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PAN-TURANISM AND ALTERNATIVE PAN-NATIONALISMS IN FINLAND 1917–1923

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The study of pan-Turanism as a macronationalist ideology is complicated by the fact that pan-Turanism consists of different national strains.[1] The Hungarian and Turkish variants of (pan-)Turanism have been studied extensively. Finnish contributions to the topic have mainly focused on the connections between Hungary and Finland. In addition, colonial and imperial powers have utilised the label "pan-Turanism" propagandistically to denigrate movements and endeavours without pan-nationalist ambitions, or to manipulate target groups.[2] My aim here has been to trace those few historical moments when (pan-)Turanist ideas have been presented in a positive way in the public discourse in independent Finland, and to explain which historical circumstances made it possible.

This chapter explores a narrow window of opportunity opening in the revolutionary year of 1917 and shutting in 1923, when the public discourse in Finland briefly seemed to change in favour of the practical implementation of pan-Turanism. During these years, the pan-Turanism advocated by Finnish, Hungarian and Tatar actors in the Finnish public sphere – in the press, in public speeches, within learned societies and sometimes narrower circles of the scholarly and political elite – appeared both as a form of macronationalism with hegemonic ambitions and as a movement of mutual minority support. The different power positions of the actors must also be considered. The Finnish and Hungarian enthusiasts of pan-Turanism could imagine vast geopolitical alliances and tumultuous uprisings from the relative safety of their own independent states, although both countries experienced bloody civil wars during this era. The most pressing needs of the small Tatar diaspora in Finland after 1917 were matters of pure survival as a community.

Conjunctural and opportunistic use of pan-ideologies is therefore an important part of this study. The Tatars in Finland needed to appeal judiciously to pan-Turanism if they wanted to acquire influential allies in a country where

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emigrants and refugees from the former Russian Empire were viewed with suspicion. The Finns, on the other hand, tended to passively accept pan-Turanism as a feature of soft diplomacy, or, in contrast, to utilise it in the internal language strife against the Scandinavianism of Swedish-speakers. Neither of these uses was motivated by solidarity with oppressed Turanian brothers – that solidarity was strictly reserved for the nearest Finno-Ugric nations, the objects of Finnish hegemonic macronationalism. Another reason for Finnish intellectuals and politicians to shy away from pan-Turanism, which I have explored elsewhere, was the fear of being associated with Asian nations, which were stigmatised as culturally and racially inferior to their colonial overlords.[3] This civilisational hierarchy was taken seriously in Finland during its struggle for international recognition as an independent state, and it was reflected in the arguments used in the linguistic conflict between Finnish- and Swedish-speakers.

However, a key agent in this study did not see pan-Turanism or other alternative macro-nationalisms as naturally antagonistic to a Scandinavian orientation. This was Rudolf Holsti, a liberal nationalist and enthusiast of Finno-Ugric "tribal" solidarity, who served as Finland's minister of foreign affairs from 1919 to 1922 and from 1936 to 1938. The Anglophile, Western-oriented Holsti envisioned a defensive bloc uniting the Baltic and the Nordic countries against the threat of the greater powers in the region: Russia and Germany. As a politician of the liberal and republican National Progress Party, Holsti often opposed monarchist pro-German conservatives of the National Coalition Party. The Agrarian Union, a centrist and republican party representing the interests of the rural peasantry, supported Holsti's ideas as they aligned with the party's Finno-Ugric pan-nationalism. Holsti's views had some significance for the small Tatar community in Finland, and there are indications that Holsti had positive influence on the protection of Tatar refugees in Finland during the Russian Civil War.

Pan-Turanism's window of opportunity in 1917–23 not only shows the latent significance of various pan-nationalisms in the past and maybe in the future, but it is also a telling example of the diversity of competing pan-nationalisms present in the Nordic region.

Historical context of the pan-Turanian idea

As a pan-ideology, pan-Turanism can be described as a relatively recent phenomenon built on ancient foundations. The Hungarian strain of pan-Turanism was inspired by a mediaeval tradition that traced back the Hungarian monarchy's founder Árpád's anchestry to Attila of the Huns.[4] Although Turkish Turanism is usually seen as a historically modern phenomenon, competing with and superseding Ottomanism and Islam, Central Asian chronicles connected the genealogies of the non-Islamic Mongols and the Muslim Turks already in the late Middle Ages and the Early Modern era. Only the Finns and Estonians, and their fellow Finno-Ugric minorities in the east, lacked comparable aristocratic genealogies

that could be utilised to bolster macro-nationalisms crossing religious, linguistic and geographic borders with compelling historical-mythological imagery.

The birth of modern pan-Turanism is usually traced to early nineteenth-century scholarship in languages, inspired by national romanticism. Similarities between Finno-Ugric, Turkic (including Tatar) and Mongolian languages had compelled philologists to theorise about their interrelations since the eighteenth century.[5] The most generous definitions of pan-Turanism embraced Korea, Japan, the Tungusic languages and even China. In 1921, Hungarian pan-Turanists reported the foundation of a Turanian Society in Japan with hundreds of new members and the spread of the idea in China.[6] A restrictive definition of pan-Turanism or a pan-nationalism of more limited scope was more attractive to Finnish intellectuals who envisioned a leading role for their own nation in it.

In 1844, young Zacharias Topelius – future novelist, poet and historian of national significance – projected a future development of the Finnish language into a culture-bearing idiom. In an essay published in the year after the first Scandinavian student meeting in Uppsala, he declared: "Today people speak of Pan-Slavism; one day they may talk of Pan-Fennicism, or Pan-Suomism. Within such a Pan-Finnic community, the Finnish nation should hold a hegemonic position of sorts, because of its cultural seniority."[7] Perhaps the pan-Finnish nation, "by no means smaller than the Slavs [!]", would one day play a greater part on the world stage. The Asian origin of the Finns, which Topelius accepted, was not an obstacle. After all, also the Hindus had a great and ancient culture. The tone of Topelius' essay, written for a Swedish-speaking audience, was apologetic. The loyalist Fennomans wished to focus national efforts on the long-term development of Finnish culture within the borders of the autonomous Grand Duchy in the Russian Empire and avoid politically risky Scandinavianism.

The difference between the loyalists and the radicals did not always follow clear-cut linguistic lines. In October 1844, a few months after the publication of Topelius' essay, the linguist Mattias Alexander Castrén wrote to the leading Fennoman philosopher Johan Vilhelm Snellman: "I am determined to show the Finnish nation that we are not a solitary people from the bog, living in isolation from the world and from universal history, but that we are in fact related to at least one-sixth of mankind."[8] There was strength in numbers. Castrén rejected cautious loyalism in favour of a macronationalist geopolitical scheme that would open the path to national independence for Finland and end Russian imperialist domination of its subject nations. His own fieldwork in Siberia among the Nenets and the Komi – albeit financed by the St Petersburg Academy of Science – ultimately served this cause, Castrén argued.

A few years later, Castrén's work bore fruit. He had studied a wide variety of Finno-Ugric, Turkic and Mongolic languages and published numerous grammars, research papers and a dissertation. In an 1849 public lecture, he confidently declared that the cradle of the Finnish nation – together with the other Finno-Ugric, "Samoyedic,"[9] Turkic and Mongolic peoples – could be found in the Altai mountains.[10] In linguistics, this theory would be entitled "the Ural-Altaic

hypothesis," often used interchangeably with "Turanian." It would also plant the seed of a new pan-ideology: the pan-Turanian idea. Castrén has been attributed its spiritual fatherhood, although many consider that the Hungarian Ármin Vámbéry coined the term. For example, the current online edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* claims that Castrén championed "the belief in the racial unity and future greatness of the Ural-Altaic peoples."[11]

After Castrén, the terms Turanian and pan-Turanian were popularised internationally by linguists like the German-British Max Müller. Finnish nationalist historian Yrjö Koskinen explored the Turanian ancestry of the Finns in his 1862 doctoral dissertation.[12] Clergyman and populariser of science, Johan Calamnius, praised the Turanian civilisation as the first and oldest in the history of humanity.[13] Turanian, applied to the Finns, was thus an accepted term. Finnish scholars were initially driving forces behind its popularisation. However, in the late nineteenth century Finns began to gradually abandon the idea, just as the term gained popularity among Hungarian authors.

The term *Turan* initially reached Hungarian readers through second-hand translations of Persian and Turkish works. In the mediaeval Persian epic *Shahnameh* by the poet Ferdowsi, the nomadic steppe warriors of Turan (often interpreted as Turks) battle the heroes of Iran. The fascination for the Orient triggered a kind of proto-Turanism among Hungarian literati, conscious of the steppe nomad heritage of the ancient Magyars. In the early nineteenth century, the Finno-Ugric language family was still only a fringe theory in comparative linguistics.[14] The Hungarian uprising of 1848–49 infused this early cultural macronationalism with political urgency, as Russia subdued the rebellion while Turkey welcomed Hungarian political refugees. A new generation of scholars, almost all of them disciples of the intrepid Vámbéry, founded Hungarian Turkology and promoted Turanism in the late nineteenth century. Between 1913 and 1944, almost every Hungarian prime minister was a member of the Turanian Society.[15]

The place of Finnish and Finno-Ugric languages in Hungarian Turanism had been hotly contested since Vámbéry's times. The Paris World Fair of 1900 was a turning point. For the first time, Finland presented its own pavilion, and Akseli Gallen-Kallela's visualisations of the *Kalevala* won the hearts and minds of the Hungarian art world. Meanwhile, in the Russian Empire, Muslim intellectuals began to adopt a pan-Turkic identity partly inspired by pan-Slavism in the 1870s and 1880s.[16] The modernisation of Japan, the increased visibility of Finland and the birth of pan-Turkism inspired the hope "that a 'Turanian awakening' was about to take place in the world and that Hungary could play a role in it."[17]

However, the goals of Turkism in Russia were chiefly defensive. The Empire's assimilation policies targeted primarily the urban and literate Tatars in the Middle Volga region. For historical reasons, Islam had been a cohesive force of the Turkic-speaking nationalities in the Russian Empire. Catherine the Great had institutionalised Islam in the Empire through the establishment of muftiates, semi-state institutions that functioned as middlemen between the believers and the Empire's administration.[18] At the price of becoming integrated in the

Empire's power structure, the Kazan Tatars achieved a relatively privileged position among the subject nationalities as religious teachers and experts.[19] Among them, the exonym "Tatar" was gradually accepted. The historian and theologian Shihabutdin Märjani utilised the term as a macronationalist concept. "Tatar" could be defined as any Turkic-speaking Muslim subject of the Russian Empire.[20]

Many Muslims from Russia moved to Turkey, where they introduced their own ideas about pan-Islam and pan-Turkism as complementary, rather than opposite, ideologies. These emigrant intellectuals, representing a variety of Eurasian populations, tended to argue on behalf of an Asian-oriented definition of Turkishness. Yusuf Akçura, founder of the Pan-Turkist journal *Türk Yurdu* in the 1910s, described the "Turko-Tatars" as a nation within the larger "Ural-Altaic" unit.[21] Struggling to include the Finno-Ugric nations within a Turkocentric definition of Turanism, Akçura introduced the concepts Lesser Turan and Greater Turan, the latter including the Finno-Ugric peoples and other non-Muslim nations.[22]

James H. Meyer has called the emigrants that provided the driving forces in these networks "trans-imperial Muslims" referring to their pan-nationalist activism that encompassed Turkish, Muslim and occasionally broader "Asian" identities.[23] Their relationship with Finland was often closer than their political views betrayed. Another emigrant intellectual of Tatar origin, writer and politician Ğayaz Ishaki, maintained close connections to the emerging Tatar community in Finland throughout the first half of the twentieth century.[24] Many of these emigrants used their positive impressions of Finland to emphasise the affinity between Turks and Finns. The educator Abdullah Battal, who had spent the early 1920s in Finland and spoke fluent Finnish, promoted Finland as a model nation in Akçura's journal *Türk Yurdu*.[25] Hamit Zübeyr, a native of Ufa in today's Bashkortostan, studied in Hungary in the early 1920s and called for cooperation between Finno-Ugric and Turko-Tatar nations in the Finnish press.[26] Although their voices did not go unheard within the small Tatar community in Finland, these intellectuals and activists could only hope for a response from their cautious Finnish colleagues if the geopolitical stars were right.

A window of opportunity: 1918–1924

The case of the Finno-Ugric Society in 1918 illustrates the quandary of a learned society that claimed to stand outside of all politics, but whose members did not hesitate to take political action when opportunity arose. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the Society balanced between its scientific mission and contemporary political demands. It had sponsored several competent and internationally renowned scholars in the Altaic (Turkic and Mongolian) languages, but these cultural spheres were no longer considered a priority after the abandonment of the Ural-Altaic theory.[27] Dominated by the nationalist and conservative politician E.N. Setälä, the Society had turned toward a narrower definition of its objectives by 1910: "the Society is first and foremost a Finno-Ugric society,"

Setälä had declared. The Society ought to produce research results that would ensure the Finnish nation a place among the civilised nations and the right to "demand respect" for her national independence.[28]

However, when the window of opportunity for national independence appeared at the end of the First World War, the pan-Turanian idea became surprisingly useful. In May 1918, the Finno-Ugric Society elected as its honorary members count Rüdiger von der Goltz, commander of the Baltic Sea Division of the German Army; Mehmet Talât Pasha, Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire; and Ferdinand I, King of Bulgaria. These nominations were hardly motivated by scientific merits, although Ferdinand I was a "native Hungarian" with "scientific hobbies." The German commander's membership was justified with his "swift and skilled action" in the Finnish Civil War of 1918 that had helped to preserve untouched the scientific collections and resources of the Finnish capital and had "restored necessary peaceful working conditions" by the end of the civil war. Talât Pasha, in turn, had earned the nomination with his "leading position in the Turanian movement."[29]

In fact, just before the Finnish Civil War, representatives of the government had travelled around the capitals of the Central Powers to gather support for Finnish independence, which had been declared on 6 December 1917. Many of these early diplomats had been recruited among Finnish linguists and philologists. Slavicist J.J. Mikkola and Finno-Ugricist Jalo Kalima travelled to Germany, Bulgaria and Turkey to establish diplomatic contacts. Kalima and his colleagues were aware of the fame of Turkish hospitality, but reality exceeded their wildest expectations: "We imagined Finland to be unknown in Turkey and beyond the Turkish sphere of interest, and that our independence would pass without much fanfare. We were mistaken."[30]

Turkish Fennophilia presented a bittersweet dilemma to Finnish philologists: It was based on a theory of interrelation that they considered scientifically unproven, misguided and even stigmatising, yet it had turned out to be provisionally advantageous. Kalima stated: "We Finns are thus a brother nation of the Turks. And when Finland […] begins its life as a free nation, then the Turk understands it as a benefit for his tribe: there goes one of *us*." Kalima emphasised that the Turanian movement was politically meaningful regardless of the scientific status of Turanism. A "Turanian chain" was surrounding Russia, with Finland as its last link.[31]

The metaphor of an iron chain or ring tightening its stranglehold of Russia multiplied in Finnish newspapers for the duration of the Russian Civil War.[32] A similar turn of phrase had been used in November 1917 by Finnish diplomats who were negotiating German support for an independence that would ensure bourgeois hegemony in the face of threatening revolutionary tendencies in Finland.[33] The delegates promised General Ludendorff that Finland would become the northernmost link in a series of nations that would form a protective wall for Europe. For the pro-German Finnish monarchists, an alliance with Germany, including a monarch of Hohenzollern stock, would ensure not only

the independence of Finland from Russia but the creation of a Greater Finland with a leading role in Northern Europe.[34]

Although the German defeat in November 1918 came as a shock to Finnish monarchists, the restless years immediately after the First World War were a time when hitherto impossible geopolitical dreams seemed to materialise. Small but determined bands of zealots took on demoralised forces of crumbling empires and created utopian states that lasted for weeks or months before others, more powerful utopian (or dystopian, depending on one's perspective) forces overran them. Gabriele D'Annunzio in Fiume, Enver Pasha in Turkestan and Roman von Ungern-Sternberg in Mongolia became models for this kind of daring action. Finland and its nearest neighbourhood in north-eastern Europe also became a stage for such bands of irregular fighters fired by irredentist ideologies blended with pan-nationalisms.

Pan-Turanism and the vanguard nations 1919–1922

In 1919, Turkologist and Mongolist G.J. Ramstedt informed the Finnish public about a unit of Muslim Tatar soldiers formed in Finland in early 1918, just before the ephemeral Tatar-led Republic of Idel-Ural fell to the Bolsheviks.[35] Ramstedt was a supporter of the Volga Tatar independence movement and hosted prominent Idel-Ural refugees in Finland, among them Sadri Maksudi, a former member of the State Duma who became a statesman and scholar in the Republic of Turkey. For Maksudi, the revival of the Finnish language provided an important model for the revitalisation of Turkish language and culture, and he praised *Kalevala*, the "Finnish national epic" composed by Elias Lönnrot in the early nineteenth century, as an achievement of the entire Ural-Altaic race.[36] The works of Maksudi and other Tatar emigrants presented Finland as a Nordic model for the new Turkish nation. The Muslim Tatar community in Finland played an important role in the maintenance of these connections with Finnish scholars and learned societies. Pan-nationalist societies founded in the interwar years, such as the Club of Vanguard Nations (*Etuvartiokansojen Klubi*) and the Prometheus Society, had Tatars among their founding members.[37]

Until the passing of the law on freedom of religion in Finland in 1923, the Tatar community in Finland had acute needs that required the support of influential allies. Firstly, many of the Tatars residing in Finland at the outbreak of the Russian Civil War wished to reunite with their families that remained in Russia. Secondly, emigrants and refugees needed help to find the necessary contacts and resources to apply for residence permits and Finnish citizenship, a right that was accorded to non-Christian residents in 1919. Thirdly, while the Tatars had been organised in Islamic charitable associations even before the passing of the 1923 law, they needed to legalise their organisations according to the association law of independent Finland.[38]

In all these endeavours, the support of liberal-nationalist Finnish allies such as G.J. Ramstedt and professor of economy, Yrjö Jahnsson, was crucial. Ramstedt

attempted to influence public opinion in favour of the Tatars, knowing well that the Finnish public had cultivated prejudices against ethnic minorities associated with the Russian Empire.[39] Jahnsson aided political refugees, providing them with legal advice and appealing to Finnish officials and politicians in their favour. He was driven not only by humanitarian interest. From 1917 to 1923, Jahnsson composed extensive plans for a geopolitical rearrangement of Northern Eurasia. Although Jahnsson's plans never materialised, he was not alone in daring to imagine new transnational alliances reaching beyond the Baltic region. His friend, the liberal politician Rudolf Holsti, was a "chief architect" of the vanguard nations policy, meaning that he promoted the establishment of a protective belt (a *cordon sanitaire*) of states along the Soviet Russian borders, but for different reasons than the western great powers that promoted such solutions to the crisis in Europe.[40]

Holsti subscribed to the idea that Finno-Ugric nations ought to unite their forces, and that the most advanced among them had an obligation to support their disadvantaged tribal brethren.[41] For Holsti, the contradictions between a Finno-Ugric pan-nationalism and a Scandinavian orientation could be overcome, since the purpose of both alliances was to safeguard the interests of small nations against great powers. In addition, Finland's purpose within the Scandinavian block was to balance the dominance of Sweden in the North.[42]

Although the cause of the "tribal brothers" was close to Holsti's heart, he pragmatically included others than Finno-Ugric nations in these projects. In 1913, Holsti had predicted a coming world war as a window of opportunity for Finnish independence, and he identified the ensuing turmoil in Russia as a chance for all small nationalities in the empire.[43] Holsti served as the minister of foreign affairs after the failure of the pro-German monarchists to create a Greater Finland with the support of the Central Powers. Holsti feared above all a closer relationship between Germany and Russia, which he predicted would be the perdition of small states in the region.[44]

However, just as many members of the Finnish political elite, Holsti did not believe that all minority nationalities had equal capabilities to become independent states – unlike Finland, a politically mature and geographically distinct unit with a constitution and a parliament.[45] These ideas partly explain why Finnish conservative and liberal nationalists alike were hesitant to formally recognise Estonian independence in 1918–19, although they supported the Estonian war of liberation against the Bolsheviks. However, they do not fully explain why Holsti chose to support Tatar independence activists whose situation was even less hopeful. Archival evidence of Holsti's activities in favour of the Tatars is scarce, but reveals that the local Tatar community approached him as a potential ally. In 1921, the Finnish Tatar community sent him an invitation to a gala dinner on the occasion of Sadri Maksudi's, the former leader of the Tatar independence movement, visit.[46]

With Rudolf Holsti, Jahnsson had a friend in a high place, and he did not hesitate to make use of this connection. Within the Tatar community, Jahnsson's

main partner was the businessman and activist Hasan Kanykoff, who rallied to the cause of an independent Tatar republic. Perhaps Kanykoff was the anonymous Tatar informant interviewed in the nationalist and irredentist journal *Suunta* on "Tatar strivings for independence" in 1919.[47] According to this informant, the Volga Tatar realm covered a territory rich in natural resources. The almost 20 million Tatar people, whose culture, "albeit underdeveloped," was fully vital, ought to profit from this wealth, rather than their oppressors – including the unreliable leaders of the White movement in Russia.

The *Suunta* interview claimed that committees in support of the Tatar cause had sprung up everywhere in Europe's capitals. Indeed, Kanykoff was a founding member of the short-lived Society of Vanguard Nations.[48] This was not an overtly pan-nationalist organisation, although the membership included individuals with pan-ideological affiliations. Nevertheless, the *Suunta* interview emphasised the militancy of the organisations, claiming that they were ready to fight both the Bolsheviks and the Russian Nationalists. The struggle would make a far-reaching impact on the Eurasian continent, for the long-term "national and political dream" of the Tatars was "to create a united Tatar realm extending beyond the lands of Tatars proper, the Bashkirs, the Turkmens and other Tatar tribes, from the area of Kazan to the borders of Afghanistan and beyond the borders of Mongolia." An editorial comment expressed interest in the plan in conjunction with the struggle of other minority nations of the former Russian empire. If there was unity, "these nationalities would represent a force that world politics, not to mention Russians, would have to take into account":

> Tatars, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Ingrians, Karelians – and why not Finns and Poles, too – form an important cordon around Russia proper. Their coordination of planning and action might even by its own weight resolve the Russian question. One thing is sure: the creation of a new Russia cannot take place without the favourable aid of these nationalities.[49]

The emphasis on numbers recalls Eric Hobsbawm's threshold principle.[50] Calculations about the relative power of the Russian Empire's subject nations had been already done in Germany during the First World War, and Jahnsson's papers contain many such tables and additions.[51] Elsewhere, I have called this tendency to seek strength in numbers "arithmetic pragmatism."[52] I refer to the calculation, explored in fiction and political commentary throughout the interwar era, that the minority nationalities of the Russian Empire or Soviet Russia, added together, would outnumber the Russians. From this calculation followed the conclusion that the united minorities could successfully defeat Russia and divide it into national republics. This idea remained popular in pan-nationalist circles until the 1930s.[53]

Although this plan never materialised, Jahnsson appealed to it as general knowledge in his letter of recommendation for the Tatar merchant Sarif Daher's

citizenship application in 1921. Daher's first application had been refused because he had not resided permanently in Finland over the previous five years, as required by law. Jahnsson wrote a testimonial to the authorities to explain that Daher had travelled abroad in order to establish contacts with Tatar independence activists on the recommendation of the minister of foreign affairs, Rudolf Holsti. According to Jahnsson, the Tatar uprising had distracted the Bolsheviks from intervening in the Civil War in Finland. Jahnsson wanted to prove that Finland was indebted to the Tatars, who had been a decisive factor in support of the Finnish independence struggle. Consequently, Sarif Daher's second citizenship application was successful.[54]

Pan-Finnism or pan-Turanism?

As we have seen, scholars, learned societies and educators were prominently represented among enthusiasts of pan-nationalisms. A congress by the title *Yhteissuomalainen koulukokous*, best translated as "Pan-Finnish School Conference," was organised by and for educators in Helsinki in 1921. Five Hungarian delegates attended the event. The pedagogical journal *Alkuopetus* later referred to these Hungarian delegates as proof of the pan-Finnish (*yhteissuomalainen*) nature of the conference. In contrast, a comment in the conservative newspaper *Uusi Suomi* was bewildered at the sudden expansion of the definition of "pan-Finnishness."[55] The commentator called the Pan-Finnish School Conference's title "completely misleading"; a few years ago, the plans had only included Estonians and Finns, but now, also Hungarians and Komi people had been invited.[56] Even some "Turko-Tatars" had sent fraternal greetings, although their hypothetical relationship to the Finns could only be found in "the dizzying darkness of the most distant past." The commentator admitted that the conference had been a strong "forge of tribal spirit," thanks to the passionate Hungarians. The hard-working Estonians had also organised numerous cultural and educational exhibitions and concerts. Their delegation was almost as large as the number of Finnish participants. Indeed, the author wondered where the host nationality was hiding. Apparently, this enlarged "pan-Finnishness" was an alienating concept.[57]

The Finnish audience's lukewarm attitude to pan-nationalist events was remarkable because teachers reputedly used to flock to educational conferences. The teachers' journal *Opettajain Lehti* also complained about a lack of interest among Finnish teachers toward the Twelfth Nordic School Meeting in Helsinki in 1925.[58] The reason for the low number of preliminary registrants from Finland was thought to be the ambivalent status of the Finnish language and "Eastern Swedish tactlessness" (some conference leaflets had used the term *finländsk*, "Finlandish," which Finnish-speakers found separatist and insulting).[59] Tensions about inequal power relations and competition for leadership roles shaped the media representation of both events.

Whereas "Nordic," at least, was treated as a neutral term, school inspector and conference secretary Alfred Jotuni had to explain the "pan-Finnish

idea" as the aim to revive cultural activities with kindred nations, comparable with "those foreign movements that are known as Latinism, Germanism and Turanism." Judging by the speeches by the Hungarian delegates, the distinction between the pan-Finnish and the Turanian idea was unnecessary. The teacher Józef Fekete presented macronationalist movements as "a new problem of world politics," listing Scandinavianism, the "Yellow Peril," and Turanism in a litany of pan-ideologies. For Fekete, the World War had awakened the Turanian idea among the Ural-Altaic peoples. The Finno-Ugric movement was a modest offshoot of this macro-national idea. Due to the small size of the scattered Finno-Ugric nations, their ambitions had to be limited to the cultural, educational and economic fields. The Finns, the Estonians and the Hungarians were to serve as the leaders of this movement, due to their higher level of civilisation.[60]

After prolonged applause, school inspector Matti Pesonen thanked Fekete for opening far-reaching visions of grand tasks awaiting "our race."[61] In the print version of Fekete's speech, published in Finnish, he used the term "golden race" for the Turanians, a term resembling the Mongolian "Golden lineage" (*altan urug*) of Genghis Khan's descendants.[62] The poet and folklorist Aladár Bán dug even deeper into kinship metaphors. According to Bán, the arrival of the Hungarian delegates in Finland showed how the Turanian racial connection could overcome geographical and temporal distances. Hungarians and Finns had mixed with strangers over the course of millennia, but "pure drops of Turanian blood" remained in their veins. This unique fraternal relationship had finally melted "the ice walls of the North." Northern coldness and ice symbolised hatred and indifference that had kept the brothers apart, while warm, fraternal love originated from the "bright southern landscape." The Hungarians inversed the hierarchy of the cardinal directions and presented themselves as the active initiators of this relationship, offering the Finns their "hearts' blood" and "souls' fire," hoping that "fraternal love" would let "spring bloom" between the "blood storms" of war.[63]

Although the Hungarian journal *Túrán* cited favourable Finnish newspaper reports on the pan-Finnish conference,[64] it did not mention the reputedly weak Finnish participation numbers. Finnish pan-Turanism enthusiasts knew that the idea faced an uphill battle. It was difficult enough to convince fellow Finns of the importance of alliances in the near neighbourhood. As Holsti discovered, many Finnish conservatives often resisted initiatives that encroached German interests. In 1921, pro-German elements in the Finnish political elite, the armed forces and the paramilitary White guards that had become institutionalised after the Civil War put up energetic resistance to any attempts at an actual defence alliance between Finland, the Baltic countries and Poland.[65] However, these elements did favour Finnish irredentist adventures in East Karelia. In late 1921, activists supported the East Karelian popular revolt against the Bolsheviks by smuggling arms and men over the Finnish-Soviet border, until the centre-liberal government put a stop to the traffic. Henceforth, the hostile conservative press incited a

defamation campaign against the minister of the interior, Holsti's party comrade Heikki Ritavuori, who was assassinated on 14 February 1922.

Tatars in Finland were likely aware of ambivalent Finnish attitudes toward pan-Turanism via their learned supporters. Hence, their appeals to Finnish solidarity with pan-Turkic or pan-Turanian projects generally avoided claims of racial kinship. Rather, Tatars referred to a spiritual kinship based on similar values and historical experiences. These included the common enemy, Russia; common historical experiences with nations in kinship relationship (e.g. the Finno-Ugric minorities in the Middle Volga region), and common ethics.

Pan-Turanism resurrected? The debacle of 1923

In 1923, many Finnish-language newspapers suddenly rallied against the perceived tendency of Finland's Swedish-speakers to hold on to their privileged positions under the guise of Scandinavian cooperation. Already in February, an editorial in the conservative *Aamulehti* attacked racial views attributed to the Swedish People's Party.[66] The editorial refuted any conceited Swedish beliefs in a pure "Germanic" race of their own. No matter what race the Finns or Swedes were thought to be, biological inheritance followed no linguistic lines, and vice versa. The editorial reminded that the Finns should not be dismissed as alien or inferior, but that the fates of both population groups were intertwined.

The cessation of irredentist activism after the foundation of the Soviet Union on 30 December 1922 had put a damper on pan-Finnish sentiments. This explained the hostile Conservative reactions in August 1923 when some Agrarian Union's newspapers presented the Turanian idea as a serious alternative to a Scandinavian orientation. On 27 August 1923, an editorial in the Agrarian newspaper *Ilkka* introduced the aim of the Turanian Society in Budapest as the unification of and mutual support for all Turanian nations, including the Finno-Ugric peoples. According to the editorial, the "awakening of the Turanian race" was already taking shape in countries such as Japan, Turkey and Hungary, proving "the movement's impact to be more powerful in the psychology of nations than usual."[67]

Another Agrarian paper, *Keski-Pohjanmaa*, agreed that the Turanian idea was worthy of attention because it aimed to unite the Finno-Ugric peoples with powerful nations. Both *Ilkka* and *Keski-Pohjanmaa* emphasised that the right time had come for such projects of extended "racial" or "tribal" consciousness in the years after the World War. Coolly and sensibly – using the attributes of Nordic rationality – Finns ought to consider this window of opportunity, instead of maintaining dated illusions about other options. With a thinly veiled reference to Sweden and the contested Åland islands, the editorial mused that "distant friends" were perhaps not worse than "our close strangers, who sometimes feel tempted to chop off a piece to themselves at our expense." The Turanian nations had common interests, which the editorial presented as a

more welcoming and symmetrical relationship "than the circles that we have attempted to enter this far."[68]

The editorial comments in favour of Turanism compared and conflated Swedes with Germans to emphasise the parallels between Finns and Hungarians. *Ilkka* predicted that "Finland's Swedes" would immediately rush to mock Turanism, just like the Germans had done in Hungary. According to *Ilkka*, "the Swedes" tried to kill the Turanian idea in Finland, because the Hungarian national awakening frightened them. The rise of Turanism would end the expansionism of the "Germanic race" in the Baltic Sea region by toppling the Finland-Swedes from their positions of power. Embracing Turanism was the only viable answer to Swedish race-consciousness, since any attempt to prove the Germanic origin of the Finns would only result in being treated like a minor and subservient part of the Germanic race.[69]

The National Coalition Party became concerned about this anti-Germanic rhetoric in the rival party's newspapers. The party had been founded by advocates for Imperial German intervention in the Finnish Civil War and a German monarch in 1918. For many supporters of this party, a rejection of "German(ic)" orientation was tantamount to treason. Pan-Germanism made even Sweden appear tolerable in the eyes of the party's Finnish-speaking members. Although the National Coalition Party had to accept the republican form of government, it remained nostalgic of monarchy and loyal to Germany, which had been "forced" (in the eyes of many conservatives) to undergo the same development. The fiercely republican Agrarian Union was its main opponent in this political struggle.

This explains why the Turanist editorials triggered an almost immediate reaction. Hugo Suolahti, professor in German Philology, first chairman of the National Coalition Party, and newly appointed rector of the University of Helsinki condemned the Agrarian newspapers as advocates of "national isolationism," a "most dangerous instinct" in the Finnish national character. Such a defensive position was justified during the peril of Russification, Suolahti conceded, but not in independent Finland, where the Finnish people had achieved masterhood. The interaction between Finnish and Germanic cultures had produced a unique, yet firmly Western civilisation: "We have […] even somewhat prided ourselves in being the vanguard of this West European culture in the east." It would be dangerous to lose this orientation. Although the brotherhood between Finland and Estonia was symbolically important, Suolahti maintained, it was not enough. The cultural connection to the "physically and linguistically" distant Hungary was even less satisfying:

> And the least believable connection is to Turkey and Japan, for the only argument presented in favour of it, some sort of a tribal connection, is completely hypothetical and does not stand a scientific investigation.[70]

For Suolahti, Turanism as "an actually existent Finno-Ugric cultural form" was baseless rhetoric. National Coalition Party newspapers supported his views. An

editorial in *Länsi-Suomi*, a newspaper in southwestern Finland, explained the Turanian idea as a logical consequence of the post-war upheavals, but derided the pretension of a "Turanian world power" supported by the numbers of the Chinese (300 million), the Japanese (70 million) and the Turko-Tatar nations (tens of millions). These "castles in the air" had enchanted the Agrarian regional newspapers, but *Länsi-Suomi* appealed to "cool reason" to diffuse the fever-dreams of the Turanian idea. Finns and their kin had to quit dreaming about Asian allies. There was no need to taint the friendship between the Western, independent Finno-Ugrian nations with "Turanian megalomania."[71]

The Turanian idea was rebuffed – not by Swedish-speaking newspapers only, although they took part in the debate, but chiefly by the leadership of the National Coalition Party, which acted as a gatekeeper of nationalist rhetoric. Most importantly, the choice was not framed as a choice between Turanism and Scandinavianism. As mentioned before, the National Coalition Party held a low profile in the Scandinavian question but nourished a sense of gratitude to Germany. According to the party line, Finland had to choose between Eastern barbarism and Western civilisation.

The window closes: Turanism in the continued interwar era

The fault lines in the Turanism question in Finland did not always run cleanly between different factions: liberals versus conservatives, pro-British versus pro-Germans, Turanists and Scandinavianists, Finnish-speakers and Swedish-speakers. There was considerable overlap between many of these categories. The window of opportunity would soon be closed by the Bolshevik victory in the Russian Civil War in late 1922, but until then it seemed that several pan-nationalisms could be united for a common cause – including Jahnsson's practical Turanism and Holsti's Balto-Scandinavian orientation.

For a few years after the pan-Turanism debacle, the idea of an "iron chain" of nations around Russia still captured the imagination of some Finnish educators, such as school inspector Matti Pesonen.[72] In Pesonen's visions, a pan-ideology was not necessary to unite Russia's opponents – the imminent downfall of the common enemy was an adequate programme. Still, traces of pan-ideologies can be found in his rhetoric. For Pesonen, cultural contacts presented a geopolitical opportunity. Through cultural exchange, the Finno-Ugric peoples would unite "to forge that horseshoe which must squeeze our ancient enemy if our tribe intends to survive." Pesonen believed that the cultural connections between Turanian nations would prepare the way to political cooperation, but he, too, had to concede that the "Turanian question was still alien to us in the Northern lands, probably also premature."[73] Finnish educators, otherwise ready to support "Pan-Finnish" cooperation, agreed: "Probably the Turanian idea is not ripe yet on the shores of the Gulf of Finland."[74] The Scandinavian connection, on the other hand, was becoming entrenched by the foundation of a Finland branch of the Norden Association in 1924.[75]

Although Turanism was dismissed as a pipedream, Finland became an important node in the pan-Turkic, diaspora nationalist network due to location, elite allies (especially Turkologists and Finnougrists) and shared geopolitical interests. The Azeri independence activist Ali Mardan Topchibashi had played a central role in Yrjö Jahnsson's plans for a "Liberty League" (*Vapausliitto*) that would fight for the liberation of the oppressed nations of Russia.[76] Another Azeri politician, Mehmed Emin Resülzade, fled to Finland in 1922 with the help of the cross-border contacts of the Tatar community, particularly the scholars and Fennophiles Musa Bigi and Abdullah Battal.[77] A third Azeri independence activist, Mehmed Sadik, published the journal *Yeni Turan*, funded by Finnish Tatars Zinnetullah Ahsen Böre and Ibrahim Arifulla.[78] Topchibashi wrote to Sadik in 1933 to thank him and the Finnish Tatars:

> This is an unforgettable virtue: to struggle for the freedom of Turkic nations while living in the far north of Europe. […] Once I had my friends among the Finns. I met them in St. Petersburg (in the First Duma). Is any one of them alive? Who are your associates in such a good country? Are they our brothers from the eternally dear [Idel-Ural]?[79]

The Muslim community in Finland contributed far beyond its numbers (around 600–700 in the 1930s) to a transnational activist network bringing together Turks, Finns and other nationalities in a common struggle for recognition. Not everyone in the community supported pan-Turkism or pan-Turanism, especially when its objectives abandoned the Tatar independence movement in favour of Turkish nationalism. Hamzä Kayenuk, son of Hasan Kanykoff, later lamented that "pan-Turanism, born out of passionate love, has swallowed many of our capable men and women, too."[80] The practical and symbolic importance of Finland in Pan-Turkic and Pan-Turanian rhetoric was greater than expected of a small, Nordic, Lutheran country. Yet it can be argued that these attributes made Finland particularly desirable as an ally and a model for pan-Turanist causes.

After the establishment of the Soviet Union ended the "iron chain" era and closed the window of opportunity for a decolonisation of the former Russian empire, there was a brief resurgence of pan-Turanian rhetoric in the early 1930s – before the breakthrough of the Scandinavian orientation under Rudolf Holsti's second period as minister of foreign affairs 1936–38.[81] Ğayaz Ishaki visited Finland in 1928 and 1930 and promoted the activities of the Prometheus League, an association of independence movements of minority nationalities of the Soviet Union. Soon, a Finnish Prometheus Society was founded by younger Tatar activists and Finnish intellectuals who had already been involved with the Club of Vanguard Nations in the early 1920s.[82]

Pan-Turanist ideas were sometimes mentioned by Tatars reaching out to the Finnish public in the interest of their local communities. Campaigning for a Muslim school in Tampere, a Mr B. Shamaletdin explained that his people belonged to the Turanian race. He mentioned that Finns and Tatars had fought

for a common cause during the Russian Revolution. Finland would have much to gain from good relations with other Turanian nations, such as Turkey and Idel-Ural.[83] This Tatar activist spoke of the Idel-Ural republic as an existing state, although it had been replaced by the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1920. In the Tatar emigrant imagination, the short-lived republic was priceless evidence of the nation's past and future capabilities.

It is understandable that Tatars in Finland generally avoided the sensitive topic of a "tribal" relationship between Turks and Finno-Ugrics. Although Tatars and Finns seemed to share a common enemy in Russia, the imperial experience did not self-evidently translate to solidarity. Finnish interest in Turanism often baulked at the prospect of uniting with nations that were imagined to be racially, culturally and geographically alien and even inferior. Hence, some Finns proposed an alternative pan-ideology with Finland as the hegemonic leader: Pan-Fennicism or "pan-Suomism." Such a hegemonic position would have been impossible to enforce in a pan-Scandinavian movement or in a pan-Turanist movement led by Hungary or Turkey. However, some, such as Rudolf Holsti, envisioned an active and dominant role for Finland in a Scando-Baltic context to keep Sweden in check and to resist the might of Russia and Germany. The adoption of the vanguard nations idea by Holsti and others was motivated by small states' desire to gain agency and resist the dictates of the great powers within the window of opportunity provided by the breakup of multi-national empires after the First World War.

Whenever pan-Turanism was presented as a positive option by Finns to the Finnish public, it was motivated by political expediency. On occasion, it was mobilised as a counterargument or attack against other macronationalist ideologies. Those actors that identified the Finnish people as a member of the Turanian macro-nation did not usually identify themselves as "Eastern." Finnish Turanists continued to see their nation as belonging to the North first – and the West second. The East was better kept at a safe distance, both metaphorically and in practice.

Notes

1 See Snyder, *Macro-nationalisms*.
2 Paksoy, "Nationality or Religion," 17–18, 22.
3 See Elmgren, "Imperial Complicity."
4 Ablonczy, *Go East!* 7.
5 Kemiläinen, *Finns in the Shadow*, 65–66.
6 Dessewffy, "A Magyarországi Túrán," 74–76.
7 Topelius, Zacharias. 1844. "Den Finska Literaturen och dess Framtid." *Helsingfors Tidningar*, May 22, 1844, 1–3. Translations are mine unless otherwise mentioned. Sommer, "Historical Linguistics Applied," 394.
8 Translation by Sommer, "Historical Linguistics Applied," 398.
9 Obsolete term for the Enets-Nenets, the Nganasan, and the Selkup peoples.
10 Castrén, "Hvar låg Finska folkets vagga?"
11 "Matthias Alexander Castrén," Encyclopaedia Britannica, last modified May 3, 2021, accessed October 4, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Matthias-Alexander-Castren.

12 See Ahrari, "Eurasia Calling."
13 Calamnius, "Kuvaelmia," 20.
14 Ablonczy, *Go East!* 18–19.
15 Ablonczy, 10, 20–22.
16 Landau, "The Fortunes and Misfortunes," 8.
17 Ablonczy, 31–32.
18 See Bekkin, "People of Reliable Loyalty."
19 Ross, *Tatar Empire*, 6.
20 Schamiloglu, "The Formation," 39–49.
21 Arai, "Turkish Nationalism," 67.
22 Ablonczy, *Go East!* 23.
23 Meyer, "Turks Across Empires," 9–11.
24 Baibulat, *Tampereen Islamilainen Seurakunta*, 100–01, 190.
25 Räsänen, *Puolikuun nousu*, 93–94.
26 "Hirek," 61–62; Zubeir, Hamid [Hamit Zübeyr]. "Venäjän turkkilaiset heimot," *Iltalehti*, August 29, 1923.
27 Salminen, *Aatteen tiede*, 73.
28 Salminen, 95.
29 Salminen, 101.
30 Kalima, Jalo. 1918. "Suomen itsenäisyys ja Turkki." *Valkoinen Suomi*, March 31, 1918, 2.
31 Kalima, Jalo. 1918. "Suomen itsenäisyys ja Turkki." *Valkoinen Suomi*, April 4, 1918, 2. Emphasis in the original.
32 "Venäjän tulevaisuus. Kansain itsemääräämisoikeuden valossa. VII." *Uuden Suomen Iltalehti*, August 7, 1919; "Taistelu bolshevikeja vastaan." *Liitto*, September 9, 1919; Jaakkola, Eemeli. "Unkari ja Suomi." *Iltalehti*, June 15, 1920.
33 Volanen, *Nuori Suomi*, 21.
34 Roiko-Jokela, *Ihanteita ja reaalipolitiikkaa*, 72; Volanen, *Nuori Suomi*, 156.
35 Ramstedt, "Tatarien waiheet," 83–85.
36 Maksudi, "Milletlerin intibahında tarih," 685–92; Raevuori, "Turkkilainen lakimies," 164.
37 Leitzinger, *Suomen tataarit*, 184.
38 See the case of Abdrahim, Ymär et. al. 1922. "Kosk. moskean rakentamista ja johtosäännön vahvistamista." AD 1011/206, Eb:240 Anomusaktit (1922–1922), Valtioneuvoston kirjaajankonttorin arkisto (Archive of the Government Registrar's Office), National Archives of Finland.
39 For examples of such prejudices, see Wassholm, "Threatening Livelihoods."
40 Zetterberg, *Yrjö ja Hilma Jahnsson*, 271–79, 287–313; Roiko-Jokela, *Ihanteita ja reaalipolitiikkaa*, 14.
41 Volanen, *Nuori Suomi*, 329.
42 Roiko-Jokela, *Ihanteita ja reaalipolitiikkaa*, 131–33.
43 Roiko-Jokela, 31, 40.
44 Roiko-Jokela, 21.
45 Roiko-Jokela, 48.
46 Holsti, Rudolf. "Muhamettilainen siirtola, Helsinki 24.11.1921." Kirjeenvaihto. Saapuneet kirjeet, K-M 1898–1922. Rudolf Holstin arkisto (Archive of Rudolf Holsti), National Archives of Finland.
47 "Tatarilaisten itsenäisyyspyrkimykset," 103–104.
48 Leitzinger, *Suomen tataarit*, 180–88.
49 "Tatarilaisten itsenäisyyspyrkimykset," 104.
50 Glenthøj, "When Size Mattered," 245–56.
51 Jahnsson, Yrjö. Undated. "Etuvartiokansojen klubi. – Yrjö Jahnssonin Itämeren valtioiden puolustusliittoa, Klubia, Suomen itärajapolitiikkaa ja ei-venäläisiä kansoja käsitteleviä konsepteja," 72. 4. Etuvartiokansojen klubi (1899–1928), Yrjö Jahnssonin

arkisto, 41, Yrjö ja Hilma Jahnssonin kokoelma (Yrjö and Hilma Jahnsson papers), National Archives of Finland.
52 Elmgren, "Imperial Complicity," 327.
53 Elmgren, 333.
54 Daher, Sarif Fethullen. 1922. AD 2772/422, Anomusaktit Eb:224, Valtioneuvoston kirjaajankonttorin arkisto (Archive of the Government Registrar's Office), National Archives of Finland.
55 *Alkuopetus*, "Kutsu toiseen Suomalais-Ugrilaiseen kulttuurikokoukseen," 74; Markku, "Yhteissuomalainen." *Uusi Suomi*, June 22, 1921.
56 The Komi were represented by the teacher and activist Igon Mösseg, a friend of Yrjö Jahnsson, who received little attention in the Finnish press but was featured in the Hungarian Pan-Turanist journal *Túrán* (B. A., "A zűrjének," 49–50).
57 Markku, "Yhteissuomalainen." *Uusi Suomi*, June 22, 1921.
58 On the Nordic School Conferences in the context of pan-Scandinavianism and Nordism, see Hemstad, *Fra Indian summer.*
59 "Pohjoismainen koulukokous," 3.
60 "Yhteissuomalainen koulukokous," *Helsingin Sanomat*, June 21, 1921.
61 "Suomalais-ugrilaisten sivistyspyrkimysten yhteiset päämäärät," *Iltalehti*, June 22, 1921.
62 Fekete, "Suomalais-ugrilaisten kansain," 304–10; Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente*, 142.
63 Fennofil, "Az első Finn-ugor Tanügyi," 38–39. I thank Orsolya Sild for the translation.
64 Fennofil, 40.
65 Volanen, *Nuori Suomi*, 387–94.
66 "Rotu ja kieli," *Aamulehti*, February 7, 1923.
67 "Sivistyksellinen ja valtiollinen suuntautumisemme." *Ilkka*, August 27, 1923.
68 "Missä ovat ystävämme?" *Keski-Pohjanmaa*, August 2, 1923.
69 "Sivistyksellinen ja valtiollinen suuntautumisemme." *Ilkka*, August 27, 1923.
70 "Rehtorin puhe," *Iltalehti*, September 14, 1923.
71 "Turaanilaisuus." *Länsi-Suomi*, September 20, 1923.
72 "Tallinnan kulttuurikokous," 89–92; "Suomalais-ugrilaisten kansojen kulttuuriyhteys," *Uusi Suomi*, June 24, 1924. Pesonen's latter speech was also published in full Hungarian translation and with a summary in Estonian and Finnish in Pesonen, "A finn-ugor népek," 15–25.
73 "Kulttuuriyhteys Suomen sukukansojen kesken," *Uusi Suomi*, February 14, 1924.
74 "Kutsu toiseen Suomalais-Ugrilaiseen kulttuurikokoukseen," 74.
75 See Stadius' contribution to this volume.
76 Jahnsson, Yrjö. Undated manuscript. "Etuvartiokansojen klubi. Esitelmiä, selostuksia, artikkeleita ja muistioita." 4. Etuvartiokansojen klubi (1899–1928), Yrjö Jahnssonin arkisto, 41, Yrjö ja Hilma Jahnssonin kokoelma (Yrjö and Hilma Jahnsson papers), National Archives of Finland.
77 Soltanbekov, "Mehmed Emin Resulzade," 119–29; Hasanli, *Leadership and Nationalism*, 201.
78 Suikkanen, "Yksityinen susi," 89; Hasanli, 212.
79 Translation by Hasanli, 212.
80 Hamzä Kayenuk to Harry Halén, attachment to letter dated November 21, 1981. Materials of Hamzä Kayenuk, Box 21, Coll. 732 Tatarica, National Library of Finland.
81 Roiko-Jokela, *Ihanteita ja reaalipolitiikkaa*, 13; see also Peter Stadius' contribution to this volume.
82 C-a., "Panturkiska strävanden," *Hufvudstadsbladet*, July 23, 1928; *Uusi Suomi*, "Venäjän vierasheimoisten kansojen vapauspyrkimykset," *Uusi Suomi*, October 5, 1930; "Prometheus-kerhon alkutaipaleelta," 2; "Helsingin Prometheus-Kerho," 4–5.
83 Shamaletdin, B. "Omauskoista kansakouluopetusta," *Aamulehti*, July 29, 1933.

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