Hallyu in Singapore: Korean Cosmopolitanism or the Consumption of Chineseness? 207 Hallyu in Singapore: When President Roh Moo-hyun invited Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai and his delegation for a luncheon meeting last Sep- Korean Cosmopolitanism or the Consumption tember, something unexpected happened. After a moment of calm, the Vietnamese officials stood up one by one and started to line up of Chineseness? in front of a woman, asking her to sign their menus. The woman was actress Kim Hyun-joo, heroine of the SBS TV drama Glass Shoes (Yuri gudu), which had been shown on Vietnamese televi- Kelly Fu Su Yin and Kai Khiun Liew sion in May 2003. The actress had become well-known in Vietnam after the drama became a big hit there. The commotion settled down only after a Korean general promised the actress’s autographs for everyone after lunch. The center of attention during the lun- Abstract cheon apparently was not President Roh or Prime Minister Khai, but the actress, Kim, showing that perhaps the “Korean Wave” is The export of Korean dramas in the late 1990s sparked off a palpable stronger than diplomacy. craze for Korean cultural commodities in early 2000. This popular cul- tural phenomenon known as hallyu has seen a surge in interest in Korean Wave Crashes on Asian Shores (www.korea.net), Korean culture expressed through study of the Korean language and August 25, 2004 understanding of the culture through travel. Heterogeneous in nature, this phenomenon re-invents itself to suit local taste cultures and pre- Mr. President, I must acknowledge that, today, many Singaporeans existing modes of consumption and distribution. In this paper, a case come into contact with Korea in their daily lives—from the Mass study of Korean popular culture consumption in Singapore demon- Rapid Transit lines constructed by Korean companies to Korean- strates the complexities of hallyu as it intersects with and challenges made mobile phones and Korean dramas they watch on television, the pre-dominance of “Chinese”-based popular culture, while remaining which, I am told, are increasingly popular among young Singapore- at the same time, very much a form of “Chinese” consumption. ans. More Singaporeans are also taking their vacations in Korea, Keywords: hallyu, Korean Wave, Chineseness, Cosmopolitanism, East attracted by its beautiful autumn and excellent ski resorts. We hope Asian popular culture, Singapore, representation of Koreans that more Koreans will also visit Singapore. While we do not have such romantic autumns and ski resorts, I am sure many Koreans will find other attractions in our multicultural surroundings (Nathan 2003). Address by Singapore’s President S. R. Nathan to President Roh Moo-hyun Introduction: “Korea in Daily Life” Kelly Fu Su Yin is a postgraduate student at Goldsmiths College, University of London. Her area of interest is gender and cultural studies. E-mail: richard_88@pacific.net.sg. The quotes above attest to the popularity of Korean popular culture Kai Khiun Liew is currently a Ph.D. candidate at University College London. His areas of interests and main publications are that of Chinese popular music, youth subcul- in Southeast Asia, a substantial part of the estimated 100 million tures and medical and social histories. E-mail: liewkk56@hotmail.com. Asian consumers of South Korean dramas, movies, and concerts daily 208 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2005 Hallyu in Singapore: Korean Cosmopolitanism or the Consumption of Chineseness? 209 (Sunday Times, May 1, 2005). Sparked off by the regionalization of cal upheavals from the perimeters defined by their society and the Korean television serials in the late 1990s, hallyu (the Korean word for nation-state. Instead, the acquisition of “Koreanness” is regarded by the “Korean Wave”), manifests itself through the consumption of hallyu consumers as an array of choices presented in a global medi- Korean popular culture, visits to Korean television filming sites, and ascape that allows them to “image” new social identities at the level study of the Korean language. of “fantasy.” Consequently hallyu is not typically accompanied by the Hallyu arose as part of the historical milieu of decolonization, intense development of cultural and institutional ethnoscapes (such economic development, and the reassertation of “Asian” identities as food outlets, department stores, and schools) that characterize that function as a social and cultural response to the global hegemo- sojourner communities of “immigrants, students and businessmen” ny of the West. In terms of popular culture, this was embodied in the (Befu 2003, 4). However, lest “fantasy” be equated with the superfi- dialogic media flows and exchanges of media products between ciality of commercialism, it is perhaps timely to understand the re- countries in Asia that displaced the “white” and “Western” with a contextualisation by the non-Korean audiences of Korean popular multiplicity of accents, voices, and identities. Conceptually, these cultural products. mediums also challenged the boundedness of geographical location In this paper, we seek to analyze and understand how the suc- and the primacy of nation-state as “the key arbiter of important social cess of Korean popular culture products in Singapore is linked to its changes,” offering instead, the opportunity for the articulation of ability to platform itself on pre-existing Chinese networks of cultural new hybrid identities in the face of discrimination and alienation consumption. These networks are conceptualized by Tu Wei Ming (a (Appadurai 1996, 4). professor of Chinese history and philosophy at Harvard University) as Unique to hallyu and other media products (Asian or otherwise) “Cultural China”—the core of intellectual discourse that is defined by that are consumed outside of their location of production is the overseas Chinese and the Chinese diaspora, as opposed to those unsettling of epistemic boundaries concerning the definitions of living within the nation-state of China (Tu 1994, 33-34). It will be “diasporic” consumption. The interest in Korean popular culture out- argued that Korean popular culture in Singapore exists to reinforce side of Korea today, is kept alive by a flexible citizenry of consumers the local boundaries of ethnicity by catering to the tastes of the who comprise both ethnic Korean communities and non-Koreans (see ethnic Chinese majority in Singapore, even as it results in a deeper Aihwa Ong’s Flexible Citizenship for a definition of the term “flexible acknowledgement and internalization of Korean culture. citizen”). They are similarly dependent upon the speed and availabil- ity of media networks and technology, and may gain access to these products through the television or the Internet. Consumers, whether The Korean Wave as a Theoretical Alternative of ethnic Korean backgrounds or not, may also enact the fantasies of these “imagined worlds” through language learning, travel to Korea, From the determinist fixity of civilizations, cultural studies have and the purchase of Korean popular culture products through e-Bay moved towards the narrative of what is described as the “third space” and web chats on discussion boards. in the narratives and subcultures from the socially marginalized and Where such consumption differs from that of diasporic commu- geographically peripheral. As opined by Revathi Krishnaswamy, the nities is its sense of urgency against a backdrop of migration and dis- activities of these groups generally “exceed the boundaries of the crimination. Hallyu consumers tend to take their consumption as a nation-state and operate in a deterritorialized or transnational fash- secondary interest and such movements rarely spur social and physi- ion.” In the process, it creates the platform of engendering a more 210 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2005 Hallyu in Singapore: Korean Cosmopolitanism or the Consumption of Chineseness? 211 nuanced process of globalization “premised on the marginalization of its manifestations and interactions with indigenous societies were the nation, especially in the domain of the cultural and the national.” varied. Compared to the comprehensive process of displacement and This “third space” too, provides a more critical analysis of the univer- disempowerment in African, Latin American, and Indian societies, sal within the particular and the particular within the universal Western colonialism in the Sino-centric realm was limited. Beyond (Krishnaswamy 2002, 106). the treaty ports, the East Asian societies of China, Japan, and Korea Behind these celebratory discourses of global multiculturalism lie did not need to engage their Western metropole as colonial subjects. critical questions of the power relations determining the regulations As such, albeit seeking to tailor the modernization of their societies and representations of such flows. To begin with, the paradigm of along Western lines, the references to the West as the cultural and lit- multiculturalism has been accused of being Eurocentric and insular, erary locus have been less prevalent in East Asian societies. The with a tendency to privilege English language and Anglo American emergence of East Asian popular culture and its importance to an narratives, hence robbing “the rest” of its theoretical aura. As Stam East and Southeast Asia audience also coincided with an era of rapid and Shohat noted: “While much recent writing has been devoted to modernization and development that have shaped the discourses of exposing the exclusions and blindness of European representations media production and its networks of distribution. and discourses, the actual cultural production of non-Europeans has For example, Tzann Li Ding posits that Hong Kong popular cul- been ignored, a neglect which reinscribes the exclusion even while ture challenges the traditional dominant/dominated relations in film denouncing it” (Stam and Shohat 2005, 488). Hence, the unequal between the West and the East and allowed for more dialogical and distribution of knowledge and prestige points to the necessity of egalitarian relations (Tzann 1998, 128-36). In this respect, Ding’s the- de-westernizing and transnationalizing the field. But, as scholars sis undermines the strongly entrenched “assumption that the process attempt to denarrativize the West, their works also risk being stereo- of globalization is continuous with the long steady, historical rise of typed, ghettoized, valourised, corportised, and co-opted to serve or Western cultural domination,” or a case where globalized culture reinforce the preexisting socio-economic and political interests (Dirlik equals Western culture (Tomlinson 1999, 23-25). Korea has also 2005, 158-70). transformed itself from a passive consumer of American films to Added to this, such contestations have been traditionally placed becoming an Asian film production hub, with successes in the within the nexus of postcoloniality between the former colonies and regional and international market. Likewise, Japanese and Hong their subjects in the Third World against the continued dominance of Kong dramas and music are immensely popular in Asia, as are Thai their metropolitan masters in the West (Berger 2002, 1-17). This films. It is therefore timely for a remapping of popular culture land- largely explains the primacy of the South Asian and Afro-Caribbean scapes across the East and South East Asian region to rediscover the contexts in celebrating and critiquing discourses of globalizations. networks and boundaries of interactions. While these accounts have offered some of the most novel perspec- tives on cultural consumption, there is a need for new perspectives on that engage the Asian-Pacific context. Hallyu: Understanding its Emergence In this respect, the experiences of East and Southeast Asian soci- eties should not be merely reflected through the languages of post- “The way the story goes, it all started when an adviser offered coloniality defined through the dominance of pioneering works. Korean President Kim Young-sam an enlightening statistic. The Although Euro-American imperialism was stretched across the globe, profits from Steven Spielberg’s Jurassic Park, the President was 212 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2005 Hallyu in Singapore: Korean Cosmopolitanism or the Consumption of Chineseness? 213 told, equalled those from the export of 60,000 Hyundai cars. of production in the film marked “an evolutionary turning point in Tempting? You bet. So, three years ago the government modified South Korean cinema, heralding a move towards a more market-dri- the country’s Motion Picture Law, bringing the industry in from the ven industry and the start of the Korean blockbuster era” (Leong financial wilderness with tax breaks previously denied all but the 2002, 24). In 1999, the movie Shiri (Swiri) became the first domesti- most important manufacturers” (Dakota and Mason 1997). cally produced film in Korean history to break the two million-ticket mark for the Seoul metropolitan area (which accounts for about 25 The beginnings of hallyu can be traced to the flourishing of artistic percent of the Korean market). It outgrossed Hollywood block- expression in Korea following the process of political liberalization busters.1 The success of Shiri was quickly followed by other critical and the rise in living standards in the late 1980s. Greater artistic and and commercial successes such as Attack the Gas Station (Juyuso media spaces resulted in higher standards in the entertainment pro- seupgyeok sageon) (1999), a “national phenomenon amongst Korean duction as companies sought to outrival each other and the competi- youth,” and Joint Security Area (Gongdong gyeongbi guyeok JSA) tion from foreign exports. Financial and economic factors in the early (2000), which took in one million ticket sales within three weeks of 1990s also encouraged the growth of the entertainment industry. In its release in Korea (Leong 2002, 27, 41). Korean movies also fea- the early 1990s, film industries were able to obtain funding from tured very strongly in international film festivals such as the Cannes Korean conglomerates. Economic factors such as the burgeoning mid- Film Festival. Im Kwon-Taek shared the prize for best director in dle classes, a result of decades of economic growth, fuelled the 2002 with Chihwaseon (2002). Park Chan-Wook’s Old Boy (2003) demand for entertainment that contributed to an expansion of the won the Grand Prix Prize in 2004. pop culture industry. Ironically the Asian financial crisis in 1997, In 1997, Korean television serials also succeeded in going region- which cut off the established entertainment industry’s “traditional” al by broadcasting in China. Serials such as Star in My Heart (1997) sources of funds, spurred the rise of independent studios and produc- became very popular and established an interest in Korean popular tion companies. At the same time, the industry was also keen to fol- culture in China. Around 2000, the publicly owned Korean broadcast- low the state’s encouragement of segyehwa (globalization) of their er KBS sparked off a regional craze for Korean television serials when markets (Russell and Wehrfritz 2004). it aired Autumn Tale (Ga-eul donghwa) in East Asia and several The earliest industries that took Korean cultural products to a Southeast Asian countries. This was “the first series to really show- global and regional audience were the film and television industry. case Korean dramas internationally” (Korean TV Dramas website). The latter benefited from the easing of censorship laws since the Gyeoul yeon-ga (also known as Winter Sonata or Winter Love Song), 1980s and were also allowed to flourish by the protectionist policies the second in a series of installments by director Yoon Suk-ho, also that required cinemas to screen Korean films for an average of 100 to resulted in a tourism boom and an interest in Korean language study. 140 days. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Korean films began to win The success of television serials paved the way for the export of rave reviews both locally and internationally. According to Lee Korean music. The music scene in Korea grew increasingly vibrant in (1997), “Park Kwang-su’s film A Single Spark (Jeon Tae-il) was a the 1990s with the demand for live entertainment in cafes and clubs domestic box-office hit and screened in competition at the Berlin and the development of strong alternative music scenes around the International Film Festival. Jang Sun-woo’s A Petal (Kkonnip) and Park Chul-soo’s Farewell My Darling (Haksaeng bugun sinwi) received recognition and prizes at various film festivals.” The high standards 1. “Is Corean cinema the new HK?” www.goldsea.com/Air/Issues/Cinema/cinema. html, February 23, 2003 (accessed August 27, 2005). 214 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2005 Hallyu in Singapore: Korean Cosmopolitanism or the Consumption of Chineseness? 215 youth district of Sinchon, Seoul (Howard 2002, 88-89). Korean youth spurred Asians to buy up South Korean goods and to travel to South who were exposed to global popular music genres such as hip hop, Korea, traditionally not a popular tourist destination. The images that reggae, and European dance music reinvented the discourses of such Asians traditionally have associated with the country—violent stu- music for a Korean audience. Seo Taiji, one of the most successful dent marches, the demilitarized zone, and division—have given way pop music performers in the 1990s, used rap and other popular forms to trendy entertainers and cutting-edge technology” (Norimitsu, of music to discuss the pressures of the Korean educational system 2005). In places such as Japan, which has faced issues like discrimi- and social problems such as “teen runaways and political corruption” nation against Japanese-born Koreans, popular culture has helped (Morelli 2001, 251). In the late 1990s, Korean music production improve impressions of Korea and its people. According to govern- became increasingly sophisticated in terms of music video produc- ment statistics, “55 percent of Japanese (now) feel affection for tion, album design, and music technologies. Such better designed Korea. For Japanese in their 20s and 30s, the figure is over 60 per- and packaged products wooed audiences in the region, with acts cent” (Kwan 2004). This has been largely attributed to the Korean such as Korean singer BoA, CLON, H.O.T., and S.E.S. drama Winter Sonata and the interest in its male lead Bae Yong Jun. Since the late 1990s, the presence of Korean cultural commodi- The Winter Sonata effect has also seen an increase in the numbers of ties in East and Southeast Asia has increased visibly (Lee T. 2005). people enrolling in Korean language classes, the sale of Korean lan- Hallyu, as this phenomenon is termed, has also given rise to increas- guage textbooks, and travel to Korea (Kwan 2004). ing transcultural traffic and media exchanges in the region, an impor- As the profile of the average consumer of Korean popular culture tant part of the pop culture diplomacy of hallyu. To complement the outside of Korea changes from diasporic communities in New York, hosting of the World Cup, the joint mini-series Friends was produced Los Angeles, or Sydney to include “non-Koreans” in East and South- through collaboration by TBS Entertainment (Japan) and MBC Pro- east Asia, this raises interesting questions about these celebratory dis- ductions (Korea) in 2002. Featuring a romance between a Japanese courses of global multiculturalism and the portability of the Korean woman and a Korean man, who overcome the prejudices and doubts identity (Sassen 1998). As Schein proposes: “One of the outcomes is of friends and family, it was intended to convey the message that that media consumers, simultaneously imbibing print, electronic, and “love is the same in every country.”2 KBS and China Central Televi- satellite communications around the globe, come to imagine them- sion (CCTV) also collaborated on a drama called My Love Beijing to selves as cosmopolitan participants in global commodity culture” mark the tenth anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two (Schein 1999, 345). Certainly, if identity is to be understood as countries (Joo 2004). “something continuously negotiated between local actors through Production firms and the Korean government have naturally social, historical and contextual changes” rather than a set of “cultur- been keen to encourage such global imaginings, not the least because al attributes transmitted through generations,” such consumers are in of its economic benefits. Research into hallyu indicates that it has a the process of acquiring “Koreanness” as they share in transnational positive effect on promoting cross-cultural interactions and under- imaginings of a cultural Korea (Jo 2002, 90). standings. According to a New York Times article on hallyu, “the However, claimants for a “uniform” Korean cosmopolitanism, in booming South Korean presence on television and in the movies has the nationalist sense of the word, are forced to acknowledge the active participation of consumers who incorporate such products into their lives and give them meaning (Jackson 1993, 209). For example, 2. Tokyo Broadcasting System. http://www.tbs.co.jp/friends21/en/ (accessed August 27, 2005). in Japan, the television serial Winter Sonata is particularly popular 216 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2005 Hallyu in Singapore: Korean Cosmopolitanism or the Consumption of Chineseness? 217 amongst middle-aged Japanese women. The appeal is derived from has been made possible by the regionalization of Korean popular cul- the serial’s play on the possibilities of life with one’s first love. It tural products to the rest of Asia. The second, but more important appealed to these women who have lived in an era where familial level is the socio-cultural contexts and medium in which such exports roles were heavily gendered and where the change of an era has are being framed in the Singaporean market. Given that the Singa- made youth the centre of popular culture in Japan. To them, Bae rep- porean audience commonly receives K-pop literature, especially that resented “an old-fashioned gentleman: cultured, well-read, and of film and television dramas, through a network of Chinese lan- kind—nothing like the shallow pretty boys who seem to dominate guage-based cultural and media industries in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japanese pop culture” (Wiseman 2004). In places such as Vietnam, and Singapore, how would hallyu be translated and mutated? Would viewers project their dreams of a better life through the consumption Korean artists be recognised as distinctive cultural agents or would of East Asian popular cultural products. As argued by Iwabuchi: they be lumped together as “Chinese” popular culture? Interrogating these questions would in turn involve the examination of Singapore’s The coalescence of popular culture with modernity and mass con- cultural politics framed in terms of the issues of ethnicity and lan- sumption in Vietnam has released a storm of desire for the prod- guage. ucts and consumer cultures of East Asia. At the same time, the Like the cultural products that they represent, Korean celebrities specificities of the engagement of the Vietnamese public with East coming to Singapore to promote their productions have been mobbed Asian popular culture indicates that these products are indigenized by Singaporean fans of all ages, faithfully awaiting their arrivals at in culturally meaningful ways to dynamically construct dimensions of a national identity not fabricated by the state, but rather in oppo- airports and other promotion venues. Male stars like Bae Yong Jun, sition to the regime (Iwabuchi et al. 2004, 7). Jang Dong-gun, and Won Bin have been particularly popular among their Singaporean female fans. Korean men have been portrayed in Hence, hallyu may at times appear to be superficial or may well rein- Korean films and television dramas as having striking facial features force preexisting socio-economic and political arrangements. The and being immaculately dressed and emotionally sensitive, prompt- exchange of information concerning how hallyu functions is therefore ing discussions in the Singaporean media of “real” and “reel” Korean also an important part of cultural studies. As it was not possible to men. To a certain extent, Korean stars have acted as Trojan horses in analyze hallyu consumption in all contexts, the authors have chosen generating more sustained interest in Korean products, knowledge of a site that they are familiar with to understand how Korean popular which was previously limited to electrical products and motor vehi- culture products are understood and consumed. cles. With an enthusiasm for South Korean lifestyles arising from an initial infatuation with male Korean celebrities, Singaporean female fans have been able to identify outlet in the republic devoted to Kore- “Intense People”: Cultural Representations of Koreans an-based food, fashion, and language schools (Chang 2005). in Singapore Travel to Korea has certainly been one of the areas where hallyu is felt. Korea has become one of the “hottest” new travel destinations The understanding of the popularization of K-pop in Singapore for hallyu consumers, as demonstrated by the size and volume of involves two levels, the first, being the heightened and changing rep- advertizements in local newspapers dealing with Korean tours. Ini- resentations and imaginations of Korean cultural geographies by Sin- tially limited to the Winter Sonata tour, which featured film locations gaporean consumers. As explained earlier, such cultural awareness such as Nami island, Yongpyeong ski resort, and Mount Seorak, it 218 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2005 Hallyu in Singapore: Korean Cosmopolitanism or the Consumption of Chineseness? 219 has also expanded to include other serials. Some of these include ation, the former was represented by male ethnic Koreans who Sokcho fishing village, the filming site of Autumn in My Heart, Muju served as military auxiliaries during the Japanese occupation of Sin- resort and the Daehan Tea gardens in Boseong, the set locations of gapore (1942-45). As mentioned in the opening sentence of Lee’s the television drama Summer Scent (Yeoreum hyanggi), and Jeju memoirs, regarding his acquaintance with South Korean political island, the location for the television serial All In. The more heroic leaders and culture, “I did not have happy memories of the Koreans and central representation of Korean popular culture, personified in because the first ones I met were in Japanese uniforms” (Lee 2000, their male artistes, is however a far cry from the earlier impressions 531). that Singaporeans harbored. Singaporeans who grew up in the 1970s-1980s would have Korea-Singapore relations were formally established in 1970, remembered Koreans as male construction workers and engineers shortly after the latter was separated from Malaysia in 1965. Making involved in the republic’s infrastructure projects. This impression regular visits to each others’ countries, the political leaders of the two continues to be used in recent years to underline the supposedly states regarded the bilateral ties as vital to the regional security and strong Korea-Singapore bilateral ties as reflected in the dinner speech stability of Northeast and Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the techno- by Singapore’s President S. R. Nathan to Prime Minister Lee Han- logical and financial muscle of Korean conglomerates has been highly Dong who made an official visit to Singapore in 2002. Nathan said: valued by the Singapore government as they embarked on the rapid industrialisation of the island’s trading economy. Hence, jaebeol Let me end with a little-known anecdote. In March 1986, Singapore (chaebol) have been significantly represented in many of the repub- had its worst ever civilian disaster when the seven-story Hotel New lic’s large scale infrastructure and commercial developments, ranging World building collapsed, killing 33 people. This was our first from the main iconic shopping malls to the train networks or Mass national calamity arising from a multi-story collapsed building. Our civil defence authorities made an appeal for help in the rescue oper- Rapid Transit (MRT). The importance of South Korea in Singapore’s ations. A group of Korean workers, then working in Singapore on political geography has perhaps been symbolized by its inclusion in a the Mass Rapid Transit project, immediately responded. They came chapter in Lee Kuan Yew’s memoirs (Lee 2000, 531-42). Serving as straight from their MRT worksite, with their helmets, tools, and Singapore’s prime minister for three decades (1959-1990), Lee has equipment to help cut through the concrete slabs and clear the been credited with bringing the country “from Third World to First” debris to look for survivors (Nathan 2002). (used as the subtitle of the second volume of his memoirs, The Singa- pore Story). As such a paramount figure in Singapore’s political cul- However, ordinary Singaporeans of that era may have had less posi- ture, his memoirs have been closely read and referred to within Sin- tive recollections of what they perceived as the crass and aggressive gaporean officialdom and the general public. male Korean expatriates and workers. Nonetheless, in contrast to the significant visible presence of Similarly until the late 1990s, media representations of Koreans their Japanese neighbours, many of who came as merchants, sailors, in Singapore ranged from the turbulence and tensions stemming from and prostitutes, there were few traces of an ethnic Korean communi- international frictions on the Korean peninsula to violent student and ty in the prewar British colonial port of Singapore established in trade union demonstrations. The other impressions of the Korean 1819. Until recent years, cultural memories and impressions in Singa- peninsula that Singaporeans are still encountering are occasional pore of Koreans were moulded by not just interactions with the Kore- advertisements in national newspapers by the North Korean embassy an disapora, but media images as well. Especially for the older gener- in Singapore, praising the leadership of Kim II Sung and Kim Jong Il 220 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2005 Hallyu in Singapore: Korean Cosmopolitanism or the Consumption of Chineseness? 221 as part of the commemoration of the communist state’s independence led to a visible increase in the presence of Korean popular culture in day. As Lee remarked in The Singapore Story of his observations of the media and in retail outlets over the last four to five years. Korean the Koreans: serials are aired daily on television. In fact, before such serials were screened on local cable provider Singapore Cable Vision, Channel U My visit confirmed my assessment that the Korean people were (a local channel) relied on the screening of Korean dramas to “carve tough and capable of enduring great hardships. Successive inva- out and take away a significant size of the audience population” from sions swept across the steppes of Central Asia and came to a halt the more established state-owned Mediacorp station (Chua 2004). on the peninsula. They were of Mongolian stock with distinctive There has also been a proliferation of shops selling Korean television facial and physical features, easily distinguishable from the Japan- serials and movies. Viewers can choose to watch Korean television ese and Chinese . . . . The Koreans are a fearsome people. When serials in Singapore by purchasing VCD (video CDs) sets that usually they riot, they are as organised and nearly as disciplined as the riot come in the form of 20 discs (one for each episode). Korean films police who confront them. . . . They are an intense people not given to compromise . . . (Lee 2000, 533). have also become a staple in Korean cinemas with an average of one Korean film being screened in the theatres at any one time. Similarly, Although images of protesting students in Korea and Korean farmers Korean music albums can be purchased from major music retail out- at World Trade Organization (WTO) summits still flash across Asian lets in Singapore. news networks, entertainment channels now present another image The consumption of Korean serials in Singapore is premised of the “intense” Korean man, probably unrecognisable to Lee. upon one’s ethnicity and correspondingly one’s ability to speak Chi- The current, taken-for-granted appearances of Korean pop stars nese. In the past, shops that sold Korean serials retailed television on television sets in Singaporean homes contrasts with the almost shows from Taiwan and Hong Kong. When Korean television serials total lack of knowledge of the Korean popular culture scene in the became popular, local distributors obtained Korean shows from Tai- republic a decade ago. The only way to watch a Korean movie wan or China to overcome the linguistic barriers to consumption. between 1990-2000 was to purchase tickets for the annual Singapore Since such products were produced with a Chinese-speaking audi- International Film Festival, which screened art-house Korean films. ence in mind, all other aspects of the packaging of such serials were The regionalization of Korean popular culture in the late 1990s only also “sinicised,” including the plot synopsis and title. As Singapore reached the shores of Singapore in 2000 in the form of the television retailers prefer selling VCDs to DVDs, subtitling possibilities are limit- serial Autumn Tale. This serial was so popular that the station in ed. As a result, such serials may come with Korean vocalisation, but charge of its broadcast was “inundated with 1,000 calls and emails are only subtitled in Chinese. requesting a rerun” when it ended (The Straits Times, December 26, Korean serials that are aired on television are similarly type-cast 2002). Winter Sonata established the hallyu trend a year later in Sin- as Chinese products. Although television serials aired on the cable gapore. networks now come with English subtitles, it is presumed that Kore- The demand for Korean popular cultural products has mainly an television serials, the most important component of hallyu, are come from ethnic Chinese in Singapore, who make up 75 percent of only of interest to a Chinese-speaking audience. Television serials the population (fifteen percent ethnic Malays and six percent ethnic that are aired on non-prime time slots (before 7 p.m.) usually come Indians) comprising the ethnic majority in the city-state of about without English subtitles. In fact, Korean television serials are so three million citizens. Interest in such products from this group has strongly identified with Chineseness that Korean television serials 222 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2005 Hallyu in Singapore: Korean Cosmopolitanism or the Consumption of Chineseness? 223 have even been used to spur an interest in Chinese language learn- the systematic codification and management of ethnicity that is typi- ing. As Lim Tian Min, a teacher at Pioneer Junior College, comment- cal of modernity (Chow 1998, 11). In the Singaporean context, the ed: “We cut Winter Sonata into various video clips, and students are encouragement of standard Mandarin was accompanied by an assault supposed to expand the story line using their own words [in Chi- on Chinese dialects. The result of such policies in a post-indepen- nese]” (Forss 2005). dence era has been the delineation of “ethnic boundaries in Singa- pore . . . even while a ‘national culture’ is emphasised” (Ang and Stratton 1996, 61). With greater coeval-ness between the speaking of Hallyu and Chineseness in the Singaporean State Mandarin and one’s state recognised ethnicity, cultural “Chine- seness” has gained great currency amongst Chinese Singaporeans, The popularity of Korean television serials among Chinese Singapore- “putting Chinese people to become more Chinese . . . in their behav- ans can be understood as an interplay of such positions where essen- iour” (Geoffrey 1976, 118). One example of this was the angry reac- tialist notions of “Chineseness” in local state discourse aids “pan-Chi- tions to a survey by Dr. Chang Han Yin of the National University of nese” imaginings and social constructions. The label of “Chinese” in Singapore, which revealed that Chinese Singaporean youth would Singapore was a product of the postcolonial policies that created have preferred to be white or Japanese rather than Chinese. 3 Such dichotomous “ethnic” categories of Chinese, Indian, and Malay, for reactions reflect the strength of state-led definitions of cultural identi- the purpose of policing ethnic tensions. It followed from the institu- ty, even as the “Chinese” in Singapore who spoke an older dialect tionalization of ethnic labels that “one cannot, even today describe become increasingly disenfranchised by ethnic policies that replaced oneself as simply “Singaporean”: one must be a Singaporean some- dialects with the use of English and Mandarin. thing—Chinese, Malay, or whatever” (Clammer 1985, 110). Associat- The strengthening of ethnic identities has proved fertile ground ed with the re-invention of “ethnicity” by the Singaporean state were for the development of cultural politics that tends to be associated the educational polices on the compulsory learning of a second lan- with a “cultural China,” a term coined by Harvard professor Tu Wei guage in local schools. While English became the primary language, Ming. Tu proposed that regions outside of China such as Taiwan, associated with administration, commerce, and education in Singa- Hong Kong, and Singapore, would prove to be a “cultural alternative pore, the learning of a second language was intended to serve as cul- to the Western model” of development and cultural politics (Ang tural ballast to the dangers of the “Westernization” of Singaporean 1998, 230). Cultural alternatives analysed more frequently in relation society (Lee G. 2003, 238; Gopinathan 1994, 67). Also, the acquisi- to “Chinese capitalist networks” are also expressed through the con- tion of a second language in schools was determined by one’s ethnic sumption of products from Taiwan and Hong Kong, centres of Sino- classification. centric popular culture production. In the Singaporean context, the Chinese born in the 1970s, or those classified as such on their availability of Taiwanese and Hong Kong products have been an identity cards, often became the first of their generation to learn important “cultural ballast” for local Chinese against the conflicting “standard Chinese” or the official national language of China. A state policies on “Chineseness.” Although the government formalised quote from Rey Chow’s article On Chineseness as a Theoretical Prob- ethnic identities and “ethnic” languages, it discouraged the use of lem aptly describes this situation: “Whereas the adoption of English in non-Western countries is a sign of Britain’s colonial legacy, the enforcement of Mandarin in China and in the West is rather a sign of 3. “White Envy Shock Polster.” Straits Times (Singapore), December 19, 1999. 224 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2005 Hallyu in Singapore: Korean Cosmopolitanism or the Consumption of Chineseness? 225 dialects among the Chinese and stereotyped dialect use as signifying gapore could also be based on the notion that, in spite of their ethnic a lack of education and social standing. In fact, Chinese Singaporeans differences, both Korea and ethnic Chinese-dominated Singapore are below the age of forty were even threatened with being “last in the considered Asian economic tigers, the development of which was queue (in government departments)” if they used dialects (Barr 2000, attributed to their Confucian heritage. Even as the ancient Chinese 35). philosopher Confucius expressed disdain for enterprise, Confucian- Consequently, cultural patterns in Singapore have mirrored the ism was promoted in the 1980s as “Asian values” by Lee Kuan Yew social engineering of ethnicity by the state, which, by stressing the as the underlying common factor behind the success of the Asian differences between cultural and racial traits, have further crys- miracle economies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and tallised ethnic boundaries. This has been reflected predominately in Singapore through deference to authorit, education, and diligence the television and radio stations as well as print media, which delib- (Chua 1999). While these Asian values were reinterpreted after the erately reflect the official racial classification of the state. Hence, Indi- 1997 financial crisis as corruption, cronyism, and nepotism, this dis- an, Malay, Chinese, and English programmes and literature are neat- course has been internalised at least in the official and public mind- ly segregated among the various ethnic print and broadcast media. sets. This is reflected in Singapore’s President S. R. Nathan (ironically An imbalance favouring the Chinese majority is however revealed expressed by an ethnic Indian) address to his Korean counterpart on in the significantly more numerous Chinese-based TV network chan- the “Confucian traits” of both countries: nels and newspapers. Even the English language papers have tended to devote greater coverage in their entertainment sections to the pop- Our countries share many social values and cultural similarities. ular cultures of East Asia instead of South and Southeast Asia. While We respect the elderly and cherish the family unit as the basic quantitative conclusions are not available, it can be speculated that foundation of society. We value education, and recognize that hard ethnic minorities in the republic would probably demonstrate greater work and thrift are vital to improving the living standards of our peoples and the competitiveness of our nations. We pursue out- familiarity with East Asian popular cultural icons than their ethnic ward-looking strategies and are committed to an open and free Chinese counterparts would be with Malaysian celebrities or Bolly- trade regime (Nathan 2003). wood stars. This familiarity is superficial at best, however, as having been pigeonholed into learning their vernacular language by official state education policies, it is unlikely that the ethnic Malay or Indians From Dae Janggeum to Da Changjin in Singapore would even have linguistic access to the Chinese-based entertainment scene. Therefore, as long as Korean popular culture When Korean serials were first aired in Singapore, they were obtained products remain packaged and presented through the Chinese cultur- from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China rather than from Korea. Korean al medium in Singapore, the other ethnic minority groups in Singa- music albums found in Singapore were repackaged in Singapore for a pore will not see them as being Korean. With the denial of a more Chinese-speaking audience. Lyrics and song titles are translated into shared multiethnic platform of consumption, the presence of Korean Mandarin. Following the Taiwanese trend, Korean music is also less cultural commodities in Singapore serves to reinforce these cultural popular compared to Japanese music. According to the marketing linkages between the centres of Sino-centric cultural production and director of Playmusic, top Japanese artist Ayumi sells no less than the network of Chinese consumers in Singapore. 10,000 copies in Singapore for every album released (Chang 2004). In The filtering of K-pop into local Mandarin media networks in Sin- contrast, the group H.O.T, which has since disbanded, was the only 226 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2005 Hallyu in Singapore: Korean Cosmopolitanism or the Consumption of Chineseness? 227 Korean group to sell over 10,000 copies of its album, Outside Castle. forms of cultural kinship” (Gilroy 2003, 52). For example, the interest Korean film is perhaps the only medium that has been fairly indepen- in the historical Korean drama, A Jewel in the Palace (Dae Jang- dent, as cinema screenings demand English subtitling. However, in geum), was generated through media reports of its popularity in recent years, there has also been an influx of Korean films with Man- Hong Kong. When the series was aired in Singapore, it contained a darin subtitles from China available for sale in local shops. short introduction to Korean food and history, not from a Korean Compared to Korean television serials which are predicated upon actor but from a Hong Kong personality whom many Chinese Singa- the removal of Koreanness and its replacement by a discursive and poreans would recognise from their consumption of Cantonese televi- circulatory Chinese framework, Korean films that are pitched for an sion serials. Perhaps, one of the more prominent example of the international and English speaking audience are less popular in Sin- apparent “sincization” of Korean popular cultural products was the gapore. Hong Kong and local Singaporean products have consistently popular drama series Dae Janggeum. Like their counterparts in outperformed Korean films in Singapore. The top grossing Asian film China, Hong Kong and Tawian, Singaporeans tended to associate the here is a social commentary on the pressures of the local education production with its Mandarin title, Da Changjin rather than its Kore- system. Directed by Jack Neo, the movie I Not Stupid (2002) took in an pronunciation. S$5.84 million, whereas the top grossing Korean film Wishing Stairs (1999) only took in S$840,000 (Ong 2005). The lack of interest in crit- ical Korean films also limits the range of movies available to the local Conclusion: Singapore and the Limits to audience. Films that are rooted in the specificities of Korean history Popular Cultural Diplomacy normally perform poorly unless the lead actors are famous personali- ties who have acted in television serials. In the case of Taegeukgi Imagined cosmopolitanism, then, is about conceiving a tauntingly (2004), a film about the Korean War and its impact on the relation- chimerical world of spatial, class, gender, and racial mobility, ship between two brothers, it was the presence of lead actors Won where state borders and economic exclusions cease to be intransi- Bin and Jang Dong-gun, who had both acted in television serials, that gent constraints. It is about the sensuous recasting of the globe, instead, as promiscuous in its cultural systems, its logics of style, was responsible for the movie’s relative success. and the myriad lifestyles it displays. It is about fantasizing commu- Although many Singaporeans have become interesting in travel- nity on a world-wide scale where geo-historical and political rela- ling to Korea, long-term or in-depth cultural exchange is limited by tions no longer determine one’s chances for participation and mem- the barrier of language. Public educational institutions do not provide bership, one’s chances for pleasure, leisure and connectedness Korean language training and hence, it is rare for Singaporeans to (Schein 1999, 369-370). visit Korea without tour guides or to seek long-term employment or studies in Korea. As the lack of language training limits cultural The phenomenon of hallyu is one of “imagined cosmopolitanism.” exchange, the cultural consumption of Korean popular culture in Sin- Through media products, consumers, particularly from the East and gapore becomes predicated on its endorsement by Taiwan and Hong Southeast Asia regions, become participants in the globalizing of Kong. Such “cultural insiderism,” as Gilroy comments, owes its pop- Koreanness. Where Korean products exist in high concentrations, this ularity to “an absolute sense of ethnic difference. . . . Characteristi- is accompanied by the desire to travel to Korea, to learn the Korean cally, these claims are associated with the idea of national belonging language, to dress like Korean entertainers, and to learn the latest in and the aspiration to nationality and other more local but equivalent Korean entertainment news. Such global imaginings are facilitated by 228 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2005 Hallyu in Singapore: Korean Cosmopolitanism or the Consumption of Chineseness? 229 production companies, distribution firms, television and radio sta- tions, and the media policies of national governments. REFERENCES The case study of Singapore has shown that hallyu can exist to Ang, Ien. 1998. “Can One Say No to Chineseness? 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