natural law as the source of legitimacy

Blackstone's attention, both in his introduction and throughout the entire *Commentaries*, is focused upon municipal law. However, natural law, God's will for human action, plays an integral part in Blackstone's conception of municipal law in at least two ways. First, natural law provides the legitimacy and proper aims of civil government's legislative authority, by way of social contract theory. Second, natural law, being superior to municipal law, has implications for the content of law, for it sets important boundaries for lawmakers while giving them broad discretion to make laws as they see fit.

2.2.2.3.2 Natural law and the social contract

Blackstone defines municipal law as "a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong".[65] For Blackstone, the right of the state to prescribe rules of civil con-

64 I Comm., 43.

65 I Comm., 43.

duct arises from a theoretical social contract. He writes of man, that "municipal or civil law regards him also as a citizen, and bound to other duties ... which he has engaged in by enjoying the benefits of the common union".[66] In Blackstone's theoretical framework, man existed in an independent state of nature, possessing the natural rights of personal security, personal liberty, and private property.[67] In exchange for the community's protection of those rights, he agreed to obey the laws of the community.[68] Such a contract, a promise to protect in exchange for a promise to obey, "*in nature and reason* must always be understood and implied, in the very act of associating".[69] Blackstone infers that this contract, or exchange, "should be regarded as one of the most important elements of natural law in the *Commentaries*".[70] He argues that this reciprocal contract "provides the link ... between the formal juridical 'rights and wrongs' referred to in the definition of municipal law ... and the natural and rational rights which English law successfully upheld"[71] As a consequence of this reciprocal, natural law-based contract, there arises "the natural, inherent right that belongs to the sovereignty of a state ... of making and enforcing laws".[72]

From this contract, civil authorities derive not only their law-making power, but their limited law-making objective: the good of society. For, "(e)very man, when he enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty" but possesses political liberty, which "is no other than natural liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no farther) as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public".[73] Consequently, according to Alschuler, while government could justly abridge natural rights, "(w)hen human law lim-

66 I Comm., 45.

67 I Comm., 129.

68 I Comm., 48.

69 I Comm., 47, 48 (emphasis added).

70 Finnis, "Blackstone's theoretical intentions", 178.

71 Finnis, "Blackstone's theoretical intentions", 179.

72 I Comm., 47.

73 I Comm., 125.

ited natural rights for corrupt, arbitrary or otherwise inadequate reasons, this law was not binding".[74] This position follows logically from the notion of a contract, since man could not have given away more than he originally possessed, and even in nature he had no right to arbitrarily deprive another of life, liberty, and property; consequently he had no right to delegate government.[75] Blackstone acknowledged the need to evaluate the success of the English common law in actually securing the rights existing in man from his natural state (in fact, he noted that as one of his objectives for the *Commentaries*).[76] Regardless of the answer to that query, it is clear from Blackstone's opening pages that due to his social contract theory, which he grounded in natural law, the protection of natural rights was the proper objective of municipal law.

2.2.2.3.3 The extent to which natural law determines the content of municipal law

In Blackstone's legal theory, natural law not only legitimizes the state's making of municipal law and establishing that law's proper aim, but it affects the content of law. Because natural law, as the will of God for man, is comprised of universally applicable, God-ordained principles, it is superior to man-made law, and therefore makers of municipal law are charged with establishing laws consistent with these principles. However, while the natural law provides guidance on some of the matters municipal law may legitimately address, it is indifferent on others. Some readers of Blackstone emphasize only one of these relationships between natural law and municipal law, guidance or indifference, and neglect the other. Such a reading of Blackstone results in a skewed view of his natural law theory. The first extreme assessment of Blackstone's view of the relationship between natural law and municipal law, which is in fact a misrepresentation, is that natural law ought to specifically direct the entirety of municipal law.

74 Alschuler, "Rediscovering Blackstone", 30.

75 Alschuler, "Rediscovering Blackstone", 30 n. 174.

76 "Let us, therefore, proceed to examine how far all laws ought, and how far the laws of England actually do take notice of these absolute rights, and provide for their lasting security" (I Comm., 125).

One author characterized classical natural law theory as a belief that "all positive law ... was but a more or less feeble reflection of an ideal body of perfect rules, demonstrably by reason, and valid for all times, all places and all men".[77] He wrote specifically of late eighteenth century Europe, Blackstone's place and time, that, "(s)tarting with the proposition that natural law was a body of eternal principles universally applicable, it was believed that the whole body of these principles might be discovered at one stroke by an effort of reason"[78] However, as Alschuler accurately perceives, "(c)ontrary to the perceptions of modern critics ... Blackstone did not believe that judges or legislators could use the principles of natural law to derive appropriate answers to all or even most legal questions".[79] This position is supported by examining the context of language facially indicating that natural law dictates all aspects of municipal law, and also by noting Blackstone's explicit language on the relationship between natural law and municipal law and his illustrations of that relationship.

A superficial reading of Blackstone's *Commentaries* could render such an understanding, for he did write in his introduction that "in order to apply (the law of nature) ..., it is still necessary to have recourse to reason: whose office it is to discover, as was before observed, *what the law of nature directs in every circumstance of life*".[80] The context of Blackstone's statement is very helpful in understanding his meaning. This sentence comes from a transitional paragraph in which Blackstone moves from discussing the attributes of the law of nature, to giving his view on the purpose of divine law. Having described the law of nature as, first, in accordance with "immutable laws of good and evil",[81] second, reducible to the precept of man pursuing his own happiness, and third, superior to all human laws,[82]

77 Pound, "The theory of judicial decision II. Nineteenth-century theories of judicial finding of law", 802.

78 Pound, "The theory of judicial decision", 804.

79 Alschuler, "Rediscovering Blackstone", 24-25.

80 I Comm., 41 (emphasis added).

81 I Comm., 40.

82 I Comm., 41.

he takes the opportunity to express that this great law, awesome as it is, does not expressly dictate all things and human reason "still" plays a role in its application. In essence, Blackstone is saying that reason is the usual medium by which this great law is "brought down to earth" to apply to the circumstances of individual men. That his emphasis here is on the function of reason, not on the scope of natural law's dictates, is evidenced by his next paragraph. Blackstone uses his discussion of reason to transition into the role of divine law. In the next section he says that on account of man's corrupted reason and consequent inability to correctly deduce the fullness of natural law, God graciously provided Scripture to expressly reveal elements of the natural law.[83]

Lest there be any doubt that Blackstone did not believe that natural law dictated every aspect of municipal law and that man, by reason and comprehension of Scripture, merely had to discover both the law and its proper applications, Blackstone elsewhere explicitly refutes the idea. On the very next page, in a discussion devoted to the relationship between natural law and municipal law, Blackstone writes: "There is, it is true, a *great number of indifferent points, in which both the divine law and the natural leave a man at his own liberty*; but which are found necessary for the benefit of society to be restrained within certain limits. And herein it is that human laws have their greatest force and efficacy ..."[84]

Thus, Blackstone clearly acknowledges points of "indifference", in which the natural law is silent and man may properly not discover, but make law (including the natural law principle, expressed through the social contract theory explained above, that laws must be directed toward the good of society), but they are made, not discovered by man, nonetheless.

The understanding of Blackstone's theory of natural law as it relates to the content of municipal law is reinforced

83 I Comm., 41, 42.

84 I Comm., 42 (emphasis added).

by Blackstone's illustrations throughout his work. For instance, in his introduction to the *Commentaries*, Blackstone explains that municipal laws may either have no natural law basis or may be a discretionary application of a general natural principle and still be proper law. To illustrate the first relationship, Blackstone says that the laws outlawing monopolies and declaring that a woman's property becomes her husband's once they marry 'have no foundation in nature; but merely created by the law, for the purposes of civil society."[85] To illustrate that sometimes the particular applications of a natural law principle are rightly left to the discretion of the municipal lawmakers and that those applications are binding once enacted as positive law, Blackstone also uses two examples. First, he says that although the duty to obey superiors is a natural law principle, "who those superiors shall be, and in what circumstances, or to what degrees they shall be obeyed, is the province of human laws to determine".[86] Likewise, natural law establishes that robbery is wrong, but human law must decide in which cases taking another's property may be justified, such as when a landlord seizes personal property from a tenant who has not paid rent.[87]

The illustrations provided by Blackstone, in conjunction with his explicit language on the topic and a proper contextual understanding of the text seemingly to the contrary, indicate that for Blackstone, natural law does not and should not direct every determination of municipal lawmakers. In fact, Blackstone gives such extensive leeway to lawmakers to use their discretion that some have accused him of reducing natural law to a negligible role in guiding municipal law. This position is likewise an unjustified over-emphasis on one aspect of Blackstone's theory. Responding to Blackstone's position that the content of municipal laws is discretionary so long as it does not contradict natural law, scholars claimed this an "empty test",[88]

85 I Comm., 55.

86 I Comm., 55.

87 I Comm., 55.

88 Lucas, Ex parte Sir William Blackstone, 'Plagiarist': A note on Blackstone' and the natural

and that it would "(i)n no way ... allow the legislative power to be bound by principles accepted prior to the exercise of its will".[89] Consequently, this logic continues, Blackstone's theory "is in danger of collapsing into a positivism that will regard explanation as extraneous to the exposition of law".[90] However, this perspective on Blackstone's theory underestimates the importance of Blackstone's qualifier of positive law. While these scholars all recognize that Blackstone deems positive law invalid if it contradicts natural law, they seem to miss the significance of this limitation. For Blackstone, natural law has a powerful restraining effect.

Many aspects of municipal law are not dictated by natural law, but they are still subject to eternal, universally applicable limitations. Reflecting on the broad discretion given to lawmakers in deciding legal questions, Alschuler comments that natural law "simply indicated the essential needs of human beings and demanded that people respect the essential needs of others".[91]

In Blackstone's system of rights, respecting the essential needs of others is no small duty and carries many implications. Thus, to say natural law "simply" indicates these matters provides a useful contrast to the view that it dictates every minute detail but understates natural law's true role. Natural law establishes principles of order that provide boundaries, expansive as they may be, in which municipal law must function.[92]

Many scholars view Blackstone's assertion that municipal law is subject to natural law principles as a "toothless" threat because Blackstone does not allow judicial review to invalidate municipal law that violates natural law. Yet

law", 153.

89 Lucas, "Ex parte Sir William Blackstone", 154-155.

90 Finnis, "Blackstone's theoretical intentions", 182.

91 Alschuler, "Rediscovering Blackstone", 2.

92 "To instance in the case of murder: this is expressly forbidden by the divine, and demonstrably by the natural law; and from these prohibitions arise the true unlawfulness of this crime. Those human laws, that annex a punishment to it, do not at all increase its [sic] moral guilt ..." (I Comm., 42).

Blackstone does articulate other ways to deal with rogues municipal laws that have strayed beyond their proper natural law bounds. First, Blackstone emphasizes the legislature as the seat of sovereign lawmaking power, as the source of legal reforms. In England, the members of Parliament are "the makers, *repealers*, and interpreters of the English laws; delegated to ... *adopt, and cherish any solid and well weighed improvement* ..."[93] When the common law was defective, the legislature was specifically tasked with enacting "remedial statutes" to rectify the problem.[94]

Since the burden of creating right law rests on the legislature, Blackstone saw judges as properly taking a more conservative role to ensure the municipal law's compliance with natural law. Blackstone wrote that when applying a remedial statute, "it is the business of the judges so to construe the act, as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy".[95] This is consistent with the mainstream thought of his time, for Michael Milgate explains the dominant legal thought of the Middle Ages and early modern period,[96] specifically its rejection of judicial review, by arguing, "(i)f one assumes that the sovereign wishes to have statutes read in light of natural law, that the legislator could not have inteneded to deviate from its paths, then there is rarely a need (for judges) to invalidate the statutes themselves".[97] So, for Blackstone, the typical way for a judge to ensure the law complies with natural law is to interpret and apply it so as not to effect manifest injustice.[98] In instances where the common law has drastically deviated from reason, and thus natural law, Blackstone permits more direct action. For, if judicial precedent is "more evidently contrary to reason; much more if it be contrary to the divine law". Blackstone adds that the actual law of the

93 I Comm., 9 (emphasis added).

94 I Comm., 87.

95 I Comm., 87.

96 Milgate, "Human rights and natural law: From Bracton to Blackstone", 54.

97 Milgate, "Human rights and natural law", 66.

98 Given the broad range of discretion permitted to lawmakers, interpreting a statute so that it was not against a specific natural law precept would only require keeping the application of laws within wide bounds, not twisting them to conform to a rigid standard.

land must be in conformity with natural law and that judges are not bound to follow that precedent, for a decision that "is manifestly absurd or unjust" is not law.[99]

To properly understand Blackstone's view of judges in ensuring municipal law's compliance with divine law, it is important to understand Blackstone's perspectives on the common law of England. In short, Blackstone believed that the laws, at their heart, were in accord with natural law. Thus, judges could interpret laws to support natural law principles in their application with confidence that they were advancing the law's objective. Likewise, a common law decision contradictory to reason, and thus natural law, was not law because the law of the land did not violate natural law. Therefore, the judge who formed the decision had simply erred in identifying the law of the land. Blackstone's prescription for judicial behaviour does not display a confidence that the body of law before any judge in England does comply with that law. For this reason, while Blackstone clearly describes the appropriate actions of a judge faced with ambiguous legislation or a stray unreasonable precedent, his thoughts are not developed fully enough in the *Commentaries* to indicate his view on a judge's proper response to municipal laws that truly violate natural law. That is, he does not give direction to judges confronted with a statute with no feasible interpretation compatible with natural law or with a precedent violating natural law that is not an outlier but an accurate representation of common law, the established custom of the land. He does, however, indicate appropriate responses to such laws on the part of the people.

Blackstone recognizes the capacity, indeed the duty, of individuals and society as a whole to refuse to submit to municipal laws that violate natural law. Although he recognizes no laws in England that would justify such resistance, he does make his theoretical point clear. Speaking of murder, he writes "if any human law should allow or enjoin us to commit it, we are bound to transgress that human law, or else we must offend both

99 I Comm., 70.

the natural and the divine".[100] Similarly, municipal law could be so noxiously offensive to natural law that the people as a whole would be justified to disobey the law because the contract that empowered the government to make the laws would have effectively been cancelled.[101] Blackstone wrote: "(I)n cases of national oppression the nation has very justifiably risen as one man, to vindicate the original contract subsisting between the king and his people."[102] Alschuler aptly summarized Blackstone's view of appropriate responses to municipal laws that do not comply with natural law when he commented: "If Parliament were to defy the law of nature (a prospect that Blackstone thought almost inconceivable), the only remedy would lie in the streets rather than in the courts."[103] In addition to opposing laws that violated the natural law, awareness of the possibility of justifiable rebellion surely served a deterrent function, as well, prompting lawmakers, whom the public perceived as deriving their authority from natural law, to think carefully before enacting laws grievously contrary to its principles.

Thus, Blackstone's assertion that the content of natural law must be in line with the precepts of natural law was defended through several mechanisms of ensuring compliance. Lawmakers had a duty to enact laws within the generous bounds set by the natural law and judges were entrusted with preserving the law as laid down for them, but also of interpreting and applying the law consistent with natural law precepts. Further, the people had a primary duty of conscience to God, and a right to insist that civil government did not compel them to break His law.

100 I Comm., 43.

101 Finnis, "Blackstone's theoretical intentions", 175.

102 I Comm., 82.

103 Alschuler, "Rediscovering Blackstone", 19 n 106.

3. Conclusion

To the debit of Blackstone's legal philosophy it should be stated that his theoretical position reflect "theoretical inadequacies" and reflects "the confusion and terminological inexactitudes which have so muddled the interpretation" of his legal theory.[104] His natural law position represents a synthesis of the two major streams of thought in the natural law tradition: on the one side Blackstone grounds law in a divine orderliness permeating the whole of the universe; on the other hand he utilizes insights regarding the law of nature, the state of nature, the social contract and man's original isolation from social life.[105] This pre-social state of nature is not a historical state of affairs, but a hypothetical state of equality, liberty and community of property, where every person has the right to punish infringements of these natural rights.[106] Because of Blackstone's synthesis of various strands of natural law thinking, it is difficult to determine his views on a number of aspects (e.g. how judges should respond to unjust statutes from English common law).

According to Blackstone's legal theory the original state of nature is "an ambiguous and impoverished explanatory category, because natural and positive law lack intelligible modes of interconnection, and because superior will rather than reasonable connection between end and means is made the basis of obligation".[107] Furthermore the original state of nature is not an ideal stage in man's social development. Due to the evils in the state of nature, the more positive law aspires to the state of nature the more primitive and undesirable is it.[108] Blackstone is also unclear about explaining why the family qualifies as a "natural society"[109] although the human person in the state of nature is isolated from social life. Blackstone's treatment of the individual's right to reputation and good name seems inconceivable in isolation from man's social life and the recognition of man's reputation and good name by fellow human beings.[110] Blackstone's theory also fails to explain the relationship between positive and natural law: the primary good is individual and pre-social and the end of the law is the protection of

104 Cf. Finnis, "Blackstone's theoretical intentions", 181.

105 I Comm., 123.

106 IV Comm., 7.

107 Finnis, "Blackstone's theoretical intentions", 182.

108 Cf. III Comm., 327. Also compare III Comm., 4, 168 & I Comm., 193, 213.

109 I Comm., 47, 422.

110 Finnis, "Blackstone's theoretical intentions", 180.

the individual's rights.[111] To the foregoing could also be added Blackstone's silence on the reconciliation of natural individual rights and civil social rights and the lack of clarity in his use of the terms "principles of society" which are neither natural nor merely positive.[112] The most profound inadequacies in Blackstone's legal theory concern his grounding of jural right in the state of nature, and not in the duties emanating from the deeper moral strata of human existence and the intercourse between human beings. Blackstone formally follows the "architecture" of St. Thomas' fourfold classification of law, however, the jural duties of both rulers and subjects in terms of a basic normative moral law, do not have any material binding authority.

Although Blackstone also utilizes Locke's views on the social contract and the natural rights emanating from the state of nature, he explicitly leans in favour of Hobbes' views in a number of respects. For example, he disagrees from Locke that the individual has a right to remove the legislature or that the subjects in the state have a right to resist the sovereign.[113]

Blackstone's work at interpreting and systemizing English common law formally followed the scheme of foundational principles consistent with the Judeo-Christian system of law – the status of law as a rule of human action in an orderly universe – revealed by God as a systematic but complex structure of norms applicable to both the nations of the world and to municipal systems of law, but his *Commentaries* reflect tensions with material jural consequences emanating from his views on the original state of nature, the social contract and the normative structure of law.

To Blackstone's credit it must be stated that one of the most important aspects surfacing from his contribution to the common law system was his emphasis on the idea of the rule of law – paramount laws in the form of the natural law – binding both the ruler and the ruled and serving as the critical norm for the existing positive legal order and for reforms to bring it into accord with the demands of justice. Blackstone's rule of law theory flows from his earnest emphasis in favour of supra positive measures for evaluating the laws of the lawmaker – the principle that positive law should aspire to meet the standards set by natural law. Similar to Aquinas Blackstone argues that the tenets of natural law have real enforceable validity to the measure that positive law which conflicts with natural law are not truly law; positive law must be fully based on natural law. Hence Thomas Aquinas says that every

111 I Comm., 48, 124: II Comm., 15.

112 Cf. I Comm., 131; III Comm., 168.

113 Cf. I Comm., 51-52; 161-162, 173, 213.

rule of law positivized by man is really rule of law only to the extent that it is deduced from natural law.[114] Blackstone's efforts at postulating universal and immutable norms of a super positive nature for evaluating human conduct in all spheres of law, at least in a formal sense, endeavoured to secure the principle postulated by Bracton, who, under Henry III, stated that "(t)he king ought not to be subject to man, but to God, and to the law; for the law maketh the king."[115]

Following Locke's attack on feudal theories of political power as a private patrimonium (*regalia*) owned by the sovereign, Blackstone became the first common law thinker to subscribe to the idea of the rule of law in its first stage of development. Similar to Locke, Blackstone views the state as a public community of law, within which political power is to be exercised in the public interest, subject to general legislation – there is no absolute and unlimited sovereignty, but power limited by the very purpose of the political body, viz. the protection of fundamental rights. Since the state finds its natural legal justification in the protection of these natural rights, Blackstone's conception of the state subject to law may be considered an instance of the emerging idea of the state subject to law gradually unfolding in the common law tradition.

Blackstone was the theorist in the English common law tradition to start out from an abstractly construed state of nature establishing the necessary juridical relations between separate individuals in subjection to universally valid and immutable laws of nature founded in human reason.[116] However, Blackstone's conception of the legislative power of the state – similar to that of Locke – slants towards the line of Bodin: it is the supreme and original law-forming power within the state and is bound only to natural law; every specific legal power is derived from it – similar to Hobbes' statements concerning the state of nature and the commonwealth being the ground of his conception of sovereignty. In effect it implies that the identity of the state of nature and violence justifies the absolute power of the sovereign; the blurring of the distinction of law and violence constitutes the presupposition that legitimates the principle of sovereignty; the state of nature survives in

114 ST., I-II, Question 95 a. 2.

115 Mekkes, *Proeve eener critische beschouwing van de ontwikkeling der humanistische rechtsstaatstheorieën*, 262: "Ipse autem rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et sub lege, quia lex facit regem."

116 In this regard Blackstone follows Locke's view that "(t)he state of Nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, (and) teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty and possessions."

the person of the sovereign, who is the only one to preserve its natural *jus contra omne*s. Sovereignty thus presents itself as an incorporation of the state of nature in society, or, if one prefers, as a state of indistinction between nature and culture, between violence and law, and this very indistinction carries the potential of sovereign violence. Sovereign violence because the state of nature did not necessarily have to be conceived as a real epoch, but rather could be understood as a principle internal tot the state revealed in the moment in which the state is considered "as if it were dissolved" (*tanquam dissoluta* according to Hobbes).[117] Therefore Blackstone's insufficient regard for the enforcement of the principles of the material law state reflects the same enigmatic deficiencies as the democratic theories of the law state based on the social contractarianism of Hobbes and Locke. Or, as Habermas would put it: state institutions are not precluded from substituting public moral communicative action for instrumentally rational behaviour, thus lacking the insight (and ability) to fulfil the ideals of normative social integration through law. Blackstone does not really have a legitimate answer to the threats emanating from the Hobbesian toning down of humanitarian ideals in favour of the growth of instrumental and strategic rationality and the teleological ideals of technological, scientific and economic development.

Although Blackstone's theory of public law does not reflect Locke's revolutionary bent to the point of renouncing the original compact and the power reverting back to the people, it is an unanswered question to what extent Blackstone leaves room for effective resistance to highly unjust laws. Fact remains that although Blackstone did not argue through the philosophical underpinnings of the principles and ideas of philosophers like Hobbes and Locke, he earnestly sought to bind the making and enforcement of law to supra temporal norms of universal validity, immutable in their effect, accessible by human reason and setting standards beyond the whims and fancies of the lawmakers – pioneering efforts at introducing the principle of the state subject to law as a formal ideal to the English system of common law. Blackstone set the English common law, albeit in a rudimentary and formal form, on the path towards the rule of law, that which the distinguished constitutional theorist, Julius Stahl, described as the "state subject-to-law-approach". The state must precisely determine course and limits of its own activity as well as the citizens' spheres of liberty in the mode of justice ("in der Weise des Rechts") and make them unbreakably secure; the concept of the law-state not simply maintains the legal order without administrative purposes, nor merely protects the rights of individuals; the typical structure

117 Cf. Agamben, *Homo sacer. Sovereign power and bare life*, 105-106

of the rule of law (the state subject to law) does not at all indicate goal and content of the state, but only the mode and manner in which to realize the latter."[118]

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118 Stahl, *Die Philosophie des Rechts*, II, 137, 138.

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Preserving intellectual legacy: generativity themes in the narratives of retired academics

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Opsomming

Die intellektuele nalatenskap van die professoraat sluit in oorspronklike vakkundigheid, die oordrag van waardes, kennis en vaardighede aan volgende generasies in die akademiese wêreld, en die instandhouding van die wetenskaplike gemeenskap. Die ouer wordende professoraat laat die vraag ontstaan hoe intellektuele nalatenskap ná aftrede in stand gehou kan word tot voordeel van die universiteit en die breër gemeenskap. Die idee van nalatenskap is verweef met Erikson se konsep van generatiwiteit, wat beskryf kan word as die begeerte om die vooruitgang en welstand van die volgende generasie te bevorder deur middel van ouerskap, onderrig, begeleiding, betrokkenheid by die samelewing en nog vele ander ingrypings, om sodoende 'n blywende, positiewe bydrae te lewer wat stand hou lank ná die self. As generatiwiteit nie behaal word nie, veroorsaak dit stagnering; dit bring teleurstelling mee as gevolg van verspeelde geleenthede. Hierdie referaat ondersoek generatiwiteit in die narratiewe van vyf afgetrede professore wat deur middel van doelgerigte steekproefneming gekies is op grond van hul lang, roemryke loopbane in die akademie. Deurtastende onderhoude ondersoek hoe deelnemers gedurende hul professionele loopbane uitdrukking gegee het aan generatiwiteit in hul wetenskaplike en skeppende werk, hoe hulle dit volhou ná aftrede en hoe hulle beplan om generatiwiteit uit te brei in hul laaste jare. Tematiese ontleding van die narratiewe het die volgende temas opgelewer: die totstandbrenging van generatiwiteit gedurende die loop-

baan; die herevaluering van generatiwiteit met aftrede; die voortsetting van generatiwiteit ná aftrede; en die toewyding aan generatiwiteit op die drempel van bejaardheid. Die studie vorm deel van die interdissiplinêre literatuur oor aftrede en doen aan die hand hoe afgetrede akademici ondersteun kan word om 'n intellektuele nalatenskap te bewaar deur betrokke te bly by generatiewe aktiwiteite namate hulle die laaste stadium van die lewensiklus betree.

Abstract

The intellectual legacy of the professoriate is embodied in original scholarship, the transfer of values, knowledge and skills to upcoming generations in academe, and the maintenance of the scholarly community. The ageing of the professoriate raises the question how intellectual legacy may be preserved after retirement to the benefit of the university and wider society. Interwoven with the idea of legacy is Erikson's concept of generativity, which can be described as the desire to promote the advancement and wellbeing of the next generation through parenting, teaching, mentoring, civic engagement and a wide range of other behaviours aimed at producing a positive contribution that survives the self. Failure to achieve generativity leads to stagnation that gives rise to disappointment as a result of missed opportunities. This paper explores generativity in the narratives of five retired professors selected by purposeful sampling on the basis of their illustrious and lengthy careers in academe. In-depth interviews explored how participants expressed generativity in their scientific and creative work during their professional careers, how they sustained generative concerns after retirement and how they plan to extend generativity into old age. Thematic analysis of the narratives produced the following themes: enactment of generativity during the career; re-evaluation of generativity at retirement; continuance of generativity after retirement; generative commitment at the threshold of old age. The study connects with the growing interdisciplinary literature on retirement and suggests how retired academics can be supported to preserve an intellectual legacy by remaining engaged in generative action as they approach the last stage of the life cycle.

1. Introduction

The ageing of the world's population, together with the parallel growth in life expectancy due to positive developments in healthcare (Lunenfeld & Stratton, 2013), creates challenges for the retirement population and for the organizations for which they worked. Organisations face three primary challenges: containment of employee retirement benefit costs, replacement of qualified workers and the transfer of critical knowledge from retirees to others in the organisation to reduce the skills drain (Calo, 2005). On the other hand, retirees increasingly seek to find ways to bolster retirement income and to extend their productivity through a range of diverse strategies, such as alternative employment, job sharing, reduced work hours, self-employment or unpaid voluntary work (Moody, 2006).

Ageing also affects higher education systems worldwide (Lahey, Michelson, Chieffe & Bajtelsmit, 2008). The retirement of the professoriate implies a loss of important knowledge and skills and a shortage of trained and qualified academics, who can speedily and effectively fill the gap left by highly experienced retirees (MacFarlane, 2012). At the end of a lengthy career senior professors have become repositories of rich academic capital. They have accumulated institutional memory, associated with lengthy administrative or governance experience; professional reputation through awards, prestigious teaching positions and discipline-linked community engagement; intellectual renown through publications; and social and political power through membership of public bodies and professional networks (Bourdieu, 1984). Moreover, at the apex of their academic careers senior professors fulfil the role of leadership. They are mentors to less experienced colleagues inside and outside the university; guardians of academic standards and values in their discipline; enablers of younger or less experienced peers by facilitating access into academic and professional networks, funding grants and research contracts; and ambassadors of the university in the public sphere (MacFarlane, 2012). The question is raised as to how this intellectual legacy can be preserved and transmitted, thus leaving behind some mark on the world of academe, which makes "a lasting impression or contribution in a personal way to the future" (Newton, Herr, Pollack & McAdams, 2013:1). Legacy is understood primarily in terms of bequeathing a material inheritance. However, in this paper, the understanding of legacy includes a cultural legacy in terms of knowledge, skills and values, which is an important but little studied component of the ageing and retirement experience (Hunter & Rowles, 2005).

The notion of legacy evokes strong association with Erikson's (1950) epigenetic theory of human identity development in which the important construct of generativity forms the core of the stage of middle to late adulthood. Generativity can be defined as the mature adult's care for the wellbeing of the next generation, not only through reproducing and caring for children, but also by generating a range of products and outcomes that survive the individual life to continue to benefit individuals, society and culture. Failure to achieve generativity leads to stagnation, which gives rise to resentment and disappointment as a result of missed opportunities. As each new generation of adults has the responsibility to hand on learning and experience, so each professional or occupational grouping has a distinct generative responsibility to transmit their craft to those they teach and guide (Batesman, 2010). From the standpoint of the academic world, generativity implies the endeavour of one generation of scholars to hand down their values, knowledge and skills to the next generation in their community of practice. From the perspective of society and culture, generativity thus demonstrated by scholars ensures that their accrued values, knowledge and skills live on to strengthen social institutions, sustain culture, contribute to civic development and motivate social change in future (McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1997).

Only a few studies (Melo, 2008; McAdams & Logan, 2006) have examined how professors who have made significant academic contributions narrate their scholarly lives in terms of generativity theory. To address this gap, this paper explores generativity themes as recounted in the life stories of retired professors. Data was gathered by in-depth interviews and the thematic analysis of the life stories produced four themes which described how participants constructed meanings around generativity during their careers, at and after retirement and in future.

2. Theoretical framework

Erik Erikson's (1950) life cycle model of human development proposes that a developing person passes from infancy to late adulthood through eight stages. In each stage, the person faces, and should master, developmental crises. A crisis does not constitute a catastrophe but a turning point for the person, "a crucial period of increased vulnerability and heightened potential for development" (Erikson, 1978:5). For each crisis successfully resolved, Erikson (1978) postulates that the person acquires a virtue or strength appropriate to that stage which adds to the person's competencies and abilities and makes him/her more able to face the crisis of the following stage

of the life cycle. Failure to resolve the crisis of a life stage successfully results in poor or regressive development. Thus, each stage builds upon the successful completion of earlier stages; crises of stages not successfully completed may be expected to reappear as problems in the future (Slater, 2003).

Erikson's seventh and penultimate stage of adult development is the long stretch of midlife, approximately 35-65 years (Erikson, 1950). The central challenge of midlife is the achievement of generativity versus its opposite pole, stagnation. The primary task of generativity is establishing and guiding future generations through the creation and maintenance of a wide range of institutional, cultural and individual resources that are necessary to sustain intergenerational solidarity (Erikson, 1964). To have and raise children is a typical generative activity but generativity extends beyond a deeply held concern for biological offspring to the next generation to which one's own and/or other children belong (McAdams & Logan, 2004). In juxtaposition, one who is self-centred and unable or unwilling to help society move forward through generative actions is stagnant and feels dissatisfied with one's relative lack of productivity. Holding these poles (generativity and stagnation) in a dynamic and healthy balance is essential to produce the emergent virtue, that is, care, solicitude or concern for persons, products and ideas (Erikson, 1978).

Taken that developmental challenges are not exclusive to a life stage but co-exist to some extent along the entire life cycle (Erikson, 1978), the challenge of generativity stretches well into later adulthood and even into old age, the final stage of human development. While procreativity and child-raising usually fill early middle adulthood; productivity and creativity, that is, "the maintenance of the world" (Erikson, Erikson & Kivnick, 1986:50) are associated with later adulthood. Furthermore, the realisation of generativity (or not) impacts on the adult's final development task, ego-integrity versus its juxtaposition, despair. In old age, previous accomplishments are re-visited and re-evaluated. If the elderly see themselves as having led a successful life, they are able to develop ego-integrity with the emergent virtue of wisdom. Alternatively, if they see their lives as unproductive, or feel that they failed to accomplish their life goals, despair emerges, leading to depression and hopelessness (Erikson, 1950). Thus, Erikson (1964) emphasises that the benefits of generativity are bi-directional: the generative adult creates legacies of self that benefit future generations, while simultaneously reaping meaning which is incorporated into self-identity and which combats despair.

Theorists applying Eriksson's work to the study of lives point out that generativity research should always be grounded in socio-historical context which shapes different experiences of midlife for different birth cohorts (Erikson *et al*., 1986). Increased longevity in the 21st century posits revised definitions of midlife (and old age) which cast new light on the timing of generative concern. Wink and James (2013) argue that today the conception of midlife has been prolonged with the emergence of the 'Third Age', that is the period of the 'young-old' which stretches from retirement up to very old age and the onset of infirmity. During this period older adults may opt to continue their commitment to generativity through sustained engagement with society. In this vein, Bateson (2010) subdivided Erikson's seventh stage of midlife into Adulthood I and Adulthood II; the latter incorporates 70+ years, when adults may choose to remain actively involved in their world and thus, continue generative acts.

Erikson's theory has given rise to a large body of theoretical and empirical research. Consequently, generativity has emerged as a complex multidimensional construct which has much to offer in diverse fields, such as religion, ethics and gerontology (Schoklitsch & Bauman, 2012). A selective overview is given of the most significant of this scholarship. Kotre (1984:112) was the first to redefine generativity as the desire and effort to invest one's life and one's work in that which will "outlive the self". He (1984; 1999) expanded the concept by proposing two modes of generative expression: agency and communion. Agency involves the expansion of the self through creating something that is self-promoting; communion includes giving what one has created to others for their benefit and use (de St Aubin, 2013). Furthermore, according to Kotre (1984), generativity exists in four domains: the biological (as in procreation), the parental (as in raising children), the technical (as in teaching knowledge and skills to others) and the cultural (as in creating and passing down a product in which the self is expressed). In particular, cultural generativity requires comment in the light of the topic of this paper. Generative educators are those who progress from technical transmission to meaning transmission through mentoring and coaching. Further, cultural generativity is strongly linked to the latter part of midlife after the activities of the last three domains lose pre-eminence (Manheimer, 1995).

Generativity theory has been further stimulated by the individual and the collaborative work of McAdams and de St. Aubin over more than two decades. McAdams and de St. Aubin (1992) (cf. also McAdams, Hart & Maruna, 1998) produced a seven-dimensional theory of the process of generativity. According to this model, generativity functions in terms of seven interrelated features: i) an inner desire for agentic and communal legacy

combines with ii) cultural demand embodied in age-related social norms for the adult to produce outcomes to benefit the next generation which in turn produces iii) a concern for the next generation. This concern is boosted by iv) a belief in the worthwhile nature of the human endeavour and this leads to v) a commitment which produces vi) generative acts defined as creating, maintaining or offering what has been created or maintained to the community. This may embrace caring for children (one's own and those of others) transmitting traditions, knowledge and skills, investing in one's community as guide, mentor and leader and/or producing creative works that survive the self. Finally, the adult captures his/her generative action by constructing vii) a narration of generativity which is part of the individual's broader life story that makes up a person's identity. The life story may in itself be part of one's legacy offered to others as who may benefit from knowing about one's life (McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1997; McAdams, 2001).

Ongoing generativity research focuses on a host of benefits that generativity provides for both the generative individual and his or her community. Generativity is often expressed in community or civic involvement (Hart, McAdams, Hirsch & Bauer, 2001), in volunteering (Kleiber & Nimrod, 2008), and in professional mentorship (Parise & Forret, 2008), all of which build social capital and systems. Generativity is related to increased life satisfaction (Huta & Zuroff, 2007), increased self-esteem (Ackerman, Zuroff & Moscowitz, 2000), positive mental well-being (Melo, 2008), family health (de St Aubin, 2013) and marital happiness (Westermeyer, 2004). In the workplace generativity leads to greater job satisfaction and career success (Clark & Arnold, 2008). Generativity is linked to productive and well-adjusted ageing and enhanced physical health during old age (Batesman, 2010; Reichstadt, Sengupta, Depp, Palinkas & Jeste, 2010). In the light of these benefits, particularly for the older adult, Taylor and Schaffer (2013) argue that 'generativity planning' should be part of retirement planning so that retirees are encouraged to become or remain generative into old age to their own and the benefit of others.

The concept of generativity resonates strongly in studies on religion (Zock, 1990). In a Christian interpretation of generativity, the emergent virtue, unselfish care, is most conspicuous. Erikson (1964) himself was the first to recognise a parallel for care for others in the Christian teachings and argued that care was epitomised by Christ's command to love one's neighbour as oneself. Building on Erikson, Christian ethicist, Don Browning (1970) regarded generative man as the epitome of the good man whose prosocial behaviour is directed at the care of mankind. Browning (2006) detected generativity and care in early Reformation ideas which teach that

the purpose or calling of life is to serve others and he (2004) expanded the notion of generative care to include mutuality: generative acts comprise giving but also receiving care which benefits both giver and receiver. This, Browning (2004) argues, enriches the Christian understanding of neighbour-love. Dillon and Wink (2004) identify intergenerational care in the Old Testament injunction to each generation to transmit the content of the faith to the next, thereby demonstrating a profound care for the spirituality of future generations. In the New Testament the task shared by the church, the family and the individual believer, who should disciple both the young in years and the new in the faith, can be regarded as a generative act (Rukia, 2003). However, the ultimate act of care is demonstrated by the redemptive death of Christ as a selfless sacrifice intended to benefit not a single generation, but all subsequent generations (Dillon & Wink, 2004). The latter point powerfully illustrates how an individual act of generativity may have a lasting legacy of universal proportions. On an individual level, McAdams and Albaugh's (2008) study of the lives of two deeply committed and socially involved Christian women illustrates how their faith motivated their generative acts. Generativity inspired by faith contributes to a person's well-being (Wink & Dillon, 2008), to deepened spirituality (Sandage, Hill & Vaubel, 2011) and increased church involvement (Dillon & Wink, 2004; Hart et al., 2001). Moreover, the generative virtue of care is institutionalised in churches which form generative communities. Churches preserve and communicate scriptural and church-historical narratives of generative acts, which inspire generative concern among their members, and churches provide networks and organised opportunities for their members to act out these concerns (Wood, 2002).

Churches are just one example of how an accumulation of generative desire, commitment and action nourishes and sustains social norms around generativity and eventually may contribute to the establishment of institutions with a generative character and mission, which have the potential to produce a generative society (de St. Aubin, McAdams & Kim, 2004). Similarly, the historical tri-dimensional function of the university as generator, transmitter and curator of knowledge belies a potentially generative role. Teaching and mentoring activities directly address intergenerational cultural transmission and university-community engagement is an opportunity to enact generative care for others as is research in the service of humankind (Musil, 2013). But as McAdams *et al*. (1998) argue, generativity is not automatic; generativity will only be realised when the university's mission is executed out of a deliberate concern for others and not as a series of disinterested acts of self-interest (Melo, 2008). At present economic considerations dominate higher

education worldwide and knowledge produced by teaching and research is regarded as a product to be vended in a competitive marketplace for profit rather than as a cultural legacy for the common good (Nixon, 2008). Ball (2009) argues that academics should engage in a four-stage process of generativity in order to understand the scholarly task in terms of care for the public good and to view the scientific and creative endeavour as building a legacy for others, rather than an exercise in self-promotion.

3. Method

Against the above background, the question posed in this inquiry was: *How do retired academics manifest and sustain generativity in order to make sense of who they have been, who they are today, and who they may be in future*? The question was addressed by an exploration of generativity themes in the life stories of retired professors. The usefulness of life story research in generative theory construction is well-documented (Erikson, 1978; McAdams, 1993; 2001; 2006; 2008; 2012). Life story research may follow two different lines: discovery, in which open-ended narratives accounts are explored for the discovery of broad themes to generate new theories about lives; or justification, whereby hypotheses are tested as they play out in different lives using well-validated coding and statistical techniques (McAdams, 2012). Operating along the line of discovery, I collected data from four men and one woman in the age group 61 to 75 years who had retired after illustrious academic careers. Participants were selected by purposeful sampling (McMillan & Schumacher, 2006) according to the following criteria: all had had a lengthy university career (ranging from 32-45 years) in which they had contributed significantly in the areas of academic leadership, teaching, research, postgraduate supervision and public engagement.

In-depth lifestory interviews were conducted in participants' homes or my own home according to preference, and recorded and transcribed. Participants were asked to reflect on their extensive academic careers, transition to retirement, their post-retirement experiences and future expectations. Email correspondence and documents, such as memoirs, creative writing and academic publications offered by participants as examples of their generative work, complemented the interview data as did field notes of conversations held off tape, impressions of the participant and the participant's home office or work space. Ethical requirements were met by informing participants of the research aim, obtaining voluntary participation and ensuring participant confidentiality through pseudonyms and the removal of any specific information that could lead to identification.

Analysis of the narratives took place during and after the interviews. My first approach to the stories was a holistic-content one, in which each story was taken as a whole and ample room was given to appreciate the uniqueness of each participant's experience (Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach & Zilber, 1998). Thereafter, I used an inductive thematic approach (Maitlis, 2012), also referred to as a categorical-content approach (Lieblich *et al*., 1998), whereby I sought to identify interpretative themes which were common to all the stories within the set (Watson, 2012). Transcripts were read several times; extended segments of the stories were coded by specific categories and then integrated into the more general themes (Maitlis, 2012). This process was loosely guided by McAdams, de St Aubin and Logan's (1993) framework for generative life story analysis: conscious generativity concerns; generative commitments in the adult's daily tasks; continued generativity in later midlife; and generative self-representation in autobiographical recollection. However, I modified this framework (McAdams et al., 1993) according to context of the post-retirement experience and as a result of in-depth reflection on passages from the interviews which vividly described participants' experiences and feelings in relation to the conceptual literature (cf par. 4 below). In my analysis I primarily understood generativity in terms of activities, attitudes and values manifested in teaching, postgraduate supervision, mentoring and coaching, research, discipline-related creative pursuits and community engagement. Parenting (and grandparenting) as an integral part of generativity was only noted where it featured strongly in the narrative, given my focus on intellectual rather than biological legacy and the association with parenting with the earlier rather than the later phase of midlife (Erikson, 1950). Cross-checking information and conclusions with participants for additional information, verification and insight was done where necessary. As the inquiry aimed at an in-depth understanding of participants' experiences from their own frame of reference, no attempt was made to generalise findings.

4. Findings

Thematic analysis of the narratives produced the following themes: enactment of generativity during the career; re-evaluation of generativity at retirement; continuance of generativity after retirement; and generative commitment at the threshold of old age.

4.1 Enactment of generativity during the career

Highly generative adults often trace a lifetime of generative commitment and action to the early discovery of a special gift or talent which guides their

intellectual pursuits or an early and unpredicted advantage, which prompts a sense of vocation. This 'blessedness' (McAdams *et al*., 1998), creates an acute awareness in the person that the undeserved advantage should not be confined to self-promotion but should also be employed to benefit others (McAdams, 2012).

References to either a gifting or a serendipitous event which paved the way to a significant academic career spontaneously opened each interview. Geoffrey, a former professor of musicology, was acutely conscious that his career was rooted in his giftedness in voice and instrumental playing. His exceptional talent created opportunities to achieve as a performer in his childhood and youth and as performer and an academic during adulthood. His illustrious career in South Africa together with stints in the United Kingdom as a result of prestigious fellowships ran on parallel tracks: the worlds of performing arts and of musicology. Jake traced the genesis of his eminent career in social psychology to his strikingly original doctoral research which drew the attention of his superiors to his academic potential. Jake ascribed this to his opportune choice of a research topic which was both relevant and controversial and which inspired his later intellectual curiosity in his field. Leslie began his narrative by recalling the "*fortunate*" event which "*landed*" him in a career in economic and management sciences. After his adolescent ambition to study medicine on an Army bursary floundered just a week before matriculation, a sympathetic teacher directed the disappointed youngster to other sources of funding. Leslie elected for and was awarded the most substantial bursary available, conditional on the pursuit of BCom followed by public service. In his public sector work he was soon singled out for his aptitude for research and his earnest commitment to the improvement of the safety of transport systems. Subsequently he was spotted by the Dean at a nearby university and invited to join the ranks. George and Rosemary's early potential as postgraduate students was also recognised by superiors who assisted in their recruitment into academe: Rosemary in the field of early childhood education (ECD) and George in history. In all cases the acknowledgement received from specialists who 'spotted' their promise enthused the participants, inspired a positive self-image and the conviction that academe was the space where they could make a meaningful contribution to society. According to McAdams (2012), intellectual or creative interests with generative potential gain impetus when they are recognised by others in the social system; this creates the cultural demand which encourages the transformation of generative concerns into commitment and action.

All participants described the most productive and expansive stages of their working lives with satisfaction and joy (Urrutia, Cornachione, De Espanes,

Ferragut & Guzman, 2009). Accounts of the participants' academic careers demonstrated a conscious preoccupation with making a contribution to their students' lives and careers, their colleagues' academic development, their chosen discipline and to the university as organisation. Rosemary's chosen discipline, early childhood education, is intergenerational by nature and gave her an ideal channel to express her passion for the welfare of the young. Her career of 32 years was devoted to achievements with a strong generative character: writing books for ECD practitioners with a national and international circulation, the design of programmes to train ECD teachers, membership of professional bodies, advocacy in the field, contributions to national policy-making and professional assistance given to countless community organisations. Rosemary's story displays a strong communal motivation for generativity (Kotre, 1984): the self-abnegating desire to care for children by educating their caregivers until both groups are ready to take over and do the same for themselves. George, the historian, also expressed an intergenerational commitment through his choice of research field, the documentation of the socio-political contribution of English-speaking South Africans. With quiet modesty he described the activities of a solid career of 43 years' loyal service to the university enacted in teaching, postgraduate supervision, a strong publications list and university administration. His last years spent in college management at a crucial time in the university's development implied the sacrifice of time which he could have devoted to his own research. However, in the latter position George discovered a new forte: his gift for mentoring the upcoming generation of academics. He "*loved*" guiding select groups of promising novices engaged in applications for research rating, promotions and grants. With some contrast, Jake described a colourful 45-yearlong career punctuated at times by personal setbacks and collegial tensions which he dealt with by good-humouredly applying his knowledge of clinical psychology to himself. Although Jake is an outspoken individualist, the overriding and sustained passion of his career has been a generative commitment to developing the scholarship and the careers of his many students through outstanding and prolific postgraduate supervision. In the academic passions of both George and Jake the communal dimension of generativity is most strongly demonstrated. The motivation for generativity is also explained by agency, the desire for self-assertion, individuality and mastery whereby the generative adult seeks to expand the self infinitely in time through his/her achievements (Kotre, 1984). In Leslie's story, the agentic mode is striking. Leslie had a prominent career highlighted by acclaimed public achievement, strong instructional leadership and bullish participation in university governance at a time when the institution's future was at a crossroad. He rose rapidly in the academic ranks to become

dean of the largest faculty in his discipline in the country: "*It was a huge, huge faculty. Man, we built that faculty! First it was 34 000 students and we ended at 360 000 something.*" He held external consultancies which produced over 400 written reports, served on key ministerial commissions and made a vocal and definitive contribution to university transformation. He remarked, "*I worked my butt off. I have produced more than the work of two or three other men.*" From the outset he was committed to finding solutions that would benefit system functioning in future. "*Practical research that is implementable, solutions, you seek for solutions to real world problems. I have written solutions for problems in movement and they are still using them at the big harbours and airports in the world.*" He published prolifically, collaborated with international scholars and spent short fellowships at renowned research institutions in the US and Europe. He spearheaded key curriculum development, headed the overhaul of courses that led to international accreditation and national honours for his faculty and supervised a large number of postgraduate students "*because of the fact that there were very limited qualified people in that area*". In Geoffrey's narrative, agentic and communal motives combine equally. Geoffrey conducted orchestras and directed national and university-based choirs at home and overseas, adjudicated music competitions established a national, accredited journal of music and led departments of musicology at local universities. His public role in the performing arts gave Geoffrey ample scope to expand the self through personal artistic achievement. But his musical engagement was primarily focused on communal activities which created an incubator for the nurture of upcoming cohorts of musicians and students of music. His description of his role in departmental and college management was couched in terms of care. He saw himself taking "*the Department under my wing and … in which time we were able to put things on the right road again*". His leadership was always fulfilled with the eye to effective succession after his departure, to identifying fresh talent, someone he "*had confidence in and who would be able to continue with the job … an opportunity for someone else to run with*".

4.2 Re-evaluation of generativity at retirement

Generative concerns expressed in work tend to peak in midlife, approximately between 45 and 55 years (Stewart & Vandewater, 1998). At retirement age, usually pegged at the mid- 60s, highly productive adults are forced to re-evaluate a life of active involvement (Erikson *et al*., 1986) and consider how and to what extent they will sustain generative concerns in late midlife and the early phase of old age (Batesman, 2010). All participants agreed that retirement was a turning point at which they had to weigh their past achieve-

ments and consider how they would shape generativity commitments in this new chapter of their lives.

Leslie, Geoffrey and Rosemary elected to retire before they had reached the institution's mandatory retirement age. In the cases of the two men, the decision was calculated in every way and financial considerations were carefully appraised. Leslie said: "*Look, whole life I have planned ahead. I know where I am going. I know what I have achieved with my team because I don't take all the glory for these things.*" Ensuring effective intergenerational succession is a strongly generative task to which both men had been committed and both had groomed competent successors to fill their leadership positions in the event of retirement. Leslie remarked: "*I realised earlier that in a few years it was time for somebody else so I coached the people who would survive me. I gave them the opportunity, the space to do their own thing but day and night I was there with an open door to give them advice and help.*" Similarly, Geoffrey described retirement as "*an opportunity for someone else to run with and that also brought it to a very nice conclusion. So I had finished something very significant. It was the end of a process that I felt that I had completed.*" His transition to retirement was managed by taking a short-term contract to coordinate the smooth succession in his department and to complete supervision of two doctoral students. Thereafter, Geoffrey's break with the university was clean and deliberate, "*I did not hanker after the department. I did not do what I have seen others do – wander the corridors of the university day after day, totally lost, making a nuisance of themselves*". Further, in both cases, the decision to retire came hard on the heels of the successful completion of mammoth university-wide projects and was facilitated by the intense satisfaction with which they looked back on the fulfilment of their responsibilities. Both had just completed ambitious re-curriculation of the courses in their colleges. Leslie had spearheaded a comprehensive and ambitious re-design of the entire curriculum offered by his faculty "*from A to Z*". However, the implementation process was estimated at five to seven years, beyond the three years left to him before statutory retirement. Moreover, amidst political transformation, Leslie recognised the need for a black dean to take his place and wished the position to go to a mentee who would be further guided by his experienced and loyal deputy-dean. Most striking was that both men saw retirement as the culmination of their life story, a moment in which they had an intense experience that their lives had been meaningful. Leslie concluded: "*It was really at the crest of the wave and that was beautiful for me. I did have a fantastic career. I left at a height and the college was blossoming. It really was tops. I had done it with no regrets. Really I was happy to go.*" Geoffrey weighed self-fulfilment

against stagnation, the other side of Erikson's generativity dialectic: "I*f you are going to retire happily, you must know that you have achieved well before you retired because those who haven't realised their vision or done well or wasted it are never happy.*" The danger of stagnation precipitated Rosemary's election of an early retirement date. University restructuring since the mid-90's had placed many new demands on Rosemary, including the training and constant supervision of novice staff. Rosemary, as one of the most experienced members of her department, was overwhelmed by ever-increasing responsibilities. Her perennial enthusiasm for her work became jaded: "*I was burnt out.*" When a family member worried about her exhausted appearance, Rosemary explained: "*I said to her, 'I am under extreme stress and I don't know what to do!' Then she said to me, 'Why don't you resign?' And I said to her, 'Well, I don't know.' And then I decided I am going to. It was an early retirement. I got pensioned.*" Although her decision was instantaneous, Rosemary did not abandon her responsibilities forthwith and completed the academic year to ensure that "*everything was perfect*". She left behind a comprehensive legacy for others to build on: textbooks and instructional material, curricula and accredited multi-level courses for the training of ECD practitioners, which she alone or she and her team had designed over three decades.

George and Jake both fulfilled their tenure before retirement. During George's last three years in the hurly-burly of management pressures and turbulent relationships, which were the outflow of incisive organisational restructuring, he had shelved writing a book designed to be the culminating project of his career. He remarked "*I was excited about retirement. I could not wait for it as I was not happy in management*." He saw in retirement the chance to consolidate his intellectual legacy through his book, a contribution to South African history, which he intended to write according to his own pace and agenda. A suggestion made by his immediate superior to accept a short-term contract in management was turned down without hesitation. On the contrary, Jake retired at mandatory age with great reluctance. The last decade of his career had been "*fantastic*". He had always thrived on the academic debate engendered by his participation in an informal group of peers who met regularly at work to bounce ideas. Moreover, the university was his '*place*', an intellectual space in which he was intellectually and emotionally fulfilled. Retirement brought an abrupt end to this sense of belonging and with it a loss of meaning. Initially he visited the campus two or three days a week, randomly seeking the company he had so cherished. Adjustment to his new routine at home was difficult. Retirement seemed to bring with it the threat of stagnation with scant opportunity to find new generativity commitments.

4.3 Continuance of generativity after retirement

Formal employment offers adults the benefit of a structured environment and daily tasks and goals to pursue generative actions. Retirement means the loss of this environment and poses a greater challenge to fuel generativity by intrinsic motivation (Moody, 2006). Solutions to this dilemma may take a variety of forms: remunerated part-time employment, such as contract work related to one's academic experience; self-motivated engagement in creative pursuits or voluntary community work. Contract work has the advantage of the external motivation imposed by a formal obligation; the latter options require larger amounts of energy and drive.

Only George and Rosemary have participated in long-term contract work since retirement. Unexpectedly and contrary to university practice at the time which disallowed contracts for retirees, George was made a second offer of contract work shortly after retirement. This time his assignment appealed to his generative sensitivity: he was required to mentor and coach a wide pool of emerging academics who were in the process of applying for national research rating. George said, "*I accepted it as that was something that I was very interested in. So I said yes. I would love to do it. It has fitted me like a glove. It is wonderful.*" This contract has been renewed several times and as he approaches his seventieth year, George still holds this contract position. To describe his task, George repeatedly refers to it in terms of care:"*I am working with people from every college. Suddenly I was thrown in the deep and I was helping academics in Law, I was helping those in the natural sciences. I was helping educationists in the Education Faculty. And it is great and it has expanded. So my work today is helping younger academics get grants, helping people with any grants. When I started this job the university had one [formal] sponsored project. It now has 21.*" George's generativity is seen in his nurture of the careers of others, thus making the "'strategic knowledge' of a wise adult" (de St Aubin, 1998:406) unconditionally available to new academic cohorts.

Rosemary started retired life by structuring a weekly programme devoted to hobbies. But soon her attention was returned to her passion, early childhood education. Approached by two private organisations, she began a part-time consultancy. Her engagement increased when a small, private Christian-based teacher training institution which planned to offer degree programmes invited her full-time professional help. Her experience in course accreditation acquired through years of working with the national accreditation body stood her in good stead: "*So I helped them and we got the degree accredited so we started writing study material.*" Rosemary's renewed joy and zest for her "*retirement job*" is tangible. She heads a small academic department of eight

young lecturers. Her aim is to "*bring the college onto the map*" by training novice lecturers and advising them on their postgraduate research in early childhood education "*so that they can make the journey*" in accordance with academic standards and the institution's explicit Reformed Christian mission. Rosemary herself is again engaged in research on teaching practice which connects directly to the transmission of professional skills to student teachers and has presented several papers since the advent of her 'retirement career' phase.

Geoffrey fulfilled a short contract immediately after retirement; since then his ongoing creation of a substantial intellectual and creative legacy has been intrinsically motivated. In retirement Geoffrey has produced a formal generative narrative: a two-volume memoir recounting his forebears' European roots, their immigration to South Africa, details of his childhood, schooling, membership of church and youth groups, student days, family formation and career. This is complemented by three anthologies of poetry and short stories interspersed with his musical compositions. Only a few of his writings have been published; but many have been shared or performed at social gatherings. A poem written in honour of the university where Geoffrey spent so many years, poetry which reveals profound religious and philosophical musings and musical compositions commemorate special events or honour friends. Virtually all his compositions and writings are dedicated as a personal legacy to his adult children and his grandchildren. His nurture of the performing arts is also expressed in his ongoing adjudication of music competitions, external examination of music students at various institutions and as occasional choir director. Geoffrey concludes he has met the goal he envisaged when he took retirement a few years before age 65: the release of time and energy from tight institutional strictures for his creative endeavours. He surmised: "*So many people in the academic world are single-minded … other people are multifaceted; they can turn their talents to many different directions and have many strings to their bow. I am the second kind, particularly because I am in music and music offers avenues outside of the university to continue after retirement.*"

The threat of post-retirement stagnation Jake feared has been countered by his continued engagement in postgraduate supervision. Postgraduate supervision, undertaken effectively and empathetically, has much in common with the prototypical generative act of parenting: the nurture of a protégé's latent abilities, emotional encouragement and the correction of weaknesses, all aimed at the attainment of the charge's eventual independence. Jake carries out all these functions, challenging and moulding his students' intellect with the eventual aim of their attainment of autonomy as scholars: many of

Jakes' students have gone on to achieve significant careers in psychology. Jake relies on *ad hoc* appointments as supervisor; however, his academic reputation among his former colleagues and students has ensured a steady flow of protégés. This supervision reaps only modest financial returns but like all authentic generative action, which promotes the development of others, it is rewarded by experiencing another's development as if it were one's own (Urrutia *et al*., 2009).

Leslie's post-retirement experience differs significantly from that of the other participants. The legacy built over four decades of service to his institution was a powerful testament to his productivity and creativity. Unsurprisingly, he received several post-retirement offers both from his own institution and others. A proposal from a top research institute in the US was reluctantly but firmly refused. Like Geoffrey, he wished his retirement to signify a final break with his former life: "*Officially I told the Faculty, I said don't phone me for at least the next three years. They did phone me and I helped them but I said, 'I have told you this is the last time'.*" Leslie's retirement has been accompanied by a thoughtful re-evaluation of his priorities. He concluded that midlife had been dominated by an all-engrossing career and that the primary generative pursuit vested in family relationships had come second. Retirement was now the time "*to bring balance back into your life if you were all work and no play.*" Leslie, a widower, re-married a retired academic who shared his many non-academic interests and deliberately switched his focus to self-enrichment, practised not in isolation but in conjunction with his wife, grandchildren and a close circle of like-minded friends with few connections to academe. Rigorous and extended travel consumes most of the couple's time: they have undertaken several overland trips in Africa and extensive camping and hiking trips in Europe and parts of Asia. Further, Leslie is engaged in a programme of non-academic reading and basks in the time he can devote to the nurture of his spiritual life. He contrasts his current daily devotions to the mad routine of the career academic: "*Then I just spent five minutes with God. I didn't have the time. What, you work all day long! Tonight you go to an Inaugeral lecture, a graduation, to whatever, another meeting, a function.*" Leslie still plans for academic pursuits, "*I want to write an article. I want to write a book on the true reality of losing a life companion. In a couple of years I want to do something for the seniors.*" But these aspirations are vague and lie at an undefined point in the future. Leslie feels his obligation is now to himself, "*To plough back into your life, what you neglected over the years. You need to plough into yourself, to get back to yourself, like reading time, religious time, music time, leisure time.*" Thus, Leslie has voluntarily and consciously disassociated himself from his previous single-minded en-

gagement in the "maintenance of the world" of academe (Erikson, 1978:11). His attention has partly turned another aspect of generativity, the relational care induced by a new marriage and an enlarged extended family. But his main concern appears to be "transcend his over-defined professional existence" (Erikson, 1978:2) through the nurture of neglected facets of identity. His passion for travel embodies a pilgrimage to reunify himself with himself. In fact, an important journey made with his wife shortly after retirement was a well-known annual pilgrimage made by devotees in Spain. Although an outlier in this regard among the participants, Leslie's experience fits Erikson's (1950) notion of epigenetic development which maintains that although generativity (vs. stagnation) is most salient to midlife, all developmental issues are present at all times. Thus, the generative adult, such as Leslie, situated in the latter part of midlife may, at some level, still be working on identity tasks associated with earlier stages of the life cycle. In retirement Leslie remains a vitally engaged and productive man. If his retirement narrative suggests narcissism, that is, a preoccupation with self, it could be seen "enlightened self-interest" (Frimer, Walker, Dunlop, Lee & Riches, 2012:149) whereby Leslie is strategically seeking to compensate for a life previously dominated by work.

4.4 Generative commitments at the threshold of old age

The realisation of the reality of death associated with ageing is a generativity-threatening experience which may often re-energise generative commitment as one attempts to reduce death anxiety by creating and re-appraising one's legacy (De St Aubin, 1998). Erikson (1950) maintains that the ageing adult may successfully counter feelings of hopelessness and despair evoked by life's finiteness by accepting his/her life as something good and worthwhile. In so doing ego integrity is achieved, which in turn produces wisdom which enables the ageing adult "to live out the future, to place him- or herself in perspective among the generations now living" (Erikson *et al*., 1986:56). Ego integrity depends largely on a life of active generativity and the integration of earlier experiences of caring into the life story (Jones & McAdams, 2013). As the participants in this study related their stories, they all demonstrated awareness of the importance of having lived life well in the face of approaching old age and the limitations it brings. Their narratives were frequently illustrated by anecdotes which revealed that they recognised their most productive years were more nearly completed than yet to be lived. They also acknowledged that knowing that they had lived lives meaningful to others helped to counter the apprehension associated with diminishing physical and intellectual powers.

Leslie opened his story by referring to the cyclical nature of life whereby the quality of life in retirement is determined by one's earlier years: "*You cast your bread on the waters* [and it will return to you] *after many days because during your life, you are actually working towards what is coming to you later in retirement.*" Not only did Leslie's fruitful professional career represent a legacy which outlasted his departure from the university, but the financial rewards have also enabled his choice of a lifestyle after retirement that is out of the reach of the average retiree. Further, the production of this legacy undergirds his justification of a retirement now spent on the actualisation of his own dreams rather than those of others. His post-retirement project of self-development, which is largely expressed through travel, is driven not only by pleasure but a sense of urgency brought on by the sudden deaths of two siblings and the sober insight that travel in one's late 60s and 70s is dependent on physical vigour and good health: "*There are still so many places we want to visit and time is running out.*" Geoffrey, the oldest participant at age 75, is already some way to achieving ego integrity. His recall of a career of caring for the musical community mingled with the gratification he finds in his continued creativity has produced tranquillity, visible in both his demeanour and his words. His artistic creations are a rich legacy for his family and the community and this has helped to create a sense of permanence in old age. Geoffrey repeatedly described his life, past and present, as a "*joy*"; inevitable crises (a spouse's serious illness, concerns about adult children and occasional financial pressures) have not been eluded but have been faced, resolved and integrated into a meaningful whole in which his future, albeit one of already lessening physical vigour, is filled with hope. George, at nearly 70, good-humouredly recognised the inevitability of slowing down in the next decade of his life and is looking forward to time to write his book. This cherished project ground to a standstill amid the demands of his post-retirement contracts: "*The book is no further. The book does not get written which is a big sadness. I do manage to write chapters [in other books] or articles, but not nearly as many as I thought I was going to do.*" George's mentoring job, which he found so satisfying, exacted a toll of time-consuming paperwork which has landed him in the dilemma of the full-time academic: active research is circumscribed by arduous administrative tasks. Notwithstanding, George is satisfied that, when the last contract ends, his knowledge and skills will be carried forward in the careers of his mentees. With gratitude, Rosemary acknowledges that her exciting 'second career' phase allowed her to reverse the stagnation, "t*hreatening, negative, dragging you down*", which darkened her last years at the university. At retirement she eschewed a leisure lifestyle devoted to her many hobbies, which she could have supported with "*my nice pension, 32 years' service, and I also bought*

back pension over the years, quite a nice pension". Instead she prolonged generative commitment enthusiastically and has ploughed back the experience gained in her 'first career' into a developing institution. However, Rosemary knows that this intense activity must end within a few years and she is already positioning herself for a less active period of 'second' retirement. She has enrolled for her third master's degree in psychotherapy and plans a practice as life-coach to help struggling postgraduate students, a plan which is consistent with her commitment to generative care.

Part of the process of life review is coming to terms with perceived mistakes, failures and omissions (Erikson *et al*., 1986). Of the participants, Jake's narrative showed the most conscious introspection concerning the achievements of previous life stages. Jake endeavours to integrate, rather than deny, low points in his career; the rather unwelcome adjustment to a more isolated life in retirement shared predominantly with his spouse also a retired academic; his brush with death during a recent armed robbery at his home; and his unorthodox religious sentiments. Jake has undertaken the integration of his past with his present with resolution and humour and so combats feelings of despair. As a qualified but non-practising clinical psychologist, he laughingly recounts how he applies counselling principles to his battle to accept the downside of retirement. His primary source of intellectual satisfaction lies in generativity expressed in his ongoing postgraduate supervision: "*I will continue supervision till I am senile.*" In his garden which has become his domestic responsibility and which he cares for good-naturedly, he has built a path of stepping stones to a bench among the shrubbery. He explains the underlying symbolism: "*I have measured the path carefully – nine tenths of my life is over. There is that last stone in the path just before the bench and I sit and contemplate it. You will never get your youth back again, you can still at times taste a little of what was good in your young days but the real challenge is what you will do with this last step.*" This garden feature suggests an unconsciously created picture of the life cycle which does more than extend into the next generation but "curves back on the life of the individual, allowing … a re-experiencing of earlier stages in a new form" (Erikson *et al*., 1986:327).

5. Conclusion

Healthy adult development in midlife is dependent on generativity and generative adults benefit society in a number of ways (Erikson, 1950). Through thematic analysis of the life stories of retired academics this study explored how an intellectual legacy may be generated, transmitted and preserved

through the career and after retirement, although the latter is not the prototypical generative stage of life (Batesman, 2010). Consistent with past research, generativity in the participants' lives was positively associated with recalling professional experiences in which care for others and for the university as valued social institution was shown through teaching, mentoring, supervising, creative endeavours and academic leadership. These generative tasks organised the narratives and their significance was integral to the life satisfaction of the participants. Generative tasks were seen as pleasant and as opportunities to continue personal growth; threats to continued professional generativity were seen very negatively.

However, generativity is not an automatic function of adult behaviour but a conscious choice which leads to commitment and action. Major life changes such as retirement may cause a disruption to generative commitment and pose the choice if and how generativity will be continued after retirement. The prolongation of generative action is encouraged when social institutions recruit retirees for new forms of service (McAdams *et al*., 1998); to continue intellectual and creative endeavours without some form of formal engagement requires greater perseverance and motivation. On the other hand, individuals may also choose to exchange generative action related to their former academic lives with self-development and/or investment in personal relationships, which were overlooked during a frenetic career (Erikson, 1978).

Given a Christian understanding of the concept of generativity, Browning (2006) stresses the mutuality of generativity, which signifies benefits both for giver and for receiver. Erikson (1978) points out that generativity fulfils the adult's need to be needed and argues that it is as essential for the renewal of the individual's own life as it is for that of the next generation. Similarly, the study confirmed that highly generative academics who created an intellectual and creative legacy of self to benefit future generations during their working lives reap the fruit thereof through meaning and purpose in their own lives after retirement. Indeed, the mutual benefits of generative commitment become even more crucial in the post-retirement phase, when the adult increasingly is faced with his/her finiteness and the need to integrate all life's experiences, both positive and negative, into the ego with a sense of hope. If the generative adult at the threshold of old age expresses fulfilment by being able to say, 'I am what survives me' (Erikson, 1950), the academic may echo, 'I am what I have been able to pass on to others in my community of practice and far beyond it'. Thus, although generativity is not typically associated with studies of older adults (Schoklitsch & Bauman, 2012), the findings of this inquiry have the potential to inform future studies on generativity and its

importance for successful ageing in the post-retirement period with particular reference to the academic profession.

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The genesis of a new conception of the state in the political philosophy of Dooyeweerd

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Opsomming

Hoewel Dooyeweerd regte studeer het sou sy aandag spoedig verbreed word tot 'n studie van die regsfilosofie, die filosofie in die algemeen en veral ook die geskiedenis van die filosofie. Daardeur is hy gekonfronteer met die eensydighede van sowel atomistiese (individualistiese) as holistiese (universalistiese) benaderings wat die ganse geskiedenis van besinning oor staat en samelewing deurkruis. Deur aandag te gee aan die struktuur van tradisionele (ongedifferensieerde) samelewings is Dooyeweerd in staat gestel om rekenskap te gee van die differensiëring van die samelewing en die ontstaan van die moderne staat. Die owerheid se gesag is in 'n publiekregtelike amp gesetel wat nie langer as 'n heerlike reg (behorende tot die privaatbesit van 'n koning) gesien kan word nie. Op die basis van sy nuut-ontwikkelde teorie van modale aspekte het Dooyeweerd vir die eerste keer daarin geslaag om sistematies-samehangend rekenskap te gee van die ryk-geskakeerde wyse waarop die staat as samelewingsvorm in alle aspekte van die werklikheid funksioneer. Hierdie analise is verder verdiep deur die idee van 'n funderings- en 'n kwalifiseringsfunksie. Met behulp daarvan kon Dooyeweerd 'n belynde begrip van die aard van die staat formuleer: die staat is 'n publieke regsverband wat op basis van die monopolie van die swaardmag op 'n begrensde territorium onder leiding van 'n publieke geregtigheids¬idee regsbelange saamsnoer in een openbare regsorde. Hierdie omskrywing hang saam met die nuwe tipering wat Dooyeweerd van die aard van die

publieke reg en die burgerlike en nie-burgerlike privaatreg gegee het – in diens van 'n geartikuleerde strewe om staatsvorming te laat rig deur die idee van 'n egte regstaat.

Abstract

Dooyeweerd commenced as a law-student but soon expanded his intellectual pursuits beyond the boundaries of the science of law. The prevailing schools of thought within the discipline of law helped him to be sceptical about the allegedly purely logical or purely jural nature of the basic concepts of the discipline of law. His novel approach accepted both the uniqueness of the various aspects of reality and their mutual coherence. In articulating his new general theory of modal law-spheres he advanced systematic distinctions which facilitated an understanding of universal modal aspects which are not only modes of being but also modes of explanation. The dominant theories of state and society mainly fluctuated between atomistic (individualistic) and holistic (universalistic) approaches – one-sided views accentuating either a quantitative multiplicity (number) or one or another societal whole of which all the other societal entities are mere parts. Traditional societies need to differentiate before the necessary space is opened up for the rise of the modern state. Nonetheless it did happen that monarchies are sometimes romanticized as the most frequent states while holding on to a view of kingship which does not allow for the office of government as being public in nature. What is unique in Dooyeweerd's understanding of the state is that it functions within all aspects of reality. Although these aspects are fitted in an irreversible order of succession, something else is needed to account for the typical nature of the state. On the basis of the distinction between modal laws and type laws Dooyeweerd introduces yet another novel systematic distinction, namely the one between the typical foundational function and the typical qualifying function of an entity. As an organized community the public nature of the state is qualified by the jural aspect while having its foundational function in the formation of power (the sword power), i.e. in die cultural-historical aspect of reality. What is unique in his legal and political philosophy is given in the way Dooyeweerd distinguishes between public law on the one hand and civil and non-civil private law on the other. In the final analysis Dooyeweerd's

new appreciation of the structural principle of the state primarily serves to inspire state-formation to observe the inherent sphere-sovereign limits attached to governmental power – the idea of a just state (rechtsstaat).

Particularly in confrontation with the dominant philosophical orientations of the early 20th century Dooyeweerd soon realized that his training within the field of law should be expanded in the direction of the philosophical foundations of the academic disciplines. At the same time he first of all wanted to test his novel philosophical ideas within an academic domain in which he specialized before he ventured to explore the general philosophical implications of his innovative new philosophical stance. In this article the focus will be on the difficulties facing his attempt to develop a new understanding of the state. For the sake of a proper understanding of the focus and scope of this article we commence with a brief overview of what will follow.

Because the main aim of this article is to account for the *genesis* of a new conception of the state in the political philosophy of Dooyeweerd, it first of all highlights the main contours of the intellectual legacy of the West, which toggled between the one-sided extremes of an atomistic (individualistic) and a holistic (universalistic) approach. It is only on the basis of this background-perspective that it is possible to appreciate the originality of Dooyeweerd's contribution to the domain of scholarship and of his confrontation with various philosophical trends within die science of law and the discipline of political theory. The way in which the familiar distinction between entities and functions is treated within this article, including a concise overview of the various ways in which the state functions within each modal aspect of reality, is not found in any article formerly published in the *Journal for Christian Scholarship*. This perspective is broadened when a brief account is given of the distinction between civil and non-civil private law (absent in the training of students in standard law-schools). This section contains novel arguments regarding succession and foundation, regarding the republican nature of the state as well as the spheres of law within a differentiated society, articulated against the background of the Roman *ius civile* and *ius gentium*. The way in which Dooyeweerd distinguishes between civil and non-civil private law barely features in *A New Critique*. In Volume III it is implicit on pages 446 ff. and explicit only on page 690 – in a single sentence: "In this view private law is only of one kind: it is identical with civil law." Dooyeweerd elaborates this significant view in more detail in his not-yet-published class-notes on the Encyclopaedia of the Science of Law.

1. Contours of the intellectual legacy of the West

Western (political) philosophy originated in Greek antiquity. During the medieval period it was transformed through an attempted synthesis between elements of Greek philosophy and biblical Christianity. What Plato and Aristotle contemplated about the state in supra-individual terms assumed a subordinate place in the medieval split between *nature* and *grace*. Although it represented the highest *temporal* form of perfection, the state ultimately was merely a stepping-stone utilized by the church which was supposed to obtain supra-natural eternal bliss (see Von Hippel, 1955:313). Via the Renaissance and the Enlightenment the emphasis shifted to individuals, the supposed atoms or elements incorporated in social contract theories. However, romanticism reverted once more to an appreciation of the supra-individual nature of a *folk community* with its own *national spirit* (*Volksgeist*). This development, through its influence upon Nazism, caused unforeseen and horrific consequences for the political situation in Europe more than a century later, particularly evident in *World War Two*. It also influenced the Afrikaner *folk ideology*.

2. Dooyeweerd entering the domain of scholarship

During the second decade of the 20th century Dooyeweerd started to acquaint himself with the broader world of scholarship.[1] After the completion of his dissertation he was confronted with the most diverse schools of thought both within legal philosophy and political theory. The preceding 500 years were largely dominated by various *humanistic* traditions which developed after the Greek-Medieval legacy dominated the scene for millennia.

Christian reflection on state and society resorted to the foundational ideas of Augustine (354-430) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1277), although it also had to distance itself from un-biblical motives present in their philosophical views. What emerged was a new approach dating back to the Reformation of the sixteenth century and eventually followed up by Groen van Prinsterer (1801-1876) and Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920). These thinkers in particular paved the way for the contribution of Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977) who, alongside his brother-in-law, D.H.Th Vollenhoven (1892-1978), developed a philosophical understanding of reality directed at and informed by the biblical distinction between Creator and creation.

1 He completed his doctoral dissertation in 1917 on *The Council of Ministers in Dutch constitutional law*.

It explains why the cultural sphere within which Dooyeweerd grew up acquainted him with significant fruits of the Reformation. Groen van Prinsterer conveys his explanation for the intrinsic link between unbelief and revolution in a work with a similar title, *Unbelief and Revolution* (*Ongeloof en Revolutie* – 1847, 1868, and 1922) and Abraham Kuyper states his views in works such as his *Ons Program* (*Our Program* – 1880) and his *Anti revolutionaire Staatkunde* (*Anti revolutionary Politics*, 2 Volumes – 1916).

3. Appreciating Dooyeweerd's originality

However, as soon as one investigates Dooyeweerd's political philosophy and theory of the state, one is struck by its comparative *originality*. Although there are many points of connection with the past, the encompassing context within which Dooyeweerd articulated his idea of the state exceeds what normal practitioners of the disciplines of law and political science would have expected.

The same assessment applies to his entire philosophy, because it is striking that academics coming from diverse intellectual back-grounds nonetheless highly appreciates the unique contribution of Dooyeweerd to scholarship as such. When Dooyeweerd turned 70 (in October 1964) the daily newspaper *Trouw* published an article written by G.E. Langemeijer, a former *Attorney General* of the *Dutch Appeal Court* and a former *Chairman* of the *Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences*. In this article Langemeijer explicitly mentions the fact that he has a totally different worldview and political orientation than Dooyeweerd.[2] He ponders the question what the significance of Dooyeweerd's philosophy is for *The Netherlands* and for the *rest of the world*? The reason for this lenience and wider scope is found in Langemeijer's preceding assessment, where he states "that one can comfortably say that Dooyeweerd is the most original philosopher Holland has produced, even Spinoza not excepted".[3]

That a president of the "Humanist League" in the Netherlands and professor of philosophy at the Technical University of Delft, dr. P.B. Cliteur, holds a similar appreciation, underscores what Langemeijer has said. According to Cliteur "Herman Dooyeweerd undoubtedly is the most formidable Dutch philosopher of the 20th century."

2 Langemeijer stated that he came "van geheel andere wereldbeschouwing en politieke orientatie".

3 "van wie men rustig kan zeggen dat hij de meest oorspronklike [wijsgeer] is, die Nederland ooit heeft voortgebracht, Spinoza zelfs niet uitgezonderd" (see Kalsbeek, 1970:10).

Another scholar, Giorgio Del Vecchio (the well-known Italian neo-Kantian legal philosopher), straight-forwardly said that Dooyeweerd is "the most profound, innovative, and penetrating philosopher since Kant" (Dooyeweerd, 1996a).

4. The importance of a world- and life-view

Initially Dooyeweerd's philosophy of the Law-Idea (*Wetsidee*) was also seen as a *Calvinistic philosophy*. He soon realized that in many respects this may cause misunderstandings and therefore eventually switched to the phrase: *philosophy of the cosmonomic idea* – literally, *Philosophy of the Law-Idea*.

The term 'Calvinism' can only be explained historically by the fact that this movement originated in the calvinistic revival which, according to Dooyeweerd, "toward the end of the previous century [19th century], led to renewed reflection on the relation of the Christian religion to science, culture, and society" (see Dooyeweerd, 1996:1). Dooyeweerd remarks that Abraham Kuyper pointed out that the "great movement of the Reformation could not continue to be restricted to the reformation of the church and theology. Its biblical point of departure touched the religious root of the whole of temporal life and had to assert its validity in all of its sectors. Kuyper argued that insight into these implications had been best expressed by Calvin, and so for lack of a better term began to speak of 'Calvinism' as an all-embracing world view which was clearly distinguishable from both Roman Catholicism and Humanism" (Dooyeweerd, 1996:1).

However, being aware of the radical and integral meaning of the biblical basic motive of creation, fall and redemption by itself does nog generate a new articulated philosophy. The challenge to accomplish such a goal faced two significant obstacles: The first one concerns a romanticized appreciation of relatively undifferentiated societies and the second one flows from the one-sidedness of traditional theories of state and society.

5. Undifferentiated societal structures

When the term *undifferentiated* is used we are reminded of the social organization of societies such as the guilds of the middle ages. They reveal features similar to the extended family and the sib as well as pre-feudal and feudal communities. Given the fact that theories of society and the *polis* (the Greek city-state) emerged within Greek culture, it should be kept in mind that

ancient Greece as well as ancient Rome reflect *undifferentiated societies*. The process of cultural and societal differentiation took shape during the reign of the patrician clans in Greece. Within the Greek city states the undifferentiated patrician clans were the bearers of power. Typically agriculture and stock-breeding were superseded by the money aristocracy, while the older Ionian tribes were replaced by territorial tribes.

Within societal conditions such as these it is understandable that the *politeia* was appreciated by Plato and Aristotle as encompassing all of society and as capable to perfect human life, guided by justice as moral virtue.

Remark:

In passing it should be noted that the word *state* is not very old. Plato used the term *politeia* (republic) while the medieval era referred to a *regnum*, also known as *empires* and *kingdoms*. Owing to their universalistic orientation Greek and medieval philosophy did not properly distinguish between "state" and "society". An empire embraced all of life and is succeeded by another empire. Charlemagne, for example, saw in the Frankish empire the successor of the Roman *empire* (see Ehler & Morrall, 1954:12).

At a later stage of his scholarly development Dooyeweerd had a good understanding of the relative undifferentiated nature of early Roman folk law. Initially the *ius civile* was the sole bearer of law. The family life of the patrician clans had a sphere of competence which belonged to the *civitas* (the Roman tribe). These patrician clans were dissolved into the Roman *familia* when the power of the Roman republic emerged. Yet the Roman *familia*, subjected to the authority of the oldest male member, the *pater familias*, was still undifferentiated. This explains why the *pater familias* had power over the life and death of its members and why the *ius civile* (Roman folk law) excluded non-Romans – anyone outside the Roman folk community had no rights. At the same time, as Dooyeweerd points out, the "sphere of authority of the pater familias was juridically distinct from the power of the state. It was religiously inviolate and absolute, and the state could not interfere with it" (Dooyeweerd, 2012:24). Also the above-mentioned Germanic *guild* system continued a totalitarian and undifferentiated structure (see Dooyeweerd, 2012:78).

Within an undifferentiated context it is not yet possible to discern a genuine state geared towards the maintenance of a public legal framework, one in which the office of government is no longer seen as belonging to the private capacity of a king. This is precisely what Ludwig von Haller did in his extensive work, *Resauration der Staatswissenschaft* (*Restoration of Political*

Science – 1820-1825). Here he dedicates a substantial part to the independence of landlords and patrimonial monarchs (Second Part, Volume 3: "Von den unabhängigen Grundherren oder den Patrimonial-Fürsten"). Before Groen van Prinsterer was acquainted with the views of Friedrich Julius Stahl, he adhered to the position defended by von Haller. The latter considered the monarchy, with its large-scale ownership, as the norm for any political organization. He holds that monarchies are not only the first, oldest and most frequent states, but that originally most municipalities were based upon domestic communities or on (patriarchal) seignorial relationships of an estate (von Haller, 1820-1825:157).[4] In his work, *Ongeloof en Revolutie*, van Prinsterer quotes the view of Guizot which advocates a similar stance. "the decisive and fundamental character of a kingship is that it was a personal and not public authority" (Van Prinsterer, 1922:68).

This romanticized appreciation of relatively undifferentiated societies is nothing but *reactionary* in a historical sense. In Kuyper's thought similar views are continued even dating back to ancient Greek culture – just compare his view of the state as an *ethical organism* which combines Aristotle and Romanticism (see Kuyper, 1907:60 ff.).

6. The one-sidedness of traditional theories of state and society

The entire history of reflection on the nature of state and society fluctuated between the extremes of *atomistic* and *holistic* theories. In the terminology of more recent sociological theories these orientations are also designated as individualistic and universalistic. The former type (atomistic/individualistic) postulates "atoms" – i.e. "individuals" – as the ultimate building blocks of society, while the latter (holistic/universalistic) assumes one or another societal whole to be the all-encompassing totality of society, embracing all other societal entities as mere parts.

4 A remark of Dooyeweerd in his extensive work, *The struggle for a Christian Politics*, sheds light on the background of this counter-revolutionary view: "Within the prevailing natural economy (the exchange of goods without the fundamental role of money as the measure of value), the services of state officials were rewarded by the territorial rulers with sizeable land grants. This resulted in the formation of a class of hereditary landowners and a subjective linking of authority to land ownership, leading to the false suggestion, maintained by some even in modern counter-revolutionary writings (Von Haller and others), that authority itself was a private right" (Dooyeweerd, 2012:25).

Before Dooyeweerd articulated his idea of the state he engaged himself in the just-mentioned study on *The Struggle for a Christian Politics*. Over a period of three years (1924-1927) he published a series of articles on this theme. The *Foreword* of this volume notes that it contains historical topics covering early Christianity and the rise of the idea of the *Corpus Christianum*. It also investigates the unitary ecclesiastical culture of the Middle Ages and its dissolution with the rise of modern Humanism, introduced by the Renaissance. As legal scholar Dooyeweerd highlights the rise and self-destruction of the Humanist theories of natural law while at the same time analyzing the development of the modern concept of *science* and the new concept of *matter*. He succeeds in relating themes that are apparently widely apart, such as the prevalent mathematical method and the views of Grotius and Hobbes. Of specific importance for an understanding of Dooyeweerd's new idea of the state is his confrontation in this volume with the nature of modern Humanism. It is remarkable how well he versed himself in the spirit of this newly emerging worldview with its dialectically opposing motives of *nature* (the natural science ideal) and *freedom* (the personality ideal).

Dooyeweerd understood the levelling effects of the continuity postulate of the science ideal and realized that it has an inherent levelling tendency that does not accept any boundaries for logical thinking. At the time he already had a first, rudimentary perspective on multiple aspects or functions of reality to which he applied the idea of spheres of laws (law-spheres) subject to the principle of sphere-sovereignty. Dooyeweerd holds:

> Also, just as frequently, we find the tendency of logical continuity to be characteristic of this ideal of science. The goal of this tendency is to have the creative intellect reconstruct the universe with all its spheres of existence and validity in a logically unbroken, continuous coherence. The sovereignty of reason, the bulwark of the humanist ideal of science, cannot accept any absolute boundaries for thought. All law-like boundaries become relative. It is logical thought that guarantees the logical coherence, the logical continuity, between all law-spheres (Dooyeweerd, 2012:273-274).

This explains why the thought of Bodin and Grotius, and in particular that of Hobbes, "as soon as it gets hold of the law-sphere of the juridical and the state, cannot but result in the destruction of all sphere-sovereignty. Whereupon the dangerous political tendencies of the ideal of science, grounded in the fundamental structure of the humanist law-idea, are realized, with state absolutism as the dreary outcome" (Dooyeweerd, 2012:274). Interestingly, Fichte and Hegel are just briefly mentioned in this work. Later on Dooyeweerd

extensively (and in different contexts) analyzes the switch within post-Kantian freedom-idealism from the rationalistic individualism of the 18th century Enligthenment to an irrationalistic universalism. This switch was mediated by early Romanticism with its individualistic irrationalism (see Dooyeweerd, 2012:251 and Dooyeweerd, 2012a:175-187).

7. Philosophical trends in die science of law

After his appointment at the Free University of Amsterdam, Dooyeweerd presented his *Inaugural Address* in 1926, entitled: *The Significance of the Cosmonomic Idea for the Science of Law and Legal Philosophy*. He commences with a brief sketch of the development of the humanistic basic motive of nature and freedom (Dooyeweerd, 1926:5-13) in preparation of a more penetrating assessment of the state of the discipline of law at the time. In the light of the dialectical nature of the ground-motive of Humanism his *Inaugural Address* displays a sharpened awareness of the antinomies[5] entailed in scholarly thinking. First of all he highlights antinomies from different academic fields, including the currently well-known set theoretic contemplation of the "set of all sets" (Dooyeweerd, 1926:83) – and then he proceeds with a penetrating analysis of antinomies within the humanistic theory of law in the light of diverse types of the humanistic law-idea.

These include naturalistic types (Dooyeweerd, 1926:16-22); idealistic functionalistic types (the Marburgh School within the neo-Kantian theory of law – Dooyeweerd, 1926:22-40); relativistic personalistic types (the Baden School of the neo-Kantian legal theory –Dooyeweerd, 1926:40-51); and the transpersonalistic type (revival of objective idealism within legal philosophy – Dooyeweerd, 1926:51-60).

In confrontation with these schools of thought Dooyeweerd soon realized that neither the logical-analytical aspect nor the jural aspect could be isolated from all the other aspects of our empirical world. For this reason the basic concepts of the science of law cannot be seen as *purely logical thought categories*, just as little as it is possible (*a la* Kelsen) to generate a "reine Rechtslehre", a "pure theory of law", in which all the ties or interconnections with the other aspects of reality are (theoretically) severed.

5 Note that whereas a contradiction concerns a confusion within a specific aspect (such as confusing a square with a circle: *a square circle*), an antinomy results when two (or more) unique aspects are reduced to one only (in the case of Zeno arguments static spatial positions are confused with the uniform flow of rectilinear movement). According to Stafleu one may interpret Zeno's arguments as a demonstration of the fact that numerical and spatial relations are inadequate to explain *motion* (Stafleu, 1987:61).

In response to the shortcomings and antinomies present in these modes of thought, Dooyeweerd further explored the implications of acknowledging sphere-sovereign functional aspects (modal aspects) of reality.[6] His confrontation with the diverse trends of thought within the science of law mediated the development of the theory of modal law-spheres and their analogical interconnections.

8. Inter-modal connections

Dooyeweerd soon realized that the so-called "categories of thought" (the apriori categories of human understanding in the thought of Immanuel Kant) are not purely logical-analytical in nature and that the meaning of the jural aspect (law-sphere) cannot be grasped in isolation from all the other aspects of reality. Equally less should these categories be "seated" within the subjective human consciousness, as a prominent representative of the Berlin school of political theory, Georg Jellinek, advocated. He explicitly rejects the idea of the jural as transcending, in an ontic sense, human subjectivity. According to him, law is an ingredient of representations in the human mind, and coming to a closer determination of what law is, amounts to establishing which part of the contents of human consciousness should be designated as law.[7]

The first challenge facing a sound theory of law is to trace the modal aspect where aspectual (functional) terms are located. Consider the concept of a *legal order*. It entails the idea of a multiplicity of jural norms that are united. A legal order therefore entails a jural unity in the multiplicity of positively shaped or formed legal principles. The phrase "legal order" thus displays an unbreakable connection between the numerical meaning of the one and the many and the jural mode of our experience. Dooyeweerd articulates this

6 Interestingly Dooyeweerd's work on the *Crisis in Humanistic Political Theory* (1931) totally avoided using the terms "modal", "modality" or the expression "modal aspect". Here he consistently restricts himself to using the term "function" (see the *Editor's Foreword* in Dooyeweerd, 2010:i).

7 "Entweder man sucht die Natur des Rechtes als einer vom Menschen unabhängigen, in dem objektiven Wesen des Seienden gegründeten Macht zu erforschen, oder man faßt es als subjektive, d.h. innermenschliche Erscheinung auf. ... Das Recht ist dem nach ein Teil der menschlichen Vorstellungen, es existiert in unseren Köpfen, und die nähere Bestimmung des Rechtes hat dahin zugehen, welcher Teil unseres Bewußtseins inhaltes als Recht zu bezeichnen ist" (Jellinek, 1966:332). Since the Renaissance modern nominalism did not acknowledge universality outside the human mind. Compare the nominalistic stance which has already been defended by Descartes: "number and all universals are mere modes of thought" (*Principles of Philosophy*, Part I, LVII).

situation by saying that within the structure of the jural aspect we may discern an *analogy* of the original meaning of the numerical aspect (the one and the many). The validity of legal rules concerns their *effect*, their *being in force*, clearly showing that the meaning of the physical aspect of energy-operation is also analogically reflected within the jural mode. Without the (foundational) meaning of the biotic aspect of reality, within which we meet life phenomena such as growth, differentiation and integration, it would be meaningless for the science of law to speak about differentiated legal spheres within society, such as constitutional law, penal law, civil private law, internal ecclesiastical law, commercial law and so on. Furthermore, the contrary between what is logical and what is illogical is analogically reflected within the jural aspect in the configuration of legal lawfulness and unlawfulness. Although the core meaning of the jural aspect is indefinable, its unique core meaning (meaning-nucleus) comes to expression only in coherence with all the non-jural aspects of reality. Perhaps the best way to designate the meaning-nucleus of the jural aspect is to see it as giving each person his or her due. Although Dooyeweerd uses in Dutch the term “vergelding”, the best translational equivalent may be the idea of *tribution* (as giving each person his or her due).

Within the theory of modal aspects (law-spheres) Dooyeweerd at the same time also acknowledges that the many-sided existence of natural and societal entities presupposes the (ontic) *universality* of all modal aspects, including the jural. This fundamental insight opens the way for recognizing an equally important trait of our empirical world, namely the fact that all natural and societal entities and processes in principle invariably function within all modal aspects of reality. This insight therefore requires an understanding of the connection between entities and functions.

9. Entities and functions

At first sight it may seem that distinguishing different modal (functional) aspects of reality does not remotely impact upon theorizing about the state. Dooyeweerd identified the following aspects, given in the order of succession which he discerns between them: number, space, movement, energy-operation, life, feeling, logical-analytical thinking, cultural-historical control, the lingual, social, economic, aesthetic, jural, moral and the faith aspect. If the structural principle of the state, designated by Dooyeweerd as its *individuality-structure*, has nothing to with most of these aspects, how can one then explain that *Annual Yearbooks* of states commence with statistics (such as the *number* of its citizens) and by providing information about the

size of the state's territory (*space*)? As noted above in connection with the phrase *legal order*, the core meaning of number, which is given in discrete quantity, underlies our awareness of the *one* and the *many*. This feature is often employed in an expanded context, transcending the mere numerical meaning of a discrete multiplicity, for instance when the idea of *unity and diversity* is articulated.

In respect of political theory and the structure of the state we have already noted that particularly since the Renaissance *atomistic* or *individualistic* theories of the state emerged – manifesting themselves in social contract theories. According to these theories the "atoms" of society and the state are the "individuals". Clearly, the various natural and societal entities which we experience always function within the numerical aspect of reality. Conversely the numerical aspect may indeed serve as a *mode of explanation* of theoretical thought. From a historical perspective exploring this mode of explanation resulted in a *reductionist* understanding of the state. It is the outcome of the theoretical attempt to explain the state merely in terms of the interaction of a multiplicity of individuals.

At the cradle of philosophy in ancient Greece the Pythagoreans even claimed that *everything is number*. This conviction was soon challenged by a shift in emphasis after the discovery of *incommensurability* gave rise to the problematic nature of irrational numbers, which led to an exploration of the spatial whole-parts relation (see Parmenides B Fr. 8:3-6 and Zeno B. Fr. 3 – see Diels-Kranz, 1960:235; 257-258).This development led to a *geometrization* of Greek mathematics. Aristotle combined a reference to the one and the many with the whole-parts relation: "What 'is' may be either in definition (for example 'to be white' is one thing, 'to be musical' another, yet the same thing may be both, so the one is many) or by division, as the whole and its parts" (Physics 185b32-186a1 – see Aristotle, 2001:221). A bit further on he provides a precise characterization of the numerical meaning of infinity (one plus another one and so on) and its spatial meaning (infinite divisibility): "everything that is infinite may be so in respect of addition or division" (Physics 204a3-4 – see Aristotle, 2001:260).

Apart from the space metaphysics of Parmenides, the road was now paved for exploring a different *mode of explanation*, which resulted in universalistic or holistic theories of society and the state. Universalistic political theories, consistently thought through, invariably terminate in totalitarian views eliminating the structural differences between the various societal entities, because they elevate one or another societal whole to incorporate all the others as integral parts (see Strauss, 2012).

Dooyeweerd's philosophy enables us to recognize the fact that a one-sided and misdirected use of the numerical or spatial aspects as points of entry and as modes of explanation does not eliminate the functioning of every state within them.

Of course natural and societal entities, as well as all events (or processes) in principle also function in *all* the other modal aspects. Let us therefore briefly reflect on the functioning of the state within the various (ontic) modal functions of reality:

First of all, as already mentioned above, the state comprises a *multiplicity of individuals* normally designated as its *citizens*. Every *census* underscores this active function of the state within the quantitative aspect of reality. Keep in mind that this numerical function affirms one of the many modes of being of the state. Moreover, the existence of the state is certainly not exhausted by its numerical functioning. The most striking feature of the spatial function of a state is given in its *territory*. In spite of the fact that the citizens of a state are constantly *on the move*, i.e., interacting with other citizens, they remain bound to the state. In fact one of the hallmarks of a democratic state is that it should provide for the freedom of movement of its subjects. In addition to the kinematic function, the state also functions within the physical aspect. By organizing the "power of the sword" the state is capable of exercising the required *force* whenever necessary – in service of restoring law and order when certain legal interests have been encroached upon (think about the actions of the police or the defence force). In popular parlance we are used to hear of *law-enforcement*. Undoubtedly the term *force* stems from the physical aspect of energy-operation and in this context, it clearly elucidates the function of the state within the physical aspect.

The state as a public legal institution binds together the *lives* of its citizens in specific ways. Taxpaying shows that every productive citizen indirectly dedicates some part of his or her time to the state. A certain portion of the life time of these citizens actually belongs to the state. Furthermore, owing to the need to maintain its territorial integrity against possible threats from outside, a defence force is required, running the risk of citizens being *killed* in military action. Clearly, the life and death of citizens assume their own roles within the state as an institution – and it undeniably testifies to the fact that the state does function within the biotic aspect of reality as well. Jim Skillen correctly points out: "Likewise, a political community exhibits biotic functions by the fact that its citizens function biotically, and many of its laws deal with public health and natural environmental regulations" (Skillen, 2008:12). The nation of a state (transcending diverse ethnic communities

without eliminating their right of continued existence), always operates on the basis of a national consciousness and an emotional sense of *belonging*. Although not all citizens may share this sentiment, a proper state should succeed in making its citizens *feel at home* (the notion of a *Heimat*). These phenomena clearly cannot be divorced from the *sensitive-psychic function* of the state. Furthermore, once we realise that citizens ought to feel at home within the state, they can also positively *identify* with it (compare the ID-documents of citizens). This function illustrates the political content of what sociologists call the 'we' and the 'they' – those belonging to this state and those not belonging to it. Since the core meaning of the logical-analytical aspect is captured in the reciprocity of *identification* and *distinguishing*, it is clear that whoever identifies something is also involved in distinguishing it from something else. The national identity of the citizens of the state testifies to the fact that this identity can't be understood only by recognizing the function of the state within the logical-analytical aspect (of identifying and distinguishing). Citizens are capable of rational interaction such that their functioning within the logical-analytical aspect of reality provides a basis for the *public opinion* within any particular state.

The cultural-historical aspect of reality concerns formations of *power*, since it brings to expression the basic trait of culture, namely the uniquely human calling to disclose the potential of creation in a process of cultural development. Such a process goes hand-in-hand with an on-going development of human society in which – through increasing differentiation and integration of specific societal zones or spheres – distinct societal collectivities, including the state, in the course of time emerge. It is only on the basis of its "sword power" that the state can function as a *public legal institution*, since maintaining a public legal order depends on a monopoly of the "sword power" within the territory of the state. Of course the function of the state in the historical aspect is also seen in the actual history of every independent state. Then, that the state has a function within the sign mode of reality is obvious from its national symbols (anthem, flag, etc.) and from its official language(s). Similarly, the function of the state within the social aspect of reality is evident in the way in which it binds together its citizens within a public legal institution. It thus determines a specific kind of social interaction. Participating in a general election, acquiring an ID, observing traffic rules, respecting the rights of fellow citizens – and many more forms of social interaction, exemplify the function of the state within the social aspect of inter-human social intercourse.

Through taxes the state is enabled to fulfil its legal obligations in governing and administering a country, which brings to light an element of the economic function of the state. Given the significance of trade and commerce "political

economy" focuses on the financial duties of a government. Although a state is not a work of art it does have the task of *harmonizing* clashing legal interests. Establishing balance and harmony amongst the multiplicity of legal interests within a differentiated society is always guided by the jural function of the state. In addition to this internal coherence between the jural and aesthetic aspects of the state the latter also has an external (i.e. original) function within the aesthetic aspect, displayed in the characteristic format of published (promulgated) state laws, in the aesthetic qualities of governmental buildings (houses of parliament, jails), and so on. The idea of public justice is not possible if the state does not actively function within the jural aspect of reality. The state also requires mutual respect between government of subjects as well as an ethical integrity amongst its citizens, for without this loyalty, the body politic will fall apart (of course the government must also conform to standards of public decency and integrity in order to avoid vices like nepotism and corruption). The nation of a state must share in its vision, its convictions regarding establishing a just public legal order through which each citizen receives its due. It is on this basis only that the highly responsible task of governing a country could be entrusted to its office-bearers. Terms like 'trust', 'certainty' and 'faith' are synonymous. The certitudinal or fiduciary aspect of reality – the faith aspect – is therefore not foreign to the existence of the state. Apart from party political differences mutual trust between government and subjects is an important ingredient of a stable state organization. And every political party operates on the basis of a specific political *confession of faith* (its *credo*).

In the light of this brief analysis it follows that all aspects of reality *co-condition* the existence the state.

10. What is unique in Dooyeweerd's understanding of the state?

10.1 The aspectual many-sidedness of the state

The modal universality of all aspects of reality implies that every natural and societal entity and process has functions within all modal aspects. We have seen that the state also shares in this many-sidedness of reality. Although this insight in itself certainly is unique, it still applies to all entities, not just to the state.

10.2 The state as an organized legal community

Of course what Dooyeweerd presents in respect of the state does not bypass historical contours found throughout the history of reflections on the domain of politics. One of the prominent features is seen in the fact that political theories have always focused on the nature and mutuality of "might" and "'right". Sometimes the state is endowed with *absolute power* and at others it is portrayed as protecting what is *right*. Theodor Litt notes that all reflection on the nature of the state oscillates between these two poles of state activity; *might* (Macht) and *right* (Recht) (Litt, 1948:23). But in spite of lines of connection such as these, linking Dooyeweerd's philosophy in general and his political and legal philosophy in particular, to the intellectual legacy of the West, shows that his novel views are not found anywhere else.

In order to differentiate between the various kinds of societal entities Dooyeweerd first of all distinguishes between organized communities (Dutch: *verbande*), communities (Dutch: *gemeenschappen*), and coordinated relationships (Dutch: *maatschapsverhoudingen*). These distinctions are intimately connected with the way in which he chracterizes natural and societal entities. For this purpose he introduces the distinction between a foundational function and a qualifying function.

10.3 Succession and foundation

Understanding this distinction between a foundational function and a qualifying function requires the insight that the various modal aspects of reality are fitted into a specific order of succession.

The numerical aspect, as the first aspect, precedes all the other – and we have already noted above that numerical analogies are found in other aspects, such as the jural, where we have met the phrase *legal order* (a *unity* in the *multiplicity* of legal norms). That the aspect of space, as the second aspect of our experiential horizon, has its direct foundation in number is evident when the nature of *dimensions* in space is considered, coupled with *spatial magnitude*. There may be one, two, three or more dimensions, analogically reflecting the meaning of number (1, 2, 3, ...). Spatial magnitudes are designated by numbers: length constitutes a one-dimensional magnitude, a surface a two-dimensional magnitude, and so on. Motion presupposes extension (the *movement-path*) and tempo (speed: specified with a *number*). Uniform motion is presupposed in the dynamics of physical energy-operation and without energy-operation living entities cannot display their vital (biotic) functioning. Apart from biotic organs no sensitivity is possible, since all sentient (conscious) creatures have *sense organs*.

Dooyeweerd advanced arguments supporting the view that the aspects just mentioned are foundational to the logical-analytical aspect, which in turn is foundational to the cultural-historical aspect, and that the same applies to the subsequent aspects which are given in the order of the lingual mode, the social aspect, the economic facet, the aesthetic side of reality, the jural, the moral and the certitudinal. In general, one can therefore say that particular aspects presuppose earlier aspects that are foundational to them.

An awareness of the order of succession between the various modal aspects, however, does not help us to arrive at a more precise understanding of different *types of entities*.

10.4 Modal laws and the type law of the state

Dooyeweerd had to introduce another systematic distinction, namely that between "modal laws" (universal laws for any possible entity, i.e., all kinds of entities) and "type laws" (holding for a limited class of entities only, i.e., for specific kinds of entities only). Modal laws hold universally *without any specification*. For example universities, businesses, states, families and sport clubs all observe the normative economic sense of *frugality*, of not *wasting* money. But accounting for the difference between *tax* and *profit* requires an insight into the *typical* differences between a business enterprise and a state. Lacking such an awareness of the *typical* differences between states and business enterprises may easily lead to a confusion of these societal entities. Max Weber, for example, claims that there is no difference between a *large scale business enterprise* and the *state* (Weber, 1918:15).

10.5 The typical foundational function and typical qualifying function of the state

In order to identify the type law for being a state, Dooyeweerd made an appeal to what he called the *typical* foundational and *typical* qualifying function of the state. This specification aims at analyzing the *type law* of the state, similar to the way in which physics would investigate the type law for being an atom. Such a type law surely is universal in the sense that it holds for all states (or all atoms). But it is immediately *specified*, because not everything in our universe is a state (or an atom) – type laws always hold for a limited class of entities only.

Our earlier general observation, namely that every natural and societal entity functions within all the aspects of reality, is now in need of a more precise characterization, because the word "functioning" should actually refer to the *typical* functions of entities. This *typicality*, however, derives from the typical foundational and typical qualifying functions of entities.

Initially Dooyeweerd conjectured that natural things (material things, plants and animals) do not have a *typical* foundational function. However, in 1950 he altered his view stating that natural things do have a foundational function (see Dooyeweerd, 1950:75 note 8). Let us consider an example from the field of biochemistry. Merely identifying 12 atoms (namely $C_4H_4O_4$) does not tell us anything about the *typical* patterns in which they can be arranged and the possible chemical structures and physical properties that may ensue as a result of different spatial configurations. Yet, when diverse spatial arrangements are contemplated, it appears that these atoms may be constitutive for two chemically distinct compounds (maleic acid and fumaric acid), as illustrated in Sketch 1 below.

Sketch 1



Although we are dealing with the same number of atoms, merely considering the foundational arithmetical aspect clearly does not generate any *typical* differences. The latter surfaces only once different spatial configurations are considered. Therefore, the typical foundational function of these molecular structures is given in the spatial aspect, while their typical qualifying function is found in the physical-chemical aspect of reality.

Regarding Dooyeweerd's conception of the state, the basic question in this context is which aspects are, according to him, the typical foundational and typical qualifying functions of the state. Surely, what Litt remarked (mentioned above), namely that views of the state oscillated between *power* en *right*, may be helpful. But it is helpful only when the argument is based upon an insight into the various modal aspects of reality, for the key problem is to identify the modal aspects within which "power" and "right" are respectively located. According to Dooyeweerd *power* (*control*) is the meaning-nucleus of the cultural-historical aspect, while what is "right" or *just* features within the jural

aspect with its core meaning of "*tribution*".[8] We may understand "tribution" as the jural imperative to give every person his or her due (*retribution* is the equivalent of the Dutch term "vergelding"). He therefore finds the foundational function of the state within the *cultural-historical aspect* and its qualifying function within the *jural* aspect.

Yet this brief characterization receives further specifications in Dooyeweerd's political philosophy. First of all, the state is an *organized community* (verband). Secondly, the state is a *public* institution, which means that the office of government is embedded in this public legal character of the state, strictly correlated with the subjects of a state.

10.6 Why a republic is not a state-form

Dooyeweerd argues that this public legal character of the state ensures that the office of government is withdrawn from the private power-sphere of any individual, such as a King in a traditional monarchy. The public interest (*salus publica*) therefore stamps the state as a *republic* by definition. It entails that the term *republic* actually does not describe a state-form, but merely designates the public-legal character of the state as such. The following explanation of Dooyeweerd elucidates these distinctions:

> An authentic state is not really present as long as the authority to govern in effect belongs, as a feudal right, to the private prerogatives of a ruler who in turn can convey, pawn, or lend them to officials belonging to the ruler's realm or even to private persons. According to its nature and inner structure, the state is a *res publica*, a "public entity". It is an institution qualified by public law, a community of government and subjects founded typically on a monopoly of sword power within a given territory. . . . Thus the division of the forms of the state into monarchies and republics commonly made since Machiavelli is basically incorrect. The word *republic* indicates nothing whatsoever about the form of government. It merely signifies that the state is a public rather than a private institution. . . Throughout the course of history many monarchies have lacked the character of a state, since governmental authority functioned not as an office serving the *res publica* but as the private property of a particular ruler. Governmental jurisdiction was an undifferentiated feudal prerogative. In such cases one should speak not of a state but of a realm (regnum), which was the property of a king. Not every realm is a state (Dooyeweerd, 2012a:162-163).

8 Note that every aspect displays a law side and factual side, analogical moments pointing (backwards and forward) to all the other aspects, subject-subject and subject-object relations. These structural elements are all qualified by the unique meaning-nucleus or core meaning of an aspect. The latter guarantees the irreducibility and indefinability of an aspect.

10.7 The integrative public legal task of the government

A genuine state arises in the process of societal differentiation and is therefore always accompanied by a multiplicity of differentiated societal entities *distinct* from the state. Although within such a differentiated society humans may assume multiple societal roles, no person is ever consumed by any one of them. Being a citizen of the state entails that we disregard all those other ties (roles) a person may have within societal entities apart from the state. Citizenship does not concern to which culture, race, sex or language group a person belongs. Nor does it ask whether a person is rich or poor, aesthetically gifted or not, highly intelligent, belongs to a particular confessional denomination, disposes over an academic qualification or not, is a member of a particular (nuclear) family, and so on. The only concern regarding citizenship is whether or not a person was born on the territory of a state or whether its parents are citizens of that state.

Yet, by disregarding these non-state ties in life they are not *eliminated*, because the public legal task of the state is precisely to bind together, in one public legal order, the legal interests flowing from participating in these non-political societal entities. On the basis of the monopoly of the power of the sword on its territory, the state is obligated to harmonize and balance the multiplicity of legal interests on its territory and whenever an infringement of rights occur, this balance should be restored in a truly retributive way.

10.8 Spheres of law within a differentiated society

Dooyeweerd rejects the extremes of atomism (individualism) and holism (universalism), respectively because these isms one-sidedly overemphasizes number and space as modes of explanation. Alternatively Dooyeweerd applies the principle of sphere-sovereignty in his analysis of a differentiated society. The scope of this principle leaves room for the own inner laws both of the state and of all the other societal entities present in a differentiated society – social collectivities (*verbande*), communities and coordinated relationships.

Within the domain of public law, including constitutional law, administrative law, penal law, criminal process law and international public law (the “law of nations”), the authority structure of the state occupies a central position. The relationship between government and subjects is a relation of super- and sub-ordination, qualified by the public-legal character of the state.

Usually legal doctrine merely distinguishes between public law and private law. However, Dooyeweerd points out that there is a difference between civil private law and non-civil private law. Earlier we noted that initially the

Roman *ius civile* was an exclusive tribal law or folk-law. The expansion of the Roman Empire witnessed how people moving to the empire lacked the rights attached to Roman citizenship. By the middle of the third century a need developed to provide for the legal needs of is these people. It was designated as the *ius gentium*. The *ius gentium* should not be considered as the intimations of the law of nations, as it is sometimes misunderstood. For that matter, these foreigners did not live *outside* the Roman Empire. Lord Mackenzie writes: "The jus gentium was a definite system of equitable law, free from technicalities, applying to the legal relations of all free persons" (Mackenzie, 1898:77, note 3).

Dooyeweerd realized that the *ius gentium* influenced the rise of civil private law. The latter developed as an inter-individual legal sphere in which every free person was equally appreciated as "a legal subject independent of all specific communal bonds, even independent of Roman citizenship. This was the difference between the undifferentiated Quiritian tribal law and the private common law" (Dooyeweerd, 1997-III:447). As a private common law civil law developed on the basis of a "large differentiation and integration of legal life and it is destined for one structure of human society only, namely that of co-ordinational civil relationships which fall outside the internal communal and collective sphere of marriage, family, the firm, organizations, and so on. Within the civil sphere individuals do not exercise any authority over each other" (Dooyeweerd, 1962a:160):

> Civil law, according to its entire structure as differentiated legal system, is the asylum of the individual personality and constitutes the safe-guard for maintaining the individual personality within legal life. . . . It can fulfil this role only in unbreakable coherence with the communal and collective juridical spheres in which the solidarity of the members in relationships of super- and subordination are maintained. Within these communal and collective spheres a person is only a member of the collectivity and is not considered according to its private sphere as an individual (Dooyeweerd, 1962a:162).

Public law and civil private law are both qualified by the jural aspect, but whereas public law displays a structure of super- and sub-ordination, civil private law operates on the basis of equality – where persons or societal entities meet each other on equal footing or by opposing each other. Civil law is "unbreakably bound to the structure of the body politic" (Dooyeweerd, 1997:446).

Non-civil private law pertains to the internal legal spheres of those societal entities that have a non-jural qualifying function, such as internal ecclesiastical law (certitudinally qualified), marital law (ethically qualified), business law (economically qualified), and so on. The legal interests entailed within the spheres of public law and civil and non-civil private law need to be protected within the legal order of the state. An integral part of this perspective is that the internal legal spheres of non-civil private law are not derived from the competence of the state – the state does *grant* them the right to exist. For this reason a just state has to acknowledge other societal spheres of competence within society in their own right.

Without the principle of sphere-sovereignty, applied both to unique and irreducible (but mutually cohering) modal aspects and to a differentiated society, theoretical thinking invariably collapses into a totalitarian and absolutistic view. The unique and novel theory of the state developed by Dooyeweerd should therefore be seen as an attempt to secure the idea of a just state (*rechtsstaat*), observing the limits of its competence and serving society merely by integrating the multiplicity of *legal* interests on its territory.

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'n Probleem-historiese analise van die neo-Thomistiese wetenskapsbeoefening

'n Verklaring van die denkrigting se veranderende visies op die verhouding tussen natuur en genade

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Abstract

A problem-historical analysis of neo-Thomistic scholarship; an explanation of its shifting perspectives on the relationship between nature and grace

A preceding article in this journal by the same author provided a broad overview of seven centuries of neo-Thomistic thinking in philosophy and theology as well as a discussion of the methodological attempts of various neo-Thomists to describe this long history of the reinterpretations of Thomas Aquinas (1224/5-1274). The final conclusion of the previous article in the series was that these historiographers were confronted with such a long and complex history that they could not provide a fully satisfactory historiographical method. This essay argues that a consistent problem-historical method may be better equipped to do the job, providing both penetrating analysis and insight.

The essay develops as follows. First a brief description of the two main aspects of a philosophical conception, viz. its ontological type and normative direction is given. The second part provides an analysis of "classic" Thomistic ontology (pure cosmological thinking, an ontological hierarchy with dualism, vertical partial universalism and a clear distinction between nature and supernature or grace) as well as its anthropology (a subsistence theory). From the third section onwards the focus is on the Thomistic nature-grace distinction, describing the modern shifting perspectives on this central dogma, while the next section explains the underlying philosophical reasons for this remarkable departure from Aquinas's original viewpoint. (Special attention is given to more recent irrationalistic perspectives.) The last (fifth) part is devoted to the discussion of a possible more biblically orientated perspective on the ancient tension between the secular/profane and sacred/holy. In an increasing secular world also Protestant Reformational thinkers are challenged by the vital question how the relationship between nature and grace, culture and Christ, creation and redemption should be viewed. If a neo-Thomistic view cannot be of help in this regard, in which direction should a Reformational philosophy be developed in the twenty-first century A.D.?

1. Inleidend

Enkele opmerkings oor die aansluiting van hierdie artikel by die vorige, asook oor die opset daarvan is nodig.

1.1 Aansluiting

Hierdie artikel behoort saamgelees te word met 'n vorige artikel (vgl. Van der Walt , 2013c) in hierdie tydskrif. Die gevolgtrekking daarin was dat neo-Thomiste self nog nie 'n bevredigende filosofies-historiografiese weergawe van die ontwikkelinge oor die afgelope sewe eeue na hulle "vader", Thomas van Aquino, kon bied nie en dat na 'n beter metodologie gesoek behoort te word. Hierdie artikel wil dus nagaan of die konsekwent probleem-historiese metode meer geskik sal wees vir dié doel. Terselfdertyd wil dit ook aantoon dat so 'n metode die merkwaardige verskuiwings wat daar binne die neo-Thomistiese denke ten opsigte van 'n sentrale dogma (die natuur-genadeleer) binne die Roomse denke plaasgevind het (vgl. bv. Meuleman, 1951) beter kan verklaar as die teologiese studies daaroor.

1.2 Opset

Die betoog deurloop die volgende fases. Eerstens word 'n kort omskrywing gegee van die twee kernmomente van enige filosofiese en teologiese konsepsie, naamlik die ontologiese tipe en normatiewe rigting daarvan. Vervolgens word (in die tweede gedeelte) 'n analise gebied van die "klassieke" Thomistiese ontologie (suiwer kosmologiese denke, 'n ontologiese hiërargie gepaard met 'n dualistiese skeiding daarbinne, vertikale gedeeltelike universalisme en onderskeid tussen natuur en genade (die bonatuurlike)), sowel as 'n tipies Thomistiese antropologie ('n subsistensieteorie). Vanaf die derde afdeling word op die tweeterreineleer van natuur-genade gefokus, asook die duidelike verskuiwings wat gedurende die afgelope eeue ten opsigte van hierdie sentrale Roomse dogma plaasgevind het. 'n Vierde onderafdeling probeer hierdie merkwaardige afwykings van die oorspronklike standpunt van Thomas uit bepaalde onderliggende filosofiese standpunteveranderings verklaar. (Spesiale aandag word aan meer resente irrasionalistiese tendense gegee.) Die heel laaste (vyfde) afdeling word gewy aan 'n moontlike meer Bybels-georiënteerde visie op die oeroue myns insiens fiktiewe spanning tussen die profane/sekulêre/wêreldse en die sakrale/heilige. Ook vir Protestantse denkers is dit 'n probleem waarvan hulle hulself nog moeilik kon bevry. Hoe behoort hulle binne die konteks van 'n toenemende sekulêre 21ste eeu die verhouding tussen natuur en genade, kultuur en Christus, skepping en verlossing te verstaan?

2. Die konsekwent probleem-historiese metode as moontlikheid oorweeg

In die vorige artikels is reeds genoem (vgl. ook Vollenhoven, 2005; Runner, 1982 en Kok, 1998:1-178) dat 'n werklikheidsvisie en filosofieë (en die vakwetenskaplike uitwerking daarvan) twee basiese vrae probeer beantwoord. In die eerste plek hoe die bestaande werklikheid volgens 'n mens se visie *lyk* en, in die tweede plek, hoe dit *behoort* te wees. Die eerste is 'n *ontiese of strukturele* vraag oor wat is (die bestaande werklikheid) en die tweede 'n *normatiewe of rigtingsvraag* oor hoe 'n mens *behoort* te dink en te doen.

Vollenhoven gaan in sy historiografie van die Westerse wysbegeerte uit van die antwoorde wat denkers dwarsdeur die geskiedenis op hierdie twee grondleggende vrae gegee het. 'n Antwoord op die strukturele probleem bied 'n bepaalde *tipe* filosofiese ontologie (of werklikheidsbeskouing) en antropologie (of mensbeskouing). Antwoorde op wat normatief vir denke

en doen behoort te wees, kom in verskillende filosofiese *strominge* na vore wat vir 'n bepaalde tyd die koers aandui. Sáám maak tipe en stroming die konsepsie van 'n denker uit. (Vir inleidende, elementêre verduidelikings van Vollenhoven se metode, vgl. Van der Walt, 2010a, 2013a en 2013b.)

2.1 Die karakter van tipes

Die interessante is dat die *tipes* filosofieë nie tot 'n bepaalde tyd beperk is nie. Nadat baie van hulle reeds tydens die Antieke Griekse denke ontstaan het, kom hulle in die loop van die geskiedenis daarna by verskillende denkers weer na vore. 'n Identiese tipe filosofie by twee verskillende denkers kan dus 'n aanduiding wees van invloed van die een denker (bv. die leermeester) op die ander (bv. die leerling of navolger) of van 'n filosofiese skool wat oor 'n korter of langer tyd kan bestaan. Hiervolgens sou 'n mens dus ongeveer dieselfde tipe filosofie by die neo-Thomistiese skool verwag. Die gemeenskaplike tipe filosofie sou dan ook die konstante element daarin verklaar. (Vollenhoven, 2000:184-259 noem al die verskillende filosofiese tipes, waarvan Vollenhoven, 2005:157-159 'n kort oorsig bied.)

2.2 Die aard van strominge

Anders as die tipe filosofie, wat eeue lank oor geslagte heen kan voortleef, en dus die kontinuïteit in 'n tradisie waarborg, duur 'n bepaalde stroming net vir 'n beperkte tyd om dan weer deur 'n nuwe normatiewe rigting vervang te word. Strominge is dus verantwoordelik vir die veranderlike of dinamiese element in die geskiedenis. (Vir 'n oorsig oor die verskillende strominge in die Westerse intellektuele geskiedenis, vgl. Vollenhoven, 2005:153-155.)

Waarom verander filosofiese rigtings voortdurend? Volgens Vollenhoven is die rede daarvoor die subjektivistiese idee oor normatiwiteit wat alreeds in die Griekse denke ontstaan het. Wat bedoel hy met subjektivisme?

Dit beteken dat nie duidelik tussen wet/norm en dit waarvoor die wet/norm geld (die subjek) onderskei word nie. Dit wat aan norme/wette onderhorig behoort te wees word verkeerdelik tot maatstaf verhef. Anders gestel: wat is, word ook beskou as wat *behoort* te wees!

Waarom lei die verskillende filosofiese strominge tot voortdurende verandering? Eenvoudig omdat daar soveel dinge in die skepping is wat verabsoluteer of tot normatiewe status verhef kan word. Binne die rasionalistiese filosofie (± 1600-1900) is die menslike verstand byvoorbeeld tot rede (*ratio*) verabsoluteer as dié maatstaf vir teorie en praktyk. Die irrasionalisme degradeer egter die rede sonder om dit heeltemal te verwerp. Binne hierdie hoofstroom (vanaf ongeveer 1900) is daar egter onderlinge

verskille. Vir die lewensfilosofie word mag of lewenskrag tot absolute norm verhef; vir die pragmatisme is nuttigheid die hoogste maatstaf; vir die eksistensialisme moet menslike eksistensiële vryheid die koers aandui (vgl. bv. Robbers, 1951).

2.3 Die invloed van strominge op tipes

Soos reeds genoem, vorm die kombinasie van 'n bepaalde tipe en spesifieke stroming die konsepsie van 'n bepaalde filosoof. Maar wat is die verband tussen die twee hoofelemente van 'n denksisteem? Die dinamiese element (normatiewe stroming) kan die tipe filosofie beïnvloed. 'n Bepaalde tipe filosofie binne die rasionalisme word dus tot 'n mate getransformeer wanneer dit ook binne die daaropvolgende irrasionalisme voorkom.

Volgens hierdie benadering van die Westerse denkgeskiedenis wil hierdie artikel ook die neo-Thomisme analiseer, wat sowel die blywende ontologies-antropologiese trekke daarvan betref (die tipe filosofie) as die veranderende verskillende strominge wat dit oor sewe eeue deurloop het.

3. Die tipe filosofie ten grondslag van die Thomisme

Hier word eers gelet op 'n aantal Thomas-navolgers uit die 16e-17e eeu en daarna uit die 19e en 20e eeu om vas te stel of hulle tipe filosofie dieselfde gebly het.

3.1 Vroeëre verteenwoordigers

Die stigter van die Dominikaanse Orde, Dominicus de Soto (1491-1560), die klassieke kommentator op Thomas se *Summa Theologica*, en T. De VioCajetanus (1469-1534), F. de Vitoria (1486-1546), verbonde aan die beroemde universiteit van Salamanca, Fr. de Suarez (1548-1617) en G. Zabarella (1532-1589) behoort almal nog tot die periode of tydstroming van die nuwe tyd (vgl. Vollenhoven, 2000:257). Hulle tipe filosofieë kom ook grootliks nog ooreen met dié van Thomas van Aquino gedurende sy tweede denkfase waarin hy sy twee *Summas* geskryf is (vgl. Vollenhoven, 2000:238).

3.2 Meer resente verteenwoordigers

By verteenwoordigers van die negentiende en twintigste eeu bly Thomas se tipe filosofie min of meer gehandhaaf. Dit geskied egter binne nuwe strominge. Hier volg enkele voorbeelde van hoe die strominge verander het. D. Mercier (1851-1926) was nog 'n neo-idealistiese rasionalis. Die volgende denkers hang egter een of ander vorm van irrasionalisme aan:

A.D. Sertillanges (1863-1948), H. Bergson (1860-1941) en M. Blondel (1861-1949) was lewensfilosowe, A. Gardeil (1859-1931) 'n pragmatis en K. Rahner (1904-1984) en M.F.J. Marlet (1921-1997) eksistensialiste (vgl. Vollenhoven, 2000).

Behalwe hierdie Roomse denkers bied Vollenhoven (2000) ook waardevolle inligting (volgens tipe en stroming) oor die volgende meer resente figure se filosofiese konsepsies: H. Urs von Balthazar (1905-1988), J. Danielou (1905-1974), L. La Velle (1883-1951), H. de Lubac (1896-1991), G. Marel (1889-1973), J. Maritain (1882-1973), P. Merlan (1897-1968), F. Sassen (1894-1971) en T. de Chardin (1881-1955).

Wanneer 'n nuwe stroming populêre mode word, word ouere strominge in die *filosofie* gewoonlik bevraagteken. In die (Christelike) *teologiese* wêreld (meestal behoudend van aard) tref 'n mens egter die omgekeerde tendens dikwels aan: Die kontemporêre filosofie word vanuit 'n voorafgaande, verouderde filosofie gekritiseer.

'n Rooms-Katolieke denker soos Delfgaauw (1952:110 e.v.) kritiseer byvoorbeeld vanuit sy rasionalistiese oortuiging bogenoemde drie irrasionalistiese strominge. Volgens hom laat die vitalisme (lewensfilosofie) die mens deur sy instinkte en nie sy verstand nie lei. Die eksistensialiste huldig 'n idee van 'n blinde keuse tot vryheid. Die pragmatiste maak menslike denke ondergeskik aan nuttige handele. Wetenskap wat nie prakties nuttig is nie is 'n luukse, sonder enige sin. Volgens Delfgaauw stel die pragmatisme die denke ten slotte in diens van die materiële welvaart van die mens.

Later sal nog aangetoon word hoe hierdie verandering in normatiewe rigting daartoe gelei het dat ook die tipies Thomistiese natuur-genadeleer getransformeer is, sodat dit nie identies gebly het nie.

3.3 'n Kort beskrywing van die tipe filosofie van die neo-Thomisme

Vollenhoven (2000:238, 257) se kernagtige tipering van die meerderheid van hierdie Thomistiese filosowe lui soos volg: suiwer kosmologiese denke, dualisme, vertikale gedeeltelike universalisme en subsistensieteorie. Wat wil Vollenhoven hiermee aandui? Die eerste vier begrippe beskryf in breë trekke die Thomistiese ontologie of werklikheidsbeskouing en die laaste die tipiese antropologie daarvan.

In die derde artikel in hierdie reeks (wat die werklikheidsbeskouing van Thomas se *Summa Contra Gentiles* behandel het) is reeds 'n breedvoerige

verduideliking van bostaande begrippe gebied. Die geheue word hier dus net kortliks verfris.

3.3.1 ***Suiwer kosmologiese*** denke beteken dat die ontstaan en wording van die skepping in hierdie soort denke nie as belangrik beskou word nie. Daar word op die bestudering van die bestaande *strukturele kant* van die kosmiese dinge gekonsentreer, terwyl hul oorsprong en *ontwikkeling* nie as belangrik beskou word nie. Dit impliseer dus 'n sterk statiese visie in teenstelling met die kosmogono-kosmologiese denke, wat, soos die woord aandui, wel aandag aan die genetiese of dinamiese wil gee. Kosmologiese denkers verskil dus van ander, latere neo-Thomiste (bv. Blondel en Von Balthasar) wat later behandel sal word.

3.3.2 ***Dualisme*** dui daarop dat die bestaande werklikheid uit 'n oorspronklike tweeheid bestaan, gewoonlik die transendente God en die nie-transendente kosmos genoem. Binne een synshiërargie is daar dus 'n hoëre en laere deel.

So 'n visie op die werklikheid lei egter tot allerlei probleme. Wat is byvoorbeeld die verskil tussen God en skepping en wat is hulle verband as hulle bloot hoëre en laere "dele" van dieselfde synshiërargie is? Hierdie (valse) probleem lei tot die "oplossing" dat God sowel transendent aan as immanent in die skepping sou wees. 'n Volgende vraagstuk steek dan kop uit: Presies op watter wyse is God in die skepping? Of: Hoe kan Hy in die skepping wees sonder dat die skepping semi-goddelik word (panteïsme genoem) of God verkosmiseer word? Of die omgekeerde: Beteken sy transendensie nie dat die skepping los van God bestaan nie (deïsme genoem)? Die enigste "oplossing" is blykbaar 'n balans tussen God se transendensie en sy immanensie.

Die Bybelse *radikale* onderskeid tussen God en sy skepping word dus nie in die neo-Thomisme gerespekteer nie. God en die skepping staan nie Bybels beskou in 'n *religieuse* verhouding nie, maar in 'n *ontiese* van *analogie* (d.w.s. ooreenkoms in verskil). Op dié wyse het die skepping tans reeds deel of partisipeer dit aan die goddelike en word die hoogste strewe van die mens sy bonatuurlike deïfikasie.

3.3.3 ***Natuur en genade***

In voorafgaande artikels is reeds aangetoon dat die onderskeid natuur-genade 'n metode is om 'n sintese of kompromie tussen die

Bybelse openbaring en 'n gangbare buite-Bybelse lewensvisie/ filosofie te bewerkstellig: Omdat 'n metode egter nie iets neutraals of "formeel" is nie, word die werklikheid self as gevolg daarvan ook *inhoudelik* volgens 'n dubbelfokusbril gekonstrueer: Dit bestaan uit 'n natuurlike, aardse en 'n bonatuurlike, hemelse, goddelike gebied.

Aangesien die transendente dikwels met die bonatuurlike, Goddelike genade en die nie-transendente met die natuurlike kosmiese dinge of terreine geassosieer word, kom die vraag egter by alle Thomistiese denkers ook na vore wat presies die verhouding en verskil tussen die twee sou wees. (In die tweede artikel in hierdie reeks het hierdie vraagstuk reeds ter sprake gekom.)

Die verskil tussen natuur en genade is volgens hulle dat die genadeterrein iets bo-redeliks is, wat alleen in geloof verstaan kan word, terwyl die natuur vir die menslike rede toeganklik sou wees en die geloof daar geen rol in hoef te speel nie.

Die verband tussen die twee is dat die natuur 'n inherente strewe (*desideriumnaturale*) na die bonatuurlike besit, wat deur goddelike genade voltooi of vervolmaak moet word.

In genoemde (vorige) artikel is reeds vermeld dat die Thomistiese denkers ná Thomas reeds vroeg al talle vrae in dié verband gestel het (vgl. bv. O'Mahony, 1929). So byvoorbeeld: Hoe kan daar in die natuur 'n strewe na die bonatuurlike wees, aangesien so 'n verlange dan nie meer suiwer natuurlik sou wees nie? ('n Natuurlike besef van onvolmaaktheid veronderstel ten minste reeds iets van bonatuurlike aard in die natuur.)

Van die kant van die genade beskou, duik die omgekeerde vraag op: As die natuur deur die bonatuurlike *vervolmaak* word (en nie *opgehef* word nie – soos Thomas telkens beklemtoon het), dan sal daar ook in die bonatuurlike iets natuurliks moet wees! Op hierdie probleem sal hieronder nog verder ingegaan word.

3.3.4 Vertikale gedeeltelike universalisme

Kortliks gestel is die gedeeltelike universalisme 'n tussenposisie tussen die individualisme, wat individuele dinge as belangriker teenoor die universele beskou (hierdie spesifieke mens is belangriker as menswees) en die universalisme wat presies die omgekeerde geleer het (menswees is belangriker as hierdie individu). Al drie hierdie standpunte het dit mis, aangesien die universele en individuele beide *fasette* van die hele werklikheid is.

Vertikale gedeeltelike universaliste sien 'n hoër-laer verhouding tussen die universele en die individuele. In die geval van die klassieke Thomisme is die vorm as die hoëre, universele en die materie as die laere, individuele beskou.

3.3.5 Subsistensieteorie

Op hierdie soort mensvisie het die vierde artikel in hierdie reeks reeds breedvoerig ingegaan. Kortliks kom dit op die volgende neer. God skep elke nuwe menslike siel op een of ander tyd (tydens konsepsie of daarna) in die menslike liggaam wat van die ouers afkomstig is (kreasianisme genoem). Omdat die siel as afsonderlike substansie (vandaar die naam vir hierdie mensvisie) van God afkomstig is, is dit iets botydelik, bonatuurlik en dus, anders as die menslike liggaam, onsterflik. Ná die dood bestaan dit ook as afsonderlike substansie voort tot by die opstanding wanneer dit weer met die opgestane liggaam verenig word. (Vir 'n meer Bybels-georiënteerde visie op die mens, vgl. Van der Walt, 2010.)

Hierbo is reeds genoem dat 'n tipe filosofie, soos so pas beskryf, nie absoluut konstant in opeenvolgende tydstrominge bly nie. Daar word vervolgens gelet op hoe 'n verandering van stroming ook neo-Thomistiese denkers se visie op 'n sentrale dogma van die Thomisme, naamlik die verhouding tussen natuur- en genade, beïnvloed het.

4. Aksentverskuiwings in die neo-Thomistiese visies op die natuur-genade tema

Hier word eers aangetoon hoe, veral in die nuwere Thomistiese denke, daar 'n verandering van visie ten opsigte van die verhouding tussen natuur en genade plaasgevind het. Daarna kan aangetoon word wat die grondliggende oorsake daarvan was. (Soms net as gevolg van 'n nuwe stroming maar dikwels saam daarmee ook 'n nuwe tipe filosofie.)

Dat moderne Thomistiese denkers vanaf ongeveer 1920 'n ander visie as Thomas op die verhouding van natuur en genade voorgestaan het, is deur verskillende studies reeds bevestig. Vanuit Reformatoriese hoek byvoorbeeld deur Smit (1950), Meuleman (1960 en 1967) en later deur Wentsel (1970). Wat dit behels het, kan hier dus opsommenderwys deur middel van 'n vergelyking tussen die ouere beskouinge en die meer resente weergegee word.

Vooraf word net weer daaraan herinner dat volgens Thomas die natuur 'n passiewe potensie het vir die bonatuurlike. Die genade aktualiseer hierdie potensie en vervul so die diepste moontlikhede en aspirasies van die natuur. Alleen deur God se ingrype kan die sluimerende, onbewuste strewe van die natuurlike mens tot volle ontplooiing kom. Thomas aanvaar dus sowel 'n harmonie asook 'n streng onderskeid tussen die twee terreine (vgl. Polman, 1961:367). Dit is veral Thomas se duidelike onderskeiding tussen natuur en genade wat deur die latere, twintigste-eeuse neo-Thomiste betwyfel sou word.

4.1 Vroeëre beskouinge

Die sestiende-eeuse debatte wys al op probleme met Thomas. Die reeds genoemde Cajetanus (oorlede 1534) het die probleem van die verhouding tussen natuur en genade probeer oplos deur die (natuurlike) verlange te ontken of te supernaturaliseer. Sylvester Ferrariensis (oorlede 1528) daarteenoor, het die bonatuurlike aard van die objek van die natuurlike verlange bevraagteken. Altwee denkers kom dus daarin ooreen dat hulle 'n *positiewe gerigtheid* van die natuur op die genade verwerp. Natuur en genade bestaan *parallel langs mekaar*. Die natuur is slegs 'n *passiewe substraat* van die bonatuur. Die begrip *desideriumnaturale* sê dus niks meer nie as dat die natuur 'n *geskiktheid besit* om die genade op te neem wanneer God dit skenk (vgl. Smit, 1950:39).

4.2 Nuwere tendense

Volgens Smit (1950:19) was daar vroeër (einde 19e eeu) al tekens van besware teen bogenoemde twee kommentatore op Thomas se standpunt, hoewel die eintlike stryd daaroor eers na die Tweede Wêreldoorlog ontbrand het. Hy beskryf die nuwe opvattings soos volg. Hulle almal verwerp die idee dat die natuurlike terrein 'n *louter passiewe substraat* in harmonie met die genade is, wat slegs deur die genade voltooi moet word. Volgens hulle bestaan daar 'n *positiewe verhouding* tussen die twee terreine. Ietwat anders gestel (vgl. Wentsel, 1970:473) worstel die nuwere Rooms-Katolieke teologie met die vraag of die natuurlike *desiderium*-begrip die genade nie reeds geïmpliseer het nie. Op verskillende maniere probeer die nuwere Thomiste dus die vroeëre sterk dualisme tussen die tweeterreineleer oorwin. Vandervelde (1975) toon aan dat as gevolg daarvan daar ook 'n merkbare verskuiwing by Roomse denkers ten opsigte van die leer van die erfsonde plaasgevind het.

4.3 Twee verskillende visies

Smit, (1950:40 e.v.) onderskei egter twee verskillende rigtings by hierdie moderne neo-Thomiste, naamlik 'n meer statiese en meer dinamiese rigting

Die eerste (statiese) rigting beskou die natuurlike verlange om God te aanskou as 'n ingeskape *ontiese* drang van die mens na die voltooiing van sy syn of bestaan. So 'n bonatuurlike einddoel kan egter nie op natuurlike wyse bereik word nie. God is ook nie verplig om op hierdie verlange te antwoord nie – dit sou sy goddelike vryheid in gedrang bring.

Smit (1950:42) lewer die volgende kritiek op hierdie ontiese (i.p.v. religieuse) visie op die verhouding tussen God (bonatuur) en mens (natuur):

> Hier blijkt weer eens dat de ontologiese en religieuse beschouwing van de grondverhouding tussen God en mens elkaar uitsluiten. Die eerste betekent steeds een beperking voor de tweede en deze laat een beperking niet toe, juist krachtens haar integraal karakter.

Volgens die Bybelse *religieuse* visie is die *hele* lewe religieus van aard – daar bestaan nie 'n natuurlike, religieuse-neutrale gebied nie.

Die tweede nuwere visie is die meer dinamiese, waarvan M. Blondel (1861-1948) hoofverteenwoordiger was. Aangesien hy 'n irrasionalistiese lewensfilosoof was, is dit verstaanbaar waarom hy soveel klem op dinamiese ontwikkeling en handele in plaas van konseptuele abstraksie (tipies van die voorafgaande rasionalisme) gelê het. Die tema van die menslike natuurlike tekort, ongenoegsaamheid, onversadigbare verlange na die bonatuurlike genade bly egter 'n sentrale tema in sy hele denke.

4.4 Onopgeloste probleme

Die kernvraag gaan dus nie daaroor of die natuur-genade onderskeid Bybels aanvaarbaar is nie, maar oor waar presies die grens tussen natuur en genade geplaas moet word. Beide die meer strukturele as die meer dinamiese beskouinge van die nuwere neo-Thomisme loop hier op dun ys.

Aan die een kant is daar die gevaar dat die natuur uit eie krag sy bonatuurlike bestemming mag bereik (vgl. Smit, 1950:41). Daarom word telkens beklemtoon dat die natuur *inefficaxis*, dit wil sê dat die bereiking van sy bonatuurlike eindbestemming die vermoë van die natuur volkome te bowe gaan.

Aan die ander kant moet daarteen gewaak word dat die feit dat God 'n natuurlike drang na die bonatuurlike by die mens ingeskep het nie die gevolg het van 'n absolute eis van die natuur (mens) ten aansien van die goddelike genade nie (vgl. Smit, 1950:47). 'n Bevestigende antwoord hierop sou die onverdiendheid van die genade en God se vrye beskikking aantas. (Sommige denkers los hierdie probleem op deur nie van 'n *absolute* nie maar *morele* eis van die kant van die natuur te praat.)

Die spanning in die verhouding tussen natuur en genade blyk gevolglik onoplosbaar te wees. Smit (1950:47) toon byvoorbeeld aan hoe H. de Lubac (1896-1991) se standpunt uiteindelik daarop neerkom dat die natuur só versupranaturaliseer word en uit die gesigsveld verdwyn dat die probleem van die verhouding natuur en genade feitlik geëlimineer word.

4.5 'n Bevestiging

Wentsel (1970:487-8) kom tot dieselfde konklusie. Aan die een kant bestaan daar *kontinuïteit* in die Thomistiese tradisie, omdat natuur en genade nog steeds as twee afsonderlike terreine onderskei word. Aan die ander kant egter ook *diskontinuïteit* of 'n duidelike verskuiwing, aangesien natuur en bonatuur baie nou met mekaar verbind word. Die afstand tussen die kerklike Christen en wêreld word feitlik uitgewis. "Nadat natuur en genade lange tyd al te ver uit elkaar getrokkenwaren, is ernu een tendens merkbaarze met elkaar te vereenzelwig en in elkaar op te laten gaan" (Wentsel, 1970:488).

Dit is te begrype dat die Roomse outoriteite in die pouslike ensikliek *Humani Generis* (1950) hom teen hierdie nuwe soort Thomisme uitgespreek het en allerlei maatreëls daarteen probeer tref het (vgl. Meuleman, 1952).

'n Belangrike vraag wat egter nog nie beantwoord is nie, is wat ten grondslag lê aan hierdie soms radikaal-veranderde visies op die eeue-oue natuur-genade tema – die volgende punt in ons ondersoek.

5. Die filosofieë ten grondslag van die veranderde visies op die verhouding tussen natuur en genade

Aangesien Smit (1950), Vandervelde (1975) en Wentsel (1970) nie 'n *filosofiese* verklaring bied waarom die nuwere Thomiste 'n nouer verband tussen natuur en bonatuur voorstaan nie, word dit nou as eie bydrae onderneem.

5.1 Nuwe irrasionalistiese strominge

Die eerste rede is ongetwyfeld die nuwe filosofiese strominge of normatiewe visies. Hierbo is reeds met voorbeelde van enkele neo-Thomistiese denkers aangetoon hoe hulle denke verskillende rasionalistiese en irrasionalistiese strominge weerspieël. Een voorbeeld dien hier ter illustrasie.

5.2 K. Rahner as voorbeeld van 'n nuwe stroming

Rahner (1904-1984) leer byvoorbeeld (vgl. Wentsel, 1970:167,168 asook Vandervelde, 1975:109-126) dat daar geen teenstelling tussen natuur en genade bestaan nie. Die natuur bestaan vir die genade en die genade reinig en voltooi die natuur – hulle is intrinsiek op mekaar betrokke. Dit gebeur egter ten spyte daarvan dat Rahner se *tipe* filosofie nog met dié van Thomas ooreenstem (vgl. 3 hierbo en Vollenhoven, 2000:257).

Die hoofrede vir Rahner se nuwe visie op natuur en genade moet dus die nuwe filosofiese *stroming* wees waarbinne hy filosofeer het, naamlik die eksistensialisme, wat groot klem gelê het op die dinamies-historiese teenoor die vaste en statiese. (In dié opsig kom hy ooreen met byvoorbeeld J. Maritain (1882-1973) se standpunt.)

Ten spyte van hierdie noue betrokkenheid van die twee terreine, vestig Vandervelde (vgl. een van sy stellings voor in sy proefskrif) die aandag daarop dat die dualisme en spanning tussen 'n natuurlike en bonatuurlike gebied Rahner se teologie bly teister.

5.3 M. Blondel as voorbeeld van 'n ander tipe filosofie

In sommige gevalle is dit egter nie alleen nuwe strominge nie, maar saam daarmee ook nuwe tipes filosofieë wat 'n veranderde visie op natuur en genade veroorsaak. As voorbeeld kan M. Blondel (1861-1949) genoem word. (H. Urs von Balthasar (1905-1988) huldig 'n soortgelyke konsepsie.) Ons staan 'n bietjie langer by hierdie invloedryke Roomse denker stil.

Blondel was nie 'n eksistensialistiese irrasionalis nie, maar 'n lewensfilosofiese irrasionalistiese denker. Dié waarmerk van sy "Lebensphilosophie" is dat die oorsprong van die norme vir die menslike lewe in 'n lewe van mag self lê – 'n duidelik subjektivistiese wetsidee, wat dinge/sake tot normatiewe status verhef.

Behalwe volgens 'n ander normatiewe rigting of stroming, dink hy egter ook wat sy tipe filosofie betref anders as Thomas en Rahner. Vollenhoven (2000:245) tipeer dit soos volg: kosmogono-kosmologies, monisties, prioriteitsleer, en noëtisties. Al die elemente van hierdie tipe filosofie dra by

tot 'n nouer, dinamiese verband in plaas van 'n geskeie, starre verhouding tussen natuur en genade.

Soos reeds genoem, beklemtoon die kosmogoniese denke (teenoor die suiwer kosmologiese denkers se strukturele denke) genetiese denke, wat verandering en dinamiek in die skepping erken.

Monistiese denkers gaan (teenoor die gebruiklike dualisme van die Thomisme) uit van 'n oorspronklike eenheid. Hoewel uit die eenheid die veelheid voortvloei, bly die eenheid ook die uiteindelike ideaal – iets wat Blondel in sy natuur-genadeleer ook sterk beklemtoon.

Zuidema (1972) bied nie net 'n goeie weergawe van Blondel se idees in hierdie verband nie, maar ook skerpsinnige immanente kritiek daarop. Hy vat Blondel se hele filosofie kernagtig in die volgende sin saam: "Blondel takes his starting point in a supranatural idea of the natural in order to postulate by means of this idea a natural doctrine of the supranatural" (Zuidema, 1972:259).

5.4 'n Apologetiese motief

Blondel se apologetiese motief was kommunikasie met en oorreding van nie-Christelike denkers deur voor te gee dat hy hierdie "ongelowiges" se standpunt inneem (vgl. Meuleman, 1958). Om dit te kon doen, gaan Blondel van die veronderstelling uit dat die natuurlike mens 'n *manque*, 'n metafisiese onrus, ontologiese gebrek of onversadigde natuurlike verlange na die bonatuurlike genade sou besit.

Die basiese patroon van Blondel se denke is dus (vgl. Zuidema, 1972:244): (1) die mens is weens sy geskapenheid gebrekkig, onvolkome; (2) die mens ervaar uit sy geskapenheid self 'n behoefte aan vervolmaking of verlossing; (3) God verhef die mens tot die bonatuurlike en wis só die gebrek uit.

5.5 Duidelike inkonsekwentheid

Blondel gaan dus uit van 'n natuurlike of immanente idee van die supranaturele. Zuidema (1972:232) stel egter die volgende kritiese vraag:

> Blondel will repeatedly point out that man's natural life is se *manque*, does not reach its goal and falls short of its destiny, if it does not culminate in a supranatural elevation and deification … however, he has never seriously asked himself why natural-philosophical reason is an exception to this. What possible reason can there be that philosophy does not se *manque* when it does not culminate in a supranatural theology through a supranatural elevation? Along with scientific

> reason … philosophy turns out to be the only thing in and on man which is to be an exception to the general rule of the insufficiency of the natural.

Zuidema se konklusie is: "Thus we encounter the extraordinary thesis in Blondel that philosophy is sufficient to demonstrate the insufficiency of everything natural with the exception of its own insufficiency on this point" (Zuidema, 1972:232).

5.6 'n Mislukte apologetiek

Blondel wou dus – soos Christelike apologete deur die eeue – die Christelike geloof vir nie-Christene aanvaarbaar maak deur aan te toon dat so 'n geloof nie onredelik is nie, maar juis redelik deur eie ontiese gebrek te erken. Zuidema (1972:252, 253) is egter nie oortuig dat so 'n poging geslaagd kan wees nie. Want die moderne mens is oortuig van sy outonomie, die feit dat hy/sy self besluit wat reg is – en sal dus nie sy/haar natuurlike gebrekkigheid aanvaar nie. Die sekulêre denker verkies om ook sonder God te lewe en sal Blondel se veronderstelde verlange na 'n bonatuurlike verheffing van die hand wys.

Zuidema (1972:259) se finale konklusie lui dus: "Bondel's 'philosophical apologetics' is in my opinion doomed to failure. It harbours the seeds of its own self-destruction."

Mag 'n mens so 'n apologetiek tog 'n soort Christelike filosofie noem – soos dikwels vandag beweer word nie?

5.7 Voorstanders van 'n Christelike filosofie?

Sassen & Delfgaauw (1957:291-294) onderskei onder neo-Thomistiese denkers vier verskillende posisies oor die moontlikheid van 'n Christelike wysbegeerte. Sommige ontken (a.g.v. 'n duidelike skeiding tussen natuur en genade) die moontlikheid van 'n Christelike filosofie op die terrein van die natuur – alleen die teologie op die terrein van die genade word – vanselfsprekend – as Christelik beskou.

Andere, soos byvoorbeeld E. Gilson (1972) huldig 'n onduidelike tussenstandpunt. Dit gaan vir hom blykbaar oor die regte metode of wyse (asof 'n metode iets neutraal sou wees). Gilson (1972:37) skryf byvoorbeeld van 'n Christelike filosofie: "It is a way of philosophizing, namely the attitude of those who to the study of philosophy unite obedience to the Christian faith. This philosophical method, or attitude … is *Christian philosophy* itself". ('n Voetnoot toon aan dat hy uit die *AeterniPatris* aanhaal.)

Vanuit 'n Reformatoriese filosofiese perspektief is slegs 'n Christelike *houding* egter nie voldoende nie – ook die *resultaat* of *inhoud* van die filosofie behoort Christelik te wees. Anders gestel: 'n mens moet nie net as *Christen* (een of ander) filosofie beoefen nie, maar 'n spesifiek Christelike *filosofie*.

5.8 'n Uitsonderlike standpunt?

Omdat neo-Thomistiese denkers dit eens is dat wysbegeerte streng en formeel gesproke, nooit die predikaat "Christelik" kan dra nie, vorm Blondel egter 'n uitsondering. Volgens hom kom die natuurlike rede langs 'n suiwer wysgerige weg tot 'n erkenning van sy eie ongenoegsaamheid en die noodsaaklikheid om vir die probleme wat dit selfs nie kan oplos nie antwoorde in die Skrif te soek. Indien die Thomistiese wysbegeerte nie Christelik wil wees nie, moet dit volgens Blondel dus as onvolledig beskou word (vgl. Sassen & Delfgaauw, 1957:292 en Robbers 1948:111. Die wysbegeerte kom derhalwe op suiwer filosofiese wyse tot die erkenning van sy eie selfgenoegsaamheid of leemte en staan oop of hunker na die goddelike openbaring.

5.9 Uiteindelik tot mislukking gedoem

Robbers (1948:111, vgl. ook 1949) wys egter daarop dat – en dit is ook ons probleem –hierdie natuurlike hunkering van die filosofie na die bonatuurlike openbaring tog nie uit die natuur kan voortspruit nie – dit moet iets bonatuurliks wees.

Ook 'n Blondeliaanse idee van 'n Christelike filosofie verskil egter van wat in die Reformatoriese tradisie daaronder verstaan word. Zuidema (1972:231) wys daarop dat Blondel nog steeds op natuurlike terrein die idee van 'n outonome, rasionele filosofie handhaaf en dus 'n werklik integraal-Christelike benadering verwerp. Van die geloof in die outonomie van die rede (op natuurlike terrein) kon die neo-Thomisme nog nie bevry word nie.

Hiermee loop hierdie ondersoek ten einde. Ten slotte moet die vraag gestel word of die Reformatoriese filosofie wel daarin kon slaag om die natuur-genade tema van die Thomisme met 'n meer Bybels-georiënteerde visie te vervang.

6. 'n Reformatoriese respons

Reformatoriese denkers was (ten minste in die verlede) van oortuiging dat die neo-Thomistiese onderskeid tussen 'n terrein van natuur en genade (of bonatuur) een van die mees kardinale verskille tussen Rome en Reformasie was en nog steeds is (vgl. bv. vanuit 'n teologiese hoek Berkouwer, 1948:134

e.v. en vanuit 'n Christelik-filosofiese perspektief Vollenhoven, 1933; Dooyeweerd, 1959:111 e.v. asook Mekkes op verskillende plekke in 1961 en 1965).

6.1 'n Valse probleemstelling

Al is daar ook vandag gereformeerde denkers wat die tweeterreineleer weer propageer (vgl. bv. die diskussie tussen Lief, 2012 en Van Drunen, 2012) impliseer vir die meeste Reformatoriese denkers die onderskeid tussen natuur en genade 'n valse probleem wat in die lig van die Bybelse openbaring onaanvaarbaar is. Dit berus op die Christianisering van 'n oeroue heidense dualisme tussen sogenaamde profane en sakrale gebiede. (In vorige artikels in hierdie reeks is ook aangetoon dat die natuur-genade tema 'n belangrike metode was om 'n sintese tussen buite-bybelse en Bybelse gedagtes te kombineer.)

6.2 Die korrekte Bybelse teenstelling

Die Woord van God ken nie hierdie onderskeid tussen natuurlike en bonatuurlike terreine nie. Die Bybelse teenstelling is nie dié tussen natuur en genade nie, maar tussen sonde en genade. Só het Bavinck (1894:18) reeds meer as honderd jaar gelede geskryf en ander Reformatoriese teoloë en filosowe het hom daarin gevolg. (Vgl. bv. Dooyeweerd, 1959; Olthuis, 1970; Smit, 1987; Spykman, 1992; Van der Walt, 2001 en Walsh & Middleton, 1984.)

Vollenhoven (1933:45) skryf byvoorbeeld dat genade allereers goddelike gunsbetoon beteken. In die verhouding van God tot sondige mense beteken dit verbeurde gunsbetoon. Die teenoorgestelde van genade is ook nie die natuur of sonde nie, maar God se toorn.

Die Reformatoriese tradisie het dus geleer dat dit tot die wese van die mens hoort om in 'n verbondsrelasie met God te staan waardeur sy *hele* lewe – nie net 'n sogenaamde bo-natuurlike sfeer van sy sielelewe nie – religieus bepaald is.

6.3 Modifikasies bied geen oplossing nie

In die tweede plek is dit belangrik om uitdruklik daarop te wys dat 'n blote herformulering of modifikasie van die natuur-genade dualisme geen oplossing bied nie. Uit die bostaande weergawe van die neo-Thomistiese worsteling met hierdie sentrale vraagstuk het duidelik geblyk dat hulle almal – ten spyte van die spanning wat dit in hulle denke veroorsaak het, en ten spyte van talle verskille met Thomas en mede-Thomiste – aan die oeroue valse tema getrou probeer bly het.

Volgens 'n Reformatoriese perspektief bied egter nóg 'n afgewaterde, nóg opgewarmde, nóg omgekeerde verhouding tussen so 'n tweeterreineleer enige oplossing. Die enigste werklike oplossing vanuit 'n Bybelse perspektief is om van die hele natuur-genade skema as *sodanig* afskeid te neem. Die vraag is egter of dit wel binne die reformatoriese teologie en filosofie gebeur het.

6.4 Voorbeelde van onvoltooide reformasie

As toets vir 'n beantwoording van hierdie vraag noem ons slegs een voorbeeld. Aan een van die reuse binne die Reformatoriese tradisie, Abraham Kuyper, word byvoorbeeld vandag weer groot aandag veral in die Angel-Saksiese wêreld gegee. Van Kuipers (2011) verskyn daar byvoorbeeld 'n omvattende, geannoteerde bibliografie van Kuyper se geskrifte. Mouw (2012) publiseer 'n bundel van sy eie opstelle in lyn met die Kuyperiaanse denke, waarin hy aantoon wat dit beteken om werklik (soos Kuyper) Reformatories te dink en ook hoe vanuit so 'n perspektief op die huidige omringende kulturele milieu reageer behoort te word – nie net individueel nie, maar ook institusioneel. Bishop & Kok (2013) bevat, behalwe 'n groot aantal opstelle oor verskillende aspekte van Kuyper se denke, op p. 453-471 ook 'n lang lys van artikels en boeke in Engels wat vanaf 1890 tot 2012 oor Kuyper se lewe, werk en denke verskyn het (vgl. ook Van der Walt, 2010b). En so pas het van Bratt (2013) 'n nuwe Kuyper-biografie verskyn wat as die beste ("definitive") tot op hede beskou word.

Kon hierdie groot figuur binne die Reformatoriese denke volledig aan die narkotiese krag van die natuur-genade dualisme ontkom? Die skerpsinnige Reformatoriese denker, Zuidema, dink nie so nie.

Volgens Zuidema (2013) was Kuyper se leer van algemene en besondere genade slegs 'n modifikasie van die natuur-genade tema. Ook Mekkes (in 1961 en 1965) kritiseer hierdie dogma by sowel Kuyper as Bavinck. (Vgl. verder Veenhof, 1994 en Heideman, 1959 vir Bavinck se visie.) Klapwijk (2013) staan ook nie kritiekloos daarteenoor nie.

Daar bestaan selfs goeie gronde om 'n knuppel in die hoenderhok te gooi met die stelling dat Protestante en selfs gereformeerde teoloë en kerkmense in die algemeen tot op die huidige dag nog nie daarin kon slaag om hulself volledig van die smet van een of ander natuurlik-bonatuurlike dualisme te reinig nie.

6.5 Wat is die Bybelse alternatief?

Die groot vraag is egter wat 'n werklik Bybels-reformatoriese visie dan behels wat in die plek van die Thomistiese idee van natuur-genade gestel kan word. Wat moet 'n Christen se verhouding wees teenoor die dikwels sekulêre denke en kultuur waarin hy/sy vandag lewe? Wat is die verhouding tussen skepping en verlossing? Dit is duidelik dat daar aan die einde van hierdie ondersoek nog heelwat onbeantwoorde vrae is wat tot dringende verdere besinning oproep.

Enkele voorbeelde vanuit Protestantse kring wat reeds met hierdie probleem worstel is byvoorbeeld Carter (2007), Carson (2008) en Klapwijk, Griffioen en Groenewoud, (1991). Dit is nie net 'n Westerse probleem nie. Ook Christene in Afrika worstel daarmee (vgl. bv. Bediako, 1992 en Van der Walt, 2011). Christene word vandag met talle bybelsvreemde lewensvisies soos individualisme, konsumerisme, nasionalisme, relativisme, wetenskaplike naturalisme en postmoderne tribalisme gekonfronteer en gedwing om daarteenoor standpunt in te neem. (Vgl. Wilkens & Sanford, 2009).

Miskien regverdig hierdie uiters belangrike en aktuele probleme dalk eendag nog 'n opvolgartikel.

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2de Kwartaal
2nd Quarter

Work – The quintessential commission given to mankind: A missiological approach

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Opsomming

Werk is 'n gawe van God, begin by God en dien as 'n refleksie van Sy Drie-Enige goddelike karakter. Werk, in die beeld van God, is deur Hom oorgedra en ingeweef in alle lewende skepsels en dien as 'n uitvloeisel van Sy Natuur. Werk is ontologies tot menswees, die gegewe en geseënde instrument waardeur die mensdom hulle skeppingsdoel verwesenlik. As gevolg van die ineenstorting van Eden is alle dissiplines van die samelewing egter gestrem; gevolglik het die karakter van werk verander, en wel in so 'n mate dat werk moeisaam en 'n vervloeking vir die mensdom geword het. Tog is die opdrag om te werk nooit deur God teruggetrek nie – nie tóé, vandag, of in die eskatologiese Koninkryk nie. Inteendeel, Christus het aan die Kruis die essensie van menswees herstel, insluitende die mens se skeppingsroeping om te werk. Werk is dus nie sekulêr of heilig nie. Werk is óf versoen, óf verlore. Hierdie versoening bring mee dat werk weereens op verhoudings geskoei is, verhoudings wat transformeer en as getuie van Sy karakter dien. Werk is

nog steeds die enigste sleutel waardeur die skeppings-opdrag uitgevoer, en waarmee die verlore institusionele dissiplines van die samelewing (mens se habitat) ontsluit en getransformeer kan word. Werk integreer en konnekteer die mens met die res van die Skepping – vanuit en vanwaar die mens ook geskape is en waaruit daar 'n geskape interafhanklikheid bestaan.

Abstract

Work is divine, beginning with, and stemming from, the Trinity. Work is replicated within all living Creation as a continuum of God's nature and is ontological to being human. It is the gifted instrument through which humanity executes its creational mandate. The collapse of Paradise saw all disciplines of life becoming strained; subsequently the character of work changed and became a curse. However, the commission to work was never revoked, not then, not now, or in the eschatological Kingdom. Christ restored the essence of being human, including mankind's creational calling to work. Work is therefore not secular or sacred, but rather redeemed or lost. Work is once again relational, transformational and witness. Work is once more the key commissioned and serving instrument to unlock and transform the lost disciplines and institutions of the marketplace, which is humanity's habitat. Work connects and integrates humanity with Creation, from which mankind originated.

1. Introduction

This article approaches the concept of work from a missiological perspective, giving purpose to working humanity, who represents God in the Kingdom on Earth. Humanity fulfils their creational intent and commission through work. This article proposes a rediscovery of the original intention of work, as the instrument and expression of being human. Its focus is on a corporate Kingdom culture that goes beyond individualism.

It is about work orchestrated by a higher being, for eternal purposes. This article does not negate individuality, but focuses on individual input within the corporate reality determined by God, for the wealth and health of His Creation as a whole. The article acknowledges that, since the Fall, the essence of

work[1] has consistently been challenged by the evolving geopolitical, cultural and economic cycles mankind has always experienced.

As humanity's habitat evolves through such cycles and transitions, there is a call to define self through what we do. It has been that way since the Fall, throughout the Agricultural Age to today's Information Age, and continuing with the advent of new technological compounded applications (Thurow, 1999:16). The essence of work was, and always will be, challenged by sociopolitical scenarios, whether stemming from feudalism, fascism and communism to authoritarian capitalism, and from destabilisation of Protestantism to secular humanism (Neuhaus, 1997:ix).

It is for this reason that this article proposes a protological understanding of work to transcend the evolutionary transitions. It intends to fill the void created by change with scriptural meaning and understanding, instead of alternative worldviews imposed by 'the ambitions of the modern state' (Neuhaus, 1997:ix) and the lack of an alternative ecclesiastic response.

In the beginning God worked and created Earth as the habitat both of humanity and the animate world. Adam and Eve were created to work; they cultivated Eden according to the will of God. Adam and Eve were the first *ecclesia* and representatives of God on earth and were sent on a specific mission relating to the rest of Creation. Their apostolic mission was to be priests to Creation; they were endowed with all the gifts and abilities to successfully serve and bring Creation in line with God's will.

They walked daily with God, discussing the advance of their work and service rendered to Creation which was also their worship (Green, 2005:37) rendered to God. Sadly, their mission failed, resulting in the collapse of all the disciplines that supported their habitat. However, Christ redeemed and restored their initial position and purpose. The commission of God's ecclesiastic fraternity is now to bring the good news that humanity's habitat could be restored to its pristine state and that this should be done through discipleship – a process of educating people to live and work according to the will, precepts and ordinances of God.

Today the marketplace cradles the institutions of society through which humanity's habitat can be transformed. The marketplace provides the grid and infrastructure through which all disciplines interconnect to give substance to the habitat of mankind. A missiology of the marketplace advocates the restoration of humanity's habitat by involving all disciplines of society,

1 Work defined as relational, transformational and witness is noted under section 4 of this article.

executing its work in accordance with His will. The various disciplines within the marketplace network by means of work. Work is the substance by which communities live, communicate and create wealth. Work is performed by God's created agents, who are redeemed and appointed to transform Earth to represent and mirror His goodness.

A missiology of the marketplace embodies the various disciplines in which work resonates, focusing on humanity as the created corporeal instrument through which the Kingdom on Earth is intended to be managed, now and in the eschatological future. This missiology endorses an understanding that redeemed humanity and their created essence to work, is the commissional key to transform (read disciple) humanity's habitat. Work can never become redundant. It is ontological to being human and as such will also be carried forward into the eschatological dispensation.

1.1 Angle of approach

This article connects with current global interest relating to work, humanity and their common habitat: the public square. The view taken is that the phenomenon of work transcends all disciplines of life, including that of the ecclesiastical fraternity. Work involves and influences all spheres of life, because work is quintessentially a human activity. Governments, institutions and religious groupings are continuously grappling with issues relating to the realities of work. People are constantly searching for possible solutions to the challenges of social stability, wealth creation and a healthy society – all of which hinge on humanity's ability to work.

Globalisation has heightened the need to study work which, as a process, has fashioned global economic interdependence. Globalisation has spurred an increase in migration and a swelling of humanity's expectations within the global socio-economic realm. The reason for migration, however, whether global, rural or urban, goes beyond the mere 'flattening' of the world. At the heart of the pull and push of migration lies mankind's desire and related expectations to be able to work[2]. It influences all disciplines of life – disciplines in which the ecclesiastic family exists.

From a Biblical perspective work, executed in accordance with God's design, is the key to the transformation of humanity's habitat. Work not only involves all institutions and disciplines of life, but is the executive substance thereof. It is thus the fulfilment and expression of the most basic human need, and

2 Also see *The Coming Jobs War* by Gallup Chairperson, Jim Clifton, providing insight into trends that might influence communities.

transcends all institutions, religions, cultures and creeds. The Christian ecclesiastical fraternity is, by default, involved in the deliberation on work as they are part of the global network of working people who experience being in the frontline of a world in search of meaning.

The ecclesiastical fraternity approaches the subject from a characteristically ecclesiastical perspective, with a need for greater involvement of the laity of the Church in the transformation of communities. The laity/clergy divide presents its own set of challenges translating into a worldview whereby work can unfortunately be defined as either sacred or secular. Classical mission models have also relaxed the traditional bias towards work because of the need for alternative missional methods. These changes are mainly as a result of tightened resources and the need for creative access into restricted domains. The most common expression of this line of thought is 'tent making', which in essence is very dissimilar to a missiology of the marketplace.

This article upholds the view that in order to transform Creation, the ecclesiastical family of Christ cannot be a specific culture, government or institution. Its calling is to co-empower: to be the people who are the change agents within their given habitat.

1.2 Intended objective

The approach of this article is protological more than ecclesiastical. It acknowledges contemporary needs and is concerned with work as ontological to being human and also the proto-commission given to humanity. Work is viewed as the primal gift and ministry imparted by God to humanity, enabling them to execute their individual and corporate creational purposes. The process is intended to liberate, enhance and enlighten mankind in its place of interaction: the marketplace.

Work as the primary commission given to mankind is intended to enhance, rather than inhibit, humanity's spiritual and physical development. Work is therefore not merely a tool of operation, but given for transformation. It is in the working to transform mankind's habitat that humanity finds its missional objective, commission and identity. Therefore work does not stand in the way of mankind's true spirituality, but rather reflects it and inevitably influences the concept of what it means to be Christian and, more specifically, to be human. The objective is also to negate a negative theological worldview that "looks forward to the day when they would grow spiritually to the place where they, like the missionaries, could cast off the burden of their daily work and

go out and serve God" (Cosden, 2006:i). Work presents an alternative to a perceived spirituality that is clearly disconnected from the (metaphysical) world, from and for which humanity is created.

The objective is to restore a positive worldview of Christianity and its relation to work. This discussion presents a progressive approach to work that can enhance humanity's understanding by highlighting that mankind does not work their way to Hell, nor escape the latter through the termination of work. Mankind therefore does not enter the Kingdom by resigning from how work is perceived. Work does not stand in the way of humanity's spirituality, it *is* their spiritual expression. By rediscovering that humanity's creational essence is to work, and that this complements and empowers mankind's unique makeup and work is *what* they are and part of *who* they are.

1.3 Preliminary considerations

The restoration of humanity's habitat does not happen in isolation but rather within three important areas. These are: work, priesthood of all believers, and a pluriform expression of what it means to be the ecclesia. This article focuses on work. Work is part of that which was and had to be redeemed. Therefore work cannot be separated or excluded from the Gospel of Salvation. Humanity has been salvaged, by Christ, for human beings to be human and to execute their human commission. Humanity, as recreated in Christ, is called to live its creational purpose, worshipping, working and living together as humans were created to be.

Consequently the message of salvation understands that work, in its creational intent, has evolved *in character* and value since the Fall – to the extent of becoming a curse. However, work in its fullness was restored on the Cross and is irreversibly linked with the message of the Kingdom to come. A redeemed understanding of work now finds its hope and surety both in the present and teleologically in the eschatological new Heaven and Earth. Work, in its ontological relationship with mankind, is not going to be discarded with the return of the Messiah. It will be carried forward to the new and as such, has eternal significance.

Cultivating a wider understanding of work in a pre- and post-Paradise context brings greater clarity to what mankind's commission entails. It is to announce the good news that Jesus came to save *that*, which was lost (Luke 19:10). This restoration includes humanity's protological commission to work, which

mirrors the essence of the Great Commission[3]. Such an understanding liberates it from a delineated interpretation of the Gospel as being just the salvation of souls. Therefore, humanity's creational commission as *imago opus Dei* is by implication a movement of His people in the world. It is a movement of redeemed working people whose witness is one of restoration – the restoration of humanity's lost position, identity and unfulfilled commission of cultivating their habitat.

By redeeming humanity, God redeemed its work – work that permeates all facets of human life and is understood and experienced as the common good and being "primarily a form of civic virtue" (Bellah, 1985:4). Work, then, is an important and central requirement for revitalising society. It brings perspective to a world of encompassing work, where work is mostly understood as a matter of duty, a means to profitability[4] and where it is ultimately performed as a necessity to survive (Cosden, 2004:67). It brings a message to a world where humanity perceives work as an instrument to achieve goals and a tool to become that which they cannot, without work.

In the culture of capitalism, work has become a means and symbol through which to attain success and status, which in turn are mainly defined by financial wealth. Sociologists and psychologists observe the 'increasingly self-directed nature' (Sherman, 1987:20) of modern cultures. Some people work to survive, while others are looking for more spiritual satisfactions from work, such as relationships, expressions of gifts and sufficient leisure

3 The 'Great Commission' as an appeal from Matthew 28:18-20, "was never the one and only motive, dominant and in isolation" but "was always connected with other motives" (Johannes van den Berg, 1956:165). It has unfortunately evolved from an inclusive appeal to being primarily an act of obedience.

4 The basis of the teaching of profitability and prosperity (Venter, 1990:60) is that God wills prosperity and that His people will prosper if they obey the spiritual laws that He has set in place. It links spirituality with health and prosperity over against the curse of sickness and poverty: "God gives the power to get wealth" (Copeland, 1974:42). The teaching of prosperity is fundamentally centred on humanity (Venter, 1990:63) and simultaneously individualistic in its nature (Neuhaus, 1997:21) and bordering on secular humanism as the deistic and secular worldview hinges on the application of certain spiritual and physical laws that will produce success and property irrespective of a person being a believer or not (Savelle, 1980:8-11). Work is thus, as with tent making, a means or tool to a (prosperous) end. The focus in this article is not on humanity or the application of specific natural, physical or spiritual laws, but rather on being obedient to the will of God in executing the commissions given to mankind to work (serve) humanity and nature in such a way that it reflects the image of God. It is in the working in obedience, with humanity for the good of the habitat where God has called the ecclesia. God is a personal and sovereign God who governs creation according to His will and not certain 'clockwork' laws (McConnell, 1988:45). The earth and its fullness belongs to God and humanity the stewards originally appointed and their position reinstated by the death of Jesus (Barron, 1987:91).

time. Workers have moved from a survival culture to an identity culture (Stevens, 1999:107). There has also been a transition from work as hard work to work that is stressful, compounded by a workplace redefined by telecommunication, email and the Internet, making work a totally intrusive and all-encompassing environment (1999:108).

Transformation of the meaning and application of work is not a case of fine-tuning economic institutions alone, but by changing the essence and fundamental understanding of work. It requires a deep cultural, social and psychological transformation (Volf, 2001:4) backed by a theology of work. The intention of this article is to think beyond the underlying dichotomy and tension of work *per se* and what it means to be human. It endeavours to bring concepts in line with an integrated Biblical view directly related to mankind's commission to work, bearing in mind that this commission was never revoked. The character of work changed with the Fall, but was again restored at the Cross.

1.4 Initial challenges

Presenting a unified understanding of humanity and work is challenged by an entrenched dualism, that of work and ministry. This mindset is supported by another regrettably divisive dichotomy: the class-structure implicit between the clergy and laity. The latter is usually defined by its association with secular work, while the clergy is seemingly released from the mundane and secular. The clergy are the ones called to serve the interests of the Kingdom and are generally understood to be employed by God, making all other work supposedly meaningless (Cosden, 2006:i).

This frame of mind questions the possibility of the workplace being a place to experience the relational presence of God. Consequently, it nullifies the idea of that anyone's work can be a witness of the Kingdom. Even worse, it cements the outlook that Earth is forever lost and beyond redemption. The Kingdom to come is thus a spiritual Kingdom and the corporeality of humanity is only an interim phase of a cyclic existence. It also tends to restrict the believers' spiritually to the realm of the Church giving rise to the Kingdom being predominantly defined in ecclesiastical terms. This view results in an ecclesiology becoming so primary (Bosch, 1991:201) that both eschatology[5] and pneumatology (and in effect mission) are submitted to the Church, fostering the perception that only work done for God in and through the Church, has eternal and spiritual value.

5 Eschatology concerns not only the completion of the life of humanity but also the consummation of God's purposes for the whole creation (Migliore, 2004:409).

1.5 Alternative expectations

The above highlights the need for a theology of work and the formulation of alternative missiological paradigms. Here are, however, other contemporary reasons for developing a working ecclesia:

a. The emergent ecclesia in the non-Western world are basically mobile, nomadic and communal people. They make do without undue religious facilities and are rarely in a position to have trained and ordained clergy. Many Christians from emerging nations do not belong to any formal congregation or denomination (Bellagamba, 1992:3), but they form a 'people movement' and then specifically a movement of working people within a communal environment.

b. The global phenomenon of migration invites a supportive theology of individual worth, enhancement and empowerment. Christians working away from home are doing so because of need and not as a result of having a call from God in the traditional sense. This necessitates a threefold understanding of the 'spiritual' nature of work, of God calling His people through circumstances and the articulation of a pluriform expression of being the ecclesia.

There is thus a need for an alternative theological perspective on work for His people to be mobile, to articulate their contemporary nature and the way they congregate in a pluriform expression within the marketplace and community.

2. Towards a theology of work

So, what is work? Work is a gift from God and essentially part of being human. The focus here is less on the *phenomenon* of work but rather on the *essence* of work. Martin Luther originated the concept of work as vocation (Volf, 2001:105) and developed this concept within his doctrine of justification by faith. The latter was done against the backdrop of medieval monasticism (Bosch, 1991:239) and the reductionism of vocation as a calling to a particular religious way of life. Today Protestants still interpret work as something of a calling and the vocational model of work has remained dominant in Protestantism and Evangelical missiology. It has again and again provided an enduring understanding of work and one that displayed the ability to be re-casted, reformed (Shriver, 1995:539) and able to stay relatively relevant.

2.1 Protestant thinking

After the Second World War, Protestant thinking veered more towards the problem of work (Richardson, 1952:35-39) as a vocation and how work

translates into the realities of life and spiritual growth. Importantly, obedience to the call of God in daily life translates into work and this continues to be a reformational emphasis that most Protestants retain in some form (Cosden, 2006:40). The distinct, yet interrelated beliefs regarding the Protestant view on vocation include the following:

a. The priesthood of all believers. Luther's view of work affirms the personal role and responsibility (Holl, 1958:238) of believers in all facets of life. Yet the traditional understanding of work as vocation appeared to have been too inwardly orientated, individualistic, with limited social concerns and too defined for static forms of society. The solution is to look beyond work, as the answer to the transformation, by rediscovering the ontological relation between being human, work and the protological commission.
b. All Christians, not only monks and priests, have a vocation. Vocation is therefore not a call to a select group or person, but a call to all believers.
c. Any work performed by Christians can be a vocation – demanding a definition of work[6].
d. Since every vocation rests on God's commission, every vocation is fundamentally of the same value before God.

Luther also speaks of a double vocation (Volf, 2001:105) for every Christian: spiritual vocation (*vocatio spiritualis*) and external vocation (*vocatio externa*). The spiritual vocation is for all who answer God's call to enter into the Kingdom. Luther saw this call as common to all Christians and comes through a mandatory experience of conversion (Bosch, 1991:125). The external vocation is a call to serve God and humanity at large through one's standing or profession in life. Luther consistently tried to link the daily work of every Christian with the centre of Christian faith (Volf, 2001:5). Therefore, in theory at least, work in every profession, including ecclesiastical professions, rests on divine calling.

The belief that every believer can and should stand in direct, personal relationship with God was, however, only practised and carried through to its logical conclusion by the Anabaptists (Bosch, 1991:26). Luther supported a more rigid understanding of office: "he denied the validity of any office that was not linked to the existence of geographically defined parishes" (Volf, 1991:242). Luther still valued the Church as a centripetal phenomenon and the gathering of people as the point of reference deliberating on all issues of

6 See 5. Working definition.

life. Protestants concluded that "since the exercise of absolute power by the papal church was wrong its exercise by the opponents of the papacy was right" (Niebuhr, 1951:29).

Any centralisation of authority, however, whether in the religious realm or otherwise, opens the door for a bi-vocational interpretation of work in terms of class and position, and not as ontologically realised. This creates a problem in the way work can be approached. Positively, Protestants have a strong interdependence on the various doctrines surrounding the initial Creation, or protology, and rightly so. It is an important aspect in uncovering and defining the nature and ontological meaning of work. The very structure of Creation supports the attempt to see work move beyond being simply an instrument of activity. Work is a command grounded in the initial Creation as a "creation ordinance" (Brunner, 1952:387) and so also for Bonhoeffer, who considered work as sharing in the primary creational mandate (Cosden, 2006:42).

2.2 Probing other and alternative disciplines

Theological anthropology is very prominent among doctrinal deliberations of the who, why and how humanity came to be where, and what humanity is. Christian anthropologies likewise have humanity as an integral part of their formulation with a specific angle on the doctrine of the image of God. There are three fundamentally different ways to understand the image of God from an anthropological approach (Erickson, 1983:489), namely the substantive, the functional and the relational.

The common denominator of the various disciplines in seeking answers (Migliore, 2004:144) to *who* and *what* humankind is, is their consistent reference to humanity as being created in the image of God. The answer comes partly through reflecting upon what humanity does in relationship with the rest of Creation where mankind occupies a central position. Humanity thus tries to make sense of its nature through working and living experiences and its understanding of reality in relation to His Creator, self and Creation.

3. Created as imago

Approaching humanity's being and position in relation to God and Creation from a protological angle provides important creational understandings. First, God's intention was initially not with humanity, but with the non-human world (Moltmann, 1977:185). His objective was to create from chaos an orderly and interrelated world that would eventually stand as witness to His work. The human-less creation of this earth, in time and space, is thus the first

reflection and witness of His image. Humanity, being constructed from the elements of nature, and given life for the purpose of managing Creation, can thus only begin to find its own image portrait as *imago mundi* and *imago Dei*.

3.1 Imago mundi

Humanity contains all of the simpler systems found in Creation, they are present in them and humanity depends upon them. Humanity is *imago mundi* (Moltmann, 1977:190) and stands before God, representing all the creatures. In this act as *imago mundi*, humankind is a working priestly creature defining its role and relationship with itself, God and the rest of Creation. Humanity does so as created corporeal beings in the image of God which is "an amazing work of the Almighty God's art" (Bavinck, 1960:521). It incorporates the eventual commissioning of humankind in relation to the rest of Creation, through work.

Placed within the context of Hebraic-Christian ontology of being-in-relationship and liberated from its own dogmatic past (Hall, 1986:21), the *imago mundi* and *imago Dei* concepts can fashion an alternative image of humankind within the larger order of nature. Humanity belongs and shares in the rest of Creation and is uniquely commissioned to cultivate the latter according to God's protocols. Humans represent the will and glory of God here on Earth. Humans can intercede before God because they are also from the community of Creation, being *imago mundi*. However, it is also in being God's counterpart and being His reflection (Moltmann, 1975:191) that humans are distinct from the rest of Creation.

3.2 Image and likeness

The concept of *imago Dei* has consistently been the dogmatic device (Migliore, 2004:141) by which Christianity attempts to explain the essence of being human and its calling. Mankind is the only recorded entity to be created '*in the image*' and '*after the likeness*' of God. There is no difference between image and likeness as it is a Hebrew parallelism and a poetic device as used in the Psalms (Berkouwer, 1962:83). There are four explicit references in the book of Genesis to image as '*tzlem*' and likeness '*denuh*' (Hall,1986:68). Genesis 1:26-27 is generally referred to as God's original decision to make man in His image and likeness – a distinct and inseparable relationship between being in His image and the working commission bestowed upon mankind.

Humanity can therefore not fathom being in His image without identifying with its working ordination, image and commission. These are given both to

male and female (Genesis 5:1-2), who were also the first ecclesia. Eve was to be a co-worker, assisting Adam in the execution of the commission. The following verse (5:3) refers to Adam who; "had a son in his own *likeness*, in his own *image* and he named him Seth" sharing in the same attributes to empower them both to fulfil the protological commission. The Genesis 9:5-6 reference to the Great Flood underscores the value of human life (Genesis 9:5-6) in relation to *imago Dei* as well as relationships within self, humanity and with the rest of Creation.

3.3 Image and relation

These passages of Scripture, in combination with a substantive outlook on imago Dei, provide a comparative basis (Gunton, 1989:103) for humanity to find itself in relation to God, itself and the rest of Creation. The symbol "image of God" describes human life in relationship with God and with other creatures (Migliore, 2004:141). Humanity has thus been created to mirror His image in their respective mutual relationships and within the order of nature. Being in His image goes beyond a set of human capacities, possessions or endowments.

The comparative substantive view also helps humanity to understand who they are by defining mostly who they *are not*. Virtues such as free will, reason and rationality provide the main distinction between humanity's commission, to creatively cultivate Creation, versus Creation's readiness to be cultivated according to His ordinances. Mankind is then also the sum of what others are not. Protestant Reformers viewed the concept of *imago* as the original righteousness people possess by virtue of their relation to God (Evans, 1988:69). *Imago Dei* therefore refers to what humanity has in common with God, functionally and substantively.

God created humanity differentiated as male and female and therefore in natural fellowship with God (Barth, 1958:73) as expressed through the Trinity. Adam and Eve executed their commission in relationship with each other and found their different abilities and personalities working towards the same end and in unison with God and Creation. Humanity's working image is restored for those in Christ who are now called to model the Kingdom in His likeness.

The instrument, through which this likeness is realised, is work.

4. Imago Dei as opus Dei

The proto commission, involving Creation, is irreplaceably fused in the image of God. Approached from a chronological protological perspective, the unfolding events in Genesis sequentially unveil the way God intended to reveal Himself. Every day, and the sequences in that day, were building blocks leading towards the eventual completion of an Earthly habitat, as envisioned by Him. This orderly and chronological creational process eventually ended with the moulding and commissioning of mankind, not as a climax, but as a conclusion. It was rounded off by a day of no work. Any one day was not more important than another. It rounded off the completion of the habitat where mankind would live and execute its commission.

Notably, the very first sequentially and prevailing revealed image of God is that of God as Creator. It portrays God *at work*. In Genesis 1:1 God introduced Himself ontologically as a working entity before any other revelation. God's involvement in Creation is known trough His work: "God is a worker, and work is something He chooses to do – part of His plan, consistent with His holy nature" (Green, 2005:27). It is within this revelational framework that humanity finds its primary creational purpose, that of work and the first expression of humanity: being in the image and likeness of God.

Humankind as *imago Dei* is a worker – not because of some evolved misfortune of nature, but because God first is a worker. Work in its essence is built into the fabric of all Creation. Humanity thus mirrors His image through executing its creational purpose. Mankind, as *imago Dei* bearers, can only express its ontological functions and relations through work executed in relation to God, self and the rest of Creation. Work, then, in its ontological protological context provides the functional essence and elements for the definition of work[7]: relational, transformational and witness.

a. Relational

The correlation between God at work and the commission bestowed on humanity is clear and translates into a functional creative intent, making of mankind a specific relational and working entity. Humanity's primal image is likewise related to being in the Trinitarian *imago Dei*[8]. The Trinitarian God's work is in relational unity with Him, just so humanity expresses its work in relationship with God, self and the rest of Creation. Work is also the relational instrument that connects mankind (male and female) with the rest of Creation.

7 Also see 5. Working definition.

8 Also see 4.1. Trinitarian

b. Witness

It is through the work of God's fingers (Psalm 8:4 and Rom 1:20) that He reveals Himself. His creational work in the Old Testament (Childs, 1885:31) stands as a witness of His greatness, character, goodness, faithfulness and provides the role model for created humanity. Likewise, mankind's work should stand as a witness reflecting the character of the God they worship.

c. Transformational

God created the physical elements and also time and space (*ex nihilo*) with their predetermined parameters. He created the core elements needed to creatively form life. He laid the foundation for a wonderful network of related disciplines devoted to the coming humanity, such as anthropology, palaeontology, history, sociology, psychology and theology. Work is the essential link between God, humanity and the rest of Creation. Humanity was empowered to work by inheriting certain imagery from God for the execution of an ordained transformational mission in the world.

In addition to its centrality, Genesis also complements the substantive effect of work, in the consistent comment of God each day: '*it was good*'. Work, as *imago Dei*, releases the essence of work – the satisfaction and a sense of completion, providing substance and function to the meaning of work as an attribute of God. God exhibited the power to create and also the inclination to transform being good in the sense of being perfect.

Sequentially, on the fourth day (Genesis 1:22), God blessed the Creation, revealing Himself as priest. God worked by performing the very act of a priest (Kessler & Deurloo, 2004:33&36), speaking in terms of abundance, multiplication and praise (Pedersen, 1962:160). He transformed the habitat and also empowered it to live out its creational purpose. The substantive characteristics of work as *imago Dei* include transformation and priesthood. There seems to be no dichotomy between being a priest and transforming (work) Creation. By performing a priestly action God worked in the same way in which He created. Any priestly gesture of redeemed humanity then is an ontological act of being human – it is work.

During the fall of humanity God revealed Himself as the provider, clothing and caring for Adam and Eve, a theme that is carried throughout Scripture (Isaiah 58:6-8 and Matthew 25:34-40). God subsequently guarded the Garden of Eden so that no one could gain access – an act bestowed on the apostolic work of the ecclesia acting as the witnesses and guardians of the Faith (Küng, 1976:407). Work understood in this fashion reveals the context

of the Triune God's work delegated to mankind. It is a pluriform expression of work executed as character and purpose and done so in unison, holistically. This provides the function and substance for a definition of work. It also reflects the character of work not as exercising dominion, but rather respect, protection and care (Migliore, 2004:141).

4.1 Trinitarian

When God in the Old Testament said: "Let us make man" it was done in a relationship and with a Trinitarian understanding of God (Childs, 1985:44). The key characteristic of a relational ontological view is that it ultimately suggests a corporate definition of *being-with-others*. The triune God is an expressed community in relation with Self and His Creation. It stands as a model for humanity – to image. An ontological understanding (Berkouwer, 1979:89) does not establish individuality at the expense or the alienation of human from human, or humans from the rest of Creation. The Trinity speaks of unity and then a *communio unity* (Volf, 1998:78) built on relationships and working together towards a common goal.

A Trinitarian view includes individuality or otherness and yet also a connectedness, giving a better understanding of the first commission as an individual, corporative, holistic and interactive mandate. This emphasises and projects the Trinity as agreeing and working together for the creation of this world *ex nihilo*, the transformation of the void and the making of mankind. The latter is to image the Trinity as in unity, interrelatedness and as working beings. The Trinitarian structure is neither pyramidal dominance nor hierarchical: it is polycentric and symmetrical (Volf, 1998:217).

Humanity, however, was not only created in the Trinitarian image, but now also in Christ. Mankind can thus be reflected upon as being created as *imago Dei*, *imago Christi* and *imago trinitatis* (Migliore, 2004:141). The Old Testament also clearly indicates that there is no other God who will have humanity's devotion (Brueggemann, 1982:36) and in whose image mankind is created.

5. Working definition

Work is more than the sum total of its instrumental parts (Cosden, 2006:17). Work is fundamental to our creational existence, expression and execution. It is an ontological reality God built into the very structures of Creation and thus human nature. Work as such is fundamental to humanness, being an end in itself. Work is ontological and also a functional relational mechanism.

It employs different instruments to express the glory of God. It becomes a normative study because it is universal in scope and applies to the 'then, now and to be'. It guides the present realisation of work towards the redeemed reality of transformation in this age, using the past and the coming new Creation as a mirror of what is to be. Work thus becomes inclusive for all cultures. It is *pan human* (Volf, 2001:86) and also not limited to a particular timeframe of history. This universality of work encourages a better understanding of its nature and meaning as well as its position within nature.

Defining work as *imago opus Dei* translates into three interrelated ontological, non-hierarchal modes of expressions: being witness, relational and transformational. These expressions employ various instruments of functionality and substantive characteristics to anthropomorphise its intrinsic values into the metaphysical world. A basic definition of work is 'to be' – what God has created us to be. It is to be in relation with God and the rest of Creation. It translates into symbiotic relationships that *transform* Creation and stand as a witness. Within this formulation, checks and balances are built into the defined interrelationship components of being relational, transformational and witness. Work is the agent of transformation.

These three components form the criteria for evaluating what we understand work to be. If any component is missing it is not work in the light of Creation or the Cross. Slavery and human trafficking and similar activities are misaligned expressions of work. These are neither witness, nor transformational, nor relational and therefore not work as intended by God, nor work as redeemed by the work on the Cross and neither a fitting description of work within the Kingdom to come. A fourth complementary substantive element, reserved for mankind only, is one that distinguishes humanity from the rest of Creation. Mankind, being created in His image is ontologically priestly – in speaking and being a blessing. Work as a redeemed priestly expression is devoid of any centripetal motives of pride, position, value, esteem or personal concerns. Humanity was not called to be priests to mankind, but priests to Creation.

Christ restored humanity in order to be priests again unto their habitat. Priestly work is intrinsically service and worship humanity brings to God. The word in Hebrew for worship and for work is the same, *avodah* and is best translated into English as "*service*" (Green, 2005:37). It describes the heart of the creational intention of work which mankind was commissioned to do. When work is service, it correlates with the word that is used in the New Testament to describe the offices of the ecclesia: "The particular place and function of the individual in the community was comprehensively described

with a word which carried no overtones of authority, officialdom, rule, dignity or power: the word, service" (Küng, 1976:389).

The creation of mankind is prototypical in that humankind was brought into being for a specific purpose, but then *always* within the serving interrelationships of witness, relation and transformation. Yet it can only be so if and when humanity is brought into the redemptive work of Christ.

5.1 Work redeemed

Jesus became human, the new Adam in God's image (Anderson, 1984:67), modelling what it means to be human again. This soteriological approach unveils the redemption that flows from His work, restoring mankind (Migliore, 2004:151) who lost their divine relationship, history and mission to work the land and their destiny to take control of all the Earth. It announces that God saved *this world*, instead of creating a new world totally detached from any history of the present. It unveils Christ being adorned with a crown of thorns[9], for the crown of His Creation, mankind, redeeming its work. In this way humanity finds its original commission to work justified, redeemed and restored to its original creative intent (Wright, 2006:313).

Redeemed humanity fulfils its proto-commission, knowing that its *opus imago Dei* has been restored. No work done in Christ can thereafter be construed as spiritually superior to another. There is neither class, nor hierarchical distinction. Redeemed humanity works with the understanding that it comprises corporeal beings, created for a purpose. They, their habitat, as well as their ontological commissioned purpose are restored and carried forward into the eschatological future. Salvation now and in the future is not only of humanity's souls, but also bodies (Kümmel, 1976:142), their bodily expression of work and the non-human creation as well.

The Resurrection of the Crucified One and His subsequent assertion of divine position, power and authority is the beginning of an eschatological anticipation of the resurrection of the dead as corporeal beings. Jesus is a historical 'bodily person' (Kasper, 1966:154). The body (*soma*) is vital to being man and it is unthinkable to be without a body after death (Kee & Young, 1996:182). The resurrection of Jesus was not a "symbolical resurrection, but a genuine and physical (*naturalem*) one, for eyes cannot be witness of a 'spiritual' resurrection" (Calvin, 1960:315). The body, as God's Creation, describes the whole of man whether communicating, in relationships or at work in His Kingdom.

9 Thorns being the symbol of the changed character of work being cursed at the fall of Paradise.

Humanity, in Christ, now lives in and models a redeemed *opus imago Dei*, mirroring the world to come. The eschatological world is part of the Gospel; Paul (Bruce, 1982:23) sees the present material universe being transformed, rather than annihilated, to fulfil its protological purposes for which God created it. The eschatological new creation is thus a continuation of the protological framework established in Genesis and therefore also in a continuous relationship with the present. The Resurrection was not a negation, but rather a restoration and affirmation of the earthly human identity. The restored earthly work will likewise have an influence on the resurrected personality of mankind (Volf, 2001:97).

The purpose of post-resurrection work is in its transformation and preservation, and then specifically as a witness of the Kingdom to come. Jesus frequently responded to transformation in the lives of people by alerting His audience to the fact that the 'Kingdom has come close', thereby implying that the restored work that He had done had become visible and recognisable in the present. The resurrection body demands a corresponding glorified, but nevertheless material, environment that not only anticipates future material existence (Moltmann, 1967:58 & 133), but also gives impetus to the present. Corporeal humanity is God's instrument for transformation.

6. Concluding

The message of the Gospel centres on the work of Christ manifested in His ministry, crucifixion and resurrection, making it Christocentric and Trinitarian (Migliore, 2004:132). Work is ontological; it is what it means to be human. The ecclesia is working people ordained as an apostolic priesthood of all believers, to be servants in the empty spaces of the market square. Work, from a missiological perspective, presents redeemed humanity as re-commissioned by Jesus to make disciples of people for a purpose – to restore, by means of work, the habitat where God has placed us. Discipleship implies the teaching and doing of God's will in every discipline of life. Work is an executive instrument translating discipleship into transformation.

Work is spiritual and gifted of God, complementing the corporeality of being human in the image of the Triune God. It is not a barrier or hurdle. It is not something that stands in the way of humanity's spirituality, but a creational instrument to release the goodness of the Triune God. Work is more than a legalistic functional commission: it also reflects the character, relationships and work of the Triune God who created a highly differentiated habitat (Migliore, 2004:115) that from its inception always showed interrelationships and interdependence.

Humanity's habitat, or environment, is a community interacting in the marketplace. Work is the means to bring the elements of the community into relationship with God and the subsequent release of God's intended and fundamental goodness. Work not only gains entry into other communities within the marketplace, but more so into the hearts and minds of the people ministered to. Work adds value to people, the environment and communities. Work is the functional transformational mechanism and a relational entity employing different instruments to express itself. Ultimately, it is a witness to the glory of God. Work as such is fundamental to humanness. Work is to be and reflects the three working offices of Christ (Migliore, 2004:186) as prophet, priest and king.

Work is embedded within the commission of Christ (Matthew 10:10) and the Gospel and it needs to be taken, worked and lived as a witness to the nations with whom the ecclesia share the 'naked spaces' (Neuhaus, 1997:157) of the market square. The focus is on the ecclesia being obedient to the will of God in executing their commissions, namely, to work (serve) humanity and nature so that its work reflects the image of God. It is to work with humanity for the good of humanity's collective habitat. Work also provides important principles in the believers' missional quest to reach the unreached. These keys are entry, sustainable presence, relationships, trust and acceptance (Mayers, 1987:49).

In closing, the earth and its fullness belong to God. Humanity was originally appointed as His stewards. Now humanity's position is reinstated by the death of Jesus (Barron, 1987:91) and the ecclesia is called to announce, disciple, work and live according to His ordinances. When they do this, the goodness of the Creator will transform the land (Wright, 2006:426).

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The views of experts on hazing in South African schools: a media analysis

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Abstract

In 2002 regulations were promulgated prohibiting hazing in South African schools and school hostels. Yet, research has found that hazing is still a fairly common practice in some South African schools and school hostels. This article reports on findings emanating from a qualitative content analysis of 13 in-depth newspaper articles written by or based on interviews with experts, as well as three editorials commenting on hazing. This paper draws on the theories of cognitive dissonance and male dominance. Findings from the study shed light on the nature and extent of hazing in South African schools; the possible consequences of hazing for the hazee, hazer and bystanders; as well as the overt and oblique reasons for hazing. The study highlights the role parents, educators and, to a lesser extent, the media should play in the reduction or eradication of abusive hazing practices. It is concluded that schools should develop unity and loyalty through acceptable forms of initiation, rather than physical, sexual and emotional abusive and humiliating activities that perpetuate the cycle of violence, disrespect and abuse of power in the name of 'tradition'.

Key concepts: cognitive dissonance theory, educators, hazing, initiation, male dominance theory, orientation, parents

Opsomming

Die sieninge van kundiges oor ontgroening in Suid-Afrikaanse skole en skoolkoshuise: 'n media-analise

In 2002 is regulasies wat 'n verbod op ontgroeningspraktyke in Suid-Afrikaanse skole en skoolkoshuise plaas, aanvaar. Desnieteenstaande toon navorsing dat ontgroening 'n redelik algemene verskynsel in Suid-Afrikaanse skole en skoolkoshuise is. Die artikel doen verslag oor bevindinge voortspruitend uit 'n kwalitatiewe inhoudanalise van 13 indiepte koerantartikels wat óf deur kundiges geskryf is óf gebaseer is op onderhoude met kundiges, asook drie redaksionele kommentare. Die kognitiewe dissonansie en manlike oorheersingsteorieë dien as teoretiese raamwerk vir hierdie studie. Bevindinge van die studie werp lig op die aard en omvang van ontgroeningspraktyke in Suid-Afrikaanse skole; moontlike gevolge van ontgroening vir diegene wat ontgroen word, diegene wat vir die ontgroening verantwoordelik is en die waarnemers; asook die direkte en indirekte redes vir ontgroening. Die studie beklemtoon die rol van ouers, opvoeders en tot 'n mindere mate die media in die vermindering en beëindiging van vernederende ontgroeningspraktyke. Daar word gekonkludeer dat eenheid en lojaliteit deur positiewe inisiasiepraktyke eerder as deur fisiese, seksuele en emosioneel afbrekende en vernederende praktyke gevestig word. Laasgenoemde hou onder die dekmantel van 'tradisie' 'n siklus van geweld, respekloosheid en magsmisbruik in stand.

Sleutelbegrippe: kognitiewe dissonansie-teorie, inisiasie, manlike dominansie-teorie, ontgroening, opvoeders, oriëntering, ouers,

1. Introduction

Orientation or initiation programmes for new Grade 8 learners or other groups of junior learners are often conducted in South African secondary schools (Jardine, 2009:13). The original purpose of these programmes was to help prepare newcomers psychologically, physically and symbolically for the new environment in which they were to live (Ancer, 2011:9). Ancer (2011:9) warns that "out of context, and taken too far [these practices] constitute ritualised group abuse and institutionalised bullying". The seriousness and commonness of such abusive practices in South African schools and school hostels led to the promulgation of *Regulations to Prohibit Initiation Practices in Schools* (Department of Education, 2002:2). These regulations prohibit

> … any act which in the process of initiation, admission into, or affiliation with, or as condition for continued membership of a school, a group, intramural or extramural activities, interschool's sports team or organisation endangers the mental or physical health or safety of a person; seeks to undermine the intrinsic worth of human beings by treating some as inferior to others; subject individuals to humiliating or violent acts which undermine the constitutional guarantee to dignity in the Bill of Rights; undermines the fundamental rights and values that underpin the Constitution; impedes the development of a true democratic culture that entitles an individual to be treated as worthy of respect and concern; or impedes the development of a true democratic culture that entitles an individual to be treated as worthy of respect and concern; or destroys public or private property (Department of Education, 2002:2).

The regulations (Department of Education, 2002:4), however, do not prohibit "positive orientation which involves a process of induction that seeks to introduce learners to their new academic environment in a manner where dignity is enhanced as learners are advised, guided and mentored". Huysamer and Lemmer (2013:2) found that well planned and well intended institutionalised sanctioned orientation programmes "frequently degenerate into hazing or, at least, accommodate elements of hazing". Despite the banning of hazing in South Africa and the efforts of some schools to introduce orientation programmes that focus on the principles set by the Department of Education, hazing is still a fairly common practice in some South African schools and school hostels (Potgieter, 2012). Hazing, a centuries-old, worldwide phenomenon (Garg, 2009:263; Huysamer, 2013:24-26) has occurred in South African schools for more than a century (Huysamer, 2013:18-24; Huysamer & Lemmer, 2013:3). Yet, an extensive literature search has shown that little research has been done on the topic within the South African context (De Klerk, 2013; Huysamer, 2013; Huysamer & Lemmer, 2013; Potgieter, 2012; Smith, 1950; Soudien, 2010). There is thus a need to investigate hazing in South African schools and school hostels. This study aims to answer the following research questions: (1) What is the nature and extent of hazing in South African schools and school hostels? (2) What are the consequences of hazing? (3) What are the reasons for the perpetuation of hazing? (4) What can be done to reduce/stop hazing practices?

Against the background of the findings by Huysamer and Lemmer (2013:12), as well as Potgieter (2011:39) that hazing is still fairly common in some South African schools more than ten years after it was deemed illegal, I will argue

that parents and educators should be at the forefront in eradicating hazing in our schools. This argument is firstly supported by a legal perspective, namely that the document prohibiting hazing emphasises the "co-extensive rights and responsibilities that they (educators) share with parents/caregivers to care for, to manage and to control learners fairly while they form part of school events" (De Waal, 2011:183), and secondly, by the Christian perspective that the school and family should cohere in a distinctive way in the education system (Lemmer, 2009:89).

2. A Christian perspective on hazing

In my quest to create an awareness of this practice in South African schools from a Christian perspective I support De Klerk's (2013:88) argument that the tendency to be lenient and dismiss hazing activities as harmless fun, or to condone them, has the potentially dangerous result of entrenching attitudes and beliefs that hazing practices are normal. Holmes (2012:2) writes that hazing contradicts the Biblical principles of "bringing up a child in the way he should go and when he is old he will not depart from it". He argues that hazing causes children to deviate from their upbringing, despite the fact that hazing is illegal. Holmes (2013a:23) furthermore argues that hazing disregards God, ridicules others and condones disrespect for oneself when one allows oneself to be hazed. Hazing is in contravention to the Christian values of tolerance, neighbourly love, care and respect for others, patience, kindness and trust. Hazing is motivated by the hazer's abuse of power at the detriment of the hazee (Venter & Du Plessis, 2012:3).

Holmes (2013a:23) further avers that the basis for the response against hazing can be found in the commandment to love God and "to love your neighbour as yourself" (Matthew 28:18-20). Laws alone cannot eradicate hazing; it is therefore imperative for parents and educators to take a stand against hazing, otherwise they will deny "the mercy and compassion to neighbours that we would not want denied to ourselves" (Holmes, 2013a:23).

Parents are their children's primary educators and entrust the formal aspects of their children's education to the school. However, the family should never be excluded from the child's education. Christian parents are obliged to educate and care for their children according to Biblical guidelines and, as a result of the promise they made to God to do so (Oosthuizen, 1992:123). Lemmer (2013:28) additionally writes that Christian parents are obliged to participate in and support all aspects of a child's schooling and thereby ensure that the spirit and character, aims, content, teaching methods and

management thereof are reconcilable with their Christian principles. This implies that Christian parents are obliged to speak out and act against any humiliating, degrading, abusive, disruptive and deadly acts observed, committed or suffered by their children.

From a Christian perspective, as I have already mentioned, the school and family cohere in a distinctive way in the education system. The family may make certain demands on the school, such as that the education should not clash with the philosophy of the family (Lemmer, 2009:89). While the curriculum and teaching methods should be according to true pedagogic principles and the community's life view (Lemmer, 2009:89), the principles of a school's Code of Conduct should be embedded in Matthew 28:18-20 (Holmes, 2013a:23). Venter and Du Plessis (2012:2) believe that learners should be guided by their educators to treat their fellow learners humanely and with respect, because

> Jesus came into this world, not as an imposter of humanity, nor as a dim reflection of humanity … but as a living, fully functional and holistic representative of humanity. (Iselin & Meteyard, in Venter & Du Plessis, 2012:2)

These Christian principles are supported by the judicial principle of *in loco parentis*. Literally translated, the expression means 'in the place of the parent' (Oosthuizen, 1992:127). Claassen (1976, in Oosthuizen, 1992:126) defines *in loco parentis* as "in the place of the parent. Those who have been entrusted by the parents with the custody and control of children under the age are said to stand *in loco parentis* to the children". People who are acting *in loco parentis* are educators and hostel staff. This implies that educators and hostel staff are under the obligation to provide custody for the learners as minors for the time they are entrusted to them. There is thus a duty of care on educators and hostel staff for the physical and mental protection of learners (Oosthuizen, 1992:127). From a Christian perspective this implies that educators are not only obliged to guide learners towards a caring relationship with their peers (cf. Holmes, 2013a:23), but also to enter into a loving, caring, serving, guiding and 'disciplining' relationship with learners (Oosthuizen, Roux & Van der Walt, 2003:388).

Practical guidelines on how parents and educators, as primary and secondary educators, can fulfil their responsibilities in protecting children against hazing and to prevent hazing, will be presented at the end of this article (cf. Section 7).

3. Concept clarification

The most common term used in South African schools and universities to denote processes in which newcomers are admitted to the community is called 'initiation', also popularly known as '*ontgroening*' in Afrikaans (Huysamer & Lemmer, 2013:2). The term initiation in the South African context often refers to cultural practices in which boys of certain cultural groups participate in rites-of-passage to mark their entry into the community as adult men. Initiation may also refer to religious ceremonies regulated by orthodox rituals (Huysamer & Lemmer, 2013:2). To avoid ambiguity, I decided to follow Huysamer and Lemmer's (2013:2) example and use the American term, hazing. The term hazing has been taken from the old American West practice of controlling stock animals. The word hazing was later appropriated in the West to ridicule and tell rough jokes to newcomers, who were called 'greenhorns' (Garg, 2009:264). The term hazing should not be confused with the term orientation, i.e. the positive introduction of learners to their new academic environment (Department of Education, 2002:4).

Allan and Madden (2008:2) define hazing as "any activity accepted of someone joining or participating in a group that humiliates, degrades, abuses, or endangers them regardless of a person's willingness to participate". This definition makes mention of two main ideas: firstly, the implied negative consequences, such as humiliation, degradation, abuse and any form of endangerment which includes psychological, physical and sexual consequences. Secondly, the definition refers to the participant participating willingly or unwillingly. The latter is an important part of the definition, as the individual being hazed is always in favour of the ultimate outcome, namely of becoming an accepted member of the group, but not necessarily as part of the process (Huysamer, 2013:15).

4. Theoretical framework

To provide a theoretical framework for the phenomenon of hazing, this paper draws on the theories of cognitive dissonance and male dominance. Cognitive dissonance occurs when a person holds two opposing views concurrently. This causes tension within the individual and, as a result, the individual adapts or changes one of his/her views in an attempt to reduce the internal tension caused by the opposing view. When a victim of hazing is, for example, forced into a degrading act during hazing, he/she rationalises the experience by convincing him/herself that 'it was not so bad', thus reducing the conflicting tension between his/her identity as an intelligent person and

his/her participation in a demeaning act. He/she consequently regards the group with which he/she seeks affiliation positively (Cimino, 2011:243; Huysamer & Lemmer, 2013:4). In contrast to the cognitive dissonance theory that suggests that hazing promotes group solidarity is the male dominance theory. Dominant expectations of heterosexual masculinity have long dictated that 'real men' should be tough, aggressive, courageous and able to withstand pain. Such beliefs, combined with the desires by heterosexual men to demonstrate that they do not possess qualities associated with gay men, may contribute to the perpetuation of hazing (Anderson, McCormac & Lee, 2011:428; Cimino, 2011:243).

5. Research methodology

5.1 Data

My decision to utilise newspaper articles rather than conducting an empirical investigation to answer the research questions was firstly motivated by Potgieter's (2012:19) findings that principals often reject the notion that hazing is practised in their school and/or are unwilling to allow researchers to conduct research on the topic in their schools. Secondly, newspaper reports on hazing have been instrumental in creating an awareness of the commonness and seriousness of hazing practices. This awareness led to the passing of legislation prohibiting hazing in South Africa (Potgieter, 2012:18; SAHRC, 2001:3), India (CURE, 2001:8) and in most states in the USA (Edelman, 2004:16). Thirdly, Van Raalte, Cornelius, Linder and Brewer (2008:492) found that people are unwilling to take part in studies on hazing because participants are asked questions on their involvement in what may be illegal activities. Van Raalte *et al*. (2008:492) therefore recommend utilising the news media as an alternative data source to an empirical study on the topic.

In order to convey an extensive picture of hazing in South African schools, news and in-depth informative articles, editorials, and letters to the editor related to hazing in South African schools and school hostels that were published in South African newspapers since the publication of the regulations prohibiting hazing were retrieved from the SAMedia database (http://www.samedia.uovs.ac.za/). On 1 November 2013 full-text keyword searches ('hazing', 'initiation', 'education' and 'schools'), yielded 84 items related to hazing within a school and/or a school hostel context that were published in South African newspapers between 1 December 2002 and 31 December 2012.

Among the 84 items, 13 were either in-depth informative articles aimed at disseminating information regarding the passing of the regulations prohibiting initiation practices in schools or articles written by experts on hazing per se or on a specific incident of hazing. The data search also identified three editorials. The primary function of editorials is to interpret and articulate the significance of specific events to readers (Helleinger & Szuchewycz, 1997:118). In line with the aim of this study, my data set was the above-mentioned 13 articles and three editorials. Table 1 gives a summary of information on the experts and community/education leaders whose writings and interviews reported on by journalists were analysed.

Table 1: Information on the experts and community/education leaders whose writings or interviews form the core of the data set

Author of article or interviewee	**Position**	**Contribution**	**Newspaper in which the article was published**
Judith Ancer	Johannesburg-based psychologist	Author of the article	*Sunday Times*
David Balt	Deputy-president of the National Professional Teachers' Organisation of South Africa	Interviewed and quoted by Rademeyer (2002a) *	*Beeld*
Huw Davies	Executive officer of the South African Teachers' Union	Interviewed and quoted by Van Eeden (2002)	*Rapport*
Julia Grey	Editor of The Teacher	Author of the article	*The Teacher*

* Articles by Rademeyer in which she refers to her interviews with Lorgat and Balt are published in *Beeld* (2002a), *Volksblad* (2002b) and *Burger* (2002c). The core of three of these articles is the same. I therefore analysed only the article published in *Beeld* (Rademeyer, 2002a).

Neil Jardine	Former principal of Michaelhouse, Kingswood College, Grayston Prep and the International School of South Africa	Author of the article	*Daily News*
Prof. Rika Joubert	Head of the interuniversity centre for Education Law and Policy at the University of Pretoria	Interviewed and quoted by Van Eeden (2002)	*Rapport*
Hassan Lorgat	Spokesperson for the South African Teachers' Union	Interviewed and quoted by Rademeyer (2002a)	*Beeld*
Janine Moolman	Editor of Agenda	Author of the article	*Star*
Delene Ritter	Regional director of Child-welfare South Africa (Eastern Cape)	Author of the article	*Weekend Post*
Dr. Charles Stofberg	Community leader (Erasmuskloof)	Author of the article	*Beeld*
Edmund van Vuuren	Former principal and member of the Eastern Cape legislature's provincial education committee	Author of the article	*Weekend Post*
Dr. Erika Wakeford	Clinical psychologist (Pretoria)	Interviewed and quoted by Van Eeden (2002)	*Rapport*

5.2 Analysis of data

Content analysis, a systematic approach to qualitative data analysis, was used to identify and summarise the content of the newspaper articles and editorials. According to MacNamara (2006:15), the precise method best used for qualitative content analysis is poorly defined and lacks specific guidelines. MacNamara (2006:15) accordingly, suggests that researchers use the research procedures given by established qualitative researchers. Consequently, I followed Nieuwenhuis's (2007:106-115) guidelines for qualitative content analysis in order to reduce, condense and group the content of the 13 in-depth articles and three editorials. A coding frame was drawn up, also providing for verbatim reporting where applicable. I used preset codes (a priori coding) that I identified whilst doing the literature review for my study. I worked though all my data sources (newspaper articles and editorials) and coded all the data. Related codes were thereafter organised into preset categories (cf. research questions). These preset categories were identified whilst doing my literature review. After I had completed my categorisation, I reread the newspaper articles and editorials to check whether I had captured all the important insights that emerged from the data. From the categories, patterns and themes which could be linked to the research questions were identified and described. The identification of emergent themes allowed the information to be analysed and related to the literature. To enhance the trustworthiness of the study, I described the research process in relatively in-depth detail, linked the data to the existing literature on the topic and gave rich, thick descriptions to allow transferability.

6. Findings and discussion

Newspapers move beyond the mere dissemination of information. They inadvertently strive to educate their readers about important social issues, such as hazing. In the next section attention will be given to themes identified in the space created by newspapers for experts, community leaders and newspaper editors to share their thoughts on hazing with their readers. I will integrate my findings with prior research and theory as viewed in the literature. The practice of concurrently presenting findings from prior and current research is an accepted mode of reporting in qualitative research, and a technique often used to enhance the trustworthiness of qualitative research findings (cf. Lemmer, 2009:94; Nieuwenhuis, 2007:110).

6.1 Nature and extent of hazing

A wide variety of ways to haze has been documented by researchers. The following is not an exhaustive list, but merely illustrative of activities "developed by young minds" (Huysamer, 2013:36) to 'welcome' newcomers into their midst: striking (beating, paddling, whipping) and kicking; scarring (leaving a permanent mark and includes branding, tattooing, cigarette burns and burning); drowning and near drowning (newcomers are forced to swim in inappropriate attire, during unsuitable weather conditions or swim in, for example, mud); excessive physical exercise; personal servitude; restrictions on personal hygiene; consumption of vile substances or smearing such substances on one's skin or hair; yelling, swearing and insulting new members; sexual simulation or abuse; humiliating performance in public; sleep deprivation; and excessive alcohol consumption (Finkel, 2002:229-232; Huysamer, 2013:36-42; Johnson, 2011:200).

The informative articles show that the different types of hazing that newcomers were subjected to range from the time-consuming, rather ridiculous activities such as barking like a dog to life-threatening physical abuse where newcomers were severely kicked and beaten or forced to drink what they perceive to be urine and emotionally abusive activities, such as forced to kick and kill an animal. The following two humiliating activities that may not be life threatening were identified by Grey (2004:11): newcomers were required to get on their knees and bark like a dog at the bidding of their seniors, and Grade 8s are called "slaves" and Grade 12s their "bosses" in ordinary conversations. Other time-consuming and/or ridiculous activities include forcing newcomers to clean the pavement with a toothbrush (Stofberg, 2011:11); hazees going to the tuck-shop for seniors; or being seen with their thumbs in their mouths for a week or longer (Van Vuuren, 2010:11). Some of the activities were, however, brutal and sadistic (Jardine, 2009:13). Mention was made for example, of older boys in school hostels beating younger boys with various utensils (Van Eeden, 2009:9; Van Vuuren, 2010:11); newcomers standing as targets while seniors boot footballs at their heads (Grey, 2004:11); newcomers being forced to crawl naked over concrete, rub Deep Heat over their genitals and forced to drink what they thought was urine (Ancer, 2011:9). Van Eeden (2002:9) refers to a traumatic incident where newcomers were forced to kick to death three jumping-hares, which were set free on a sports field. Jardine (2009:13) lists the following three "uncivilised refinements": "throw boys into dams … at midnight, piss in their tea [and] jacklift them up the arse with sharp-pointed shoes".

The analysed articles give no clear indication on the extent of hazing in South African schools and school hostels. That it may have been a pervasive practice before the banning of hazing in 2002 can be deduced from Lorgat (in Rademeyer, 2002a:4), Balt (in Rademeyer, 2002a:4) and Davies's (in Van Eeden, 2009:9) comments. All three said that the commonness and serious nature of hazing practices necessitated the promulgation of the regulations. As is the case with the views of the aforementioned three teachers' union leaders (cf. Table 1), post-2002 articles are also vague when referring to the extent of the problem (Jardine, 2009:13; Van Vuuren, 2010:11). This vagueness is understandable: Finkel (2002:229) believes that due to the "massive underreporting of incidents, defining the prevalence of hazing is extremely difficult". The only indication on whether or not hazing practices have declined after the passing of the regulations was found in Ritter's (2010:11) article. She writes:

> There seems to be some light at the end of the tunnel. I have seen the prevalence of initiation decreased over the last few years and I believe it has a lot to do with the fact that the negative aspects of initiation far exceed the positive.

Although the above quoted comment should not be seen as irrefutable evidence of the decline of hazing practices in schools, it can be assumed that Ritter has some insight into the prevalence of the problem, particularly in the Eastern Cape: she is regional director of Child Welfare South Africa (Eastern Cape) (cf. Table 1). It should be noted that she ascribes the decline of hazing not to the 2002 regulations, but to a greater awareness of role-players to the negative impact of hazing.

Studies by Huysamer and Lemmer (2013:12) and Potgieter (2012:39) shed some light on the prevalence of hazing in three boys-only schools in Gauteng Province and three secondary schools (boys-only, girls-only and mixed gender schools) in the Free State respectively. The Grade 12 learners who took part in Huysamer and Lemmer's (2013:12) study disagreed that the following took place in their respective schools: striking a Grade 8 with the fist (70.4%); sleep deprivation (64.4%); and consuming strange food (69.2%) or alcohol (80.4%). Respondents agreed that Grade 8s are required to do excessive exercise (68.2%) and that Grade 12s shouted at Grade 8s (58.5%). Potgieter (2012:50) found that hazing is infrequent in the three schools which took part in the study. Menial tasks, such as carrying a senior's bag, cleaning seniors' shoes and bringing water to a senior were the three most common hazing tasks. Yet, less than half of the hazees were doing these boring tasks

for Grade 12s: carrying a bag (35.9%); carrying water (28.5%); and cleaning shoes (27.6%). Huysamer and Lemmer (2013:12) and Potgieter's (2012:50) findings cannot be generalised due to the limited nature of the two studies.

An analysis of the newspaper articles thus reveal that newcomers in South African schools and school hostels are subjected to a wide variety of humiliating, abusive, crude, uncivilised, emotionally traumatic and even life-threatening acts of hazing. Some acts were nevertheless non-threatening, time-consuming and ridiculous. Ancer (2011:9) succinctly summarises hazing practices as "brutal, bizarre and wholly irrelevant". Owing to the vagueness of available information in the newspaper articles on the prevalence of hazing, it was not possible to ascertain the extent of hazing in South Africa schools and school hostels. Attempts to answer my research question by utilising existing research, is hindered by the limited nature of existing research on the topic.

6.2 Possible consequences of hazing on hazers, hazees and bystanders

Hoover and Pollard (2000:10) identify the following negative consequences of hazing: getting into fights; committing a crime; getting injured; considering suicide; fighting with parents; doing poorly at school; discontinuing socialising with friends; missing a prior commitment; getting into trouble with the police; hurting someone else; being convicted of a crime; experiencing difficulty sleeping, eating or concentrating; being depressed; crying all the time; suffering low self-esteem; or experiencing an emotional breakdown. De Klerk (2013:88) concurs with the foregoing consequences of hazing on the hazees, but adds that hazing may lead to negative publicity for the school.

In the following discussion of the findings emanating from newspaper articles on the consequences of hazing, I will firstly focus on hazees; thereafter, attention will be given to the possible negative impact of hazing on the hazers.

In an article by Moolman (2003:8) she reflects on the "damaging school rites [that] still rule our adult lives". She writes that "certain initiation rites at schools serve no purpose except to instil fear. For some boys, these practices results in a deep sense of inadequacy and the need to prove they are 'real' men". She warns that many young boys carry this emotional baggage into adulthood. Ritter (2010:11) also believes, depending on the severity of the hazing, that it could have a lasting negative effect on a child's personality. Wakeford (in Van Eeden, 2009:9) is especially worried about the negative effects of hazing practices on children with a lack of self-worth.

After briefly explaining the original aim of initiation practices, namely to prepare individuals to become part of a new group, Ancer (2011:9) warns that

> … out of context, and taken too far, they constitute ritualised group abuse and institutionalised bullying. Once they take hold of a group, harsh initiation practices become part of that culture and can be difficult to uproot. More than one school head has discovered that their attempts to moderate initiation practises is actively resisted by pupils, who wishes to pass on the same trial by fire they underwent.

The above quoted view is supported by Johnson (2011:203) who opines that hazing ceremonies are "cycled and recycled from year to year [and] offer few opportunities for new members to opt out or question the often abusive nature of the rites of passage".

Joubert (in Van Eeden, 2009:9) and Jardine (2009:13) reflect on the possible impact of hazing on the hazee. From a legal perspective, Joubert (in Van Eeden, 2009:9) warns that hazees are breaking the law by exerting power over newcomers in an abusive manner. Jardine (2009:13) on the other hand, looks at the impact from a more personal perspective:

> A relative of mine says he still feels shame at how he humiliated another boy to the point of desperate and ineffectual rage; crying out, tears flowing, fists beating the air. Today the perpetrator would like to expunge his guild by finding the boy and apologise to him. But of course, now it's too late. Damage has been done. Life's moved on.

Jardine's (2009:13) contention is supported by previous research. Edelman (2004:18) found that "even though hazing perpetrators expect to feel *schadenfreuden* (enjoyment derived from the misfortune of others) … hazers themselves suffer from guilt associated with their wrongdoing".

Whereas none of the newspaper articles reflected on the possible impact of hazing on the bystanders, studies by Edelman (2004:18) found that bystanders may suffer emotional harm, because of "their fear of confronting hazers".

This study thus found that hazing may result in the need for victims to prove their masculinity and to deal with their experiences of fear, inadequacy and a sense of vindication. The data furthermore reveal that hazing may have legal

and emotional consequences for the hazers. These findings are supported by previous research (De Klerk, 2013:88; Edelman, 2004:18; Hoover & Pollard, 2000:10).

6.3 The reasons for hazing

The reasons offered by experts whose newspaper articles were analysed feeds into the theories underlying this study, namely the male dominance and cognitive dissonance theories. While the male dominance theory is supported by arguments that hazing is character building and teaches newcomers to become 'real men', the cognitive dissonance theory links up with the argument that hazing is a key factor in creating pride and solidarity in a school. It should be noted that none of the experts supports hazing. On the contrary, the main objective of their articles was to repudiate arguments in favour of hazing.

Grey (2004:11) believes that the culture and ethos of boys' schools with a "rich history" are rooted in "military, authoritarian values, often with a colonial flavour for good measure". According to her so-called initiation practices at schools which humiliate and terrify newcomers "gets down to a perverse interpretation of masculinity. It's all about socialising boys to become rough 'n ready jocks, demoting qualities like sensitivity and gentleness to the bottom of the male food chain". Ancer (2011:9) likewise sees hazing as a pretext to "force [boys] into a stereotypical mould of masculinity". Jardin (2009:13) concurs with Grey and Ancer, and rejects the argument of pro-hazing proponents that hazing "made a man of me". He argues that hazing ignores the influence of the home, friends, family and other beneficial experiences beyond the school in character building. Grey, Ancer and Jardin's argument that the underlying reason for hazing is a culturally constructed notion of what it means to be 'a real man' supports the social dominance theory that underpins this study. Huysamer and Lemmer (2013:18) argue in this regard that activities aimed to prepare juniors to conform to the codes of behaviour by the stronger (senior boys) construct a "regime of masculinity". Adults – parents and educators alike – who openly or surreptitiously support male dominance and power often turn a blind eye to and support hazing when it occurs (cf. Huysamer & Lemmer, 2013:18; Johnson, 2011:203).

Huysamer's (2013:32) contention that hazers justify hazing because it serves them well in achieving a sense of belonging and that it is perceived to be character building is corroborated by the editor of the *Star* (2009:16), Ancer (2011:9) and Van Vuuren (2010:11). All three reject the claim by pro-hazing groups that hazing is character building. Ancer (2011:9) writes in this regard:

> Often initiations are defended as arduous tests of strength and character, teaching humility and toughening up or weeding out the weak, the argument goes. However, most of us school our children to prepare them for the 21st century workplace, not the rigours of the battlefield or a survivalist lifestyle.

The suggestion by Grey (2004:11) that hazing is perpetuated by the notion that it is the "duty" of senior learners to pass on the traditions of the school is supported by previous research (Huysamer, 2013:32). According to Van Vuuren (2010:11) the only "tradition" displayed when older boys beat younger boys with various utensils, is one of violence in society.

The essence of the cognitive dissonance theory is captured in Van Vuuren's (2010:11) article. He writes that: "Kids do not often speak out because [of their] … fear [of] being rejected by the rest of the learner corps". The argument of pro-hazing groups that group solidarity is a positive outcome of hazing is rejected by Jardine (2009:13). Jardine (2009:13) calls hazing a "harmful and unnecessary practice" and argues that it is not possible to create school spirit "by robbing pupils of every shred of their dignity". The view of this retired principal is supported by members of academe. Johnson (2011:218) writes that camaraderie does not develop when individuals feel "violated, harassed or disparate to other members of the group". Findings from Van Raalte *et al*.'s (2008:492) study also reject the notion that hazing increases cohesion.

In reaction to an incident of abusive hazing at a boy's school in Inanda, Johannesburg, the editor of the *Star* (2012:12) slams pro-hazing proponents who "write off initiation in its milder forms as youthful exuberance and harmless stupidity" and writes that "mild initiation can graduate to fully-fledged assault or death. Sexual violence, of any sort, can never be condoned, not in a country with an egregious record such as ours".

Media analysis reveals that educators often play a role in maintaining hazing. Jardine (2009:13) writes in this regard that some schools that "still persist in a paradigm of these harmful and unnecessary practices", do not have "their priorities right" and turn a blind eye to "so-called traditions". This stance is supported by Garg (2009:268). He writes that a lack of supervision and a lack of implementation of anti-hazing measures by education authorities may be reasons for the perpetuation of hazing.

Findings from this study, as well as previous research are in agreement with claims that hazing is character building, part of a school's 'tradition', advances group solidarity and is nothing more that youthful exuberance and

fun, are not only flawed, but perpetuates the cycle of abuse. Another finding of this study on the continuation of hazing; namely that newcomers take part in hazing activities because of their desire to be accepted as part of a group, can be explained within the context of the cognitive dissonance theory. The findings also highlight the role of alumni, learners and educators in the perpetuation of hazing practices.

6.4 Experts' suggestions on how to prevent or reduce hazing practices

Researchers (Finkel; 2002:232; Garg, 2009:266) and the regulations prohibiting hazing (Department of Education, 2002:5) hold educators responsible for the protection of the dignity and rights of learners. The regulations (Department of Education, 2002:5) indisputably state that

> Every educator has a duty to control the actions of learners when such actions may inflict harm to others or to the learner, or violate the rights of other learners or educators. Educators must take reasonable measures where necessary to prevent a learner from harming himself or herself or others.

Ritter (2010:11) similarly places the responsibility for the prevention of unacceptable initiation practices (hazing) on the school:

> I believe strongly that if a school or pupils feel it necessary to do initiations, it should be heavily supervised and the right precautions should be put in place to prevent any serious incidents. It is the duty of the school's governing body to ensure that newcomers will not be at risk.

Jardine (2009:13) furthermore emphasises the need for parents and educators to work together to address hazing. He gives the following advice to parents and schools:

> Parents and schools [should] combine in a mission which ensures that initiation into school communities is a memorable and lasting experience for all the right reasons, that the school is truly great because of the way it develops people, not only for the much-touted sports and exam results.

Ancer (2011:9) appeals to parents to speak up against hazing practices from a position of knowledge and self-knowledge:

> Parents must make up their own minds about initiation, but must do so from a position of knowledge. Your child is ultimately your responsibility, so insist that a school is transparent about initiation practices and that you will not tolerate mindless hazing.

Jardine (2009:13) likewise emphasises the involvement of parents in the eradication of abusive hazing practices in schools. He writes that parents should "demand clarification of initiation procedures" and notes that parents should not "fall for feeble rationalisations which tacitly condone bullying".

It is thus the findings of this study that parents and educators are legally and morally obliged to campaign against abusive learner-on-learner practices, and that they should form an alliance in the interest of learners are supported by previous research (Holmes, 2013b:3; Lemmer, 2009:89; Venter & Du Plessis, 2012:3). It can also be argued that there is a duty on Christian parents and educators to work together against any humiliation, degradation, abuse, disruption and violent acts observed, committed or suffered by their children or learners placed in their care. Parents and educators who ignore or condone acts of hazing are acting in contravention of Matthew 28:18-20. Educators who ignore or condone acts of hazing are moreover in breach of the principle of *in loco parentis*. Educators are liable to provide a safe environment for the learners under their care.

7. Recommendations

In accord with my main argument, as well as the findings from this study, namely that educators and parents should play a leading role in addressing abusive hazing practices in schools, my recommendations on how to reduce hazing in schools and school hostels will focus on the role of schools and parents. Parents and educators, as primary and secondary educators of children, have a legal and ethical responsibility to act against abusive hazing practices.

The regulations for prohibiting hazing in schools (Department of Education, 2002:4) place the responsibility for complying with these regulations on educators and the school governing body. The following should be taken into consideration by school management and educators in their efforts to

eradicate hazing practices in their schools:

- School management should make a serious commitment to educate learners, parents, alumni, educators and administrative staff about the different types of hazing, the dangers of hazing, the underlying reasons for, and myths about hazing. All role-players should know the difference between positive orientation and abusive, humiliating hazing practices (Department of Education, 2002:2). School management should send out a clear message that hazing will not be tolerated and that those engaging in hazing behaviour or condoning it, will be held accountable (Allan & Madden, 2008:37).
- The promulgation of the regulations banning hazing might have reinforced the secretive character of hazing. Adult supervision of all orientation activities is thus imperative. Schools should, through supervision, try to prevent incidents of hazing under the guise of orientation. School principals who allow the unsupervised orientation of newcomers may face criminal charges. Regulation 3.5.2 (Department of Education, 2002:4) stipulates that it is unlawful for schools to delegate their authority to discipline to fellow learners.
- Learners and educators should know what the policies, procedures and regulations pertaining to hazing are. This information should be transparent, regardless of whether the learners are home-based or reside in school hostels (Holmes, 2013b:2).
- Hazing prevention information should be part of a school's Code of Conduct. Schools should create anti-hazing training, implement a 24-hour anonymous hazing hotline and teach acceptable orientation activities, such as community service and mentoring programmes (Holmes, 2013b:2).
- Schools should keep systematic and accurate records of hazing incidents, appoint an ombudsperson to hear hazing complaints, and reprimand transgressors. The latter should acknowledge restorative practices.
- The heinous nature of some types of hazing (Department of Education, 2002:2) might compel schools to refer these cases for criminal investigation and not simply handle them internally.
- Educators' critical self-reflection is essential. This study has found that some educators, often unintentionally, perpetuate hazing. It is therefore imperative that Christian values of tolerance, neighbourly love, care and respect for others, patience, kindness and trust, as well as the legal principle of *in loco parentis* guide educators' relationships with the learners placed under their care.

The secretive nature of hazing, newcomers' desire to become part of the group despite being subjected to humiliation, and the aspiration of boys to conform to masculine stereotypical images of how 'real men' act, necessitate an open relationship between parents and their children, and a willingness of parents to be involved in the lives of their children and protect them against abusive and humiliating behaviour. InsideHazing.com (2011) gives practical guidelines for parents to protect their children against hazing:

- Parents should protect their children by making the school accountable for their actions or lack thereof by their staff. By keeping quiet, parents are unintentionally condoning hazing.
- It is important that parents model the behaviour they want their children to emulate. This implies critical self-reflection. Parents should refrain for speaking out in favour of uncaring, violent behaviour, thus implying that hazing is "fun" or essential for character/team building.
- Parents should inform their children about the responsibilities and consequences – legal and ethical – of their behaviour in situations without adult supervision.
- Parents should make sure of what kind of adult supervision and rules are in place at the location in which their children will be.
- Parents should support their children when they sense danger or injustice. They should discuss actions that they might do.

The media played an important role in the passing of anti-hazing laws abroad (CURE, 2001:8; Edelman, 2004:16; Garg, 2009:263) and in regulations prohibiting hazing in South African (Potgieter, 2012:18; SAHRC, 2001:3). It is therefore important to utilise the media and electronic social platforms to create awareness of the commonness and ill effects of hazing. The media should move beyond sensationalising incidents of hazing, and inform those with an interest in education, including learners, parents and educators, that hazing is illegal in South Africa and may have detrimental effects on the hazer, the hazee and even on the bystanders.

8. Limitations of the study

My motivation for using newspaper articles and editorials as data to study hazing does not nullify the problems surrounding the use of the media in research; namely, the subjective atypical character of most newspaper articles. The majority of the authors of these articles or quoted experts and editors were forthright in their condemnation of hazing. Most newspapers will, however, not knowingly publish false information, but will use framing to

"cultivate or promote a particular view of social reality" (Du Plooy, 2009:27). I therefore acknowledge that I have analysed data with subjective undertones. This critique, however, holds true for all qualitative research. It is therefore recommended that despite the difficulties surrounding research on the topic, a comprehensive mixed method research project on hazing in South African schools and school hostels should be undertaken.

9. Conclusion

Hazing was banned in December 2002. Yet, a reading of newspaper articles and research conducted reveal that it is a fairly common phenomenon in South African schools and school hostels. An analysis of the data set (newspaper articles written by experts and three editorials) reveals that newcomers to schools and school hostels are subjected to hazing practices ranging from the ridiculous and time-consuming, to life-threatening and crude, emotionally degrading acts that may have serious short- and long-term negative effects on the hazees, hazers, bystanders and the reputation of the school. A desire to belong, to conform to male stereotypes (how to be a 'real man'), to pass on the 'rich traditions of the school' to newcomers and group solidarity seem to be some of the reasons for the perpetuation of hazing. Legal and Biblical principles acknowledge the role parents and educators should play in the elimination of hazing practices in schools and school hostels. The media should play a role in the creation of an awareness of the existence of abusive hazing practices and the need to eradicate these practices.

The banning of hazing, however, does not imply the termination of positive orientation programmes which aim to welcome newcomers (Department of Education, 2002). All schools need continuity and new learners a sense of belonging. Orientation programmes can serve this function, while also reassuring senior learners that the new learners value being part of the rich traditions of the school. Learners who are inducted into the traditions of the school are more likely than non-initiated learners to maintain the school much like the senior learners have left it. New learners will feel intricately bound to and involved in the social fabric of a school which goes to great lengths to educate them about their link to the historical roots of the school (Johnson, 2011:220; Van Raalte *et al*., 2008:492). A school can develop unity and loyalty through acceptable forms of initiation, such as doing community service and through mentorship programmes. However, new learners who are physically, sexually and emotionally abused and humiliated in the name of tradition will perpetuate the cycle of violence, disrespect and the abuse of power.

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The growing, worldwide movement for Christian higher education

Some requirements for Christian tertiary education, especially in Africa

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Opsomming

Die groeiende, wêreldwye beweging vir Christelike hoër onderwys; enkele vereistes vir 'n Christelike tersiêre instelling, veral in Afrika

Hierdie en die twee volgende artikels bevat die bygewerkte teks van 'n lang lesing wat oorspronklik by die internasionale konferensie van die International Association for the Promotion of Christian Higher Education (IAPCHE) op 25 Mei 2013 by Calvin College te Grand Rapids, Michigan in die VSA gelewer is. Die sentrale tema van die konferensie was "How to internationalize Christian Higher Education through IAPCHE". Ek is versoek om my lesing veral op Afrika toe te spits.

Die titel van my lesing was egter "How NOT to internationalize – and perhaps secularize and render irrelevant – Christian higher education on the African continent". Die rede vir die "How NOT..." was omdat ek nie so seker was dat die nuwe modegier van internasionalisering – ten spyte van die voordele wat dit mag inhou – nie ook (soos in die geval van die voorafgaande idees van ontwikkeling en globalisering) ideologies besmet is nie.

As gevolg van die lengte van die lesing word dit in drie agtereenvolgende artikels verdeel. Hierdie eerste een bied die agtergrond. Die tweede sal verduidelik hoe en waarom die destydse Potchefstroomse Universiteit vir Christelike Hoër Onderwys (PU vir CHO) versekulariseer is. Die derde artikel sal sewe kragtige kontemporêre ideologieë bespreek as 'n belangrike rede waarom die PU vir CHO getransformeer is tot die huidige sekulêre Noordwes Universiteit.

In hierdie inleidende artikel word oor die volgende besin: (1) Die huidige internasionalisering van Christelike hoër onderwys (CHO); (2) Die Afrika-konteks; (3) Drie leidende visies wat in die loop van die geskiedenis ontwikkel het oor die aard en taak van 'n tersiêre instelling. (4) Die soort diens wat van so 'n instelling (universiteit of kollege) verwag kan word. (5) Die belangrikheid van 'n pluralistiese samelewingsfilosofie vir die (relatiewe) onafhanklikheid van instellings vir hoër onderwys van kerklike, politieke en ekonomiese oorheersing. (6) As oorgang tot die tweede artikel word ten slotte verduidelik waarom die skrywer (in die hieropvolgende artikel) dit as belangrik beskou dat die geskiedenis van die sekularisering van die PU vir CHO – as waarskuwing vir ander Christelike instellings – vertel behoort te word. (Hoewel die lesing nou in artikelvorm gepubliseer word, is die voordragkarakter daarvan nie drasties verander nie.)

0. Preamble

0.1 The new heartland of Christianity

There is no scarcity about books on Africa. Some of the most recent ones are those by Guest (2004), Meredith (2006) and Ilo (2012). Since our focus will be on Christianity on the African continent, let me mention the works by Baur (1998) and O'Donovan (2000), commemorating 2000 years of Christianity in Africa. To this may be added Oden (2007), emphasising the African contribution to Western Christianity and Ntarangwi (2011) about the social impact of the Christian faith in this part of the world.

We are also reminded by the works of, for instance, Jenkins (2002, 2006, 2009), Sanneh (1993, 2003) and Carpenter & Sanneh (2005) that, while Christianity is declining in the North and West, its heartland is today moving to the Southern world. Especially in Africa Christianity is growing very fast (cf. Johnson & Ross, 2010). According to the Pew Foundation for Religion and Public Life (at Boston) in its report on global Christianity (2012) it is

estimated that at the moment about 500 million Christians are to be found in Africa south of the Sahara. Christians in the 51 African countries represent 24 percent of global Christianity! Also many Christian schools, colleges, seminaries and universities are started (cf. Van der Walt, 2010c, 2010d).

0.2 The link between different levels of Christian education

It speaks for itself that the ideals of Christian-oriented (primary and secondary) schooling and (tertiary) college/university education are inseparable. If we don't educate children and young girls and boys at school, we will have no Christian students on campus. But we also need Christian academics, who will train our future school teachers in a Christian worldview approach to the basic subjects to be taught in our schools to eventually fulfil the needs of worldwide CHE (cf. Carpenter, 2008).

For more information about the world movement of CHE one can easily Google on the Center for International Higher Education (CIHE) and the Program for Research on Private Higher Education (PROPHE).

Since Christian schooling and Christian higher education go together closely, I will mention some still worthwhile works to be studied especially by teachers at school. They are: Carvill, Vriend, Olthuis and Vander Stelt (1970); De Boer, Van Brummelen, Blomberg, Koole and Stronks (1993); Fowler (1987 & 1991); Fowler, Van Brummelen and Van Dyk (1990); Lambert and Mitchell, (1996); McCarthy, Oppewal, Petersen and Spykma (1981); McCarthy, Skillen and Harper (1982); Mechielsen (1980); Stronks and Blomberg (1993) and Van Brummelen (1986, 1988 & 1994).

0.3 An effort towards a broader and deeper view

Three characteristics of a philosopher can be a real nuisance to other scholars.

In the first place he/she wants to see issues in a broader perspective. (This is the reason why this paper is published in three separate articles.) I could not simply discuss the issue of internationalization in isolation, but had to view it against the intellectual décor of both present Western and African civilization. Only then, I assume, can one truly understand what internationalization really implies.

Secondly, like a seismograph, the philosopher has to register the tremors of an advancing earthquake. Stated in biblical terms he/she has to test the spirits of the times (1 John 4:1), or to read the signs of his/her times (Luke 12:54-56). Accordingly he/she has to remind their fellow travellers that God

has placed everyone of them in *anno Domini* 2013 for a unique task to be accomplished (cf. Esther 4:14).

Thirdly, philosophers can be irritating because they always ask questions. But actually there are only two kinds of people who don't ask questions: those who think they know everything and those who don't know that they know nothing.

If you have to measure how large and deep a pool is, the advice of a Xhosa proberb is "Isizibasiviwangodondolo" – you need a long stick. The "stick" with which I will try to "measure" internationalization and its hidden presuppositions will be that of a Christian-Reformational worldview and philosophy.

To make this clear I now in advance provide my own definition of education.

0.4 A preliminary circumscription

If I have to briefly formulate my own viewpoint about education in general it will be more or less the following: "Education is a multidimensional, formative and worldviewishly (or ideologically) determined activity, which gives normative direction to a person's development by guiding, unfolding and enabling her or him to understand and accept her or his place and calling in God's world."

0.5 The setup of what follows

This long paper is published in three separate articles. The first provides the *general background*; the second focuses on the *history* of the secularization (caused by its internationalization) of the Potchefstroom University (PU); the third paper analyses the different *secular ideologies* hidden behind this development, illustrated with concrete examples of what happened at this university in Africa.

The first article may be regarded as "carrying coles to Colebrook" by some of my readers. For the following three reasons I nevertheless include it. Firstly I am aware of the fact that it may be valuable to some of my African colleagues. Secondly, how can one speak about the internationalization of higher education if one does not have clarity about what *higher education* entails? Thirdly, it is of even greater importance first to ascertain the meaning of *Christian* higher education before one can meaningfully discuss its internationalization.

The first article, now following, therefore provides the following appetiser on our menu: (1) Contemporary internationalization and Christian education; (2) the African background; (3) the nature and service of an institution for higher education: three viewpoints; (4) the primary service of a Christian

academic institution; (5) an analysis from a pluralist social philosophy, and (6) the approach and aim of the next article on the secularization of the erstwhile Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education.

1. Internationalization and Christian higher education

I was invited by Dr. Mwenda Ntarangwi, the executive director of IAPCHE, to deliver a paper on "Internationalizing Christian Higher Education through IAPCHE; an African phenomenological reflection". I, however, took the liberty to change it with his permission to the above title "How *not* to …" and simplified the subtitle to "Narrating an African experience".

Let me, however, first state clearly in advance that I don't want to reject internationalization out of hand, painting it in black. Firstly, we can all benefit from certain of its aspects. Secondly, I don't think (the correct kind of) internationalization is against God's will if we want to obey his well-known command in Matthew 28:18-20.

1.1 Internationalization, globalization, informationism and secularization

I changed the topic because I am somewhat cautious about a combination of "internationalizing" and "Christian (higher) education". I am suspicious that this new term may simply be a screen hiding various dangerous contemporary ideologies (cf. e.g. Venter, 1999b). To substantiate my viewpoint I will continuously refer the reader to the relevant sources, emphasizing especially those from a Reformational perspective. (Limited space will not allow a review of every bibliographical reference.)

1.1.1 Internationalization and globalization

One may distinguish between but cannot really separate internationalization and globalization. (The first concept seems to me to be more encompassing than the second that some writers tend to view as merely of an economic nature.) An Oxford dictionary (cf. Wehmeiher, 2005:787) very briefly defines internationalization both in a positive and negative sense: "the belief that countries should work together", and "to bring under the control (or protection) of many nations". Globalization is defined as: "The fact that different cultures and economic systems around the world are becoming connected and *similar to each other*" (Italics added. See also Giddens, 2003).

1.1.2 International education in general

The explanation of the theme of this IAPCHE Conference accompanying its invitation to participate seems to be more or less in agreement with what can be found on a popular source like Wikipedia (2012). It provides some information about the meaning, contents and criteria of "international education" (the same as "internationalizing education"?) It has two general meanings: (1) Education that transcends national borders through the exchange of students and/or lecturers. (2) A more comprehensive approach to education that intentionally prepares students to be engaged participants in the international world.

Its contents include (1) knowledge of religions and cultures; (2) familiarity with international issues; (3) skills in working effectively in global or cross-cultural environments; (4) ability to communicate in multiple languages; (5) respect and concern for other cultures and peoples.

Its main criterion is to develop citizens of the world, but also universal human values, skills and knowledge that can be applied broadly, global thinking, assessment and international benchmarking.

Wikipedia also mentions a number of problems in connection with international *higher* education. (1) There is little consensus concerning the guiding theme of the field as well as its scope; (2) It is not a prominent feature in contemporary higher education and (3) not the primary concern of most scholars in the field. (4) Very few published materials are available. (Most of the sources mentioned by Wikipedia either deal with development or/and globalization.)

It thus seems to me that we need not differ about the very close relationship between the two concepts of globalization and internationalization. Even if African students do not study in Europe or the USA, but in neighbouring countries (e.g. internationally), they may be indirectly or directly shaped by the globalization process driven by the Western world. Many of the exchange programmes, initiated from the side of the West or already Westernized institutions, are aimed at making their students and/or lecturers more culturally sensitive to African cultures. But inadvertently they may lead to the opposite: carrying the baggage of "superior" Western internationalization to the countries they intended to learn from!

1.1.3 Globalization queried

I should also draw attention to the fact that the literature consulted which was written from an African perspective is mainly critical about globalization.

Many writers are of the opinion that the ideology of the global market seems only to enrich the world's industrial giants, produces gains for a few, causes the marginalization of many and polarization between poor and rich (cf. e.g. Moloka & Le Roux , 2001). They regard the benefits of economic globalization, for instance to South Africa, at its best tenuous, and at worst, doubtful. (Worthwhile reading on globalization is offered by Goudzwaard, 2001; Goudzwaard & De Santana Ana, 2005, as well by Goudzwaard, Vander Vennen & Van Heemst, 2008:139-156; Venter, 1999b and Dinakarlal, 2010).

Since globalization is a multi-dimensional process it does not only affect economic life. It can, for instance, lead to the dominance of English and the marginalization and eventual elimination of many indigenous languages. Many languages all over the world have already become "endangered species" on the "red data list". South Africa has eleven and many other African countries hundreds of mother tongues and dialects – a precious cultural heritage – but English is gradually becoming the dominant language.

1.1.4 Informationism

One of the most powerful means of achieving internationalization and globalization is today's media and the electronic and other ways of fast communication throughout the world. Information technology is restructuring not only the economy but our entire social life (cf. Castells, 2004). According to a recent news report more people in the world today are addicted to their TVs, computers, cell phones and fast electronic communication media, like for instance Google, Facebook, twitter, etc. than to tobacco and alcohol. I refer the reader to the books by Cavalier (2005), Breems and Basden (2012), Jones and Basden (2003) Schulze (2000 & 2002), Schuurman (2013), Taylor (2008) and Van der Stoep (1998 & 2001) for more information.

1.1.5 Secularization

My thesis is that behind these powers (internationalization, mass communication and globalization) we may discern a collection of non-biblical ideologies which may turn contemporary culture into a secular movement, dangerous to Christian higher education.

I will not enter here in a discussion of my viewpoint that secularization is a radical, anti-Christian religion (cf. Van der Walt, 2007 and Taylor, 2007). But let me at least quote from a warning sounded by Spykman almost thirty years ago: "The overwhelming crisis of our times is … the omnipresent spirit of secularism – closer to us even than the nearest TV dial. Secularism is a half-way house to atheism, a form of practical atheism. Without denying the existence of God, secularists presume to exclude him from public life. Belief

in God does not count, so the argument goes, at those crucial decision-making centres in life where the important societal policies are hammered out which shape human culture and the course of history. In our social, economic political and educational institutions, in science, technology, the arts and the media there faith does not matter" (Spykman, 1986:78).

Sanneh (1993:208), a prominent African writer, has to say the following about secularism: "Contemporary Christians have … sought to make common cause with secular forces in order to demonstrate the usefulness of Christianity, in other words, to transform Christianity into a secular establishment."

However, the implications are: "… modern Christians have arrived at the point where they could now retain the prerogatives of prayer and worship only by cooing like a private dove or else flocking with the public hawk with their religious wings clipped".

It is very important to realize that every human being is religious in nature and therefore believes at least in something (cf. Biezeveld, De Boer, De Vos & Dingemans, 2001). Also secularism is a powerful religion and worldview. But, while it demands from all other religions/worldviews to be confined to one's private life, it influences both the public and private domain (cf. Buijs & Paul, 2007).

But secularism is not only the number one danger for *Christian* tertiary education. Also scholars working at educational institutions with other orientations (e.g. Jewish, Muslim, etc.) are becoming worried more and more about the effects of the same phenomenon.

1.1.6 The challenge

Thus it seems to me to me that this conference has to face at least five challenges: (1) What is *internationalization*? (2) What does it mean to internationalize *higher education*? (3) How should *Christian* higher education (CHE) be or not be internationalized? (4) How could it be done without *secularizing* Christian higher education? (In other words to pursue it without its having perhaps unforeseen, detrimental implications.) (5) How can CHE be internationalized in such a way that it remains *relevant* to the local (e.g. African) context?

This last requirement leads me to a few introductory remarks about Christian higher education within the African context.

2. Christian higher education in Africa

Firstly a brief reminder about this continent's history.

2.1 Africa's history in a nutshell

Those participants outside Africa should be reminded at least about the following major events and the disruption, poverty and many other consequences it lead to on the African continent. While the West was for very long fascinated by the idea of *progress*, Africans have had (1) to suffer for centuries under *slavery* from the East and the West (human trafficking in today's terms). (2) From about 1884 African nations were *politically dominated* by Europe. In their "scramble for Africa" European nations divided the continent amongst themselves. *Economic exploitation* of Africa's labour, land, minerals etc. was often disguised behind the idea of "civilizing" the black "barbarians". (In South Africa both blacks and whites were affected: 34,000 white and 21,000 black men, women and children died during the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 in British concentration camps!) (3) After independence of most African states (from the middle of the 20th century) the *Cold War* was fought between the US and Russia to win the friendship – and resources – of African nations – some of these conflicts continuing up till today. (4) Next the magic word "*development*" (unending growth) was invented. Another illusion of the twentieth century – it was soon replaced by so-called "sustainable development". (I cannot here go into the reasons why this last move also was a failure but discussed it in various of my publications like Van der Walt, 2001, 2003a, 2006, 2008.) (5) The next vogue approach to be tried out was *globalization*. (6) And the most recent slogan is *internationalization*. Will it also be an empty, temporary slogan or fad? A smokescreen to harm my continent? (For further reading see Fowler, 1995; Turaki, 1993 and 1997:11-93 and Gifford, 1998:1-20).

2.2 Western higher education in Africa

For our topic one should at least distinguish the following three types of social formations in Africa (cf. Turaki, 2011:4, 5). Firstly *transformed* pre-colonial, indigenous institutions or social structures, which reflect the new meanings of colonialism. Secondly, *migrated* social structures, which were more or less literally parcelled out or imported from the imperial West to Africa. Thirdly, *emergent* social institutions, neither indigenous nor brought from outside Africa. National statehood and universities are examples of the second kind of migrated institutions wholly imported from the Western world.

Unless I am wrong, because of the still strong influence of traditional religion and culture (a topic I have written on extensively but cannot go into now), Africa still has to integrate fully formal higher Western education into the African context to be wholly relevant to the continent. Internationalization (in other words further Westernization), instead of Africanization, may be counterproductive, a stumbling block to real indigenized, relevant education. (For an analysis of the differences between traditional African and modern Western culture, cf. Turaki, 1993:249-252; Van der Walt, 2003a, 2006 and 2008 and for Africanizing Western science cf. Van der Walt, 2011c).

Of course I do not for one moment say that IAPCHE does not have an international or global calling to promote *Christian* higher education – in Africa too. As will transpire it is today needed more than ever before. I want us to be cautious about *wrong* ways of internationalization.

2.3 Universities as cultural products

"Why not more positive?" you may ask. The main reason is that everywhere contemporary tertiary education cannot be isolated from our global world culture and the ideological forces driving it (cf. Van der Walt, 2011a:1-5). After *ecclesiastical* rule and subsequent *political* (colonial) imperialism, we today experience a new rule, the first global imperium. This new empire is a *commercial* one – not only dominant in the North-Western world, but also in the Southern hemisphere, the African continent included.

During a long history, a variety of ideologies have, however, secularized our Western cultural environment. Secularization implies not acknowledging either the true God or his directions for human life – unacceptable ideas to us as Christian scholars (cf. Van der Walt, 2007).

The basic philosophy behind secularization is (already as early as in Hellenist philosophy) the idea of human autonomy (derived from the Greek *autos* = self + *nomos* = law), viz. that the human being – especially his reason – should himself be the infallible norm to guide him in theory and practice. God's threefold revelation was replaced by human Reason (an absolutized mind and will) as an unquestionable pseudo-revelation (cf. Mekkes, 2010). In this way, after the fall into sin, mankind, therefore, not only wanted to be like God (replaced him), but also constructed his/her final – but deceptive – security (his/her own normative revelation).

This crazy idea also lead to subjectivism: Not acknowledging God as Lawgiver and his revelation as normative; creational things and human endeavours (subjected to his ordinances) were elevated to laws/norms. What *is* is also regarded as what *ought* to be!

Our electronic information culture, development, globalization and internationalization should therefore, according to a biblical viewpoint, not be norms in themselves (autonomous) but should be evaluated normatively! If not, they become like a dangerous train without any rails and therefore no direction to go.

2.4 Perhaps Africa's greatest problem?

To summarize my main concern: Should we burden Africa with imported Western internationalization, while it already has enough of its own problems? Sometime ago Kinoti (1994:15ff) mentioned only hunger, disease, injustice, dehumanization, economic and political problems. Recently Turaki (2011:3, 4) provided a list of no less than sixty serious challenges categorized under the following headings: Cultural and social issues, political, economic, judicial and religious issues. Educational problems are explicitly mentioned. And Van der Walt (2003b) wrote about the moral crisis in Africa. (It should be no surprise that Adeyemo in 1997 wrote a book with the title *Is Africa cursed?*) What is unfortunately missing in these lists of Africa's problems is secularization. In many places traditional African religion today is simply replaced by the secular religion of the West.

My uneasiness is the following. Perhaps because of the phenomenal growth of Christianity in Africa (cf. again Johnson & Ross, 2010) I could find very little on secularization from an African perspective (cf. Shorter & Onyancha, 1997). However, this may be Africa's greatest problem – if not now then definitely in future. Without an integral Christian worldview and lifestyle (not a mere "churchified" Christianity) the present rapid growth may soon be reversed into an even quicker decline of integral Christianity. The widespread influence of the so-called gospel of health and wealth (mainly imported from the US) can, for example, not really provide solutions to Africa's problems (cf. Gifford, 1998).

Thus in my view the motivation for establishing Christian schools and tertiary institutions should not be merely the failure of government institutions, decline of standards and bad moral behaviour, but primarily the secular character of education itself. (This statement implies neither that nothing good can be expected from secular higher educational institutions, nor that Christian institutions can in any way be perfect.)

The need for CHE established, the next question will be:

2.5 When to start a Christian academy and what it implies

Hart (1976:79) provides a few suggestions indicating when the time is ripe to venture in the direction of a separate Christian institution: (1) When the power of sin has taken on alarming proportions. (Then a Christian institution should also identify the key areas in which the power of idolatry has progressed far and make them its priorities.) (2) When it becomes evident that Christians can no longer work effectively in existing public institutions because they do no longer provide sufficient elbow room for one's deepest Christian convictions. (3) However, when Christians start an own institution they should know beforehand what a university is *not* (e.g. a moralistic hothouse) and what it *should be*.

2.6 What a Christian university should not be

Since it is often easier to say what something is not or should not be, let us begin by stating how the "Christian" of a Christian college/university in its full meaning should not be understood (cf. Van der Walt, 2011c). (1) "Christian" should not merely have a historical meaning; (2) it should not be interpreted in terms of *church* activities on campus; (3) or that Christian *evangelisation* is being done amongst students; (4) the "Christian" is also not located in *additional subjects* taught (like Bible Studies or Theology); (5) neither does it merely refer to the religious (Christian) convictions of most of the students and/or staff or (6) opening or closing one's lectures with *Bible reading and prayer*.

Let me for a moment focus on only one common danger to Christian education originating among Christians themselves.

2.7 Not acknowledging God's threefold revelation

A real risk in practising Christian scholarship (especially in theological schools or faculties of theology) is the tendency towards Biblicism or bibliolatry.

2.7.1 The dangers of biblicism

This approach firstly regards the Bible as a sort of rule- or textbook, instead of a lamp to enable us to read the text of creation. Secondly, it views the Scriptures as the only revelation from God. Thirdly, it gives the impression of being objective. In actual fact biblicism can be a method first to read one's own preconceived worldview (even an unbiblical one) *into* the Word (eisegesis), followed by reading it *out from* the Scriptures (exegesis) – but now divinely sanctioned! Next, this way of dealing with the Scriptures implies a wrong interpretation of one of the well-known passwords of the sixteenth century Reformation, viz. *sola scriptura*.

This Latin expression does not mean that we should regard the Bible as God's sole revelation. It actually means "*by* the Scripture alone". In other words *in the light* of Scripture alone (cf. Ps. 36:10, Ps. 119:105) will we be able to understand the two other "parts" of God's revelation.

Finally, a biblicist viewpoint may separate the Bible, especially when regarded as the field of investigation of only theologians, not only from ordinary believers but also from the scholarly work to be done in all the other disciplines. (The idea been that theology studies God's revelation – or even God himself – while all other scholars have to confine themselves to the investigation of creation.) Either these many other fields of study are then regarded as secular by nature, or other scholars have to enquire from the theological experts what the Bible has to say for their subjects. Both of these options are deplorable. The second is also diametrically opposed to the basic Reformational idea that the Bible is accessible to every believer. I do not deny the value of theological education, but it cannot – as many theologians might suppose – solve all our pressing problems. (This tendency clearly transpires from expressions like "theological economics", "theological ecology", "theological ethics" and many more.)

2.7.2 God's threefold revelation

The correct viewpoint is that God's one Word is a threefold Word. Already before the fall He revealed himself in creation, and continue to do so today. (In this regard I strongly recommend the book by Mekkes (2010) which emphasises the absolute necessity for genuine Christian scholarship to also acknowledge God's creational revelation.) After Adam and Eve fell into disobedience, He walked a second kilometre with us: First in an oral and then in a written form, He drives his Word even closer to us in the Scriptures, documenting the successive unfolding stages of revelation. Because of our unwillingness to hear and see, God so to say, walked with us all the way by giving us his final Word, incarnated, personified in Jesus Christ, the key to God's entire revelation (cf. Luke 11:52). One can only truly understand God's revelation in creation as well as in the Scriptures from his central revelation in Christ.

Thus to minimize or devaluate any part of God's threefold Word or revelation, will not only imply ignoring his full revelation. It will sooner or later also distorts one's view of creation, one's calling in this world – including scholarship – as well as one's relation to one's Creator and Redeemer. (For more on this perspective based on biblical evidence, cf. the clear exposition by Spykman, 1992:76-90.)

According to Mekkes (2010) God's revelation is also not static, but a dynamic power, a voice from beyond our human horizon to direct us in our thoughts and deeds. Nobody can really think or live without revelation. One either listens to the Truth obediently or rejects it and replaces it with one's own pseudo-revelation (Romans 1:18-20).

I am thus not rejecting or minimizing the Scriptures, but pleading for biblically oriented worldview and philosophy (cf. Van der Walt, 2010e).

2.8 The implications for Christian scholarship

If you ask me about the implications of the preceding ideas for genuine Christian scholarship, I would have liked to refer you to the two excellent articles of Vollenhoven (2011). But since they are in Dutch let me quote from one of his followers, Spykman (1991:19) in English:

> Here then is the Christo-centric basis for Christian scholarship. Recognizing him [Christ] as the key to God's Word for creation and as the heart of his Word inscripturated, we can begin to "lead every thought captive in obedience to Christ" (2 Cor. 10:5).
>
> By the impinging power of his creational Word, God in his preserving grace still maintains the structural order of the cosmos. This makes science possible. By the light of the written Word He redirects our hearts and minds and wills unto renewed academic obedience. In the Word who now claims 'all authority in heaven and earth' (Mat. 28:18). He answers the question: In whose service do we stand.

As a compressed definition of Christian scholarship Spykman (1991:19) offers the following:

> (a) Seeking to discern the norms of God's Word for creation as they hold for our life together in this world; (b) illuminated and directed by God's Word in the Scriptures; (c) under the rule of God's Word in our Lord Jesus Christ; and (d) in the service of his coming Kingdom.

Of course this is an easy ideal to state, but hard to be practiced! (Cf. Griffioen, 1994; Felch, 2003; Young, 2013.)

2.9 Only preliminary signs

In spite of the worldwide movement towards CHE (cf. Carpenter, 2008) and the presence of Reformational Christian scholarship (cf. Van der Walt,

2010b, 2010c 2010d & 2010f), also in our Christian academic endeavours we should not forget the importance of humility. Calvin already stipulated the requirement for what he called a *philosophia christiana* (Christian philosophy): in the first place humility, in the second humility and finally humility again. None of the symbols we erect as signs of the coming kingdom of God are here to stay. Also our academic institutions are only symbols of the new world to come at the return of Christ – they are not that new world itself. When they are not clear signs anymore we should break them down – just like the old temple in Jerusalem.

We turn now to our third main point:

3. The nature and service of an academic institution: three basic views

Usually only when there is time left – as a hobby – most academics reflect on the nature and task of their daily work. This is also the case at Christian institutions and important for our reflections about internationalizing universities.

As Seerveld (2000:2) correctly writes, the Bible (cf. Psalm 78:7-8) does tell us to instruct the next generation, but not how a university should be structured. The only option we have is to critically trace the history of university education of the past.

3.1 Three basic views

When one studies the history of universities it becomes evident that during its long history different viewpoints about its task have been held. Apart from Seerveld (2000:1-4) Venter (1975, 1978a, 1978b, 1978c, 1978d & 1987) provides an excellent overview and finally distinguishes between the following three main ideas: (1) the moulding of a person's whole life, (2) strictly scholarly (theoretical) education, (3) tertiary education (also) has the task to serve society at large. Generalized we may call the second the more European-Continental view and the third a more typical North American approach.

Especially Africans will expect their higher educational institutions to serve their people and countries. (Service, after all is a biblical idea. Cf. Matthew 20:26-28) However, the question is *what kind* of service, since the service rendered should tally with an institution's specific nature and task.

Let us start with a representative of idea number 2 to help us to reflect on (1) the nature of a university, (2) what kind of service it could render, (3) its critical role and (4) how it should be done.

3.2 The university viewed as a strictly scholarly institution

An impressive amount of reflection on the nature and task of a university viewed from a Reformational perspective was done in the past in the Netherlands (cf. e.g. Popma, 1969; Bruggemann-Kruijff, Voorsluits & Zijlstra, 1978; Stellingwerff, 1971). I start with a definition of a like-minded scholar in English.

3.2.1 A definition

The oldest idea about the university was that it is (and should be) a community of teachers and students (*universitas magistrorum et scholarium*). The following definition with the addition of research (a task added during the 19th century) follows this idea:

> A university embraces a community of scholars whose pursuit is to gain scientific insight into reality and to make their theoretic finds serviceable to society.To that end it engages in research and educates those who will translate the insights of the academy in terms of social functions for leaders in our culture (Hart, 1976:74).

Thus education at university is considered to be primarily of a theoretical nature. It brings the scholar into contact with the universally valid constitution of experience holding for everyone. But the academic does not get at this constant lawful behaviour unless he/she breaks up his/her experience and pulls part of it out of context. For that reason theoretical knowledge is always an abstract, a broken and distant and therefore limited kind of knowledge (cf. Blokhuis, 1985). It is more or less like looking down from a plane a few thousand meters above the earth. One will merely recognize the larger landmark contours like mountains, rivers, forests, deserts etcetera.

3.2.2 Illustrations

To use another simple example: Chemically speaking, water is H_2O, but what water really is is not exhausted in this formula of a natural scientist – you will not be able to quench a thirsty person by offering him the logical reduction of water to H_2O! But we are so much influenced by science that, for example, a medical doctor may be inclined to treat only a *migraine* by prescribing some pills – totally forgetting that he has to help a *person* not feeling well.

Furthermore every discipline only studies a small facet of the whole of multifaceted reality. An interesting example of how scholars from different disciplines analyse the *same* phenomenon from *different* theoretical perspectives is discussed by Runner (1982:152).

3.2.3 Both unlimited and limited power

Hart (1976:77) illustrates both the power and weakness of theoretical knowledge with the following example. An agricultural scholar is not primarily concerned about a particular crop failure. He asks the question: Why? His attention is directed at the circumstances that may predict the regularity of such failures. When he has completed his research his theories no longer deal with any one situation in particular, but with all possible cases under the same conditions. Because he deals with regularity of structural relations, his statements are unlimited, appealing to universal validity.

But because he deals with no situation in particular and since his theories always only approach reality and are not to be identified with it, his work is also limited. Kok (2004:63) agrees when he says that scientific work can deepen our understanding or enhance our ability to describe something – it is *more* than everyday knowledge – but at the same time it is *less* than pre-scientific knowledge because of its abstract character about a small part of reality.

3.2.4 The kind of service to be rendered

According to this viewpoint the function of scholarship is that it can provide a penetrating analysis of reality; it can help in foreseeing the possible; it can fulfil a critical function.

About the last kind of service Hart (1976:87) writes:

> … the nature of scholarship is by definition critical. For that reason it is not only dangerous for the academy to be controlled by ecclesiastical, industrial and political powers, but it is even risky for the community for scholars not to be able to criticise these institutions or to be afraid of embarrassing them … A critical community of scholars and students which exercise its critical function responsibly is not a danger but a service to society.

3.2.5 Casting out academic "demons"

According to Hart (1976:71, 72) apart from a critique of society and culture in general a university – in particular a Christian one – has the responsibility

to cast out enslaving demons or ideologies which hold the university itself under their spells and charms.

External powers

They are in the first place external destructive powers infiltrating an institution. Hart mentions all kinds of ideologies or -isms, like scientism, specialism, rationalism etc. The greater the conviction with which these viewpoints are held amongst the staff, and the more their origins and functions are hidden from Christian academics, the greater will be their influence.

The irony is that actually these damaging ideas did not originate outside the academy. They were conceived by intellectuals and academics in higher education. Like boomerangs these dangerous ideologies are now returning to attack their own "home" and "fathers"!

Internal dangers

In the second place more internal dangers can also affect an institution negatively. One example is (cf. Hart, 1976:94) that simply because of the size of an academic institution the growing administration and organization can interfere with the academic process. Structures, rules, meetings and more can kill scholarly creativity.

Of course the exposure of these dangers is merely preparatory to unleashing the liberating powers of a Christian academy.

3.2.6 The way in which the service should be given

From what was said already the first requirement for service is perhaps the university's own in-house service: To gain critical insight into its own work and thus not to idolise scholarly knowledge but be aware of its limitations, viz. its more *indirect* and *theoretical* service to society at large.

On how it should share its insights the following should be kept in mind: (1) The university can only provide *advice* and should not *decide* about e.g. economic policies. (Governments may closely follow the economic theorist's analysis without solving the economic problems of a country.) (2) Theoretic knowledge is *not neutral* but influenced by personal convictions and many other factors. (3) Since an actual, practical situation is never a mere copy of a theoretical model, academic *activism* can be dangerous – trying to force reality into its own ideals. (4) Especially Christian scholarly advice should be done *in humility*, in realizing its own inadequacy, incompleteness, temporary nature, fallibility and more. (5) Lastly, in the interest of quality service,

Christian scholars and a Christian institution should *not try to do everything* a secular one does. It will identify and focus on the real burning, central issues in a culture, crying the loudest for redemption.

Usually Christian institutions will not be able to do everything also because of limited financial and other resources. Stated differently: Christian higher institutions of learning should scratch where it really itches. In biblical terms: they should erect tents of refuge, small signposts of the shalom of God's coming kingdom.

3.3 The university in the service of society at large

From an Anglo-American perspective Wolterstorff has published quite a number of books and other contributions on Christian education and Christian academic work. (Cf. Wolterstorff, 1980; Joldersma & Stronks, 2004; Sloane, 2003 and Stronks & Joldersma, 2002.) He is a representative of idea number 3.

3.3.1 Practice-oriented scholarship

Wolterstorff (1983:3 ff.) like Hart, rejects a world-aversive type of Christianity in favour of a world-transformative kind. However, his view about the relation between theory (scholarly work) and praxis (the world outside the academy) differs from that of Hart. Wolterstorff advocates practice-oriented scholarship to which he devotes a whole chapter (p. 162 ff.). Simply stated, one may say that, instead of orthodoxy, he favours orthopraxis (cf. Bolt, 1986).

What he has in mind does not only imply scholars' responsibility for the ways in which their theories are applied in practice. He sees a much closer relationship and even quotes Karl Marx's well-known words: our task is not to *describe* the world (theoretically) but to *change* it (practically).

3.3.2 Social responsibility

Wolterstorff in the beginning of his book distinguishes between the praxis-oriented theorist and the neo-Calvinist idea (p. 166), but later on he combines the two (p. 171) and concludes (p. 172) that social responsibility is inescapable for a Christian scholar. (This idea was to a certain extent also incorporated in South African universities' threefold task: teaching, research and community service.)

The following words more or less summarize his viewpoint:

> The neo-Calvinists have focussed on the fact that Christian commitment involves 'a way of seeing reality', and they have reflected seriously on the consequences of that fact for the practice of scholarship. What they have failed to think through – so it seems to me – is the consequences of the fact that Christian commitment also involves a mode of engagement in society. Their understanding of commitment has remained too abstract. What is needed is reflection on the relevance of theorizing to obedient action, not just reflection on obedient theorizing. In truth, there can be no understanding of the nature of obedient theorizing without perceiving the relevance of theorizing to obedient action, and the need for theorizing to be of service to the action (Wolterstorff, 1983:172, 173).

Wolterstorff is clearly a representative of the third idea about the task of an academy distinguished by Venter above.

3.3.3 A critical voice

Seerveld (2000:3) is much more critical about the American type of universities after World War II. They were transformed into vocational institutions to enable students for the job market. Mathematics, natural sciences, technology, engineering etcetera were emphasized, while a wider perspective on the world was lost. These "educational cafeterias" or "degree factories" were furthermore closely linked with the market forces – universities become Big Business.

Seerveld (2000:3-4) writes

> … the student get lost in the massive machinery of teachers needing to publish articles of expertise in refereed journals only the initiate can read, and the university's fixation handling the grades of a student's 'performance' efficiently rather than taking the time to judge the worth of the education given and received. And university administrators, rather than being held accountable for their visionary leadership of a community of scholars, often came to be evaluated by their success in raising funds. Large American universities today, I believe, are run more like business corporations … and yet have become cultural power-brokers around the world on what higher education should be.

Seerveld (2000:9) therefore does not take the America Western model of university scholarship as the norm for what an institution for higher learning should be.

3.4 Comprehensive moulding as task of the university

We also have to say something about the first view of the task of a university mentioned above, viz. moulding or forming a person's life. Also this is an old ideal if one recalls that especially British academics saw the task of their universities as the training of the "gentleman". This view is considered today anew (cf. Jeynes, 2012 and earlier, in a more popular form, Anderson, 1995).

Since the issues remained the same and even intensified today, I will have a brief look at the report of a working group (under the chairmanship of Prof. L. Bouckaert) to the Catholic University of Louvain, dated 1992.

3.4.1 Point of departure and context

Its point of departure is that a university should not be a conglomerate of autonomous, isolated subject departments and faculties, merely held together by the administration of the university. Simply technical knowledge of a student's special subjects will lead to idiotism without the necessary formative influence on the students as concrete human beings.

As background this report first sketches the context, concentrating mainly on the economizing of the university, a relativism in values and (economic) rationalization.

The report is clearly critical about the idea that the university should become an economic unit in the market. Its reasons are *inter alia* that it would inevitably lead to competitive pressure to produce; place more emphasis on the market value of only some subjects; emphasize technical and professional training; and leave even less space for the important formative task of a university.

3.4.2 The meaning of moulding

The report correctly states that – like all education – the moulding or formative task of higher education is much more than simply the transfer of knowledge. It includes many facets like motivations, convictions, values and relations. Only in this way can a university be a cultural shaping institution, where technical specialization is not excluded but not overstressed.

3.4.3 Possible solutions

This report provides three strategies to counteract the lack in the formative character of education: (1) it can be done from a comprehensive view about the world and being human; (2) by no longer living "apart together", but an integration between the different sciences; (3) more openness towards interaction, dialogue and cooperation between all the fields of specialization.

In this way also students can be enriched by discussions – instead of *ex cathedra* education.

The report furthermore emphasises the value of subjects like philosophy and literature. In spite of the fact that they may be regarded as (economically speaking) not useful, they are value-able to remove the blinkers of specialization.

The report finally also recommends that courses in ethics should not only be offered in, for example, medicine, engineering and economics, but in every discipline.

We have now reviewed three basic ideals of what a tertiary educational institution should be. I leave it up to you to discuss which of the three models, or a combination of them, will be the most appropriate within the present African context.

We have now arrived at a fourth main issue:

4. The primary service of a Christian academic institution

The real danger exists – especially today – that the academic world's service to the outside world is overemphasized to such a degree that its *internal* service – the teaching of its students – is downplayed. Seerveld (2000:8) warns:

> If a secular government promotes technology and engineering … so that the university can assist a country to meet the rabid international competition of industrial production, one needs to ask whether the kingdom of God has the same priorities before one joins the crowd … [towards] the godless, dominant rush to serve Mammon.

A college/university today, especially a large one, cannot be visualized consisting only of teachers and students – it also needs managers who administer the institution. I will confine myself here to a few remarks about the teaching process taking place between lecturers and students. However, later on (in the article following this one) it will become evident that a Christian educational institution without managers organizing it in a Christian way proves to be an impossibility.

4.1 Defining teaching

Kok (2004:60) provides the following definition:

> Teaching our students requires that we *lead* them into ("intro-duction") places unknown or less known to them when they begin; that we *guide* them through what more often than not seems initially to be a maze of theories, concepts, facts and procedures; and that we do this all while *enabling* them to walk these paths confidently on their own – in community – in the future.

To lecturers Kok (2004:64ff.) gives the following advice: about an activity (teaching) that has many dimensions. The teacher has to know not only his stuff, but also his students; mastering the former and being open to the latter.

4.2 Relationships

The lecturer's relationship to his/her students does not imply her/him to be their buddy, but to connect with them, understand them and their needs. As a teacher you are there, ultimately not for yourself but for them, to facilitate their learning. Work with them, pray with them, make time for them also outside the classroom. If possible have them over to your home.

One should also share with them one's own vision of life and sense of vocation, of what inspires and excites one, of what one as a Christian stands for. This should be done without an attitude of complacency or coercion.

To be privileged to sit at the feet of such a mentor means much, much more to students than merely to read books or consult their computers for information only.

4.3 Method

In this regard Kok (2004:65) recommends Vollenhoven's thetical-critical method. One should not begin by defining one's own stance in terms of what one *negatively* rejects (an antithetical attitude) in secular scholarship, but by *positively* stating thetically one's own, albeit preliminary, Christian viewpoint. In addition to proceeding thetically, Christian's also need to work critically. We have to examine and test the spirits that seek to impact our everyday lives as well as permeate the academy. Students must be taught to know, question, analyse, evaluate their academic and cultural environment. Such a thetical-critical method has a double advantage: It helps students both to understand themselves better and to understand what is different from their own viewpoint.

4.4 The master teacher

Epstein (1981) is still worthwhile reading if one intends to become a good teacher/lecturer. He, for instance, mentions the following characteristics: (1) knowledge of, insight into and enthusiasm about the subject you teach; (2) commitment to one's students; (3) putting your own subject in a wider context; (4) being a bold intellectual pathfinder, not condoning intellectual orthodoxy.

Now a few flashes about a Christian university or college.

4.5 A Christian university

In sections 2.4 to 2.6 above we have already stated what a Christian university should not be, as well as what Christian scholarship entails, but nothing about the task of a Christian educational institution. We now listen to what Seerveld (2000) has to offer in this regard.

First he defines it as follows:

> A university is an institutional community of an older and younger generation of scholars and students whose calling together is to discover and cultivate God's world with informed, imaginative reflection, and then as responsible, responding human subjects *coram Deo* together articulate their acquired wisdom in awed thanks to God, sharing its blessings with one's neighbours, and by taking care of all God's marvellous creatures (Seerveld, 2000:5-6)

In this connection Seerveld strongly emphasises wisdom against the technism of today and writes:

> What the biblical Proverbs call 'knowledge' … is a first-hand, intimate experience of what God wants done, and what the Bible calls human 'wisdom' … is the Spirit-filled, disciplined ability to judge what God wants done, what is right to do, what is just … (Seerveld, 2000:8)

Against specialization and the disappearance of a common perspective binding a university community together, he emphasises (p. 6) the need for a Christian worldview and a Christian systematic philosophy and historiography. About the second he writes:

> By a Christian philosophical systematics I mean the practice of theory oriented towards probing the structured aspects of things, persons, acts and events, fettering out the interrelated meaning of the matters under scrutiny. A Christian idea of philosophy, you could say, is that philosophy is more a set of fundamental questions that it is a number of answers; philosophy is a constellation of categories within which one proceeds to think and make conceptual judgments. A Christian philosophical systematics itself will be a network of leading ideas what order how you analyse specific affairs and construe their encyclopaedic connections, and this network of leading ideas or orientational categories will be marked by biblical wisdom. (Seerveld, 2000:6. Cf. also Venter, 1999a on the role of a Christian philosophy at a Christian university.)

4.6 The availability of an integral Christian philosophy

The reader may be interested whether such an integral, biblically-orientated Christian philosophy exists to service as the basis for Christian tertiary education and to form a cohesive element, countering the dangers of a multi-university. The good news is that such a philosophy is available today, also in the English language. (See my bibliography at the end.)

The ideal of such a genuine Christian philosophy originated already at the establishment of the Free University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands in 1880. But especially since the middle of the 20th century it crystalized more clearly and gained momentum with the work of professors D.H.Th. Vollenhoven (1892-1978) and H. Dooyeweerd (1894-1977). In South Africa it was supported by professor H.G. Stoker (1899-1993) in his own unique way.

Through the following generations up to the present day the heritage of these three “fathers” has been respected but also modified – not only in philosophy but as the basis for many other disciplines. The recent work (of 540 pages in Dutch) by Woldring (2013) traces this long history of about 135 years, telling something about the life and insights of every one of these Reformational scholars.

But it is important to be aware of the fact that this unique Christian-Reformational philosophy (and its applications to other subjects) was not confined to a small country (The Netherlands) and a language few people today can read. For detail about its impact around the world the reader may consult my article (Van der Walt, 2010f). I therefore encourage my English speaking readers to get acquainted with its liberating voice for a real Christian encounter with many burning issues for today.

To enable you to follow my argumentation, I should also make the following remarks (or fifth main point) about the kind of social philosophy underlying the idea of a Christian tertiary institution.

5. An analysis from a pluralist social philosophy

An important shortcoming of evangelical-reformed Christianity all over the world is its lack of a biblically-oriented, own "philosophy" about social life and consequently simply to accommodate to one or other secular viewpoint (cf. Runner, 1982:159-195; Van der Walt, 2010a, 2011b).

I therefore have to state in advance that I neither accept an individualistic nor a socialistic or communalistic view of social life or Christian efforts to "baptize" them. According to the first idea (of which capitalism is a prime example) the individual is regarded as of primary importance, while social structures are viewed merely as contracts between individuals. According to a socialistic and communalistic philosophy the opposite is the case: A certain societal relationship (e.g. a tribe, the state or a religious institution) is absolutized into encompassing all individuals and other social structures.

5.1 A pluralistic social perspective

In the light of what was explained already, a genuine Reformational perspective on social life also rejects the today very popular distinction between a "private" and "public" square, according to which the first may allow a place for one's religious convictions but the second should be secular (cf. Skillen, 1990).

The Reformational tradition prefers a third alternative, a pluralist social perspective according to which humans live in a variety of social relationships. Each of them (marriage, family, school, church, state, business and university) has a different task and calling. Therefore each one has a different kind of internal authority vested in their own office bearers with limited power and qualified responsibility (cf. Skillen & McCarthy, 1991; Skillen, 1992 and Van der Walt, 2010a). One societal structure (e.g. business) is therefore only in exceptional cases allowed to interfere in the internal affairs of others (e.g. a university).

The Reformational tradition also rejects hierarchical authority, meaning that God (or a god) *transfers* his divine authority to people (officers or managers) in authority in a societal structure. Such an idea of *derived* (semi-divine) authority usually results in authoritarianism and elevates people in authority

above any critique. Authority implies the insight of the leader(s) in the specific task of a school, university, business, etc. and a willingness to obey that task. If not, they should be reprimanded or replaced.

To keep this in mind is of the greatest importance, especially for university leaders, managers and administrators. We cannot discuss it here, but in the next article the vital importance of a correct view on authority, power and responsibility for managers will become evident.

5.2 The implications for a college/university

The upshot of the above plural view of social life is:

> Only when the typical structure, the unique intrinsic nature of an institution, is accounted for, will it be possible to come to a meaningful distinction what *typically* does and does not belong to the task of that institution (Strauss, 2009:594).

Because of urgent needs of various kinds, a societal relation may sometimes undertake a-typical tasks – not to make another social structure (permanently) dependent or subservient – but with the aim to strengthen the typical task of another social structure.

Therefore Strauss (2009:595) continues:

> When universities – for the sake of relieving poverty, uplifting communities and opening opportunities involve themselves in a-typical tasks ('community service'), the aim should always be to help various sectors of society to grow and mature to a point where they can properly function within their social orbits.

5.3 Confessional pluralism

In the Reformational philosophy an important distinction is made between two concepts: structure and direction. The first refers to the variety of *creational things*, plants, animals and humans; the second indicates the *religious direction* of human beings and various things they create.

Structure and direction should be clearly distinguished (not confused as in the dualism of nature and supernature), but can never be separated, since they are inseparably related.

An example of their *separation* is that of two development workers. The secular expert knows everything about the know-how (structural side)

of development, but may not do his work out of real love. The Christian, on the other hand, is motivated by real compassion (the correct direction) for the underdeveloped poor, but completely lack the insight on how to do development.

An example of *inseparable nature* of structure and direction is that of a marriage. It may legally and otherwise fulfil all the requirements of married life, but if the direction (mutual fidelity) is lacking, the marriage structure will eventually fall apart because of its wrong direction.

These two concepts (structural and confessional) are also applied in a Reformational philosophy of social life and education. Apart from *structural* pluralism (already explained above) the reformational tradition also believes – since today we live in a pluralist society (cf. Newbigin, 1966, 1986, 1989 and Hunsberger, 1998) – in *confessional* pluralism. This refers to the *direction* of social structures and institutions, to the inescapable fact that social life cannot be separated from a specific worldviewish-religious commitment. All humans should therefore have the equal right to express their deepest convictions also in public. Secularists, Muslims and Christians may, for instance, establish their own religiously-oriented educational institutions, political parties, etc. (cf. McCarthy et al., 1981 and McCarthy *et al*., 1982).

Boer (2006:16, 17) regards confessional pluralism as the only real solution, for instance, of the long, bloody struggle between the approximately 80 million Christians and the same number of Muslims in Nigeria to obtain a say in so-called public life. (Muslims are also fighting Western secularism.)

5.4 Diversified love

God does not prescribe in the Bible how a university should be structured. At the time of the Bible no such institution existed. As a result of human cultural activity many societal relationships only developed later in history. But all of them have to be obedient to God's central commandment of love in order to fulfil their specific tasks. Like the many colours of a rainbow love should become concrete as public justice in politics; as careful stewardship of resources in economics; as mutual fidelity in marriage; and in the academic world as loving God with your mind, when trying to understand the world as well as your specific calling.

However, in this fallen and broken world, to really love God and our fellow creatures does not imply a kind of romantic love. It irrevocably implies suffering for oneself and suffering with others (compassion). Also in the academic world we must first stand at the cross where Christ suffered out of love for

us, to be able to become his followers, suffering out of love when ignored or persecuted because we want to be his faithful witnesses in scholarship.

6. The approach and aim of the next article

For the following article I have decided to follow the African way by telling you a real story, leaving it to you to draw your own conclusions and challenge me with your questions. (For a similar but fictitious story cf. Van der Walt, 2001:167-183.)

6.1 The aim of the story

This story is a *practical* illustration of how not to internationalize Christian higher education. It will assist you in seeing the *concrete implications* of various international secularizing ideologies at a higher educational institution; that these ideologies are not abstract ideas but real ways of living, also influencing education.

Differently stated: How Christians themselves have – within only about fifteen years – secularized a large African Christian higher educational institution with about 20,000 students on campus and an additional 45,000 off-campus students. A very sad story indeed. When I walk on the Potchefstroom campus these days (the School of Philosophy and the Faculty of Theology perhaps the only exceptions) I feel a bit like Nietzsche in his well-known story: In bright daylight with a lantern looking to find God and his norms somewhere.

6.2 Testing the spirits of our age

After the fall into sin every culture everywhere is always a mixture of good and bad. As Christians we therefore have, as said already, to test the spirits of our times (1 John 4:1) – not only in a pre-scientific but also in a scholarly way. Full human well-*being* – not only well-*fare* – is the green light in a culture, a sign that we obey God's ordinations. But Christians should also be aware of orange and red warning lights, indicators that a culture and its institutions do not follow God's guidance.

In such a situation Christians are often tempted to take a dualistic approach: on the one hand accepting the dominant secular culture of public life, while on the other hand trying to remain faithful Christians in their private and church life – the already mentioned phenomenon of a divided heart. However, in this way Christians do not avoid the danger of secularism but fall right into its devious trap. Eventually it becomes evident that it is impossible to live a double life, sitting on two chairs, serving two masters.

6.3 The positive aim

Thus the sad story about the secularization of the erstwhile PU for CHE (Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, since 2004 renamed the North-West University) to be told in the next article is nevertheless narrated with a *positive* intent: IAPCHE and the recently newly established Christian colleges and universities all over Africa and elsewhere should take note of how and why a prominent African educational institution, with a rich history of 135 years, was robbed of its Christian character. A totally different Christian African university at Potchefstroom could have emerged (cf. Van der Walt, 1998).

History does not belong to the dust-bin of the present: God uses the past to teach us wisdom for the future. May this story move your hearts and minds to discern, apart from possible benefits, the lurking dangers behind internationalization.

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Note: Due to the fact that not much has been published elsewhere on the history told in these articles, this bibliography is firstly, though not exclusively, mainly confined to the publications of local (Potchefstroom) authors. (My apologies for including so many of my own publications, but after all, this is my personal story.) Secondly, without excluding secular works on higher education and ideologies, I have deliberately tried to draw the attention of the reader also to sound Reformational sources. Thirdly, I have milked many cows, but the cheese I have made remains my own product and responsibility.

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Die rol van die Switserse pers tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog, 1899-1902

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Abstract

The Role of the Swiss Press during the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902
This essay investigates the position and role of the Swiss press during the Anglo-Boer war, 1899-1901. It is concluded that although the Swiss remained politically and juridically neutral during the Anglo-Boer war, the Swiss press played a meaningful role in the expanding movement in favour of the humanisation of international conflicts and by explicitly propagating a spirit of anti-imperialism.

1. Inleiding

Die Anglo-Boereoorlog was in bepaalde opsigte 'n waterskeidende gebeurtenis in Switserland. Die positiewe gesindheid van Switserland jeens Brittanje is vervang met 'n kritiese ingesteldheid wat 'n duidelike anglofobiese beslag gekry het. Die positivistiese gees wat die internasionale politieke toneel oorheers het, uit hoofde waarvan die opvatting van "mag is reg" gehandhaaf is, is in Switserland toenemend deur 'n anti-imperialistiese sentiment verdring.[1] Dié ontluikende sentiment wat 'n eksplisiete begaandheid oor die lotgevalle van burgerlikes weerspieël het, het 'n opkomende gees van regverdigheid in internasionale aangeleenthede tot gevolg gehad.[2]

1 Raath & Strydom, "The Hague Conventions and the Anglo-Boer War", pp. 150-152.

2 Raath & Strydom, "The Hague Conventions and the Anglo-Boer War", p. 154 e.v.

Die Switserse pers het in belangrike opsigte die voortou geneem in die ontwaking van dié sentiment. Alhoewel Switserland polities en juridies 'n beleid van nie-inmenging in buitelandse aangeleenthede gehandhaaf het, was die Switserse pers ooglopend teen Brittanje se oorlogspoging gekant. Die Switserse pers het 'n toonaangewende rol gespeel om sentimente teen Brittanje op te wek. In dié opsig het die Switserse pers 'n belangrike bydrae gelewer om 'n internasionale regverdigheidsgevoel te stimuleer teenoor die heersende positivistiese inslag van die internasionale regs- en politieke verkeer tydens die 19de eeu.

Vanaf 1899 tot 1902 het nuusberigte en artikels oor die verloop van die Anglo-Boereoorlog en die Bokseropstand in Sjina die buitelandse beriggewing in Switserse nuusblaaie oorheers. Nie alleen het die pers[3] die Switsers deeglik op hoogte gehou van die jongste gebeure in die strydende Boererepublieke nie, maar het dit ook die openbare mening oor Switserse sentimente jeens die oorlog vertolk. Soos 'n bevolking van 'n land nie 'n homogene standpunt het nie, is die openbare mening ook nie konstant en eenduidig nie. Die openbare mening word deur talle sosiale, ekonomiese, juridiese en etiese aspekte bepaal. Gevolglik was die Switserse pers nie eenduidig en homogeen in hul standpunte oor die oorsake van die oorlog en die rol van Brittanje nie.

Die verloop van die oorlog is so saaklik en objektief as moontlik weergegee.[4] Kommentaar op die gebeure was egter meestal subjektief en was pro-Boers of pro-Brits afhangende van die lesers vir wie die beriggewing bedoel was. Die meerderheid media in Switserland het tydens die oorlog die pro-Boeregevoel van hul lesers vertolk en het nie geskroom om standpunt teen Brittanje in te neem nie.

Tydens die oorlog is deeglik kennis geneem van die standpunte in die Switserse pers. Switserse koerantberiggewing is nie slegs gretiglik deur die Switsers gelees nie, maar het ook in sommige kringe in Brittanje en ander Europese lande 'n welkome ontvangs geniet. Volgens Uhl het die hele Switserse pers teen Brittanje gedraai: "Im Burenkrieg nahm die ganze zivilisierte Welt gegen Grossbritannien und für die beiden südafrikanischen Republiken Partei. In der Schweiz ergriff eine flammende Burenbegeisterung, die nur mit dem Philhellenismus zu Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts verglichen werden kann,

3 Die begrip "pers" word hier tot nuusblaaie en tydskrifte beperk.

4 Die feite was nie altyd in alle opsigte korrek nie, en heelwat onakkuraathede het voorgekom. In sommige gevalle is feite foutief oorgeneem van die Britse pers. So het die *Berner Tagwacht* van 2 Januarie 1901 byvoorbeeld berig dat president Steyn die inval in die Kaapkolonie persoonlik gelei het en onderweg gewond is. Sulke onwaarhede kom meermale voor.

alle Kreise des Volkes."[5] Dit beteken egter nie dat die hele Switserse pers sy rug op Brittanje gekeer het nie. Brittanje het, alhoewel in beperkte mate, in sy vriendekring sommige invloedryke Switserse nuusblaaie gehad. Die Britse regering was nietemin bekommerd oor die uitlatings en invloed van die Switserse koerante. Sprekend van hierdie teleurstelling oor die anti-Britse gesindheid van die Switserse pers was die kantopmerking van koning Eduard VII by 'n berig van die Britse gesant in Bern aan die Foreign Office, gedateer 19 November 1901: "A sad state of affairs."[6] Hierdie opmerking kan ook van toepassing gemaak word op die Europese pers in die algemeen, wat 'n sterk anti-Britse neiging geopenbaar het. Minister Francois Bertis teken die volgende opmerking aan by 'n berig van 14 Februarie 1902 dat "The European Press and especially the Swiss newspapers are against us …"[7] Hierdie opmerking is reeds vroeër – en wel pas na die uitbreek van die oorlog – deur Sir Thomas Sanderson, die permanente onder-sekretaris van die Foreign Office, in 'n privaat gesprek teenoor Bourcart[8] gemaak.[9] Tydens die gesprek noem Sanderson dat Switserland die enigste Europese land was waar 'n persstem ten gunste van Brittanje gehoor is.

Daar moet op gelet word dat vanweë die kompleksiteit van die Switserse bevolkingsamestelling en internasionale posisie, ook die Switserse pers 'n bepaalde kompleksiteit vertoon. Soos ander perslande het die Switserse pers ook die eienskappe van nuuslewering en -kommentariëring; 'n tendensieuse en 'n openbare meningsvormende funksie vertoon. Die lesersgehoor van die Switserse koerante en tydskrifte het 'n eie identiteit gehad waarmee rekening gehou moet word, naamlik 'n eie taal, oortuiging, geloof en kultuur wat met die aard en inslag van bepaalde koerante verband hou. Om derhalwe die invloed, rol en effek van die Switserse pers te verstaan, is dit nodig om die soeklig 'n wyle op die pers[10] en daarna op die verskeidenheid leserstrominge in die land te fokus.

5 Uhl, *Die diplomatisch-politischen Beziehung zwischen Grossbritannien und der Schweiz*, p. 77.

6 Kyk Bonjour, *Geschichte der Schweizerischen Neutralität*, bd. II, p. 85 vn. 8.

7 Bonjour, *Geschichte der Schweizerischen Neutralität*, dl. II, p. 85.

8 Switserse gesant in Brittanje.

9 *Burenkrieg*, 2001:283, brief: Bourcart – le Président (2.11.1899).

10 Die standaardwerk in dié verband is Dovifat, E. (Red.), *Handbuch der Auslandpresse* (Bonn, Athenäum-Verlag, 1960).

2. Die Switserse pers in historiese konteks

Switserland is een van die oudste perslande in die wêreld. Waarskynlik die derde oudste koerant in Europa is in 1610 in Basel gedruk, terwyl die oudste tydskrif op die Europese vasteland, die Switserse tydskrif *Bibliothéque Universelle*, die eerste keer in 1796 in Genève verskyn het.[11] Dit was 'n tydskrif met 'n internasionale politieke inslag waarvan die uitgangspunt was om die Britse beleid deur dik en dun te regverdig en te verdedig, soos die oorspronklike naam, *Bibliotheque Brittannique*, ook aandui. Hierdie blad, saam met die Franse blad *Siécle*, was die kampvegters vir die Britse saak op die Europese kontinent.[12]

In die Switserse joernalistiek was daar reeds vanaf 'n vroeë stadium 'n sterk politieke inslag waarneembaar. Indien koerante nie sterk politieke standpunt ingeneem het nie, is dit wel deur vlugskrifte en ander media gedoen. Ook die godsdiensstryd in Switserland figureer sterk in die perswese. Dit begin in 1634-1635 toe die Calvinistiese blad, *Mercure Swisse*, in Genève, die Katolieke *Mercure d' Etat*, beveg het. Die politieke aggressie van hierdie en ander koerante is egter beteuel deur 'n streng kantonnale sensuur wat tot 1789 gegeld het. Ingevolge hiervan kon joernaliste lyfstraf, gevangenisstraf of selfs die doodstraf opgelê word indien hulle sou waag om kritiek op die kerklike of kantonnale owerheid uit te oefen.

Die koerantwese van die agtiende eeu was, soos in die res van Europa met die uitsondering van Holland en Brittanje, ingestel op nuuswaardige gebeure. In 1789, gedurende die tydperk van die Helvetiese Republiek (1789-1803) het die perswese 'n koersaanpassing gemaak. Die vryheid van die pers is gewaarborg as die reg wat die pers het om te onderrig. Hierdie siening was daarvoor verantwoordelik dat die karakter van die koerante verander het: die kliniese beriggewing het spoedig verander, kommentaar is gelewer en politieke menings in koerante was aan die orde van die dag.

Die nuutgevonde persvryheid en die sterk aktiewe politieke meelewing van die volk is gedurende die Napoleontiese tydperk, 1803 tot ongeveer 1830, asook die tyd van die Heilige Alliansie, aan bande gelê. Die jaar 1830 het 'n opbloei van die Switserse perswese ingelui. Die hoogtepunt van hierdie ontwaking was die 1848-grondwet waarin persvryheid aanvaar en as 'n regsbeginsel neergelê is.[13]

11 In 1866 is die hoofkantoor na Lausanne verskuif. Vgl. die vlugskrif van Tallichet & St. John., *Europe and the Transvaal War*.

12 Tallichet & St. John, *Europe and the Transvaal War.*

13 Kyk Bundesverfassung, artikel 45. Persvryheid is ook in die grondwette van 1874 en 1942 gewaarborg

Hiermee het die moderne ontwikkeling van die Switserse pers 'n aanvang geneem. In 1827 was daar slegs 33 koerante en in 1857 180 koerante.[14] Dit is opmerklik dat kantons, klein stede en afgeslote valleie hul eie koerante gehad het wat in die leefwêreld van hulle lesers 'n prominente plek verower het omdat hulle die demokratiese siening van hul lesers gedeel het. Die kwaliteit van die klein koerante het gestyg namate belangrike regeringsinstellings 'n sterk ontwikkelingsperspektief in die openbare lewe gehandhaaf het: "Die Impulse der Entwicklung wuchsen vor allem aus der Eigenart der politischen Einrichtungen in der schweizerischen Demokratie", aldus Karl Weber.[15]

Die demokratiese sentiment in Switserland het reeds in die tweede helfte van die negentiende eeu 'n hele reeks koerante, waarvan die invloed ver buite die grense van Switserland gestrek het, tot gevolg gehad. Hierdie koerante het deur hul saaklike beriggewing en weldeurdagte kommentaar internasionale aansien verwerf. In dié verband kan verwys word na die *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* wat in 1780 gestig is. Die koerant se tradisie en oortuiging was van so 'n aard dat dit na aan die Vrysinnig-demokratiese Party te staan gekom het, maar in die redaksionele politieke kommentaar nogtans onafhanklik gebly het. Die vernaamste doel van die blad, gesteun deur sy omvattende kontinentale korrespondensie, was om die daaglikse belangwekkende gebeurtenisse deur flinke en omvattende beriggewing aan sy lesers oor te dra.

Belangrike koerante in die Duitse taalgebied, wat telkens die aandag getrek en groot invloed uitgeoefen het, was benewens die liberaal-konserwatiewe Basler Nachrichten (herstig in 1845)[16] ook die vrysinnig-demokratiese National-Zeitung (gestig in 1842) in Basel. Voorts was daar die liberaal-onafhanklike Bernse dagblad *Der Bund* (gestig 1880). In Lucern was die twee belangrikste en invloedrykste koerante die *Luzerner Tages-Anzeiger* (gestig 1897)[17], 'n onafhanklike koerant, en die konserwatief-Christelik-sosiale *Vaterland* (gestig 1833)[18].

14 Dovifat, *Handbuch der Auslandpresse*, p. 229.

15 Weber, *Profil der Schweizer Presse*, p. 16. Weber was 'n hoogleraar, uitgewer en kommunikasie-deskundige.

16 Opgerig as 'n algemene inligtingsblad; smelt in 1902 saam met die *Algemeine Schweizer Zeutung*.

17 Later bekend as die *Luzerner Neueste Nachrichten und Zentral-schweizerisches Handelsblatt*.

18 Oorspronklike naam *Luzerner Zeitung*.

In die Franssprekende gebied het veral die Katolieke koerant, *La Liberté* (gestig 1871) in Fribourg[19], die liberale en protestantse *Journal De Genève* (gestig 1826) en die liberaal-demokratiese *Gazette de Lausanne* (gestig 1778) groot invloed uitgeoefen.[20]

Alhoewel die groter en meer prominente koerante se invloed onbetwisbaar was, moet die rol van die kleiner koerante nie buite rekening gelaat word nie. Hierdie dorps- of streekkoerante het die gesindheid van die mense vir wie dit bedoel was duidelik weerspieël en het terselfdertyd groot invloed op hul lesers uitgeoefen. Die openbare meningsvormers was egter in die stede gelokaliseer en het 'n groter mate van kontak met die buitewêreld, deur middel van toerisme, handel en nywerhede, gehandhaaf.

Teen die einde van die 19de eeu was daar nog geen perswetgewing in Switserland nie. Die doel van die pers is implisiet in die reeds genoemde artikels van die 1848 en 1874- grondwette beliggaam, terwyl ongekodifiseerde bepalings wel in 'n reeks siviele en kriminele wette op nasionale en kantonnale vlak voorkom. Hierdie wette is gebaseer op die gewaarborgde persvryheid vervat in die grondwet. Maatreëls teen die misbruik van hierdie vryheid en oortreding van die persvryheid is neergelê wat aansluit by die sedes en gewoontes van die spesifieke gebied. Artikel 55 van Grondwet van 1874 lui soos volg: "Die Pressfreiheit ist gewährleistet. Über den Missbrauch derselben trifft die Kantonalgesetzgebung die erforderlichen Bestimmungen, welche jedoch der Genehmigung des Bundesrates bedürfen. Dem Bunde steht das Recht zu, Strafbestimmungen gegen den Missbrauch der Presse zu erlassen, der gegen die Eidgenossenschaft und ihre Behördung gerichtet ist."[21]

Reeds op 'n vroeë stadium het 'n sterk bewussyn van die belang van beroepsetiek in die Switserse pers geheers. In 1883 is die *Verein der Schweizer Presse-Association de la Presse Suisse* (oftewel die V.S.P.) in Bern gestig. Tot hierdie vereniging het behoort vooraanstaande redakteurs en joernaliste. Die doel van die vereniging was die handhawing van persvryheid, die onafhanklikheid en die waardigheid van die Switserse pers. Dit het die belange van die persberoep verteenwoordig sonder onderskeid tussen politieke oortuigings of rigtings en het daarna gestreef om onderlinge verhoudinge te bevorder.

19 Katoliek; orgaan van die Konserwatief-Christelik-Sosiale Party.

20 Die koerante in die Italiaanse en Romaanse taalgebied was van onbeduidende omvang en het meestal geen eksplisiete politieke standpunt ingeneem nie.

21 Met die inwerkingtrede van die Switserse Strafwetboek op 1.12.1942, het pare. 2 en 3 van art. 55 weggeval, maar is 'n omskrywing van die inhoud van hierdie pare. in art. 27 van die Strafwetboek opgeneem. Kyk *Der Schweizerische Strafgesetzbuch*, van 1.12.1942.

In 1899 het die verskillende uitgewers hulle in 'n persvereniging georganiseer, naamlik die *Schweizerischen Zeitungsverlegerverband* (of S.Z.V.). Dié organisasie het onder andere die norme van die advertensiewese bepaal. Die genoemde twee organisasies was daarvoor verantwoordelik dat die Switserse pers 'n hoë standaard van beriggewing gehandhaaf het en daardeur die agting van die Europese perswese verwerf het.[22] Aangesien elke koerant sy voorkeure en oortuigings gehandhaaf het – 'n feit waarvoor die V.S.P. onder andere in sy doelstellings voorsiening gemaak het – het daar tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog twee duidelike strominge, naamlik die pro-Boere en pro-Engelse oortuigings, in die perswese na vore getree.

3. Switserse persstandpunte op die vooraand van en tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog, 1899-1902

3.1 Die pro-Boerestandpunt in die Switserse pers

3.1.1 Die Switserse pers en die aanloop tot die oorlog

Die Transvaalse ultimatum van 9 Oktober 1899 aan Brittanje is elders in die wêreld as 'n oorlogverklaring van die Boere gesien. In die gebiede van sentraal-Switserland is die Boere egter nie as die aggressors voorgehou nie. Tewens, die Boere is geensins in die Switserse pers – uitgesonder die pro-Engelse koerante – in die rol van aggressors voorgestel nie.

Die politieke gebeure in die aanloop tot die ultimatum was aan die Switsers goed bekend.[23] Die wyse waarop president Kruger tot op 'n punt aan die Engelse eise toegegee het, het in die sentrale gebied die mening laat ontstaan dat Brittanje op 'n oorlog afstuur en dat Transvaal met sy toegewings poog om die oorlog te voorkom. Die *Vaterland* berig op 13 Oktober 1899 dat Brittanje die ultimatum as 'n oorlogverklaring beskou. Die Boererepublieke is as die lammetjie voorgestel wat die water van die wolf vertroebel het. Die verwysing na en die vergelyking met die fabel van die Griek Hesopus was duidelik: Brittanje se imperialistiese uitbreidingsdrang teen die einde van die 19de eeu is vergelyk met die optrede van die vraatsugtige wolf, terwyl die Boere voorgehou is as die sagte, onskuldige lammetjie. Dié koerant

22 Kyk Bürgin, *Statistische Untersuchungen über das schweizerische Zeitungswesen*, 1896-1930.

23 Switserland was egter in 'n dilemma vanweë bestaande verdrae met Brittanje, die oorheersende Britse posisie in die internasionale wêreld en die feit dat Switserland ook verdrae met die Boererepublieke gehad het (kyk Raath, "Internasionaalregtelike perspektiewe op Switserland se betrekkinge met Brittanje, die Z.A.R. en die O.V.S. in die Aanloop tot die Anglo-Boereoorlog: 'n Politieke Dilemma", *Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap*, pp. 57-84).

spreek ook 'n skerp oordeel oor Britse imperialisme uit en sluit af met die gerusstelling dat niemand hom meer deur die Engelse wolf laat verneuk nie, omdat die pers die dade van Brittanje aan die kaak stel.

Die siening oor wie die ware aggressor in die aanloop tot die oorlog was, hang nóú saam met die beoordeling van die krysgronde van die betrokke partye. Die pers in die sentrale gebiede van Switserland het tussen die werklike en skynredes van Britse aggressie onderskei. Die meeste koerante het deur die bank regverdiging vir die ultimatum gevind in die feit dat die Republieke die goud- en diamantvelde moes beskerm. Dié koerante was dit ook eens dat die Boere hulle identiteit regverdiglik deur die ultimatum wou behou, aangesien fortuinsoekers – veral Britse onderdane – in groot getalle na die Republieke gestroom het: "Dadurch bot sich England … ein Scheingrund, um über Transvaal eine Art Aberaupsicht zu beanspruchen."[24] Die uitlanderkwessie is gevolglik deur hierdie koerant as 'n skynrede vir Britse oorheersing afgemaak en daarmee was die belangrike vraag van die uitlanders sover dit dié koerant betref, afgehandel.

Die vyf prominente koerante van sentraal-Switserland se vingerwysing na Brittanje as die aggressor het berus op drie gronde waaroor die koerante onafhanklik van mekaar konsensus gehad het: Transvaal het probeer om die Britse eise sover menslik moontlik tegemoet te kom; Brittanje het in die loop van die onderhandelinge met die Z.A.R. van standpunt verander en die uitlanderkwessie as 'n rookskerm gebruik vir oorlog; dat Brittanje die vraag van susereiniteit ook as sekondêr beskou het en die begrip gesien het soos dit die Britse regering gepas het, aangesien die begrip volkeregtelik nie duidelik omlyn was nie.

Die redes wat Brittanje aan die wêreld voorgehou het as synde oorsake van die oorlog, was vir hierdie koerante nie aanvaarbaar nie. Hulle was eenstemmig dat Brittanje net ter wille van die goud van Transvaal oorlog wou maak. Die *Schwyzer Zeitung* verklaar dat die Britte geen belang by Transvaal gehad het toe die land se rykdom in sy landbouprodukte gelê het nie, maar "der blendende Schein des neuentdeckten riefen Goldes liess ihnen keine Ruhe."[25] Die uitspraak van die *Vaterland* was dat dit juis die geldbaronne is wat op die agtergrond die oorlogstoneel oorheers: "Mit ihrer eigenen Haut müssen sie ja nicht in die Gerbe nach den reichen Goldquellen

24 *Midwaldner Volksblatt*, nr. 39 (30.9.1899). In dieselfde, maar uitvoeriger trant, skryf die *Schwyzer Zeitung*, nr. 80 (7.10.1899): "Es zeigte sih, dass das Eintreden Grossbritaniens für die angeblich verletzten Interessen der Uitlander nur ein Vorwand war, um die Republik der Buren in eine britische Kolonie nach dem muster der Kapkolonie zu verwandeln."

25 *Schweizer Zeitung*, nr. 80 (7.10.1899).

in Südafrika sind sie … aber begreiflich sehr lüsterz."[26] Die uitgesproke *Mitwaldner Volksblatt* was ook oortuig daarvan dat die Z.A.R. se goud die werklike oorsaak van die oorlog was want Engeland meen "es gehöre alles Gold der Welt".[27]

In die liberale pers is egter geen woord van imperialisme en koloniale politiek gerep nie, maar die oorsake van die oorlog is binne die raamwerk van die politieke oorwegings van die grootmoondhede gesoek. Die politiek van die grootmoondhede was vir die demokraties-georiënteerde sentrale Switserland totaal vreemd en was dit sake wat die streek, wat hoofsaaklik uit boere bestaan, nie aangegaan het nie. Vir hulle was die feit dat die Afrikaner-boere se grond as gevolg van die oorlog in die hande van nie-Boere kon kom, belangriker as die staatkundige begrippe van imperialisme en kolonialisme en die internasionaal-politiese betekenis en implikasies daarvan. Die koerante in dié streek was daarom belangrike instrumente waardeur die Switserse boere tot die Afrikaner-boeregemeenskap gespreek het. Die posisie van die *Vaterland* was in dié opsig ietwat anders omdat sy lesers dorpenaars was. Die klem het by hierdie koerant nie op die kommunikasie van boerehart tot boerehart geval nie. Vir die stadsmense was geld belangriker as grond. Die klem het gevolglik van grondbesit na die besit van geld verskuif. Om dié rede is Brittanje se goudgierigheid op die voorgrond gestoot. In hierdie verband het die geldbaronne met die oog op die goudreserwes van Transvaal onder skoot gekom. Dié kritiek was dus net teen 'n bepaalde Britse segment en nie teen die Britse volk as geheel nie. Deur hierdie houding het die *Vaterland* aansluiting gevind by die liberale pers wat die skeiding in die Britse volk nog sterker beklemtoon het.

In die berigte van die genoemde koerante is die Jameson-inval met die werklike oorsake van die oorlog in verband gestel. Die sentiment in die sentrale deel van Switserland was dat die Z.A.R. 'n onafhanklike staat was en as sodanig erken is. Die aanspraak van Brittanje dat hy deur middel van die susereiniteitsreg 'n inspraak op Transvaalse belange het, was dus in dié kringe in Switserland onaanvaarbaar. Die Londense Konvensie van 27 Februarie 1884 het tot gevolg gehad dat die woord "susereiniteit" geskrap is: "Daraus folgern die Boeren mit Recht, dass Engeland in ihre ineren Angelegenheiten sich nicht zu mischen habe."[28] Dié koerante het voorts op die reg van Transvaal gewys, soos onder andere in bogemelde aanhaling aangedui word. Die vraag of die Transvaal se reg geskend is,

26 *Das Vaterland*, nr. 234 (12.10.1899).

27 *Mitwaldner Volksblatt*, nr. 39 (30.9.1899).

28 *Das Vaterland*, nr. 228 (8.10.1899).

is op morele gronde beantwoord – dit was vir Brittanje moreel verkeerd om oorlog met Transvaal te soek en daarom was die Z.A.R. verplig om sy vryheid en onafhanklikheid te verdedig. Die *Midwaldner Volksblatt* verwys in dié verband na die Boere se "heilige reg" om die wapen op te neem.[29]

Die eis van die uitlanders in Transvaal om stemreg – 'n aanspraak wat op juridiese gronde geregverdig kon word – het geen simpatie van die sentrale Switserse pers ontvang nie. Dié pers was tewens baie sterk gekant teen die uitlanders se aanspraak op gelykberegtiging en het eerder aanklank by die standpunte van Transvaal gevind. Die redes hiervoor moet tot 'n groot mate in die geskiedenis van sentraal-Switserland gesoek word. Die inwoners van hierdie streek was boere in hart en niere en het alles wat aan hulle lewenswyse vreemd is, gewantrou. Die ontwikkeling van Luzern het arbeiders na die industrieë gebring – dus nie-boere. Die boerebevolking het nie dié grondlose element, wat van ander streke afkomstig was, vertrou nie. Tradisioneel was slegs die boere stemgeregtig en verkiesbaar, terwyl die grondlose "immigrante" nie belastingpligtig was en geen politieke regte gehad het nie.

Die wekroep van die Franse Revolusie, naamlik "vryheid, gelykheid en broederskap" het 'n gestadigde verandering in die politieke tradisie van Switserland tot gevolg gehad, behalwe in die sentrale gedeelte waar Napoleon se soldate met sterk weerstand te make gekry het.[30] Dit is gedoen ter wille van die behoud van vryheid en hul tradisies.

Die stryd van die Transvalers het die Switsers dus sterk aan hul eie geskiedenis herinner en kon hulle president Kruger se politieke standpunte begryp en waardeer – die uitlanders was nie boere nie en as sodanig het die Transvaal die reg gehad om hulle stem- en kiesreg te weier. Die *Midwaldner Volksblatt* het die situasie soos volg opgesom: "Das ist vernünftig ... und wenn der mann – Oom Kronje heisst er – zu uns kommen will, so geb' ich ihm die Stimme zu Ratsherrn"[31] – dit wil sê 'n lid van die Boerevolksraad sou hom hier met gemak in die politiek van sentraal-Switserland kon uitleef.

Die sentraal-Switserse pers het spontaan met die Boere geïdentifiseer. President Kruger is voorgehou as die prototipe van die Boere[32] –'n eenvoudige en reguit mens[33], terwyl die uitlanders gesien is as ontwortelde stadsmense

29 Midwaldner Volksblatt, nr. 39 (30.9.1899).

30 Die gevegte van die Switsers by Rothenthurn en Biberegg van 2 & 3.5.1798 en die geveg van Midwaldner op 9.9.1798 is hier ter sprake.

31 *Mitwaldner Volksblatt* , nr. 39 (30.9.1899).

32 *Mitwaldner Volksblatt* , nr. 39 (30.9.1899).

33 Kyk *Vaterland*, nr. 228 (8.10.1899).

wat oral tuis is waar daar geld te make is.[34] Die geesverwantskap wat die sentrale Switserland met die Boere gehad het, verklaar die spontane reaksie van die Switserse pers ten gunste van die Boere. Tog het die *Midwaldner Volksblatt* sy lesers daarop gewys dat ofskoon daar duidelike historiese parallelle met die Transvaalse Boere bestaan, die volk nie die oorlog met die hart moet beoordeel nie, maar met die verstand.[35]

Ook koerante in ander streke het die Boeresaak deur die oë van die geskiedenis beoordeel. Die vraag of die Boere die aggressor was al dan nie, is bepaal deur die historiese parallelle met Transvaal. Omdat bykans die hele Switserse bevolking ook 'n hoë premie op hul vryheid plaas, is die Boere oorwegend nie as aggressor gesien nie. Hoe meer parallelle daar tussen die betrokke streek- en die Transvaalse geskiedenis bestaan het, hoe groter was die simpatie wat deur die pers met vurige pro-Boere koerantartikels aangewakker is. Die simpatie van die konserwatiewe Katolieke pers van die sentrale Switserse gebiede was dwarsdeur die oorlog pro-Boer. Deurgaans is oorlogsverwante kwessies deur die bril van die Boere beoordeel en standpunt ingeneem teen – volgens hul mening – die onnodige bloedvergieting en die haat waarmee die stryd teen die Boere gevoer is.

Alhoewel die sentrale Switserse pers oorwegend geesgenote van die Boere was en die Boeresaak na- en goedgepraat het, het die liberale pers wat die res van Switserland verteenwoordig het, gepoog om nie met die hart, maar met die verstand te oordeel. Die simpatie van die liberale pers is derhalwe meer ingewikkeld en abstrak en spruit nie uit emosionele sentiment soos dié van die sentrale Switserse pers nie. Dit is opvallend dat die liberale pers 'n verskeidenheid van artikels en berigte oor die oorlog geplaas het: reisbeskrywinge oor die Boererepublieke; die geografie van die streek; die klimaat en geskiedenis; oorlogsberigte van militêre korrespondente; inligting oor Rooikruismissies; toestande in die militêre hospitale en kampe; briewe van dokters; skrywes van Switsers wat in Transvaal woonagtig was; korrespondensie van soldate met hulle vriende en/of familie; berigte oor die oorlogstoneel en soeke na vrede; berigte oor die stemming te velde en in Londen – kortom, oor alles wat in die behoefte van die lesers voorsien het met betrekking tot die oorlog, feitelike mededeling om 'n mening te vorm of om lesers se nuuskierigheid te bevredig en sensasielus te stil. Die liberale pers se berigte was gerig op die intellek en nie op die gevoel – soos wat dit by die sentrale Switserse pers die geval was – nie.

34 *Ebenda*, nr. 39 (30.9.1899).

35 *Midwaldner Volksblatt*, nr. 44 (4.9.1899).

Ofskoon die liberale pers eensgesind was in die aard en inslag van hul beriggewing, was hulle nie eensgesind in die redes daarvoor nie. 'n Duidelike aksentverskuiwing was waarneembaar. Dit was nie hier die onbestrede aspekte wat die grootste ruimte in beslag geneem het nie, maar juis die dinge waaroor verskil is. Waar die sentraal-Switserse pers oorwegend min na die Britte verwys het, het die liberale pers heelwat oor die Britse belange en oor die dinge wat Switser en Boer verskillend van mekaar gemaak het, te sê gehad.

Die liberale pers het die redes vir die oorlog – soos die konserwatiewe Katolieke pers – gesien in terme van die liefde vir die vryheid en politieke selfbeskikking van die Boere. Enkele nuwe gesigspunte is aangeraak, byvoorbeeld dat die stigting van Rhodesië nie 'n finansiële sukses was nie en dat die Z.A.R. se goudvelde ingepalm moes word om die knoop deur te hak[36], asook president Kruger se dinamietmonoploie.[37] Die *St. Galler Tagblatt*[38] het byvoorbeeld verskille tussen Transvaal en Brittanje as die enigste rede vir die oorlog beskou, terwyl ander koerante van die liberale pers ook die volgende redes aangevoer het: die belangstellingspolitiek van finansiële groepe in samewerking met die kragte van die Engelse imperialisme, terwyl Rhodes as die belangrikste van die finansiële groepe deur die *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*[39], die *Basler Nachricten*[40] en die invloedryke Bernse *Der Bund*[41] uitgesonder is. Die meer pro-Britse *Anzeiger für das Limmatthal* het die verband tussen mynmagnate en imperialistiese motiewe vermy en opgemerk dat die neerlaag by Majuba in 1881, die mislukte Jameson-inval van 1896 en die wil om die goud te besit belangrike faktore was, maar dat die belangrikste rede was "dass die Transvaal Republik der englischen Expansionspolitik in Wege steht".[42]

36 Kyk *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, nr. 256 (1899).

37 *Basler Nachrichten*, nr. 271 (1899).

38 'n Vrysinnig-demokratiese blad. Hierdie koerant wat die eerste keer in 1838 verskyn het, was die enigste dagblad van die stad St. Gallen asook van die kantonne St. Gallen, Appenzell en Thurgau. Kyk Dovifat, *Handbuch der Auslandpresse*, p. 240.

39 *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, nr. 256 (1899).

40 Hierdie koerant wat op 1.4.1845 vir die eerste maal verskyn het as *Basler Nachrichten aus der Schweiz und für die Schweiz mit Finanz- und Handelsblatt* was 'n koerant wat deur die intelegensia van die stad Basel gelees is, en was 'n gesaghebbende bron op handelsgebied. Sedert 1.8.1856 verskyn dit onder die titel *Basler Nachricten*, maar bly steeds hoofsaaklik 'n gesaghebbende bron oor die handel. Sien Dovifat *Handbuch der Auslandpresse*, p. 238.

41 *Der Bund* was nie alleen tot die kanton Bern beperk nie, maar is wyd in Switserland gelees. Die koerant verskyn die eerste maal op 1.10.1850. Kyk Dovifat, op cit., p. 239.

42 *Anzeiger für das Limmatthal*, nr. 118 (1899).

Voorts is die rassevraag ook bygesleep. *Der Bund* het gemeen dat die oorlog "ein Kampf um die Volkherschaft zwisschen der niederdeutschen und der angelsächsichen Rasse in Südafrika"[43] is, terwyl die *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* geskryf het dat die Hollandse element in Suid-Afrika hulle voorgeneem het om nooit onder Engelse heerskappy te staan nie: "Und da diese Hoffnung die Kraft wesentlich aus den Dasein jener Republiken schöpft, oder doch sich daran heftet, so war schon aus diesen Grunde die Selbständigkeit der letzteren zu brechen."[44]

Die oorsake wat die Switserse liberale pers vir die uitbreek van die oorlog aantoon was die stimulus vir die Engelse om die goudvelde te besit; die goud- en diamantmonopolie as belangstellingsveld van 'n groep geldbaronne; Britse imperialisme en spanning tussen die Engelse en vaderlandse (Germaanse) rasse.

Die susereiniteitsvraag en die reg van die Z.A.R. in hierdie verband het besondere aandag van die liberale pers gekry. Die Engelse inmenging in die interne sake van Transvaal het by die sentrale koerante 'n spontane meegevoel met die Boere laat ontstaan, terwyl die liberale koerante die saak nugter en op juridiese gronde oorweeg het. Dit was veral die *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* wat die soewereiniteitsvraag breedweg in 'n artikel onder die opskrif: "Die Suzeränität Englands über die südafrikanische Republik" bespreek het.[45] Dié koerant kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat dit nie die susereiniteit maar die soewereiniteit oor Transvaal was, wat Brittanje verlang het. Ander liberale koerante het nie die saak so breedvoerig bespreek nie, maar het die siening van die Z.A.R. gedeel.[46] Die koerante was dit ook eens in hulle oordeel dat Engeland die aggressor was. So praat die *Basler Nachrichten* van "brutaler Vergenwaltigung"[47], terwyl die *St. Galler Tagblatt* besluit: "Auf Grossbrittanien fällt die moralische Verantwortung für die kommenden Kriegschrecken."[48] Ofskoon die liberale pers Engeland uitgewys het as die aggressor, het hulle nie daarmee die Britse volk as sodanig bedoel nie. Hierdie koerante het Brittanje gesien as die tuiste van 'n kultuurvolk vir wie hulle groot agting gehad het. Toe daar gedurende die oorlog heelwat stemme uit Brittanje teen die oorlog gehoor is, het hulle agting vir die Britte verder gestyg omdat die

43 *Der Bund*, nr. 7 (1900).

44 *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, nr. 336 (Bylaag 1899).

45 Kyk Neue Zürcher Zeitung, nr. 264 (oggenduitgawe (1899)).

46 Vgl. *Der Bund*, nr. 263/11 (1899) en *Basler Nachrichten*, nr. 269 (1899).

47 *Basler Nachrichten*, nr. 269 (1899).

48 *St. Galler Tagblatt*, nr. 240:11 (1899).

gemelde protes die teken was dat dié volk nog morele waardes gehad het.[49] Die Britse regering en die geldwolwe is as die aggressors uitgemaak.

Alhoewel die liberale pers in duidelike teenstelling met die pers in sentraal-Switserland dit nie met president Kruger se politiek eens was nie, het hulle tog hoë agting vir die Boere as volk gehad.

Die mislukte Jameson-inval in Transvaal het aanvanklik 'n vloedgolf van sterk anti-Britse sentimente in die Switserse pers tot gevolg gehad. Daarna het die Switserse pers 'n meer gematigde toon jeens Brittanje ingeneem. Die toenemende spanning tussen Transvaal en Brittanje op die vooraand van die Anglo-Boereoorlog het egter toenemende anti-Britse standpunte in die Switserse pers opgewek. Veral sommige Switserse koerante – by name die *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, *Journal de Genève*, *Gazette de Lausanne*, *Zürcher Post* en die *Basler Nachrichten* – is fyn deur die opeenvolgende Britse gesante in Switserland gemonitor. Die verskerpende krisis tussen Transvaal en Brittanje het 'n merkbare toename in anti-Britse artikels tot gevolg gehad.[50] Die anglofobiese gesindheid van die Switserse pers was vir die Britse regering 'n bron van kommer. Die Britse gesant, St. John, het bykans daagliks oor die houding van die Switserse pers en die gesindheid van die Switserse bevolking gerapporteer.[51] In die berigte van St. John en sy opvolger, Greene, het veral die anglofobiese berigte van die *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* sterk gefigureer.

3.1.2 Die Switserse pers tydens die oorlog

Vir die duur van die oorlog sou die Switserse persstandpunt oorwegend negatief teenoor Brittanje staan. Die afsterwe van koningin Victoria het, volgens St. John, 'n klein positiewe wending tot gevolg gehad.[52] Die Switserse koerante het veral die Britse koloniale politiek aangeval en oor die verloop van die oorlog in Suid-Afrika berig. Vergrype van die Britse leër, toestande in die Boerelaers en diskrediterende artikels oor Britse troepe het prominensie geniet. Britse militêre en politieke leiers het veral onder die pen van Switserse koerantredakteurs deurgeloop. In die *Journal de Genève* is Chamberlain byvoorbeeld as 'n gehate persoon uitgewys: "... celui qui mène

49 Vgl. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, nr. 28 (1900).

50 Kyk F.O. 192/150, nr. 36 (12.4.1899).

51 Vgl. F.O. 2, bde 23, 373, 374, 375, 511, 512, 642, 680, 688.

52 Die gedenkdiens te Bern is deur ongeveer 4 000 simpatiseerders bygewoon. St. John rapporteer: "It is the universal opinion here that never before was so delightful and dignified a service held in the cathedral pf Berne as that of Saturday last in loving memory of Queen Victoria" (F.O. 192/157, nr. 9 (6.2.1901). Vgl. ook F.O. 192/157, nr. 4 (24.1.1901); F.O. 192/158, nr. 5 (25.1.1901); F.O. 2/511, nr. 10 (17.2.1901).

la barque c'est un parvenu de la polititique. Il s'appelle Joseph Chamberlain et il est bien l'homme le plus universellement détesté qu'il y ait en Europe".[53] Gevolglik was die Switserse pers by die Britse gesante in diskrediet. Greene berig by geleentheid in sterk taal oor Switserse koerantredakteurs: "When I tell Your Lordship that there are no fewer than seven hundred newspapers and periodicals circulating in this little country, it is easy to see what mischief may be wrought by this indiscriminate dissemination of falsehood among the ignorant population of the rural districts. These newspapers, many of which are merely of local importance, are edited or 'run' by any literary hack who can hold a pen, from broken down parsons to slicitors clerks, and are naturally only too ready to print *tales quales* any articles which may have been sent to them, no matter whether they be founded on fact or falsehood."[54] St. John het geïmpliseer dat die Switserse koerantredakteurs met buitelandse fondse ondersteun word en daarop gesinspeel dat pro-Boere standpunte deur president Kruger gefinansier word: "... not altogether unconscious of the manner in which President Kruger disposes of the vast sums of secret service money placed at his command."[55] Vervolgens versoek St. John dat die vreemde invloede wat op die Switserse pers inwerk nagegaan moes word. Voorts skryf St. John dat die *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* vanuit Duitsland befondsing ontvang en derhalwe onder morele dwang staan om artikels vanuit Berlyn te publiseer. Sulke artikels word dan weer in Duitse dagblaaie as sogenaamde neutrale menings aangehaal.[56]

Voorts het die Britse gesant, Greene, beweer dat volgens sy inligtingsbron, Angst, 'n *Bureau de Direction* van Boerekant in München geopen is wat anti-Britse berigte en artikels gefinansier en aan Switserse redakteurs beskikbaar gestel het. Greene het op grond van hierdie inligting tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat dié buro met geheime organisasies verbind was en noue bande met die *Alldeutschen Verband* in Zürich gehandhaaf het. Greene het egter oor geen verdere besonderhede beskik nie en het slegs verwys na die berig van die konsul van 1 Februarie 1896 oor die anti-Britse stemming onder

53 F.O. 2/642, nr. 7 conf. (14.2.1902).

54 F.O. 2/511, nr. 39 conf. (24.6.1901).

55 F.O. 2/23, nr. 2 (4.10.1899

56 F.O. 192/151, nr. 15 (18.11.1899). Na bewering is 'n artikel oor die hongersnood in Indië deur die Duitse correspondent van die *Neuen Zürcher Zeitung* in Londen opgestel en in dié tydskrif gepubliseer (F.O. 100/337, nr. 22 (23.3.1901). Voorts is ook beweer dat dat die konsul van Duitsland, Portugal en Oostenryk 'n berig oor die Boerelaers in die *Journal de Genève* van 25 Aug. 1901 gepubliseer het. Van soortgelyke oorsprong is na bewering 'n berig in die *Journal de Genève* as gevolg waarvan 'n mediese dokter en twee verpleegsters verbied is om die Boerelaers te besoek (F.O. 2/511, Greene - Farnall (27.8.1901).

die Duitsers in Switserland en 'n deel van die Switserse bevolking. Angst, 'n inligtingbron van St. John, het die *Alldeutschen Verband* 'n groot deel van die skuld vir die anti-Britse gesindheid gegee.[57] Volgens die Britse gesante is allerlei berigte van Boerekant gefabriseer, wat dan neerslag in Switserse dagblaaie gevind het. Daar is eksplisiet verwys na 'n brief van 'n Nederlandse predikant uit Suid-Afrika waarin na beweerde Britse vergrype verwys is en wat op 28 Februarie 1901 in die *Gazette de Lausanne* verskyn het. Hy noem ook die voorbeeld van 'n berig deur 'n Boer oor die moord van 'n gewonde Boerekryger. Om die berig meer geloofwaardig te maak, is die slagoffer as 'n lid van die Rooikruis voorgestel.[58]

Die Britse gesante in Switserland was veral ontsteld oor pro-Boere berigte wat vanuit Britse anti-oorlogskringe afkomstig was. Veral die naam van die Britse joernalis William T. Stead, lid van die vredesparty in Brittanje, het in dié verband dikwels opgeduik. Die Britse gesante in Switserland was veral onthuts oor Stead se pamflette "The Truth About the War, Told in Plain Answers to Straight Questions" en "Hell Let Loose". Ook het die gesante gal gebraak oor telegramme en briewe met oorlogsinligting en toesprake van politici vanuit Londen wat onbehoorlik verkort is sodat dit Brittanje in 'n swak lig gestel het. Die bronne daarvan kon Greene egter nie noem nie.[59]

Greene en sy voorgangers in Bern het 'n hele reeks voorbeelde aangevoer van verdraaiings deur die pro-Boere pers. In een geval, volgens hulle, het 'n Switserse koerant 'n gedeelte uit 'n Franse blad aangehaal waarin die woorde "Ultimatum des Boers" verander is na "Ultimatum aux Boers".[60] Die *Times* van 9 Februarie 1901 het gemeld dat die aanbod van die gekleurde bevolking van die westelike distrikte van Suid-Afrika om die wapens vir Brittanje op te neem afgewys is, terwyl die *Bund* berig het dat die aanbod aanvaar is.[61] St. John se beriggewer, Naville, het beweerde gevalle van verdraaiing aan St. John oorgedra. Hy noem onder andere drie gevalle waar die *Daily Mail* sogenaamd aangehaal is, maar dat dit in werklikheid rapporterings van die betrokke koerant self was.[62] Na bewering is terugslae en nederlae van die

57 F.O. 2/511, nr. 39 conf. (24.6.1901). Op 28 Mrt. 1901 het St. John berig dat William Stead in München 'n *Zentrale für Bestrebung zur Beendigung des Burenkrigeges* (te Königstrasse 31) opgerig het. Dit is nie duidelik of dié *Zentrale* dieselfde instelling as die *Bureau de Direction* was nie.

58 F.O. 2/511, nr. 2 (10.1.1901), nr. 10 (17.2.1901), nr. 17 (1.3.1901).

59 Kyk F.O. 2/374, nr. 86 (11.12.1900); F.O. 2/511, Naville - St. John (15.2.1901, nr. 12 (23.2.1901), nr. 48 conf. (19.11.1901).

60 F.O. 2/511, nr. 3 (11.1.1901).

61 F.O. 2/511, nr. 3 (11.1.1901).

62 F.O. 2/511, nr. 4 (14.1.1901).

Boere dikwels verswyg of in oorwinnings verander. 'n Voorbeeld daarvan was, so is gesê, dat die *Times* van 20 Junie 1901 soos volg gerapporteer het: "The Transvaal. Kimberley, June 18. Colonel Scott's railway guards engaged the enemy at Hartebeestepan, in the Western Transvaal, on the 15th inst. The engagement lasted five hours and resulted in the capture of a quantity of stock and two wagons with rifles and ammunition. Four Boers were taken prisoners." In die *Neuen Zürcher Zeitung* van 20 Junie 1901 is dié inligting soos volg verander: "Der südafrikanische Krieg. Kimberley, 19 Juni. (Englische Quelle.) Am 15. Juni kam es bei Haarten East in Westtransvaal zu einem fünfstündigem Gefecht. Die Buren erbeuteteten einige Vorräte und einige Wagen mit Flinten und Patronen und machten vier Gefangene."[63] As verdere voorbeeld van soortgelyke verdraaiings is inligting vervat in 'n telegram genoem. Die sondebok was na bewering die J*ournal de Genève* van 29 Desember 1901. 'n Britse gevegsgroep is in die nag by Tweefontein verras. Nadat die offisiere 'n wapenstilstand versoek het, lui die berig in die Geneefse blad: "... i ly eut une panique chez les Anglais qui néanmoins se conduisirent de leur mieux". Lord Kitchener se berig oor dieselfde insident in die *Times* lui: "No panic, and all did best."[64]

Gedurende die ampstyd van Salisbury[65] is die berigte van Britse diplomatieke verteenwoordigers in Bern met groot belangstelling deur die Britse owerhede gelees. Berigte is ook dikwels aan die Britse koning voorgelê en besonder belangrike sake vir kennisname onder kabinetslede versprei. Die kommentaar van die Britse Foreign Office toon dat die anglofobiese gesindheid van die Switserse pers sterk betreur is. In 'n telegram van 19 November 1901 verskyn byvoorbeeld die reeds genoemde koninklike misnoeë oor die betrokke persstandpunte.[66]

3.2 Die Britse reaksie op die Switserse pro-Boere gesindheid

3.2.1 Die optrede van die Britse gesante en hul medewerkers in Switserland

Die Foreign Office het geen poging aangewend om die anti-Britse kampanje te opponeer deur die oprigting van 'n persburo soortgelyk aan die *Bureau de Direction* in München of deur die oprigting of finansiële ondersteuning van 'n selfstandige Switserse koerant om dié oogmerk te bereik nie. Angst en St. John se voorstelle in dié verband het geen ondersteuning kon vind nie.

63 F.O. 2/511, Nr. 39 conf. (24.6.1901).

64 F.O. 2/642, nr. 1 conf. (4.1.1902).

65 Vanaf 1895 tot 1902 Premier en van Junie 1895 tot November 1900 Minister van Buitelandse Sake.

66 F.O. 2/511, nr. 48 conf. (19.11.1901).

Die bestryding van anti-Britse berigte is in die hande van die Britse gesante in Bern en hul ondersteuners en helpers gelaat. Nadat Salisbury in 1902 deur Balfour as Premier vervang is, het hy vir 'n tyd 'n merkbare gebrek aan belangstelling in berigte oor die anti-Britse standpunte van die Switserse pers gehandhaaf. Die kantopmerkings by 'n berig van 14 Februarie 1902 lui: "Some of the earlier despatches from Berne about the Anglophobia of the Swiss Press were circulated at Lord Salisbury's wish. But they have gone off in interest. H(enry) F(arnall). The European Press and especially the Swiss newspapers are against us and they must be left to provide for their readers the food that suits them. F(rancis) B(ertie). I agree: I have never believed that a propaganda on the opposite side would be of any avail. L(andsdowne)."[67] Dit is opvallend dat Bertie die Switserse pers as besonder anti-Brits bestempel. Die heftigheid van die aanvalle is goedskiks uit die "Burenbegeisterung" en die "Furor Helveticus" verklaar.

Die reaksie van die Britse pers – veral die chauvinistiese Engelse blaaie – was uiters heftig teen die anti-Britse houding van die Switserse pers gekant. Verskeie Britse blaaie het gepoog om deur aanvalle op Switserland Britse toerisme na Switserland te ontmoedig. Veral tydens die lente van 1900 en 1902 was sulke inisiatiewe opvallend in die Britse pers. In 'n artikel van 16 April 1900 plaas die *Financial News* 'n artikel met die opskrif: "Swiss violence for English visitors." In die artikel word onder andere beweer dat 'n reis na Switserland 'n uiters gevaarlike onderneming is en dat voorgenome besoekers uit Brittanje hulself gelukkig kan ag indien hulle veilig sou terugkeer. Die *Financial News* het veral Britse dames afgeraai om na Switserland te reis.[68]

Vanweë die Britse Foreign Office se standpunt om nie 'n persburo op te rig of 'n koerant te vestig om die anti-Britse beriggewing te beveg nie, was dié taak in die hande van die Britse konsuls en hul helpers in Bern. Angst, Boiceau en Naville, medewerkers van St. John, het hul dienste vrywillig en sonder vergoeding verrig. By die aanvang van die Anglo-Boereoorlog het Angst as leier van die defensiewe Britse propaganda-veldtog opgetree. Onvermoeid het hy artikels geskryf en alles in werking gestel om die Britse saak te stel. Kort na die aanvang van die oorlog tree hy met Robert Schwarzenbach in verbinding, wat, volgens St. John, vir die meeste uitvoere na Switserland verantwoordelik was. Schwartzenbach is deur die Britse konsul versoek om die Britse propaganda teen die grootste Zürichse dagblaaie te mobiliseer.

67 F.O. 2/642, nr. 7 conf. (14.2.1902).

68 Kyk brief van S. Copeland van 27.4.1900 aan die Bundesrat met die pleidooi om uitsluitsel oor die waarheid of valsheid van die artikel te gee. Die *Echo* van 24 Mei 1900 het berig dat pokke in Luzern uitgebreek het. St. John het daarna talle navrae uit Brittanje oor die beweerde epidemie ontvang (kyk F.O. 192/155 van 25.5.1900).

Schwartzenbach het 150 eksemplare van 'n pamflet deur Naville bestel en onderneem om dit aan sy vriende en vooraanstaande persone te stuur. In sy begeleidende brief het Schwartzenbach gewaarsku teen die skade wat die Switserse handel met Brittanje kon ly.[69]

Teen die einde Januarie 1900 tree, op versoek van Angst, 'n groep invloedryke industrialiste en ander bekende persone in Zürich met 'n "Offenen Brief an die Schweizer Presse" na vore. Daarin protesteer hulle teen die anti-Britse houding van die Switserse koerante, in besonder dié van die *Neuen Zürcher Zeitung*, en waarsku teen die nadelige effek op Switserse uitvoere.[70]

Die effek van die "Offenen Brief" was vir die ondertekenaars daarvan uiters negatief. Die publiek het met skerp en venynige aanvalle gereageer. Die *Neuen Zürcher Zeitung* het in sy uitgawe van 6 Februarie 1900 leedvermakerig berig dat die groot getal lesersbriewe teen die "Offenen Brief" uit alle stande en klasse van die bevolking duidelik bewys het dat die *Neuen Züricher Zeitung* die sentiment en oortuiging van die meerderheid van die lesers vertolk het.

Mettertyd tree St. John se ondersteuners sowel as ander geesgenote toe in reaksie teen die Switserse koerante. Angst, Boiceau en Naville werk vrywilliglik en kosteloos ter ondersteuning van die Britse saak.[71] Een van die nuwe medewerkers ter ondersteuning van die Britse saak, was A.F. Ammann-Volkart, direkteur van die firma Volkart & Co. in Wintherthur, met filiale in Londen, Kalkutta en Bombaai. Ammann reageer teen 'n artikel wat die Londense korrespondent van die *Neuen Züricher Zeitung* oor beweerde kunsmatige hongersnood wat Brittanje in Indië veroorsaak het. Ammann publiseer 'n reeks artikels met die titel "Britisch Indien und seine Regierung" in die *Züricher Post*. Die inligting vir sy artikels het hy van die Foreign Office via Angst ontvang.[72]

Vanweë die bekommernis oor die moontlike afname van Britse toerisme na Switserland het die Schweizerischen Hotelierverband die kant van Brittanje gekies. Hulle het gepoog om die anti-Britse toon van verskeie Switserse koerante met dreigemente van vergeldingsmaatreëls te demp.[73]

69 F.O. 192/151, nr. 4 (17.10.1899).

70 F.O. 2/374, nr. 10 (26.1.1900, nr. 11 (30.1.1900). Die brief (in die vorm van 'n manifes) is deur Konrad Fusser (1838-1908), 'n geestelike in Zürich en professor aldaar, opgestel.

71 Die enigste rekening was vir 'n bedrag van 20 Frank vir regsdienste gelewer weens besware teen skerp artikels deur die *Neuen Zürcher Zeitung* (F.O. 2/512, nr. 20 (1.8.1901).

72 Kyk F.O. 100/350, nr. 36 (30.4.1900); F.O. 100/353, nr. 1 (7.5.1900); F.O. 100/350, nr. 13 (8.5.1900);, nr. 55 (23.6.1900, nr. 65 (18.7.1900, nr. 28 (29.8.1900).

73 Vgl. F.O. 2/374, nr. 58 (18.4.1900), nr. 59 (24.4.1900).

3.2.2 Ondersteuning deur besoekers aan die Boererrepublieke

Artikels deur militêre kenners en betrokkenes by die oorlog in Suid-Afrika het soms vir die anglofiliste soos manna uit die hemel gekom. Dr. König en dr. Montmollin, twee lede van die Switserse Rooikruis by die Boere, het na hul terugkeer 'n reeks artikels gepubliseer waarin hulle onsimpatiek teen die Boere gereageer het.[74] 'n Artikel deur luitenant Alexis Pasch wat aan Boerekant geveg het, was eweneens negatief teenoor die Boeresaak. Pasch se artikel het die Britse Foreign Office dermate begeester dat Sanderson voorgestel het dat die *Times* se aandag daarop gevestig behoort te word.[75] Ten spyte van hul onvermoeide werk kon die ondersteuners van St. John, Greene en die Britse belange nie daarin slaag om die toon van die Switserse pers te verander nie.

Die pro-Boerestandpunt was verreweg die sterkste in die Switserse pers tydens die oorlog. Dit is byvoorbeeld opvallend dat geen enkele groot Duits-Switserse dagblad vir Brittanje kant gekies het nie. Die Duitse pro-Britse simpatie is slegs waarneembaar in die briewekolomme en dan veral in dié van die liberale pers. Sowel die konserwatiewe Katolieke pers soos gemanifesteer in die sentrale gebied[76] as die koerante van die sosiaal-demokrate vertoon geen pro-Britse mening nie; indien wel, is dit byna onopvallend. Die twee strominge verskil egter heelwat van mekaar ten opsigte van die redes vir hierdie pro-Boere houding.

Die twee Luzernse dagblaaie *Vaterland* en *Tagblatt*[77] was aanvanklik die mondstuk van die konserwatiewe Katolieke in die sentrale gebied van Switserland. Later het die *Luzerner Tages-Anzeiger bygekom*.[78] Talle ander sentraal-Switserse koerante het hulle steeds besig gehou met beriggewing oor slegs plaaslike of suiwer kantonnale gebeure. Dit is ook belangrik om die *Midwaldner Volksblatt* en die *Schweizer Zeitung* by bogenoemde drie koerante te voeg, aangesien hierdie koerante buitengewone aandag aan die stryd in die twee Boererepublieke bestee het. Van hierdie vyf koerante

74 F.O. 2/374, nr. 74 (4.8.1900); *Berner Tageblatt*, 2.8.1900 en *Journal de Genève*, 17.8.1900.

75 F.O. 2/511, nr. 35 (3.6.1901); *Tribune de Lausanne*, 31.5.1900; *Gazette de Lausanne*, 1.6.1900 en 10, 12.6.1901.

76 Die kanton Luzern moet hier gesien word as die fokusgebied.

77 Die *Vaterland* het die eerste keer op 12.9.1833 as *Luzerner Zeitung* verskyn. In 1872 is die naam verander soos wat dit tydens die oorlog was. Die koerant was aanvanklik Katoliek maar verteenwoordig later die konserwatiewe Christelik-sosiale standpunt (vgl. Dovifat, *Handbuch der Auslandpresse*, p. 240). Die *Tagblatt* se volledige naam was die *Luzerner Tagblatt* en het in 1852 die eerste keer verskyn.

78 Die *Luzerner Tages Anzeiger* het op 21.10.1897 verskyn maar is vanaf 2.1.1918 beter bekend onder die naam *Luzerner Nachrichten*.

was dit veral die weekblad, *Midwalder Volksblatt*, wat geen geheim gemaak het van sy gevoel vir die Boeresaak nie. Tewens, die benaming "Boer" was voldoende om simpatie en 'n gevoel van verwantskap by sy lesers op te wek. Hierdie simpatie het in die hartland 'n besondere intimiteit gehad omdat hierdie gebied 'n soortgelyke historiese ervaring as die Boere in die Boererepublieke gehad het.[79]

4. Slot

As gevolg van die mislukte Jameson-inval het 'n sterk anti-Britse propagandadrif in 1896 in die Switserse pers posgevat. Daarna het nuusmedia, met uitsondering van die *Neuen Zürcher Zeitung*, met toenemende vriendelikheid oor Brittanje begin skryf. Met die toenemende spanning tussen die Z.A.R. en Brittanje, het daar weer anti-Britse artikels in die Switserse koerante begin verskyn, wat toegeneem het na mate die spanning tot 'n punt gedryf is. In hierdie verband het veral die *Journal de Genève*, die *Gazette de Lausanne*, en die *Basler Nachricten* 'n belangrike rol gespeel. Teen September 1899 was dit duidelik dat daar 'n nuwe anti-Britse golf ontwikkel het[80], wat na die uitbreek van die oorlog met volle geweld op Brittanje losgelaat is. Die anti-Britse pers het daarby die stemming van die meerderheid van die Switsers vertolk en het dus besliste aansluiting by die siening van die leserspubliek gevind. Dit is dus geen wonder dat die Switserse pers by die Britse gesant in Bern, wat daagliks oor die houding van die pers en bevolking van Switserland aan sy regering gerapporteer het, in 'n swak lig was.

Die persveldtog wat deur die meeste van die Switserse koerante en tydskrifte van stapel gestuur is, het beantwoord aan die kriteria vir propaganda wat Maletzke ontwikkel het: "Propaganda soll stehen für geplante Versuche, durch Kommunikation die Meinungen, Attitüden, Verhaltenswesen von Zielgruppem under politischer Zielsetzung zu beeinflussen."[81] Met die oogmerk om in te lig oor wat in Suid-Afrika gebeur, om steun te werf vir 'n eksplisiete anti-imperialistiese standpunt deur op die vryheidsideale van die

79 Hiermee word bedoel die Oostenryks-Hongaarse oorheersing van die gebied wat 'n lang en moeisame stryd om bevryding tot gevolg gehad het. Die uiteindelike bevryding het gelei tot die verbond van 1291 waardeur die gebiede (oftewel gemeentes) in sentraal-Switserland bymekaar gebring is. Hierdie stryd het tot die ontstaan van die mites oor die held Wilhelm Tell gelei – 'n persoon met wie die Boeregeneraal Christiaan De Wet geïdentifiseer is.

80 Vgl. *Journal de Genève* (8.10.1899).

81 Maletzke, "Propaganda: eine begriffskritische Analyse", *Publizistik*, p. 157.

Boere te appelleer, rasionele argumente teen Britse aggressie aan te voer en die nodige bewyse van onhumanitêre Britse optrede aan te bied, sowel as om 'n emosionele beroep op afwysing van Brittanje se oorlogspoging te doen, het die Switserse pers meegewerk om 'n sterk anti-positivistiese inslag in die internasionale politieke en regsverkeer te vestig. Die uitvloeisel van dié nuwe regverdigheidsbewussyn in die internasionale orde was 'n ontluikende humanitêre gees. Die inslag van die Switserse beriggewing was eerder anti-imperialisties as wat dit pro-Boer gesind was. In dié verband het die Switserse pers aangesluit by die anti-Britse gesindheid in ander Europese lande om die gewaande gemeenskaplike Europese vyand – synde Britse imperiale oogmerke – te beveg. Dié standpunt word in die *Burenfreund*, van Julie 1902 soos volg verwoord: "Die Schweiz is allzeit ein Hort der Freiheit gewesen. Die Geschichte und Erziehung dieses Volkes würde es ganz unverständlich erschienen lassen wenn man dort nicht mit Hertz und Seele an der Sache der Buren Anteil nähme. Selbst die Frauen haben sich energisch an der Agitation beteiligt und ihren Schwestern einen offenen Weinachtsbrief mit fast 60, 000 handschriften übersandt."[82]

In die *Bürgerische Freitagszeitung* is die anti-Britse sentiment selfs sterker verwoord: "Dennoch läszt ihr Schiksal uns keine Ruhe und immer wieder taucht vor uns die Frage auf: können wir denn wirklich gar nichts tun und sind wir durch unsre Kleinheit und Neutralität dazu verurteilt, wortlos zuzusehen, wie ein freiheitsliebendes Christenvolk planmäszig ausgerottet und von der Erde vertilgt wird? Dürfen wir es ohne Einsprache geschehen lassen, dasz in diesem Krieg die Grundsätze der Genfer Konvention vom Roten Kreuz fortwährend verletzt und alle Regeln des Völkerrechts geschont, die wehrlose Zivilbevölkerung, Frauen und Kinder, des Abdachs beraubt und allen Schreken des Krieges presigegeben wird, dasz ohne jede strategische Notwendigkeit, sondern blosz als 'Polizeimaszregel' und 'Abschrekungsmittel' die friedlichen Heimstatten niedergebrannt werden – *bisjetzt schon über 5000* – oder ist es nicht vielmehr unsere heilige *Plicht*, in Namen der Humanität, im namen des Völkerrechts und auf die möglichen Konsequennzen solcher unbestandeten Rechtsverletzungen sogar für uns selbst, vor der ganzen Welt lauten und einmütigen *Protest* zu erheben gegen diese Art Kriegsführung in Südafrika?"[83]

82 *Der Burenfreund*, nr. 24, (Julie 1902), p. 483.

83 *Bürgerische Freitagszeitung*, nr. 1 (4.1.1901), hoofberig op p. 1.

Alhoewel Switserland polities en juridies neutraal gestaan het, het die Switserse pers 'n beduidende rol gespeel in 'n groterwordende beweging ten gunste van humanisering van die internasionale geskille en deur 'n eksplisiete gees van anti-imperialisme op te wek.[84]

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84 Kyk ook Raath, "Switserland en die beginsel van nie-inmenging in die internasionale reg tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog, 1899-1902", *Koers*, 70(4) 2005, pp. 601-630; Raath & De Freitas "Internasionaalregtelike Perspektiewe op die Switserse Neutraliteitspraktyk en Ondersteuning van die Boerepublieke tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog, 1899-1902. Deel 1: Historiese Grondslae van die Switserse Neutraliteitspraktyk", *Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap*, 2006 (1ste en 2de Kwartaal), pp. 103-128; "Internasionaalregtelike Perspektiewe op die Switserse Neutraliteitspraktyk. Deel 2: Switserse Ondersteuning van die Boererepublieke Tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog, 1899-1902", *Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap*, 2006 (1ste & 2de Kwartaal), p. 150.

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