

# THE SYRIAN ARMY

## DOCTRINAL ORDER OF BATTLE

A REPORT BY JOSEPH HOLLIDAY ♦ INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR

FEBRUARY 2013



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**COVER IMAGE: SYRIAN TANKS TAKE PART IN THE KUWAITI NATIONAL DAY MILITARY PARADE, FEB. 26, 2011. DOD PHOTO BY MASS COMMUNICATION SPECIALIST 1ST CLASS CHAD J. MCNEELEY/RELEASED**
















# **THE SYRIAN ARMY**

## **DOCTRINAL ORDER OF BATTLE**

**JOSEPH HOLLIDAY**

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ORDER OF BATTLE					
Symbol	Echelon/ <i>Arabic</i>	Command/ <i>Arabic</i> (Equipment)	# of Personnel	Component Units	Total #
	Corps/ <i>Falaq</i>	General/ <i>Awal</i>	50,000	3-4 Divisions	3
	Division/ <i>Firqa</i>	General/ <i>Awal</i>	5,000-15,000	5-6 Brigades/Regiments	14
	Brigade/ <i>Liwa</i>	Maj Gen/ <i>Liwa</i>	2,500-3,500	5-6 Battalions	>40
	<b>Mechanized Brigade</b> 105 IFVs 41 Tanks 3,500 Soldiers			3 Mech Battalions 1 Armored Battalion Artillery/ADA/Engineers	
	<b>Armored Brigade</b> 105 Tanks 31 IFVs 2,500 Soldiers			3 Armored Battalions 1 Mech Battalion Artillery/ADA/Engineers	
	Regiment/ <i>Fawj</i>	Brig Gen/ <i>Amid</i>	1,500	3 Battalions	>20
	<b>Special Forces Regiment</b> 1,500 Soldiers			3 Infantry Battalions	
	<b>Artillery Regiment</b> 45 Howitzers 1,500 Soldiers			3 Artillery Battalions	
	Battalion/ <i>Katiba</i>	Colonel/ <i>Aqeed</i>	300-500	4-5 Companies	
	Company/ <i>Suriya</i>	Captain/ <i>Naqeeb</i>	60-80		

**SOURCE NOTE:** The above table is based primarily on interviews with an exiled former Syrian Army General Officer on March 20 and April 19, 2012, as well as the appendices in Human Rights Watch's December 2011 report "By All Means Necessary."

## INTRODUCTION

Current estimates of Syrian opposition strength have generated confidence that the Assad regime will be defeated militarily. This assessment cannot be made without also estimating the real fighting power of the Syrian regime. The regime's military strength rests on many factors, such as the loyalty of troops, the status of equipment, and the number of casualties sustained. These variables have no meaning, however, if not compared to a valid baseline. This paper establishes the composition of the Syrian Army, provides insight into the historical roles of particular units, and assesses the doctrinal order of battle of the Syrian Army as it existed in 2011. The Full Order of Battle appears on page 12.

This report precedes the Institute for the Study of War's upcoming report, *The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War*, which will examine the ways in which Assad has deployed his forces in the ongoing campaign against Syria's opposition. Understanding the composition, history, and doctrinal order of battle of the Syrian Army is necessary to explain how the Assad regime prosecuted counterinsurgency operations in 2011-2012. Explaining the structure and orientation of the Syrian Army as it existed at the outset of the conflict forms the baseline from which to analyze Syrian military operations and deployments in the current conflict.

At the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011, the Syrian Army was one of the largest and best-trained forces in the Arab world. Organized according to Soviet doctrine, it was oriented to project power into Lebanon and to defend against a potential Israeli invasion. Despite its relatively poor combat record against the Israelis, the Syrian Army had earned a reputation as a disciplined and motivated force.<sup>1</sup> The Army's cohesiveness and continued logistical capacity in the current uprising is consistent with this reputation.

The Syrian military has also exhibited shortcomings. Most of Syria's military materiel is outdated Soviet equipment from the 1970s or earlier. Corruption among Syrian

military leadership has been pervasive. Most importantly, Syrian military commanders have not traditionally demonstrated initiative or the ability to react to opposing forces without deferring to their superiors in the chain of command. Years of training with Soviet military advisors may have contributed to this inflexibility, but the behavior derives primarily from Hafez al-Assad's insistence on a highly centralized and personal chain of command reaching directly from the President to individual unit commanders.

### General Composition

As of 2011, the Syrian Army was comprised of 220,000 personnel, most of whom were conscripts.<sup>2</sup> The Chief of Staff of the Syrian Armed Forces maintains operational control of these forces. [See Order of Battle, pg. 4.]

After Syria's defeat by Israel in 1976, nine of the Syrian Army's thirteen divisions were placed under the operational command of three Corps headquarters in an apparent effort to delegate decision-making authority.<sup>3</sup> In practice, division commanders still often reported directly to the President.

Eight of Syria's thirteen Army divisions are conventional armored or mechanized divisions containing four maneuver brigades each. The



different brigade types are mixed in a three to one ratio in each division, so that an armored division includes three armored brigades and one mechanized brigade, while a mechanized brigade contains the opposite ratio. Each division possesses additional combat support elements and an artillery regiment. At full strength, each of these conventional divisions is comprised of approximately 15,000 soldiers.<sup>4</sup>

Each Army brigade—Syria’s primary maneuver unit—is theoretically made up of 2,500-3,500 soldiers. Understanding this brigade-level echelon is the most useful way to appreciate the combat power and employment of the Syrian Army in the current fight. Each armored brigade is made up of three armored battalions and one mechanized battalion. Each mechanized brigade includes three mechanized battalions and one armored battalion, maintaining the same three to one mix of subordinate unit types as the divisions. Also like Syria’s divisions, these brigades include organic artillery, air defense, engineering and other combat support elements. Divisional artillery regiments are comprised of approximately 1,500 soldiers, divided into three battalions of 300 to 500 soldiers, and do not include additional combat support elements.<sup>5</sup>

The Syrian Army’s five specialized divisions include the 4<sup>th</sup> Armored Division, the Republican Guard, two Special Forces divisions, and the 17<sup>th</sup> Army Reserve Division. These divisions diverge from the conventional structure stated above, containing both brigades and maneuver regiments. These infantry, armor, and Special Forces regiments are comprised of approximately 1,500 soldiers each, divided into three battalions of 300 to 500 soldiers. These regiments do not include additional combat support elements.<sup>6</sup>

Syrian Army brigades and regiments, therefore, are smaller than conventional Western brigades and regiments and larger than Western battalions. Similarly, Syrian battalions are smaller than Western battalions and larger than companies. As ISW’s upcoming report will detail, the full strength of this doctrinal force structure has not been available to the regime during the current conflict. In order to hedge against defections, Bashar al-Assad has deployed only the most loyal elements of the Army. Within the conventional divisions, this loyal core has been limited to small detachments selectively deployed, while the regime’s praetorian, majority-Alawite divisions have been deployed in full.

### **Praetorian Units**

The **Defense Companies** acted as the primary regime-protection force for the first decade of Assad’s rule, preceding the regime’s modern praetorian units. Commanded by Hafez’s brother Rifat, the Defense Companies accounted for a full third of Syrian land forces at their height—twelve elite brigades of armor, Special Forces, and artillery—and played the leading role in defeating the Muslim Brotherhood uprising.<sup>7</sup> “Rifat, self-consciously the shield of his brother’s regime,” historian Patrick Seale explains, “built up his Defense Companies, turning them into the best armed, best trained and best paid units in the Syrian Army.”<sup>8</sup>

Alawites made up ninety percent of Defense Companies’ strength, many selected on the basis of “close tribal links to Hafez al-Assad.”<sup>9</sup> After Rifat’s abortive 1984 coup, Hafez al-Assad reduced the Defense Companies to one division, demobilizing or transferring large numbers of troops to other units, primarily the Republican Guards and Special Forces.<sup>10</sup> He then reflagged the truncated Defense

Companies as the 569<sup>th</sup> Armored Division, which in turn reflagged years later to become the 4<sup>th</sup> Armored Division.<sup>11</sup>

The **4<sup>th</sup> Armored Division** has performed as Bashar al-Assad's indispensable elite unit since the outset of the 2011 uprising. The Division is organized in similar fashion to conventional armored divisions, with three armored brigades and one mechanized brigade, but the regime has kept these brigades at full strength and attached an additional special forces regiment to the Division, making the Division larger than most. The Division Commander is technically Major General Mohammed Ali Durgham, but Bashar's brother Maher al-Assad is widely suspected to act as de facto Division commander, despite his title as 42<sup>nd</sup> Armored Brigade Commander.<sup>12</sup> The son of Ibrahim Safi, a top commander under Hafez al-Assad, commands the Division's artillery regiment.<sup>13</sup>

Almost all of the Division's troops are career soldiers, and former Syrian Army officers estimate that eighty percent of the Division's ranks are Alawites.<sup>14</sup> Because it served first and foremost as a regime protection force, the 4<sup>th</sup> Armored Division was oriented against internal threats as well as external ones. Its position at the Mazzeh military complex overlooking the southern suburbs of Damascus allowed the Division to control key access points around the capital, limiting the possibility of a coup. In the event of an Israeli invasion, 4<sup>th</sup> Armored was expected to act as the last line of defense for the regime.

Hafez al-Assad established the **Republican Guards** in 1976 under the command of Adnan Makhoul, his wife's first cousin.<sup>15</sup> Originally, these Presidential Guards, as the unit is still sometimes called, drew their ranks exclusively from the Air Force, which is the service that

was the closest to Hafez.<sup>16</sup> The Republican Guards eventually grew to a mechanized-brigade equivalent, and it owes some of its lineage to transfers from the dissolution of the Defense Companies in the mid-1980s.<sup>17</sup>

At the outset of the 2011 conflict, the Republican Guard included three mechanized brigades and two "security regiments."<sup>18</sup> The overall force structure is comparable to a conventional mechanized infantry division, but like the 4<sup>th</sup> Armored Division, the Republican Guard is outfitted with better equipment and maintained at full strength. Brigade commanders include regime stalwarts like Talal Makhoul, who hails from the family of Hafez al-Assad's wife, and the Division's officers and soldiers are almost entirely Alawites.<sup>19</sup> The Republican Guards did include Sunni leadership at the outset of the conflict, notably Manaf Tlass, son of Syria's long-serving Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass and close friend to Bashar before the uprising. As early as May 2011, the regime reportedly placed Tlass under house arrest, and he defected in July 2012.<sup>20</sup>

As the regime's premier praetorian force, the Republican Guard was primarily oriented to protect against internal threats. The majority of the Division is situated around the Presidential Palace and in the Qasioun military complex overlooking Damascus' northern suburbs, putting the Division in a good position to counteract a coup, just as the 4<sup>th</sup> Armored Division controlled key access points to the capital's south.

The **Special Forces Regiments** enjoy a special place in the Syrian Army because they have served both as a regime protection force and as a critical component of Syria's national defense. Syrians use the term Special Forces to describe these units, but they more closely resemble conventional light infantry units

than Western Special Forces in both mission and composition. The term Special Forces has been applied ostensibly because of their specialized training in airborne and air assault operations, but they should be regarded as light infantry forces, elite only in relation to the conventional armored and mechanized brigades of the Syrian Army.

From the 1970s to the mid-1990s, all of the Special Forces regiments were organized under Major General Ali Haydar's Special Forces Command. Haydar was an important ally to Hafez al-Assad, and his regiments served as a critical counterweight to Rifat al-Assad's Defense Companies during the latter's 1984 coup attempt.<sup>21</sup> Afterwards the Special Forces absorbed many soldiers and officers from the disbanded Defense Companies, making it the third regime protection force that owes its lineage in part to those Defense Companies, along with the 4<sup>th</sup> Armored and Republican Guard.<sup>22</sup>

Haydar did not share the close familial ties of other praetorian commanders, although he was a member of the large Alawite Haddadun tribe, to which the Makhlof family also belongs.<sup>23</sup> When Ali Haydar objected to the possibility of Bashar's succession in the mid-1990s, Hafez promptly relieved the General and arrested him.<sup>24</sup> Hafez split up the formidable Special Forces Command by standing up the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Divisions, each of which commands three regiments. Hafez therefore reduced the total number of regiments under direct control of Special Forces Command to six. The 15<sup>th</sup> Division fell under the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps in the South, while the 14<sup>th</sup> Division was assigned to 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps and oriented along the Lebanese border.

Some have suggested that the Special Forces are almost entirely composed of Alawites; however, Muslim Brotherhood reports

following the early 1980s uprising suggest that only half of the Special Forces soldiers were Alawites, although nearly all the officers were.<sup>25</sup> The relatively consistent level of defections from the Special Forces during the 2011-2012 conflict suggests that the Special Forces included a greater percentage of Sunni soldiers and junior officers than either the 4<sup>th</sup> Armored Division or Republican Guard.<sup>26</sup>

Special Forces Command, along with at least three of its regiments, is located in the al-Dreij military complex in the mountains between Damascus and the Lebanese border, behind the Presidential Palace.<sup>27</sup> The 15<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Division and its three regiments were located in the high ground of Jebal Druze near the Jordanian border.<sup>28</sup> The Special Forces regiments' specialized training and light infantry capability have allowed them to operate in mountainous terrain such as the Anti-Lebanon Mountains that form Syria's southwest border.

### Conventional Divisions

Since the Syrian Armed Forces established the three Corps Headquarters in the mid-1980s, the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps has formed the first line of defense against an Israeli invasion over the Golan Heights or through Jordan.<sup>29</sup> Each of the units within 1<sup>st</sup> Corps was assigned a sector that conformed to an over-arching operational plan for the defense of Syria. The independent 61<sup>st</sup> and 90<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigades occupied reinforcing fighting positions along the Golan Heights. The second line of defense was divided into southern and northern sectors: the 5<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Division secured the southern approach and Jordanian border, and its eastern flank was secured in turn by the 15<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Division utilizing the advantageous terrain of the Jebal Druze. The 7<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Division secured the most direct approach from the northern Golan



to Damascus, with its western flank secured by the heights of Mount Hermon. The 9<sup>th</sup> Armored Division, positioned to the rear of the mechanized divisions, was poised to reinforce or counterattack the front.<sup>30</sup>

Most of the divisions within 1<sup>st</sup> Corps pre-date the Corps-level formation. The 5<sup>th</sup> Division was one of Syria's first division-level units and has remained in the same area of operation throughout its history. As early as the 1967 Six-Day War, the Syrian 5<sup>th</sup> Division has held positions along the Jordanian border.<sup>31</sup> The 7<sup>th</sup> Mechanized and 9<sup>th</sup> Armored Divisions played a role during Rifat's 1984 coup, when their prominent commanders briefly supported Rifat but ultimately sided with the President.<sup>32</sup> The 9<sup>th</sup> Division's Alawite commander General Hikmat Ibrahim has remained close to the Assad family since then, and he went on to command the 4<sup>th</sup> Armored Division.<sup>33</sup> The 9<sup>th</sup> Armored also fought with the coalition against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War.<sup>34</sup> Only the 15<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Division is a relatively recent formation, established between the mid-1990s restructuring of Ali Haydar's former Special Forces Command and the beginning of the current conflict.


At its inception, Hafez al-Assad made the Syrian **2<sup>nd</sup> Corps** responsible for managing the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, which had begun almost a decade earlier in 1976. Syrian Armed Forces remained in Lebanon until the 2005 Hariri assassination and subsequent Cedar Revolution forced Syrian withdrawal. Consequently 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps has been oriented toward Lebanon for most of its existence, and most available accounts of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps describe it as Syria's Lebanese occupation force.<sup>35</sup>

2<sup>nd</sup> Corps' two primary divisions also predated the Corps-level restructuring of the

mid-1980s. Both the 1<sup>st</sup> Armored and 10<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Divisions had been units in the Syrian Army since at least Rifat's 1984 coup attempt.<sup>36</sup> In particular, Alawite General Ibrahim Safi's 1<sup>st</sup> Division played a crucial role in blocking Rifat's Defense Companies, and he later commanded Syrian Armed Forces in Lebanon.<sup>37</sup> The 14<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Division was established to command three Special Forces Regiments after the mid-1990s restructuring of Ali Haydar's consolidated Special Forces Command.

Before the onset of the 2011 conflict, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps was primarily responsible for securing the Lebanese border and providing a broad second line of defense against potential Israeli invasion. The 10<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Division was oriented to secure key avenues of approach from Lebanon to Damascus, while the light infantry regiments of the 14<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Division would seize high ground in the Anti-Lebanon Mountains to conduct reconnaissance and canalize Israeli columns into the 10<sup>th</sup> Division's engagement zones. The 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division was responsible for defending the southern approaches to Damascus from the Kiswah military complex, situated amidst the low ridgelines to the south of the capital.<sup>38</sup> 1<sup>st</sup> Division's control over this key terrain, combined with its historical regime-protection role, suggest that the Division was particularly trusted among the conventional divisions.

The **3<sup>rd</sup> Corps** was responsible for interior defense and reinforcing the front in a war with Israel, and it was the last Corps Headquarters to stand up in the late 1980s.<sup>39</sup> The 11<sup>th</sup> Armored Division, headquartered near Homs, was responsible for securing central Syria, while the 3<sup>rd</sup> Armored Division secured the northern approach to Damascus from its military complex near Qutayfah. The 17<sup>th</sup> and



MAP 1 | NOTE: INSET FOLLOWS ON PAGE 11.

18<sup>th</sup> Divisions were independent of the Corps structures, and they were responsible for northern and eastern Syria.<sup>40</sup> Of these four divisions, useful historical information only exists for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Armored Division, which has traditionally acted as one of Assad’s most reliable conventional divisions.

During the early 1980s, General Shafiq Fayyad’s 3<sup>rd</sup> Armored Division played a key role in defeating the Muslim Brotherhood uprising. Beginning in March 1980, the entire 3<sup>rd</sup> Division cleared Aleppo and garrisoned the city for a whole year “with a tank in almost every street,” historian Patrick Seale has explained. He describes General Fayyad “standing in the turret of his tank” and

proclaiming that “he was prepared to kill a thousand men a day to rid the city of the vermin of the Muslim Brothers.”<sup>41</sup> During the 1982 assault on Hama, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division’s 47<sup>th</sup> Armored and 21<sup>st</sup> Mechanized Brigades provided the backbone of the assault. Muslim Brotherhood reports following the early 1980s uprising suggest that three quarters of the officers of these brigades were Alawites, as well as a third of the soldiers.<sup>42</sup>

During Rifat’s 1984 coup attempt, Fayyad’s 3<sup>rd</sup> Division joined Ali Haydar’s Special Forces in blocking Rifat’s Defense Companies in Damascus.<sup>43</sup> Not only was Fayyad one of Hafez al-Assad’s first cousins, but one of Fayyad’s sons married a daughter of Rifat al-



MAP 2

Assad.<sup>44</sup> The role of Shafiq Fayyad therefore illustrates the significance of extended family networks in Assad's control over Syrian security institutions, a theme that will emerge once again in the study of the regime's counterinsurgency campaign of 2011-2012.

### Conclusion

At the beginning of the unrest in 2011, the Syrian Army was structured and oriented to defend against an Israeli invasion and project force into Lebanon, while ensuring that no one force could execute a successful coup attempt. The latter imperative resulted in heavy investment in the regime's praetorian

formations, namely, the 4<sup>th</sup> Armored Division, Republican Guard, and Special Forces. While the Syrian Army had experience quelling internal unrest during the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in the early 1980s, the armor-centric formations and highly personal chain of command were designed for conventional conflict. The Syrian Army was ill-suited to wage low-intensity conflict against the insurgency that began to take shape at the end of 2011. ISW's upcoming report, *The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War*, will detail how the regime has responded to the opposition, reorganized its security forces for internal conflict, and fashioned a new style of warfare.



## **Doctrinal Order of Battle**

A number of resources detail the structure of the Syrian Army of the 1990s, but they are out of date. Many changes took place after the Syrian occupation in Lebanon ended following the 2005 Cedar Revolution. Many brigades have been moved, disbanded, or been established since then. These earlier sources form an important baseline, but they are insufficient to describe the structure of the Syrian military as it existed at the outset of the present conflict. Defection videos and interviews with former members of the Syrian military provide critical insight into the structure of the Syrian Army as it existed at the onset of the 2011 revolution.

The doctrinal order of battle presented in this backgrounder is not a factsheet, but rather an assessment, derived from the following sources [See Chart 2]:

### Republican Guard

- “By All Means Necessary: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes against Humanity in Syria,” Human Rights Watch, December 2011.
- “Private Moussa Mohammed Sadiq (104<sup>th</sup> Brigade, Republican Guards) defection statement,” YouTube Video, May 16, 2012, <<http://youtu.be/y7h4LGe7CNo>>.

### 4<sup>th</sup> Armored Division

- “By All Means Necessary: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes against Humanity in Syria,” Human Rights Watch, December 2011.
- Michael Weiss, “My interview with a defected Syrian soldier; plus, more leaked Syrian documents,” *The Telegraph*, August 9, 2011.
- Interview with exiled former Syrian Army General Officer, Washington, DC, March 20, 2012.
- “Private Humam Khabouss (555<sup>th</sup> Regiment, 4<sup>th</sup> Division) defection statement,” YouTube video, May 16, 2012, <<http://youtu.be/y7h4LGe7CNo>>.

### Independent Special Forces Regiments

- “By All Means Necessary: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes against Humanity in Syria,” Human Rights Watch, December 2011.
- Michael Weiss, “My interview with a defected Syrian soldier; plus, more leaked Syrian documents,” *The Telegraph*, August 9, 2011.
- Interview with exiled former Syrian Army General Officer, Washington, DC, March 20, 2012.
- Email from Syrian opposition activist, March 30, 2012.
- “Colonel Bassam Qassim al-Sheikh Ali (41<sup>st</sup> Regiment, Special Forces) defection statement,” YouTube video, February 15, 2012, <<http://youtu.be/DujnVweuAfA>>.
- “Lieutenant Khalid Mohammed al-Issa (41<sup>st</sup> Regiment, Special Forces) defection statement,” YouTube video, August 29, 2011, <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zvC8a0Xe5oo>>.



#### 14<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Division

- Skype Interview with exiled former Syrian Army General Officer, April 19, 2012.
- “Captain Ibrahim Munir Majbour (556<sup>th</sup> Regiment, 14<sup>th</sup> Division) defection statement,” YouTube video, June 15, 2011, <[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xC5y\\_T5Go0A](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xC5y_T5Go0A)>.
- “Captain Maamoun Kilzi (554<sup>th</sup> Regiment, 14<sup>th</sup> Division) defection statement,” YouTube video, November 22, 2011 <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qhjwz-3x6tU>>.
- “Captain Mahmoud Mukhaiber (36<sup>th</sup> Regiment, 14<sup>th</sup> Division) defection statement,” YouTube video, April 17, 2012, <<http://youtu.be/PHA8qx6osts>>.

#### 15<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Division

- Interview with Syrian Army Defector and former FSA leader, Washington, DC, April 23, 2012.
- “By All Means Necessary: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes against Humanity in Syria,” Human Rights Watch, December 2011.
- “Private Mohammed Abbas (404<sup>th</sup> Regiment, 15<sup>th</sup> Division) defection statement,” YouTube video, May 4, 2012, <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2cO44ynFf80>>.
- “Three Privates announce defection (404<sup>th</sup> Regiment, 15<sup>th</sup> Division),” YouTube video, December 30, 2011, <<http://www.youtube.com/user/UgaritNews#p/u/5/7tUBXE8OgSU>>.
- “Captain Ziad al-Attr (127<sup>th</sup> Regiment, 15<sup>th</sup> Division) defection statement,” YouTube video, May 16, 2012, <<http://youtu.be/k8uz3t4VHNq>>.
- “Lieutenant Jameel al-Hassan (127<sup>th</sup> Regiment, 15<sup>th</sup> Division) defection statement,” YouTube video, February 12, 2012, <<http://youtu.be/7Z9ZrtFrMbk>>.
- Human Rights Watch, “We’ve Never Seen Such Horror: Crimes against Humanity by Syrian Security Forces,” June 2011.
- Al Arabiya daily news updates on fighting in Homs <<http://www.alarabiya.net/syria>>, February 13, 2012, translated from Arabic by Elizabeth O’Bagy.

#### 5<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Division

- Richard M. Bennett, “The Syrian Military: A Primer,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 3 No. 8, August/September 2001.
- “By All Means Necessary: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes against Humanity in Syria,” Human Rights Watch, December 2011.
- Skype Interview with exiled former Syrian Army General Officer, April 19, 2012.
- “Lieutenant Ibrahim Ayoub (15<sup>th</sup> Brigade, 5<sup>th</sup> Division) defection statement,” YouTube video, July 12, 2011, <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ElKe7veCHA>>.
- “Captain Yousif al-Hamoud (15<sup>th</sup> Brigade, 5<sup>th</sup> Division) defection statement,” YouTube video, September 26, 2011, <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RAYOz78ze3E>>.
- “Omari Battalion captures two soldiers from 12<sup>th</sup> Brigade, 5<sup>th</sup> Division,” YouTube video, February 14, 2012, <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Da7GaMh3dy4>>.

#### 7<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Division

- Richard M. Bennett, “The Syrian Military: A Primer,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 3 No. 8, August/September 2001.

- Skype Interview with exiled former Syrian Army General Officer, April 19, 2012.
- “Lieutenant Qassim Ahmed (88<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade, 7<sup>th</sup> Division) defection statement,” YouTube video, June 18, 2012, <<http://youtu.be/9uGBZMFZFKk>>.
- “Captain Hussam Mahmoud al-Kara’asha (121<sup>st</sup> Brigade, 7<sup>th</sup> Division) defection statement,” YouTube video, March 25, 2012, <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IiknfcqQumI>>.
- “Lieutenant Zahir Abdul-Karim (68<sup>th</sup> Brigade, 7<sup>th</sup> Division) defection statement,” YouTube video, September 6, 2011, <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rqz4PLq-Xa0>>.

### 9<sup>th</sup> Armored Division

- Richard M. Bennett, “The Syrian Military: A Primer,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 3 No. 8, August/September 2001.
- “By All Means Necessary: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes against Humanity in Syria,” Human Rights Watch, December 2011.
- Skype Interview with exiled former Syrian Army General Officer, April 19, 2012.
- “Lieutenant Mohammed Hassan Hussein (43<sup>rd</sup> Brigade, 9<sup>th</sup> Division) defection statement,” YouTube video, February 21, 2012, <[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iv\\_9zgutnVk](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iv_9zgutnVk)>.
- “Lieutenant Hamza Fathallah (43<sup>rd</sup> Brigade, 9<sup>th</sup> Division) defection statement,” YouTube video, February 12, 2012, <<http://youtu.be/7Z9ZrtFrMbk>>.
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