




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YUGOSLAVIA

FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective

Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia

Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective

Belgrade, 2017

YUGOSLAVIA FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Publisher

Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia

For the publisher

Sonja Biserko

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Photos and illustrations on the cover

- Youths Day, Maribor, 1961. photo: wikipedia.org
- Vukovar 1991, photo by Željko Jovanović
- Map of SFRY, www.jugosloveni.info

Illustration on the back cover and first page of the book

- Pablo Picasso, poster for the movie *Neretva*, 1969.

Printed by Delfimedia

Circulation 500

CIP – Каталогизacija y yyybykacija –
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд
ISBN 978-86-7208-208-1
COBISS.SR-ID 240800780

This book has been published thanks
to the support provided by the Federal
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Federal
Republic of Germany



Ambasada
Savezne Republike Nemačke
Beograd

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WHY THIS PROJECT

MORE THAN TWO decades have passed since the beginning of Yugoslavia's disintegration that ended with Kosovo's independence declaration in 2008. The international community was actively involved in the crisis from the very start. It attempted to settle differences (The Hague Conference), then set the criteria for the mutual recognition of the successor-states (acknowledgment of republican borders as state borders), provided humanitarian aid throughout the war, imposed peace agreements on the warring sides, embarked on armed intervention in Bosnia and then in Kosovo, and finally opened up avenues towards Europe to all the states emerging from Yugoslavia. However, the signatures put on the peace agreements did not put an end to national projects nor to territorial ambitions (albeit to be achieved by other means).

As long as these aspirations were predominant, any reconciliation process was inconceivable. The thesis also prevailed that the war had been waged for re-composition of the Balkans, of course along ethnic lines. The borders defined by the Badinter Commission on Yugoslavia remained, though most of the newly-established countries became predominantly nation-states. The ethnic principle taking precedence over the civic still keeps the issues of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia open. There is no doubt that it also keeps open the question of Kosovo, regardless of its many minority communities.

The international community undertook many fact-finding initiatives (aimed at ascertaining the number of victims, for example) that turned out to be successful. In this context, much has likewise been done in the territory of the former Yugoslavia (in the newly-emerged states), mostly in publishing, the compilation

of documentation and testimonies, video-recordings, etc. And notable progress has been made in the establishment of the number of victims on all sides. This is of major significance as it bars the way to further myth construction and manipulation with the number of victims.

It goes without saying that the Hague Tribunal has made the biggest contribution and left the region an invaluable legacy. This mostly relates to its numerous rulings, documentation, video-material, and so on. True, regardless of all the important work it has done, The Hague Tribunal has not answered the crucial question about the character of the war.

Despite the indisputably precious insight into the development of the war, contextualization and a vertical chronology of the events that eventually led up to it are still lacking. In other words, a proper understanding of Yugoslavia's brutal disintegration calls for an insight into the crucial cause of the break-up – an insight into the conflict between various concepts for Yugoslavia's re-organization (while the country was still in existence).

The majority of citizens in the successor states do not have a real understanding of the reasons behind the disintegration of their former country and the hardships the war brought with it.. Strong emotions and impressions, individual and collective, have been stirred up, but without essential knowledge about the Second Yugoslavia or knowledge about one or other of the peoples that were its constituent elements. This is particularly true of the younger generations who are almost indifferent to the former Yugoslavia and barely know anything about the region. Their attitude towards other ethnic communities ranges from utter unconcern to extreme intolerance. This is the result of the fact that all the successor states that ethnically adjusted and largely fabricated their histories have distanced themselves from Yugoslavia.

A state of confusion, mutual animosity and distrust, especially characteristic of the young, hinders reconciliation and

normalization, which can only be attained through historical truth. As things stand now in the region, reconciliation will be left to younger generations that had nothing to do with the conflict.

The purpose of this project is to interpret and describe objectively key historical processes that are vital to an understanding of Yugoslavia and its brutal disintegration. Yugoslavia played a crucial historical role: it functioned as a framework for the emancipation of all the Yugoslav peoples and the constitution of their republics – states.

This collection of papers is the product of a joint endeavor by a group of historians, art historians, culturologists, sociologists, economists, politicologists and other researchers of different generations. It can also guide the reader through more copious reading material made up of studies that are already in place or will be placed in due course on the Web portal at *www.yuistorija.com*.

This research project was realized thanks to support by the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the FR of Germany. Formally, the research behind it took two years, but it is actually the product of a much longer-term process. All the researchers involved have invested years or even decades of research work in their studies. Thanks to the fact that they trusted one another and cooperated as true colleagues – a pre-condition for harmonious work on this project and the result of long years of interaction, the project proceeded smoothly as the logical outcome of the collaboration of many years by critically-minded humanities scholars in post-Yugoslavia territory. Since its initial stage, work on the project has so far involved almost fifty researchers and experts in (post) Yugoslav history from all the successor states and many from the West.

The fact that the past is being misused on a daily basis in all the post-Yugoslav states, without exception, shows that we are right when we argue that rational knowledge and historical research are both a starting point and an essential element of stable relations in the region, which are imperative to its sustainability.

We make no claim to present a definitive picture of Yugoslavia's disintegration as that will be certainly the focus of research of future scholars. The truth about its break-up is not simple or one-sided; on the contrary, it is extremely complex and calls for a multi-disciplinary approach. Our ambition, however, is to provide enough information and analysis to younger generations that will give them a deeper insight into the context other than the one they are being offered. Our ambition is not only to assist them in overcoming the historical narratives that have been imposed on them, but also to encourage their constructive and deeper reasoning about their future in the countries in which they live.

Sonja Biserko

YU-HISTORY: a MULTI-PERSPECTIVE HISTORICAL ACCOUNT

UNDER A VARIETY of titles, numerous books in different languages, published before and after the disintegration of the SFR of Yugoslavia tackle the history of Yugoslavia. A major characteristic of the works by South Slav writers is that they are authored by one and rarely two historians. Representative Yugoslav multi-ethnic projects have been realized only partially. By 1959, two volumes of *The History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia* rounded off concurrent historical narratives about the period till approx. 1790–1800. Thirty years later practically nothing could have been done to get the other three volumes into print. “The spring of the people” (*Proljeće naroda*) and the emergence of civil society in the 19th century remained insurmountable challenges to Yugoslav national historiographies. The case of the history of the Communist Party/League of Communists of Yugoslavia could not basically have been any different. Despite currently widespread stereotypes about Yugoslav communist uniformity *A Historical Overview of the CPY (Pregled povijesti SKJ)* (Belgrade 1963) caused many conflicts, in the Party most of all. This is why the foreword to this single volume penned by sixty researchers of all Yugoslav nationalities was published with many reservations in 1985. Multi-disciplinary encyclopedic articles in the first and second volume of Krleža’s *Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia (Enciklopedija Jugoslavije, 4/Hil – Jugos, Zagreb 1960, 567–651, 5/Jugos – Mak, Zagreb 1962, 1–154 and 6/Jap – Kat, Zagreb 1990, 161–608)* are the truly valuable exceptions. Historians were on the margins of that project.

The disintegration of the SFR of Yugoslavia in the war has always and still does incite the interest of historians from almost all over the world. The trends of seeing only one's own national history and legitimizing the breakdown of the Yugoslav community as something more or less "inevitable" dominate the national historiographies of the post-Yugoslav states – with due respect for the individuals aware of their professional responsibility to research the phenomenon of Yugoslavia's history most comprehensively and critically. In other words, by criticizing the teleological and historical-deterministic aspects of Yugoslav historiography in all its phases from 1918 to 1990–91 that imply – on theoretical and ideological assumptions – the concept of "Schicksalgemeinschaft" – we see historiographic production likewise convincing us – based on theoretical and ideological assumptions – that the Yugoslav community simply had to disintegrate.

The value of this project initiated by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia with financial assistance from the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany is that it is based on the belief that the end of Yugoslavia was not the end. On the contrary, it was the beginning of critical reflection of the "quasi-totality" of the history of Yugoslavia, of peoples and nations alike – regardless of their constitutional statuses – sharing, at any time and in any way, the same Yugoslav experience. The project also posits that the history of Yugoslavia represents an unavoidable aspect of European and even global history of the 20th century.

No doubt that the history of Yugoslavia will always be in the plural and at all times faced with the variously formulated questions researchers have raised. When one bears in mind how important the Yugoslav period of all the Yugoslav peoples and nationalities (*minorities*) has been – and still is – for understanding their modernity, but also their tragedies and traumas, and for understanding all the problems they had to cope with and are still

coping with at this turbulent crossroads of people of different ethnicities and religions, cultures and civilizations, projects like this are indispensable to ensure and maintain, above all, dialogue and communication between historians of national historiographies and the post-Yugoslav states, who anyway have limited opportunity to obtain even basic information about the professional work done all over the world, let alone to work together as people cooperating for their own sake and for the sake of the European future that we are all, hopefully, looking forward to. From this point of view, no matter of how multi-perspective it is, this joint endeavor is in fact uni-perspective.

Drago Rokсандić

THE MULTI-PERSPECTIVITY OF (POST) YUGOSLAV HISTORIES

THE IDEOLOGICAL PARADIGM of Yugoslavia radically changed from the mid-1980s till the early 1990s all over its former territory. Under this paradigm Yugoslavia was seen as an optimal frame which, having broken off with unitarianism and centralism, could present a new picture of Yugoslavia, different from the integral Yugoslavism in the period between two world wars. By the end of his rule, Tito became critical about what he saw as over-emphasized republican interests and a neglected Yugoslav frame. Even the determiner “Yugoslav” was more present in public life, among the urban and educated population as a rule, as evidenced by the 1981 census according to which the number of Yugoslavs was more than four times greater than in 1971 (from 1.3 percent it had grown to 5.8 percent of the total population). Songs glorifying Yugoslavia, its unity, the brotherhood of its peoples and national minorities, were still being sung in the mid-1980s, while Yugoslavism was promoted mostly through pop culture. The life of “an average Yugoslav” was more noticeable by far in public discourse than in earlier decades. Despite all the problems, everything more or less resembled a society that was certainly not facing the kind of bloody collapse that was soon to follow.

But what was actually hidden deep below the surface and triggered off such a strong eruption? Yugoslavia has left a deep imprint behind it to this very day and it can be assumed that this will be the case for a long time to come and fill all its successor states with strong emotions. The Yugoslav experience cannot be wiped out

just like that and independently of how anyone perceives and values it today. Yugoslavia had a dynamic and extremely complex history like many other countries if not all. What makes it different is the fact that we refer to it – as we do to a handful of other countries that emerged and disappeared in the 20th century – solely in the past tense. This collection of papers is yet another attempt to try and explain the reasons why this is so.

The Yugoslav state emerged in 1918 when Serbia and Montenegro united with the South Slav provinces of a smashed Austria-Hungary on December 1 (they formally united in the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs). The new state was named the *Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes*. This state was created by the unification of the South Slavs whose each and every grouping (people, ethnicity) was at a different stage of identity-building. This process was recognized and acknowledged as rounded off in the case of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians although all three peoples were at a different stage of identity-building. This perception was mirrored in the country's name and in the concept of the people that had united, albeit under three names. The emerging national identities of the Macedonians, Bosniaks and Montenegrins were ignored and their identity-building stalled. In other words, the Serbian political and intellectual elite took for granted that the majority of these peoples belonged to the Serbian part of the three-named nation. The Croatian national program was certainly exempt from most of this thesis, especially in the case of the Muslim population. The concept of the three-named nation was redefined in 1929 under the imposed, decretal Yugoslavism meant to amalgamate all South Slav identities/entities into one and only one Yugoslav nation.

Yet the idea of national unity, the ideal of the existence/creation of a unique Yugoslav nation had emerged from many schools of thought and was accompanied by many different torchbearers, idealists and pragmatists, true believers and heretics, zealots

and dissidents, sincere followers and conformists. And it had its opponents, too. Was it “compromised” by serving centralization and the political dominance by parts of the Serbian political elite or, regardless of this, was the further development of individual national identities a more probable historical process, the real question. History proved the latter to be correct. Why? Were the reasons why simply the consequences of a specific political constellation or the logical outcome of the identity-building processes? Yet again, the argument that Yugoslavia was doomed as a *state project* seems unjustified. On the other hand, the arguments that the different peoples in the “Slav South” made up one single nation were also unjustified, the same as the high hopes that they would one day merge into one nation. Such expectations were simply unrealistic, based only on the idealism of the idealists and the cynicism of the hegemonists. The obvious differences between these two were interpreted as a historical aberration that had to be and could be “corrected” within a new state frame. However, consensus on the character of the common state, mostly seen as a cause promoted by elites of questionable legitimacy, was based on petty politics and never truly reached. Yugoslavism was a factual, if diffuse, idea that lost much of its initial power when rigidly boiled down to a single, decretal formula.

Destroyed in the war that broke out in 1941, burdened by the legacy of ethnically motivated domestic crimes, Yugoslavia was renewed as a federal republic with internal cohesion (brotherhood and unity), cosmopolitanism and the denial of provincialism as the predominant pattern of the party and political elite. The purpose of this pattern was to weaken and pacify nationalist ideologies that had to be overcome through the Yugoslav state frame, with civic identity as a supra-national formula and existing, recognized individual ethnic identities of the Yugoslav peoples (and minorities) rather than their amalgamation. In short, the concept of national unity was discarded, but the state idea was preserved.

This is how the concept of complex identity that implied a national (ethnic) and supra-national (state) component as a guarantee of equality of the peoples that made up a common state, at home and internationally, was systematically built up. Yugoslavism as an identity determiner was thus provided with a realistic content. This was the realistic and largely accepted historical and political legitimacy of the state, based on the common anti-fascist struggle of members of all ethnic (Yugoslav and minority) groups (1941–45), on anti-Stalinism and open conflict with Stalin (948–53), self-management as the authentic Yugoslav road to socialism, non-alignment that ranked Yugoslavia among the torchbearers among a large number of countries that would not accept the Cold War partition of the spheres of interest between Moscow and Washington, and on the emancipation and growth of a social state that opened up avenues to lead its citizens out of poverty and the breadline. From this point of view, Yugoslavia was a historically inimitable, nationally identified, emancipatory and progressive, but also secure, framework for the development of all the nations living in it. The final constitution of the national subjectivity of the Muslims, Montenegrins and Macedonians and a breakthrough in modernization, but at the same time protection from the territorial aspirations of its neighbors testify to the historical significance of the Yugoslav integration.

The de-legitimization of socialist ideology and monopoly of the ruling party (KPJ-SKJ), and the collapse of socialism after 1989 were followed by the disintegration of the Yugoslav state. In the name of democracy (understood as a counterpoint to the existing order), Yugoslavia was demolished under the pretext that “the national question” was “a democratic question,” which would be undeniable were it not assumed that a nationalist response was also – democratic. Yugoslavia was brought down on the nationalist platform and with the unanimous argument that its very existence stood in the way of progress and freedom. The elites of all the

Yugoslav nations found reasons to detect real or ostensible shortcomings that they saw as problematic in their own republics, plus the problems between republics, within the Yugoslav frame. They mostly disagreed about the future concept for the Yugoslav community. The rise of the nationalist perception of federal relations that mostly prevailed among Serbia's elites in the 1980s, backed by the masses finally turned into republican policy created an atmosphere in which the largest republic in Yugoslavia felt certain that, through a series of political offensives, it would manage to enforce constitutional reforms proclaiming the formula of a "modern federation," which no other republic would accept as it implied re-centralization. From Serbia's point of view, there was only one alternative to constitutional reforms that could be summed up in its belief that not even armed conflicts could be "excluded" and "inter-republican borders dictated by the strongest." The sum and substance was that Serbia's elite made it clear that, with the exception of Slovenia, they would not recognize any future internationally recognized status of borders between members of the federation. To realize its vision of Yugoslavia, Serbia counted on the power of the more or less entire JNA (Yugoslav People's Army). Although nationalist responses to the epochal challenges facing Yugoslavia in the late 1980s could be recognized in all the republics, the policy propagated by Serbia's elites and implemented by its regime was a catalyst that, in the form of open threats, galvanized other nationalisms and decided the character and course of Yugoslavia's disintegration. Hence Serbia, during the Yugoslav crisis (when it was over, and in many ways to this day) found itself standing alone and on the opposite side of the other countries that emerged from Yugoslavia's disintegration.

As in the history of the emergence and constitution of the Yugoslav peoples, the history of their "exit" from Yugoslavia evolved in quite different historical circumstances. Each country emerging from Yugoslavia (1991) had to cope with problems only partially

similar to the problems facing the rest as early as the actual process of disintegration. As they were all bent on different goals, the evolution of each and every former Yugoslav republic was singular. And when their shared prospects for membership of the EU finally crystallized, their starting-points were dramatically different. This can only partially be ascribed to Yugoslavia's unbalanced development. Most of the reasons why this was so found their roots in the first half of the 1990s that – with the exception of Slovenia – annihilated almost all the modernization achieved in the 20th century.

The reasons behind the outcome as such and the breakup of the Yugoslav state go much deeper. Their roots lie in the historical continuity of Yugoslav society, politics and economy, in the cumulative experience of the people in the region, and their expectations and the choices they made. These causes are not to be found in simply one point in history when developments took an allegedly inevitable course. However, certain preconditions, the entire range of that society's diverse characteristics, a series of political decisions taken and economic solutions found, the global-historical context and, to some extent, the role of actual figures entitled to make decisions, all this and much more render certain outcomes possible or more probable than others and, finally turned them into reality. This project was developed with the aim of helping to recognize all these causes or at least to hint at them.

This collection of papers has four sections, unequal in size. The first provides an overview of (self) perceptions, realizations and representations of the South Slav communities from the late 18th century onward, of the concept of South Slav similarities and differences, interrelations and a life together, and Yugoslav ideologies and politics in various South Slav national traditions up to 1918. It was written by Drago Rokсандić.

The second section, mostly dealing with political history, is further segmented and logically follows the course of Yugoslavia's

separation – into the constitutive elements of its federalism, except for two provinces, each with notable specificities of its own in the second Yugoslavia. Each chapter – Slovenia (Božo Repe), Croatia (Ivo Goldstein), Serbia (Latinka Perović), Bosnia-Herzegovina (Husnija Kamberović), Montenegro (Šerbo Rastoder), Macedonia (Ljubica Jančeva and Aleksandar Litovski), Vojvodina (Milivoj Bešlin) and Kosovo (Mrika Limani) – is written as a logical overview, but their authors were selected according to the criteria of their research of their subject matter so that they could incorporate their own heuristic capacity into their works. All the texts in this section follow the development of the nations and historical provinces included in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as of 1918, and give brief outlines of the 19th century. The authors first outlined the histories and their constituents in the first Yugoslavia and during the World War II, and then paid due attention to the histories of each republic or province in republican Yugoslavia up to its disintegration in 1991. In most cases, they also summed up the post-Yugoslav period and took stock of the countries under their scrutiny after they left the Yugoslav community. For the first time in our historiography, all the elements of the Yugoslav community were thus scanned, initially and conclusively, in a single volume from longitudinal and multi-dimensional angles.

The third section includes several works that, unlike the second, focus on Yugoslavia as a whole: its society, economy, culture and Yugoslav everyday life. In their contributions the authors tried to encompass the dynamics of the Yugoslav area throughout the 20th century by throwing light on major aspects such as social emancipation, the modernization of society, changes in the social structure, education system, etc. This was the main focus of Srđan Milošević. The economic-historical dimension of the Yugoslav 20th century was analyzed by Vladimir Gligorov. From a secular angle and with a special emphasis on the negative effects of

nationalist impositions on economic policies, he noticed that the series of wrong decisions that hindered the converging process had been badly needed by Yugoslavia to overcome regional differences in economic development, substantively characterized in the economic history of Yugoslavia. In his paper on Yugoslav culture (mostly on the arts) Nenad Makuljević honed in on the complex interaction between culture and politics or, more precisely, on the interaction between the arts and the Yugoslav idea from the mid-19th century, the revolutionary content of this interaction, resistance to the growing ideologization and integration of the arts in socialist Yugoslavia into epochal global trends. For his part, Igor Duda provided an overview of the everyday life of citizens of Yugoslavia, marked by a continuing rise in the standard of living, meeting everyday needs and spending free time. This particularly referred to the second half of the 20th century when people from practically all social strata experienced enormous improvements in their lifestyle of a kind that many Yugoslavs born in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia could not have even imagined as children but which, after just a decade or two, became a reality and a reality for most citizens of Yugoslavia.

Finally, two studies make up the last, fourth, section that deals with perceptions of Yugoslavia. Mitja Velikonja's work focuses on the phenomenon of post-Yugoslavia in the territory of the once common state. Velikonja dissects a variety of discursive practices and narratives about Yugoslavia in the aftermath of its breakup. First he examines the initial *damtatio memoriae*, then the parallelism of memories and their contrariety, the "dialectics of memory and no memory" and instrumentalization of the memory to conclude with the emergence of nostalgia as a "retrospective utopia." As for the study by Tvrtko Jakovina, it provides an overview of Yugoslavia's foreign policy, especially of its major segment – non-alignment.

However, once all the studies, including those not found in this volume, are placed on the Web portal and this collection of papers

goes into print, this project does not end. In fact, this is when its life actually begins. Feedback on this endeavor and reactions to it in all the societies concerned could be as dynamic as the research work itself. No doubt that the results of this project will *a priori* clash with predominant ideological matrixes, especially with the nationalist prejudices of each society in question. Academic circles will also have their say.

The very variety of these research topics indicate the inter-disciplinary and multi-perspective approach to this project. National or ideological plurality is present, though not in the foreground. The multi-perspective aspect of the research was a priority. Just as in this collection of papers and the works placed on the portal, members of the project team tried to strike as much balance as possible in representing all the constituent elements of Yugoslavia. This is the factuality of specific circumstances. Due to various obstacles that are, fortunately, growing fewer and fewer, research into the national histories of the countries emerging from Yugoslavia, as well as the best authorities on these histories, are still concentrated in each of the countries with which this project is concerned. One of the goals of this project is to change this situation in some way and to induce and intensify mutual interest in the histories of neighboring countries. This was why much in this collection of papers deals with some national perceptions that underscore the problems and specific traits of each society that otherwise might be lost in a summarized overview. However, the studies in this volume do not overlook the Yugoslav frame, although they perceive its significance differently. Hence, these are, in fact, histories of Yugoslavia, which, taken as a whole, provide a picture in relief showing the absolute complexity of Yugoslavia's history.

Milivoj Bešlin

Srđan Milošević

|

Manifold Yugoslavisms – How Yugoslav Nations Entered Yugoslavia

YUGOSLAVISM BEFORE THE CREATION OF YUGOSLAVIA

DRAGO ROKSANDIĆ

THE CONCEPT OF (*Yugo*) *Slavism* or *Slavdom* (Yugoslavism or Yugoslavdom) is a neologism of German origin (*Slawentum*) which points to the – by origin and meaning – comparable German concept of *Deutschtum*, Germanness, created around 1770 within the *Sturm und Drang*, (Storm and Stress) movement, that is, during the formative period of modern German nationalism. It was Johann Gottfried Herder (born in Mohrungen on August 25, 1744– died in Weimar on December 18, 1803), who in thinking about the relationship between thought and language, developed the concepts of ‘national genius’ and ‘national language’, thus laying the groundwork for the Romantic concept of the nation. In his philosophical history of mankind, he highly valued the future of Slavdom, and as he was one of the leading German/European thinkers who developed the concept of *Kulturnation*, that is, the model of thinking about nationhood in terms of philological-literary concepts (e.g. “national rebirth”), he is unavoidable in any

attempt to understand the process of the national integration of the majority of (south) Slavic nations. He is all the more relevant in so far as he anticipated the later much developed principles of Slavic interconnectedness and Pan-Slavism. Jan Kollar (Mosovce, July 29, 1793, – Vienna, January 24, 1852), then developed these principles which, in the entire Slavic world – but particularly in the South Slavic – wielded enormous influence (On the Literary Reciprocity of Different Tribes and Dialects of the Slavic Nation, 1837 / *Über die literarische Wechselseitigkeit zwischen den verschiedenen Stämmen und Mundarten der slawischen Nation*).

However, nations, understood primarily as a sovereign people, had in the “long 19th century”, already after the French Revolution of 1789, become historical subjects that had appropriated the experience of the national past, the national present and future, so that (*Yugo*) *Slavism*, too, originally a phenomenon of South Slavic interconnectedness, had conceptually changed its meanings dramatically in different national traditions. From that standpoint, (*Yugo*) *Slavism* cannot be an analytical concept, but nevertheless can be the subject of analysis, including in all its distinct, particular historical manifestations, meaning also as an ideologeme.

Even though *Duden* now interprets *Slavdom/Slavism/Slawentum* as “the character and culture of the Slavs (Wesen und Kultur der Slawen)”, while taking *Germanness / Deutschtum* to mean: “1.the totality of Germanic manifestations of life; German character / Gesamtheit der für die Deutschen typischen Lebensäußerungen; deutsche Wesenart; 2. belonging to the German people / Zugehörigkeit zum deutschen Volk; 3. the totality of German national groups abroad Gesamtheit der deutschen Volksgruppen im Ausland)”, for an historian these definitions are merely “archeological”, since, in a reductionist way, they merely follow the shifts in meaning of both concepts from the 18th to the 20th century. The duty of the historian is to deduce meanings from both text and context. In this regard, something should first be said about

the South Slavic context of Yugoslavism from the perspective of long-term history.

I

Even though the topic of early Slavic “ethnogenesis” is being innovatively debated today (for example, F. Curta, D. Dzino, V. Sokol), the South Slavs are the only Slavs who, at the crossroads of Late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages, were to be found within the borders (limes) of the Roman Empire, settling in the regions between the Mediterranean and the Danube basin. They inhabited regions that by sea and/or land connected and/or separated its western from its eastern parts – the one predominantly Romanized, the other predominantly Hellenized, that is, regions that separated Rome from “New Rome” (Constantinople). Nevertheless, this is a unique and contiguous space in which, according to epigraphic findings, Greek and Latin parts can be found within the same text or, in other instances, Latin texts written with Greek letters can be found. At the same time, this was the only European area that was, after the Slavic migrations and by the end of the first millennium, settled by the last migratory waves of peoples from Eurasian regions (Bulgarians and Hungarians), but also a unique area in which the Romanization of Late Antiquity endured, even where it was weak and relatively the furthest away from its Roman epicenter (Romanians). Furthermore, it was the only European region where, side by side, “Greeks” and “Barbarians”, and “Romans” and “Barbarians” endured simultaneously. It was also unique by the fact that Christianization began very early and ended very late, with numerous jurisdictional, ritual, confessional and ecclesiastical controversies characterizing the shifting borders of the Christian West and the Christian East, which was also marked by deeply rooted paganism, heresy and, from the 15th century onward, its own autochthonic version of Islam. There is in fact no European monotheistic religion that did not

become autochthonic in this region. This was a unique European region that spawned and maintained Glagolitic, Cyrillic, Roman and even Arabic Slavic literacy, parallel with Greek and Latin language culture.

And there is another aspect, perhaps the most important. This was the only European region in which, first, the epicenters of hegemonic power always lay elsewhere, outside of the region itself; and second, from Late Antiquity onwards it was never controlled by only one empire. There was no European or global power in the “long” 19th and the “short” 20th centuries that did not try its hand out in the region, precisely during the era of South Slavic and Balkan national integrations. To all empires this region was peripheral, but also, in different ways and at different times, it was the be all and end all of everything! Between circa 1500 and 1800 the socio-demographic, ethno-demographic and confessional-demographic circumstances in the entire region changed so much and became so complex that the already belated European processes of modernization and national integration among the South Slavs faced challenges that were rarely as great elsewhere in Europe. In a multitude of different versions, already by the 19th century Yugoslavism had far surpassed the limits of concepts, linguistic and cultural practices implied by “Slavic interconnectedness.” However, it became a realistic, but still equally diverse, political option only – in circumstances initiated by World War I – after the empires of the European “ancient regime” had disintegrated (the Habsburg Monarchy, the Ottoman Empire, together with the Russian Empire).

There is no South Slavic nation, or for that matter any other nation in the region, that, from the perspective of the 19th and 20th centuries, did not in their medieval epoch have their own “golden age”. For modern Slovenes it was (the Duchy of) Carantania (626–745 CE), for the Croats it was the era of national lords [end of 8th century to 1102 – King Tomislav (925?), King Peter

Krešimir IV], for the Montenegrins, but also the Serbs, in different ways, the era of the Vojislavljević dynasty [1168–1371 – King Mihajlo Vojislavljević (10770)], for the Serbs again in the era of the Nemanjić dynasty [1168–1371 – King Stefan Prvovenčani (the ‘First-Crowned’ King, in 1217) and Stefan Dušan (emperor in 1346)], for the Macedonians and Bulgarians (also in different ways) Samuel’s Empire (976–1014), for the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, again in different ways, the Kotormanić dynasty [cca. 1250–1463 – duke and king Tvrtko I (1353–1377 and 1377–1391)]. On the other hand, there is no South Slavic nation that does not nurture the tradition of various historical defeats (paradigmatic example – “Kosovo”) and that, during the 19th and 20th centuries, did not aspire towards the national renewal of its erstwhile “greatness”, with the protection and support of one or more of the European or global powers, secular and/or spiritual. At the same time, the mutual borders between the South Slavic peoples always more or less overlapped (and still do), and as far as tradition goes, everything was or could become contentious (ethnicity, language, culture etc.). Furthermore, in contra-distinction to the Middle Ages, the modern South Slavic nations of the 19th and 20th centuries, as soon as they were constituted as territorial nation-states – founded on the principle of inviolable sovereignty – were inevitably faced with the harsh and complex realities of their own societies and cultures. There is hardly any boundary within them – of whatever nature – that coincides with the state boundary! Additionally, precisely because of this complexity, there is no South Slavic nation-state that does not have a polycentric geographical, social, economic and cultural morphology that from the “inside” resists national hegemony tailored to the interests of the epicenter of state and national power.

Yugoslavism was essentially the only attempt among the South Slavs in mid-south-eastern Europe to use endogenic processes from “below” to go beyond the (sub) regional logic of survival

at the periphery of imperial regimes, to secure a better future for all by constituting a multifaceted complex state union according to the measure of its own needs. However, such an ideal type of Yugoslavism never, in fact, existed. It could not have existed anyway, since the dynamics of interconnected changes “externally” and “internally” prevented all nations individually in their development in central and south-eastern Europe. They were forced to earmark large portions of their potential for the armed forces or police units because of the disputes and conflicts within their own borders or with their neighbors, in peace or in war. Once again, Yugoslavism as an alternative saw its first opportunity only when, in the course of World War I, the empires that had previously enjoyed hegemonic status during an extended period of time in the region disintegrated. Nevertheless, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes received its international legitimacy from the powers victorious in the war that had no borders with it (the United States, Great Britain, France), while the one power that had – Italy – was at the same time the single biggest external threat to the international survival of the Yugoslav state. At the same time, with the partial exception of Greece, there was not a single neighboring state with which the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes did not have open or potential territorial disputes. In conclusion, the Yugoslav alternative in mid-south-eastern Europe in its end result could not escape peripheralizing effects – precisely of the kind it was conceived to prevent.

II

With the proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on December 1, 1918 – through the hasty unification of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with the Kingdom of Serbia – the majority of Serbs and Croats, but also, at the time, the majority of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sandžak Muslims, found themselves within the borders of the same, South Slavic state, for

the first time in history. The same was true of the Montenegrins, who, by the unification of the Kingdom of Montenegro with the Kingdom of Serbia at the Podgorica Assembly on November 24 and 29, 1918, entered into the new state deeply divided as a nation. The Slovenes, who were constitutionally recognized – and who were also, like the Croats, vitally short-changed victims of the 1915 Treaty of London – and the constitutionally unrecognized Macedonians, became citizens of the new state only in part. Basically, the Slovenes became citizens through the principle of self-determination, and the Macedonians by the logic of international recognition of the borders of the Kingdom of Serbia in 1913. Macedonians and other residents of Macedonia were denied the right of self-determination, not only by the Serbian side, but also by the Bulgarian and Greek sides. Bearing in mind that the members of the largest national minorities – Albanian, Hungarian, German and Turkish – also became residents of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes without having any say in it, a crucial question – still open for debate even today – is what Yugoslavism meant to each mentioned nationality and to what degree their historical expectations were fulfilled or denied on December 1, 1918?

This question is all the more pertinent also because the so-called Habsburg Monarchy South Slavs (Slovenes, Croats and, to a degree, Bosnians – *trans.*) were deeply involved in the war against Serbia and Montenegro and also played an important role in the occupation regime in these two countries. On the other hand, there were also many Austro-Hungarian South Slavs who participated as volunteers on the Serbian or (Triple) Entente side – something that also needs to be taken into consideration. South Slavic political émigrés from the Habsburg Monarchy from 1914 to 1918, along with the Yugoslav Committee as the key player, but also with the Yugoslav movement among the South Slavic émigrés from Austria-Hungary abroad, essentially modified the picture of World War I as a fratricidal war between the peoples and the nations that in 1918 had

opted to live in a common state. Without this it would have been very difficult to legitimize internationally the character of World War I among the South Slavs as anything but fratricidal.

III

By December 1, 1918, the Croats and Serbs were already old European peoples. All the other, Slavic and non-Slavic peoples within the borders of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were also deeply rooted in the regions of central, south-eastern and Mediterranean Europe, regardless of how and when they were given ethnic attributes or to what degree they were constituted as modern nations at the time of Yugoslavia's establishment. Regardless of their enormous mutual differences, they all held in common the fact that in 1918 they were at the periphery of modernization processes that had in the "long 19th century" transformed the civilizational morphology of Europe and the world. Therefore, the question of history before the establishment of Yugoslavia had, in each individual case, been posed – in the terminology of Koselleck – on the one hand, as a question of cultivating the experience with which each nation joined the new, common state ('*experience*', *Erfahrungsraum*) and, on the other, as a question of their expectations from the newly-proclaimed state at the time of joining it ('*expectation horizon*', *Erwartungshorizont*).

From this standpoint, the problem of Yugoslavism before the creation of Yugoslavia is, above all, a problem of the epoch of constituting the modern South Slavic nations – something that took place from the late 18th century onwards. Yet it is also a problem of the epoch of transformations in Europe and the world through modernization, in the end result, even independently of how and to what extent individual South Slavic communities participated in these processes. Both the cultivated experience and the horizon of expectation are phenomena and processes that demand concrete historical analysis. They are thus subject to both endurance

and change and so the history of Yugoslavism before the creation of Yugoslavia was also subject to change and re-creation in every historical situation, if and when Yugoslavism was at all historically relevant. Therefore, Yugoslavism, in all its different manifestations, was always somewhere in between the experiences of the conceived and the unattained in the historically open-ended South Slavic national-integrative and modernization processes. Just as societies in the Slavic south modernized in a convulsive way, equally so the South Slavic nations went through the process of national integration burdened by a multitude of “delays” when compared to different European models and patterns of integration, at the same time going through various forms of contradictory (self) recognition, inclusion and exclusion, different territorial logic etc. All these phenomena and processes were likewise reflected in the experience and practice of Yugoslavism before the creation of Yugoslavia.

At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that the developmental logic of both the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire from the second half of the 18th century to the beginning of the 20th century could in different ways accelerate and/or delay the processes of modernization and national integration among the individual South Slavic nations – and frequently in contradictory ways [the Ottoman Patriarchate of Peć, 1557–1766, and the Habsburg Metropolitanate of Karlovci versus. the trans-regional dispersion of Serbian Orthodoxy; the Habsburg imperial Illyrian Movement vs.. the ideology of the Illyrian Movement of the Croatian National Revival; the Habsburg-Ottoman trade relations after 1718 vs. the trade and communications networking of the South Slavic countries etc.].

From this viewpoint, the modernization and national integration processes of the Croats and Serbs were more complex as they were the subjects of both empires – of course, much more complex among the Serbs than the Croats, because proportionally

there were many more Serbs on the Habsburg side than Croats on the Ottoman side and because the two autonomous states, and later kingdoms – Serbia and, irrespective of certain reservations, Montenegro – were the main spearheads of national integration. Both were internationally recognized at the Berlin Congress in 1878, Serbia becoming a kingdom in 1882 and Montenegro in 1910. Both had autochthonic dynasties, which in south-eastern Europe of the 19th and 20th centuries was more the exception than the rule (the Petrović, Obrenović and Karađorđević dynasties). None of these dynasties had noble ancestry, which was truly a special case without precedent in the Europe of the time. On the other hand, the Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia (i.e. Triune Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia – *trans.*) was the only entity among the South Slavs that had maintained intact legal-state continuity for practically a millennium, regardless of the fact that after 1102 it was not a recognized international entity and that territorially it was not integrated under the authority of the Habsburgs (1527–1918).

IV

A special research problem is Yugoslavism *avant la lettre*, that is, Yugoslavism before Yugoslavism as it is being discussed in this paper. What are involved here are the phenomena and processes that anticipated (South) Slavic reciprocity/mutuality or (South) Slavic inter-connectedness. It is sufficient for the moment to confine ourselves to several examples.

In 1768, Jovan Rajić (Sremski Karlovci, 11 November 1726 – Kovilj Monastery, 11 December 1801), a theologian, philosopher and, above all, historian educated in Europe, concluded the manuscript of his long, four-volume work with a title without precedent: “A History of Different Slavic Peoples, especially Bulgarians, Croats and Serbians” (*История разныхъ славенскихъ народовъ наипаче Болгаровъ, Хорватов и Сербовъ ...*). After much delay

it was finally published in Vienna in 1794 and 1795, through the perseverance of the Metropolitan of the Karlovac Archbishopric Stevan Stratimirović. Realizing that he could not write about Serbian history if he followed the territorial principle, Rajić opted for a history of the nation – an approach that had already gained legitimacy in European historiography. Having simultaneously in mind the Slavic – but not in the confessional (religious) sense – framework of Serbian history, he joined Serbian history to the history of its neighbors, the Bulgarians and the Croats: “At first, Rajić wanted to connect the history of the Serbs to the history of all Slavic peoples, especially the Russians, but soon had to desist from this plan, confining his narrative to the South Slavs. He went on, in the introduction, to give an overview of knowledge about the Slavic peoples in general, their beginnings and their homeland, their name, language, customs and beliefs, and then moved to present the history of the Bulgarians from the beginning to the fall of the Second Bulgarian Empire, also briefly outlining the history of the Croats. The remainder of the work (three out of four volumes) was devoted to Serbian history...” (Ćirković – Mihaljčić 1997: 614). The secular approach of the work, laid out in the, albeit limited, South Slavic context, was ahead of its time in Serbian culture and Serbian historiography, in terms of a working model and there was no viable alternative to his work for a long time afterwards. It was a Serbian history in a South Slavic context.

When Josip Šipuš (Karlovac, circa 1770 – ?), in his *Basis of the Wheat Trade (Temely xitne tergovine polag narave y dogacsajev)*, published in Zagreb in 1796 – a work otherwise dedicated to Zagreb bishop Maksimilian Vrhovec – opened up the issue of the modern standardization of the Croatian language, he did not confine himself to Croatian linguistic traditions: “Many are familiar with the different ways of speaking (German) by residents in Upper and Lower Saxony, and again how both speak differently from Swabians, Austrians, residents of the Lower Rhine region

(Niederrhein) and the Swiss – they speak differently to such a degree that they can barely understand each other. Nevertheless, their scholars and writers everywhere speak a uniformly pure, compatible and comprehensible language, unified by rules and pronunciation. Our glorious nation, I think, still has a long way to go to such concord. If it were not so dispersed and huge, it would already have disappeared a long time ago, given how forces from every side impede it, and in some cases even destroy it.” (Šipuš 1993: 8, translated by Dr. Mijo Lončarić). Referring to the German linguistic situation and talking about “our...dispersed and huge...glorious nation”, Šipuš was obviously appealing to his readers not to turn a deaf ear – when considering a modern Croatian linguistic standard – to the Slavic incentives that were already coming from people like Josef Dobrovsky (Gyarmat, July 17, 1753 – Brno, January 6, 1829), the Czech philologist, Slavic scholar and key figure of the early Czech National Revival.

With its petition of May 19, 1790, addressed to the Croatian Assembly, the Zagreb Royal Academy of Sciences requested the “powerful protection” of the upper classes and ecclesiastical orders in an appeal to be given university privilege (Sidak 1969: 317–319). The faculty initiated this after the breakdown of the regime of Joseph II and the renewal of constitutionality in the Habsburg Monarchy, as well as in the face of tectonic changes in the European “ancien régime” after the French Revolution of 1789. It did so at a time when it was expected that the Habsburg Army would continue its anti-Ottoman push towards Bosnia and Serbia, which had begun in 1788 and continued through October 8, 1789 when it managed to take Belgrade. In asking for university privileges (extended teaching rights, status for faculty, funds for the university etc. – *trans.*), the Royal Academy argued its case thus: “...if we bear in mind the present circumstances, when serious thought is being given not only to the removal of impediments to science but also to the appointment of citizens of our homeland

to all offices in these kingdoms, and if we also take into consideration future circumstances in which not only those parts of Croatia that still suffer under the Turkish yoke, but also the kingdoms of Bosnia and Serbia – as favorable omens so far seem to indicate – will be liberated and thus that these glorious kingdoms will even be expanded, we consider that it is not only right and useful, but also absolutely necessary to have in our midst a university in which – once impediments to scientific work are removed and once proper funds are secured for its development – our domestic youth will gather in great numbers and acquire an education in all sciences and noble skills enabling them to work in different fields in our homeland” (Sidak 1969: 318). At a time when the nationalism of the Hungarian upper classes was in full swing, and when the preservation of the *status quo ante* was of tantamount importance to the Croatian upper classes, the professors’ faculty of the Royal Academy made its voice heard stating “we are of the view that, with this humble proposal to the upper classes and ecclesiastical orders, we have in part fulfilled our duty as citizens respectfully concerned about the greater good of all”! This was anticipation of the modern Croatian national revival, but in a context that was not exclusively Croatian because it also included the kingdoms of Bosnia and Serbia.

The leading Vienna Slavic scholars of Slovenian and Croatian origin [Jernej Kopitar (Repanj, August 21, 1780 – Vienna, August 11, 1844), Franc Miklošič (Ljutomer, November 29, 1813 – Vienna, March 7, 1891), Vatroslav Jagić (Varaždin, July 6, 1838 – Vienna, August 5, 1923) and Milan Rešetar (Dubrovnik, February 1, 1860 – Florence, January 14, 1942)] exerted great influence on the processes of standardization in the South Slavic languages and especially on the linguistic convergence of Croats and Serbs. In that regard the greatest success was achieved through Jernej Kopitar’s influence on the ingenious autodidact Vuk Stefanović Karadžić (Tršić, November 6, 1787 – Vienna, February 7, 1864) who lived in Vienna

from 1813 until his death in 1864. Karadžić's linguistic reform of the Serbian language, based on the neo-Shtokavian Ijekavian dialect (the eastern Herzegovina dialect of Serbian which Karadžić spoke – *trans.*), radically separated the Serbian language and its Cyrillic alphabet from its Slavic-Serbian tradition, that is, from its organic connection with the Russian language. The much more complex development of the Croatian language in its threefold literary traditions (Chakavian, Kajkavian and Shtokavian), which were more or less interconnected in the early modern period, following the period from 1780 to 1815, was increasingly directed towards standardization based on its own Shtokavian tradition. This opened up the process which, in the period from 1835 to 1850, laid the foundations for the Vienna Literary Agreement between the principal Croatian and Serbian linguists – this being the key initiative in the process of linguistic convergence between Croats and Serbs, Bosniaks and Montenegrins.

V

In the above examples, the implicit '(South) Slavic common horizon' is the precondition for the modern approach to one's own national issues and aspirations, that is, Yugoslavism is the *in statu nascendi* (nascent state) for the period of early nationalism. Still, Yugoslavism cannot be understood only from the perspective of modernization. In the history of South Slavic nations, both in the early modern period and in the "long 19th century", tradition and innovation keep up in equal pace – something that is typical of European fringe countries. 'Common Slavic horizons' coexisted in the Middle Ages in the experience of various Slavic peoples – mainly due to Old Slavic linguistic and cultural traditions, largely immune even to confessional boundaries – only to gain in importance through European influences – which remained strong all the way up to and including the 20th century – in the epochs of humanistic and then baroque Slavic studies.

The Protestant fringe in the history of South Slavs exerted both in the linguistic and also in the cultural sense a crucial influence on the national formation of the Slovenes, the South Slavic nation that in a long historical period maintained itself at the crossroads of European Slavic, Romance and German cultures. Primož Trubar (Rascica, June 9, 1508 – Derendingen, June 28, 1586) – coming of age and maturing in the Slavic, Romance and German worlds at the time of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, in the time of the “Ottoman scare” and, more broadly, the time of the shifting European world view – was not only a Protestant thinker and preacher, but also a humanist who left such an indelible mark on Slovenian culture that it could not be called into question even by the comprehensive re-Catholicization of the Slovenes. However, his work was projected along South Slavic lines and was ultimately the most influential among the Croats.

The Slovenes, as subjects of the Habsburg Hereditary Lands, and the Croats in the ‘*Reliquiae reliquiarum*’ (the ‘leftovers of the leftovers’) of the Croatian Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia after the Ottoman conquest of Slavonia in the late 16th century – *trans.*), were never as close as they were in the period from 1526–27 to 1606, between the enthronement of Ferdinand I as the Croatian King and the Treaty of Zsitvatorok (of 1606), and before and after the Bruce Treaty of 1578 (both treaties were between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans – *trans.*). Intellectual exchange between individuals on both sides of the Croatian-Slovenian border were far-reaching and stimulating, while the South Slavic Protestant imagination barely had limits at a time when everyone all the way down to Constantinople was fair game for conversion, regardless of their faith. Many a strong individual, from both the Croatian and the Slovenian sides, took part in these exchanges. Although they probably would not have existed if there had been no Reformation, one should also not overlook the numerous cultural transfers from both Italy and Germany that had made their

way into Croatia by way of Slovenian mediation before and after the Reformation. Even though the meaning of such mediation changed after the Battle of Vienna (1683–1699), when the borders of the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia shifted eastward to Zemun, they were important at least until the Berlin Congress in 1815.

Mavro Orbini (Dubrovnik, mid-16th century – Dubrovnik, 1611)– even though he was not the first in the early modern era to write about the Slavs – is the founder of the modern understanding of Slavism. In his work “Kingdom of the Slavs” (*Il Regno degli Slavi*, Pesaro, 1601), the spirit of Catholic renewal and erudite culture are amalgamated in a way that far surpasses the boundaries of his initial inspiration by Dubrovnik culture. He set forth a work that in different ways became a point of reference in the culture of all Slavic, especially South Slavic nations. Orbini’s Slavs originate in Old Testament times: “...the father of Japhet, namely, knowing that necessarily there must be three stages of human life and granting each of his sons a profession that would fit the given character of each, made his decision known thus: ‘You, Shem, as a priest will conduct the service of God. You, Ham, will work the land and devote yourself to crafts. You, Japhet, will rule and defend the country as king and be skilled in arms as a soldier’ (...) Thus the Slavs, having descended from Japhet, had always been courageous in arms and had conquered many peoples” (Orbini 1999: 76). Orbini also names all the peoples of his time of Slavic origin: “These peoples of Slavic ethnicity and language are not only those inhabiting Dalmatia, Illyria, Istria and Carpathia, but also other famous and powerful nations like the Bulgarians, the Ras or Rasani (old, medieval Serbs – *trans.*), Serbs, Bosnians, Croats, the inhabitants of the five surrounding mountains (Petogorci, “the Five-Mountain people”), the Russians, Ukrainians (Podolans), Muscovites (a variation of Russians – *trans.*), the Circassians (close to the Macedonians – *trans.*), the Pomeranians (living in southwestern, central Europe near the Baltic Sea – *trans.*)

and those living in the Bay of Veneti (in the Baltic Sea – possibly precursors of the Slovenes – *trans.*) and all the way to the river Laba (present-day Russia – *trans.*). Those that have descended from these nations are called by the Germans, to this day, call the Slavs or the Vendi or the Vindi (Slovenes): ultimately these consist of Lusatian Serbs, the Kasubi (Polish Serbs), Moravians, the Poles, the Lithuanians, the Silesians (inhabiting what is mostly present-day Poland – *trans.*) and the Czechs. In brief, Slavic languages extend from the Caspian Sea to Saxony and from the Adriatic to the North (German) Sea where all throughout Slavic peoples are to be found” (Orbini 1999: 77). Orbini’s baroque Slavic imagology, published at the time of the exhausting Habsburg-Ottoman Long Turkish War (1593–1606), had its South Slavic epicenters as they could be perceived from Orbini’s broad Dubrovnik-based view, which compiled many literary sources from Antiquity and the Middle Ages. It suggests an essentially different understanding of a nation from that suggested by (Johann Gottfried) Herder and as such has remained a lasting fountain of South Slavic inspiration.

The Jesuit Juraj Križanić (Obrh near Ozalj in Croatia, 1617 or 1618 – Vienna, September 12, 1683) undoubtedly contributed the most to the early modern understanding of Slavism as something beyond confessional boundaries (“trans-confessional”). From an early age in his homeland Croatia, he gained first-hand experience of the scope and consequences of Catholic-Orthodox in-fighting. Educated in Ljubljana, Graz, Bologna and Rome, Križanić dedicated his life to the ecclesiastical and cultural unity of the Slavic West and East, and to the support of Russia which he saw, once Europeanized, as the leader of the Slavic nations’ renewal. His huge intellectual output, which did not falter even in the time of his Siberian exile, was overwhelmingly dedicated to his chosen calling. The tragic episodes of his life – the utter misunderstanding which followed him from Rome to Moscow, his Siberian exile, and, finally, his death in Vienna on the very day on which the

Ottoman siege ended – are all a testimony to the fact that he was at odds with his time. Irrespective of just how differently he was perceived by different individuals at different times, he was either the misguided dreamer or the herald of possible different futures. There never would have been Yugoslavism in the “long 19th century” without its dreamers or visionaries.

In contrast to Križanić, his contemporary, the Pauline monk Ivan Belostenec (Joannis Bellosztenecz; Varaždin, circa 1594 – Lepoglava, 1675), spent most of his life laboring on his voluminous “Treasury – A Latin-Illyrian (i.e. Slavic) Dictionary” (*Gazophylacium, seu Latino-Illyricorum onomatum aerarium*; vol. I-II, Zagreb 1740), the first Croatian dictionary to include words in the Kajkavian, Chakavian and Shtokavian dialects – with an emphasis on the Kajkavian dialect. In spite of his seminal role in Croatian culture, Belostenec’s South Slavic vision was constrained by the erudite constructs that came out of the *Pax Ottomanica* (Ottoman Peace) in central south-eastern Europe of the 17th century.

In Belostenec’s dictionary there is even no clear distinction between “Slav” and “Slovene”! *Sclavus* (Slav) is *Szlovenecz* (Slovene – I, 1092), but also *Sclavonia* (Slavonia) is *Szlovenfszki orszag* (Slovenian country, state), while *Sclavonicus* (Slavic) is *szlovenfszki* (Slovenian as *inszlovenfszki jezik*, Slovenian language – I, 1092). A *Szlovèncz* (Slovene) is, on the other hand, *Illyrius*, *Illyricus*, *Sclavus* (an Illyrian, a Slav). A *Szlovènka* (a female Slovene) is *Illyrica mulier* (female Illyrian), *Szlovenfszki Orszag* (Slovenian country) is *Illyrica*, *Illyris*, *Illyrium*, *Illyricum*, *Sclavonia* (Illyria, Slavonia). Finally, *Szlovenfszki* (Slovenian) is *Illyricus*, *Illyricanus*, *Sclavonicus* (Illyrian, Slavic – II, 507).

Additionally, *Croata* (Croat) is *Horvath*, *Hervat*, “(a)ntiquitùs nominabantur Curetes” (“the ancient legendary tribal name” – I, 379). *Croatia*, *olim Crobotia* (Croatia, formerly Crobotia) is *Horvatfszki orszak*, *horvatfszka zemlya* (Croatian state, Croatian country), *y Kralyevsztvò* (the Kingdom – I, 379). *Horvatfszki orpo*

horvatŝki (Croatian) is *Croaticè*, *Illyricè* (Croatian, Illyrian – II, 129). In Belostenec's dictionary, the meanings for Illyrian, Slav and Croat overlap, but it is highly questionable when he is talking about Slovenes as Slovenes, and when Slovenes become Slavonians and even simply Slavs.

Furthermore, *Dalmata* (Dalmatian male) and *Dalmatius* (Dalmatian female) is *Dalmatin*, *Dalmatinka* (Slavic versions of the same), while *Dalmatia* (Dalmatia) is *Dalmaczia*, *Dalmatinŝzki orŝzag* (Dalmatian country – I, 400). As distinct from the mutually overlapping Croats and Slovenes, in Belostenec's dictionary Dalmatians are uniform ('one-dimensional') from Antiquity onwards. Even though his Dalmatia is not a kingdom but a country, he fails to describe its relationship with Croatia proper!

A similar constructivist approach, with its serious, 'epochal' limitations, was also applied in the case of the Bosniaks, Serbs and Bulgarians:

Bosnya Orŝzag (Bosnian country, state) is *Bosna zemlya* (Bosnian country), *Bosnia*, *Misia*, *Regnum Bosniae* (kingdom of Bosnia). *Bosnyak* (a Bosniak)...is *koi je iz Bosnye...* ("he who comes from Bosnia – II, 26).

Raŝtia (Rastia or Rascia – the country of the Ras, 'Old Serbs') is *Thracia* (Thrace – the ancient name given to the south-eastern Balkan region, the land inhabited by the Thracians – I, 1020), while *Thraca*, *Thracia* (Thrace) is *Rasci* (Rasia) or *Valachia magna* (Great Valachia or Walachia – a historical region of south-east Romania between the Transylvanian Alps and the Danube River – *trans.*) or *Vlaski orŝzag* (Walachian country – 1210). *Szèrblyanin* is *Rascianus* (Serbia is Rascia), while *Szèrbŝka zemlya* (Serbian country, land) is *Rascia*, *Servia* (Rascia, Serbia – II, 498) *Ulàh* (Vlach) is *Valachus*, *Rascianus*, *Trax*, *Tracus*, *Thracis* (Walachian, Rascian, Thracian – II, 569).

Bùlgarin (Bulgarian) is *Bugarin*, *Bùgar*, *Bulgarus*, *Maesus* (Moesia), while *Bulgàrŝki zemlya* (Bulgarian country, land) is *Bulgaria*,

Maesia Superior (Greater Moesia – Moesia was an ancient region and later Roman province situated in the Balkans along the south bank of the Danube river. It included most of the territory of modern-day Serbia (without Vojvodina) and the northern parts of the modern Macedonia (Moesia Superior), as well as Northern Bulgaria and Romanian Dobruđa (Moesia Inferior) – *trans.*), *Triball* (Triballi) – an ancient tribe whose dominion was around the plains of modern southern Serbia and western Bulgaria, roughly centered where Serbia and Bulgaria are joined – *trans.* – (II, 34)].

The common denominator of Belostenec’s “etymologizing” is the implicit belief that the (South) Slavs are an autochthonic people in south-eastern Europe. Whether it is viable to connect the ethno-genesis of the South Slavic peoples to their predecessors from Antiquity is still an open question and it certainly did not interest Belostenec as a question in cultural anthropology but rather as an issue of legitimacy in the historical sense. In this he was consistent, and one could say that Belostenec belonged to those scholars who anticipated one of the great issues of Croatian and other South Slavic national integrations in the 19th century – that is, to what degree as a nation they are historically rooted in (the territory of) their own countries. Namely, following the logic of Romantic “primordialism,” those who in the past were firmly rooted (in their territory) could also with greater confidence believe that they would sustain themselves there in the future too.

The interweaving of different types of identity in Belostenec’s work is fascinating because it enables multiple constructs, but also because it opens up the possibility for alternative solutions which could become the binding tissue for all of them. With his pan-Croatianism, formulated in his work *Croatia rediviva* (Croatia revisited), published in Vienna in 1701, Pavao Ritter Vitezović (Senj, February 7, 1652 – Vienna, January 20, 1713) dissolved the dilemmas of scholars like Belostenec and extended the name Croatian to all South Slavs and, in that respect, completed the work

on the first modern history of Serbia, *Serbiae illustrate libri octo* (Eight illustrated books of Serbia).

From 1701, to 1835 – when Ljudevit Gaj (Krapina, July 8, 1809 – Zagreb, April 20, 1872) in Zagreb launched the *Novine horvatzke* (Croatian News) and the *Daniczu horvatzku, slavonzku y dalmatinzku* (Croatian, Slavonic and Dalmatian Morning Star), which, the following year, he had already renamed as *Ilirske narodne novine* (Illyrian National News) and the *Danicu ilirsku* (Illyrian Morning Star) – the process of Croatian national integration explicitly shifted to a program of South Slavic, “Illyrian” linguistic and cultural linking and integration, whilst at the same time not abandoning the class political program of the state and legal unification of Croatian lands: “The ideology of the Illyrian Movement contained and expressed two levels of integrationist impulses, the Croatian and the South Slavic. The latter was most strongly felt on Croatian territory, which was at the core of the dynamic, northern part of South Slavic territory, partly adjoining Slovenian territory and partly overlapping with Serbian territory. The South Slavic idea neutralized strong specific provincialisms... and played an important role in forming the Croatian nation. At the same time, it facilitated the cooperation of Croats and Serbs in Croatia in achieving common interests – the building of institutions needed by a society in its transition from a feudal to a bourgeois society and maintaining the special political position of the “Triune Kingdom” as a bulwark against Hungarian political and national expansionism” (Stančić 1990: 133). In this sense, the Illyrian Movement played both a Croatian international and a South Slavic international role. Irrespective of the fact that its results were contradictory, both amongst the Croats, and amongst the other South Slavs, especially the Serbs and Slovenes, there is no doubt that the Illyrian Movement opened up, in a concrete historical way, the issue of what should and could be the processes leading to the establishment of modern South Slavic nations

and the development of modern societies in general. In different ways, this issue was of vital importance to all South Slavic nations. The practical, political effects of this movement were visible in the spring of 1848. Even though the idea of “Austro-Slavism” – a South Slavic synonym for Yugoslavism – as a liberally based project of the (con) federal, constitutional reform of the Habsburg Monarchy, remained only at the level of political aspirations of the South Slavic national elites, (Yugo) Slavism, which conceptually soon marginalized the concept of Illyrism, achieved legitimacy in circles in favor of South Slavic integration, especially in Croatia. Not even the many controversies associated with this concept would question this all the way up to 1918.

The name Illyrian was contentious both amongst Serbs and amongst Slovenes, and Teodor Pavlović (Karlovo – today Novo Miloševo – February 14, 1804 – Karlovo, August 12, 1854), the editor of *Serbskoga narodnog lista* (Serbian National Paper) – as much as he supported “pan-Slavic literary interconnectedness” – also emphasized: “Let the Krajnci (Slovenians) be the Krajnci; the Horvats (Croats) the Horvats, and the Srbliji (Serbs) individually; but when we talk about all of them together, let us call ourselves as we by nature do and must call ourselves: of one tribe born, dear brother Yugoslavians and Yugoslavs!” (Novak 1930: 78–79).

The experience of the simultaneous Serbian coming-of-age in respect to national integration both as Habsburg and Ottoman subjects – which, on the one hand, implied dynastic/monarchic loyalty, and on the other, an agrarian revolution reduced to a bureaucratic nation-state – is reflected in the critical questioning of the socialist Svetozar Marković. He was a decisive advocate of the federalist resolution of the Serbian national issue and the national issue of every other nation that overlaps and intermingles with the Serbs: “The Serbian people are so positioned as to intermingle with the Bulgarians, Croats and Romanians, while two of these nations, the Bulgarians and the Croats, are their closest

relatives by blood and language. Where are the frontiers of ‘the united Serbs’, of the new Serbian state? This is difficult to achieve, if we do not wish to get into conflict with all these peoples. (...) The Serbian people have no geographic or ethnographic boundaries which would set it apart as a unique whole. In order to create a state of five to five and a half million Serbs, the Serbian people would have to make enemies out of the Bulgarians, Croats and Romanians. They would have to take on the role of conqueror, as the Hungarians are doing today.”

When the Croatian national elite accepted the Yugoslav name, it accepted it more consistently than any other South Slavic national elite, but it should also be emphasized that it did so with the support of many influential Serbs, mainly from Croatia, but also – and not too rarely – with the support of the Slovenes, and in other parts as well. From the Society for Yugoslav History (*Društva za povjestnicu jugoslavensku*, 1850), and the Archive of Yugoslav History (*Arkiva za povjestnicu jugoslavensku*, 1851), via the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts (*Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti*, 1866) – established in great part by the donation of Đakovo bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer (Osijek, February 4, 1815 – Đakovo, March 8, 1905) – all the way up to the Yugoslav Committee (*Jugoslavenski odbor*, 1915–1919), which was made up of influential Croats, Serbs and Slovenes, war refugees from the Habsburg Monarchy including Frano Supilo (Cavtat, November 30, 1870 – London, September 25, 1917) and Ante Trumbić (Split, May 15, 1864 – Zagreb, November 17, 1938), Yugoslavism as a concept, a cultural and/or political program, a practice and above all a vision realized itself in many contradictory forms amongst primarily Croats but also other South Slavs in the Habsburg Monarchy, as well as outside its borders, above all in Serbia and Montenegro. However, the short-lived State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (October 29 – December 1, 1918) did not choose the Yugoslav name as its own, nor did it become the name of the Kingdom

of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (December 1, 1918), up until the royal ‘octroyed’ (or ‘granted’) acts of October 3, 1929, when the dictatorship of King Alexander I invalidated the project of the common Yugoslav state. The true motive for evading the Yugoslav name in 1918 was to formally disguise what was in reality a unitaristic project, while in 1929, by conceding the Yugoslav name, the intention was to formalize a deception which no longer had any real bearing on the national interests of the Yugoslav peoples.

VI

As far as the geographic aspects of South Slavic national integration in the “long 19th century” are concerned, Yugoslav studies and ideologies were particularly focused on – what we would call today – economic geography and ecology. Here it is important to bear in mind that at the time autochthonic ideas about the South Slavic world were already taking shape on the margins of the Dinaric-Pannonian basins, also in large part on the boundaries between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire and were strictly monitored by the “sanitary cordons” (*Sanitatscordon*) of the Military-Krajina buffer regions, practically until the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878. Ljubljana, Zagreb and Belgrade are cities along the Sava River and whatever separates them, they had in common that they mutually recognized each other by way of urbanity and by way of ethnicity – at least from 1840 onwards – as the epicenters of events in the South Slavic north and south, along the Danubian and the Adriatic routes. Ljudevit Gaj was the first who programmatically, linguistically and culturally integrated the area from the Julian Alps to the Black Sea, from the west to the east, endowing the Croatian national renewal (i.e. Illyrian Movement) with a Yugoslav meaning. (1835–1848). However, it was only in the latter part of the 19th century that the conservative national élites, confronted with the great challenges of European-wide modernization, would begin

to realize that less than a third of the mostly northern South Slavic territories were agriculturally fertile flatlands, while two thirds consisted of mountainous terrain, significantly less agriculturally productive, with limited lines of communication and very few natural thoroughways from the plains to the Adriatic Sea, and without waterways that led into this sea. In these areas, there was not enough drinking water to sustain concentrated populations and larger livestock funds. These were problems confronting all South Slavic peoples except for the Macedonians integrated into the Vardar-Aegean plains, who, in any case, were not capable, during the better part of the 19th century, of developing larger urban areas or huge livestock funds – especially since, as Ottoman subjects up until 1912–13, they were also confronted by various challenges from the Bulgarian and Serbian, but also Greek and Albanian sides. If there was a geographic basis to the South Slavic/Yugoslav issue, it could only be concerned with the pro-modernizing and pro-national-integration transversal and longitudinal networking of territories to the north and south of the Middle-European-Adriatic basins, between the sub-Danubian and Adriatic regions, predominantly in the mountainous areas of the Balkan Peninsula.

The ideologues of South Slavic/Yugoslav cooperation sought the economic basis of Yugoslavism primarily in agrarian economics, and even if they had anticipated industrial economics, they were more focused on the development of the state rather than on the development of entrepreneurship, driven more by the fear of mass pauperization than by the transitional processes leading to capitalist economics. Agrarian economics and rural culture were dominant in South Slavic societies up until the socialist modernization and industrialization in the second half of the 20th century, but the social and economic types were very different, from the Habsburg Hereditary Lands in the north-west to the tribal communities in the south-east, and from classic Ottoman serf-like relations to the agrarian economics and rural culture of the free

farmers in traditional communities in autonomous/independent Serbia. It was very difficult to project any kind of common, stable South Slavic state on that basis. Therefore, the ideologues of South Slavic/ Yugoslav cooperation advocated a different approach. The German *Drang nach Sudosten* (lit. “thrust towards the south-east” i.e. the former German policy of eastward expansion – *trans.*), Italian irredentism, as well as all the other grand national programs of the South Slavic neighbors, provided more than sufficient reason for the South Slavs to defend their vital, common interest, crucial for their future, together, in a common Yugoslav state, within or outside of the borders of the Habsburg Monarchy. After the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, that began in part as a reaction to Italy’s war against the Ottoman Empire, this issue came to a head and its resolution depended on the great powers which were ready for such an outcome because of their numerous other interests.

On the eve of 1914, Jovan Skerlić (Belgrade, August 20, 1877 – Belgrade, May 15, 1914) was one of the Serbian ideologues of integral Yugoslavism as the South Slavic response to the challenges of the “age of empires”, but also as the guarantee of successful Westernization, advocating – among other things – a compromise in linguistic unification (neo-Shtokavian Ekavian plus Roman script). As a huge authority in Serbian culture, he was also a leading influence on the political beliefs of many, especially the young generation.

In contrast to Skerlić, his contemporary Dimitrije Tucović (Gostilje at Zlatibor, May 13, 1881 – Vrače Brdo near Lazarevac, September 20, 1914), a Marxist and social-democrat, was consistently against all trans-national projects that legitimize the hegemony of one nation over another. In his work “Serbia and Albania: A Contribution to the Critique of the Serbian Bourgeoisie’s Policy of Conquest” (*Srbija i Arbanija. Jedan prilog kritici zavojevačke politike srpske buržoazije*, Beograd 1914), he wrote things which today seem like prophecy: “We dealt here in detail with the Albanian

issue driven more by practical needs than theoretical interests. The Albanian policy of our government ended in defeat which cost us many lives. In that respect, even greater sacrifices await us in the future. The policy of conquest pursued by the Serbian government towards the Albanian people has created such relations on the western border of Serbia that peace and a normal state of affairs can hardly be expected anytime in the near future. At the same time, this policy has pushed Albania into the hands of two major powers that have the greatest interest in the Western Balkans – and every consolidation of any outside capitalist state in the Balkan Peninsula represents a serious danger to Serbia and the normal development of all the Balkan nations.” He was also deeply convinced that relations between the South Slavic and Balkan nations must develop along (con) federal lines and, in the long term, be secured through the socialist transformation of all of them. However, the outcome of World War I was such that the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes became a problem the moment it was established, both within its borders, but also outside them.

None of the states established by Versailles after 1918 was a (con) federation. Even though the key players in this order were liberal democracies (the United States, Great Britain and France), practically none of the newly – established states – with the possible exception of the Czecho-Slovak Republic – was a liberal democracy. Although all of them emerged from the experience of life in multi-national empires, none of them consistently respected the imperatives of multi-nationality. Moreover, Weimar Germany was, with respect to its constitution, incomparably more centralized than the *Deutsches Reich* (one army, centralized fiscal authority etc.): “The German Republic from 1919 was thus potentially much stronger than the Reich from 1871 ever was” (Simms 2016: 287). Thus all who participated in the establishment of the Yugoslav state as a state based on Woodrow Wilson’s principles

were obviously mistaken, since the only formula that in the civic sense could have been sustainable was a federal one, one that the victorious side did not recommend even to vanquished Germany. Bearing in mind that World War II was in many respects a continuation of World War I, the Yugoslav state was an anomaly. Its reconstruction was possible based only on radically different assumptions.

In 1996, John Lampe published a book of synthetic analysis called *Yugoslavia as History. Twice There Was a Country* (1996), reminding readers that the Yugoslav state had disappeared in 1941, only to be re-established, after the hell of war from 1941 to 1945, and then, in 1991/1992, only to disappear again in the whirlpool of war and violence from 1991 to 1995. Therefore the question that for all researchers is all the more intriguing is how it was possible, after everything that had burdened relations between the peoples and nations of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes / Kingdom of Yugoslavia from 1918 to 1941, and the terrible human degradation and deprivation of the occupied Yugoslav territories from 1941 to 1945, to renew Yugoslavia as a federal state with a political monopoly by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia/ League of Communists of Yugoslavia?

The paradox was all the greater since the Yugoslav communists were the only ones, after the capitulation of the Yugoslav Royal Army in April 1941, in the process of the establishment of occupational and collaborationist régimes, to declare a willingness to universally lead the resistance against occupation and collaboration and for the renewal of Yugoslavia as a community of nations. Namely, they were banned and literally outlawed in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1920/1921, subject to state terror and proscribed in dominantly anti-communist public opinion, including the opposition. In 1941, in terms of strength, they were a barely discernible force. No one who knew anything about them could doubt that their determination to lead armed resistance was

not motivated by restorational but by revolutionary inspiration. “Never a return to the old!” was the message to all who were invited to join them. This was ultimately a message to all those who in the previous Yugoslavia felt deceived and betrayed and who did not rule out the possibility of a better, more just world. The second message, “brotherhood and unity”, was directed at all who, for whatever reason, felt marginalized and denied in their human, civic and national rights and who did not exclude the same rights for others. This alternative was so radical that the national-liberation resistance to occupation and collaboration could not avoid being burdened on its margins by civil war. However inclusive this communist – inspired, national-front mobilization, it had to be selective in order not to lose its credibility. The brakes failed seriously for the first time at the moment of “victory”. Revanchism against the vanquished, however limited, had far-reaching consequences, as did every other repressive campaign, with loss of human life or without it, which ensued all the way up to the dissolution of the SFR Yugoslavia in war. Even though in terms of modernization and level of civilization, socialist Yugoslavia did achieve results and values that were without precedent in the history of South Slavic nations, it did not manage to create a political culture and a political system capable of withstanding the pressures of internal and external crisis.

To Lampe’s insights we could add a *post scriptum*, namely, the year 1999, as well as numerous other phenomena in the “Western Balkans” and in the “region” that still confront us with disturbing uncertainties. Tragedies and traumas are everyday occurrences for millions of people, former citizens of the SFR of Yugoslavia and the many and varied transitions from the proscribed (socialist) “uniform thinking” seem endless. While Slovenia and Croatia have managed to become members of the European Union, it is still a huge open question whether any other state that emerged from the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia will manage to enter

into its full membership, even though the majority of the population in all of them wants this. Simultaneously, the recognizable contours of a repeated transformation of the “Western Balkans” into a global field of imperial confrontation are increasingly visible. There is nothing new under the sun in the Balkans.

* Given that in the literature devoted to the Yugoslav heritage of the different nations that made up Yugoslavia at the time of its dissolution there is considerable discussion about the history of Yugoslavism before the creation of Yugoslavia, the author of this paper – written after the above – mentioned works – decided upon a textbook-like, individually-profiled review of the “big topics”.

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II

Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives

The Bosniaks, the Croats and the
Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Their
Experiences of Yugoslavia

IN PERMANENT GAP

HUSNIJA KAMBEROVIĆ

NOW THAT INTEGRATION into Europe is on the public agenda, the discourse in Bosnia-Herzegovina is tending to build up a narrative about Bosnia-Herzegovina that is not actually integrating but returning to Europe from which it was “torn away” when it joined the Yugoslav state in 1918. Similar narratives, characteristic of Croatia and Slovenia, may have found their way into Bosnia-Herzegovina too. Indeed, what happened to Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1918 up to 1992, and was it really “abducted” from Europe where, as part of the Habsburg Monarchy, it had spent the last decades of the 19th and first decades of the 20th century? Has Bosnia-Herzegovina returned to the Balkans since 1918, where it had been up to 1878 and wherefrom, now in the early 21st century, it is trying to join Europe or – in line with this new narrative – is it once again “making a break” for it? What, in this sense, are Bosniak, Croat and Serb experiences of Yugoslavia and what memories of Yugoslavia are they building in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

**BETWEEN THE STATE OF SLOVENS,
CROATS AND SERBS AND THE KINGDOM
OF SLOVENS, CROATS AND SERBS**

They experienced Yugoslavia differently. The Bosniaks and the Croats joined Yugoslavia in 1918 after centuries of life in multi-ethnic empires. The Bosniaks experienced the Ottoman Empire as their own, while the Croats mostly saw the Habsburg Monarchy as best suited to their national interests as a whole. Bosnian Serbs mostly nourished bad memories of these two empires. Hence, Yugoslavia was for them a state best suited to their national interests in toto. These all seem to be the starting points for Bosniak, Serbian and Croatian understanding of the very act of establishment of the Yugoslav state in 1918. “A Bosniak is never satisfied with anything. He is a threesome. What suits a Croat is unacceptable to a Muslim or a Serb, and the other way round. The Muslims aim for some kind of autonomy and integration into Hungary, at least most of them do, the Serbs yearn for some kind of Serbian state, while the Croats want to be incorporated into Croatia,” said General Stjepan Sarkotić, head of the administration for Bosnia-Herzegovina, at an audience with Emperor Karl in the spring of 1918.

And yet, though the true will of the people in Bosnia at the time regarding the establishment of the state of Yugoslavia is hard to determine, the standpoints of the political elites (or whoever today believes that they belong to this group) about the issue can at least be outlined.

The end of World War I left the Muslim political elite totally disoriented. Although historical processes clearly indicate that great monarchies – and thus the Habsburg Empire – were nearing their end, in 1917 Muslim politicians submitted to Austrian Emperor Karl a memorandum in which they dreamed of Bosnia-Herzegovina with a special autonomous status within the monarchy! At the time everyone was involved in the creation of a new state, including a section of the Muslim youth that, under the

influence of various structures from Serbia, had already joined youth movements bent on destroying the monarchy, the great majority of Muslim politicians looked upon the falling monarchy as Bosnia-Herzegovina's future! It was only in September 1918 that they came to accept the Yugoslav idea and caught the train that took them to the proclamation of the Yugoslav state. Having wandered for a long time and been quite at a loss during World War I and having vegetated on the political margins at the time that the state was being created, in the autumn of 1918, this elite finally managed to recognize the main course of history and accept the fact that a new state had been established. According to records, as early as spring 1918 the reis-ul-ulema Jamaluddin Čaušević, a Muslim religious dignitary, told Dr. Anton Korošec

that he supported the establishment of a Yugoslav state, saying, "Do whatever you have to do, and I will stand by every action that brings freedom to our people. I am fed up with our own, Turkish and German rule." His views were compatible with those of Muslim political leaders whom only developing circumstances pushed onto the "Yugoslav train." An analyst from Sarajevo is likewise on record as writing that Muslims were somewhat anxious about what awaited them in the new, Yugoslav state, their qualms deriving, among other things, from their traditional struggle for Bosnia's autonomy throughout history – their "desperate ... struggle against the entry of foreign troops into Bosnia, as testified by the struggle against the entry of Austrian troops in 1897." "No wonder, therefore, that some felt uneasy anticipating the entry of the Serbian army, for they misguidedly saw it as a foreign army of occupation." Besides, the literature often quotes an argument justifying Muslim fears of life in a Yugoslav state: an alleged statement by Stojan Protić promising an easy solution to the Muslim question saying, "Once our army has crossed the Drina river we shall give the Turks twenty-four hours, or even forty-eight, to convert to the faith of their ancestors. Those refusing to obey will be beheaded,

as happened in Serbia earlier.” Although proved beyond any doubt to be a fabrication, at all crucial moments in the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina that statement was brought up as clear evidence that the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be, from the very beginning of the Yugoslav state, cast in the role of poor wretches. But the Muslim elite overcame these fears and shortly after Serbian troops entered Bosnia-Herzegovina in early November 1918 honored them with a special, magnificent banquet in the Officers, Club in Sarajevo. The guests were served “perfectly prepared dishes of Bosnian-Muslim cuisine.” Along with other social celebrities of Sarajevo at the time, the “flower of Muslim citizenship and intelligentsia” attended the ceremony. The Croatian political elite in Bosnia-Herzegovina – having long dreamed of a triadic system in the Habsburg Empire only to realize later how unrealistic that idea had been compared to the predominant Yugoslav idea – also joined in the process of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s unification with the Yugoslav state. All Croatian political groups, including leading circles of the Catholic Church in Bosnia-Herzegovina, backed the “Yugoslav solution.” Together with Serbian political representatives, Croatian politicians also clearly demonstrated this support at a meeting with Hungarian prime minister Count Istvan Tisza in September 1918 when, in a special memorandum, they cast their vote for Yugoslav unification. Shortly afterwards, even the Catholic Church in Bosnia-Herzegovina issued a circular calling on its believers and the priesthood to be “loyal to the new authorities” and did not label the entry of Serbian troops into Bosnia-Herzegovina as a form of occupation. “The people need not be afraid of them. They should be told that this is not a hostile occupation, but that the Serbian troops have come at the request of our authorities, to put an end to plundering and other illegal acts...”

Serbian political and religious leaders were the most actively involved in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s unification with Serbia. Torn between the idea of Bosnia’s unification with Serbia in a common

state and that of broader Yugoslav unification, the Serbian political elite in Bosnia-Herzegovina preferred the latter. Serbian political representatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina had worked for the Yugoslav Committee in London, while in Bosnia-Herzegovina proper several outstanding Serbian politicians – of whom the most active were Vojislav Šola, Šćepan Grđić and Danilo Dimović – had endeavored to come closer to their Croatian counterparts (Jozo Sunarić, Đuro Džamonja, Vjekoslav Jelavić and others) and strengthen the Yugoslav movement. When their dream came true in late 1918, the main objective of the Serbian political elite was attained: a large state incorporating the majority of Balkan Serbs was established. “God bless the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes,” said the Metropolitan of Sarajevo Evgenije Letica on December 5, 1918 rejoicing at the establishment of the Yugoslav state.

All in all, regardless of some assistance from Serbian and Croatian figures and, by the end of the process, from a small group of Muslim politicians from the circle of Mehmed Spaho and Halid-beg Hrasnica, both of them young and barely influential at the time, Bosnia-Herzegovina was not a major factor in the establishment of this state in 1918. Besides, it did not join the Yugoslav state in 1918 in the same manner as Vojvodina and Montenegro, which had first united with Serbia and then with Croatia and Slovenia. Bosnia-Herzegovina entered the Yugoslav state in a roundabout way – through the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs that brought together Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This creation, though termed “a state,” functioned in October and November 1918 without internationally recognized sovereignty and by its character was more of a provisional rather than a real state. It had, however, functional institutions of provisional government, in which representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina were included. The Committee of the People’s Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs /SCS/ constituted on October 5, 1918 in

Zagreb with the participation, from Bosnia-Herzegovina, of Serbian and Croatian politicians (Danilo Dimović, Đuro Džamonja, Kosta Majkić, Jozo Sunarić and Vojislav Šola) addressed Serbian and Croatian leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina, saying that Bosnia-Herzegovina would have 18 deputies in the Plenary Council (8 Serbs, 4 Croats and 6 Muslims). Still, out of the six planned Muslim members, only two were elected to the Council (Hamid Svrzo and Mehmed Spaho). Dr. Halid-beg Hrasnica was only later added to the list.

The People's Council of SCS for Bosnia-Herzegovina was established in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is much controversy about the exact date of its establishment, but what can be said with certainty is that the event took place before October 24, 1918 when the Main Committee of the People's Council of SCS for Bosnia-Herzegovina initiated the formation of territorial committees. Gligorije Jeftanović was the president of the Main Committee, and Jozo Sunarić and Halid-beg Hrasnica vice-presidents. At the suggestion of the Main Committee, the Central Committee of the People's Council of SCS decided on October 30, 1918 in Zagreb that "the Presidency of the People's Council of SCS should be in touch (...) with the People's Council in Sarajevo about members of the government." Svetozar Pribičević told the meeting of the Central Committee that Atanasije Šola from Sarajevo had informed him that they "were waiting for a decision by the People's Council before assuming power." At a meeting on November 3, the Central Committee discussed the issue and approved the appointment of "autonomous authorities (...) in Bosnia," which meant that the People's Government for Bosnia-Herzegovina had been formed in the meantime. Atanasije Šola was at the head of the government made up of 11 ministries. Six members of his Cabinet were Serbs, four were Croats and one was a Muslim. On November 1 the government formally assumed office in Bosnia-Herzegovina from Stjepan Sarkotić and already on November 3 sent a

special diplomatic mission to Višegrad to talk to the commander of the Serbian Army about the role Serbian troops should play in the establishment of law and order in Bosnia-Herzegovina at a time when the “old regime” was falling apart while the new one was barely effective. On November 6, 1918 Serbian troops arrived in Sarajevo.

It is interesting to follow the relationship between the People’s Government for B-H and the Zagreb-seated People’s Government of SCS. When the establishment of the Government of People’s Council of SCS for B-H was decided, Matko Laginja, politician, lawyer and the Council’s commissioner for Istria, argued that in the State of SCS all institutions should comply with the Central Government in Zagreb and, in that context, put an emphasis on the government in B-H. “The Bosnian Government can only be a branch office of the Central Government. No government should be special.” Was this really the case?

When Dr. Mate Drinković, the commissioner for defense in the People’s Government of SCS in Zagreb, delegated some of his officers to “keep law and order” in Bosnia, Sarajevo responded promptly. The meeting of the People’s Government for B-H of November 10, 1918 communicated to him that there was nothing for these officers to do in B-H given that they (the government) had invited the Serbian Army and its commander Duke Stepa Stepanović whose troops had already entered B-H and they had been enforcing law and order. Therefore, the communication quotes, the government in Sarajevo is returning these officers, suggesting to the Zagreb-seated government “to deploy them, at your convenience, to keep law and order in Yugoslav regions in need of their services.” “Some of the officers who had come to Sarajevo at the order of the government in Zagreb, i.e. Defense Minister Mate Drinković, the government in Sarajevo will be put at the disposal either of the armed forces or the commanders of the Serbian Army.” Establishment of any army whatsoever, concluded the government in

Sarajevo, would be met with disapproval by the people and, therefore, “we deem that such an attempt should not even be made... Serbian troops will be keeping law and order here.” In conclusion, the communication asks the Zagreb-seated government to “seek the consent of the People’s Government for Bosnia-Herzegovina or at least of a member of the People’s Council in Bosnia-Herzegovina prior to taking such major decisions so as to avoid any misunderstanding.”

This shows how far the government in Sarajevo relied on the Serbian Army, although B-H entered the Yugoslav state in 1918 through the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs rather than via direct unification with Serbia as proposed by the Serbian Government. The Serbian government’s plans for B-H’s direct unification with Serbia rather than through the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs are substantiated in many writings as well as in the many telegrams local authorities sent to the Serbian government calling for direct unification with Serbia regardless of the views of the Central Committee of the People’s Council of SCS in Zagreb. On the grounds of these documents some researchers have argued that the people in B-H were delighted with the arrival of Serbian troops and prospects for unification in a Yugoslav state.

FACING NEW REALITIES

The very act of proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on December 1, 1918 was not accompanied by any grand manifestations of excitement by the masses in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Whether or not the common people were aware of this piece of news also remains disputable. The fact that telegrams advocating direct unification with Serbia were sent to Belgrade from some parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina even after December 1, when the new state had already been proclaimed, leaves room for various interpretations, not only of the identities of the authors of those telegrams but also of the state of affairs in the field after

unification. The common people had other worries. Serbian peasants were making use of the time of instability and rather inefficient government to maltreat landowners and seize their lands, Muslim landowners were looking for a way to protect their own lives, while the common people were just trying to survive the cold winter of hunger.

Still, the question of the position of some religious and ethnic communities, but also of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole, in the newly-formed Yugoslav state was raised. Formally, all religious communities were equal before the law. It took time, however, for that equality to prove itself in real life. Religious communities were subject to political influence throughout the life of the First Yugoslavia, and the agrarian reforms had a greater effect on the Islamic religious community and the Catholic rather than on the Orthodox Church. The Orthodox Church cooperated closely with the state, given that their views about the necessity of centralization coincided.

The state mainly controlled the activity of the Islamic religious community, except for the first decade when this community retained its autonomous status from the Habsburg era. For its part, the Islamic religious community demonstrated its loyalty to the state. This was most evident in reis-ul-ulema Jamaluddin Čaušević's address to Regent Alexander during his visit to Sarajevo in 1920. "Your Royal Highness," he said, "allow me to emphasize in this solemn hour that the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina truly love your Royal Highness and the entire noble house of the Karađorđević dynasty. I am obliged by my love for the homeland to stress that the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina would like to see the noble person of Your Royal Highness as the source of their full equality and equity!"

The attitude of the Catholic Church was approximately the same. During the Regent's visit in 1920 Archbishop of Sarajevo Ivan Šarić emphasized Bosnian Catholics' loyalty to the new

state and their endeavor for “a wonderfully prosperous and even more glorious Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.” Nevertheless, regulation of the status of the Catholic Church was beset by many problems as testified by the failed Concordat project with the Vatican.

Though formally equal, some communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina were faced with multiple challenges in everyday life after the proclamation of unification. Muslim landowners were badly affected by agrarian reforms, the Muslim and Croat populations were subject to plunder and assaults, especially in the borderland with Montenegro, and political elites organized in parties by religion and ethnic origin – with the exception of the Communist Party, which prioritized social issues over religious and national – were preoccupied with debates on the number of seats in provisional representational institutions, not because they believed that this number proved Bosnia-Herzegovina’s actual position in Yugoslavia, but rather, as they saw it, as a way to best represent the religious and ethnic interests of the communities they stood for. Bosnia-Herzegovina had 42 representatives in the Provisional People’s Representation (PNP) of the Kingdom of SCS. However, they did not act as a single delegation advocating the interests of B-H. Instead, they advocated the interests of the parties that had delegated them, many of which had their seats outside Bosnia-Herzegovina. They participated in the Yugoslav Club (members of the Yugoslav Democratic Party and the Croatian People’s Party) and the Radical and People’s Club (members of the Croatian People’s Community), but some of them were also in the Non-Partisan Club.

Bosnia-Herzegovina’s status in Yugoslavia was defined in the St. Vitus Day Constitution of 1920, the declaration of which had obtained the support of B-H political parties. The Constitution provided centralism. The reasons why representatives of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization – the political party mostly standing

for the social, political and religious interests of the Muslims, and originally for federalization of the state – voted in the highly centralist Constitution as such, have been the subject of a lengthy public debate. No doubt that one of the reasons for their support was that the government had promised to respect the historical borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina when organizing the administration, i.e. to protect its territorial integrity. The promise was met under Article 135 of the Constitution but the loose wording of the provision left room for some municipalities and even districts to integrate with other regions if so decided by 3/5 of the vote in the Assembly. Consequently, it happened that the Constitution and the subsequent law on the state's division into 33 regions – 6 of which related to Bosnia-Herzegovina within its historical borders – provided territorial entirety for Bosnia-Herzegovina but, at the same time, opened the door to disintegration of that entirety. And, indeed, this is what happened in 1929, though not through the possibility allowed by the constitutional provision, but at the time of dictatorship when the Constitution was suspended. This was the first time Bosnia-Herzegovina was territorially dismembered in the Yugoslav state and it was also the first partition in the period between the two world wars that scarred the Bosniaks' memory of Yugoslavia as a state openly hostile to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Under the law of October 3, 1929 on the state's name and division into administrative regions, Yugoslavia was divided into nine banates (or, *banovina*) and Bosnia-Herzegovina into four (*Vrbanjska, Drinska, Savska and Zetska banovina*). Two banates out of the four had seats outside B-H, and the Muslims were in the minority in each (the Serbs were in the majority in three banates and the Croats in one). This fact was played on in subsequent political activity, but also in political propaganda and publishing – even in scholarly books – to emphasize the anti-Muslim and anti-Bosnian character of the state's administrative division, and anti-Bosnian and anti-Muslim dimension of the new policy of integral

Yugoslavianism. This division certainly signaled abolition of the provincial specificity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, preserved for some time after 1918. More importantly, as the border at the Drina river was annulled, the latter found itself almost in the midst of the *Drinska Banovina*.

Between the two world wars, the Bosniaks were notably concerned with Bosnia-Herzegovina's specificity. Ever since the establishment of the Yugoslav state their policy was to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina's entirety and the main promoter of that policy was the Yugoslav Muslim Organization. In the mid-1930s, following the dictatorship (either overt or covert) the Bosniaks established the Movement for the Autonomy of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, and in opposition to the ideas of autonomy advocated by the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, there emerged another movement formed by some Muslim and pro-Croatian politicians and led by Hakija Hadžić. The Movement cooperated with Bosnia-Herzegovina's Croats active in the Croatian People's Movement and its leader Vladko Maček. As Maček put it once, the objective of his Movement was to unite Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia on "the grounds of the Croatian ethnic majority" (according to him, Catholics and Muslims made up the Croatian community). "Should this turn out to be impossible to accomplish, we could accept a compromise on B-H that remains as a complete entity but obtains autonomy," he said. With this blurred idea about safeguarding Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole, Maček won over some Muslim politicians dissatisfied with Mehmed Spaho, leader of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, for his coalition with Milan Stojadinović in the mid-1930s. Spaho was blamed for having renounced his party's program for autonomy, though at the time of dictatorship he said on several occasions that Yugoslavia should become federalized. "Federation or separation," he allegedly told British archeologist Arthurs Evans in 1932. However, his coalition with Stojadinović imparted fresh vigor to the Muslim

branch of the Croatian Peasants' Party (HSS) that advocated federalization as a solution to the Yugoslav crisis, but never detailing the federal units that would make up the state.

In the late 1930s, the Bosniak leading party, the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO), supported Serbian-Croatian negotiations on a compromise between two conflicting concepts (centralist and federalist). They did not have the remotest idea that the establishment of the *Banovina of Croatia (Banate)*, emerging from partitioned Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1939, would create that compromise solution. The notorious Cvetković – Maček Agreement was nourished in the memory of the Bosniaks as a perfidious Serbian-Croatian pact evoking concerns for the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the late 20th and the early 21st century.

While the Bosniaks were struggling for Bosnia-Herzegovina's integrity and autonomy within Yugoslavia – all the time wavering between the Serbian and Croatian confronted blocs, sometimes siding with the former and sometimes with the latter – Croatian and Serbian political leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina proper were divided into those who favored Bosnia's unification with Croatia and those aiming at its unification with Serbia. Some of them, however, stood for safeguarding Bosnia-Herzegovina's autonomy from Croatia and Serbia alike, as they thought it far better to have autonomy than lose a part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

WARTIME SPLITS AND POLITICAL (DIS)ORIENTATION

When World War II broke out, Bosnia-Herzegovina faced new challenges. Against the backdrop of the Bosniak autonomy movement of 1939–40 – still active though not homogeneous in practice – and in wartime conditions that smashed the state of Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina was incorporated into the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) in its entirety. The Drina river became the border once again. However, the division into 12 big administrative districts – six entirely in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

six only partially – annulled its historical and political territorial integrity. The seats of five big districts were located outside Bosnia-Herzegovina's historical borders.

Establishment of the Independent State of Croatia was the outcome of Yugoslavia's defeat in the war, and the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina had no say in the matter. Most Croats and Bosniaks accepted and welcomed the newly-established state and even hailed the entry of German troops, while the Serbs had many reasons to distrust the NDH from the very outset.

Dissatisfied with the Cvetković – Maček Agreement and the establishment of the Banovina of Croatia, some Muslim politicians who used to form the Muslim branch of the HSS joined the Ustasha movement upon the outbreak of war in 1941 and integrated into structures of the new NDH regime. They believed that integration of the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the NDH was more acceptable than partition, whereby a part would go to Croatia and another remain reserved for the Serbian portion of the Yugoslav state. Others had an eye on autonomy from the very start and so in April 1941, their delegation, in cooperation with some Serbian activists, urged reis-ul-ulema Fehim Spahu to initiate autonomy for B-H with the German authorities within the new world order. This attempt ended in disaster: the Serbian members of the delegation were killed while the NDH regime strongly cautioned Muslim members to stay away from anti-government activity. Later on that "spark of autonomy" developed into the still mysterious Memorandum, allegedly sent straight to Hitler in late 1942, asking for B-H autonomy from the NDH. However, all this underlined how lost the Bosniaks were during the war, how divided and committed to various political and military formations. In the historical arena of World War II, the Bosniak divide constituted a large spectrum ranging from loyalty to the NDH and participation in Ustasha, *Domobran* (homeland defenders: transl. note) and German military formations, through activism in the troops

of the “Yugoslav Army in the Homeland” and the movement for autonomy, to struggle in the Partisan movement, which offered a new vision of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an equal member of the Yugoslav federation. The first signs of the Bosniaks’ shaken trust in the NDH were already visible in the autumn of 1941 in the so-called Muslim resolutions that indicated crisis in Bosniak circles. When they realized that the NDH was no protection from *Chetnik* pogroms, the Muslims’ trust in it began spiraling downward and rapidly shifting to the Partisan movement.

The Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina mostly welcomed the NDH as their nation-state, especially in Western Herzegovina where news of its establishment was met with “euphoria.” The idea of the NDH as the final realization of the centennial dream of a Croatian nation-state had been nourished for a very long time, therefore, it was simply referred to as “our state,” “the Croatian state,” and the like. This was due to the Croats’ bad experience with monarchist Yugoslavia on the one hand and, on the other, to promises about the new state being solely “Croatian and peasant,” which were music to the ears of the peasantry making up the majority of the B-H population, especially the peasantry in areas with a Croatian majority population, such as Western Herzegovina. Experiences were quite different in areas with an ethnically mixed population. However, already during the war the idea of the NDH as a Croatian nation-state was challenged by the realities of the crimes committed in the name of that centennial dream. In the broader context of relations between the warring parties, this was what gradually destroyed this state and eventually wiped it out by the end of the war. However, promoters of the idea popped up for decades following the end of World War II.

Unlike the Croats and the Bosniaks, the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina distrusted and opposed the NDH from the very start. As early as April 1941, albeit still timidly at the time, they gave vent to their feelings. Loyal to Yugoslavia on the one hand, and exposed

to legal and physical violence on the other, the Serbs refused to recognize the NDH as a state in which they saw a future for themselves. They soon rose up in arms: first in June in Eastern Herzegovina and then, in late July, in other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In June, it was more of a spontaneous revolt against violence than anything else and the rebels were predominantly well-off peasants, the clergy and the middle-class. The June rebellion was mostly organized by the Communists in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The two movements cooperated at the beginning, but split up over time and some of the rebels in the June rebellion joined the Communist ranks, while others transformed themselves into the Chetnik movement. In late 1941, the two movements became distinct: the Partisan movement fought for a new social order, although committing crimes in its struggle, especially against the Muslims, while the other was barely concerned with Bosnia-Herzegovina and believed in a post-war revival of Yugoslavia with the Serbs playing a leading role. As the war neared its end, the Partisan movement was on the up and up, among other things thanks to recruitment of rebels who used to fight against the Partisans and were accomplices in the crimes against the Muslims and the Croats. This sowed the seed of Muslim and Croatian distrust in the Partisan movement, which found notable expression in their memorial culture in the early 1990s. The final result of World War II in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a heavy toll in human lives: out of 320,000 people killed, 164,000 were Serbs, 75,000 Bosniaks, 64,000 Croats and about 9,000 Jews.

All in all, World War II in Bosnia-Herzegovina was multi-layered, with everyone fighting everyone else, and “five fronts were in confrontation – the occupying force, the Ustashas, the Chetniks, the Muslims and the Partisans” The occupying troops had two wings: one in the hands of the Germans and the other of the Italians. “Of all the countries making up the Yugoslav state, B-H had the most complex war situation.” In the end, the Partisan

movement, which after noisy and fierce debates among the Communist elite opted for Bosnia-Herzegovina's equality within the Yugoslav federation, emerged as the winner. The debates on Bosnia-Herzegovina's status in the future Yugoslav state (an autonomous or a federal unit) were not at all present on the scholarly and social agenda in the aftermath of the war, even once they had been placed on the social scene, and they were not explained adequately against the social, military and political backdrop of World War II, but used instead as an argument for the alleged anti-Bosnian and anti-Muslim orientation of the Partisan movement. However, the truth is that the Communist leadership's dilemma about the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina derived from its commitment to the Soviet model, according to which only ethnically pure historical regions could have the status of a republic, while ethnically mixed areas such as Bosnia-Herzegovina just the status of an autonomous unit in a federation of national republics. And yet, that dilemma was settled in 1943 and 1944 when ZAVNOBi H (the State Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Bosnia-Herzegovina) sessions finally defined Bosnia-Herzegovina as a federal unit, equal with other republics within the Yugoslav state.

THE EXPERIENCE OF SOCIALISM

At the end of World War II in Bosnia-Herzegovina "the Serbian masses were in the winning camp, the Muslims were in second place, while the Croats occupied the back seat (...) With the luggage of old legacies and new controversial tendencies Bosnia-Herzegovina was opening a new chapter in its history" when it had to actually put into effect the equality it had formally obtained in the war. It was only in the late 1960s that Bosnia-Herzegovina, faced with the centralism of the Yugoslav state over the initial decades of socialist Yugoslavia, realized its full equality.

Likewise, some peoples in B-H proper were challenged with preserving the national equality that had been proclaimed in the

war. Though formally equal, though mostly on the account of developments during the war, their experience of socialist Yugoslavia was a different story. Some regions with a majority Croatian population such as Western Herzegovina had been marginalized for almost two decades. At the so-called Mostar Council in 1966, the leadership of the B-H League of Communists raised its voice against it, began removing the Ustasha “mortgage” from the entire population of this region and thus launched the process of Western Herzegovina’s integration into the larger B-H frame. However, that process has been never brought to an end while marginalization of the Croat – populated regions – evident in the aftermath of the war – would leave resentful memories of the period of socialist Yugoslavia in the minds of the Croats. The Croatian political elite of the 1990s particularly insisted on those memories, emphasizing that the Croats had been subjugated in socialist Yugoslavia. The hardship the Croats had undergone in the aftermath of the war and their mass migration abroad in search of work was stressed. In the early 1970s, for instance, the Zagreb-seated *Glas koncila* (Voice of the Council) magazine that was distributed throughout B-H underlined that “one Croat in every five is away from his homeland” and that “sad and painful is the very thought that this flower and hope of the Croatian people has to earn his daily bread away from our *Beautiful Homeland*.” The repression against the Croats during and after the *Croatian Spring* of the 1970s was a major argument used to support this thesis. One of the HDZ leaders in B-H said, “We, the Croats, have definitely served our time,” referring to many Croats who had spent years in jail at the time of socialist Yugoslavia. The fact was that the percentage of the Croats in the population structure of B-H steadily dropped throughout the period of socialist Yugoslavia (according to the census of 1948, the Croats made up 24% of the entire population, but only 17% in 1991), as a result of their emigration either to Croatia or

abroad (mostly to Germany), but also of the growth of the Muslim population.

After the war not only the Croats but the Bosniaks, too, were faced with the challenge of rounding off their national integration. In the early 1960s, the B-H Communists initiated recognition of the Muslim nation, which they campaigned for with scholarly argumentation throughout the 1960s. By the end of the 1960s, the reality of the Muslim nation was definitely recognized by the B-H and Yugoslav Communist elites. Subsequent denials of the Muslim nation, especially in the 1980s, were used to create preconditions for destruction of the Yugoslav state and the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although in Yugoslavia the Bosniaks were fully acknowledged as a nation, became a major cultural and social factor and expanded demographically (from 30% of the B-H population in the 1948 census, the percentage of Bosniaks grew to 43% in the census of 1991), in the 1990s the Bosniak political elite was building a negative image of their experience of Yugoslavia. They emphasized the Muslims' subjugation in the socialist era, insisting that their national identity had not been recognized, that they had not been adequately represented in the army officer corps, in the police, etc, that they had been exposed to various waves of violence (hardship in the aftermath of World War II and trials of members of the Young Muslims group in 1947, 1949 and 1983, a hard life and migration to the Sandžak and Turkey, especially in the "Ranković era"), and the like.

The B-H Serbs emerged from the war as the greatest victims and perceived Yugoslavia as their "home sweet home". Researchers have proven that in the socialist era they had occupied key political and social positions in Bosnia-Herzegovina for a long time. The story about mass atrocities and genocide against them fanned the flame of the Serbs' perception of their major contribution to the creation of the Yugoslav socialist state and their responsibility for its safekeeping. In the early 1990s, Serbian political leaders

in B-H kept reminding the people that the Serbs had suffered the most in World War II and had been the biggest victims of the conflict with the Cominform, underlining that the loss of their demographic majority in B-H was a consequence of the misguided policy of the Communist elite which, having recognized the Muslims' national identity, had ruthlessly worked against Serbian national interests, etc.

The truth is that the percentage of Serbs in the entire population of Bosnia-Herzegovina almost crumbled at the time of socialist Yugoslavia (from 44% of the population in 1948 it fell to 31% in 1991). Despite that fact, the majority of Serbian Communists were devoted to Bosnia-Herzegovina's affirmation as an equal federal unit of Yugoslavia throughout the socialist era. What seems most convincing is that the B-H Communist movement as a whole was not ethnically oriented since the Communists endeavored to affirm and develop all national identities and opposed the building of a supra-national identity that could have disturbed the ethnic balance – a major factor of B-H's integrity. This was evident in the 1960s and 1970s when some circles promoted Yugoslavianism and Bosnianism as national identities. The Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina turned down both options flat, arguing that anything like that could lead towards centralization and unitarianization of the country (Yugoslavianism) or denial of the Serbian and Croatian national identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnianism).

The Communist movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina remained loyal to a man to Yugoslavia for a very long time. Thanks to this unity, Bosnia-Herzegovina modernized its society in the socialist era, made economic progress, integrated its infrastructure, set up scientific and cultural institutions, and opened itself up to the world. In the mid-1980s, however, serious cracks started appearing in this unity and continued spreading and multiplying in the second half of the decade and, finally, after much scandal and heavy political propaganda, brought Bosnia-Herzegovina closer to the

bloody war of the 1990s. In the early 1990s, the Serbian political elite was rapidly turning its eyes towards Belgrade and pinning its hopes on survival of Yugoslavia as a safe haven for its identity. On the other hand, by promoting the story about marginalization of the Croats the Croatian and Bosniak elites were practically preparing their compatriots for Yugoslavia's inevitable disintegration – which, indeed, took place soon afterwards.

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA IN YUGOSLAVIA'S FINALE

As in 1918 when the state of Yugoslavia was established, Bosnia-Herzegovina was no major factor whatsoever in its disintegration in the 1990s. After the parliamentary elections in 1990, national parties (the SDA, SDS and HDZ) came to power in Bosnia-Herzegovina and differences in the way they perceived the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia became evident in almost no time. The HDZ promoted Yugoslavia as a loose federation, the SDS was opposing to the very idea and insisted on a “democratic Yugoslavia organized as a modern state,” while the SDA did not take a firm stand, but advocated “a modern state” that would be neither a confederation – as the Croats wanted – nor a federation, the Serbian concept. As the time went by, ideas about the future constitutional status of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia took shape within the SDA, which eventually resulted in the Izetbegović – Gligorov proposal for Yugoslavia as an asymmetrical federation. When that proposal was turned down, like the one for safeguarding a “rump” Yugoslavia that would include neither Croatia nor Slovenia, the door opened wide to Bosnia-Herzegovina to leave Yugoslavia. On that road, however, it had to overcome new stumbling blocks. Non-national (left-wing) parties were weak and only in power in Tuzla and Vareš, while the resentment of the citizens in all other parts was represented by a bloc of national parties that were already at loggerheads. This situation led towards Bosnia-Herzegovina's implosion. The ruling political

parties, including the SDS and HDZ, which had their sponsors in Serbia and Croatia, could not reach agreement on a single matter of any importance. Debates in the republican assembly were fierce, brimming with nationalistic rhetoric, even warmongering, and were often conducted in a rough and crude manner. The strategy implemented in the field was a strategy for the breakup of the B-H entity through so-called regionalization. In late 1991, when the majority in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina voted for independence from Yugoslavia – a vote verified in the referendum of early March 1992, it became clear that the course towards independence would be a bloody one. The SDS opposed the outcome of the referendum on independence, mobilized the Serbs with the idea about “remaining within Yugoslavia,” and decided to realize its policy through war. Before war actually broke out, with the assistance of some smaller Serbian parties (though not supported by the Serbs active in non-national parties), the SDS had established parallel Serbian institutions in municipalities and but also all over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Simultaneously, the HDZ in B-H also formed the Croatian Community (later the Republic) of Herceg-Bosnia thus lessening the chances for the survival of B-H as a whole outside Yugoslavia. Nonetheless,, in the situation as it was in the early 1990s when the political actors in Bosnia-Herzegovina stood no chance whatsoever of influencing the course of history in any major way, by following that course Bosnia-Herzegovina joined the states that had become independent of Yugoslavia. The turnout in the referendum of February 29 – March 1, 1992 was 64% of the electorate (mostly Bosniaks and Croats) and 99% of the people who went to the polls voted for an independent and sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina. On April 6, 1992, the European Union acknowledged an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina and other countries followed suit. For the first time after several centuries, Bosnia-Herzegovina had the opportunity to develop

its identity as a state outside other large state structures, including Yugoslavia. It started down a road that turned out to be very thorny.

CONCLUSION

The Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats experienced Yugoslavia differently, above all, monarchist and socialist Yugoslavia. Bosnia-Herzegovina did not contribute much to the creation of the Yugoslav state, which it joined indirectly, through the so-called State of Slovenians, Croats and Serbs, and its Bosniak, Serbian and Croatian representatives were not equally active in the process. Most Serbs and Croats adopted the idea of a Yugoslav state relatively early in the process but most Muslim politicians, after a long period of vacillation, only caught the “Yugoslav train” at the very end of the war. However, once they entered Yugoslavia, they accepted it as a state and actively participated in its constitutional structuring, but were negatively affected by certain government moves, principally the agrarian reforms. The Croats and the Serbs competed against each other over organization of the state, but most researchers claim that both Croats and Bosniaks were marginalized in monarchist Yugoslavia.

The experience of socialist Yugoslavia was quite different. Socialist Yugoslavia ensured not only formal but true equality, especially as from the early 1960s. However, when perceived from the angle of the country’s disintegration in the 1990s and the experience of war and hardship, socialist Yugoslavia is pictured badly, which is then transferred into a historical experience. For example, the level of modernization Bosnia-Herzegovina attained in the Yugoslav state is denied. This approach, however, has nothing to do with the real historical experience of the Yugoslav state, especially of socialist Yugoslavia.

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STATEHOOD LOSS AND ITS RENEWAL

ŠERBO RASTODER

MONTENEGRO IN THE 20th century is an example of “accelerated history” in which the dynamics of change and the complexity of historical occurrences accentuated the phenomenology of its history and its largely ideologically biased perception. In the 20th century, Montenegro had been an independent state until 1918; an integral part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918–1943); one of the six socialist republics in socialist Yugoslavia (1943–1992); and a member state of the two-state Yugoslav federation (FRY) 1992–2006. At the referendum of May 21, 2006 Montenegro renewed its statehood and once again became an agent in its own right in Balkan and European history. It looked as if Montenegro had “spent” an entire century running around in a circle looking for itself. Crucified between the myth of its own historical significance and its objective importance as measured by statistics and hard pragmatism Montenegro had always strived to outdo itself. This is why, in the historical sense, it is a place of extremes and contradictions that are difficult to reconcile. In that kingdom of illusions modern ideologies supplanted the old in an attempt to “bury” them,

just as the “old”, for which many had thought they were already only a part of historical archives, kept resurrecting themselves. In the 20th century the conflict between the traditional and patriarchal and the modern also determined the dramatic social changes that appeared on the surface to be the surrogates of different ideologies. In the 20th century, Montenegro had gone through four wars, two of them world wars. At the end of World War I it had lost its statehood, and at the end of World War II it had partially restored the attributes of statehood. At the end of the 20th century, in the break-up of Yugoslavia, Montenegrin society was confronted with a new historical challenge and with the re-emergence of old historical redundancies. Although it was not, as an independent political agent, a direct participant in the wars marking the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, the consequences of events of the last decade of the 20th century, excluding the fact that on its territory there were no direct hostilities, were equally as dramatic for Montenegrin society as the previous wars.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR: THE SMALLEST ALLIED ARMY

During World War I, 1914–1918, Montenegro fought on the side of the Triple Entente forces. In the July 1914 crisis, triggered by the assassination in Sarajevo of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Ferdinand, Montenegro unconditionally sided with Serbia. The same day the Austro-Hungarians declared war on Serbia, King Nicholas issued a decree on mobilization and by August 6 Montenegro had already officially declared war against Austro-Hungary, ignoring the promise made by the empire’s diplomats that in the case of neutrality it could count on territorial concessions (Skadar). Having just emerged from the Balkan Wars in which its demographic, economic and military resources had been depleted, Montenegro entered into a new military conflict, which will prove to be its last as an independent state. At the insistence of its allies, above all Russia, a high command was established at the very outset of

the war to coordinate military operations with the Serbian military. Serbian general Božidar Janković was appointed head of the general staff of the Montenegrin High Command, placing the Montenegrin Army under the command of the Serbian military. With Serbian officers having taken up key command positions, the Montenegrin Army was used in accordance with the strategic interests of Serbia and by the orders of the Serbian High Command – which had detrimental effects on the Montenegrin military and Montenegro as a whole.

The great offensive against Serbia, beginning in October 1915, and the suppression of its military to the south also meant the beginning of hostilities in the Montenegrin theatre of war. The Serbian Army was in retreat along three lines, of which the Pec-Andrijevića-Podgorica-Skadar-Ljes (Medua) line was closest to the operations of the Montenegrin Army and directly dependent on its performance. In its retreat the Serbian government arrived at Skadar on November 26, 1915 and its High Command followed ten days later. The Montenegrin National Assembly had last convened on December 25, 1915, determined to do the same as Serbia. But there was no one to protect the Montenegrin retreat. Securing the withdrawal of the Serbian Army and protecting it from enemy incursions across Sandžak, Herzegovina and the bay and littoral of Kotor. The Montenegrins had been left all alone in the Balkan war theatre. Even though the smallest and the weakest of the allies, Montenegro had been given the role of last defense. Barely 40,000 Montenegrin soldiers were given the impossible task of defending a front line some 500 kilometers long. The pleas made by King Nicholas and the Montenegrin government to the Allies for help in men, food, munitions and supplies turned out to be futile. The Allies were only prepared to fight for the “common good” to the last Montenegrin soldier. In the famous Battle of Mojkovac, which took place on January 6 and 7, 1916, the Austro-Hungarian Army had been stopped. The Montenegrin victory at Mojkovac would

go on to become unique, among other things because it is a rare example in history of an army that went on to capitulate practically only days after a great victory – because the main thrust of the attack by the Austro-Hungarian Army had been directed towards Mt. Lovćen, defended by meager forces. By January 11, 1916, the Austro-Hungarian Army had taken over all strategic points on the Lovćen mountain massif on January 13 it entered undefended Cetinje, and by January 15 it had full control of the city and surrounding territory. At the order of the Serbian government, Serbian officers withdrew from Montenegro. Likewise, King Nicholas started to retreat with a part of the government, appointing beforehand general Janko Vukotić head of the High Command to replace the Serbian officers who had left. By January 21, Skadar had been taken by the Austro-Hungarians and the expected defense along the river Bojana and around Skadar had been abandoned. All lines of retreat for the Montenegrin Army had been cut off. A document on the surrender of arms was signed on January 25, 1916 and Montenegro had in reality capitulated, although a formal document by that name had never been signed. The causes of its capitulation became the subject of heated political and propaganda disputes within its state leadership. All the while no one thought of posing the logical question: was it truly realistic to expect of the smallest Allied army, abandoned and alone in the entire Balkan theater of war, devoid of assistance from its allies, stretched thin on a 500 kilometer front line, and surrounded on several fronts, to stop an armada which could not be stopped even by armies 20 times the size of the Montenegrin Army? In any case, the consequences of the improvident policies of the Montenegrin state leadership and its sovereign, King Nicholas, would prove to be catastrophic for Montenegro. For by that time already, the question of the future of Montenegro and its prospective unification with Serbia had been opened, an issue that was also supported by some of the great Allied powers. Russia wanted the unification of Montenegro and Serbia under

the Karadorđević dynasty and the creation of a great Serbian state in the Balkans that would underpin its policies in the region. This is why in 1916 Russia cut off its aid to Montenegro and rejected the possibility of King Nicholas coming to Russia. Suspected of secret negotiations with Austria-Hungary and blamed for the capitulation of Montenegro, King Nicholas and the circles around him would not enjoy the unconditional support of the other Allies either – France, Great Britain, or even Italy. That Montenegro had been “sacrificed” by the Allies had already become clear towards the end of the war. Instead of returning, like King Peter I of Serbia, to his country as one of the allies, King Nicholas had practically been barred from returning from France, where, in Neuilly-sur-Seine near Paris, his court and government had been staying. After the breakthrough of the Salonika Front (i.e. Macedonian Front – *trans.*), and after the Allied conference in Versailles on 7 October 1918, a decision was made for Allied forces to occupy Montenegro. Sidestepping all agreements, the French tacitly allowed the participation of Serbian troops in these operations, with clear political objectives that had been shared with the Serbian Command. In any case, military reasons were not crucial in making this decision because immediately after the Salonika Front breakthrough, Montenegrin irregulars (known as *comes* or *komiti* – *trans.*) and insurgents had liberated Montenegro from Austro-Hungarian occupation. Only in the fighting for the liberation of Podgorica did units of the Serbian Army come to the aid of Montenegrin irregulars and insurgents. By order of the Serbian High Command of October 25, 1918, Montenegrin insurgent troops were disbanded, and the same fate befell the Montenegrin irregulars by an order of November 12, 1918. Thus the end of the war saw Montenegro occupied by Allied forces, that is, by French, British, Italian, American and Serbian troops. A joint command of the Allied forces was formed in Kotor, headed by a French general. The first to withdraw from Montenegrin territory were the British (April 1919), followed by the French

(by March 1920) and the Italians (by June 1920). In the meantime, Serbian troops were rebranded into the Yugoslav Army and as a legalized military force stayed in Montenegro. The Allied forces had not fulfilled the main mandate with which they had entered Montenegro. Instead of restoring order and peace – which, by the way, no one had brought into jeopardy in the first place – they left Montenegro in a state of civil war.

Later reckoning would show that in World War I Montenegro had lost some 20,000 soldiers. Some 15,000 Montenegrins had gone through concentration camps in Austria, Hungary and Albania. Material damages and losses from the war were an estimated 723 million francs – the amount presented for war reparations at the Paris Peace Conference. Additionally, Montenegro was left without its own state, as well as without the oldest ruling dynasty (the Petrovićs) in the Balkans, which had governed Montenegro for 221 years.

UNIFICATION WITH SERBIA AND ENTERING THE KINGDOM OF SLOVENS, CROATS AND SERBS

In 1918, together with the Serbian Army, came politicians in charge of implementing the policy of “*unification of Montenegro with Serbia*”. Immediately upon the arrival of Serbian troops on Montenegrin soil, they formed the *Provisional Central Executive Committee for the Unification of Serbia and Montenegro*, which acted under the instructions of the Serbian government. The policy of the Serbian primeminister, Nikola Pašić, was motivated by the need to present the work on unification as the will of the Montenegrin people and thus reduce the possibility of foreign meddling given that Montenegro was an internationally recognized state and a formal ally. It was thus necessary to confer formal legitimacy to the four-member Provisional Committee, consisting of two Serbian and two Montenegrin citizens. That Committee had really usurped the powers of Montenegro’s legislative and executive

bodies. At a meeting in Berane on October 25, 1918, the Committee proscribed “*Rules for Electing National Representatives to the Great National Assembly.*” A deadline of seven days was given for “*holding assemblies and electing*” representatives, and in some places, like Cetinje, this was reduced to three days. The “electoral” process was managed by the *Central Executive Committee* via its commissioners and representatives, who convened assemblies and meetings and determined the results of the election. The Serbian Army had orders to “*energetically pursue and by all available means suppress any agitation, regardless of the origin, on the territory occupied by our forces.*” At the same time, the Serbian High Command issued orders to its headquarters in Sarajevo, Zagreb and Belgrade to prevent the return of respectable Montenegrin concentration camp internees until the “*issue of unification was settled.*” And since a large part of the Montenegrin military and political elite were internees, it is easy to comprehend the significance and consequences of such a decision. In such conditions, 165 representatives (MPs) were “*elected*” by acclamation during the “likeminded assemblies”. The Great National Assembly was in session from November 11–16, 1918 in Podgorica (and was known as the Podgorica Assembly). The main decision was adopted at its 2nd regular session on November 13, 1918. The assembly representatives adopted, without a debate, by acclamation, the predetermined text of the *Decision* and later signed it. The decisions of the Podgorica Assembly were not recognized by any of the Great Powers. On December 28, 1918 Serbia officially severed diplomatic ties with Montenegro – practically a month after the decision on unconditional unification had been adopted. With these decisions of the Podgorica Assembly, Montenegro *de facto* ceased to exist. Both internationally and domestically the process of its “burial” was totake time, but in the end this *fait accompli* policy paid off.

The mood in favor of unification and the creation of a Yugoslav state was ubiquitous and had a tangible manifest character in

Montenegro. The dispute was brought about over the issue of how to implement unification with Serbia and the other Yugoslav territories, that is, how to be an equitable partner in the creation of the Yugoslav state. Some were in favor of the unification being implemented on an equal footing and that it should be decided upon by the legal representatives of Montenegro: the king, the government and the National Assembly. Others had accepted the concept of (Serbian prime minister) Nikola Pašić and the Serbian government that Montenegro should first unite with Serbia through a unification of their essentially one (“Serbian”) nation under the Karađorđević dynasty and then, thus unified, enter a joint Yugoslav state. Dissatisfied with the decisions of the Podgorica Assembly, the conduct of the authorities and the policy of the unifier (Serbia) – which was directed at the belittling of everything with the prefix ‘Montenegrin’ or the Petrović dynasty – but also dissatisfied with the dire socio-economic conditions, the opponents of this *de facto* annexation started preparations for an uprising. The plan of the uprising was discovered beforehand and a few days ahead of its occurrence 125 of its more prominent members were arrested. Nevertheless, on December 21, 1918, the rebels surrounded the major towns and cities in Montenegro. The headquarters of the rebels was in the vicinity of Cetinje, from where on December 22 they issued their *Demands* to General Venel, commander of the Allied troops (formally the main military authority in Montenegro), as well as to the Executive National Committee, the provisional “government” of the Podgorica Assembly, in which, among other things, they stated: “1. *We all agree that Montenegro should, under equal rights with the other territories, enter into one great Yugoslav state devoid of all internal political borders – and we leave the decision of the political order to be legally resolved by the regularly elected assembly of all (constituent) Yugoslavs, and we will wholeheartedly abide by it.*”

Conflict broke out on December 24, 1918 in the morning when the rebels tried to enter Cetinje and the Serbian Army and

supporters of the annexation fired at them. The hostilities ended at the intervention of Allied commander General Venel who demanded the rebels surrender their arms and return home. Some of the rebels fled to the Bay of Kotor and Bar, whence the Italians moved them first to the Albanian port of Shengjin (It: San Giovanni di Medua – *trans.*), and then further on to Italy, while a considerable number of the rebels went underground ‘into the forest’. The Christmas Uprising of 1918 had been quelled for a while, but resistance to the annexation would continue until 1924. The uprising had turned the attention of the Paris Peace Conference towards Montenegro, an effect that had been one of the objectives of the rebels, but it also initiated a long-term struggle between the supporters and the opponents of unconditional unification. Mobile units of the irregulars (*the comes – trans.*) began a guerrilla struggle – supported by the local population – and persisted in spite of repression from the authorities during frequent punitive expeditions. The largest organized military campaign against the rebels in Montenegro was conducted in December 1919 and in January and February of 1920. At the order of high military and state bodies, which had estimated that there were at the time some 900 rebels at large in the Montenegrin countryside, the region of the (Yugoslav) Zeta division militarily covering Montenegro had been divided into 14 smaller areas from which simultaneous incursions against the rebels began, coupled with the arrest and detention of their family members and all who directly or indirectly aided the rebels. In this campaign alone 22 rebels were killed, some 599 were arrested or forced to surrender, together with 138 renegade soldiers – all in all 757 individuals. From 1920 to 1927 warrants with rewards for the arrest or liquidation of the rebels were issued. The estimate for the total number of rebels arrested, detained, convicted or killed in these conflicts mounts to five thousand. Many houses were torched and great material damage was done. Many rebels and their families, confidants and supporters were brought

to trial. A number of them were amnestied by the decrees of King Alexander on November 28, 1920. A number of them were also pardoned in 1925, so that at the beginning of 1928 there were still some 120 Montenegrin irregulars and opponents of unconditional unification in prisons in Podgorica, Mitrovica and Zenica.

Refugee rebels and a sizable number of Montenegrin émigrés gathered around the Montenegrin government and court in exile led desperate diplomatic and military battles in order to annul the decisions of the Podgorica Assembly. After the decisions of the Podgorica Assembly and the beginning of the uprising in Montenegro, the Montenegrin Army in exile was founded with the support of Italy and with the objective that it should be used for incursions into Montenegro and in assisting with annulment of the decisions made by the Podgorica Assembly and the return of King Nicholas to the country. On the basis of an April 1919 convention between the Montenegrin and the Italian governments, Italy provided for the support of Montenegrin soldiers stationed in Gaeta, a small town between Rome and Naples on the shores of the Tyrrhenian Sea. The Montenegrin Army in Italy at full capacity numbered four battalions, a special artillery unit in Font d'Amore, and a National Guard. At the beginning of 1921 it numbered 1,559 soldiers, not counting family members who also lived as émigrés. Italy used this army as a way of blackmailing the Yugoslav state regarding territorial disputes. Had Italy been sincere about its support for the Montenegrin émigrés it probably would not have lodged the army on the shores of the Tyrrhenian but on the opposite shore of the Adriatic Sea – closer to the Montenegrin shore. This became clear in November 1920 when Italy signed the Rapallo Treaty with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes resolving the territorial disputes. By December 1920 the Italian War Ministry issued orders banning further entry of Montenegrin émigrés. In March 1921 the Montenegrin Army was disarmed and its battalions relocated. The soldiers were offered a

return passage to their country. Those who refused were incarcerated. The greatest number of soldiers expressed a desire to emigrate to Russia or the United States. Italy rejected requests for passage to Russia. The position of the remaining Montenegrin soldiers improved for a short period after the fall of the Giolitti cabinet (July 1921), together with the departure of foreign minister Count Sforza, who was considered by Montenegrin émigrés to be their main opponent and the man secretly negotiating with (Serbian prime minister) Pašić on disbanding the Montenegrin Army. Italy formally cut off its support to the Montenegrin Army on June 1, 1921. The largest number of émigrés returned to Montenegro. A number of them left for Argentina and the United States, while others, in an attempt to reach Russia, were still wondering through Turkey and other countries as late as 1923, and yet others traveled to Belgium and other European countries. Very few remained in Italy and with Mussolini's ascent to power they were dispelled altogether. During the whole period between 1918 and 1924, the Montenegrin émigrés tried to draw attention of European diplomacy and the public to the Montenegrin issue. The statement by Lord Gladstone, son of the famous William Ewart Gladstone, an old friend of Montenegro, made in the House of Lords on March 11, 1920, that "Montenegro would not have been treated worse if it had fought on the side of our enemies" was possibly the most indicative assessment at the time of the behavior of European diplomacy towards the Montenegrin issue. In a situation in which the Great Powers fully supported the idea of the creation of a Yugoslav state on the ruins of the Habsburg Empire, the essence was more important than the form, the objective more important than the procedure, and expedience overruled justice. Serbia had become the backbone of French policy in the Balkans, and the Yugoslav state the project of Versailles Europe. There was no place for Montenegro in this situation. It was too small to become an alternative to the Yugoslav project. Therefore, the

main concern of European diplomats was how to satisfy the form and bring the “burial” of Montenegro to its conclusion. The empty seat with the sign “Montenegro” at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, as well as the formal protocol reception of the Montenegrin government-in-exile delegation (consisting of General Ante Gvozdenović, prime minister Jovan Plamenac and Dr. Pero Soc) by the High Council of the Paris Peace Conference in March 1919, were all just courteous responses to the numerous appeals, memorandums and letters sent by the Montenegrin émigrés, more a part of the political folklore in which the Montenegrin issue was posed before European diplomats at the end of World War I as a matter of a mere formal dilemma of justice and equity.

From 1918 to 1943 Montenegro was part of the centrally organized Yugoslav state. According to the administrative division from April 1922, according to which the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was divided into 33 regions, a part of the territory of the former Kingdom of Montenegro became part of the Zeta region with the capital in Cetinje. The former districts of Bjelopolje and Pljevlja became a part of the Užice region. In the later administrative division of the country into banates (*banovina – trans.*) from 1929, when the Yugoslav state was divided into nine banates, Montenegro became a part of the Zeta banate.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE IN THE FIRST YUGOSLAVIA

In the period from 1918 to 1941 Montenegro was an agriculturally underdeveloped region in which small landownership was dominant. It was isolated by way of communication, without connections to its hinterland, and culturally backward with a high percentage of the population being illiterate. According to census data from 1921, the agrarian population made-up 85.3% of the overall population; ten years later it was down to 79.1% – which was above the Yugoslav average that in 1921 amounted to 78.9% and in 1931 76.5%. Only Bosnia-Herzegovina had a higher percentage

of agrarian population – by some 3.3%, while Slovenia was lower by 18.8%. Because of isolated communications, products that were in demand were some of the most expensive in the country, while market surplus, consisting mainly of livestock products, was sold at dumping prices. In such conditions farm villages became impoverished, farmers were in debt, and famine was a pervasive occurrence. The Montenegrin farmer, tied to the local market, suffered the negative consequences of the advance of industrial production, which was eroding the traditional manufacturing crafts and accelerating the decline of old patriarchal cooperatives. The underdeveloped market forced the farmer to pay higher prices for goods in demand and sell his surplus at lower prices. Assessments right after 1918 were that over 150,000 people in Montenegro were without any means of livelihood – mainly because of the war in which the majority of the labor force was interned and the land left uncultivated due to war devastation and requisitions. The years 1927 and 1928 were exceptionally difficult since a longstanding drought destroyed even the potato crop and cases of starvation were recorded. The situation was again similar in 1935–36 when famine spread to all districts in Montenegro. In order to survive, or make it possible for their children to escape poverty through education, the farmer would borrow from the bank, or more frequently, from individuals (merchants, pensioners, teachers, priests, clerks). In time the indebtedness of farmers became a dramatic social problem. According to assessments made by appropriate institutions, the overall farmer debt in Montenegro came to 496 million dinars, or 7.1% of the overall agrarian debt in Yugoslavia, while the share of Montenegrin agriculture was only 0.30% of all Yugoslav crop production or just 1.44% of all livestock production. A special problem was the fact that 2/3 of all (farmers’) debt was in the hands of local loan sharks (given as IOUs, by word of honor). For the state, such a debt was legally nonexistent. In 1936, the Yugoslav state enacted a decree liquidating all farmers’ debt. The said

trends accelerated the process of eroding the village economy and contributed to transforming farmers into the proletariat. Thus, for example, in 1935, 70% of homesteads put up for auction were left in the hands of the banks since no one could buy them.

The value of per capita industrial production was only 15.5% of the Yugoslav average and was similar to that of Macedonia, and way below those in Bosnia-Herzegovina (59.5%), Serbia (73.5%), Croatia (138%) and Slovenia (290%). These parameters indicate a value that was up to 25 times less than the percentage participation of the Montenegrin population in the overall Yugoslav population and hence comes as no surprise that the Montenegrin national income was only 31% of the average Yugoslav income. Montenegro lagged behind Slovenia, which was the most developed, by over 22 times. Montenegro expected that the Yugoslav state would assist its economic development and enable a more productive use of its natural resources. As capital was distributed in accordance with political power and influence, economic and social circumstances changed very slowly in Montenegro since in a centrally organized state its influence was bound to remain minimal or even negligible.

In 1921, the illiteracy rate in Montenegro was about 67%, while ten years later it was reduced to 56.1%, of which 34.2% were male and 77.3% female. After 1918, the Serbian school curriculum from 1899 was introduced into Montenegrin schools. Simultaneously, the Serbian 1904 Education Law was implemented in Montenegrin schools up until the (Yugoslav) unification of school legislation in December 1929 when unified curricula plans and programs were introduced for the whole country. Subject matter tied to the history of Montenegro and the Petrović dynasty was dropped from these programs as they were generally bent on eradicating everything that was connected to the state and historical specificity of Montenegro.

Political life in Montenegro between 1918 and 1941 was marked by the founding of new political parties, harsh parliamentary and

extra-parliamentary clashes, numerous victims of political conflicts, the politicization of society and a social rhetoric, which ranged from despair to illusion. In a centrally organized state, the influence of Montenegro was reduced to a *statistical error* in the process of adopting decisions at the level of Yugoslavia. From seven to thirteen Yugoslav parliamentary representatives were elected from Montenegrin territory, frequently divided up into several mutually opposed parties. In the Yugoslav Assembly, which numbered anywhere from 419 to 319 representatives, Montenegrin MPs, even if they had all been from the same party, made up such a minority that they had no influence whatsoever on the decision – making process. The fact that in 39 Yugoslav governments in the period between the two World Wars, in which there were altogether 819 ministerial portfolios, only five were ministers from Montenegro, who had been active for less than an average mandate of a government, is fairly indicative. In the period before the introduction of dictatorship in 1929, four parliamentary elections were held in the Yugoslav state (1920, 1923, 1925, 1927). The general characteristic of parliamentary life in the electoral district of Montenegro before the dictatorship of 6 January was that the parties in power (the Radicals and Democrats, in coalition or separately) could never gain a majority. The introduction of dictatorship did not meet with resistance either in Montenegro or in other parts of Yugoslavia. The first to feel the repression of the dictatorship were the Communists. Some 100 members and sympathizers of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) were arrested in Montenegro, including some high-ranking party officials. They were convicted and handed down long-term sentences, while others immigrated to the Soviet Union. In the country, the center of resistance to dictatorship was at Belgrade University. The resurgence of political life during the dictatorship came after the organization of “elections” on November 8, 1931, in which only the pro-government, pro-dictatorship party participated – known first as

the Yugoslav Radical Farmer's Democracy Party (JRSD), and then changing its name to the Yugoslav National Party (JNS) in 1933. In Montenegro this regime party of the "6 January dictatorship" was joined mainly by high-ranking party officials of the Radical and Democratic parties and by individuals who supported the dictatorship. The party acted with support from the government and up to the time of King Alexander's death (1934) it was the political backbone of the dictatorship.

The three most influential opposition groups (Democrats, Farmers and Federalists) renewed their political activities on the eve of the May 1935 elections. From 1933 onwards the Communist Party advocated cooperation with other opposition parties but as yet still lacked the influence to make itself politically effective. In a situation in which objectively there was no possibility of resolving even a single issue of concern for Montenegro, an increasing number of malcontents were joining the Communists and their ideology of toppling the existing order. In brutal raids and reprisals in March 1936 over 230 Communists from Montenegro were arrested. The fierceness of the political clashes and the terror that reigned in Montenegro is convincingly borne out by the fact that in the period from 1936 to 1938 alone 11 people were killed and over 40 were wounded in political violence. The number of those killed, arrested, detained and put on trial in Montenegro in the period from 1918 to 1941 was, percentage-wise, several dozen times greater per population than in any other region of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Instead of being one of the expected "backbones" of the Yugoslav state, in this period Montenegro was one of its most turbulent regions.

INTERNAL SCHISMS IN WORLD WAR II

In World War II from 1941 to 1945 Montenegro shared the fate of the Yugoslav state. Montenegro was occupied by Italian troops, which entered its territory on the same day that the Kingdom of

Yugoslavia capitulated (17 April 1941). The *High Civilian Commissariat* was established, representing the highest occupational authority until the uprising of 13 July 1941, when military rule through the *Military Governorship* was introduced. The territory of present-day Montenegro was splintered so that the region of the Bay of Kotor was annexed to Italy as a separate province within the *Dalmatian Governorship* (by a decree on May 20, 1941), while the region along the Montenegro-Albania border was annexed to so-called Greater Albania, an entity created under the Italian protectorate which also encompassed the larger part of Kosovo and Metohia, a part of western Macedonia, and Albania proper. On the remaining part of Montenegrin territory the fascists, supported by a faction of the Montenegrin (Federalist) Party, tried to reestablish the independent state of Montenegro.

Expectations harbored by a part of the Montenegrin Federalists (pro-independence party – *trans.*) that they could establish a Montenegro within the boundaries of 1914, or a Greater Montenegro from the Neretva River to Mat, along with Metohija and Sandžak and the proclamation of Mihailo Petrović as king, melted away in the pragmatism of the occupying forces and the refusal of the grandson of King Nicholas to accept the throne under Italian occupation. The state boundaries of “independent Montenegro” were determined in Rome and reduced to the area not annexed by Italy or incorporated into Albania. The role of film extras, directed by Italy, Montenegrin Federalists also suffered because of the fact that the declaration, adopted by acclamation by the “assembly” convened on July 12 (Petrovdan Assembly), was written in Rome. The delegates adopted the declaration by acclamation, ostensibly annulling the decisions of the Podgorica Assembly from 1918 and thus repealing the regime of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and also dissolving the Yugoslav constitution, while proclaiming Montenegro a “sovereign and independent state” in the form of a constitutional monarchy. The idea of renewing the

Montenegrin state had been politically compromised as a result of the occupation by fascist Italy and its existence confined to the length of that occupation. The general popular uprising (of July 13, 1941 – *trans.*) made the effects of the Petrovdan Assembly redundant and intimated a completely different direction for resolving the issue of Montenegro's status. Namely, from the middle of the 1930s the communist movement in Montenegro grew steadily in strength as it had been renewed generationally and organizationally and it flourished mainly amongst the younger generation of intellectuals, students of Belgrade and other universities. Germany's attack on the Soviet Union (June 22, 1941) accelerated the decision to stage the uprising in keeping with so-called communist internationalism, which obligated members towards solidarity and struggle against a common enemy. By June 27, 1941 the military leadership of the uprising had been formed – the so-called General Headquarters of the Partisan National Liberation Forces of Yugoslavia (NOB POJ), headed by Tito. The decision on holding the uprising was itself brought by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CK KPJ) at a session on July 4, 1941 in Belgrade. Milovan Đilas, a member of the CK KPJ Politburo from Montenegro, was sent to Montenegro with directives to initiate the uprising. The uprising, beginning on July 13, 1941 turned into a mass supported, general uprising. The massive response surprised both the organizers and the occupiers, considering that the Italian occupation was one of the mildest occupation regimes at the time in Europe. Estimates are that by July 20, 1941 there were some 32,000 armed fighters on the side of the uprising. With the exception of a few larger cities, the whole of Montenegro was liberated within 10 days. In its scope and massive character, it was the largest uprising by a nation in the whole of occupied Europe. From the military-strategic point of view, also in terms of its scope, response and speed of organization the Montenegrin uprising of July 13, 1941 had no precedent either in the

Yugoslav or the European theater of war at the time. In the fall of 1941 the fighters of the uprising were already reorganized into territorial units, mobile Partisan units under the command of the *General Headquarters of the National Liberation Forces (NOP) for Montenegro and the Bay of Kotor* established on October 20, 1941. The uncompromising struggle against the occupation forces and their collaborators during the entire length of the war, coupled with revolutionary enthusiasm that excluded every possibility of renewing the old regime and form of state organization, clearly demonstrated by the setting-up of new authorities of government on liberated territories, established the Partisans as the “*main enemy*” not only of the occupiers, but also of all domicile collaborator forces and quisling regimes that had emerged from different ideologies. In time the Partisan movement under Tito’s leadership grew into a wide movement that offered an alternative to the radical chauvinism and nationalism present in all ethnic and religious communities threatening all groups on the territory of the former Yugoslavia with extinction. In time the Partisan movement became a respectable, organized, disciplined, and to a significant degree, fanatical military force, even within the scope of the European anti-fascist movement.

The second armed formation on the territory of Montenegro was known as the *Chetnik Movement* and it was organized in Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, parts of Croatia, Sandžak, Montenegro and Kosovo and Metohija. The Chetniks personified the Greater Serbia nationalist movement which fought for “*king and country*” and the creation of a “*Greater Yugoslavia and an ethnically pure Greater Serbia encompassing the boundaries of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Srem, Banat and Bačka*” (the last three being parts of what is called Vojvodina – *trans.*) within it. This implied the “*cleansing of state territory of all ethnic minorities and national elements*”. The Chetniks considered the Partisan movement – necessarily always also seen as Communist also – as

their greatest enemy and against it they cooperated with all occupation and quisling forces. The organization of this movement in Montenegro, as a military formation of the Royal (Yugoslav) Army in the homeland, began towards the end of 1941. On October 15, 1941 Draža Mihailović, as the leader of the Chetnik Movement at the Yugoslav level, appointed General Staff major Đorđe Lašić as commander of all Chetnik forces in Montenegro and captain Pavle Đurišić as commander of Chetnik forces for the counties of Andrijevica, Berane, Kolašin, Bjelopolje, Prijepolje and Pljevlja and for some smaller municipalities. Going from Serbia (Mihailović's HQ at Ravna Gora) into Montenegro, Lasic came with *Instructions* highlighting that the “*Chetnik forces represent a continuation of the former Yugoslav Army*” and explicit orders that the struggle against the Partisans in Montenegro should begin from the said HQ. The elimination of Partisan leaders and the fight against the Partisan Movement as the main enemy began with support from occupation forces which ultimately led the Montenegrin Chetniks into the most unprincipled forms of collaboration.

The third armed formation, established on the basis of an ideology that was present in Montenegro well before the war, was the *Independence Movement of Krsto Popović* (literally the ‘Green’ or Zelenaški Movement – *trans.*). The political and military elite of this faction was comprised of members of the Montenegrin (Federalist) Party and so-called *gaetans* (members of the Montenegrin Army in Italy after the Christmas uprising of 1918) who enjoyed the greatest support on the part of Montenegrin territory that was defined as such in 1878 (so-called Old Montenegro). This faction refused to lend its support to the Italian proclamation of “Independent Montenegro” and opted for a political platform that did not exclude the possibility of a Yugoslav state with Montenegro as a federal unit – distinguishing itself from the other federalist faction headed by Sekula Drljević that was against any kind of Yugoslav state. This faction too saw the occupying forces as allies in

the process of “pacifying” Montenegro, that is, in eliminating the Partisan Movement. The Independence Movement disintegrated with the capitulation of Italy. Except for Krsto Popović and a smaller group of his closer followers, the bulk of the Independence Movement members switched sides and joined the Partisan Movement. In March 1947 Krsto Popović himself was shot as a “*renegade*”. From the end of September to the end of October 1943 the Partisans had liberated about two thirds of Montenegrin territory. Large parts of liberated territory also meant the influx of new combatants (from September to the end of 1943, 31 Partisan battalions were formed). The *General Headquarters of the National Liberation Forces of Montenegro* was established in October 1943. Kolašin became the seat of Partisan Montenegro – a town that for eight months had also previously been the seat of the Chetnik High Command. The process of the renewal of Montenegrin statehood during the war was also tied to Kolašin.

The decisions of the Second convocation of the Anti-fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), the highest governing body on Partisan liberated territory, on the federal restructuring of the Yugoslav state, were supported at the second session of the State Anti-fascist Council for the National Liberation of Montenegro (ZAVNO CG) in Kolašin on February 16, 1944. At the third session of ZAVNO, July 13–15, 1944, this body became the *Montenegrin Anti-Fascist Assembly for National Liberation* (CASNO) as the highest legislative and executive body of Montenegro. At this session a decision was also adopted that Montenegro, as an equal federal unit, should enter into the composition of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (DFJ). This in effect renewed the statehood of Montenegro that had been annulled in 1918, this time within the framework of a federal Yugoslav state.

After the capitulation of Italy, Montenegro was occupied by Nazi Germany. The 17-month – long German occupation of Montenegro ended at the beginning of 1945 when the last city had been

liberated and when the last German soldier had been expelled from Montenegrin soil. The main operations for the liberation of Montenegro began in the fall of 1944, after attempts by occupying forces to destroy the units of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOVJ) in northwestern Montenegro were thwarted in the summer of the same year. In the closing operations in liberating Montenegro the Partisans showed little clemency towards their enemies. In spite of Tito's declaration towards the end of the war that advocated amnesty on condition fighters switched sides to the ranks of the NOVJ, by and large the Montenegrin Partisans were not very open to such a possibility. Therefore there were relatively few crossovers and surrenders in the finish of the war in Montenegro and this pushed some Chetnik units into retreat towards Slovenia and ultimately into great anguish, misery and death.

Later assessments determined that about 10% of the overall population or some 37,000 Montenegrins were killed in the course of World War II. About 14,500 Partisan fighters from Montenegro died in the war and about the same number were killed on the side of the Chetniks and collaborationists. War damages were assessed to be almost 44 billion dinars. The ambivalence of Montenegro is also reflected in the fact that few regions of Yugoslavia had as strong a revolution, but equally as strong a counter-revolution, more massive resistance to the occupying forces and greater collaboration with them, a stronger Communist but equally as strong anti-Communist movement. Nevertheless, thanks to the victorious side – the Partisan Movement of Montenegro – Montenegro entered into federal Yugoslavia with enormous moral capital. With the most massive uprising in 1941 as a phenomenon of European scope, it had some 1850 people in leadership positions at various military, political and party high-ranking levels throughout Yugoslavia in the period from 1941 to 1945. Of the 23 members of the Partisan High Command, more than a

third (eight) were Montenegrins. At the end of 1944, Montenegrins were at the head of eight out of eighteen Partisanmilitary corps. Montenegrins made up 36% of all Partisan generals at the end of the war even though Montenegrins barely added up to 2% of the overall Yugoslav population.

MONTENEGRO IN THE FEDERAL YUGOSLAVIA

Right after the end of the war, the Communists embarked on the process of acquiring legitimacy for the changes in authority that had taken place during the war. The election for the Constitutional Assembly on November 11, 1945 was dominated by the list of the Yugoslav National Front (an organization led and controlled by the Communists) which won an absolute majority. This was taken as a formal confirmation of the new state organization, of revolutionary development and of the new republican framework of the state. At a session in Belgrade on November 29, 1945 the Constitutional Assembly adopted a declaration proclaiming the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FNRJ) which was defined as a federal 'people's state' with a republican order and a union of equal nations that had freely determined to remain united in Yugoslavia. The Constitution adopted on January 31, 1946 was the final act in forming a Yugoslav federation consisting of six republics. The administrative, state, political, economic and cultural space of Montenegro – which had undergone multiple changes in the first half of the 20th century (in 1912, 1918, 1922, 1929) – was finally rounded off in 1945 and for a long time to come it would be the precondition for the social integration of this region. The territorial-administrative demarcation with Serbia on the whole coincided with the Montenegrin-Serbian boundaries from 1912, with the exception of Metohija (in 1912 it had become a part of Montenegro), which now became a part of the Autonomous Kosovo-Metohija Region as a part of federal Serbia. Within this territorial framework the future governments of Federal Montenegro,

the People's Republic of Montenegro (1946–1963), the Socialist Republic of Montenegro (1963–1991), and the Republic of Montenegro (1991), would be constituted.

The elections for the representatives of the Constitutional Assembly of the People's Republic of Montenegro (PR Montenegro = NR Crna Gora – *trans.*) were held on November 3, 1946, and the constitution of the PR of Montenegro was adopted on December 31, 1946 the same day as the constitutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia (Serbia adopted its constitution on January 17 and Croatia its on January 18, 1947). This constitution established in Montenegro the same form of government as the one at the federal level and the ones in the other republics. It defined Montenegro as a “*people's state with a republican order*”, in which the Montenegrin nation, on the basis of the right to “*self-determination, including the right of secession*”, and on the principle of equal rights, enters or unites, along with other nations and their republics, into the Federal PR of Yugoslavia. As in the FPR of Yugoslavia and the other republics, a system of parliamentary government was established in Montenegro and lasted from 1946 to 1974, to be replaced later by a delegate system (1974–1989/1992), all being confirmed by republic-level and federal constitutions (1953, 1963, 1974). The constitution of the SFR of Yugoslavia adopted on February 21, 1974, and in accordance with it, the constitution of the SR of Montenegro adopted on February 25, 1974, defined this republic as *the state of the Montenegrin nation and other nations and 'nationalities'* (ethnic groups – *trans.*) residing in the republic.

By 1948, larger private ownerships had been turned into state-owned property. On the basis of the Yugoslav *Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonization*, adopted on August 23, 1945, expropriation of larger land properties had been implemented and an agrarian land fund had been established for distributing land to the poor, those with no land, and veteran families that had insufficient land. From 1945 to 1948, 5,394 families with 37,425 members

from Montenegro colonized arable land in Bačka in Vojvodina (in northern Serbia, from where a huge German minority had been expelled) – a little less than 10% of the overall colonized households (60,000) from other parts of Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia).

From 1947 to 1954, 68.8 billion dinars – 8.6 billion dinars a year – had been invested into Montenegro. For the first time in the Yugoslav state, Montenegro could count on economic assistance whose objective was not only the acceleration of economic development, but also the leveling-out of growth with the more developed parts of Yugoslavia. From 1945 to 1948, Montenegro's economy was on the rise; then from 1948 to 1952, it went through a period of stagnation, and then it dropped again below the level of 1948 in 1952. Yugoslavia's conflict with Stalin prevented any significant investments by the Yugoslav state in the economy of Montenegro and this caused it to stagnate since Yugoslav investments in Montenegro dropped from 79.2% (of Montenegro's budget) in 1947 to 29.9% in 1952.

The split between Tito and Stalin in 1948 had grave consequences for Montenegrin Communists. This schism among the Communists over different concepts of "building socialism" – like all other political schisms of the 20th century – was the most severe in Montenegro. The Resolution of the Informbiro (i.e. the Soviet Communist Information Bureau), that is Stalin, was supported by members of the highest party leadership of Montenegro – out of the nine members of the highest body of Montenegrin Communists, four supported Stalin's accusations against the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ). Some high-ranking Yugoslav military and diplomatic officials from Montenegro also had greater faith in Stalin than Tito. In such circumstances, Tito applied Stalinist methods of concentration camps and jails "*for re-education*" against his opponents. This "re-education of the misled" was reflected in the practice of isolation and establishment of internment camps of which

the most famous was Goli otok (“Bare Island” – *trans.*) – an island in the Adriatic chosen because of its proximity to the West for fear that in the event of a Soviet invasion, the pro-Stalinist internees could provide the Soviets with logistical support. This danger was at its highest at the time the Korean War broke out in 1950. Stalinist Gulag-like torture methods were applied against his supporters in Yugoslav jails and internment camps. And percentage-wise the largest number of internees was from Montenegro. In Montenegro, 5,007 people were arrested on charges of supporting the pro-Stalinists – or 8.99% of the overall number of individuals in Yugoslavia arrested on such charges (compared to Serbia proper with 51.49%, Croatia 12.49% and Vojvodina 9.68%). Compared to overall population size, the percentage rate was by far the largest in Montenegro (1.16%), almost as twice as large as that in Serbia (0.59%), and more than twenty times greater than in Slovenia (0.05%). Of all those arrested in Montenegro, 2,067 were convicted which made up 12.77% of all those convicted in Yugoslavia. Regular courts adjudicated in 34 cases and military courts in 457 cases, while 1,567 individuals were sent to internment camps (“sentenced to socially useful work”). According to records left by former internees, some 150 individuals from Montenegro did not survive the torture in jails and internment camps or were killed while being arrested – the most infamous case of the latter being the Bijelo Polje municipal Communist Party committee when, in January 1949, twelve out of eighteen renegade members were killed during arrest. Some 130 individuals fled Montenegro to Eastern bloc countries, and another 27 fled by 1952 to Albania.

In the period from 1945 to 2006, the population of Montenegro underwent radical changes in every respect. In some segments of life the rhythm of change was fast and dramatic. The general trends of moderate growth in population, change of lifestyle, social structure, quality of life, the educational and cultural level of the population, inter-ethnic marriages, dissolution of large households, a

drop in both birth and mortality rates, accelerated urbanization and modernization, migration from country to city, from north to south, emigration in order to become guest workers abroad or in other parts of Yugoslavia – in many of these segments the parameters oscillate but within them the general trends of modern society can still be discerned. By its population size, as well as its overall land area of 13, 812 square kilometers, Montenegro was the smallest Yugoslav republic. Montenegro's population went from 2.4% of the total Yugoslav population in 1948 to 2.6% in 1981, while its land area represented 5.4% of the total Yugoslav land area.

Montenegro had always been a pronounced area of emigration. The estimates are that in the period from 1953 to 2006 some 115,000 more people emigrated than immigrated – which is one third of its natural birthrate. According to the 1981 census results, on the entire territory of Yugoslavia there were 579,043 individuals who thought of themselves as “Montenegrin” in the ethnic sense – of which 30.8% did not live in Montenegro, but in the other republics (Serbia 147,466, Bosnia-Herzegovina 14,114, Croatia 9,818). The general opinion about Montenegrins was that they were a mobile community and that they were as a rule professionally successful in environments outside Montenegro.

The number of migrants was especially high in the period from 1991 to 2006, which was the result of the break-up of Yugoslavia, the local wars, uncertain livelihood, insecurity and the like. In April 1993, there were 64,258 refugees in Montenegro from the war-torn areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; and during the NATO intervention of 1999, some 80,000 refugees from Kosovo entered Montenegro. The greater part of the refugees returned to their previous places of residence after the war, but in the period from 1991 to 2003 the number of migrants leaving Montenegro increased by 122.9% because 29,211 people left Montenegro for “third countries”

In 2003, Montenegro had a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.879 and by that parameter it belonged to countries of

medium development level (0.5–0.8) like Bulgaria, Russia, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Romania, Malaysia, Panama etc. Montenegro's annual domestic product saw its biggest drop in 1993 (\$1706 dollars) and by 2003 it achieved only 85.1% of its GDP in 1991, that is, \$ 2,682 dollars per capita. The participation of the service industry in the GDP in 2000 was 56.7%, while the participation of industrial production was 19.6% in 2001. In 2003 the tourist sector accounted for 14.4% of GDP. Montenegro's overall foreign debt in 2003 was 496.4 million dollars or 28.4% of the GNP. At the same time, unemployment increased in the years 1991–2000 and in 2003 the official unemployment rate was 34%. Beginning with 1989, Montenegro also underwent a drastic fall in the standard of living. In 1989, the annual domestic product per capita was around \$ 2, 300 dollars, only to fall by 1994 to a realistic value of between \$ 200 and \$ 300 dollars. The economic sanctions imposed by the international community in May 1992 on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY – Serbia and Montenegro) brought about additional economic and other forms of isolation of this region. In the course of 1993 the FR of Yugoslavia underwent the highest hyper-inflation ever recorded – 120 billion per annum –and a huge redistribution of the economy occurred, along with a misappropriation of citizens' foreign currency savings. Unemployment went up to 40%, the economy was by and large devastated, grinding to a halt and shifting into the gray zone. This dramatic economic downturn was a consequence of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the wars in the region.

YUGOSLAVIA: THE FINAL STAGE

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a two-member federation made up of Serbia and Montenegro was established on April 27, 1992. The international community had in the meantime recognized Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as independent states. In April 1992 the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina escalated

and the international community got involved in the conflicts in former Yugoslavia as both a mediator and one of the interested parties.

The conflicts formally came to an end in November 1995 in Dayton, USA, when the presidents of Croatia (Franjo Tuđman), Serbia (Slobodan Milošević) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Alija Izetbegović) agreed to a cessation of hostilities, which ended the war in Bosnia Herzegovina; the full peace accord was then signed in Paris in December of that year.

Since mediation by the international community to peacefully resolve the conflict in Kosovo was unsuccessful – mainly because the political negotiations in Rambouillet and Paris in February and March of 1999 had collapsed – the NATO alliance intervened militarily (March-June 1999). On March 24, 1999, 19 NATO members began an air campaign against the FR of Yugoslavia in which it is estimated that 1,200 to 2,500 people were killed. The air campaign, which lasted for 78 days, seriously damaged infrastructure, military and commercial installations and buildings, and media outlets, especially in Serbia. The air campaign against the FRY ended on June 10 with the adoption UN SC Resolution 1244. The day before, representatives of the Yugoslav Army and NATO signed a Military-Technical Agreement in Kumanovo (in Macedonia on the border with Kosovo – *trans.*), which laid out details for the withdrawal of the Serbian police forces and the Yugoslav Army from Kosovo and for the entry of international military troops.

Under pressure from the international community, especially the European Union, on March 14, 2002 the *Agreement on Principles of Relations between Serbia and Montenegro within the State Union* (dubbed as the “Belgrade Agreement” for short) was adopted and with it a new state entity, called the (State Union of) *Serbia and Montenegro*, was established for a term of three years. The agreement stipulated that after a period of three years each member state had the right to organize a referendum and decide

whether to continue the state union or become independent. This ended the existence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. State sovereignty had been transferred to the member states. The *Belgrade Agreement* did not define the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro as the state of all the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro, but as a union of the member states – Serbia and Montenegro.

The establishment of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro temporarily halted the process of dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Thus Montenegro had – from the annexation of 1918 whereby it was a part of a centralized Yugoslav state (1918); then to the status of a federal unit in a six-member Yugoslav federation (1943); then to part of a two-member federation (1992), and ultimately to a member state in the state union of Serbia and Montenegro (2003) – completed an historical circle in which each new change in its legal-and-state status also meant an increase in its state personhood. In this sense, the referendum organized on May 21, 2006, after which Montenegro became an independent state, was the logical historical conclusion of that process.

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RESITANCE TO CENTRALISM

IVO GOLDSTEIN

OUR ANALYSIS WILL focus on the Croatian experience of Yugoslav history. The question that is usually asked, at the level of popular understanding of the past, is confined to the very simple dilemma of whether Yugoslavia was a good or bad solution for the Croatian people. It is clear that a simple or short answer does not exist.

In both Yugoslavias, the “Croatian question” (although it was not so called after 1945), in other words, the question of the status of the Croatian lands and Croatian people was still relevant just like in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The promotion of “Croatian interests” and “Yugoslavism” was not necessarily contradictory; rather, it consisted, or could consist, in some form of federal union.

Yugoslavism among the Croats grew on the foundations of Illyrism (although expressly distancing itself from the name “Illyrian” and what it signified) as a specific supra-national idea. First, during the revolutions of 1848 and 1849, it pleaded for forging links among the South Slavs in the Monarchy. It primarily associated Croatism, that is, the Croatian national feeling, with a

broader feeling of cultural belonging to Slavism and South Slavism as the framework, or even prerequisite, for the survival of the small and weak Croatian nation. In Croatia, the Yugoslav ideology had many interpreters or, more precisely, a number of currents, perceiving the relationship between Croatism and Yugoslavism in different ways. The main ideologist of Yugoslavism was Franjo Rački. As a historian and politician, he was also the defender of the Croatian state right. Yugoslavism mobilized educated individuals for the creation of a modern civic culture. The entwined Croatian and Yugoslav feelings left an imprint on literature and the struggle for a standard language and historiography.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE CORFU DECLARATION

As the First World War approached, it was increasingly believed, especially by Croatian intellectuals, that the Yugoslav option was the result of a maturing cultural and national consciousness at a higher level. These intellectuals bore in mind the examples of Germany and Italy, whose nations were still hopelessly divided in the mid-19th century, but succeeded in transforming themselves into the strongest European nations and states by the early 20th century.

During the First World War, one part of the Croatian political scene believed in the survival of the monarchy and its reorganisation on a federal basis, which would lead to the creation of a South Slavic federal unit covering the area from Mount Triglav to Sarajevo. On the other hand, political émigrés (Ante Trumbić, Frano Supilo, Ivan Meštrović and others) held that the survival of Croatia in any union with Austria-Hungary had no perspective, thus pinning their hopes on a state union with Serbia and Montenegro. Therefore, in April 1915, in Paris, they formed the Yugoslav Committee with the aim of representing the interests of the western part of the future South Slavic state, including the present-day states of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as Vojvodina.

Before long, representatives of the Yugoslav Committee and a circle of like-minded people established the first contact with Serbian political representatives. However, the Serbian government did not want the Committee to be treated as its interlocutor on an equal footing, but rather as a political propaganda body in the service of its Yugoslav programme.

The Serbian government pursued a two-faced policy. Already towards the end of 1914, it stated (and often repeated) in the National Assembly that “Serbia’s war is a struggle for the liberation and unification of all our enslaved brothers, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes” and equalized the “great cause of the Serbian state and the Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian tribe”. However, Prime Minister Nikola Pašić also periodically promoted an alternative option – he pleaded that Serbia should obtain only those lands whose addition would not call into question the Serbian (and Orthodox) majority in the future state. For example, he proposed the “division of Slavonia into Catholic and Orthodox”, recognized Italy’s right to the Eastern Adriatic coast, etc.

In July 1917, representatives of the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government signed the Corfu Declaration that laid down the basic principles for the unification and organisation of the future Yugoslav state as a constitutional, parliamentary and democratic monarchy under the Karađorđević dynasty, based on universal civil liberties. A special guarantee was given for the equality of all three flags (Serbian, Slovenian and Croatian), all three national denominations, all three religions and two alphabets. Ante Trumbić later interpreted the Corfu Declaration as a document that implicitly defined the South Slavic union as a federation, which was systematically ignored by Pašić.

When the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (State of SCS), which included Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Vojvodina, was created on October 29, 1918, it theoretically had the following options at its disposal: to remain independent or enter

into a union with the other states. In practice, there was almost no choice. As members of the Allied coalition, the Serbian and Italian armies began entering its territory. In a week or two, the Italian army occupied a large part of the Adriatic coast and it seemed most likely that it would not withdraw from that territory. In a considerable number of places, like Split, the Serbian army was greeted as a liberator.

BLURRED ARRANGEMENTS

However, the arrangements between the State of SCS and the Serbian government on organisation of the state and other issues remained vague. In the days to follow, the Serbian side failed to give any guarantee. Internationally unrecognized, fearing the Italian advance, exposed to manipulations and diplomatic games, and lacking its own armed forces, the State of SCS was forced to take urgent steps. In principle, the common state with Serbia was accepted, but there remained the dilemma of whether it would be based on a confederal or federal concept, which would imply longer negotiations, or whether it should be immediately accepted, which would mean that no conditions would be set. In the Conclusions and Instructions of the Central Committee of the National Council of the State of SCS on Unification with the Kingdom of the Serbia, adopted on November 24., it was demanded that the organisation of the future state should be left to the Constituent Assembly for decision-making. A delegation of the National Council hurried to Belgrade despite Stjepan Radić's call for them "not to go like geese into the fog". With this sentence, which was frequently quoted later on, Radić did not oppose a union with Serbia, as often interpreted; rather, he was calling on top politicians not to rush into making a decision or, in other words, to ask Belgrade to give them clear guarantees that previous agreements would be observed before making any decision.

Upon its arrival in Belgrade, the delegation presented an address to Regent Alexander. The text only partially respected the Instructions of the National Council, thus practically leaving the political initiative and all authority to the Regent. Thereafter, Alexander proclaimed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and on December 1, 1918 the delegation signed the act of unification with the Kingdom of Serbia.

The new state stretched from the Alps almost to the Aegean Sea and covered the area that had not been under a single administration since the 4th century. Such a framework put Croatia in quite a different situation. The Central European environment, which had been important for Croatia for centuries, disintegrated. In return, it was attempted to develop a new cultural and national self-consciousness of the South Slavic peoples.

At that time and in subsequent years, many Croats opted for the Yugoslav state, thinking that it would remove the “curse of small numbers”, which had always accompanied them under the Habsburg Monarchy. However, they did not think that it would be necessary to level regional specificities or negate national identities. Miroslav Krleža pointed out that in 1918 the “Serbian state” was in the heads of Croatian politicians “faced with their own political nothingness” and that in comparison with the “Austrian perspective it resembled a warm domestic home”.

During the subsequent years, there were no political parties in Croatia which called into question the survival of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, that is, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia – they mostly called for federalisation of the state. The exceptions included the remaining members of the pre-war Rightists (*pravaši*) and Frankists (*frankovci*), who were active both in Croatia and abroad until 1929 and then only abroad as émigrés where they formed the Ustasha movement that had its political leaders and paramilitary formations.

Croatian politicians, especially those from the coastal regions (from Istria up to Dalmatia) considered Yugoslavia to be the best bulwark against Italian imperialism. In 1920, as the first Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Ante Trumbić explained how he was born a Croat and would die a Croat and that he was a politician and never a fanatic. As a Croat he worked for the Yugoslav idea and not for a separate Croatian state. For such a commitment he presented several arguments and concluded: “If I had not worked for the State of SCS, that is, Yugoslavia, I am convinced that we would have become the spoil of foreign interests and greed”.

In 1921, for example, many inhabitants of Korčula enthusiastically greeted the representatives of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes when the Italian army left the island (but retained Lastovo in the vicinity). At that time, the Korčula priest Mašo Bodulić said that “this liberated island is a Serbian land because it is Croatian and vice versa, and all is Yugoslav. We are one body, one soul, one country”.

The Catholic Church also pleaded for the creation of a Yugoslav state on the basis of Strossmayer’s idea of Church union and awareness that the Croatian (and Slavic) people in a state with German and Hungarian domination (as it had experienced Austria-Hungary) was deliberately neglected.

Support of Yugoslavism in the Croatian national corpus stretched up to “*orjunaštvo*”: *Orjuna* (the Organisation of Yugoslav Nationalists) was an extremist nationalist and terrorist organisation founded in Split in 1921 with the aim of protecting a unitary Yugoslav state. Its members fostered the cult of the Yugoslav nation, which sometimes bordered on fanaticism. At the same time, they justified a strong authoritarian state, as opposed to the postulates of democracy and parliamentarism. *Orjuna* was theoretically independent but, in practice, it was the regime’s auxiliary, paramilitary force and repressive apparatus for a showdown with the political opponents of Greater Serbism, that is, Yugoslav

integralism. *Orjuna* included a considerable number of Croats. Some of them were also among its leaders.

DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE NEW STATE

However, most Croats became disappointed with the new state very soon. The differences had already come out into the open in understanding the role of the Serbian army, which had risen to fame in the First World War, but its political culture was utterly undeveloped. Despite staying out of daily politics, the top military leadership was the pillar of Karadorđević's politics. The generals were convinced that with the entry of their army into the territory of the former Austria-Hungary and independent Montenegro, they were fulfilling a historically significant mission. Some greeted it as the liberator, while others came to hate it due to its violent behaviour and lack of discipline. The alleged or actual lawbreakers were arrested, beaten and sometimes even executed. After a few months, the army was replaced by the gendarmerie, but the methods did not change. A considerable number of gendarmes came as loyal cadres from Serbia, which only enhanced the feelings of animosity.

At the end of 1919, dissatisfaction in the former Austro-Hungarian territories was also caused by the decision to affix special stamps on all Austro-Hungarian banknotes charging a 20% fee. Even greater dissatisfaction was caused in 1920–21 when unification of the monetary system started and the Serbian dinar became the sole medium of payment. At that time, the dinar was exchanged at a rate of 1 dinar = 4 kronen although the actual value of these two currencies was the same.

In order to strengthen their position in the process of adopting a constitution, the ruling circles adopted the provisional Rules of Procedure for the Constituent Assembly under which the deputies were obliged to take the oath before the King immediately after the elections. Thus, the Republic or Monarchy dilemma was

largely prejudiced. The deputies of the Croatian Republican Peasant Party (HRSS) decided to boycott the work of the Assembly which significantly weakened the other advocates of the republican system of government – Communists and Republicans, which facilitated a formal victory by the unitarist and centralist forces.

In debates on the Constitution in the Constituent Assembly, the ruling Radical-Democratic Coalition sought to impose its solution on all issues concerning the country's system of government and political life. All drafts, proposals and remarks were rejected, not only if they were advanced by the opposition political parties, but also by more sober-minded members of the ruling circles (e.g. Stojan Protić). Mate Drinković, a then member of the Provisional National Assembly and since 1920 the Minister of Postal Services, warned the proposer of the centralist option: "Gentlemen, you all know very well where such a constitution leads", and continued: "Such centralism is very dangerous for our state because, by force of natural law, its arbitrariness must provoke organized resistance, which can pose a serious threat".

In the end, the Constitution legitimized the principles of unitarism and state centralism. The historical provinces were dissolved and the whole country was divided into 33 districts. Croatia was divided into six districts. Zagreb only remained the seat of the Zagreb District. Since the 16th century, the authorities seated in Zagreb had never had jurisdiction over such a small area. The Croatian Parliament (Sabor) was dissolved for the first time after several hundred years. This centralized state was illogical and impractical from both the social and economic aspect, so this alone generated political and social instability.

In 1922, author Ksaver Šandor Gjalski (1854–1935) stated that he had "worked towards South Slavic harmony, love and unification on all sides for forty years" and that now he "must admit that a unified people still does not exist... In order to achieve a unique entity, it is necessary, first of all, to put an end to all grief and

misfortunes emanating now from power in Belgrade and spreading among its public”.

Tensions culminated in 1928 when the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) deputies Pavle Radić and Đuro Basariček were assassinated, while Stjepan Radić, Ivan Pernar and Stjepan Grandža were wounded in Belgrade’s Parliament. News of the assassinations provoked demonstrations and in clashes with the police during the following days, at least five people were killed and many more were wounded. In fact, there was no larger settlement in Croatia where commemorations and mournful processions were not organized despite being prohibited. The Peasant-Democratic Coalition (SDK), which included the HSS and Pribičević’s Independent Democratic Party, announced that it would not recognize either the St Vitus’ Day Constitution or the system of government and that all decisions made in Belgrade would be null and void for the people in the *prečani* regions. The SDK held that everything should be returned to the status before 1 December 1918.

Some newspapers published geographic maps showing the options for Croatia’s independence, that is, the severance of the western parts of Yugoslavia and the creation of a United States of Central Europe.

The situation was additionally aggravated by the fact that the assassin Račić enjoyed tacit support in some high government circles and that this was no secret. Admittedly, he was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment (at that time, the death penalty was given for much less serious crimes), but he was placed under comfortable house arrest. The situation reached a critical point in early August when Stjepan Radić died of his wounds. His funeral, which saw the largest attendance in the history of Zagreb and Croatia, turned into a big political event – it is estimated that there were about 150,000 people in the funeral procession.

Funeral speeches were delivered by Miroslav Krleža, who spoke about another “Croatian tragedy”, and Svetozar Pribičević, who

said: “We all feel, and the local Serbs are especially aware of the fact, that the Croats brought their historical statehood into the common state and this is one more, even stronger reason for such organisation of relations in our state that those who knew how to preserve their state over the centuries are guaranteed full equality”. A few days earlier, Pribićević said in Belgrade’s Parliament that the established system of government did not offer equality to all of its parts and that the “Serbs in the *prečani* regions must show solidarity with the Croats”.

The assassination of Radić and his associates had a shock effect on the situation in Croatia. It definitely sealed the fate of parliamentarism in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, opening the door to its abolition and the proclamation of absolutism and, in the subsequent phase, to the collapse of monarchist Yugoslavia. Over a longer term, this event remained a profound traumatic experience for Croatian society and Croatian-Serbian relations in general.

PROCLAMATION OF DICTATORSHIP

The situation could not be calmed for months. On the 10th anniversary of the proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (December 1, 1928), the Zagreb police started shooting at protesters shouting “free Croatia” and “Peasant-Democratic Coalition”, as well as at Maček, Pribićević and Radić. At least two persons were killed and a number were seriously wounded.

King Alexander gained support for the proclamation of a dictatorship on January 6, 1929, first from the army, gendarmerie and police, and then from the government bureaucracy. At first, the dictatorship was also supported by a section of the Croatian political scene, reckoning that it would be easier to agree on the settlement of a dramatic situation with the King personally than with Serbian politicians. Vladko Maček stated at that time that “the vest is now unbuttoned and should be buttoned up”, implying that

the “vest” was wrongly buttoned in 1918. He held that the “abolition of the St Vitus’ Day Constitution, which has oppressed the Croatian people for seven years” was a favourable fact and expected an offer from Belgrade. He added that he was “absolutely sure of the great wisdom of His Majesty the King and that we will succeed in achieving the ideal of the Croatian people that the Croat is a master in his own home, in his free Croatia”.

Cautious optimism was soon replaced by bitter disappointment because, with the introduction of dictatorship, the ten-year debate on the constitutional system and, hence, settlement of the “Croatian question” was forcibly interrupted. It was renewed much later in the second half of the 1930s, without King Alexander, but in a situation that was much less favourable for both sides concerned.

Since all national emblems – flags, coats-of-arms, national anthems, institutions, symbols of historical development and state law – were forbidden, this represented one more blow to national pride.

Just at that time, in 1932, Ante Pavelić founded the Ustasha movement in Italy. In his program texts, he advocated national exclusivism and announced the creation of an independent Croatia as the ultimate goal. He and his followers stirred up the cult of hatred and revenge, primarily towards all supporters of the Yugoslav idea and then towards the Serbs (and later the Jews). The movement announced the most radical methods of struggle, including terrorism. The obsession with blood and violence reached mythical proportions, creating fertile ground for genocidal crimes in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH). At the beginning, the Ustasha movement was linked to Fascist Italy and a little later to Nazi Germany as well.

From the summer of 1932, members of the Ustasha organisation planted bombs at railway stations and police stations in Croatia, leaving dead and wounded civilians. They also raised the failed

Velebit Uprising, after which the gendarmerie undertook a series of severe repressive measures, which caused further discontent.

During the dictatorship, a number of politicians ended up in prison. Radić's successor as leader of the HSS, Vladko Maček, was accused of helping terrorist activities (after he had spent five months in prison, the charges against him were dropped and he was released). In 1929, due to criticism of the dictatorship in his speech on the occasion of the establishment of the Bar Association, its Chairman Ivo Politeo was also arrested. Even Svetozar Pribičević, who was a great believer in Yugoslavia, did not fare any better. He was interned in Brus for some time and was also hospitalized in Belgrade for a short period. Following the intervention of foreign diplomats, he (already sick) was allowed to go abroad where he supported Croatian aspirations towards greater independence and then full independence until his death in 1936. He also wrote the book *King Alexander's Dictatorship*, which actually represented his showdown with the ruler.

Although the goal of the January 6 Dictatorship was to persecute the promoters of national/nationalist and liberal ideas, it first showed its repressive face to the communists who, for their part, offered a pretext for repression by staging an armed uprising. During the "White Terror" from 1929 to 1932 at least 328 people and probably many more were killed. The center of the police activities and persecution of the communists was Zagreb, where Đuro Đaković, Secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and Nikola Hećimović, Secretary of Red Aid, were arrested and then tortured and killed. All "seven secretaries of the League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia (SKOJ)" were also killed in Zagreb and its surroundings. All this testifies to the antagonism towards the regime, which was felt in Croatia and among the Croats.

By changing the name of the state into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the autumn of 1929, King Alexander rejected the concept of compromise-based national unitarism (expressed in the syntagms

“three-named people” and “three tribes of a single people”) and replaced it by integral Yugoslavism in which there was no room for tribal affiliation and national designations. The administrative division into banates (*banovine*) had no ethnic, economic or geographic justification. It was a deliberate attempt to annul the continuity of historical and national regions and their boundaries. All these actions were direct blows to Croatian national feelings and interests.

The King held that, after ten years of unsuccessful parliamentary efforts, he alone should realize the most important goal: to level the Yugoslav space in a national sense or, in other words, to create a single Yugoslav nation on an ideological basis – integral Yugoslavism. In the following years, it turned out that he was greatly mistaken. First, national specificities in the Yugoslav space were already developed, so that historical processes could not be reversed. Second, he tried to achieve goals that were unachievable in a democratic environment by using dictatorship. Maček called the King’s intention to create a unified “Yugoslav nation” using repression “nonsense” and cited a unnamed HSS member: “You cannot create a child by a decree and King Alexander thinks that he can create a whole new breed of people in such a way”.

In the Belgrade Parliament, which was strictly controlled by the King, even the supporters of nation-building protested against the repression. In 1932, Budislav Grga Anđelinović spoke about the existence of the “Croatian question” (“Let us not act like an ostrich and bury our heads in the sand.”), which was pure blasphemy for the supporters of unitarism, while deputy Ivo Elegović warned that “we, the people’s deputies, especially from the Croatian regions, know on the basis of direct observation that, unfortunately, the national cauldron is boiling. Gentlemen, don’t let this cauldron explode”.

Dictatorship and its implementation additionally strengthened its opponents and also encouraged them to use aggressive

methods. One of the first victims of the violence was King Alexander himself.

THE KING'S ASSASSINATION AND THE CVETKOVIĆ-MAČEK AGREEMENT

The King's assassination in Marseilles was organized by Macedonian nationalists together with the Ustasha organisation. The Ustashes themselves said that the "Ustasha gun had spoken out". A significant role in this event was also played by the Italian and Hungarian secret services.

Alexander's violent death like the assassination of the Croatian deputies in 1928 imposed a heavy burden on political life and "hampered the modernisation of Yugoslavia as a state and, in particular, as a society". These two tragedies demonstrated the extent of the rift between Serbs and Croats – probably not so much in politics as in an emotional sense and at the level of popular mythology. For many years, they were one of the key arguments in national memories that "we can't go on together any more". However, a considerable number of people still did not share such this opinion. These were primarily the numerous Serbs in Croatia who sided with their broader homeland Croatia in 1928 and followed the policy of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS). On the other hand, the Croats that were inclined towards the monarchist option (their number was smaller than during the 1920s and over time, as the Second World War approached, it grew even smaller) also mourned over the King's assassination in Marseilles. Many of them visited the King's tomb on top of Oplenac Hill, while 30 young men from Smokvica on the island of Korčula did not shave their beards for six months in the memory of the King.

At that time, the Ustashes in Croatia were weak – their organisation did not exist and the newspapers and brochures under their influence had a small circulation. They gained weight in 1937 when Prime Minister Stojadinović reached agreement with the

Italian government to grant amnesty to some of them, so that they could return to Yugoslavia. Accordingly, by the summer of 1939, some 260 Ustasha émigrés, among whom Mile Budak was the best known, had returned to the homeland.

Although the authorities – during the parliamentary election campaign in 1935 – largely used aggressive measures (at election rallies in Croatia the police killed 20 or so people), the unitarist forces won a Pyrrhic victory. This was a sign that the authorities must negotiate with the opposition, especially the Croatian. Hence, after 1935 it was again possible to speak more freely about inter-ethnic and social problems and tensions that could be termed “the Croatian question”.

As a supporter of the idea of integral Yugoslavism and a political realist, regent Paul Karađorđević met with Vladko Maček shortly thereafter. Maček asked him to call a new election and “restore the 1918 status”, but Paul rejected this proposal. In passing, he asked Maček “whether the Croats want this state” and “how many Frankists there are and what is their program”. He did not get a clear answer to this question. Although this meeting did not produce direct results, it was clear to all that some kind of compromise should be sought.

The Cvetković-Maček Agreement (in fact, the agreement between the Croatian political elite and Belgrade’s Royal Court) was concluded on 26 August 1939 in a state of imminent war psychosis, only five days before the outbreak of war. The essential part of the agreement was the establishment of the *Banovina* (Banate) of Croatia as an administrative unit. The *Banovina* included those parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina with a majority Croat population and part of Srijem. The boundaries so determined were an attempt to solve the Croatian national question. However, when the boundaries in Bosnia-Herzegovina were determined, the Muslim population was ignored and only the proportions of the Serbs and Croats in the districts were taken into account. This

imposed a heavy burden on the hitherto cooperation between the HSS and Muslim politicians in the anti-centralist program.

At such moments, however, internal tensions and foreign pressure were too heavy, so that even more prudent political solutions could not relax them. There were many opponents to this agreement – some HSS members also held that Maček did not get enough. Maček was exposed to an even greater number of attacks from right-wing nationalists, Frankists and others, most of whom joined the Ustasha movement later on. They proclaimed him a traitor, arguing that the only solution to the “Croatian question” lay in separation from Yugoslavia. For their part, Serbian nationalists and conservatives viewed the Cvetković-Maček Agreement as a surrender to the Croats.

The HSS had a strong coalition partner – the Independent Democratic Party which differed from all other Serbian and pro-Yugoslav political parties because it consistently defended the Croatian right to its state-legal and ethnic specificities in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, it firmly defended the view that the solution to the “Croatian question” should not be sought beyond the boundaries of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

Although it seemed that the Cvetković-Maček Agreement actually saved Yugoslavia, it turned out that it had an opposite effect – it “unintentionally proved the limitations of centralist Yugoslavism and opened the door to alternative solutions”.

“INDEPENDENT” CROATIA

Due to their severe disappointments encountered in Monarchist Yugoslavia, many welcomed the creation of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) in April 1941. They also held that, by creating a new state that would be politically close to the Nazi regime, Croatia would avoid the ravages of war into which Europe was being dramatically plunged – all this under the slogan “There is no war and we have a state!”

With the proclamation of an “independent” Croatia, the goal to which Croatian extremists had aspired for years, with lesser or greater support from some circles in Croatia, was now achieved. However, it was mostly impossible to resolve the problems placed on the agenda. The first problem – dependence on the Reich and Italy – was interpreted by the Ustashas and their supporters as if this were an advantage. They held that by linking the NDH to the Reich, they would make fast progress because the Reich had established a thousand-year “New Order in Europe”, which proclaimed its superiority over decadent Western capitalism and godless Communism. However, it soon turned out that it was a noose around their neck which the NDH authorities could not – or perhaps more accurately, did not want to – remove.

The sympathy that a section of the public had for the NDH soon gave way to dissatisfaction. Through demarcation of the borders with Italy and Hungary, the NDH lost large parts of Croatian territory while the German and Italian armies enjoyed special treatment, so an increasing number of people realized that the NDH was actually a German-Italian protectorate. The persecutions of Serbs, Jews and Roma on racial, religious and ethnic grounds, as well as the brutal terror against their Croat political opponents caused aversion and uncertainty among an increasing number of people (“great enthusiasm in the streets soon dwindled after the emergence of the first posters of shot and hanged opponents and innocent hostages”).

All this was accompanied by great economic problems, so that many people found themselves on the brink of starvation. The abrupt emergence and continuous strengthening of political and armed resistance against the Ustasha regime and foreign occupation were the most convincing indicators of the political sentiments of the Croatian and non-Croatian population in the NDH.

Despite feeling the rigidity of Ustashism, some people deceived themselves that “it is better to have any Croatia than none at all”,

but such a view would soon “force them to make a choice burdened by severe consequences”.

In September 1941, Juraj Krnjević, Vice-President of the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London, claimed that the “people at home cannot openly raise their voice due to the unprecedented terror”. At that time, Krnjević conveyed Maček’s message to British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that Croatia was still democratic and that Pavelić’s government was not the desired choice of the Croatian people.

Toward the end of 1941, Glaise von Horstenau, appointed German General in Zagreb, reported: “Too little support from the people for Pavelić in the creation of the state is increasingly manifesting itself as a flaw”, and then in February 1943: “The Ustashas are a worn-down piano that can barely produce full tones”. Just as Pavelić came to power with the support of his great allies, his stay in power also depended on their goodwill.

The NDH population was more sharply differentiated in relation to developments than in most other countries under the occupation or influence of Nazi Germany. There were relatively more participants in crimes and relatively still more forms of domestic resistance against the perpetrators of those crimes. In his speech in Glina in February 1944, answering the question of “why did he join the Partisans?”, the great poet Vladimir Nazor (1876–1949) said that he was “prompted to do so because of the inhuman persecution and extermination of the Jews, who are humans like us, and especially because of the terrorising and killing of the Serbs, who are our blood brothers and with whom we have lived for so many centuries”.

THE UPRISING AND PARTISAN AUTHORITIES

At first, the calls of the Partisans for an uprising against the foreign occupation and the Ustasha regime were exclusively anti-fascist and patriotic. They resisted “fratricidal war”, condemned the

Ustasha crimes against the Serbs and Chetnik retaliation, and crimes against the Croats and Muslims. Aware of the people's discontent with pre-war Yugoslavia, the Communists also announced a struggle for a better post-war order in the country – democracy and inter-ethnic equality. They proclaimed the goals of the National Liberation Struggle (NOB) to be “the “liberation of the country from foreign rule and domination” and the establishment of “a new democratic Yugoslavia of free and equal peoples, with a free Croatia built on the basis of self-determination”. Hearing these slogans, anti-fascist armed resistance gradually spread among the Croats, so the idea of Yugoslavia was reaffirmed among them.

In June, in the newly-liberated territory in Otočac and the following day at Plitvice in Lika, the Partisans founded the Regional Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council (ZAVNOH), their supreme representative body of Croatia. In a resolution adopted by ZAVNOH, “the reactionary regimes” of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the *Banovina* of Croatia were resolutely condemned, while at the same time emphasizing the need to build a new people's government in all Croatia as a guarantee for a new democratic Croatia within a new democratic Yugoslavia. This was the basic document used to build the position of Croatia in the new, socialist Yugoslavia in the following years.

The situation on the battlefield was directly reflected in the changed attitude towards the belligerent parties. The year 1943 was a groundbreaking because the forces of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOVJ) took the initiative on the battlefield, but even more so because Croats were increasingly joining the Partisans. Although there are no sources that can directly testify to this, there is no doubt that, at the time, especially in the autumn of that year, most Croats supported the anti-fascist Partisan side, helping it actively. There are numerous data – whose impartiality should not be doubted – which witness this phenomenon. For example, the German South-East Command sent the following

report to Supreme Command concerning the military and political situation in NDH territory in August 1943: “The political situation in the country is worsening. The NDH authorities have lost all supporters, even among sections of the Croatian people... The NDH army can be dismissed as the pillar of the state”.

In late September 1943, thanks to Nazi military power, the Ustasas entered Split, but the Intelligence Service of the Directorate for Liberated Territories in Split informed Zagreb two months later that “due to extraordinary circumstances in Dalmatia, the situation for direct development of the Ustasha movement is unfavourable. Unfortunately, enemy propaganda has succeeded in politically poisoning the great majority of people and arousing hatred towards Ustashism and the Ustasha movement.”

After the final liberation, the new authorities in Yugoslavia and in Croatia, were more popular than in any other East European country. Many people gave credit to the Communists for ending the war and ethnic carnage. In addition, calling for equality in a poor country had to be met with approval. Propaganda slogans and mobilisation songs (such as the song “Fall down force and injustice... our day, too, has dawned”) had a significant effect. During the following years and decades, the regime enjoyed relatively great support among the wide strata of the population, primarily due to the building of State Socialism, which brought accelerated industrialisation, mass education and health and social care.

LIBERATION AND POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT

Support of the regime in Croatia and among the Croats was also helped by the fact that Zadar and some of the islands,, Istria and parts of the Croatian Littoral were included in Yugoslavia or, more precisely, Croatia, thereby healing long years of frustration.

However, behind the polished mask of building a new and satisfied society there were a considerable number of people who were extremely dissatisfied. There were also many people who

had lost someone in “squaring accounts with the People’s enemy”, although he or she did not deserve death. The authorities used up this credit they had among some people rather quickly. As early as the summer of 1945, many innocent people, picked up in mass arrests at the end of the war, primarily civilians and *Domobrani* (Home Guard), did not return home. In addition, the sweeping nationalisation after 1946 left only small-scale crafts and trade in private hands, causing discontent and a change of attitude towards the government.

Part of the population still cherished the hope that the economic and social situation would improve. Since there were no free elections or any other way of freely expressing their political views, it is impossible to assess more precisely the degree of public support for the regime and how quickly this support was lost, or periodically recovered thanks to some actions. In this connection, the national factor in Croatia was important because, despite political slogans about the equality of the republics, it was obvious that a new centralism had been installed.

Croatia became one of the six republics making up the federal state that promoted Yugoslav patriotism with its politics and supra-national ideologies (brotherhood and unity, socialist internationalism). However, it tried to maintain the balance by promoting national identities and the interests of individual peoples (and nationalities). It was held that the national form was strictly observed, primarily thanks to the establishment of a federal system. However, in expressing this national form some traditional contents were missing. “The canon of Croatian national culture, constructed during the time marked by HSS cultural policy, remained almost intact, like the presentation of Croatian folklore onstage during the period of socialist Yugoslavia. In the reality of everyday life and suppressed by modernisation processes, as well as the policy of de-Christianization and putting pressure on the peasants, national culture was retreating. However, being

refined and shaped into a canon, it seemed to be the least dangerous expression of national culture for real politics”.

In the sphere of historical memory in Croatia, the brunt was borne by *Ban* Josip Jelačić (and partly the Zrinski family). Since Jelačić was defamed as an “enemy of the working class” (because, in Karl Marx’s opinion, he took part in the suppression of the progressive Hungarian revolution in 1848), his monument in Zagreb was removed in 1947 and streets and squares bearing his name in Croatia were re-named. The names of Ante Starčević with his rightist ideology and Stjepan Radić with his general human rights were allowed (or at least tolerated), the latter more than the former, but they were served to the public in strictly “measured” quantities. It was in this atmosphere that we should place the statement by well-known singer Vice Vukov (1936–2008) that during the 1960s it was possible to speak about “Slovenian” and “Macedonian” singers, while he was always called a “Zagreb” singer, not “Croatian”. He added that “those from Belgrade were likewise called “Belgrade” singers, not “Serbian”.

During the immediate post-war years, contrary to public proclamations, all power was concentrated in the hands of a small number of federal or republic Politburo members. The Croatian Politburo had fifteen or so members. According to recently published records, it is clear that the Politburo controlled all aspects of social life. At all events – it decided on the the composition of the government, what the government would say at an important public meeting, which government members would speak, how many HRSS members would be in the Parliament – after the 1950 elections – whether killers would be handed over to the police or not. There were no great discussions on strategic issues at their sessions, let alone discussions on decisions taken at a higher level – the Federal Politburo in Belgrade. In the early 1950s, although a process of democratisation and federalisation had been initiated,

the functioning of both the federal and republican Politburos still bore many characteristics of strict centralisation.

Pursuant to a 1952 parliamentary decision, the Government of the People's Republic of Croatia was reorganized and reconstructed, establishing the Presidency of the Government, five ministries and nine councils. Although this process, called "decentralisation and de-bureaucratisation" in party parlance, produced only partial results for years, or even for decades, it nonetheless significantly changed Yugoslav/Croatian society. It brought changes in all spheres of life, including the army in which territorial defense, organized at republic level, was gaining importance.

Although the government wore the mask of self-satisfaction in public and confidently claimed that the situation was ideal, the highest officials knew that this was not true. They would openly admit this in their narrow circle. For example, in 1950, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia (CK KPH) stated that it was necessary to "fight against chauvinism, especially in mixed districts... now and then there appear enemies who use various slogans about the inequality of one's own or another people, about alleged neglect or suppression and the like".

In the meantime, in January 1953, the Federal Assembly adopted the Constitutional Law on Elements of the Socio-Political System and the Federal Organs of Government. In February, the Parliament adopted a similar legal act. At that time, one could already observe the trend whereby the adoption of federal regulations was immediately followed by the adoption of republican ones. While elections for the Constituent Assembly and adoption of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Croatia took place in 1946–47, one year after the adoption of these procedures at federal level, Croatian regulations were adopted just three weeks after their federal counterparts. Nevertheless, after the adoption of the Constitutional Law in early 1953, things started moving towards decentralisation, in contrast to the immediate post-war period.

During these years, a parallel process was underway. As in the whole of Yugoslavia, Croatia was also developing both economically and socially at an accelerated pace.

The most important characteristic of this period was fast economic growth. Between 1952 and 1960, the social product in Croatia increased by 106% and in the following decade (1961–1970) by a further 76%. During the period 1953–63, the average annual growth in production was 9.5%, while the growth of personal consumption was exactly 10%. This economic growth, backed by Western financial assistance, was one of the highest in the world.

Under the influence of economic reforms and Ranković's downfall, the 1960s constituted the period of the most vigorous economic growth in post-war Croatia and Yugoslavia. Between 1962 and 1970, average real pay (without taking into account a high increase in the employment rate) increased by 90%. In some years, its increase was only 14%, but it was never lower than 4%. At that time, the manager stratum was also formed in Croatia. These people developed the entrepreneurial spirit and promoted Western behavioural patterns within the socialist economic and social system.

Liberalisation was most clearly reflected in almost full freedom of movement, both inside and outside the country, including considerably relaxed border controls. Although the border with Austria was opened in 1953 and with Italy two years later, the number of border crossings did not register a striking increase until the mid-1960s. In the Zagreb area the number of issued passports increased from 47,479 in 1964 to a total of 307,163 in 1966 and 1967.

During this period, a large number of Croats from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (proportionally many more than any other Yugoslav nation) went to “work abroad temporarily”. Until 1971, most of them went to the Federal Republic of Germany (70%). In 1971, the Croats constituted 22.1% of the Yugoslav population, while in the total number of migrants (763,000) they accounted

for 39%. At that time, the Croats constituted 20.6% of the population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and their share among the workers from this republic who were employed abroad was more than double – 42.4%. Many of these “workers temporarily employed abroad” (*Gastarbeiter*)” converted their temporary stay into a permanent one, but maintained ties with the homeland and sent about 500 million dollars to Yugoslavia each year, of which 300 million dollars went to Croatia. In 1967, foreign exchange remittances by these workers accounted for 1.2% of Croatia’s national income, while seven years later this share had grown to 7.4%.

Workers temporarily employed abroad built houses and brought other material goods (cars, household appliances), so that many underdeveloped regions were transformed from the mid-1960s till around the mid-1980s solely thanks to the work of their compatriots abroad.

The increase in Croatian tourism was of special importance. In 1938, less than 3 million tourist nights were recorded, in 1958 already eight million, while in 1969 this rose to more than 28 million tourist nights. During the 1960s, the annual growth rate of tourist nights recorded two-digit numbers. In 1963, for example, Dalmatia recorded 57% more foreign tourist nights than the year before. Roads were also built. The building of the Adriatic Highway, over 650 km long, had a crucial impact on tourism development. Roads were also built in the interior of Croatia. Thanks to its modern roads (for that time), Croatia was connected to the West and other federal republics, as well as within the country itself, so that it started functioning as a transport entity. Airports were also opened in Dubrovnik and Split (1966), and thereafter in Pula (1967) and Zadar (1969).

During these years,, the University of Zagreb expanded at an accelerated rate, and separate departments and then faculties were also founded in other cities. They turned into universities in Split, Rijeka and Osijek in the 1970s.

Zagreb TV began broadcasting in September 1956, as Yugoslavia's first TV station. Even earlier, an important role in newspaper publishing was held by *Vjesnik u srijedu*, the first Yugoslav entertainment and political weekly spanning a broad spectrum, which was launched in 1952. In some periods, it had a circulation of 300,000 copies and exerted a strong influence on the development of the Croatian and Yugoslav media and society in general. In the subsequent years, the *Vjesnik* Newspaper Publishing Enterprise carried out many successful and important projects.

This was also the period of cultural expansion in numerous spheres. The Zagreb School of Animated Film was founded in the mid-1950s. In the following years and decades, its authors received numerous international awards, culminating in the Academy Award (Oscar) for the Best Animated Short Film in 1962, won by Dušan Vukotić (1927–1998) for his film *Surogat* (The Substitute).

The cultural upswing, caused partly by liberalisation and democratisation during the 1950s and 1960s, brought new ideas and new trends into Croatian culture and its public. During these years, they naturally exerted an influence on Croatian politics and society as a whole.

RAISING "FORBIDDEN" QUESTIONS

During the 1960s, an increase in the standard of living strongly contributed to the formation of an increasingly broad middle class that was developing a world view different from the rigid Marxist line. The Western way of life and, in particular, a consumer mentality, were becoming increasingly evident. As early as the late 1960s, true party believers warned that Marxism was being "disputed" and proclaimed "obsolete" and that Marxist ideology was considered "outdated". They also claimed that various anti-Marxist ideological tendencies were being revived and that their opponents aspired towards the "de-ideologisation" and the "convergence" of social systems.

It was logical that in such a libertarian environment, in a considerably more affluent society, a new atmosphere was created and that hitherto forbidden questions began to be asked. This meant that relations within the Federation, that is, inter-ethnic relations would also be reassessed. At first, debates about them were refracted – or politically coded – by emphasizing the question of language.

After the downfall of Aleksandar Ranković, the need was felt for decentralisation and federalization. Hence, public discussion about constitutional amendments was initiated. In March 1967, the *Telegram* weekly published a document entitled *Declaration on the Name and Status of the Croatian Standard Language*, which was signed by 18 scientific and cultural institutions in Croatia. The signatories of the *Declaration* demanded equality in the status of the Slovenian, Croatian, Serbian and Macedonian languages in federal institutions and the consistent use of the Croatian standard language in Croatia. Publication of this text had broader implications since it indicated national inequality and, in particular, repression of the Croats and the Croatian language. At the 7th Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia, the *Declaration* was branded as “an act directed against the brotherhood and unity of the peoples and nationalities of the SFRY” and as “tendentious and politically harmful”. The Parliament claimed that “with their demands the signatories attacked the main achievement of the National Liberation War – brotherhood and unity”. The party members who had signed the *Declaration* were branded as “politically immature”. All state and party forums gave bureaucratic and essentially deceitful assessments that “the Yugoslav union created the conditions for resolving inter-ethnic relations – including the question of language, in a different way”.

Of the 70 party members who had signed the *Declaration*, 34 were punished in various ways, while 10 were expelled from the

League of Communists. The authors of the *Declaration* were subjected to political pressure and temporarily or partially removed from public life.

Although the events associated with the *Declaration* had an unsuccessful outcome for Croatian interests, some of the demands were adopted very soon. For example, at the end of 1967, the Federal Executive Council decided that as of 1968 all federal regulations should be published in the languages of all the peoples. The *Declaration* and related events were a prelude to a general emancipation movement in the years to come.

During these months, both the League of Communists and society in general demanded a realistic debate about the development of self-management, the operation of banks and inter-republic relations. All this clearly indicated that it would be difficult to preserve the indisputable “brotherhood and unity” dogma with the wave of democratisation. One of the most sensitive topics was whether the interests of individual republics should be subordinated to the imaginary “common” interest.

During these years, power in Croatia was gradually taken over by a reformist and nationally-oriented leadership headed by Savka Dabčević-Kučar and Mika Tripalo. It also included Ivan Šibl, Pero Pirker, Dragutin Haramija and Srećko Bijelić. Apart from some minor (insubstantial) differences, this circle of people took a unique stand – they advocated a radical transformation of the economic system and the democratisation of political life.

By the end of 1971, when the movement, called the “Croatian Spring” after the Prague movement bearing the same name, was forcibly suppressed, it was spontaneously joined by a large number of the Croatian people and enjoyed wide public support. Although various ideological, national and social aspirations (many of which could not be explained due to the limited democratisation of society) came to the fore during that relatively short but eventful period, two basic ideas dominated – national and liberal-democratic.

With different people and on different occasions, one or the other would be more strongly expressed, but most often they merged together, with the national idea being more dominant.

Even these two basic ideas were never clearly defined and analysed, while many people were afraid to say all that was in their minds. In public, the wish for further democratisation was exclusively presented as a reform within the socialist system, but some people obviously thought that it would be necessary to aspire towards the development of pluralistic liberal democracy. Although the publicly avowed goal was a more independent Croatia within Yugoslavia, between the lines of some writings and in some incidents the wish for the full independence of Croatia could be discerned. Later events, especially after 1990, when individuals and groups were freer to speak out and act as they wished, suggest that two visions of the Croatian state were present at the time: one was democratic, with an anti-fascist and democratic identity, while the other was based on national exclusionism and in some ways continued the traditions of the NDH. Although there were also some inappropriate anti-Serbian acts and procedures, anti-Serbian feelings appeared only sporadically and on the margins of the “Croatian Spring”.

According to the “Croatian Spring” participants, the unequal status of Croatia was especially evident in the economic sphere because, for example, the unjust provision under which exporters, whose seat was mostly located in the north-western republics, tourism and Croatian workers temporarily employed abroad had to deposit a high percentage of foreign exchange in the National Bank of Yugoslavia. In many newspapers in Croatia it was insisted that “the unfair distribution of wealth in which the person who creates this wealth receives the least, must be eliminated in our environment”.

There is no doubt that it was very difficult to fulfil the wish to establish “clean accounts”. After the collapse of the “Croatian

Spring”, Stipe Šušvar argued that theses about the exploitation of Croatia were not correct. He rejected the assessments given in previous years that the federal state favoured Serbia and the underdeveloped republics. He argued that economic analyses showed that insofar as overall development was concerned, all republics were developing at an almost equal pace. However, if shorter periods were taken into account, some republics fared better than others. On the other hand, some analyses pointed out that the more developed republics were developing at a faster pace (he was right because, for example, Croatia in 1953 was more developed than the Yugoslav average by 14%, while in 1979 by as much as 30%). The market carried out redistribution in favour of more developed republics due to price differences between finished products and raw materials, while redistribution in favour of the underdeveloped republics was carried out by subsidising general consumption and earmarking resources for additional investments. Šušvar agreed that the administration was making mistakes and even behaving in a biased manner, depending on the prevalent national structure. However, he saw the causes of these economic problems as lying in the preservation of centralism, different development levels of the republics and the redistribution of profits due to the functioning of the market and investments.

However, similar tensions also occurred at the level of Croatia, although they were much less publicly present, since Croatia itself was actually divided into developed and underdeveloped parts. North-Eastern Croatia, Slavonia and parts of the Adriatic coast were more developed, while Lika, parts of Dalmatinska Zagora and other mountainous regions were underdeveloped. The republic had the funds for underdeveloped regions. The resources earmarked for this purpose were increasing faster than the social product, but that did not help either. As the years passed, the underdevelopment of the “passive” regions only deepened due to their inability to overcome it. It is no accident that national

antagonisms, which soon evolved into a war, erupted first in those regions towards the end of the 1980s.

The forcible suppression of the “Croatian Spring” generated strong negative feelings towards the Yugoslav authorities in Croatia, but the conformism of many people did not allow the understanding that Yugoslavia as such should be replaced by an independent Croatia that had now come to maturity. Apathy also reigned since the general opinion was that decisions were made by the will of the state-party apparatus and not by the majority will of the people.

Nevertheless,, the ideas of the “Croatian Spring” participants were incorporated into the 1974 Constitution, which affirmed the statehood of the republics, thus laying the foundation for the independent states of the early 1990s. Finally, political apathy in the 1970s was somewhat mitigated by the fact that this period saw the highest standard of living both in Yugoslavia and Croatia (between 1965 and 1979 onwards the average growth rate was 6.5%).

The result of apathy as well as political repression was the creation of a social and political atmosphere that was later termed the “Croatian silence”.

Until second half of the 1980s, Croatian leaders remained more rigid than in most other republics and did not allow any more open discussion. Since they understood the “struggle against nationalism” as one of their primary tasks, it was impossible to speak about the status of Croatia in Yugoslavia during these years.

The situation in Croatia was additionally aggravated by the deaths of Krleža in 1981 and Bakarić two years later. There were no more authority figures of the kind that had dominated Croatian cultural and political life for decades and who might reverse the negative trends. At the same time, the Croatian economy ran into problems because its construction, metallurgy, machine-building and shipbuilding industries plunged into crisis.

The relative stability of the system (and hence Croatia's attitude towards Yugoslavia and in Yugoslavia) was secured by Yugoslavia's decades-long openness towards the world, where Croatia had an advantage over the other republics due its intensive contacts with the world at large and vigorous tourism that continued to increase. According to all the statistics, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Croatian social product was about 25–30% higher than the Yugoslav average. The developed parts of the country were even more developed – Zagreb's social product was 111% higher than the Yugoslav average, while Rijeka, Poreč and Krk lagged only slightly behind Zagreb.

However, the party nomenclature did not know how to use all this to its advantage because it was not inclined towards changing the utterly inefficient political and economic system. The situation was worsening. One of the indicators was the distancing and antagonism of young people towards current politics. In Croatia in 1974, 13% of people did not want to be members of the League of Communists, while in 1989 this percentage increased to 70% and in 1989 to as much as 75%. As a comparison, these figures in Yugoslavia were 9% in 1974, 50% in 1986 and finally 51% in 1989.

In the mid-1980s, a certain degree of liberalization started in Croatia, partly due to the fact that the League of Communists was losing its legitimacy to act as supreme arbitrator. Liberalisation was also reflected in the increasingly open criticism of social reality, in discussions about a civil society, reform and pluralism. So the criticism of Milošević's movement, when it began to develop, was left to liberalized public life and the media. However, the indecisiveness and hesitation of the leadership of the League of Communists of Croatia was one of the key reasons for its election setback in the spring of 1990.

In such circumstances and as a result of similar processes in other Communist countries, initiatives emerged for the formation of opposition societies and political parties in late 1988 and early

1989. The newly-formed opposition was faced with two problems: the introduction of multi-party liberal democracy and resolution of the national question.

Despite the tensions, inter-ethnic relations in Croatia could be considered relatively stable even towards the end of 1989. According to surveys, the great majority of Croats (65.8%) and Serbs (72.1%) considered inter-ethnic relations to be good or very good, while only 8.7% of Croats and 4.5% of Serbs considered them as mostly bad or very bad. Are these findings realistic or was it a question of self-deception or the fear of expressing sincerely held views?

DISINTEGRATION OF THE FEDERATION

However, those were the weeks and months when it was increasingly expressed that Croatia should not remain in a Yugoslavia organized according to the wishes of Milošević's movement.

It turned out that the political system based on "brotherhood and unity" (replaced mostly by the term "togetherness" at that time) was very fragile and that its stability was largely false. The reasons for the relatively fast changes in Croatia and the entire Yugoslav space partly lay in the poorly developed political culture. The public was inclined towards "mass authoritarianism" or, in other words, towards reacting collectively and not individually. Consequently, gregariousness at work! In a specified social situation and at the will or "order of the social hierarchy, the prevalent value orientation (in this case – inter-ethnic tolerance) is very quickly transformed into its opposite (ethno-nationalism). It should also be taken into account that the 1980s were marked by a protracted economic crisis, leaving behind disappointed, if not poor, people, and this always opens the door for demagoguery, populism and manipulation. The instigator of the collapse of the Yugoslav socialist union should be sought not only in Croatia, that is, "social poverty and economic irrationality", but also in the

symbiosis of “awakened nationalism and the hunger for a restoration of identity”.

The attitude of the Croats and Croatia towards Yugoslavia is well illustrated by the attitude towards Yugoslav sports teams. In June 1989, Zagreb was the venue for the European basketball championships. The Yugoslav national team led by Dražen Petrović won all their games convincingly and became European champions. A celebration after winning the gold medal was organized on Republic Square. The popular singer Kićo Slabinac was the show’s presenter. The basketball players appeared on the stage at around one thirty in the morning. Shouts of ‘Yugoslavia! Yugoslavia!’ resounded throughout the square. Sixty thousand people greeted the national team. “The celebration continued in Zagreb’s clubs until the early hours”, *Večernji list reported*.

Exactly a year later, in June 1990, Zagreb was the venue for a football match between the Yugoslav and Dutch teams. The Yugoslav team members actually played this match for themselves since there was no one to root for them. When the national anthem was played, most spectators turned their backs towards the pitch and whistled. The stadium was full of Dutch colours and flags and the majority of Yugoslav team members and selector Ivica Osim were on the receiving end of insults.

Around 1990, empires and socialist federations were falling apart. But the principle of freedom, involving not only individual freedom, but also the free will of the people, decided the fate of the Yugoslav state. This was one of the fundamental reasons why Croatia became an independent state one or two years later, for most Croatian citizens simply did not want Yugoslavia in any form any more.

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IN SEARCH FOR IDENTITY

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ALEKSANDAR LITOVSKI

MACEDONIA WAS THE most southerly region, i.e. republic (South Serbia, Vardar Banovina, Vardar Macedonia, the Democratic Federal Republic of Macedonia, the People's Republic of Macedonia, the Socialist Republic of Macedonia) of the once kingdom or republic prefixed Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia linked a part of the Macedonian people and other Yugoslav peoples into a common state. In the period 1918–91, Macedonia's territory of 25,713 square kilometers was an integral part of Yugoslavia and its population ranged from 808,724 to 2,022,547 people (according to the censuses of 1921 and 2002 respectively). Characteristic of this region or republic throughout the Yugoslav era was its multi-ethnicity. According to statistics in the period of the Kingdom of SCS/Yugoslavia, the Macedonian ethnic community predominated in the corps of the Serbian ethnic community in Macedonia. Of all other ethnic communities, Turkish, Serbian, Bosniak, Aromanian, Roma, etc. the Albanian was the biggest.

Table: Population Of The Republic Of Macedonia

CENSUS	1953.	1961.	1971.	1981.	1991.	1994.	2002.
Macedonians	860.699	1.000.854	1.142.375	1.279.323	1.328.187	1.295.964	1.297.981
Albanians	162.524	183.108	279.871	377.208	441.987	441.104	509.083
Aromanians	8.668	8046	7.190	6.384	7.764	8.601	9.695
Roma	20.462	20.606	24.505	43.125	52.103	43.707	53.879
Turks	203.938	131.484	108.552	86.591	77.080	78.019	77.959
Bosniaks	/	/	/	/	/	6.892	17.018
Slovenians	1.147	838	648	983	513	403	365
Serbs	35.112	42.728	46.465	44.468	42.775	40.228	35.939
Croats	2.770	3.801	3.882	3.307	2.878	2.248	2.686
Montenegrins	3.414	3.246	3.920	2.526	3.225	2.318	2.003
Others	6.832	10.815	30.384	64.162	77.452	26.511	15.939
TOTAL	1.304.514	1.406.003	1.647.308	1.909.136	2.033.964	1.945.932	2.022.547
	1.305.566	1.405.526	1.647.792	1.908.077	2.033.964	1.945.995	2.022.547

PLANNED AND ORGANIZED DENATIONALIZATION

In the period 1918–91, the history of Macedonia opened with yet another partition of its territory that had started in the Balkan Wars and been verified at the Paris Peace Conference. This partition determined relations between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria in the time to come.

The states that partitioned Macedonia – though each by a different method – constantly, in a planned and in organized way, worked on denationalization and assimilation of the Macedonian people. These were the years during which anything representing any form of Macedonian national feeling was persecuted and brutally punished.

The partition badly affected the economy of the Vardar part of Macedonia, the region allocated to the Kingdom of SCS. The newly-established border with Greece severed the channels of normal trade with Salonika as the most important economic and trading center. Years of almost non-stop military action laid waste to the economy. This, plus the policy of the Serbian authorities – ruthless economic exploitation and total economic discrimination in

World War I – rounded off the picture of deplorable economic circumstances in this part of Macedonia.

In the aftermath of World War I, the régime tried to maintain a system of “emergency measures” in Vardar Macedonia imposed on it during the war. The Macedonian population was compact in the territory of Macedonia within the borders of the Kingdom of SCs. However, with an eye to converting them to Serbs, the régime worked on their denationalization on the one hand, and colonization by the Serbs on the other. It also went for “administrative colonization.” In other words, most public servants were of Serbian origin and were as such settled in that part of Macedonia. Colonization was also intended as a protective military measure: the colonies were strategically built in the borderland and close to major roads and railroads. The constant presence of army and police forces was characteristic of rule over Vardar Macedonia..

Following the occupation, Macedonia was named South Serbia and the Macedonians called the South Serbs. The Serbian régime wished to create an atmosphere of fear and insecurity at all times. Its policy for Macedonia was one aimed at strengthening “Serbian patriotism” and Bulgarophobia. To implement this, the régime overstressed the threat of “Bulgarization” and its duty to take every precaution to avoid it.

In addition, action by the VMRO (the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) played into the hands of the Serbian régime: from 1919 to 1934 233 public servants and 185 civilians were killed and 268 wounded in 467 attacks by party activists.

Vanče Mihailov’s VMRO activism culminated in the assassination of Serbia’s King Alexander on October 9, 1934 in Marseilles. Party action was also responsible for the formation of a Štip-based, special military-Chetnik organization, the “Association against Bulgarian Bandits,” and the deployment of “federalist” troops under the command of Stojan Mišev and Gligor Ciklev, paid for from the pockets of the population of the eastern parts of

Vardar Macedonia, whom the same troops often terrorized for no reason whatsoever.

The entire state administration, the press, schools, the Church and numbers of nationalist organizations were engaged in the denationalization and assimilation of the Macedonian people. Any Macedonian legal and independent political action was disabled. The Macedonian language was banned from public and private use, while the law and politics prohibited any manifestation of Macedonian national consciousness or culture. Terror, pressure, arrests, detention and expulsion were the main methods of the policy for Vardar Macedonia. This was why people in Macedonia barely felt any difference when the dictatorship of January 6, 1926 was proclaimed, banning all political freedoms in the country: Macedonia was by then already used to this situation. In October 1929, the monarchy was divided into banships (*banovine*) and Macedonia was included in the so-called Vardar Banovina. Bowing to the pressure of popular dissatisfaction, the régime had to make some concessions as of 1932. By calling municipal elections in 1933, it hinted at a return to parliamentary democracy. Municipal elections in Macedonia were held on October 15, 1933 in the entire territory of the Vardar Banovina, in 440 municipalities, with the participation of 1,113 candidate lists. Out of 354,242 registered voters, 246,976 cast their vote, which meant that the turnout was 69.79%. In the parliamentary elections in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1935, the people in the Vardar Macedonia voted for four candidate lists.

The activity of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) strongly influenced the development on the political scene in Vardar Macedonia. The communists were the only ones to recognize Macedonian national individuality. In this context, the stands the KPJ took on the Macedonian national issue, which in large part corresponded to the goals of the Macedonian movement for national liberation, played a major role on the eve of World War

II. Those stands, no matter how blurred especially on Macedonian unification, mobilized the Macedonians for the anti-fascist war and partially enabled resolution of the Macedonian national question.

That KPJ policy contributed to the emergence and activism of the Macedonian National Movement (MANAPO) and most Macedonian students studying in Belgrade, Zagreb, Skopje and elsewhere joined in. Standing up against Serbia's policy of denationalization, the Macedonian student youth of the 1930s resolutely spread ideas about the need to fight for Macedonian national and social rights. The basic postulates of the movement were put in black and white in a document called the "Political Declaration," adopted undercover at a meeting of Macedonian students on August 26, 1936 in Zagreb and subsequently signed by the rest of the student youth.

Actually, MANAPO was fighting for Macedonian national freedom and equality in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the country's transformation into a federation that would ensure equality before the law. Most importantly, the members of the movement actively joined the anti-fascist struggle later on, and became promoters of Macedonia's national emancipation. Kiro Gligorov, the first president of the independent and sovereign Republic of Macedonia, was one of them.

THE OCCUPATION OF MACEDONIA IN WORLD WAR II

In April 1941, when the Balkans became a theater of war, Macedonia became subject to new geopolitical divisions. Thanks to its central position on the Balkan Peninsula, Macedonia was a territory of strategic importance to the Third Reich's plans for occupation of the Balkans. On the eve of World War II, other great powers and neighboring Balkan countries were also aspiring to take control of Macedonia and making plans of their own.

Following the attack on Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941 and hence on the territory of Vardar Macedonia, the German army rapidly progressed through all the frontlines and totally smashed the Yugoslav troops by the end of April 1941. Having suffered military defeat, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was erased as a state, while Germany, Italy and their “satellites” divided its territory among themselves.

The territory of Vardar Macedonia was also partitioned at the so-called Vienna Conference of the foreign ministers of Germany and Italy on April 21–22, 1941. The Vardar part of Macedonia was handed over to Bulgaria with the exception of the territories in the west around Kičevo, Gostivar, Debar and Tetovo that were integrated into Albania with its puppet government.

The Bulgarian occupation forces divided Vardar Macedonia into two administrative regions, *Skopska* and *Bitolska*, and installed completely new judicial, police, military, financial and religious authorities. The state of Bulgaria passed numbers of laws and by-laws on Macedonia. It thus established a special legal system quite different from its own. The entire population of the occupied territory immediately received Bulgarian citizenship and was strictly forbidden to declare itself as Macedonian. In fact and contrary to all international norms, Bulgaria both formally and legally annexed the territories of Vardar and Aegean Macedonia.

Propaganda spreading “Bulgarian national consciousness” in the “newly liberated” territories was the priority of all governmental and non-governmental institutions. Concrete measures were taken through the education system, the Church and a large number of “cultural institutions.”

Macedonia’s right-wing and pro-Bulgarian groups and organizations played a special role in all this by upholding the Bulgarian occupation régime and its plans for denationalization and assimilation. To a greater or lesser extent, depending on their actual needs, they all worked for the Greater Bulgaria project and the

Bulgarian state. Before Bulgaria's capitulation, and in tandem with German intelligence and diplomatic services, even supporters of the Čkatrov-Đuzelov group and Mihailov's VMRO attempted to set up an "independent" Macedonian state with either Hristo Tatarčev or Vančo Mihailov at the helm. Given that ASNOM (the Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of Macedonia) had already constituted a Macedonian nation-state, it goes without saying that their anti-Macedonian action stood no chance.

Following the Italian occupation and under the Royal Envoy to Albania Francesco Jakomoni's decree, the territory of Western Macedonia was annexed to so-called Greater Albania. Administratively, the territory of Western Macedonia included the Debar Prefecture with its seven sub-prefectures or districts. The Italian 41st Florence Division and its commanding officer, General Arnold Arci, were headquartered in Debar. This military command held all the reins in the occupied territory and had command over all Italian military-police institutions. It even appointed even civilian commissariats.

The main Albanian quisling organization was *Belli Kombeter* (National Front) formed in November 1942. Its ideology stemmed from fascism and the Greater Albania project. Thanks to the latter, it was most influential among the Albanian minority population in Western Macedonia. The process of "Albanization" was carried out intensively in all spheres throughout the occupation. This practice was continued after Italy's capitulation in even more manifest forms.

Macedonia's occupation instigated the gradual organization of an armed, anti-occupation and liberation struggle by the Macedonian people under the leadership of the Macedonian national-liberation and pro-communist movement. One should bear in mind that the very organization of an armed anti-fascist struggle against the backdrop of strong "Greater-Bulgarian" and "Greater-Albanian" propaganda, and the repressive institutions of the occupier,

resolved to destroy that struggle and its promoters by all means, legal and illegal, was an extremely complex task.

In September 1941, the KPJ Provincial Committee for Macedonia decided resolutely to start preparing for armed struggle. Soon after, on October 11, 1941, actions by the Prilep Partisan Platoon marked the beginning of the anti-fascist uprising of the Macedonian people as an integral part of the Yugoslav People's Liberation Struggle led by the KPJ.

In the spring of 1942, armed operations intensified, thus strengthening the armed struggle. In the autumn and winter of 1942, armed struggle was still unquestionable despite a Bulgarian massive military offensive against the Partisans. On the contrary, their struggle was growing stronger and stronger. In fact, it even intensified in 1943 with the arrival of Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, the KPJ Central Committee (CK KPJ) delegate to Macedonia and member of the Supreme Command of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOVJ). Soon after, the membership of the newly formed Central Committee of the KPM (Communist Party of Macedonia) was tasked not only with party, but also political and military, activity in the field.

The decisions taken at the Prespan meeting of the CC of KPM on August 2, 1943 near the village of Oteševo considerably contributed to strengthening the armed struggle and its organizational structure. Namely, the meeting decided to form larger military formations, which subsequently characterized the NOVJ and Partisan troops in Macedonia as a regular army.

After Italy's capitulation on September 8, 1943 the troops of the People's Liberation Army and Macedonian Partisans (NOV and POM) partially disarmed the Italian forces in Western Macedonia and established an extensive belt of liberated territory including the towns of Kičevo and Debar for a time. The Initiating Committee to Convene the Anti-fascist Council of People's Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) was also formed at the time. The

Committee gave a green light to those who had already been planned to be its delegates. First, schools in the Macedonian language were opened on the liberated territory and action taken to restore the independence of the Macedonian Orthodox Church (MPC). Within the ranks of the Macedonian People's Liberation Movement, the liberated territory was seen as an embodiment of the "Free Macedonia" slogan and the nucleus of a Macedonian state. The Manifesto of the General Staff of NOV and POM, the most important document defining the goals of the anti-fascist struggle in Macedonia, with a platform for Macedonia's national liberation, was also prepared and published on the liberated territory in the second half of October 1943.

The liberated territory in Western Macedonia was sustained till early December 1943. By December 18, 1943, the majority of NOV and POM troops had arrived in the liberated territory, in Meglensko in the Aegean part of Macedonia. On December 21, 1943 in Meglensko, the CC of the KPM held a consultation – known as the *Fuštani Consultation* – to analyze the work done and set guidelines for further development of the armed struggle.

The beginning of 1944 marked the beginning of a German-Bulgarian winter offensive against NOV and POM troops in the area of Meglensko. The Partisan troops were not smashed in the offensive but, on the contrary, grew in numbers and intensified their activity in early 1944. The so-called February counter-offensive caused their struggle to increase dramatically as did the number of new fighters.

The establishment of a liberated territory in the Kumanovo-Vranje area was a threat to the most important transportation and communication route of German troops in the Balkans. Therefore, as of late April 1944, German and Bulgarian forces mounted massive military offensives meant to annihilate Partisan units in the area. The Bulgarian offensive of May 1944, known as the *Spring Offensive*, ended in disaster despite the multitude of strong

administrative and propaganda measures the Bulgarian authorities had taken in the territory under their control.

From the summer of 1944, anti-fascist sentiments grew visibly stronger among the Macedonians and support for the Partisans became almost popular. Following pitched battles waged throughout Vardar Macedonia in June and July 1944, many newly-liberated territories were established.

After thorough preparations in the spring and summer of 1944, and in line with the decisions of the Second Session of AVNOJ in the Prohor Pčinjski monastery (now in present-day Serbia), the Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) held its first session on August 2, 1944. With the participation of the majority of the elected delegates from the Vardar, Pyrenean and Aegean parts of Macedonia and with representatives of the Great Powers and the Yugoslav military and political top leadership in attendance, this session laid the foundations for Macedonian statehood.

MACEDONIA'S INTEGRATION INTO THE YUGOSLAV STATE

The session adopted a *Decision* proclaiming ASNOM the highest judiciary and executive representative body and the highest body of the state whereby it legalized Macedonia's statehood, which was further confirmed by having Macedonian declared the official language.

The Declaration on the Fundamental Rights of Citizens, another document adopted at the first ASNOM session claimed that the feeling for togetherness, inter-ethnic tolerance and equality had been centennial characteristics of the Macedonian people.

ASNOM approved the decisions of the AVNOJ Second Session by publicizing that Macedonia had joined the Yugoslav state in the first phase of the next act that would bring about unification of the entire Macedonian people in a single state.

The role of the main executive power up until final liberation was allocated to the Presidium of ASNOM. The federal leadership was dissatisfied with the efficiency of this body. Its “bulkiness” and inability to carry out major duties, as well as the need for its “re-organization” were “a unique example” of the then federal state.

This was why, for inexplicable reasons, Macedonia was the first republic to undergo centralization through its executive body, the so-called working committee of the ASNOM Presidium, which was nothing but a fabrication though admittedly invested with certain legislative powers that overstepped its portfolio (for example, the ASNOM documents did not provide for this committee). There are no records about its “dismissal.” However, there are also no records about its activity following the establishment of the government of the People’s Republic of Macedonia (NRM).

The process of constituting the NRM as a state ended in the appointment of the republican government. Planned as “the people’s government” and a true representation of popular will, it turned out to be centralized, alienated from the people and “above it.” The same was true of the codification of the Macedonian standard language in 1945.

DEPENDENCY ON THE FEDERATION

The constitutions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FNRJ) and the NRM confirmed the centralist character of the state by defining Macedonia as “the people’s state in the form of a republic in which the Macedonian people shall freely exercise their rights and freedoms” and enjoy sovereignty limited by the federal bodies. In fact, this meant that, although independent, Macedonia in actual fact depended much on the federation. This was evident in its economy and economic development and in the 1947–51 five-year economic plan for the rapid industrialization and electrification of Macedonia and GNP growth in order for it to bridge the existing gap between the developed and less developed. This

concept was not implemented in practice. On the contrary, all republican officials did everything in their power to channel most investment funds into their own republics. The departure from the electrification and industrialization plan for Macedonia was an excuse for its abandonment. In terms of its GNP, Macedonia was at the bottom of the scale. Moreover, despite the planned “rapid” electrification, only 13 million dinars had been set aside for Macedonia – ten times less than for the same purpose in other republics. The next development plan was additionally detailed and supplemented with new systemic solutions. The Crediting Fund for the Underdeveloped Republics and Autonomous Provinces, which included Macedonia, was established at federal level. Republics were freed from paying back credits and the funds were used for investment in the underdeveloped regions.

The landmark of this period was the Cominform Resolution or Tito-Stalin conflict. In Macedonia, as in other republics, the state used the method of re-educating those who believed in Stalin and distrusted Tito. Following the Stalinist model, Tito isolated these Macedonians, as well as other like-minded persons from all over Yugoslavia, in the Goli Otok concentration camp. About 1,000 Macedonians – outstanding activists and communists many of whom had occupied high political positions or made up the core of the then Macedonian intelligentsia such as Panko Brašnarov, Lazar Sokolov, Vladimir Poležinovski, Venko Markovski, Petre Piruze-Majski, as well as the first prime minister of independent and sovereign Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Kljusev – were imprisoned on Goli Otok.

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

Workers’ self-government – or, the socialist self-government system and decentralization model meant to introduce a unique, Yugoslav “socialism with a human face” – was characteristic of the 1950s and put into practice through the Constitutional Law of 1953.

Macedonia wholeheartedly accepted workers' self-government although it had lost in its power structure with the constitutional reforms. It also said yes to introduction of a commune system and a number of by-laws enabling it. A municipality-commune became a basic unit of this system. Two administrative-territorial units, 86 municipalities and 7 districts were established in Macedonia. Under the constitutional amendments of 1963, districts were deprived of their power and municipalities became the centers of self-governing decision-making. Administratively and territorially, Macedonia was divided into 32 municipalities.

A new constitutional preamble adopted in 1963 determining Macedonia as "socialist" – the Socialist Republic of Macedonia /SRM/ – and defining it as "a socialist democratic community, and the state of the Macedonian people and Turkish and Albanian nationalities in Macedonia" – then replacing the term "national minorities" by "nationalities" were the landmarks of this period. The changes made to improve inter-ethnic relations did not achieve the desired effects – on the contrary. They were followed by a period of open dissatisfaction of the Albanian ethnic community that culminated in the 1968 well-organized protests of which the most intense were staged in Tetovo. Protesters demanded "more human rights," while the Albanian banners taken off official buildings had triggered their protest. Nationalism was growing in areas with ethnically mixed population. Protesters marched under nationalist slogans such as "The time has come for civil war" or "This is the end of Albanian slavery." Some party officials were also making nationalist statements, while at the same time calling for democratization, decentralization and more independent republics. Dissatisfaction was also evident at the Fifth Congress of the SKM (1968). Six out of seven Albanian and Turkish candidates for the Central Committee were not elected. A compromise solution to the "problem" was found in an acclamatory enlargement of the Central Committee.

Nationalism was growing in Macedonia. In order to fend it off, strengthen the federation and give priority to Yugoslavianism as an ethnicity, the federal leadership began working on constitutional amendments that implied amendments to the republican constitutions as well.

These amendments and the 1974 Constitution defined the SRM as a common state of the Macedonian people and Albanians, Turks and members of other equal nationalities, and provided the rights and duties of the Macedonian people and other nationalities vis-à-vis their constitutionally guaranteed rights. Further on, the Constitution provided for equality of the mother tongues and alphabets of nationalities in the municipalities of their residence where they constituted a considerable percentage of the total population, with the Macedonian language. It also guaranteed their religious rights, the right to stage their own cultural events, etc. The expanding nationalism of the last decade of the SFR of Yugoslavia verified these rights in their true sense. In this period Macedonian Moslems were under strong pressure to replace the suffixes of their family names from *ski* and *ov* with *i* and *u*. Statistics show an impressive number of changes in family names in certain municipalities (Skoplje – 578 persons, Veles 366, Prilep 472, Resen 257, Debar 255, Struga 218, Bitolj 87). In addition, the number of settlers from Kosovo when compared with the number of persons who emigrated from Macedonia was on the increase. Some 22,000 Albanians moved in. while about 5,000 moved out (the ratio being 4:1).

The trend of national affirmation of the nationalities was a fact. However, where do you cross the line between affirmation and nationalism? This question was in the wind at the time, just as it still is today.

AFFIRMATION OF CULTURE

Basically, the constitutional amendments represented a positive trend in the exercise of Macedonia's statehood. Equal representation of the republics in federal bodies improved. In 1967, for the first time, a Macedonian high official, Kiro Gligorov, was elected vice-president of the Federal Executive Council (SIV). The fact is, however, that never before in five decades of the federation's life had a Macedonian been elected president of the SIV (*i.e. the prime minister*).

An upward parity trend was also noted in the nomination of ambassadors and consuls. In this period and for the first time since the Liberation, a Macedonian, Vasko Karangeleski, was appointed army commander of Macedonia. At the same time, Macedonia's statehood grew stronger. Establishment of the Macedonian Academy of Arts and Sciences (MANU) and the proclamation of an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church additionally affirmed its statehood.

This was a period when Macedonian culture was truly affirmed both in Yugoslavia and internationally, mostly thanks to the *Tanec* folk troupe (established in 1949), the federal and international Evenings of Poetry in Struga (*Struške večeri*) launched in 1961, the Ohrid Summer (*Ohridskog leto*, started in the same year), the Macedonian National Theater, the Macedonian Opera and Ballet, and the *Theater of Nationalities* staging a multitude of events, both domestic and international – all of which represented symbols of Macedonian identity.

However, what mostly marked this period and symbolized Yugoslav unity and solidarity was the Fund for the Reconstruction and Construction of Skopje. It was established by the Federal Assembly to help relieve the consequences of the disastrous earthquake that destroyed Skopje and killed many. The peoples

of Yugoslavia were the first to generously offer a helping hand in cleaning up the debris and rebuilding a city that was in ruins. With their help and the help of the international community, the city was rebuilt in record time and named “The City of Solidarity.”

LIBERAL TRENDS IN THE LC OF MACEDONIA

A reformist wave was sweeping through the SKJ and SKM. The liberal faction of the Party was louder, advocating its democratic transformation. Its protagonists were younger party cadres who had not taken part in NOB (the *People’s Liberation Struggle*).

Liberal trends in SRM were directly affected by similar tendencies in other republics. Liberalism in SRM was actually autochthonous. Krste Crvenkovski was seen as its main proponent and his liberal statements sounded reasonable and acceptable to many “radical” intellectuals, but also to party officials such as Ljupčo Arnaudovski, Slavko Milosavljević, Dimitar Mirčev, Milan Nedkov, Čamuran Tahir, Tomislav Čokrevski and many others.

Macedonian liberals called for “democratic ideas” – in practice, the right to strike, pluralism, the democratization of the trade unions, etc. The reaction to these tendencies was anti-liberal and started with the famous “Letter” (*Pismo*, a program document adopted at the 21st Session of the Executive Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia). The Party leadership had the “Letter” on its agenda but took no steps regarding it. Tito, therefore, visited Macedonia in late 1972. The end results of his visit were all messages and lessons: “Implementation of the Letter is not to be questioned...just do what was agreed on...do not waste time clearing up personal relationships...There should be no different opinions about certain problems...Problem-solving starts at the top, from the leadership...”

The showdown with the liberals began in 1973 under the motto “Implementation of the Letter” and culminated at the 36th Session of the CK of SPM (January 18–21, 1973).

“Maximum unity in the Party” was conceived as a political campaign but it was also used by certain party officials to square accounts of a quite personal nature. “Who’s for whom, who’s with whom?” or “Who’s for Laza, who’s for Krsta?” These were just some of the formulations that transcripts taken at party meetings were brimming over with, alongside qualifications such as conservative, progressive, a bureaucrat, a democrat, a factionist, etc. What followed was a multitude of “voluntary” resignations and “early” retirements by individual liberals who did not fit into the newly-constructed party scheme.

The economic reforms, launched in the mid-1960s, unfolded independently of reforms in the Party and the Constitution. Investments had stagnated. Investments which the federation was duty bound to make and put into effect were curbed. The living standard dropped, primarily as a consequence of two devaluations of the dinar in 1971. Productivity lagged behind the Yugoslav average by 19%, which resulted in low revenues of enterprises, the latter itself resulting from an inappropriate production structure (out of 248 representative industrial products manufactured in the SFR, Macedonian industry produced only 109). This directly caused low profits, lower anyway than the Yugoslav average by 10–15%, as well as the growing domestic indebtedness of the Macedonian economy.

THE CULMINATION OF ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS

In the decade preceding Yugoslavia’s disintegration, Macedonia’s underdevelopment was at its peak. This was manifest in banking and business losses, a rise in unemployment, low wages, domestic and foreign debts, etc. The widening social gap was giving rise to tension and inciting strikes. In 1986, 140 strikes were registered in the SR of Macedonia with the participation of 23,045 employees. Work hours lost to strikes amounted to 202,245. In six months in 1989 alone there were 92 work stoppages of more

than 9,000 employees and 67,293 work hours lost. The fall in production quite logically resulted in a liquidity crisis blocking bank accounts of 50 OURs (abbr. for organization of joint work, *organizacija udruzenog rada*) that provided jobs for 98,000 people. Economic enterprises owed 53,300,000 dinars to domestic banks and their foreign debts totalled 309,000,000 dollars, which exceeded Macedonia's capital inflow by 40%. By December 31, 1988, Macedonia's foreign debt had reached 1,150,000 dollars, of which 985,000 dollars were convertible debts. Another reason for underdevelopment was that the republics were highly inter-dependent in terms of raw materials, final products and sales. Macedonia's own production met just 48% of consumer demand for cooking oil, 48% for wheat, 25% for sugar and 47% for coffee. The remaining demand had to be compensated for by "imports" from other republics, which included 373 medicaments not produced in Macedonia. Unemployment was the biggest threat and the most complex problem. Unemployment soared in Macedonia. In 1982, 119,000 persons were registered as jobless, while in 1988 the figure rocketed to 136,417. The last attempt at a rescue mission was in the form of the SIV package of economic reforms supposed, among other things, to bridge the gap between the "developed" and "underdeveloped" republics. However, some republics (Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia) had not paid their taxes to the federal budget for months and, with a helping hand from their "people," "raided" the Yugoslav financial system and the Central Bank (the People's Bank of Yugoslavia) borrowing 1,400,000,000 dollars. All the then Macedonian leadership could possibly do was to conclude that the Yugoslav economic system was no more.

THE STATE IDENTITY-BUILDING PROCESS

Apart from the economic sphere, the crisis was also manifest in the dysfunctional political system. In Macedonia, categorized as far behind among the "conservative republics," this was manifest

in the form of an almost silent promotion of a Macedonian state, a shy attempt at democratization and in the idea of “no-party pluralism” that was accepted at the federal level.

This sort of pluralism was fully affirmed by the 10th Congress of the SKM (1989). The reformist wing proved to have the upper hand over the dogmatic-conservative. Petar Gošev was elected president of the Presidency of the Central Committee of SKM. Once transformed, the SKM, the unique political factor up to then, paved the way for its own demission. Several ecological associations formed at the time were seen as possibilities for “alternative expression.” Amendments to the Law on Social Organizations and Citizens’ Associations (1990) legalized political pluralism in Macedonia. In 1990, the number of registered political parties grew to 23.

In Macedonia, the process of federal democratization acted as a catalyst. The winner of the first multi-party elections in 1990 was the VMRO-DPMNE (the party with the “national prefix”) that had advocated secession in the election campaign. Macedonia’s separation from Yugoslavia was highly democratic, following the referendum of May 8, 1991. Its citizens voted for an independent and sovereign Republic of Macedonia.

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REASONS FOR ENTERING AND EXITING

BOŽO REPE

ENTERING THE FIRST YUGOSLAVIA

The current Slovenian view of Yugoslavia, particularly from a political standpoint, is based on the thesis that Yugoslavism was a solution arrived at out of necessity, something that helped the Slovenians to overcome a difficult period until they returned to where they belong – to so-called Europe. History, of course, paints a different picture. Slovenians did believe in Yugoslavia and they invested a lot of energy and money, as well as political effort, into its democratization; both major politicians, priest Anton Korošec and communist Edvard Kardelj were proud Yugoslavs, but both also saw in it an ideological connotation: Korošec saw a guarantee that his party would have absolute rule over Slovenia in agreement with the court and Serbian parties and that he would organize it in accordance with Catholic principles, while Kardelj was convinced that the main connective tissue of Yugoslavia was socialism and that the country would collapse without it – which ultimately did happen.

It was not until the second half of the 1980s that Slovenians arrived at thoughts or even a national program which did not simultaneously prejudice, in one way or another, the solving of the national question within Yugoslavia. And the ideas about Yugoslavia were different, even contradictory to one another. During World War I and practically until its conclusion, Slovenians believed in the possibility of solving their national question within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Of course, Yugoslavism's predecessor, the Illyrian movement, had previously appeared to them as a similar possibility. The movement was a South Slavic literary-cultural and national-political movement dating back to the first half of the 19th century. The idea stems from Jan Kolar's Pan-Slavic theory. Its basis was belief in Slav autochthony in the Balkans, the theory that the South Slavs descended from the ancient Illyrians. For this reason the Shtokavian dialect of the Croatian and Serbian language was named *lingua Illyrica* (*ilirika*; *illyrische Sprache*) and the residents Illyrians. Some respected educators saw the possibility of a Slavic state as early as the time of Illyrian provinces, after the defeat of Napoleon, when the Illyrian kingdom was founded in 1816 as a special administrative creation within Austria, and which would later become the country of Austrian South Slavs. The Illyrian movement was particularly important in Croatia, while for Slovenians, the implementation of Illyrianism meant accepting a common South Slavic language – some combination of Shtokavian with elements of other languages. For this reason, not many Slovenians supported the idea. Instead, they were more in favor of certain forms of cultural and political cooperation with the South Slavs.

The Illyrian movement was followed by trialism, the idea of merging “*all South Slavs within the monarchy into a governmentally and judicially independent body under the crown of the Habsburg Monarchy*”, as defined by the statement made by the Kranj State Council on 16 January 1909. Trialism primarily depended

on Croatian stances, which were at first not inclined to connecting with Slovenia (for example, the so-called Rijeka Declaration in October 1905), all in agreement with the Hungarians and the Italians. Slovenian politicians sought to include Croatian politicians in their governmental and judicial programs. The idea of trialism reached its final stage in the Austrian part of the monarchy thanks to the May Declaration in May 1917, and just one day before the Austrian part of the monarchy restored parliamentary life, the Yugoslav Club was founded, which united Slovenian, Croatian and Serbian deputies from the Austrian part of the monarchy (there had previously been three clubs: the Croatian-Slovenian Club, the National Club and the Dalmatian Club). On 30 May, 1917, on behalf of the Club, Dr Anton Korošec read in German the so-called May Declaration, which was the name of the document put together at the beginning of May by Dr Janez Evangelist Krek, and whose final draft involved Dr Anton Korošec, Vjekoslav Spinčić, Dr Josip Smodlaka and Dr Melko Čingrija (who was also Prefect of the Dubrovnik county and one of the founders of the Croatian-Serbian coalition), and which was signed by all members of the Yugoslav Club. The declaration stated: *“The undersigned deputies, united at the Yugoslav club, hereby state that based on ethnic principles and Croatian national law, we request that all territories of the monarchy inhabited by Slovenians, Croats and Serbs unite under the crown of the Habsburg-Lorraine dynasty into an independent government body, free from any foreign rule and established on the basis of democracy. We will wholeheartedly invest ourselves into achieving this request made by our unique people. With this in mind, those signed here will continue to participate in parliamentary work.”*The May Declaration was not only a tool used in the parliamentary struggles in Vienna, even though that had been its main purpose initially. A strong movement in support of the Declaration sprang from the Slovenian regions, which gave the Declaration a necessary multinational scope.

As the war was drawing to a close, the course of military and political events resulted in the increasingly significant option of unifying the Yugoslav nations outside the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is true that even before the war the option had supporters in a small students' society *Preporod (Revival)* (associated also with Young Bosnia), while a federal Yugoslav state was also promoted by Slovenia's most famous writer Ivan Cankar. During the first two years of the war, despite their unquestionable loyalty to the monarchy, Slovenians were subjected to brutal government violence (prison, confinements). Then, towards the end of the war, Slovenian politicians gradually and cautiously began labeling the May Declaration as the minimum of their requirements, mentioning possible solutions in spite of the government and the monarchy, as their patriotism and loyalty to the throne began to diminish. However, when it came to the Yugoslav option outside of Austria-Hungary, Slovenian politicians had little impact. The most important, so-called "Piedmont" role (named after the region that united Italy) belonged to Serbia. That role stemmed from Serbia's position: it was an independent state, a member of the Allied forces, it had military power and all this put together is what gave it a dominant position during the unification. The Serbian government made its intentions clear at the very beginning of the war – on 7 December 1914 – when, in addition to liberation, it proclaimed the unification of "*all our enslaved brothers – Serbs, Croats and Slovenians*" as a military goal within the Niš Declaration. With this move, it manifestly exceeded its historical program from 1849, Garašanin's Draft [*Načertanije*], i.e. the aspiration towards the unification of all Serbs under one state. Imperial Russian diplomats warned Serbian politicians against creating such a state (i.e. Yugoslavia), in which the Serbs as a nation and Orthodoxy as a religion would indeed have a relative majority, but where other, different nations put together against them and other religions in relation to Orthodoxy would constitute a majority,

which could push Serbia into a crisis, similar to the one Imperial Russia experienced during the war. There was no mention of internal organization of the state within the Niš Declaration, which is why there was a justified fear that the Serbs would merely use annexation (“adjoining”, as they called it) to expand their territory, as they had done after the Balkan Wars with Vardar Macedonia. Since it was not entirely clear to Regent Aleksandar and the Prime Minister what they were getting into, Serbian geographer Jovan Cvijić showed them at the beginning of the war where all South Slavic nations were living on a map, on the basis of which they then determined their military targets and included Slovenians in them. This was followed, to a large extent, by complaints from Niko Zupančič, a Slovenian ethnographer who lived in Belgrade and was in charge of a local museum there.

Moving towards and away from the Greater Serbia program – which was called the “small” and “large” Yugoslav program due to territorial overlapping with the Yugoslav program – was part of Serbian politics until the end of the war. Especially because the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the emergence of new states in its territory did not appear very likely up until October 1918, i.e. it was contrary to the politics led by the Allied countries, and many Serbian politicians did not want to make the Serbian cause secondary to Yugoslavism, and later also constantly equated the two.

Leaving aside the politically encouraged hostility towards Serbia at the beginning of World War I (the most famous slogan was “Srbe na vrbe”, which literally meant “Hang Serbs from the willow trees!”), it can be said that positive Yugoslav feelings certainly existed among the Slovenians, at least from the Balkan Wars onwards. Slovenia’s leading newspapers kept an ongoing check on events on the fronts and expressed their sympathy for the Serbs and the Bulgarians (to whom they also added the Macedonians), particularly during the First Balkan War. During the Second

Balkan War, Slovenian journalists sided with the Bulgarians and were critical of Serbia, but they primarily complained because the previous alliance had been broken off.

Because of the war, violence and a ban of political activity within Austria-Hungary, the third core of the Yugoslav idea was represented by political émigrés, primarily of Croatian politicians from Dalmatia (Dalmatian deputy and member of the State Council Dr Franjo Supilo, Dr Ante Trumbić, world famous sculptor Ivan Meštrović and others). These migrant politicians founded the Yugoslav Committee which included several Slovenian politicians: Bogumil Vošnjak, Gustav Gregorin, Josip Jedlowsky, Niko Župančič and Drago Marušić. Members of the Committee sought to gain the support from the Allies and proved to be quite successful at it due to their personal ties. In mid-July 1917 (Serbia was significantly weakened at the time because of the situation in Russia, which was Serbia's main supporter), Nikola Pašić convened a conference in Corfu which was attended by the Serbian Government and the Yugoslav Committee. The result was the so-called Corfu Declaration, adopted on 20 July 1917. According to the Declaration, the new Yugoslav state would be established on the basis of self-orientation, not annexation, but it would be a constitutional monarchy with the Karađorđević dynasty at its helm. It would be called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS), the Constitution would be adopted by a qualified (absolute) majority in the constituent assembly that would be elected through universal, direct elections. Due to its shortcomings, the Committee led by Ante Trumbić could not affirm the principles of a federation during these negotiations. The country would be divided according to natural, social and economic criteria, and not based on historical and national criteria, although there was talk of an equality of language, writings and religions between Yugoslav "tribes". The Corfu Declaration was essentially a political manifesto and the Serbian government treated it as such (for example, it subsequently

did not respect the conclusions on the adoption of a constitution with a qualified majority). When necessary, when it was in its favor (the question of the monarchy, centralized regulation), Serbia characterized it as a government act. Even afterwards, the Serbian government sought to prevent the Yugoslav Committee from obtaining the role of an internationally recognized entity. Its role was becoming weaker, though it was still involved in unification discussions that were held in Geneva from 6 to 9 November 1918 between the representatives of the State of SCS and the Serbian government. One of the reasons for the underestimated role of the Committee was the fact that the Committee had not formed its own military units – unlike the Czechoslovak National Council, for instance.

Objectively speaking, Yugoslavism was part of a wider and heterogeneous pan-slavism, which no longer had any influence on events in the monarchy during the final months of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Everyone was resolving their national question in their own way. The final attempts from the court and politics, which were, in truth, aware of the necessity to solve the Yugoslav question, were in a so-called sub-dualistic situation, i.e. separate – in the Austrian and in the Hungarian part of the monarchy – which was, in fact, requested by the Hungarian government (which wanted to expand its authority onto Dalmatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina). With such a concept, the May Declaration would remain unfulfilled. Despite that, the Austrian authorities attempted to make an impression of trying to turn the monarchy into a union of federal states, the plans of which were reported in a variety of newspapers in August 1918. Under pressure from the German parties, the authorities gave up on the idea. On October 11, 1918, Emperor Karl received the President of each national club separately. He offered Korošec an autonomous unit for the South Slavs within the monarchy, but Trieste and Rijeka, along with the communication lines to the two ports would remain under the

jurisdiction of a common state. Korošec insisted on Trieste being covered by the South Slavic state. Karl unsuccessfully tried to play the Catholicism card. During the conversation, Korošec (allegedly) told him: “*Es ist zu spät, Ihre Majestät!*” (“It’s too late, Your Majesty!”) as well as “*What has happened is cause enough for our distrust.*” Slovenians will not commit suicide just to do someone a favor. Korošec’s impression of the conversation was as follows: “*You could see the Emperor was so depressed that he seemed on the verge of giving up.*”

Starting from the summer of 1917, the Yugoslav idea became a reality in the consciousness of the Slovenian people. However, the decision to connect on a governmental and judicial level outside the Austro-Hungarian Empire was not an easy one for the Slovenian elite. For centuries, loyalty to the monarchy was something that had gone without saying for all social strata – for ordinary people, for the educated, and particularly for the clergy. Of the Slav peoples, the Czechs and Slovaks were most similar to Slovenians in culture and mentality, but they had opted for their own country, and also still had the Austrians in between them. Politicians had a glorified perception of the South Slavs, but in truth, they did not know them well. The predominant cause of caution was differences in religion. “*How difficult will it be for us if we come under the rule of an Orthodox king after leaving a Catholic emperor! Deus misereatur nostri! [May God have mercy on us!]*,” prince and bishop Anton Bonaventura Jeglič wrote on November 22, 1918, although he later confessed that he could see no other solution because the Slovenians would have otherwise been Germanized. The uncompromising and fanatic behavior of the German Austrians towards Slovenians left no great options. The same was true of the Hungarians. Austria-Hungary fell apart against the will and influence of Slovenia. The Italian army had been pressing. Austrian Germans wanted unification with Germany, which at the end of the war seemed like a realistic option. Not even the Hungarians ever

thought of giving up on Slovenian territory. The possibility of breaking up into pieces was looming large. Slovenians were part of the defeated country; Serbia was in the winning camp. The Austrian emperor signed a truce in the night between 2 and 3 November 1918, and it came into force on November 4. According to the London pact, Italian troops gradually arrived at (and sometimes attempted to cross) the demarcation line as early as 19 November.

Slovenians waved goodbye to Austro-Hungarian Yugoslavism via the State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS) which lasted for onemonth, and soon afterwards they became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which would later become the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. During this transitional period, there was dual Austrian-Yugoslav rule in the territory of the Austro-Hungarian South Slavs, and it was being resolved gradually and peacefully. The final shift in government occurred on October 29, 1918 in Zagreb when the Croatian Parliament broke off law and state links with Austria-Hungary, declared the Croatian-Hungarian Agreement from 1868 to be null and void, and proclaimed the establishment of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. Croatia's Parliament also recognised the National Council – the highest governing body of the short-lived state of the Austro-Hungarian South Slavs – as the highest authority. Slovenians also joined the new state on the very same day, at a mass event in Ljubljana which was attended by around 30,000 people. The National Council, a political body formed in 1918 and composed of representatives from all Slovenian parties, had not adopted the special declaration of statehood, but did end up backing the conclusions reached by the Croatian Parliament and the National Council in Zagreb at a public event on October 29. In the opinion of historians and lawyers from former Yugoslavia (Dr Ferdo Člinović, for example), a constitutional act is made up for by referencing the conclusion of the Croatian parliament. Objectively speaking, Croats had a firmer legal basis than the Slovenians thanks to the

Croatian Parliament's decision, but this was not true of Dalmatia which remained an Austrian province with which the Croatian-Hungarian agreement was not concerned. In the case of Dalmatia, they referred to Croatian state law. Not having their own state tradition, Slovenians could still refer to natural law, the stances of the United States of America (the so-called Wilson's points), and last but not least, to Austria-Hungary's consent that its peoples may decide on their own destinies. Considering that the Austro-Hungarian Empire's days were numbered, and that the State of SCS was only a transitional entity, the legal basis for the formation of the State of SCS was only of internal significance during the heated inter-ethnic debates within what would become Yugoslavia.

The State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was not internationally recognized and lasted for only one month. It was a short-term and interim solution during the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the internal and foreign policy circumstances at the time, its chances of survival were slim. However, it initiated a momentum of nationalist sentiments, which had been hampered and even oppressed, and gave the Slovenians their first national Government (officially, the Government of SCS in Ljubljana) and allowed them the feeling of having lived up to resolving public law acts, since Slovenia's national government was peacefully taking over duties from former Austrian authorities and addressing the issues of succession. There were, however, hiccups when it came to the issue of borders. The indecisive and lethargic behavior of the Slovenian government had to be rectified by individuals – particularly Rudolf Maister, who managed to preserve Maribor and Styria. Due to volatile politics and the vagueness of jurisdiction, the government was often in conflict with the National Council in Maribor, as well as with other local national councils.

The unification of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with the Kingdom of Serbia and other former Yugoslav areas into a single state has been described in great detail and from various

aspects in Yugoslav historiography, so we will not repeat it here. We shall recall only that this process had initially been carried out in parallel and without coordination at crucial moments. Dr Anton Korošec, delegates of the State of SCS and representatives of the Yugoslav Committee negotiated in Geneva with Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić and representatives of Serbian parliamentary parties between November 6–9, 1918. The situation was unfavorable for the representatives of the State of SCS, the state had not been internationally recognized and its territory was being penetrated by Italian forces. Despite the disproportionate political power between the sides, an agreement which acknowledged the equality of the two unifying countries was concluded (in relation to the unification of the people of Montenegro, the Geneva Declaration says, “*We welcome them with our brotherly embrace and we are sure that they will rush to welcome it and join in this act that has always been their highest ideal.*”). The agreement also stipulated a confederative unification (although this term was not directly used), and a constituent assembly was supposed to be established prior to the election, one which was made up of temporary national representation and composed on a basis of parity between deputies from the Serbian National Assembly and the National Council. The Constitution was to be adopted by a qualified (two-thirds) majority. In Serbia, the Geneva Declaration was labeled as an insult to Serbian weapons, and the declaration was not recognized by either regent Alexander or the Serbian Government. Several days after the signing, Pašić told representatives of the National Council and the Yugoslav Committee Korošec and Trumbić that, due to pressures from home, he was forced to withdraw and that the agreement was invalid.

At the same time, a confusing debate was being held at the National Council in Zagreb about how to unite with Serbia (Vojvodina had already done so on its own, directly), and was under additional pressure from the Austro-Hungarian Serbs. There were

conflicting views on the formation of a single, Yugoslav people. After various opinions of its members during the debate on 16 and 18 November, the cultural department of the National Council proposed a resolution which advocated for national individuality and political autonomy: *“The Slovenian part of the Yugoslav nation has developed independently in terms of language, therefore the Slovenian language is the vessel of that spiritual content – its closest relative, the Serbo-Croatian language, is a self-functioning organism – and in the domain of the Slovenian standard language, successful cultural activities are now possible only in this particular language.”* The resolution was not signed by liberal cultural workers, who advocated for Yugoslav Unitarianism just like the Liberal Party did with its *“Declaration of social workers”*. Slovenia’s strongest party, the Slovene People’s Party, did indeed advocate autonomy, but due to the absence of Korošec, it had no real leadership and was in a state of confusion (like Slovenian politics overall).

The Yugoslav state unification, as it is known, was carried out at a special ceremony on 1 December 1918. The National Council’s delegation arrived in Zemun on 27 November and on the following day in Belgrade, where it was situated at Belgrade’s finest hotel, the *Grand*. They were received ceremoniously, with the performance of all three national anthems – Slovenian, Croatian and Serbian (*“Forward, Flag of Glory”*, *“Our Beautiful”* and *“God of Justice”*), as all three flags were hoisted on the home of regent Alexander. During the ceremony, the first delegation to address regent Alexander was the National Council with its so-called *“Address”*. It stated that the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs from Austro-Hungary had carried out a coup, temporarily formed an independent, national state, and as early as 19 October, expressed a desire to unite with Serbia and Montenegro *“into a single national state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which would include all continuous ethnographic territories of the South Slavs”*. On 24 November, the National Council decided to declare the unification of the

State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with Serbia and Montenegro into a single state and elected a delegation, “*which stands before Your Royal Highness to officially and ceremonially communicate this decision.*” The “Address” subsequently stated that the monarchy of King Peter and regent Alexander was accepted as an unconditional form of government, that it would be decided on by its constituent assembly, and that “*a single country,*” i.e. a centralized form of government, was also unconditionally accepted. This later led to numerous criticisms of the delegation. The criticisms, however, were partly justified, because the National Council was divided and did not know how to act, and conveyed its insecurity onto the delegation. Regardless of the manner of unification and the subsequent dissatisfaction with the Kingdom of SCS and later with the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Slovenia accepted the unification as a necessary shield from Germanic and Romanic pressure. The regent’s pretentious response (*the Proclamation of Establishing the Kingdom of SCS*) referred to the work of his ancestors and the Serbian people and accepted the “Address” of the National Council’s delegation saying, “*On behalf of His Majesty King Peter I, I proclaim the unification of Serbia with the provinces of the independent state of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs into a single Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.*” He also specially emphasized national unity and its centralist and monarchical form as a self-evident fact. In accordance with the principle of compromise unitarianism, the new state was to be a constitutional, parliamentary and democratic state of a “*trinomial nation*” with the Karadžević dynasty at its helm. The regent’s act –by which the Kingdom of Serbia *de facto* ceased to exist –was subsequently confirmed by the Serbian Assembly on 29 December. The first government (which lasted until August 1919) was appointed on 20 December 1918, was led by Protic, and included representatives of all major parties from the newly formed country. Anton Korošec became its vice-president, Ante Trumbić, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, while Svetozar

Pribićević, the most deserving “*prečanin*” politician advocating a quick and centralized unification, became Minister of Internal Affairs (Serbs labeled the provinces of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire across [“*preko*”]the Sava, Drina and Danube rivers as “*prečani*”). The military which recruited around 140,000 people, 2,550 Austro-Hungarian officers and around a hundred Montenegrin officers was also reorganized, with the regent Alexander and Serbian politicians carefully making sure that Serbian officers retain the highest positions and overall dominance in the army.

After long and heated debates between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian Government which had started back in Corfu and continued after the formation of a joint government on 1 March 1919, an interim National Parliament (temporary assembly) was established, and was active until November 28, 1920, when the regent dissolved it, i.e. it lasted for twenty months including interruptions, and was effectively active for about sixteen months. The interim Parliament included a total of 296 members, of which 84 were from Serbia, 62 from Croatia, 32 from Slovenia, 12 from Dalmatia, 42 from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 12 from Montenegro, 24 from Macedonia, 4 from Istria, and 24 from Vojvodina. The National Parliament adopted few laws, and even the budget was mostly adopted through governmental regulations. However, the National Parliament managed to dismiss two monarchical-centralist drafts of the constitution, which were in truth not that different from the subsequently accepted the St. Vitus Day Constitution, meaning it was merely a case of delaying the inevitable.

The Allied powers, including the United States, recognized the new country as late as mid-1919, when it was necessary to sign a peace treaty with Germany, while numerous countries recognized it even later, having acknowledged Serbia as an entity in international relations up until that point. Even at the peace conference in Paris, the Yugoslav delegation was the official delegation of the Kingdom of Serbia, although it persistently declared itself as the

delegation of the Kingdom of SCS, which is why some leading Allied powers (excluding Italy!) silently recognized it. Also, many Serbian politicians spoke about how the unification of December 1 was merely an adjoining of the “prečan” provinces to Serbia. Internally, with the exception of the Serbian Assembly, no authority specifically ratified the act of December 1, neither the Croatian Parliament, nor the National Council in Zagreb (which was abolished on December 3, and its administrative tasks transferred to the presidency that was supposed to act until the formation of a joint government), nor the National Council in Ljubljana. Because of its centralized nature, the unification of December 1 was accepted with mixed feelings, since parties and groups, as well as prominent individuals viewed it differently.

After the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1919, Slovenians found themselves divided into four states. After defining the national borders of the Kingdom of SCS, the Yugoslav part of Slovenia extended to 16,197 square kilometers (and was divided into the Ljubljana and Maribor regions), and after the administrative division of the country in the thirties, the Slovenian territory in Yugoslavia (along with the Drava *banovina*) occupied 15,849 square kilometers. Nearly one third of Slovenians were living outside the borders of Slovenia. This was a heavy blow for Slovenian national integrity. The largest number of Slovenians, more than 378,234 of them, remained in Italy (based on the so-called Treaty of London from 1915 and the subsequent Treaty of Rapallo from 1920). Close to 100,000 of them remained in Austria – in the south and east of Carinthia, in Klagenfurt and its surroundings, above the Vrbovsko Lake, in Villach and its surroundings, as well as the Gailtal valley. Smaller portions of the Slovenian people were still living in the border areas of Styria between Kozjak and Radgona. Based on the 1920 census, 6,087 Slovenes remained in Porablje above Monostra in the Kingdom of Hungary. There were also many immigrants abroad (around 373,000).

The Kingdom of SCS provided Slovenians with a new government and political system, and they also stepped into a quite different philosophical and cultural environment compared to what they had been accustomed to. What prevented Slovenians from having a bigger impact on common state policies were a centralized government and a relatively low percentage of the population within the same country (eight percent), as well as the inconsistencies, contradictions, disputes and mutual hostilities within Slovenian politics. Essentially (with the exception of the royal dictatorship period), their impact was based on the fact that they were the “kingmaker” in Serbo-Croatian disputes, the so-called “petty politics”, i.e. connecting with the court and Serbian centralist parties. It was not until the eve of the war in Europe, after the Cvetković-Maček agreement, that this kind of politics, led by Korošec, lost influence. Korošec secretly started initiating contacts with the Nazis, a practice which was continued by his successors after his death in December 1940. The goal was to obtain a German protectorate (modeled on Slovakia) for Slovenia, either independently or together with the Croats, before the attack on Yugoslavia happened. The basic division into three blocs – conservative-Christian, liberal and socialist – was maintained during the interwar period, but there were new divisions within the blocs, and as a consequence, new parties were also formed. In fact, the political orientation of the Slovenians in the Kingdom of SCS and in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (as shown by election results) prior to the introduction of the dictatorship in 1929 remained identical to that of their final decade within Austria-Hungary. The Catholic-oriented Slovene People’s Party had an absolute majority throughout. The exception was only in 1920 during the rise of the Communists, which was the result of social and political processes at the end of the World War, and partly due to the impact of a new political space, which somewhat strengthened the position of unitary liberals (in truth, they were divided into two parties at the

time). The political structure started to change significantly after 1929, when the dictatorship banned parties from certain Yugoslav peoples. In this forced political paralysis, large parties began to fragment into numerous smaller groups and movements, and new informal and connections began to emerge. Due to ideological and religious reasons, opposites between parties and groups became more prominent, and the polarization was contributed to by the search for a way out of the economic crisis (the attractiveness of Soviet collectivism on the one hand, and fascist corporatism on the other), and because of this vulnerability, the national question came to the fore. The significance and reputation of civil parties began to fade as the left-wing grew stronger and alternative forms of political action sought affirmation (connecting at an anti-fascist and people's-front basis). But the relative and primarily party democracy existed only up until 1928. Among other things in the kingdom, women were not allowed to vote. Also, election results were of no significance for parties, because ruling depended on a coalition at the level of Yugoslavia, and the two most powerful parties, Catholic and Liberal, ruled within different coalitions and time periods, each of them individually, for around half of the period between the two wars, despite the fact that the otherwise weak Liberals barely managed to garner 20 percent of the vote. After becoming part of the Yugoslav People's Party, i.e. the Yugoslav Radical Union in the 1930s, the Slovene People's Party ruled without interruption from 1935 until the beginning of the war.

Despite periods of crisis (agriculture was the exception), Slovenians prospered economically in the kingdom, and also set the foundations of a national economy through various forms of nationalizing German property. They could affect economic policies much more significantly than in the preceding monarchy, which was fragmented into nationally mixed historic states where Slovenians only had a majority in Kranjska. Although the levers of

political power which regulated the economy in Yugoslavia rested largely in the hands of the Serbs, the Slovenian economy made use of the more developed part of the country, an educated workforce, a developed transport infrastructure and high protective tariffs. This is why manufacturing production, as well as textile and similar industries were primarily developed, under the influence of favorable prices of raw materials and a large, open market.

The greatest gains were made in the sphere of national and linguistic preservation, as well as the development of education and culture. The entire school system was Slovenized, and a university was founded in addition to a number of other cultural institutions. This was all the more significant because the minorities in neighboring countries were subjected to forced assimilation, political and judicial persecution, planned economic impoverishment and mass migration.

THE AVNOJ YUGOSLAVIA

The concept and the formation of Slovenia in the second, federal (AVNOJ) and socialist Yugoslavia was no longer in the hands of the clergy and Catholic politicians, but the Communists who founded (initially, the coalition of) the Liberation Front (*Oslobodilački front*) as early as April 1941, right after the attack on and breaking up of Yugoslavia. Already in September 1941, the Front decided to join the Yugoslav liberation movement under the leadership of Josip Broz – Tito and opted for a new, federal (later renamed “AVNOJ”) Yugoslavia. During the war, the Liberation Front systematically built up Slovenian statehood and national power. A key event in this process was the Assembly of the Delegates of the Slovene Nation in Kočevje in October 1943, which elected the first parliament in Slovenian history, the Slovenian National Liberation Committee (*Slovenski narodnoosvobodilni odbor – SNOO*) – SNOO pleaded for a new, democratic Yugoslavia with a republican form of government, and with its conclusions changed the

position of Slovenia in Yugoslavia – from the status of an administrative unit (Drava Province) to one with a political and legal (federal) status. After the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in November 1943 in Jajce, which definitely favored a federal Yugoslavia, SNOO was renamed the Slovenian National Liberation Council (*Slovenski narodnoosvobodilni svet* – SNOS) (SNOO's session in Crnomelj in February 1944) and operated as the Slovenian Parliament until its dissolution in September 1946. In May 1945, SNOS also appointed the Slovenian national government. After that, SNOS was dissolved, its presidency (presidium) organized elections for a constituent assembly, and after constituting the Assembly, the first constitution in Slovenia's history was passed in early 1947. In this way, the continuity of national authority was guaranteed at a formal level. When regulating inter-ethnic relationships, the thesis on resolving the national question in the context of the class question was adhered to. This had a series of consequences, including (re-)centralization, which only began to loosen as late as the 1960s. Despite everything, we can say that the Slovenians in AVNOJ Yugoslavia went from declarative to republican statehood, from a written constitutional right to sovereignty, including the right to secession from 1946/47, practically until the confederal status under the 1974 Constitution. During all the post-war decades, Slovenian politicians, and particularly Edvard Kardelj, were among those who were crucial decision-makers in the design of the constitutional and political system of Yugoslavia.

Objectively speaking, inter-ethnic conflicts and objections to Slovenian separatism were a constant of political events from the end of the fifties. They became public during the sixties with the recognition that Yugoslav socialism had not once and for all resolved the national question (the Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) in 1964). The differences in the perception of Yugoslavia in connection with Slovenian stances

were described as early as the sixties by Serbian writer Dobrica Ćosić: either an alliance of independent states or a unitary state, which would eventually also become ethno-national with a majority, Yugoslav people. When Josip Broz Tito (the main factor of an integrated Yugoslavia along with the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav People's Army) died in 1980, Yugoslavia was plunged into a period of agony and mutual accusations of exploitation and historical injustices that had happened to individual nations, and had been committed by other nations. Cultural and economic differences (7:1 between Slovenia and Kosovo), insufficient mutual knowledge and stereotypical images of each other began to grow rapidly despite decades of having lived together. Information systems operated primarily within the republics. Slovenians increasingly began to view Yugoslavia with mixed feelings. This was caused by the economic crisis, the now vanished fear of once powerful enemies (Germany and Italy), an increased fear of Serbia's aggressive politics, and last but not least, generational differences. Slovenian views became homogenized as the Yugoslav crisis progressed. The feeling that Slovenia was lagging behind became stronger and stronger, because according to the data available to the authorities, the purchasing power of the Slovenians, which had been 80 percent of Austria's purchasing power in the mid-seventies, fell to 45 percent in the mid-eighties. The homogenization of Slovenians was also contributed to by the tendentiousness of media reports in the other republics, as well as envy, because the economic situation in Slovenia was better than in other federal units. In moments of crisis, Slovenians also had a better organized supply, in addition to the possibility of buying from close abroad. So-called "autochthonous" theories began to form, according to which the Slovenians were not South Slavs, but natives, Etruscans, Veneti, etc. Also, the so-called "Central European" identity was getting stronger and more prominent.

The attitude of the Slovenian authorities towards the Federation in the first half of the eighties was a quiet, grouchy and mostly futile battle with the growing centralization reminiscent of the fifties and sixties. The older, primarily partisan generation, harbored an emotional relationship towards Yugoslavia, which was particularly true of the politicians who had taken part in its creation. Although they persistently defended Slovenia's interests, they could not imagine Slovenia's future outside Yugoslavia (Slovenian attitudes were reported on as completely different, and proclaimed as separatist, particularly by Serbia's media and politicians). The stances of the generation born during the war and immediately after it did not differ significantly. This belief (despite some earlier doubts) did finally change in the late eighties and early nineties.

For the younger generation, Yugoslav consciousness in the eighties functioned only when it came to sports (primarily football and basketball) and Yugoslav rock music. For the male youth segment of the population, the main Yugoslav ordeal was military service. Traditional school trips and prom trips across Yugoslavia were reoriented to the West, most generations that were growing up never saw their capital and had no personal relationship towards Belgrade as the center, nor would they recognize the Yugoslav Assembly building from a picture of it. Values had also completely changed. For Slovenians (regardless of the generation in question), there was a prevailing economic "egoism" (as they were often told), an orientation towards the West, a consumerist fever and a desire for modernization which would make Slovenia a post-industrial society and align it with Europe's developed countries. Nationalism (which, except for one part of the intellectuals and later politicians, was a value in itself) stemmed primarily from the realization that Yugoslavia was becoming a "setback" for Slovenia's developmental ambition. The well-known stereotypes about Slovenian superiority in Yugoslavia, emphasizing economic

efficiency and standards, the difference in relation to the “Balkan south”, diligence, modesty, Austro-Hungarian Central European tradition, grew stronger among the Slovenians as foreign media reported on it more commonly while the Yugoslav crisis began to deepen. Slovenian ambitions – although not overly stated in public – were clear: to remain the strongest economic factor in Yugoslavia, make use of the advantages it offered, and at the same time increase its competitiveness in the capitalist markets, especially in those of neighboring countries. Slovenia was internally quite aware of both its role and its importance in Yugoslavia and made efforts to take full advantage of them, i.e. to use everyday economic processes to compensate for what the Federation was administratively taking away from it. As more doubt was being cast over whether Yugoslavia (highly influential in international circles) was really prepared to join European integrations which were of vital importance for Slovenia, the dilemma of how much it made sense for Yugoslavia to maintain an unchanged form also began to increase. Although Slovenia’s official policy was not ideologically different from Yugoslavia’s, it showed significantly more pragmatism and had no prejudices or reservations in relation to opening up to the West, especially in economic terms. In domestic Yugoslav relations, Slovenia became much more affected by nationalism. Nationalism was caused by the growing crisis, and was directed primarily against immigrants from the south (“southern brothers”, as people used to call them derisively). This was significantly aggravated by the media, which increasingly declared Slovenia to be Yugoslavia’s “scapegoat”.

Slovenia’s policy towards the center in the period after Tito’s death and until the second half of the eighties can be characterized as defensive and focusing primarily on preserving what had been achieved. On the economic front, there was the pretty clear position of a developed republic which was resisting demands for the socialization of debts, payments into the so-called Fund

for Reciprocity and Solidarity (which was primarily used by other republics to cover their losses), increases in assistance to the underdeveloped, increases in payments to the federal budget, increases in the percentage of direct sources for funding the Federation at the expense of registration fees and an overall centralization of power, as well as various measures – due to the economic crisis – that introduced an administrative division of goods, similar to the one after the end of World War II (the abundance of anti-crisis proposals included, for example, one according to which all of Yugoslavia should have a unified arrangement for the production of bread). When it came to the functioning of the federation, there was resistance towards aspirations to changing the constitutional order, the harmonization of certain important segments of society such as education (resistance on the issue of the so-called common program core, resistance was put up by cultural workers, whereas politicians only backed them up later), science and great infrastructure systems (mail, railway, electric power system), which were allegedly inefficient because of their “fragmentation” across the republics. One of the points on which Slovenia remained powerless was the increase in the bureaucratic apparatus, which used the political stalemate in Yugoslav political bodies to strengthen its authority and power. In the area of foreign policy, Slovenia had a tendency towards multiple opportunities for direct contacts (which was primarily its economic interest), more equal representation in diplomacy, as well as linguistic equality.

In the second part of the eighties, the attitude towards the Federation was formed as part of the gradual changes in political relations between the authorities and the opposition which was still in its early days. With the 57th edition of the *Nova revija* (*New Review*) magazine in 1987, the question of the future position of the Slovenian people became the focus of debate in literary and other forums, as well as in constitutional discussions. The discussions had a common red thread: the Slovenian people had

to form a nation, i.e. attain statehood with original sovereignty which would not be subordinate to Yugoslavia's; at the same time, a new legal order needed to be established, one that would allow the democratic expression of the will of the citizens (a request for the revocation of "tutoring" by the League of Communists of Slovenia over the Slovenian people and a request for the introduction of political pluralism). The ideas presented in *Nova revija* gradually became part of the official policy, which in 1989, under reformist Milan Kučan, opted for a "departure from the government", i.e. assessing itself at multi-party elections. With the expansion of a democratic space, the impact of the public increased greatly and the role of the Assembly also strengthened since the delegates had a more independent role.

The thing that had a decisive influence on Slovenia's attitude towards the Federation in the late eighties was a dispute with the then most powerful federal institution – *Jugoslovenska narodna armija* – JNA (the Yugoslav People's Army) which did not hide its intention of introducing a state of emergency in Slovenia and removing what was, in its opinion, a nationalist leadership. A mass response to the dispute was evoked during the process against "the four" (three journalists from *Mladina* (Youth) magazine and a non-commissioned military officer), who were taken to a military court in Ljubljana by the JNA in late July and early August of 1988, for allegedly revealing military secrets. The trial had all of Slovenia on its feet, triggered mass protests and the establishment of the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights, which ultimately did not become (as the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) did in Croatia) the largest opposition force, but silently disintegrated after the trial ended.

At that time, the question of the political system and the question of Slovenia's position in Yugoslavia were merged under the issue of constitutional order. The Constitution became the major field of competition between the socialist government and a

portion of critical public experts. The first to speak out against the amendment to the federal constitution was the Slovene Writers' Association in 1987. Legal experts from the opposition estimated that changes would lead to a greater Unitarianism.. Constitutional changes, in the opinion of the opposition, should not have gone in the direction of greater centralization, but towards greater autonomy of the republics (confederations), support for private entrepreneurship, abolition of the monopolistic role of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the introduction of political pluralism (direct elections with multiple candidates). The Slovenian leadership was able to influence the improvement of some amendments that the Federal Council of the Assembly of Yugoslavia adopted in October 1988, but Slovenian supporters of the amendments also acknowledged that the criticisms leveled at centralization were justified. While the debate on amendments to the Federal constitution was taking place, the question of a change to the Slovenian constitution also began to circle. Proposals for amendments to the Slovenian constitution were put up for public debate in the spring of 1989 after Serbia had changed its own constitution and thus seized provincial jurisdiction from both Kosovo and Vojvodina (whereby the constitutional order of Yugoslavia had formally come to an end). Slovenian constitutional amendments (which strengthened Slovenian sovereignty and forbade the introduction of a state of emergency without the approval of the Slovenian Assembly) encountered strong opposition from all bodies of the federal leadership, as well as the leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. There was a wish to prevent their annexation in every way, threats of a state of emergency in Slovenia had resurfaced thanks to an agreement between Milošević and the JNA leadership, but the then Defense Minister Veljko Kadijević changed his mind at the last minute. The amendments which spoke of the right to self-orientation, secession and association, and the amendments on economic sovereignty and

jurisdiction of the federal government in Slovenian territory were the primary targets of criticism, or were completely rejected. Slovenia's basic arguments were brushed aside along with Slovenia's indication towards the fact that Serbia had changed the Yugoslav constitutional order in February and then demanded that the other republics do not interfere in its "internal" affairs. All federal authorities pleaded against the amendment, and an announcement was issued to trains of protesters from other parts of Yugoslavia who were willing to come to Slovenia. Since blocking the adoption of the amendment had failed, Milošević's bloc attempted to organize a so-called bureaucratic revolution against the Slovenian leadership, by means of which the leaderships in Vojvodina and Montenegro had already been displaced. Organizing a meeting in Ljubljana was, in truth, planned several times, initially during a wave of meetings in the summer and fall of 1988, but the organizers needed greater preparation at that time, and their primary goal was to discipline the "Serbian" territories. Another attempt was made on December 1, 1989 in response to the adopted amendments, but the Slovenian authorities strongly opposed it (even at the cost of potential conflict and bloodshed).

During Yugoslavia's final stages, Ante Marković's government attempted to salvage the country through a concept of "modern socialism." Marković had taken over the country several months after the collective resignation (the first in the history of socialist Yugoslavia) of Branko Mikulić's Government on December 30, 1988. Marković's programme was met with many objections at every level in Slovenia, especially when it came to the concentration of jurisdiction at the *Savezno izvršno veće*/ SIV (Federal Executive Council) and the National Bank of Yugoslavia. The program also recognized the possibility of an organized, deliberate and planned redistribution of all internal and, to an even greater extent, (additional) parts of foreign debt. It was clear that the actual debtors could not be forced to pay their debts, and that the solvent (i.e.

the most developed) parts of the country were to take on the largest burden. In spite of all the objections, the Slovenian Assembly adopted Markovic's program. Despite reservations after the first multiparty elections in April 1990, which were narrowly won by the opposition, the new Government continued to support Markovic's program for a brief period. The economic situation began to deteriorate rapidly, the currency market stopped functioning in the fall of 1990 (the Government had initially limited the purchasing of foreign currency, and then banned it altogether). Starting from October 1990, the Slovenian government stopped supporting Markovic program, i.e. endeavored to avoid it. As it has often been the case throughout history, customs became a key point of dispute. Apart from the JNA, the customs authorities remained the only institution under the Federation's jurisdiction, but Slovenian customs officers started to play on it with prepared balance sheets. In truth, the Slovenian authorities did promise Marković in Belgrade that they would pay customs duties in accordance with the principle of registration fees, but avoided doing so (other republics behaved in a similar manner).

BREAKUP

Once the opposition (Demos) assumed power in Slovenia, the first republic to hold multiparty elections, a stance was formed in reference to Yugoslavia that the Federation cannot be an equal partner in the negotiations, but only the nations which had formed Yugoslavia and which had to reach a mutual agreement—one that was in accordance with the principle of sovereignty – on what would happen in the future. It was only several weeks before independence was achieved that talks with the federal authorities, primarily with Marković, had occurred. Marković (including his visits to Slovenia) tried to convince the Slovenian leadership to drop their plans for independence, but was not ready to give up the jurisdiction that the Federation still had. At the beginning

of 1991 (in terms of the economy, Yugoslavia had already practically disintegrated because of Serbia's breach of the monetary system and other reasons), Slovenia held talks with representatives of all the republics and presented their decision on independence to them. The decision was based on a referendum conducted on 23 December 1990 – 93.2% of the voting population voted, and 88.2% voted for independence. The results of the referendum were announced on December 26. In truth, the referendum did not explicitly reject Yugoslavia, which is why Slovenian authorities offered the possibility of an alliance of autonomous, sovereign and independent states (a confederation), or an economic community. Only Croatia shared their opinion (the two republics drafted a proposal for a confederate agreement together), Serbia and Montenegro wanted a “modern federation,” Macedonia was in favor of “any option” which the Yugoslav nations would agree on, while Bosnia persisted on a modified federation. After the collapse of negotiations on February 20, 1991, the Slovenian parliament adopted a resolution on amicable dissociation, but the other republics would not make their stances on the matter known in the beginning (except for the Croatian Parliament, which passed a similar resolution). No significant progress was made even during negotiations at the Federation's Presidium (extended to include the presidents and presidents of the republics' Presidiums), nor at meetings between presidents of the republics (their Presidiums), which took place in March and April. The European Community's (EC) stance was that it would recognize the independence of Slovenia or Croatia as long as there was a possibility of an agreement on Yugoslavia, which was promised loans in the amount of billions of dollars along with a quick inclusion in the EC if it were to stay in one piece and reform. The United States (US) had a similar stance to most other countries. Despite the adverse external circumstances and threats from Belgrade, as well as the military, the Slovenian Parliament passed a basic constitutional charter on

25 June, a constitutional law for its implementation and a declaration of independence, whereby Slovenia formally declared its independence.

On the very same day, Slovenian authorities took control over customs offices and border crossings, where around 300 Slovenian police and territorial defense officers had arrived. Improvised international border crossings began operating on the border with Croatia. The next day, on June 26, a solemn declaration of independence was held in front of Parliament. In the night of June 25–26, 1991, the federal government held a session and decided that due to the realization of federal regulations on crossing the state border, the smooth flow of traffic and of fulfilling Yugoslavia's international obligations, control of the border crossings in Slovenia needed to be taken back. The government entrusted this task to the Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs and the Federal Secretariat of People's Defense. This initiated the so-called Ten-Day War in Slovenia, which ended in negotiations on Brioni (the so-called Brioni Declaration), but the war continued in Croatia and, subsequently, in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

OVERVIEW OF SLOVENIA'S TIME IN YUGOSLAVIA

Despite its constant dissatisfaction, Slovenia believed in the country of Yugoslavia, and invested an enormous amount of energy in its survival and organization; during the first, and to an even greater extent during the second Yugoslavia, Slovenia's political and economic elites had a major impact on the national leadership which is why they did not even think to look for a solution outside Yugoslavia until the late 1980s. Their main objective was to secure the best possible position for Slovenia within the Yugoslav (con)federation, which was in line with the true state of global relations after World War II, especially the division into two blocs between which Yugoslavia had established a specific position. On the whole, Slovenia's time in both the kingdom and the socialist

state of Yugoslavia had a positive result. There were plenty of bad or dubious things, from centralism and unitarianism to them is guided socialist revolution. However, in uncertain times of territorial fragmentation and pressure from German and Italian imperialism, Yugoslavia offered a chance of survival. In the first Yugoslavia, Slovenians attained informal cultural autonomy, which included their own university, and they grew stronger economically. For the first time in history, Prekmurje was directly connected to its nucleus. In the second Yugoslavia, the position of Slovenia was the result of the National Liberation Struggle and the fact that the Slovenians, as part of the Yugoslav anti-fascist movement, ended the war on the side of the anti-fascist coalition. The Slovene Littoral region (more than one third of the Slovenian population and a quarter of its territory) became an integral part of the newly formed republic and Slovenia claimed access to the sea. Without the status of one of the six republics with the right to self-orientation, including the right to secession, a stance on independence would have had no real basis.

Although it is impossible to deny Slovenian nationalism, Slovenia's exit from Yugoslavia was primarily caused by an inability to democratize and modernize Yugoslavia, as well as secure the national rights to its peoples and bridge the gap with more developed countries which began to connect in Europe, not just economically, but also politically. Independence became a possibility due to a combination of liberal ideas and national sentiment which accumulated sufficient mass energy. Nevertheless, the crucial implementation was aided primarily by international changes. When it comes to the psychosocial aspect of Slovenians, the vanished fear of their centuries-old enemies Germany and Italy certainly represented an important element, alongside a sense of being under threat from Serbia (which was not based on national enmity, but on different concepts of development). Political and social changes during the eighties in Slovenia took place in the

context of the global crisis of communism, the dissolution of the bipolar division of the world and of the Soviet Union, as well as a profound political, international and economic crisis in Yugoslavia. Without changes in the outside world, the entire process would have probably ended up in a forced unification of Yugoslavia, a defeat of alternative movements, a clash with the opposition and a departure of the reformist Government from Slovenia's political scene. During the independence process and the brief armed conflict, circumstances were favorable for Slovenia. The military intervention in Slovenia was powerful enough to bring about the unity of the government and the population, but not so powerful as to lead to a new schism. This would have inevitably happened had the conflicts continued, since some politicians advocated a peaceful solution as soon as possible, while others saw the possibility of their own rise to and consolidation of power as the conflict intensified. Slovenia managed to stop the JNA's attack by combining military and police operations, knowledge of events in the army (which was still ethnically mixed and which was in great confusion) and the reasonable behavior of individual *Teritorijalna odbrana* – *TO* (Territorial Defense) commanders (who disobeyed orders to attack certain barracks and other buildings) and JNA officers, many of whom were living in Slovenia with their families, with the important role of local politicians in individual negotiations in the field and with the acquisition of support from the global community, which forced Western politicians who had been against the disintegration of Yugoslavia to change their attitudes. What was significant for the outcome of the conflict in Slovenia was the fact that the Serbian political leadership led by Milošević, as well as some of the JNA's leading officers decided to try and implement the concept of Greater Serbia, so they were no longer interested in the survival of Yugoslavia and the preservation of Slovenia within it. At the right time and under pressure from public opinion, the European Community

also got involved, having been shocked by conflicts on European soil. The conflict between Serbia and the JNA on the one side and Slovenia on the other had already been replaced by what was for Yugoslavia a truly fateful inter-ethnic conflict between Serbia and Croatia, one which was the final nail in Yugoslavia's coffin. War scenes from Croatia, and later from Bosnia and Herzegovina, became everyday occurrences and had a psychological impact on the political decisions of European and world officials. They also did not know how to find a solution to the wars in other parts of Yugoslavia which were ethnically mixed, unlike Slovenia.

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EXPERIENCE WITH OTHER NATIONS

LATINKA PEROVIĆ

THERE ARE MANY more or less detailed histories of Serbia in the 19th and the 20th centuries. This paper tries to summarize the history of the modern Serbian state, established at the turn of the century and its experience in the common state with other Yugoslav nations; Yugoslavia's development and the reasons why it turned out to be unsustainable at two global historical crossroads: the beginning of World War II and the demise of the Soviet Union as a political-military and ideological hegemonist in Eastern Europe. And both times it collapsed in bloody wars between its nations.

One of the first detailed insights into 19th century Serbia after the rule of the Obrenović dynasty was penned by Serbian lawyer, historian and politician Slobodan Jovanović (1869–1958). This paper refers to it not because of its originality and completeness, but also the indisputable intellectual authority of its author who also wrote another – true, more concise – overview of Serbia's

historical experience up to the mid-19th century published, in deference to the author's last will and testament, after his death.

Slobodan Jovanović wrote, "From the social viewpoint, it is hard to imagine a plainer and simpler country than Serbia in the 19th century. Above all, it is a small country with the population of barely two and a half million – and that figure only by the end of Obrenović rule.¹ The ethnic composition of its population is uniform, the same as their religion and language.² Social gaps are almost nonexistent: peasants make up the majority and public servants and well-to-do merchants at thin layer.³ [...] Differences among the peasantry are meager: there are no large landed estates.

"The tasks of our new state are tough but not complex: we have to establish, in the territory of a recently Turkish *pashalik*, a modern European state with an administration and army of its own, with courts and schools, banks and railroads. And then we have to incorporate into a thus organized country other Serb lands that are still under foreign rule⁴ [...]. The policy of the Obrenović era, both

1 In 1900 Serbia had a population of almost 2.5 million.

2 The great majority of people were Serbs (90.26%); other ethnic groups made up less than 10% of the population. Vladimir Karić, *Srbija – opis zemlje, naroda i države*.

3 At the beginning of the 19th century "all the Serbs were peasants." It was only in 1866 that 1.6 out of 100 citizens were literate. Ibid.

4 For these tough tasks Serbia had, at the beginning of the 19th century, nothing but human resources – ethnically, religiously, linguistically and socially homogeneous, and dreaming for centuries about restoring its ancient glory and the state it had in the Middle Ages – one that had actually never been homogeneous. Responding almost 100 years later to Lajos Kossuth's claim that "The Serbs believe they are a nation but they are nothing but a bunch of highway robbers," Dušan J. Popović (*O hajducima*, Part II) says that Kossuth "overlooked the basic truth that those 'bunches of highway robbers' had established a state, while the Hungarian peasant has remained to this very day cannon fodder for his lords." And when Slobodan Jovanović asked his father Vladimir Jovanović (1833–1922), the precursor of liberalism in Serbia and, at the same time, a great national romantic, how it was that his generation had so glorified the past, the latter replied they had nothing else to start with. Hence, the function of a myth was twofold: to compensate for a feeble past and to encourage a better future.

foreign and domestic, is resolute and solid enough.⁵ Everything is geared to the same goals: national unity and the Europeanization of institutions.⁶ The Obrenovićs will go down in history as Mihailounbending about the first goal and Milan about the second.

“[...] Still, Serbia has had a turbulent and bloody history. Prince Mihailo was killed. King Milan, having survived a military coup, a peasant rebellion and two assassination attempts, abdicated when only 35 years old. King Alexander’s rule begins and ends in an army officers’ plot; and there were three coups d’état between these two plots. And once Alexander was killed like Milan, the Obrenović dynasty was wiped out in blood. [...] Foreigners say that our country is in a permanent state of crisis.

“A simple country, Serbia is a new one at the same time. No traditions have been created or rooted. Throughout the 19th century two opponent dynasties battled and slaughtered each other, and neither was capable of entrenching itself ultimately; this non-existent dynastic tradition was one of major sources of permanent uprisings and turmoil. There are also no partisan traditions. All the parties are new and, instead of drawing their missions from their people’s past, they copy Western European party programs [...] We do have social classes and ranks, but none possess a strong class consciousness [...] Our only tradition, deep-rooted and steadfast as it has been cherished for centuries, is nationalism. Nationalism is what inspires rulers, parties and masses alike to lofty deeds.

5 All the players in foreign and domestic policy – the people, intelligentsia, politicians and rulers – originate from the same rural substrate. The nonexistent differences between them constitute the foundation of their unity.

6 In practice this meant transplanting the rules of a modern, essentially individualistic society onto a pre-modern and essentially collectivist one; hence the resistance and conflicts between form and substance. The intelligentsia was “borrowing”, but not at the cost of “distancing itself from the people.” On the other hand, the form itself was claimed to prove that 19th-century Serbia was a Western European state.

“Along with undeveloped traditions, we have also not developed a political culture. We are still a young, artless people that are just beginning to accumulate political experience and, having no other skills, solve everything by the use of force [...]

“Serbia’s biggest driving force in the Obrenović era was nationalism. When we fought against the Turks and were threatened by Austria’s imperialism our nationalism came to resemble the fanaticism of a persecuted sect. Neither the monarchic principle nor class consciousness was as important as nationalism [...] A statehood idea was by far more important than the monarchic principle and class consciousness. But this idea has never possessed the authentic power of nationalism; and it has developed slowly, never emerging as pure, but mixed with other ideas [...]

“The Obrenović era can lay claim to finally organizing Serbia as a state – a process the *Ustavobranitelji* /Defenders of the Constitution/ had launched. Rulers and politicians alike are to be praised here, though the successful outcome is not to be ascribed only to their statesmanship but also to our national energy. Now, as in our entire 19th-century history, the power of national energy is amazing. In just decades we had to build an illiterate peasant country with no capital or technology into a modern state, which was an enterprise necessitating commitment, capital and technology alike. That was, in a way, a mission as lofty as had been liberation from the Turks and defense against Austria. The people’s strength was so strained that it all but burst at the seams and many thought a mission that was far beyond our strength would crush us [...] However, despite everything, we entered the 20th century with an organized state.” (Slobodan Jovanović, “*Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića*,” III /”The Rule of Alexander Obrenović,” Vol. 3)

The long-lived Slobodan Jovanović (he died in the late 1960s) not only witnessed, but also learnt his lesson in the no less dramatic follow-up to the Serbs and Serbia’s history in the second half of the 20th century. He witnessed the curtain fall on the struggle

between Serbia's dynasties, a struggle ending in the brutal murder of the last of the Obrenović family. He witnessed the army's influence growing and, in parallel with emerging parliamentarism and its limitations, booming militarism and nationalism. He despaired over the situation of the administration, economy and education. And yet, in the aftermath of the Balkan wars, he wrote to a friend (October 3, 1913), "I would say, with no false modesty, that our army is the very best in the Balkans" – and that such an army must have a heart and energy. In the two Balkan wars and WWI he was the head of the Supreme Command's press bureau. He watched the emergence of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918–29) and then of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929–41). For the first time all the Serbs were living in one state, but alongside other nations now. Crises over national identities and the state system shook the Kingdom from start to finish. In response to the Serb-Croat agreement (1939) Jovanović established the Serbian Cultural Club, advocating an administrative unit for the Serbs as well. Following Serbia's signature under the Tripartite Pact (1941) he engaged in politics. First he was the deputy premier in the cabinet of General Dušan Simović (1941) and then premier of the royal cabinet in exile (1942–43) and representative of Supreme Commander of the Royal Army in the Homeland Dragoljub Draža Mihailović. In the trial against Mihailović (1946) he was sentenced to a 20-year suspension of civil rights. This meant that his works were condemned to oblivion – and it turned to be groundless.

By the end of his life, Slobodan Jovanović – drawing from his rich experience and knowledge of 19th century Serbia – wrote "A Contribution to the Study of the Serbian National Character" (*Jedan prilog za proučavanje srpskog nacionalnog karaktera*), explicitly stipulating in his will that the work could only be published after his death (it was first published in Cleveland in 1964). The absence of a cultural pattern as an indispensable supplement

to the national and political one crucially influenced Serbia's modern history – that is the main message this study puts across. “The intelligentsia has neither transplanted any actual cultural pattern (*they had even been hostile to Serbs from Austria-Hungary, who could help in this regard despite the fact that their names, religion and language were the same as those of Serbs in the Principedom of Serbia – L. P.*) nor nurtured any elements of our people into an original pattern,” wrote Slobodan Jovanović.

To achieve the primary goal – the creation of a state – all an illiterate peasant could rely on was national energy. Other means were necessary for solving more complex tasks such as organization of the state. This task required commitment and knowledge. But even aspiration towards the latter was seen as a waste of the energy needed for the primary task – the one seen as unfinished until “the last Serb” is living within the borders of a single state. (To Nikola Pašić “freedom of the entire Serbian nation” was an ideal loftier than civil freedoms in the Kingdom.”) In his above-mentioned work Slobodan Jovanović implicitly raised this question by saying that Serbia had not produced the intellectual and political elite with a modern understanding of what constitutes a nation. A half-intellectual feeding on nationalism as the only tradition prevailed, said Slobodan Jovanović.

A half-intellectual is a “man who has duly finished his schooling but learned almost nothing about culture and morality [...] He neither understands spiritual values at all nor appreciates them.” He appreciates everything only by the standards of personal success, while his perception of success is provincial – hence, materialistic. In the same way as spiritual values, he disclaims the cultural aspects of moral values though does not negate them completely since breaches of discipline as such imply criminal accountability. And yet, he is basically still a primitive.

“He sees politics as a means for getting rich and turning himself into a gentleman once given high office. He does not care a straw

about some lofty and general goals. Only when a half-intellectual elbows his way to the top of the political ladder is his dwarfishness exposed.”

Unlike the half-intellectual, in whose eyes history is static and simple, a modern intellectual views it as a dynamic and complex process. For, “As soon as a man overcomes national egoism just a bit he realizes that a nation itself is not what philosophy calls a *value*” (emphasis, L. P.). Only general cultural ideals, to whose service a nation pledges itself, can invest it with values (Slobodan Jovanović).

Basically business-like and aggressive as he was, a half-intellectual was also concerned with the interpretation of Serbian history. And his interpretation was not without influence on the course of history. Hence, authors of Serbian histories engaged in a debate (1879) shortly after the state’s independence (1878). Two tendencies were visible here: the national-romantic approach was promptly adopted by the half-intellectual, and the critical approach based on facts connected them into a process. Though not characteristic of historiography alone, that is where this gap has entrenched itself to this very day.

In his book “The Serbs among the European Nations”, outstanding Serbian historian Sima M. Ćirković provides a comprehensive insight into the history of the Serbs and Serbia. Unlike Slobodan Jovanović, Ćirković starts from Serbs’ most distant known past, and travelling through time, space and people, reaches the end of the 20th century, the second half of which Jovanović did not live to see – but had predicted. Ćirković’s wrote down his interpretation in the most dramatic period of Serbia’s history – the 1990s. English *Blackwell Publishing* house asked him to write a book about the Serbs for the edition “Peoples.” The book titled “The Serbs” was publicized in 2004 in London. It was translated into ten languages. Though published in the Serbian language the same year, 2004, the book barely evinced any echo in Serbia’s

academic circles. How, then, can one learn from history when historiographic masterpieces are ignored? Be that as it may, a succinct analysis of the history of the Serbs and Serbia in the late 19th and the 20th century would hardly be possible without reliance on the syntheses penned by two great scholars such as Slobodan Jovanović and Sima M. Ćirković.

THE BEGINNING OF THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE AGAINST THE TURKS: THE EMERGENCE OF THE STATE (1804–1878).

On *Sretenje* (Candlemas) of February 15, 1804 in the village of Orašac, nearby Topola, Serbs from the Belgrade *pashalik* and Šumadija, led by Đorđe Petrović (1762–1817), rebelled against the *dahijas*.⁷ And this was what people at the time and their descendants called the event: the Uprising against the *Dahijas*. Later on, it was named the First Serbian Uprising under the leadership of Karadžorđe to distinguish it from the Second Serbian Uprising led by Miloš Obrenović (1780–1860). German historian Leopold von Ranke termed it “the Serbian revolution” in a book published in 1829. Other historians also saw this term “revolution” as legitimate considering its two legacies: national liberation in the form of permanent autonomy, and personal freedom and property rights acquired with disappearance of serfdom. “But these legacies came only after an unending 30-year tension, so that the revolution was not just one event but a chain of events (Sima M. Ćirković).

The course of the Uprising, which lasted for almost ten years (1804–1813) and went through several phases, was interrupted by international developments. When they achieved their first objective (murdering or expelling the *dahijas*), the rebels strove for more and more rights, including governance of the Belgrade *pashalik*. A permanent body, the Ruling Council (*Praviteljstvujušči sovjet*) of the Serbian People was established as a government with

7 Dahije or dahijas were renegade janissary officers; the Turkish origin of the word means ‘uncle.’

six ministers (1811). The Serbs from Hungary lent considerable assistance to the rebels: Dositej Obradović was appointed Minister of Education. The title *vožd* – leader – was introduced specifically for Karađorđe. At the same time, opposition to Karađorđe appeared for the first time. Its leaders were expelled, but remained split nevertheless. In the mid-summer of 1813, strong Turkish forces penetrated the rebels' lines of defense. The leaders of the uprising fled the country, whereas the masses were forced either to follow in their footsteps or adjust themselves to new circumstances. Management of the Turkish *pashalik* was restored: *ajanissary* regime without *janissaries*.

And yet, resistance continued despite the catastrophe in 1813 (the rebellion in the Požega *nahija*). The decision to start a new uprising was made in Takovo on April 23, 1815. Miloš Obrenović, one of the leaders of the First Serbian Uprising and the only duke who had not fled the country after its breakdown, was elected leader. Illiterate but with a strong instinct for diplomacy he was against armed struggle and economized on his own forces from the very beginning. He negotiated an unwritten agreement with Marshli Ali Pasha and also negotiated with the Sublime Porte while fortifying his rule. His regime did not differ much from the Turkish. In dealing with his opponents he was ruthless. He put down several revolts (1817, 1821, 1825 and 1826) and slaughtered many of his opponents, including Karađorđe once he returned to Serbia (1817).

Miloš Obrenović acquired autonomy with the Sultan's decrees – *hatti-sherifs* of 1829, 1830 and 1833. The *hatti-sherif* of 1830 proclaimed Serbia a vassal state with autonomous administration. By a special act Miloš was recognized as prince.

The other side of the coin of Prince Miloš's rule lay in his initiatives for a stronger economy, better healthcare and cultural institutions. The stratum of leaders that emerged with Miloš and got rich thanks to him, wanted to damp down his personal power and

called for a constitution. The Prince agreed and entrusted publicist Dimitrije Davidović (1780–1838), born in Zemun and secretary of the Prince's office since he moved to Serbia in 1829, with drafting the document. The *Sretenje* Constitution (February 15, 1835) only lasted two weeks. Everyone had a reason to be against it: the Sublime Porte, Russia, Austria and Prince Miloš. Work on another constitution was moved to Constantinople and there Serbian representatives, Turkish officials and Russian diplomats, produced in tandem, in late 1838 and in the form of a *hatti-sherif*, a constitution called the Turkish Constitution.

Under the Turkish Constitution the Prince appointed ministers and seventeen members of the Soviet, who soon took over all judiciary authority and so forced Prince Miloš to leave Serbia (April 1839). Into his shoes, as agreed with the Sublime Porte, stepped his younger son Mihailo (1823–1868) as an elected rather than hereditary prince.

Defenders of the Constitution (*ustavobranitelji*) – Toma Vučić Perišić and Avram Petronijević – were intent on ousting Prince Mihailo by force of arms. Under this pressure, he was also forced to leave Serbia (1842). The *Ustavobranitelji* brought in Prince Alexander Karađorđević (1826–1885), Karađorđe's son, in his place.

Relying on the legacy of Prince Miloš's rule in the era of the *ustavobranitelji*, Serbia (1842–1858) made major progress in state-building (laws, institutions, administration etc.). Serbs sent to study abroad since 1839 returned home as promoters of new ideas and the Serbs from Austria-Hungary also contributed much to the process. One of the most important achievements of the *ustavobranitelji* regime was the Civil Law (1844) produced by writer and jurist Jovan Hadžić (1779–1869), an Austro-Hungarian Serb.

Serbia's foreign policy program – *Načertanije*⁸ – kept as a top secret till the early 20th century – was developed in the mid-

8 An old term denoting a "draft," trans. note

1840s (1844) under the influence of Polish emigrants hostile to both Austria and Russia. Drafted by Franjo Zah, *Načertanije* was finally blue-penciled by Ilija Garašanin who replaced Zah's term "South Slavs" with Serbs and "the Serbian nation." Considering the upcoming collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Serbia should – according to Garašanin's revised version – eventually assemble "all Serbian people in the region" and create "a new Serbian state" on the "good old foundations of the ancient Serbian empire." (Sima M. Ćirković).

The ideas that the Serbs educated abroad were bringing back home were primarily liberal (Latinka Perović, *Srpskisocijalisti 19. veka*, 1). The generations raised between 1848 and 1858 consisted of individuals who, having encountered liberal and democratic ideas during their studies abroad, called for a people's assembly invested with judicial powers and for freedom of the press. They allied with the strongmen in the Council who were opposed to Prince Alexander Karađorđević's autocratic rule for quite different reasons. By the end of 1858, they managed to have the parliament invested with advisory powers but also with a say in the election of a ruler. They called for the resignation of the Prince who, afraid of assassination, was hiding in a fortress from where he escaped to Austria. Miloš Obrenović, already a very old man, was elected Prince. His second rule was in no way different from his first. In his stead came his younger son, Mihailo: mature, cosmopolitan and enlightened. Mihailo shared Garašanin's stance that "the people should be ruled by a strong and enlightened authority." Prince Miloš used to say that Mihailo was certainly not a highwayman (*hajduk*).

From the beginning of his second term as ruler, Prince Mihailo tried to free the principality from the Porte's meddling in its affairs. By passing a law on the State Council (1861), he annulled the Turkish Constitution. Lawson the People's Assembly and the People's Army followed, and then the Law on the State Administration

(1862). Playing on incidents, brawls and the bombing of Belgrade (1862), he applied pressure on the Porte to withdraw Turkish troops from the Belgrade fortress— which Turkey eventually did in 1867.

At the same time Prince Mihailo was preparing the country for possible conflict. In 1866–67 he entered into formal alliances with Montenegro and Greece and signed with Bulgarian émigrés, on their initiative, an agreement on a common state with him as its ruler and an agreement on integrating Bosnia into Serbia with Croatia's People's Party.

Because he avoided armed conflict with Turkey, Prince Mihailo was not popular in the ranks of the United Serbian Youth, established in Novi Sad (1866). The second convention of the organization was banned in Belgrade (1867), and its activities were also restricted in Novi Sad.

Prince Mihailo advocated reconciliation between the two dynasties, whose conflicts were undermining Serbia's development. However, he himself was killed by a group of Karađorđević supporters (Belgrade, June 1868).

His assassination was a heavy blow to Serbia that had never before had such an important figure as ruler who, moreover, had left no successor designate. Regency was established. With a helping hand from the army, Army Minister Milivoje Blaznavac enthroned the underage Milan Obrenović (1854–1901), Miloš's brother Jevrem's grandson. The second regency was set up (Milivoje Blaznavac, Jovan Ristić and Jovan Gavrilović) and another member elected when Milivoje Blaznavac died. The regency governed until Milan Obrenović came of age (1872). Having reached an agreement with the Liberals in 1858 the regency passed the 1869 Constitution. This Constitution, itself a major step toward state-building, was strongly opposed by conservative and democratic political currents alike.

The status of the Serbs in Austria-Hungary was changeable, contingent on the state of affairs in the empire. As such, it affected their relations with their fellow nationals in the Principedom of Serbia, with whom they shared the same language and religion. In the late 18th century they had been placed under the rule of Hungarian nobles. Buda and Pest were centers where Serbian cultural institutions were begotten. “Hungarian” Serbs were most concerned with the Principedom’s fate after the 1813 uprising had been put down. They had assisted Serbia under Miloš Obrenović’s rule although viewed as foreigners – *nemčkari*⁹.

During the revolution of 1848 when the Hungarians proclaimed their revolutionary program (February 15), the Karlovci Serbs proclaimed *Vojvodina*¹⁰ in the territories of Srem, Baranja, Banat and Bačka (May 12–14). Metropolitan Josif Rajačić (1775–1868) was elected Patriarch while Colonel Stevan Šupljikac (1778–1848) was elected Duke. The proclamation of Vojvodina echoed throughout Croatia. The historical impact of these developments is seen by historians as lying in the fact that the grassroots had enforced a reorganization of the monarchy.

Having suffered defeat in the war with France and Piedmont-Sardinia (1859) and, especially when defeated by Prussia (1866), Austria had to redefine its relationship with the Hungarian part of the empire. The result was the formal annulment of Vojvodina. Dualism was agreed (1867), and the Hungarian part of the monarchy was turned into a Hungarian nation-state. Novi Sad became the center of Serbs’ cultural life (the “Serbian Athens”). This was the time when figures that were subsequently to play major roles in Serbia’s politics emerged on the public scene: Svetozar Miletić (1826–1901) and Mihailo Polit-Desančić (1833–1921). Following the Law on National Minorities (1868), with which both lawmakers and beneficiaries were dissatisfied, the battleground moved to

9 Germans, though in a derogatory sense, transl. note

10 Dukedom, duchy

the Parliament, but citizens' associations (cultural, sport, etc.) that enjoyed freedom of action were those crucial factors in safeguarding the Serbs' identity.

By the mid-19th century, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia had been freed from the Sultan's administrators and clerks. However, the majority of Balkan Christians, mostly peasants, were still living in fiefdoms. Under pressure from rival powers and in fear of revolts, the Ottoman Empire tried to introduce reforms and modernization. Under the 1833 *hatti-sherif*, the central government guaranteed personal and property freedoms but the peasants remained on feudal land. The new lords of the *spahi* lands – *chitluk sahibs* – imposed new taxes on them, while the agas, beys and Muslim clergy were opposed to reform of the central government.

The peasants staged revolts that were neither territorially restricted nor socially motivated. The uprising of July 9, 1878, known as *Nevesinjska puška* (the Gun of Nevesinje) was not organized. Nevertheless it spread throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. The uprising in Bosnia-Herzegovina found an echo among the Serbs in the Principedom, Hungary and Croatia (where people formed humanitarian aid units). Prince Mihailo was reserved. A brutal showdown with the rebels attracted the attention of European Turkey.

Russia and Austria had signed a secret agreement on the division of spheres of influence, in which Austria disputed Serbia's enlargement to include Bosnia, while Russia had nothing against it considering its own interests in Bulgaria and Constantinople.

Having become allies, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on Turkey in July 1876. Their armies were poorly prepared for warfare, but help came from Russia and Russian General Chernyayev was in command of military operations. As these operations took a bad turn for the Serbian army, Prince Milan accepted a helping hand from the Great Powers. Montenegro continued along the warpath and won major battles.

Faced with strong resistance near Plevna, Russia forced Serbia to re-enter the war. Serbia started military action in mid-December 1877. While the war was still in full swing, it announced that it aspired to the territory of the “Old Serbia” (the Kosovo *vilayet* under Ottoman administration). These ambitions were curbed by the Russian-Ottoman treaty of San Stefano, granting Serbia independence and enlarging its territory by 150 square kilometers. The territory granted to Montenegro was much bigger, whereas Bulgaria got the region spreading “from the Danube to the Aegean coast and Albanian mountains.” Russia made no bones about prioritizing Bulgaria’s interests over Serbia’s.

England and Austria, both dissatisfied, pressed for revision of the San Stefano treaty. At an international conference in Berlin (the Berlin Congress, June 1878), Serbia and Montenegro were declared independent. Montenegro doubled its territory while Serbia enlarged its own by five towns (Niš, Pirot, Vranje, Leskovac and Prokuplje).

To protect its interests Serbia turned to Austria-Hungary. In return, it accepted a trade agreement obliging it to build, over the following three years, a railroad connecting the country to the Hungarian railroad system. Serbia and Montenegro were the only countries in Europe without railroads.

The Serbs were deeply disappointed with the outcome of the Berlin Congress. More than this, it seemed to them like a national tragedy, mostly because of the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which “cut off expansion to include these lands, whose Serbian population now had to be liberated” (Ćirković, *ibid.*).

In the above-mentioned work “Serbs among the European Nations” Sima M. Ćirković calls the progress the Serbs made after the Berlin Congress “divergent.” The Serbs in the Habsburg monarchy were territorially partitioned and once equality before the law was proclaimed, the issue of national collectivity became

central. The monarchy established under the agreement of 1867 was dual, but Serbs were now divided into four rather than two entities.

In the territory of “historical” Hungary and under the Agreement /*Nagodba*/ of 1868 Croatia was given autonomy and the Law on National Minorities did not apply to it. At the time the “military frontier” /*Vojna krajina*/ was not under the jurisdiction of the Croatian authorities (1881), 497,796 Serbs or 26.30 percent of the entire Serbian population lived in Croatia. The Serbian Progressive Party was established after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serbs advocated independence for Croatia and its enlargement. They dedicated themselves to economic development (1895 – the “Serbian Bank” in Zagreb; the “*Privrednik*” / businessman/association). The “Croatian-Serbian Coalition” was formed (1905). Its founding fathers were political figures that were destined to play an important part in the creation of the Yugoslav state – Frano Supilo (1870–1917), Ante Trumbić (1864–1938) and Svetozar Pribićević (1875–1936). The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina sharpened the relationship between the Croats and Serbs. Nevertheless Croat lawyers were those who represented Serbian defendants at framed trials.

Dalmatia was not in Croatia but in the Austrian part of the monarchy. Serbs made up 17 percent of the local, mostly rural, population. They supported calls for Dalmatia’s annexation to Croatia and Slavonia. The differences emerged after Austria’s occupation of Bosnia and Croatia when the Croats placed the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on their political agenda.

Until annexed (1908) Bosnia-Herzegovina was under the Sultan’s rule. Serbs made up 42.88 percent of its population (1879) – totalling 438,496 people. The Austrian authorities relied on the Muslim gentry. Among the Serbian population, tradesmen became the spearhead to safeguard the language and education of Serbian Orthodox youth.

The Tsar passed the 1910 Constitution the modern provisions of which had not brought stability. Young people were advocating revolutionary ideas and nation-states. The policy to impose “the Bosnian nation” on the population failed. Neither Croatian nor Bosnian nationalism managed to “absorb the Muslims” (Ibid.).

Four hundred and sixty thousand Serbs lived on Hungarian territory (an area much larger than present-day Vojvodina). They were the more urban and literate part of the Serbian population. By the end of the 19th century they were head and shoulders above the Serbs living in the monarchy. In the early 20th century, the Serbs would take over this leading role.

The civilian movement developed into the Serbian Liberal Party, which subsequently split. One wing assembling rich and outstanding politicians (“notables”) did not want to staunchly oppose the 1867 Agreement. By contrast, radical elements (the Radical Party 1902–14) spoke for the lower strata, advocating universal suffrage and gender equality. At its helm was Jaša Tomić (1856–1922), whom historians call a controversial figure because of his anti-Semitism and the murder of the Liberals’ leader Miša Dimitrijević (1889.)

Though divided by state borders, the different parts of the Serbian nation were linked by a common language and religion. Through their intellectual elites, these parts with differing socio-economic development made up a unique cultural space – a space of different mentalities and lifestyles, and open to European influence.

TWO STATE-BUILDING IDEAS IN THE PRINCEDOM OF SERBIA AFTER THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: DEVELOPMENT OF THE YOUNG STATE ON THE INSIDE AND ITS ENLARGEMENT

Following the Berlin Congress, the question of domestic and foreign policy orientation challenged the newly independent state. Nikola Pašić (1845–1926) noted, “It can be said that

the common people were dissatisfied with the outcome, but enquired no further. However, the intelligentsia was divided into two camps” (Nikola P. Pašić, *Pisma, članci i govori 1872–1891/Letters, Articles and Speeches/*). This was analogous to the Russian intelligentsia’s split into Slavophiles and Westerners in the 1840s. And it was also mirrored in the political parties established in the Principedom of Serbia in 1881.

All three parties (Liberal, Progressive and Radical) had longer or shorter track records. The Liberals were involved in the declaration of the 1869 Constitution after Prince Mihailo’s assassination, and were in power during the 1876–77 wars. Jovan Ristić (1831–99) resigned the premiership in 1880. The intellectual core of the Progressive Party (Milan Piroćanac, Stojan Novaković, Milutin Garašanin and Čedomilj Mijatović) – all of them Serbia’s first intellectuals in the modern sense of the term – hinted at its European orientation in the *Videlo* magazine (1880). Even before formally established as a party, the Radicals had fought against the Liberals for ten years: the Serbian United Youth split into Liberals and Socialists (1866); the parliamentary opposition (1874–75 (Adam Bogosavljević) and in 1878 (Nikola Pašić); activism at home in the 1876–78 wartime period (Nikola Pašić) and in exile (Pera Todorović). They saw Svetozar Marković (1846–75) as their forefather. As a government stipendiary in Russia, Marković adopted the revolutionary ideas of the Russian intelligentsia of the 1860s and then befriended a group of Serbs (Nikola Pašić, Pera Velimirović, etc.) living in Switzerland at the time. The Serbs in Switzerland were close to Russia’s revolutionaries in exile promoting the ideas of their leaders (A. I. Herzen, M. A. Bakunin, P. L. Lavrov, P. N. Tkatchev and S. G. Nechayev).

Marković lost the government stipend for criticizing the 1869 Constitution and returned to Serbia. He and like-minded figures published newspapers (*Radnik/Worker/*, *Javnost/Vox Populi/* and *Oslobođenje/Liberation/*) and the *Rad /Work/* magazine. He

criticized Serbia's development after the declaration of the 1869 Constitution and was opposed to a repeat of the Western European course (against liberalism and capitalism). On the other hand, he promoted people's self-government with reliance on patriarchal municipalities and communes. He came out with the idea of a radical opposition to liberal thought also after the declaration of the 1869 Constitution. Students adopted his ideas, but it was the hard-core parliamentary opposition from the ranks of the peasantry – "*gunjac* and *opanak*"¹¹ – that had established the state – to spread these ideas.

When Jovan Ristić's cabinet resigned on account of the trade arrangements provided under the Treaty of Berlin, Prince Milan entrusted Progressive Milan Piroćanac (1837–97) with the premiership. His Cabinet launched synchronous reforms that were labeled "top-down revolution." It passed laws on the press, assembly and associations, the judiciary, compulsory education, the Central Bank, a national currency and a standing army. The government was after rounding off these reforms with a new constitution that would place an individual at the top of its agenda and introduce the presidential system. The Radicals were at the same time secretly drafting "their" constitution in which popular representation equalled a covenant.. And that was why Milan Piroćanac tendered his resignation.

A deep crisis broke out over the law that provided for disarmament of the popular army and establishment of a standing force. A rebellion (the Timok Rebellion, 1883) broke out in the villages of the Eastern Serbia. Prince Milan crushed it with his army. The epilogue was a state of emergency, court martials, members of the Main Committee of the People's Radical Party on trial, two of them (Pera Todorović and Raša Milošević) sentenced to death only to be amnestied by Prince Milan. Nikola Pašić was the only

11 A sheepskin fur jacket and peasant footwear

one who was not arrested or brought before a court martial. He fled the country, first to Rumania and then Bulgaria. This actually put an end to the activity of the People's Radical Party.

Another crisis broke out in 1885 when King Milan (the king since 1882) went to war against Bulgaria for having annexed Eastern Rumelia. The marital skirmish between King Milan and Queen Natalia only added fuel to the fire and King Milan was forced to seek a compromise with the Radicals. The outcome was a Radical-Liberal coalition government (1887).

The end of the second Progressive government, formed by Milutin Garašanin (1843–98), was marked by a fierce showdown with party members in the provinces. They were fired from public service, had their property confiscated and were brutally killed (some 140 of them were targeted). The second showdown, in Belgrade, came after the proclamation of the Liberal Constitution (1888). This one, from which the Progressives never recovered, was called “the people giving vent to their deep frustrations” / “*veliki narodni odisaј*” / though it was less violent than its predecessor in the provinces. However, they both testified to the attitude towards political opponents. They were treated like enemies as Nikola Pašić termed them upon his return from his six-year-long exile (1883–89).

King Milan initiated the proclamation of a new constitution on condition that it was accepted “from cover to cover.” He appointed representatives from all three parties as members of the Constitutional Committee. The constitution was drafted along the lines of Belgium's liberal constitution of 1831. Rumanian, Greek and Bulgarian constitutions had already been developed according to the same model. Soon after the 1888 Constitution was declared (December 22) King Milan abdicated in favor of his son Alexander, a minor (February 22, 1889). After six years in exile, on March 10, 1889, Nikola Pašić came back to Serbia.

While in exile – and until the war against Bulgaria (1885) – Nikola Pašić was a torchbearer for the country's Western course

after the dethronement of King Milan. He established relations with Metropolitan Mihailo, a pronounced Russophile, who was also in exile. And through the latter, he first came into contact with Slavophile circles in Russia, and then with Russian officials.

On his return to Serbia Pašić first disciplined the People's Radical Party while imbuing it with a hostile attitude towards other parties and strengthening his own leadership of the party. In the early elections (September 14, 1889) out of 117 parliamentary seats, the Radicals won 102 and the Liberals 15, while the Progressives once again boycotted the elections. This elected parliament was "constituted as a one-party assembly" (Živan Živanović, *Politička istorija Srbije u drugoj polovini XIX veka / A Political History of Serbia in the Second Half of the 19th Century*). It was a homogeneous Radical government and it was governed by the party's Main Committee's instrument – the party caucus. Apart from the Regency, the Radicals were in the majority in the State Council, in the courts of appeal and cassation, and in the main inspectorate.

In the coup d'état (1893), King Alexander proclaimed himself of age, and then (1894) replaced the 1888 Constitution with the one declared in 1869. Feeling free after his father's death (1901 in Vienna), King Alexander proclaimed (in 1901) the so-called Imposed Constitution */Oktroisani ustav/*. The leader of the People's Radical Party considered it a good enough instrument, though not perfect "for the easier attainment of greater and loftier goals such as liberation and unification of the Serbian nation." The freedom of the "entire Serbian nation" was "an ideal greater and worthier than the freedom of the citizen in the Kingdom" (Nikola Pašić, *Moja politička ispovest / My Political Confession*)

Additionally compromised by his marriage to his mother's widowed lady-in – waiting Draga Mašin, King Alexander was much resented. In a plot hatched by officers and politicians, the King and the Queen were brutally murdered on the night of May 28–28, 1903. This drew back the curtain on dynastic conflict (three

murders and three expelled rulers), shaking Serbia throughout the 19th century.

A couple of days after the murder of the last of the Obrenovićs, the 1888 Constitution was restored in a somewhat amended form, as the 1903 Constitution. Petar Karađorđević I, Prince Alexander Karađorđević's son, was chosen to be king.

The May coup d'état put an end to the era of omnipotent rulers and gave Serbia's biggest party – the People's Radical Party – a historic victory. At the same time, it opened the door to politics to the army as a powerful constitutional player. Influencing the composition of a new cabinet, the conspirators marginalized all constitutional factors – the King, the government and the parliament. The Court and the government, however, raised their safeguard to the level of national policy, as the plotters were, in fact, guarantees of the Court and its policy (Olga Popović – Obradović).

Three years later (July 22, 1906) in the National Assembly Nikola Pašić commented, "The act of May 29 is not a crime: if it were, all the struggles for liberation all over the world would be crimes... This act is seen as a lofty, patriotic act." Referring to the "threat of the army", of whose opposition representatives had issued warnings, he said such a danger was "totally over-exaggerated." It was only in 1906 that the conspirators – under strong pressure from abroad, especially from England who broke off diplomatic relations with Serbia because of the officers' role in the murder of the last of the Obrenovićs – were dismissed from the army only to form, under the leadership of Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis (1877–1917) a secret organization *Unification or Death*, better known as *The Black Hand /Crna ruka/* (1917).

The growing nationalism, fueled by Austria-Hungary (the Customs War/Pig War between Serbia and Austria-Hungary in 1906–11 and annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908–9) contributed to the complete militarization of society. The brief period of

Serbia's parliamentarianism was marked by preparations for war and wars themselves.

WARS: 1912, 1913 AND 1914.

Not many Serbs were left in the Ottoman Empire after the Berlin Congress and Serbia's enlargement ("four districts"), but what was left behind were territories Serbs cared about very much (Prizren, Skopje, the Patriarchate and Kosovo with its "central place in Serbia's historical tradition", for which generations had dreamed of taking vengeance. However, not only the Sultan's rule, but the ambitions of Bulgaria and Greece in Macedonia, and of the local Albanian population stood in the way of Serbia's spread towards its "historical core."

Macedonia's population had been already aware of their specificity (neither Serbs nor Bulgarians) and they demanded autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. After the Berlin Congress, the Albanians also called for autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, considering the demographic changes in Kosovo (the Prizren League).

Quarrels over Macedonia had prevented the contestants from joining hands in a war against the Ottoman Empire. But then, in 1912, Serbia and Bulgaria entered into a military alliance to be followed by the Bulgaria-Greece alliance and one between Serbia and Montenegro. These allies entered the war in October 1912. Having triumphed at Kumanovo (October 23–24, 1912), the Serbian troops marched into Skopje (October 26), and then Bitola. Turkey turned to the Great Powers for mediation. A truce was signed, but hostilities were revived again by mid-1913. After Macedonia, Serbian troops entered Albania occupying Llesh, Drach and Elbasan.

An ambassadorial conference demanded the withdrawal of Serbian troops. The troops did withdraw, but Serbia's military circles would not say yes to Macedonia's partition.

Bulgaria started another Balkan war (June 29 – July 31, 1913). When Rumania, Serbia, Greece and the Ottoman Empire entered into the war, Bulgaria was forced to sign a truce, while Serbian troops remained in Macedonia.

The military and civilian authorities bickered with each other in the newly – acquired territories. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbia did not apply to these territories. Having sided with the army, King Peter Karađorđević I abdicated in favor of his son, Regent Alexander. The Salonika trial (1917) put an end to military-civilian clashes.

The victory of the Serbian army in the Balkan wars found an echo among the Slav population in the Hapsburg monarchy, which responded to the Slavs' enthusiasm with increasingly repressive measures. The Serbs formed secret organizations. One of them was Young Bosnia /*Mlada Bosna*/. Ready to go for assassinations, its members opted for one, which, in the atmosphere that prevailed in the aftermath of Bosnia's annexation was a trigger mechanism. On St. Vitus' Day on June 28, 1914 in Sarajevo they gunned down Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophia. The assassination heralded the outbreak of WWI.

One of the ten points of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia demanded that the Austrian authorities should be included in the investigation of the assassins' ties with Serbia. The Serbian government condemned the assassination and – unprepared for another war after the losses suffered in 1912–13 – accepted all the points except for the one mentioned above that questioned the country's sovereignty.

The controversy over the assassins' ties with Serbia – permeating historiography too – was revived on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of WWI (2014). Serbian scholars of authority claim, “Without a doubt, the participants had received arms from Serbian officers, while in a report in 1917 Colonel

Dragutin Dimitrijević Apisacknowledged that he was responsible for planning the assassination” (Sima M. Ćirković, *Ibid.*). However, who was used as an instrument by whom – soldiers by conspirators or the other way round – remained an open question. But those raising it seem to neglect that both sides were advocating the “unification of death” program.

Playing on Serbia’s unpreparedness for another armed conflict, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on July 28, 1914. A chain of alliances followed: Montenegro declared war on Austria-Hungary (August 6) and then on Germany (August 11); Russia sided with Serbia; Germany sided with Austria-Hungary, and declared war on Russia, France and Belgium; Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia, and France and Great Britain on Austria-Hungary. When Japan sided with the Triple Entente and the Ottoman Empire, the Triple Alliance/the Central Powers, the war became global in character.

On the eve of WWI, about two million Serbs lived in Austria-Hungary. After its enlargement in 1912 Serbia had a population of some 4.5 million, compared with Austro-Hungarian Empire’s 50 million. Against this background of power unbalance Serbia defeated the Austrian troops at Mt. Cer (the battle of Cer, August 20, 1914) and crossed into the enemy’s territory. In another offensive, the Austrian army occupied Belgrade and the territory between the rivers Sava and Danube. Then the tables turned (the battle of Kolubara, Nov. 17 – Dec. 15). The enemy had to withdraw. Both sides sought allies during a ceasefire. The Triple Entente signed the Treaty of London with Italy promising it a large part of the Adriatic coast. On the other hand, Bulgaria joined forces with the Central Powers since Nikole Pašić would not agree to concessions in Macedonia.

Following another offensive, Serbian troops, along with civilians, were forced to withdraw to Kosovo and then, through Montenegro and Albania (the “Albanian Ordeal”) – from Valona to

Corfu – to the coast. With a helping hand from the Allies, the surviving troops and civilians found refuge in camps in Greece, France, Switzerland and North Africa. Young people who had survived were provided with schooling in Switzerland.

Territorial loss was seen as a heavy blow. The government split up: the cabinet and the parliament in Corfu on the one hand, and the Regent and those officers faithful to him, including members of the Black Hand, on the Salonika front on the other. Suspected of planning the assassination of the Regent, members of the Black Hand were put on trial in 1917 (the Salonika trial) and Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis was sentenced to death (the trial underwent revision after WWII).

A meeting in Corfu (July 20, 1917) between representatives of the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee resulted in the Corfu Declaration on the organization of a future state.

In the spring of 1917, Slovenian MPs in the Austro-Hungarian parliament passed the May Declaration invoking the people's right to self-determination and the Croats' right to statehood, and demanding the establishment of the state of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs within the Habsburg monarchy.

A major development in the international arena (the Russian Revolution and Russia's withdrawal from WWI, the US entering the war and its unwillingness to safeguard the old European order with the Habsburg monarchy) sped up these processes among the South Slavs.

The Salonika Front was breached on September 15, 1918. The People's Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was established in Zagreb (October 6, 1918). The Council made a number of decisions on the breakup with the Habsburg monarchy and the creation of the state of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. Historians and theoreticians of law at the time were in disagreement over the status of this state. It was threatened from two sides: from the outside, with Italy aspiring to Slovenian and Croatian territories, and from

the inside, where the danger was seen in revolutionary elements (“green forces”). The Council counted on assistance from the Serbian army.

Serbia was in favor of annexation of as many regions as possible.

A decision on unification with Serbia and ousting the Petrović dynasty was made in Montenegro (the Podgorica Assembly, Nov. 26, 1918). And in Novi Sad, the “big people’s assembly” decided on unification with Serbia (Nov. 25, 1918). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, municipalities proclaimed unification with Serbia whereas the Sarajevo-based People’s Council opted for Zagreb.

In Geneva, negotiations on dualism with representatives of the Zagreb-based People’s Council failed because the cabinet of Nikola Pašić had resigned. The Council in Zagreb voted for unification with Serbia and sent an elected delegation with instructions */Naputak/* to Belgrade where, on December 1, 1918, King Alexander Karađorđević proclaimed unification.

SERBS ASSEMBLED IN ONE STATE FOR THE FIRST TIME: TERRITORIALY DIVIDED AND MIXED WITH OTHER NATIONS

Of all the newly-established European states after WWI, the *Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918–29) / the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929 –41)*¹² was faced with the biggest challenges. It had to strengthen its international standing and define its borders. Its nations had known almost nothing about one another and it was only within the new state that they realized what their interests were and how to set their goals. They were divided by their

12 This is a summary of the study “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918–29) / Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929–1941)” and three case studies detailing it 1. “The St. Vitus Day Constitution of June 28, 1921, Yugoslavia’s the first constitution: unitarian-centralistic principles win against the concept of a complex state;” 2. “Croatian representatives assassinated in the People’s Assembly: June 20, 1928;” and 3. “Separatism: a reaction to the dictatorship of January 6, 1929.” This study and case studies are available at the Helsinki Committee’s web portal, under the subtitle “Yugoslavia’s dissolution.”

different histories, religions and traditions but also by large economic disparities and levels of literacy. The new state with its disparate judicial, educational and economic systems looked chaotic. The consequences of the war – poverty, hunger, disease and the like – were palpable and threatened turmoil. Frustration over the heavy losses in human life hung in the air. Observers of these challenges, both domestic and foreign, used to comment, “Yugoslavia is easier to imagine than to realize.”

Shortly after King Alexander proclaimed unification on December 1, 1918, Yugoslavia’s very first cabinet under the premiership of Stojan Protić (1857–23), one of the leaders of the People’s Radical Party, was formed. The cabinet decisively influenced the composition of the provisional people’s representation tasked with preparing a constituent assembly. The outcome of the elections for the constituent assembly (Nov. 20, 1920) revealed that the electorate was deeply divided into two blocs – centralist and federalist. This gap was also manifest in the number of constitutional drafts put forth as alternatives to that of the government. New divisions emerged over the cabinet’s draft house rules for the Constitutional Assembly, which were contrary to the provisions of the Election Law. They obliged representatives to pledge allegiance to the King, which prejudged the form of the state, and the constitution, declared by a simple rather than qualified majority vote. Nikola Pašić’s cabinet stopped at nothing to get the constitution voted in. The Croat Republican Peasant Party boycotted the proceedings of the Constitutional Assembly to demonstrate that the Constitution would be declared against its will. The state was thus placed on the limit of legitimacy (see, Latinka Perović, “The St. Vitus’ Day Constitution of June 28, 1921, Yugoslavia’s First Constitution: Centralistic-Unitarian Concept Wins against the Concept for a Complex State”).

Several constitutional drafts from different parts of the country, submitted by different political parties, groups and individuals

– none of them disputing the state's unity but only its centralist system – raises the question of the grounds on which the administration, the main promoter of centralism and unitarianism, was refusing to discuss any form of autonomy, federation or confederation.

At the very beginning of WWI, the Serbian government had set unification with the Croats and Slovenians as its goal. To Serbs, the document of December 1, 1918 was tantamount to realization of that goal.

The Serbs brought their state, their monarchy and their victorious army, as well as the territories won in the 1912–13 wars, to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The population of South Serbia – as the area of Macedonia alongside the Vardar River was called at the time – was not so integrated into the Serbian nation as the population in the territories Serbia was enlarged with at the Berlin Congress.

The manner in which the unification of December 1, 1918 was realized left the process of integration of the Serbian nation unfinished and generated divides. The Montenegrins who entered the new kingdom having left behind a state and dynasty of their own at the Podgorica Assembly in 1918 split into the supporters of unconditional unification (*bjelaši*)¹³ and those opposing it (*zelenaši*)¹⁴.

Problems in the countries who found themselves in a single state after December 1 were a different story. In Slovenia, there were almost no Serbs. Things stood differently in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Croatia, Serbs – though a minority nation – became a political majority. To leading Serbian politicians in Croatia (such as Svetozar Pribičević), Serbia was – until the Serbian-Croatian coalition (1927) and especially until the January 6 dictatorship (1929) when Stjepan Radić was already dead (1928) and Svetozar Pribičević himself confined – “the most authoritative

13 The Whites

14 The Greens

factor in determining Serbian interests.” Ruling circles ‘perceived and managed the new state as if it were an enlarged Serbia. ‘To them, Yugoslav integration was the top priority. In a strong, common state Serbs were everywhere safe and secure. However, the processes of integration and disintegration were simultaneous. Members of other nations were flocking together on the national principle basis, whereas Serbs, Slovenians and even Muslims were splitting up.

Croatian politicians were trying to internationalize the Croatian question. After one mission he paid to Moscow with this in mind, Stjepan Radić was arrested. He was faced with a 10-year term of imprisonment and a ban on his party. Then they changed their strategy. One of party leaders, representative Pavle Radić declared in the National Assembly that they recognized the St. Vitus’ Constitution and were changing the name of their party to the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS). From 1925 till 1927, the HSS participated in the government. However, the continual parliamentary conflicts culminated in bloodshed. Radical Puniš a Račić shot dead two Croatian representatives and wounded another two. Stjepan Radić, the main target, was wounded and soon died of his wounds. Though their murderer was called a lunatic, all indicators (the press, the Prime Minister, the chairman of the People’s Assembly, the Court, etc.) speak of a thoroughly prepared assassination. This was evident in the scandalous trial of the murderer that foreign observers saw as a warning of bad Serbian-Croatian relations to come (see, “Croatian representatives assassinated in the People’s Assembly: June 20, 1928” at the web portal).

The crime committed in the highest representative body of the common state not only compromised parliamentarianism, but deepened people’s mistrust of the state itself. It would appear

that the crime was meant to trigger a solution prepared long before.¹⁵

Responding to the state crisis, King Alexander issued the Manifesto of January 6, 1926. He proclaimed that the time had come to block out intermediaries between the King and the people. He suspended the Constitution and dismissed the People's Assembly. He appointed politicians loyal to the Court members of the cabinet of General Petar Živković, the commander of the Royal Guard. He banned political parties and placed their leaders under control. Its "tribal characteristics" having been taken away, the name of the state changed from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Instead of 33 districts, nine *banships* (*banovina*) were established with the King appointing the *bans*. The goal was to abolish the historical provinces.

The Yugoslavia of banships was "supposed to be a melting pot for a new Yugoslav nation. "The ideology of integral Yugoslavism, born in dictatorship, was everywhere met with disapproval. Separatism and irredentism were growing stronger and stronger (see, (Latinka Perović, "Separatism: a Reaction to the Dictatorship" on the web portal).

On September 9, the King "gifted" to his people a new constitution – *Oktroisani ustav* (the Imposed, or September 1931 Constitution). Dictatorship was formally annulled, but well disguised ("the little constitution"). When Hitler rose to power (1933), King Alexander turned his back on France, Serbia's traditional ally, and looked to Germany. While the King was visiting France, Croatian and Macedonian separatists killed him in Marseilles on October 9, 1934. His heir, King Peter II (1923–70) was underage at the time. Hence, under King Alexander's last will and testament, the

15 For more details see the study headlined "*The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918–1929). The Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929–1941)*" published on the web portal. Here the author just emphasizes the crucial points leading towards the state's short lifespan. .

state was ruled by a regency with the King's cousin, Prince Paul Karađorđević (1893–76) at the helm.

After the declaration of the Imposed (September) Constitution, the pro-regime party – Yugoslav Radical Peasant Democracy (the Yugoslav National Party after 1933) also advocated an ideology of integral Yugoslavism. The cabinet of financial expert Milan Stojadinović (1888–1961) lasted longer than any other cabinet formed under the Regency (1935–39). Stojadinović continued the policy of taking sides with Germany and settling accounts with Italy. He won over the Slovenian People's Party and Yugoslav Muslim Organization to a new party – the Yugoslav Radical Community – and imposed himself as its leader. (Count Ciano noted down in his diary, "Stojadinović is a fascist, if not by party membership then by his views on government and a way of life" (Jože Pirjevec).

Stojadinović's conflict with the Serbian Orthodox Church over the Concordat and the election victories of Croatia's and Serbia's opposition in 1938 provided Prince Paul with the opportunity to bring Dragiša Cvetković (1893–1969), a politician who was little-known but ready to come to an agreement with the Croats, into the government. The Cvetković – Maček Agreement was signed after brief negotiations (August 26, 1939) and Maček and his ministers joined the cabinet. Croatia got its *ban*, its assembly /*Sabor*/, and jurisdiction over the administration, education, the economy, and traffic policy. Strongly opposed to the establishment of the Banship of Croatia was the Serbian Cultural Club (1937), the core of Serbia's intellectual and political elite.

Only a day after the Agreement was signed (September 1939), WWII broke out. The Kingdom found itself in a difficult position. The alliance with Hitler was unpopular. On the other hand, its power to resist was poor. "In a cage with a tiger," Churchill said of Prince Paul. On March 25, 1941 Yugoslavia joined the Axis Powers. Two days later (March 27, 1941), mass protests erupted in Belgrade

and other towns in Serbia. The generals carried out a coup d'état. Dušan Simović (1882–1962) was appointed Prime Minister. The new cabinet did not annul the country's membership of the Axis (Sima M. Ćirković is probably Serbia's only historian to mention this fact). Without declaring war, Hitler, filled with vengeance, decided to bomb Belgrade (April 6, 1941). German troops entered Yugoslavia from several sides. The Independent State of Croatia / NDH/ was proclaimed in Croatia on April 10, 1941. Deputy Prime Minister of the Royal Government, Dr. Vlatko Maček, appealed to the Croats to accept the new government. First *Ustasha* concentration camps were established in Italy and Hungary after the proclamation of the January 6 dictatorship /1929/, whilst *Ustasha* tenets on an ethnically pure Croatia had been known since the early 1930s.

WORLD WAR II (1941–45)

Even historians argue about what it was that crucially decided the Kingdom of Yugoslavia's short lifespan: aggression from outside or unsettled controversies at home? And, probably the same fate that befell the Republic of Yugoslavia, even if there had been no aggression and with domestic controversies seemingly settled, indicates that we need to take a different approach to the Kingdom and the Republic alike as entities in the light of the long histories of their composite nations. Taken separately, the histories of each and every nation – in the “from-to” form – do not provide explanations of their alliances or their dramatic conflicts.

After the brief “April War” (April 6–18, 1941), Yugoslavia capitulated and was soon partitioned among the countries that had requested a revision of the division following WWI. Hungary (Bačka, Baranja and Međumurje), Bulgaria (Macedonia and Southeast Serbia) and Italy (Kosovo and Metohija through its vassal Albania, and occupied Montenegro) were parties to the deal. Slovenia's territory was divided up between the Reich and Italy.

The Independent State of Croatia spread over a large part of Yugoslavia. Its Ustasha regime ruled with “militia, army, secret police and more than twenty-odd concentration camps” (Mari Žanin Čalić, *Istorija Jugoslavije u 20. veku*). The first Ustasha camps in Italy and Hungary had been established at the time of the January 6, 1929 dictatorship, while the first Ustasha documents were written in the early 1930s. They quoted an ethnically pure state of Croatia as their primary goal (see Latinka Perović on “Separatism: a Reaction” on the web portal). This, above all, referred to Serbs making up 30 percent of the NDH’s population. The Ustasha concept of an ethnically pure state implied a planned destruction of the Serbs. The Serbian alphabet was banned, their priests were killed and their churches demolished. In late September 1941, some 120,000 Serbs fled Croatia, and another 200,000 a year later. In collection centers turned into concentration camps to which they had been deported, Serbs – along with Jews, Roma and opponents to the Ustasha regime – were being physically eliminated. Most infamous of all were the concentration camps of Jasenovac, Stara Gradiška and Jadovno. Horrible enough in itself, the truth about the Ustasha system of concentration camps, especially Jasenovac, became the subject of mythology that declared scientific truth null and void.¹⁶

What was left of Serbia was under German military command that relied on the domestic civilian authorities: the Commissioner Department and then, as of the end of August 1941, on the “Serbian government” of the extreme nationalist General Milan Nedić (1878–1946). The Germans were in command of the army, the police, the economy and finance unlike in France where they left these domains to the domestic quisling government.

Milan Nedić counted on the supporters of Dimitrije Ljotić’s “*Zbor*” /Gathering/ and Kosta Pećanac’s *Chetniks*. To him, the establishment of a peasant state in Serbia hinged on the Reich’s

16 Ivo Goldstein, *Jasenovac. Tragika, mitomanija, istina...*

victory. Serbia's quisling regime persecuted Communists and other anti-Fascists. Education, culture and the press underwent changes. The Jewish community was destroyed. Military forces were formed with German assistance: the Serbian Volunteer Corps and Serbian National Guard.

"Serbian Chetniks" and Communists were at the forefront of resistance. With a group of officers, Colonel Draža Mihailović (1893–1946) came from Bosnia to Western Serbia and established his headquarters on Mt. Ravna Gora. He would not accept the country's occupation nor would he confront the occupiers – and so he ended up in collaboration. He considered himself the King's legitimate representative. The government in exile appointed him commander of the Yugoslav Army Headquarters in the Homeland. His military organization was spread all over the country, undisciplined and led by self-willed commanders. The Chetniks stood for "restoration of the monarchy, the old ownership relations and the hegemony of the Serbian bourgeoisie" (Branko Petranović). Their program for an ethnically pure Serbia implied deportation and dislocation of some four million people. Ethnic cleansing was not spontaneous, but executed on command, and its purpose was to ethnically homogenize the Serbian nation.

On the eve of WWII (in 1940 at the Fifth Territorial Conference in Zagreb) and after long wavering over the national question, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia /KPJ/ decided to defend the country. After twenty years of illegal activity, new generations of party members had replaced the old, factional struggles ended, and Bolshevization was completed. In that closed circle, open only to the Soviet Union via the Comintern, the strategy for social ("there shall be no return to the old ways") and national questions (Yugoslavia restored on federal foundations) was decided. And that strategy implied a struggle against the occupier and Partisan warfare backed up by a firmly organized Communist Party of Yugoslavia actually structuring the Partisan resistance.

The autumn of 1941 saw two meetings between Dragoljub Draža Mihailović and Communist and Partisan leader Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980). The meetings produced no results since the programs of the main players were diametrically opposed and already by November 1941 the Chetniks and Partisans clashed for the first time.

In Western Serbia (September–November), the Partisans had a hold on a considerable amount of territory centred in Užice (the “Užice Republic”). A German offensive made them withdraw and “after that the Partisans were left without a major stronghold in Serbia” (Sima M. Ćirković, *Ibid.*).

Dražić Mihailović’s authority was backed up by the fact that he had the support of the government in exile that had promoted him to general and appointed him Minister of the Army and, moreover, secured him Allied assistance. However, the state of affairs became more and more dependent on the balance of forces at the fronts. With the capitulation of Italy (1943), Germany was no longer capable of fighting on all fronts.

The Partisan leadership (in late 1942) was in favor of establishing parallel rule, not only at local, but also at national level. It formed the Anti-fascist Council of People’s Liberation /AVNOJ/, assembling representatives of different parties and groups. At its second session (November 29–30, 1943 in Jajce) AVNOJ assumed the function of a government body. It suspended the King’s government, banned the King from the country, decided on a federal system for the country and invested Josip Broz Tito with the rank of Marshal.

While the Partisans were struggling for international recognition, the Allies were discussing the post-war order in Europe. At their meeting, Stalin and Churchill (1944, Moscow) included Yugoslavia among the countries destined for a fifty-fifty split. Churchill was trying to get the Partisan and Chetnik movements to unite. On the island of Vis (June 1944), representatives of the

London-based government and Partisan leadership agreed to form a democratically-oriented government capable of uniting all the forces in the struggle against the Germans, and leave discussion on the post-war system of government till the end of the war. The Yalta conference (February 1945) decided that AVNOJ should include ex-Yugoslav MPs (elected in 1938). The King appealed to the so-called Yugoslav Army in the Homeland to join the Partisans. This sealed Draža Mihailović's fate; "to the nations at home and to major allies, the reconstruction of Yugoslavia became a natural and indisputable goal" (Ćirković, *Ibid.*).

In the summer of 1944, Partisan forces broke into Serbia. Stalin wanted the Partisan leadership to include Red Army troops – that had come to the Yugoslav border from Rumania – in the liberation of Belgrade (October 20, 1944). In early March 1944, as agreed between Tito and Ivan Šubašić, the coalition government of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia was formed.

A non-judicial showdown with collaborators began. Pre-war politicians walked out of the government. Elections for the Constitutive Assembly were called for in November 11, 1945. The turnout was 88.66 percent with 90 percent of the electorate casting their votes for the People's Front formed by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The strategy for a revolutionary takeover, one of the goals of the liberation war, was proceeding smoothly.

On November 29, 1945, the Republic was proclaimed. Federal Yugoslavia's first constitution drafted along Soviet lines was promulgated on January 31, 1946. The state named the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was made up of six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia) each with a government, the highest people's representation, and a constitution of its own. Serbia had one autonomous province – Vojvodina – and one autonomous area – Kosovo and Metohija.

THE SERBS IN ONE STATE ONCE AGAIN AND ONCE AGAIN TOGETHER WITH OTHER NATIONS

Established on the principles of federalism, the Second Yugoslavia began its life as a strongly centralized state and under the proclaimed dictatorship of a modern class – the proletariat, the sole assumption in a state of peasants. The Serbs who had made up the main the body of the Partisan army enabling Yugoslavia's reconstruction saw the federal system as detrimental to them for two reasons; one was the establishment of new nations – Macedonian, Montenegrin and even Bosnian Muslims; and the other was Serbia's asymmetric arrangement – the autonomous province of Vojvodina and the autonomous area of Kosovo and Metohija. It was not fair to Serbia, they thought, that Istria, Dalmatia and Herzegovina had not been given the same, autonomous status.

Following the fall of the “Užice Republic”, the Partisan movement no longer operated in the territory of Serbia. As said above, “cleaning up” the terrain for the new regime had made people even more reserved about it. Their grudge was based on their reaction to violence. In May 1944, the Department for the Protection of the People (OZNA) was formed. At its helm was Aleksandar Ranković (1909–1983), a member of the party and state top leadership along with Josip Broz Tito, Edvard Kardelj and Milovan Đilas. A wave of terror started that swept over collaborators, quislings and political opponents –genuine and potential alike. And especially at local level, this outside-the-courtroom show-down grew into variously motivated forms of revenge. In parallel with a sigh of relief at the end of the war, there was a spread of fear, the fear that – often undercover – questioned the legitimacy of the new regime. The situation changed only gradually since violence – planned or spontaneous – was turning into the *modus operandi* of the new regime.

In the period 1945–48, the new regime altered the status of ownership relations based on the Soviet model. Properties were

nationalized, the management of economic affairs taken over, a planned economy established and heavy industry and infrastructure prioritized. The neglect of agriculture resulted in poor supply, a problem that was, in turn, solved by force (compulsory buyouts, forced membership of peasant communes, etc.).

It was only in 1948 that the Serbian public slightly modified its attitude towards the new regime. Stalin's assault on the KPJ leadership, accused of veering towards the West and capitalism, and the expulsion of the KPJ from the Information Bureau of Communist Parties started yet another wave of violence. Some 16,000 people, dissenters from among the ranks of the Communists, were arrested and sent to concentration camps, including the most infamous, Goli Otok. Armed incidents at the border and unprecedented resistance by the KPJ were broadening the frontline of defense at home. That was Josip Broz Tito's biggest success. In his memoirs, one of the leading members of Belgrade's *Praxis* circle, Mihailo Marković, says, "Tito accomplished something incredible. Despite all their Slavophilism and Russophilism, in 1948, 1949 and 1950 the Serbs were ready to fight the Red Army that they had onceso admired." It was in defense of the country's independence, as a shared interest, that Josip Broz Tito became "nearer and dearer" to Serbia. There were several reasons why this was so.

Tito had renewed Yugoslavia to envelop all Serbs. He had relied on Russia as Serbia's historical ally. He had formed a strong army, which was a major factor in Serbia's history (according to German sources, German commanders used to say during the war that, if captured, Tito would be treated as a marshal because of his military and statebuilding skills). A party of the type Tito had created originated from Russian revolutionary, 19th century ideas. Last but not least, the Serbs and Tito had been identified with Yugoslavia (when, after proclamation of the 1974 Constitution, high-ranking party official Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo asked Tito what would happen to Yugoslavia, the latter replied, "Yugoslavia is no

longer.” In other words, to both Serbs and Tito a state is non-existent if not centralized and unitarized – Jože Pirjevec).

When speaking in public Tito struck a balance between centralism and federalism – in the state, though not in the party. Actually, he himself was always in favor of a centralized and unitary state. Hence, he recognized how significant Serbia was for Yugoslavia. He kept his ears open to any criticism of his personality coming out of Serbia. When the criticism became more open – as at the time of Croatia’s *maspok* (mass movement) – he angrily told a small circle of Serbian officials, “I came here in 1941 and from here I went on” (Latinka Perović, *Zatvaranje kruga*). And the agreement he had made with a part of the Serbian leadership paved the way for the showdown with the entire leadership of Croatia (Ibid.).

In 1948, Tito was above all defending the independence of the country he symbolized. His breakwith the communist ideological monolith was a by-product of his attempt to better explain the conflict. He would approve changes unless they changed the basic characteristic of the Soviet model: state ownership and the political monopoly of the Communist Party (some twenty years later, at the time of dramatic debates on constitutional amendments, Edvar Kardelj told Serbian party leaders that Tito and Serbia had been against all changes from the very beginning (Latinka Perović, *ibid.*).

Even when he tried for the first time to democratize the country – following the change in the party’s name into the League of Communists (1952) and Stalin’s death (1953) – Milovan Đilas was severely criticized by the party leadership and then excommunicated, put on secret trial four times and sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. Đilas had the support of liberal, academic circles in the West and Western officials saw Yugoslavia’s stability as a priority.

Josip Broz Tito's mental ties with the Soviet Communist Party's ideological core had never been severed. Even at the time of the biggest bilateral crisis in 1948, he himself told a meeting with leading army officers, "Every wolf has a lair that he never leaves for good." And indeed, he eventually returned to his own lair.

In 1955, a Soviet state and party delegation came to Belgrade. According to some Yugoslav diplomatic sources (such as Koča Popović and Veljko Mićunović), this marked the beginning of Tito's defensive attitude towards a reformist model for society. Tito was seismographically reacting to change and directly questioning, especially in the long run, the organic characteristics of the Soviet model – state ownership and party monopoly, as said above. And he reacted not in institutions, but when addressing mass meetings, thereby severing the orientation towards a market economy (Split, 1962) and arrangements aimed at "dethroning" the party (Maribor, 1966).

In a Yugoslavia that moved from being one of the most backward countries in Europe on the eve of WWII to a middle-income country with industry and many modern characteristics, the Serbs prospered, and prospered more than ever before in their modern history. "Sudden and swift changes had taken place in earlier periods, mostly among the 19th century Serbs in Hungary, and later in the Kingdom of Serbia under the rule of Prince Miloš, but all of them benefited only the smaller, educated, well-to-do and urban part of the society. In the second half of the 20th century, the changes were massive, covering virtually the entire nation, and altering its profile" (Sima M. Ćirković, *Ibid.*).

Though limited in attainment, these changes indicate that, at the end of the 20th century, the Serbs were no longer a nation of peasants. In 1946, peasants made up 72.3 percent of Serbia's population and in 1966–56 percent, whereas in 1976, only one third of the population earned its living from farming. Urban settlements mushroomed overnight. Mandatory eight-year schooling cut

down the number of illiterates. The network of schools at all levels of education spread beyond Belgrade: Novi Sad (1960), Priština (1970) and then Niš and Kragujevac became new university centers and university faculties were opened in several other towns. Health and social insurance improved the nation's healthcare and social security. People's lifespan was longer (from 45 years of age in the aftermath of WWII to 77 in women and 77 in men in 1981). The position of women changed radically – both normatively and in real life. The population became upwardly mobile. Industry was shifting from villages to the towns. Later, the downward employment spiral took them abroad – out of 800,000 Yugoslavs working abroad, 300,000 were Serbs. The press, radio and television services (since 1958 in Belgrade) expanded. By not only publishing domestic but also foreign authors, publishing houses contributed to this diversity and the country's opening up to the world. Many translated books; by authors from East and West saw the light of the day. The arts were blossoming (“the Age of Pericles” was how writer and film director Živojin Pavlović termed this era in culture). Literary works, paintings, music and movies that were produced far outstripped a purely domestic level and often received important international awards, including the Nobel Prize for Literature – awarded to Ivo Andrić. Writers and artists were conducting “double” dialogues: with regime officials and among themselves. *Realists* and *Modernists* had magazines of their own: *Savremenik* (The Contemporary) and *Delo* (Work).

This poor, underdeveloped country was making progress thanks to foreign assistance and loans. However, many historians (such as Žanin Čalić, *Istorija Jugoslavije*, or Sima M. Ćirković, *Srbimeđu evropskim narodima*) are of the opinion that voluntary work by ordinary citizens – especially young people – made a great contribution as well. The fact that cannot be avoided was the Serbs' adjustment to the post-war regime and their compatibility with Josip Broz Tito. Like Tito himself, they reluctantly accepted

frequent constitutional amendments seeking a formula to sustain the complex and contradictory Yugoslav state after Tito's death. In a way, this was all part and parcel of Serbian tradition. Slobodan Jovanović was wont to say that the Serbs did not react "during a process" but all of a sudden, so their reactions seemed something unexpected. To illustrate this, he quoted the year 1839 when the Defenders of the Constitution had forced Prince Miloš to abdicate, or 1858 when, under pressure from the Liberals, Prince Alexander Karađorđević had to seek refuge in a fortress and then cross over into Austria. But it was perhaps Nikola Pašić who, speaking about the ousting of the dynasty in the early 20th century, best explained the reasons why this "accumulated" dissatisfaction suddenly erupted. When asked by a reporter shortly after the murder of the last of the Obrenovići (1903), "Was such a catastrophe predictable?" he answered, "You know that in Serbia we have had coup d'état after coup d'état, laws that have been declared and then annulled, and conflicts coming in series. We Serbs or – the South Slavs in general – are not like the peoples in the West that promptly protest against breaches of the law. We are somehow passive by nature and would allow wrongs done to us accumulate until the offender really overshoots the mark and realizes himself that he has no other way out. Conflicts had inevitably led the late King Alexander towards catastrophe.

"I know our parliamentarians and senators too well. These people, the great majority of them, are for the monarchy. A republic doesn't suit Serbia it's too early for a republic and too far away from us. As a republic, Serbia would be exposed to *all sorts of foreign influences and that would be the biggest evil of all. Serbia is concerned not only with its today's self, but also with Serbian ideas. Having a republic would be like abandoning the pledge we made to ourselves* (emphasis by the author). Even as a monarchy we have had much difficulty in fending off foreign influences... And besides, dear sir, you are aware that there are Serbs who do not know what

to do with universal and totally unrestricted freedom because they know nothing about respecting that freedom” (Čedomir Višnjić).

This is what Pašić said on the eve of the wars in 1912, 1913 and 1914 in which Serbia, after its declaration of independence in 1878, was extending its territory so as to bring all Serbs into a single state. The Serbs wasted an inordinate amount of human resources on this crucial aim, not seeing the brute force they used against others as a crime. For them, a centralized and unitary state was a path to integration and therefore, they shunned any idea whatsoever of a composite state: autonomy, federation or confederation. They relied on what they had staked themselves: a state – the Kingdom of Serbia, the Serbian monarchy, the Serbian army, their victims and the percentage of Serbs in the total population of the new state. They saw violence against others (such as the proclamation of the St. Vitus’ Day Constitution or the assassination of Croatian representatives in the People’s Assembly), and then dictatorship, as the means necessary to overpower resistance by others. As an epilogue: it was aggression from outside together with the absence of inner cohesion that accelerated the disintegration of the first Yugoslav state.

In a complex state, other nations, mostly Croats and Slovenians, as nations in the modern sense of the term, and those in the process of formation, always found ways to protect themselves from hegemony, meaning ways to complete their national integration.

In the Second Yugoslavia, renewed by federal standards, federalism itself was formal for too long. It was only when some parts of the Federation, following the Soviet model, were invested with the first elements of statehood that the two concepts clashed. Historians are divided over the issue: according to one school of thought, decentralization – republics turned into nation-states – brought about Yugoslavia’s disintegration; the other sees decentralization as the realization of people’s right to self-determination proclaimed in all the Yugoslavia’s constitutions and a precondition

to free nations' agreement on the context of their rational unity. However, the actual process was far more contradictory and dramatic.

From the early 1960s the dynamics of developments in Yugoslavia intensified. The extensive economic growth wasted away. Breakthroughs in science and technology, as well as new policies, had considerably changed the world. At the same time, especially after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Khrushchev's address, Communism fell into crisis, which was differently coped with within the international Communist movement. In the East, there were attempted reforms to halt the arms of the Warsaw Pact, while in the West, Euro-Communism shattered its delusion about the applicability of the Soviet model to Western society. In Germany, following its economic revival, accountability for Nazism was on the agenda and its new Eastern policy formulated. By overlooking the generally "slow" course of history, contemporary authors are also neglecting the influence these changes had on Yugoslavia, and especially the different reactions to them in the country itself.

Faced with new challenges the Yugoslav party leadership responded differently (March 1962), their responses corresponding with either of the two conflicting currents of thought personified by Serb Aleksandar Ranković and Slovenian Edvard Kardelj. Centralism or federalism in both the party and the state once again became a key issue. Tito seemed to be weighting the pros and cons, though actually siding with Aleksandar Ranković. At the 8th Congress of the SKJ (1964) a liberal economic orientation prevailed (the gap between the "developed" and "underdeveloped" was very deep at the time); and so did a decentralization trend in the party. Specifying the federal parity of the party's Executive Committee Tito declared himself a Croat. The party was shocked. Professor Mihailo Marković writes, "The public was

stunned to hear Tito saying out loud that he was a Croat (the general opinion having always been he was a dedicated Yugoslav).”

Work on constitutional amendments (1963) and economic reforms, termed by historians from abroad the most radical in Eastern Europe (John Lampe) were natural follow-ups to the liberal orientation of the SKJ 8th Congress. But these reforms met with strong resistance. Aleksandar Ranković, seen as the pillar of the resistance, was soon discharged. The reasons why he had to be removed were weak: he was accused of having been aware that Josip Broz Tito had been bugged. The most lucid insiders, however, said that they could not explain Tito's decision to have Ranković removed (Aleksandar Nenadović, *Razgovori s Kočom*). The fact that not long before, the sacked Ranković had been welcomed at the highest state level in the Soviet Union and addressed as Josip Broz Tito's heir, is often quoted. In Serbia, the ouster of Ranković, a powerful Serb in the state and the party, was seen as the beginning of the end for Yugoslavia. The first to address Tito about it with assurance was writer Dobrica Ćosić (1921–2014). But that also marked the birth of an informal opposition, assembling the regime's "opponents" and "renegades" from different periods (Chetniks, *Kominformers*, Ranković supporters and some priests). The 1967 local elections in Serbia mirrored the response to the removal of Serbia's "strongman" (the list of candidates included several retired generals, some of whom had received the green light for their candidacy from Josip Broz Tito himself).

The student revolt in Belgrade in June 1968 coincided with student protests breaking out all over the world, but also boasted local characteristics. It was a reaction to the social inequalities that the economic reforms were generating, which indirectly influenced its collapse. Tito sided with the students.

Shortly after, in May 1968, Dobrica Ćosić and Jovan Marjanović (1922–1981), professor and member of the CC of the SKS, called for a change of policy on national issues (many authors say this

was the reason why Ćosić was excluded from party membership. Actually, this was not true given the prevailing balance of forces both in the Serbian leadership and in Serbia at large).

The entry of Warsaw Pact troops in Prague (August 1968) marked the end of the delusion about “socialism with a human face” that presupposed the possibility of a reform of Soviet socialism. Yet, emerging from the liberal tendencies of the 8th Congress of the SKS – now already a distant echo – some liberal changes did take place within the party. Party congresses in the republics were held before the Federal congress. And all these congresses elected leaderships of the next generation – not as new biologically as mentally. Marko Nikezić (1921–1991), a Belgrade underground fighter in WWII, diplomat, ambassador and Foreign Minister, was elected president of the CC of the SKS. This marked the beginning of a fresh boost to the economy, but in politics as well. “A new man,” said the public, in fact, meaning “a man of the West.” His main idea was that Serbia should not identify with Yugoslavia, but focus on its own development. He refused to have Serbia used as “the other party” in the conflict with Croatia’s leadership (1971). He wanted to have Yugoslav institutions discuss the problems raised by the Croats, but others as well. Otherwise, Josip Broz Tito would continue to be the chief arbiter and his personal power would grow stronger and stronger. The views held by Nikezić created a certain reserve on the part of some of Serbia’s state leaders. Though considered “his” Foreign Minister whom he knew fairly well, Tito himself was reserved about Nikezić for the same reasons. Following the removal of Croatia’s leadership (December 1, 1971 at the 21st session of the CK SKJ Presidency in Karadorđevo) and as a result of the four-day talks Tito had with Serbia’s “enlarged” leadership (October 1972), their party counterparts in Serbia were discharged. Slovenia’s leadership was also on the carpet, though without the mass purges in the economy, culture and media as in Croatia and Serbia. “The young guard”

as Slovenian historian Jože Pirjevec (*Tito in tovariši*) called the key figures in these leaderships had not overstepped the principles inherent in the party's change of name (1952) and party program (1958), but, with a sense of reality after the country's modernization and democratization, including its international relations. Oriented towards dialogue and agreement, they wanted to take the country into a new era together with Josip Broz Tito. The U-turn the "Letter" of the CK SKJ Presidency took (1972) that returned the party to the period before the changes announced in 1952 and 1958, as well as the ensuing showdown with the "young guard", were reminders that the legacy of the Cominform was still alive and kicking.

Against the backdrop of the permanent hot-cold, release-grab, centralization-decentralization tactics, work on the constitutional amendments sped up. The new, 1974 Constitution – to which the 1968/1972 constitutional amendments had actually paved the way – was now in the hands of new republican leaderships that had emerged from mass purges. Tito was reserved about the confederalist constitution: "The entire Yugoslavia was too small for him" (Aleksandar Nenadović, *Mirko Tepavac*). However, he believed that stronger unity of the party and his personal position (now proclaimed lifelong president) would counter the egoism of the republics. And yet, it was the balance of forces that tipped the scales. Serbia had been on one side and all other republics on the other. The constitutional amendments were strongly opposed in Serbia. Serbia saw itself as the damaged party. Its two provinces had become constitutive elements of the Federation, which the political scene had viewed as a step towards the status of republic, while the republics as nation-states prevented the national integration of the Serbian nation, although – as often neglected – Serbs had been a constitutive people of another two republics beside Serbia (Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina). However, the Serbs kept quiet all along – till the death of Josip Broz Tito (1980).

Questioning the 1974 Constitution started with a request for a change in the status of the provinces and continued with numerous signs of dissatisfaction with the position of the Serbian nation in Yugoslavia. First the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences decided (1986) to have its say about the Yugoslav crisis and put forth solutions to it (SANU Memorandum). Regardless of the circumstances in which that document saw the light of day (the manner in which it became public and the ensuing ban on the ceremony to mark the 100th anniversary of SANU), it resounded strongly in Serbia and Yugoslavia because of the Academy's high repute. Some thought that it was only after the Memorandum that "Academy was ready to take over the role of the Serbian nation's leading institution, something which it had only been in words only till then" (Mihailo Marković, *Ibid.*). Some others like the then president of the CK SKS Ivan Stambolić (1936–2000) – who was to be killed on the eve of the change of regime in 2000 – saw the Memorandum as a *Memorial to Yugoslavia*.

The 8th session of the CK SKS that crystallized the differences in views was held in an atmosphere of already dissenting voices over resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. The group led by Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006) called for radicalization of the Kosovo question, whereas that headed by Ivan Stambolić advocated dialogue. But this split did not polarize the Serbian public. On the contrary, Slobodan Milošević actually homogenized it. The media, associations, especially the Writers' Association of Serbia, imbued the myth of Kosovo with fresh emotions fueling mass mobilization. "Anti-bureaucratic revolution" meetings in Belgrade and Kosovo Polje, staged to mark the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, brought together hundreds of thousands of Serbs. Slobodan Milošević was perceived as the leader of the Serbian nation and Serbs were being mobilized in all the republics – in fact, wherever they had lived for centuries together with other nations. "That was an irreparable mistake" (Zoran Đinđić).

Well-organized groups were being dispatched to other republics to “tell the truth” about Kosovo. This was the atmosphere in which the leaderships were ousted in Vojvodina and Montenegro. The “truth-tellers” were prevented from entering Slovenia. Consequently, Serbia kicked back (with an “economic war,” and a campaign against Slovenians accused of being ungrateful to Serbia where 7,000 of their countrymen had found refuge during WWII, etc.).

The last, 14th, Congress of Yugoslav communists ended with the Slovenian and Croatian delegations walking out because all their proposals for the Europeanization of Yugoslav society had been turned down. President of the Federal Government, Ante Marković, responded to the split with optimism: the SKJ has gone but not Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia, however, was a party state. Following the death of Josip Broz Tito as the arch arbiter in domestic affairs, another pillar went – the party as a guarantee of the country’s unity. And what was left once Serbia proclaimed a constitution that put an end to the consensus the 1974 Constitution had achieved – was either separation or conflict. Slovenia and Croatia went after their constitutional right to self-determination. As the program for a “Serbian Yugoslavia” – a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia or Yugoslavia as an enlarged Serbia – failed, Serbia opted for the program for a Serbian nation-state in all the territories inhabited by Serbs. And that meant a territorial war – the war that counted on the unity of the Yugoslav People’s Army and the existence of the Soviet Union.

Many books written on the 1990s wars have differently interpreted the experience of the Serbs and Serbia. Their irreparable losses in human lives and damage resulting in fatal regression – in a dangerous conflict with the times – are still being calculated. The moral and intellectual collapse of society is being put into words, together with the loss of future prospects. And yet the Serbs – not only seen by European nations, but also, to start

with, by the nations of ex-Yugoslavia – are still faced with one crucial question: how much did history – both as an objective process and consciousness and knowledge of it – influence their orientation and inappropriate response to the challenges of the Yugoslav crisis (Sima M. Ćirković, *Ibid.*)? And the dreadful consequences the Serbian nation suffered testify to the inappropriateness of their response. A search for the answer to the above question is the purpose of this overview of the modern history of Serbia and the Serbs.

AGAINST COLONIAL STATUS

MRIKA LIMANI

TO SITUATE SERBS and Albanians in a historical context – especially where Kosovo is concerned – is a difficult task to achieve. While historical inquires often tend to shed light on complicated and disputed matters, they generally have the advantage of mulling over past conflicts and topics that no longer have a direct impact on anyone’s everyday life. It is perhaps precisely this triviality that spoils most historical narratives on Kosovo, as they will indubitably impact on its current political situation one way or another, or be influenced by the prevailing situation. Remaining true to objectivity has proven time and time again to be troublesome, as it has somehow been assumed that it falls upon the historian to approve or negate Kosovo’s ownership by one or other of the leading players. In saying this, however, I contend that it falls upon no one, still less upon a historian, to intentionally fashion the historical and mythical narratives of any polarized side, which serves no greater purpose than to induce and fuel hatred and conflict even more.

The modern history of the Albanians begins with their plea for liberation from the Ottoman Empire. After numerous hardships and about five centuries of Ottoman occupation, and only after the Empire was damaged by the Balkan Wars, the Albanians finally seized their chance and declared independence on the November 28, 1912, in an area partially occupied by Serbs. It would take another year until it was internationally recognized at the Conference of Ambassadors in 1913. Once this was achieved, however, a large part of Albanian-inhabited territories remained outside the official borders of Albania. Kosovo being the largest territory that remained outside Albania was to be bound by a completely different fate from the former.

The advancement of the Serbs in Kosovo was considered a glorious Serbian achievement. They consider the Patriarchate in Pejë historical and religious treasure, which collapsed in 1766 under Sultan Mustafa III. In taking Kosovo, the Serbs relocated the seat of the Serbian Patriarch to Pejë. The monastery in itself was quite well preserved throughout this time, a task that was gracefully completed by the tribes of Rugova, who took pride in proclaiming themselves the “vojvode”, or keepers, of the monastery. The Serbian invasion was ultimately welcomed by the Serbian population of Kosovo, who thought of it as liberation rather than invasion. The arrival of the Serbs resulted in a violent century. Filled with wars, resistance, and pure political incompatibility, Kosovo’s place in Yugoslavia is quite turbulent.

In the falls of 1912 and 1913, Kosovo and Albania were invaded by Serbia and Montenegro. The Balkan Wars had wreaked havoc on Kosovar Albanians whose villages were burned to ashes and whose residents that had managed to escape death were forced to flee their homes. Under such brutal wartime conditions, the Montenegrin and Serbian authorities targeted the Muslim population of Kosovo, the majority of which was Albanian. Some chronicles evidence the atrocities committed by the Montenegrins, including

decapitation and mutilation. The Balkan wars had cost the Kosovar Albanians thousands of dead and more destroyed houses. It is estimated that around 20–25,000 Albanians were killed up to the end of 1912 and about 20,000 emigrated from Kosovo. Dimitrije Tucović wrote about this conquest where he strongly voiced his concern that due to these events it would be extremely difficult to establish amicable relations with the Albanians in the near future.

After the Balkan Wars, Kosovo remained a troubled area that presented significant difficulties to Serbian and Montenegrin attempts to establish an effective administration or reign and thus subjected the inhabitants to military occupation.

In further establishing Serbian rule in Kosovo, the arrival of Serbian settlers in 1913 and 1914 changed the ethnic composition significantly, seeing that at the same time numerous Albanians were also emigrating to either Turkey or Albania. At the same time, Serbian intellectuals were waging a propaganda war against the Albanians, which described the latter in strongly racist tones – such as claiming that the Albanians had lost their evolutionary history as late as the 19th century.

During this time, the Albanian population of Kosovo had remained largely illiterate, with an incredibly small active political class since they had mostly emigrated and continued their meagre and somewhat inconspicuous patriotic activity as *émigrés*, albeit a group who voiced its dissatisfaction with the existing political system in Yugoslavia. The remaining Albanian population was left isolated from state affairs and positioned as second-class citizens amidst the new Serbian and Montenegrin administration.

However, the situation did improve temporarily for the Albanian population in Kosovo during the First World War. With the advance of the Austro-Hungarians into Serbia, between 1916 and 1918, the Albanians in Kosovo arguably welcomed the Austrians as liberators, who at least were willing to let Albanian schools open in Kosovo, contrary to the previous established administration.

The Austro-Hungarians went even further in their attempts to appease the Albanians by giving them government and authority in local and municipal matters, arguably in their attempts to fend off Serbian influence and support however weak local Albanian resistance to the Serbs, a gesture which would ultimately prevent the Serbs from gaining access to the Adriatic coast. This in itself was a continuation of previous policies evidenced in 1913 when Italy and Austria-Hungary strongly objected to the procurement of a port by the Serbs on the Adriatic. Such policies left a strong pro-Austro-Hungarian sentiment among the majority of Albanians in Kosovo, a sentiment that later contributed to some extent in exuding sympathy towards the Germans during the Second World War.

The violence exercised against the Kosovar Albanian population incited an armed rebellion against the Serbs, although not entirely systematic and consistent. The rebellion known as the *kaçak* movement involved small bands of armed men who protected their villages and local areas. These groups were recorded as early as 1913 and their origin is thought of more as a retaliatory response against the atrocities committed during the First Balkan War in particular, and generally against the Montenegrin and Serbian onslaught. The Albanians were swift to retaliate in other ways, too, particularly in that they barely expressed a sympathetic approach towards the Serbian Army during their retreat in the winter of 1915 through the Montenegrin border, to the Adriatic coast and off to Corfu, when the Serbian army was downsized from 300,000 soldiers to nearly half its number during this retreat.

KOSOVO AND ITS TUMULTUOUS PLACE IN THE FIRST YUGOSLAVIA

The new Yugoslav state was formed on the December 1, 1918, and it included Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia under the Karađorđević dynasty. Although Kosovo and Vojvodina were also included in

the Yugoslav kingdom, no such clear stipulation stressed this extension of borders. The inclusion of Kosovo within the First Yugoslavia, which the Serbs re-took in September 1918, was not welcomed by the Kosovar Albanians as a result of previous hostilities between the Serbs and Albanians. The local Albanians in Pejë even pleaded with the commander of the French troops to liberate the area from the Serbs. This stance can be attributed to previous enmities with the Serbs, but it was also a situation provoked by Belgrade's attempt to requisition the arms of Kosovar Albanians. Maintaining peace and order in Kosovo proved increasingly difficult for the Serbian state authorities. The insurgents' activity was limited to small attacks on official buildings and Serbian officials provided the latter were outnumbered. Such was the case in November 1918, for example, when a local band of armed men attacked the municipality in a village in the vicinity of Prishtina.

The insurgents' advantage was their ability to scatter in mountainous areas, and in this period they began to rapidly shape their ideology. Some Albanian figures, who enjoyed a good reputation among those in Kosovo formed the "National Defense of Kosovo" (Komiteti Mbrojtja Kombëtare e Kosovës) Committee in May of 1918— a movement which shaped the resistance into a national movement with a strong liberation character. The Committee was led by Hasan Prishtina and Bajram Curri, who fought for Albanian national rights in Yugoslavia.

The *kaçak* (kachak) rebellion of 1919 organized by Azem Bejta and his band in Drenicë, received massive support from other leaders of local bands – including those in the Dukagjini. The rebellion was also strong in the Dukagjini Plain, where at one point about 1,000 men were gathered and ready to fight the state military in the region between Pejë and Deçan.

In 1920, the state initiated another wave of disarmament, which proved successful in maintaining peace in Kosovo for a while. It is worth noting that despite the existing hostilities, Albanians were

not completely deprived of basic rights within the kingdom – they had the right to vote in elections for the Constitutional Assembly, and there even were some Albanian members of parliament. The latter were to some extent active in promoting the national interests of the Kosovar Albanians, especially by forming the Islamic Movement for Protection and Justice (henceforth Xhemijet/Cemiyet) in 1919. An interesting series of events developed during these years in Kosovo, which served as a battleground, both figuratively and literally, for Albanian and Serbian hostilities. Mark Gjoni, for example, a tribal leader from the Northern Albanian Highlands, declared the “Republic of Mirdita” in Prizren in July 1921 – and later sent a request for recognition to the League of Nations, which was denied. As to how bizarre a signal this must have seemed to the League of Nations, we can only speculate – especially in terms of desensitizing the international players in any Albanian cause – including those within Yugoslavia. It would not be unusual to assume that having numerous fractured Albanian groups must have made it incredibly difficult for anyone to discern whether there was a fight for national liberation, or in any case for unification with Albania proper, or if they were merely voicing political ambition rather than national interests. However, the atrocities committed against Albanians did leave a mark and in effect, the League of Nations pressured the Yugoslav troops to respect the previously established demarcation line, and preferably cease the killings. The Yugoslav troops obliged and retreated to the previously determined demarcation line, which in fact formed the neutral area of Junik in 1923. Midhat Frashëri, who would later establish the National Front, sent a letter of protest to the League of Nations where he went into detail, explaining the violence exerted against Albanians by state-sponsored units.

The Albanian national identity among those living in Kosovo was strongly promoted and enforced by the “National Defense of Kosovo” Committee, mostly because the leading intellectuals at

the time were rightfully afraid that the local Albanians would be soon assimilated as Turks – even the state did not recognize their national identity, and in lieu of it, defined them as Muslims. Somewhat congruent with the Sundhausen postulate regarding the provenance of national identity in the Balkans, it is evident that the Albanian national identity was shaped (and intentionally promoted as such) within the margins of defiance towards the Ottoman Empire, albeit in a different tone from their Balkan counterparts who adamantly resisted Ottoman acculturation and fought the Turks off until the Empire's demise. Although oxymoronic, the Albanian members of the Xhemijet (Cemiyet) party did accept the Muslim veil, probably also because it was the only legal way they could become a member of the parliament as an Albanian.

On a broader plane, it is worth mentioning Oran's postulate where he states that it is evident that in cases "where the religion of the dominant nation is different from that of the dominated nation, the religion of the latter supports its nationalism or national identity", which seems to be pretty much the case with the Xhemijet party and its promotion of the national movement.

The Kosovar Albanians were strongly influenced by these nationalist ideas – later to be further promoted during the Second World War – which were imported through schoolteachers from Albania who taught in Kosovo. In this sense, it is evident that Albania proper served as a matrix state for Albanians living in Kosovo.

In terms of education and literacy, the majority of Kosovar Albanians were uneducated and illiterate. This came as a result of prohibiting schools in their native language, in an attempt to instill linguistic assimilation among the local Albanians. Those who had the economic means to pursue their education were forced to do so only in Turkish through elementary religious schools, limiting their education to a purely religious nature. This in itself damaged the centralized character of the resistance and it did to some

extent distort national sentiment among the local Albanians, which contributed greatly to the maintenance of relative peace in the following years.

In the meantime, Albania's political role had diminished greatly in relation to Kosovo. With copious difficulties in holding up a stable government, it simply lacked the necessary political and economic stamina to involve in what were considered Albanian territories remaining outside Albania's borders. Although initially against the creation of Albania, Yugoslavia did eventually establish diplomatic relations with Albania in 1922, which to some extent signaled that Kosovo was already considered lost territory for Albania. The case of Kosovo became henceforth a Yugoslav and Serbian problem.

During this period, the local Albanian Kosovars continued fighting for unison with Albania proper, in what appeared to be an expression of unquenched idealism that was completely overruled by the state's authority. The aforementioned Albanian parliamentary members, stemming from the Xhemijet party, did attempt to promote Albanian issues on a state level. Although most of their attempts were to no avail, they did have some influence in maintaining some sense of unity and political representation among the local Kosovar Albanians, whose mere existence as a minority, was completely denied in 1919. Ferat Draga, a member of this party and eventually its leader, was vociferous in promoting national unification.

The 1920s were bleak years for both Serbs and Albanians in general. Economic conditions were far from satisfactory and a large number of Albanians emigrated to Turkey and left their lands to the new incoming Yugoslav colonists. It is estimated that 115,427 Albanians, Turks and Bosnians emigrated from Yugoslavia to Turkey between the 1920s and 1930s. The economic depression of 1929 hit Yugoslavia as well, and caused a drop of 60 % in the state's exports. The metallurgy industry with the Trepça mines at

their head – already established in Kosovo – continued to operate and meet the state's consumption of zinc and lead, but this did not ultimately alleviate the severe economic situation.

This decade proved extremely violent. The Serbian settlers had expelled Albanian peasants from some villages in the vicinity of Gjilan and Mitrovicë in 1921–1923, which led to acts of retaliation by the Albanians.

In the midst of internal political turmoil under the authoritarian reign of King Alexander when in 1929 he annulled the constitution of 1921, which had made Yugoslavia a constitutional monarchy with much power attributed to the King and which, admittedly, was based excessively on Serbia's constitution of 1903, the state-supported suppression of Albanians in Kosovo continued .

The '1930s were just as desolate, as a similar policy of suppression continued unabated under Stojadinović and Cvetković after King Alexander's assassination in 1934. Kosovo had no schools in Albanian, except some that were opened illegally and hidden away from the state authorities. Some religious schools were used for teaching in Albanian, and were effectively an Albanian cradle against the state. In similar vein, the Albanian Catholics in Kosovo were strongly devoted to maintaining at least some shred of Albanian culture among the locals, be it through opening illegal Albanian schools, distributing literature in Albanian or delivering sermons in Albanian. In 1931 alone, Albanians made up only 3.6 % of the population of Yugoslavia – a figure that continued to grow rapidly in the forthcoming decades. By 1937, 70% of the population in Kosovo was Albanian.

The state-induced wave of new settlers in Kosovo came from all over Yugoslavia, including Vojvodina. The colonists from Vojvodina especially seemed to have great difficulty in mingling and adapting to the local mindset, which further indicates the evident cultural differences, not only between Serbs and Albanians, but also the Serbs from Kosovo and those from Vojvodina. This is

an interesting observation because it implies that local grievances were more likely to have been the product of complex socio-cultural and economic situations rather than ancient inter-ethnic hatred.

There is some evidence that, at least on the diplomatic level, the Albanian state authorities did address the problem of the Albanian minorities in Yugoslavia, as reported by Sir Andrew Ryan to Lord Halifax in 1939. However, this could equally have been a strong indication that King Zogu was aware of deteriorating Italian-Yugoslav relations and chose this as an appropriate time to voice his concerns over the Albanians in Kosovo.

The history of Kosovo within the First Yugoslavia can be summed up as a continuous process of colonization combined with agrarian reform to induce the expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo and the settlement of Serb and Montenegrin colonists, policies, which ultimately further strengthened inter-ethnic enmity in Kosovo. Kosovo was a purely agrarian society during this period.

THE AXIS OCCUPATION OF KOSOVO AND THE PARTISAN STRUGGLE FOR SUPPORT

Yugoslavia was attacked by the Axis forces in April 1941. Not fully prepared to handle attacks on all fronts, the Yugoslav Army organized and resisted the invasion for as long as it could – the resistance lasting for a total of ten days. No noticeably strong resistance was recorded in Kosovo. Albanian conscripts were not allowed to participate in the operations and those Yugoslav detachments that were standing their ground in Kosovo, were too weak to fight off the German Panzer divisions. Some small resistance was recorded in Suharekë and Prizren, but this faded quickly. The Germans, Italians and Bulgarians occupied Yugoslavia swiftly thereafter.

The Axis occupation was perceived as a great opportunity for numerous Albanian leading figures whose collaboration with the Axis forces would further their political ambitions. Avni Gjilani, for example, who was a member of the irredentist group in Fiume, a city on the disputed Italian-Yugoslav Dalmatian border, sided with the Italians. After the invasion, he was quick to write to Jacomini where he stressed the urgency of forming a “Great Albanian” state. This type of individual rather than state – level diplomacy continued well on throughout the duration of the occupation. Gani Kryeziu, Ferat Draga and Ali Draga also embarked on a similar initiative to unite Kosovo with Albania proper in autumn 1941, by addressing a similar note to the Duce. Kosovo’s proper administrative function as an Albanian state per se did not begin until the formation of the Ministry of the Liberated Lands (Ministria e Tokave të Liruar) in December 1941.

The installment of a German-Italian administration in Kosovo after the invasion in April of 1941 elicited a mixed reaction among the local population. The Albanians in Kosovo who became part of the Kingdom of Albania together with Albania proper were thrilled that they would finally have schools in Albanian and a considerable number of them treated the Italians as liberators rather than occupiers.

On the other hand, one must note that there was no established fascist movement in Kosovo. A letter written by Martin Schliep, a German diplomat, describing the popular Albanian stance towards the Italians, is quoted as saying how vast was “(...)the hatred of the Albanians for the Italians, which cannot be denied because the Italians attempted to develop fascism in Albania, which for many Albanians was a foreign concept. It is for this reason that despite all the respect they feel for the Führer, National-Socialism never aroused a deeper interest in them”. Granted, he said this after the Italians had capitulated and left the Germans without an ally in Europe, which goes a long way to explaining the bitterness of this recorded

communication between German officials. In any case, it is evident that the situation was as described in Albania prior to its invasion by Italy in 1939, which shows that the pro-Italian Albanians temporarily embraced fascism because they equated it with positive Italian colonialism to be used as a means to catalyze modernization within the European context, a sentiment which greatly extended to the Kosovar Albanians under Italian rule in 1941. As far as the attitude of the Kosovar Albanians towards the Germans who administered the area within Serbia proper is concerned, it is worth noting that they were grateful to the Germans for providing regional autonomy in a sense, as agreed upon with Xhafer Deva, who served as a leader. How far this autonomy stretched, however, remains a topic of debate. Discussions on a final demarcation line between German and Italian occupied territories lasted from April until August, when an imperial decree declared the annexation of parts of Kosovo to Albania proper. The area of Albania expanded by about 50% and its population by around 75%. Without a doubt, the interests of both parties related more to economics, therefore they were understandably more interested in gaining access to the mines in Kosovo rather than liberating these areas or helping the residents to lessen local divisions.

The variation in the balance of power in favor of the Albanians, initiated the expulsion of those Serbs who remained in the Kosovo area that had been annexed to Albania proper – a wave of expulsions which peaked in 1942, namely about 20,000 Serbs. A number of Montenegrins who had settled in Kosovo during the inter-war period were also expelled from Kosovo in 1941. There were instances where Serb-populated villages were exposed to violence as well. This was not necessarily a result of state-administered Italian policies, but the policy aimed at expanding territorial control by both the Italians and the Germans certainly played effectively on local enmities and divisions and the local players did not hesitate for a moment in using violence. Inter-ethnic-fueled violence

was rampant in the area between the border of Montenegro and modern-day Kosovo during the period from August 1941 until December 1942.

A new wave of German policies relating to the Kosovar Albanians was introduced after Italy's capitulation in September 1943. These were aimed at maintaining a stable and pacified situation in the lands inhabited by Albanians. The Germans took good advantage of the national sentiments of the Albanian Kosovars regarding unification with Albania proper.

Counter-insurgent activity also developed at a much slower pace in Kosovo. This was mostly due to the fact that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia did not appeal to the local Kosovar Albanian peasants because the Party bore more of a national connotation, i.e. Slavic. The Kosovar Albanian Communists who did eventually gain sufficient support to form their own units were mostly educated in Albania and had close ties with the Communist group in Shkodër, the majority of whom had likewise completed their education in Albania, which seemed to have shaped their ideological inclinations to some extent. Miladin Popović was President of the Regional Kosovo Communist group, which under Comintern orders, greatly helped in forming the Communist Party of Albania together with Dušan Mugoša.

The policies of the Comintern, and in effect CPY policies in Kosovo, were in agreement in terms of appeasing national interests to entice support, a policy which took precedence over the proletarian revolution in places where the latter was lacking. Mimicking a similar approach, despite their Leftist inclinations, the Kosovar Albanian Partisans took a pragmatic approach in persuading the Kosovar Albanians to side with them by appealing to their national interest –unification with Albania proper.

A meeting held in summer 1943 in Mukje, a village in northern Albania near the city of Krujë, was held in order to discuss the formation of a unified front between the Partisans by members

of the National Liberation Council and nationalists represented by the National Front, in waging war against fascism. The agreement was never implemented due to a disagreement that arose in regard to Kosovo. The memorandum from the meeting stipulated the formation of an ethnic Albania, and hence Kosovo's unification with Albania proper – a topic that was thought best avoided at the time. The issue re-emerged later during the winter of that year at a conference in Bujan, a village in northwestern Albania, where the Kosovar Albanian Partisans vowed to unite Kosovo with Albania proper after the war, which was later overruled by the Yugoslav leadership. The division between the Partisans and the National Front was raised as an issue by Miladin Popović, who was concerned that he was unable to obtain sufficient support from the Albanians.

The alignment of the Kosovar Albanians regarding foreign forces during the war presents an interesting historical case. Some politicians were openly very pro-German, such as Xhafer Deva, then there were others who were perhaps less fond of the Nazi ideology, but still co-operated with the Germans likely for utilitarian reasons. Such was the case with Rexhep Mitrovica and Bedri Pejani. Their involvement in establishing the Second League of Prizren in September 1943 signaled the formation of what appeared to be a strong nationalistic front in Kosovo backed by the Germans. The League's mandate to form a state military was perhaps a only dim hint of some sort of existing sovereignty in Kosovo, despite it all being very short-lived. The League did eventually manage to form a militia, but it was nowhere near the size of the army that Rexhep Mitrovica promised to Hitler in early 1944, where the former mentioned a figure of 120,000 to 150,000 soldiers.

There were some state-sponsored Albanian militias that were active in Kosovo prior to Italy's capitulation, who continued their activities under German occupation after a slight restructuring and a short pause in late 1943. They were mainly tasked with

protecting the border with Serbia and Montenegro and fighting off the Partisans.

Tasked with a similar assignment was also the most notorious of the Albanian militias during the war, the SS Skanderbeg Division, which aside from taking part in two battles against the Partisans, also rounded up and deported 281 Jews in 1944. The division ceased operating shortly after.

Stabilizing the territory after Germany's retreat, and incorporating it under the Partisans' control took longer than anticipated, due to the fact that a number of Albanians continued fighting off Partisan units well into May 1945, including the area of Drenicë, Trepçë, and Gjilan. Martial law was declared in February 1945 in Kosovo. Through the workings of the Conference of the National Liberation Council for Kosovo and Metohija, in July 1945, Kosovo was annexed to the Serbian Federation. The Conference was attended by 33 Albanian delegates, as opposed to 142 Serbian and Montenegrin delegates combined.

KOSOVO AS PART OF THE SERBIAN FEDERATION IN THE SECOND YUGOSLAVIA

The Communist representatives of the Popular Front abolished the monarchy on the November 29, 1945, two years after they had proclaimed a provisional government in Jajce. The new Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of six republics, with Kosovo as part of the Serbian Federation. Although the Kosovar Albanians' position in Yugoslavia was not enviable, it was not until Yugoslavia's ideological split with the Soviet Union in 1948, which saw the emergence of a new political reality for Kosovar Albanians. Maintaining a similar ideological alignment with the Soviet Union, Albania positioned itself politically vis-à-vis the Cominformists and thus its ties with Yugoslavia were damaged. Up to that point, the Kosovar Albanians had enjoyed cultural, political and economic ties with Albania proper. However the situation

changed afterwards and certain Kosovar Albanians were in effect labeled “fifth-columnists”. The Yugoslav secret police claimed it had discovered a network of spies who had infiltrated the area from Albania. The secret police had opened 170,000 files on Kosovar Albanians who were considered suspect. The severing of ties with Albania in effect caused the Kosovar Albanians to become scapegoats, which invited their persecution by the Yugoslav secret police. The re-emergence of the disarmament campaign by the Kosovar Albanians in 1955/56 and the emigration of Albanians to Turkey brought to the surface the inter-ethnic tension between Serbs and Albanians, a rift which grew even wider through the next decade. Between 1945 and 1966, around 246,000 Albanians emigrated from Yugoslavia.

However, Kosovo’s position within Yugoslavia changed significantly in 1966 when the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists was held on the Brijuni Islands. There Aleksandar Ranković was heavily criticized by Josip Broz Tito for his dubious work with the secret police. He was dismissed from his position in the Party the same year.

A new wave of politics emerged in Kosovo, which pushed forward the agenda of transforming Kosovo into a Yugoslav republic. As a leading Kosovar Albanian politician, Fadil Hoxha was also adamant in demanding equal rights for Kosovar Albanians. These new developments were vocalized by the Kosovar Albanian masses as well. In the demonstrations of November 1968, the demonstrators insisted that Albanians were to be recognized as a nation and, in effect, have the political status of Kosovo elevated to that of a republic within the Yugoslav Federation. The demonstrations represented both nationalist unrest and a display of discontent for Kosovo’s socio-economic stagnation. The imprisonment of numerous Kosovar Albanians who were suspected of political dissidence deepened the discontent of Kosovar Albanians with the regime. These events indicate that the disruption of

the balance of rights and sovereignty given to the Kosovar Albanians contributed greatly to further exacerbating Serbian-Albanian relations.

The following decade was a fairly prosperous one for the Kosovar Albanians, who enjoyed rapid cultural and economic progress. The founding of the University of Prishtina in 1971 greatly influenced the development of an intellectual class among the Kosovar Albanians, who would later play a defining role in Kosovo's partition from Serbia. Furthermore, a loan given by the World Bank to Yugoslavia in 1971, which was invested primarily in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, helped in the economic prosperity of these regions.

Meanwhile, Kosovar Albanian politicians were appointed to key state position in Yugoslavia. Fadil Hoxha was appointed Vice-President of Yugoslavia in 1978–79 and later Sinan Hasani served as President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia in 1986–1987. Their appointments guaranteed that Kosovo's interests would be promoted on a federal level. The emergence of an Albanian Yugoslav identity among the Albanians took firmer shape during the '70s and '80s, represented by a younger urban generation who had reaped the benefits of being a Yugoslav citizen, a name which no longer triggered a threatening connotation among them, although the sentiment was not fully shared among the rural Albanian population in Kosovo.

From the Albanian perspective, the apex of this progress came in February 1974 when the Yugoslav constitution was reformed for the fourth time after the war. Kosovo was recognized as an autonomous region, and was transformed into a constituent element of the Federation, retaining a complete state apparatus including a Parliament, Supreme Court, independent police force, territorial autonomy and so forth. Kosovo's status was dual because it was still defined as a province within Serbia, as an appeasing gesture to Belgrade. Yugoslav-Albanian relations were re-established

in the same period, mostly as a diplomatic move by Yugoslavia in an attempt to strengthen internal security in the light of the threat of Soviet expansion. Albania's influence among the Kosovar Albanians re-emerged in the sense of strengthening their national feelings.. However much the industrialization of Kosovo was initially stimulated, it eventually became stagnant- – a deficiency which was most evident in the 1980s. Investments were made into further industrializing Kosovo, such as the expansion the zinc and silver foundry in Trepça, and the construction of two power plants "Kosova A" and "Kosova B". However, the quality of the ores was not very high and this affected the foundry's volume of production. A similar issue arose with production at the "Kosova B" power plant, which was not functioning because it lacked the capacity to extract the natural resources needed to power the plant. At the same time, the incongruity of population growth vis-à-vis economic growth also contributed to Kosovo's economic stagnation. Likewise, tensions were growing in the other republics of the Federation resulting from the economic decline that had fallen upon Yugoslavia due to its debts. The more advanced republics in the north were more eager to join the German economic zone rather than subsidize the poorer republics and regions in the south. On a local level, the rapid population growth of Albanians in Kosovo also contributed to strengthening inter-ethnic tensions with the Serbs, who were outnumbered by the Albanians. In 1981 alone, there were 1.7 million Albanians compared to only 427,000 Serbs.

The student riots of March and April in 1981 had shed light on the growing tensions between Belgrade and Prishtina. Although what initially began as riots by students demanding better conditions, the rioters eventually grew in their thousands, demonstrating more general discontentment with the social, political and economic situation in Kosovo. What had started out as student protests swiftly changed to appeals for Kosovo to become a constitutional republic. Retaliation and brutal intervention by the

Serbian police resulted in widespread indignation from the Albanians and in effect further increased the number of rioters. As a result, nine people lost their lives and around ten thousand Albanians were arrested, most of whom were released after serving 30 days in prison. The University of Prishtina was labeled a bastion of Albanian nationalism and separatism.

The economic situation became most severe during the 1980s. This was followed by a migration of Serbs from Kosovo, who felt threatened by the growing Albanian population in Kosovo, but also because the competition for jobs had increased. These developments were received negatively by public opinion in Serbia and ignited extremely hostile inter-ethnic sentiments. The situation became even more adverse when, in 1986, a Memorandum relating to current social issues was leaked from the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, which raised the alarm that the Serbian population was enduring “[...] *physical, political, legal and cultural genocide* [...]” in Kosovo.

The emergence of nationalist narratives in the public arena of Serbia and Kosovo was cunningly exploited by Slobodan Milošević, a young politician who, up to that point, had been extremely apathetic to the issue of Kosovo. His attitude changed swiftly in 1987, when a petition was signed by 60,000 Kosovar Serbs the same year claiming that genocide was taking place against the Serbs in Kosovo.

The vocal discontent of the Kosovar Serbs with the tense, inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo was exploited by Milošević. In a speech held at a rally in Kosovo Polje in 1987, he proclaimed to the Kosovar Serbs: “No one has the right to beat you”.

The strikes held by the Trepça miners in February of 1989 were countered with violent measures by the state authorities.

Arguing that an uprising was being planned in Kosovo, the Serbian regime sent troops to Kosovo and in March 1989, a manipulated meeting of the Kosovo Parliament revoked Kosovo’s autonomy.

The revocation of Kosovo's autonomy paved the way for the Serbian regime to suppress the Kosovar Albanians during the following decade. The initial Albanian response was to pursue a policy of non-violent resistance under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova. However the extensive segregation of the Albanians exacerbated inter-ethnic grievances, and ultimately resulted in the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army.

Unable to fend off Serbian aggression militarily, foreign assistance was sought throughout the 1990s which culminated in NATO intervention in the war after the Yugoslav delegation refused to accept the Rambouillet Agreement. This intervention successfully halted ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians. The retreat of the Yugoslav army left a power gap during which the majority of the Serbian population was forced to flee Kosovo.

CONCLUSIONS

The Serbian occupation in the first decade of the 20th century was violent and one that possibly strongly influenced local grievances among the Albanian and Serbian populations. Settlement programs, agrarian reforms, state-sponsored imprisonment and the overall suppression of Albanians in Kosovo account for the deep inter-ethnic divisions. While the position of the Albanians in Yugoslavia was not always favorable, especially in the First Yugoslavia, there was some advancement and development in the Second Yugoslavia. It is undeniable that Kosovo was a deeply backward region whose population was mainly agrarian. In this context, the establishment of the University of Prishtina, the Albanology Institute, the Academy of Science and Arts, and the formation of the Institute for History in the 1970s speak volumes for the development of national consciousness, but also for the foresight in establishing institutions that proved essential in forming an independent state apparatus of Kosovo. The conditions in which these institutions were established and the Albanian cause in

Kosovo propelled forward were undoubtedly only possible in the specific political circumstances in Yugoslavia that emerged from the liberals' influence in Tito's leadership. Although intended for the contrary, this political approach was ultimately detrimental in nurturing fertile ground for ethno-centrism in Yugoslavia.

After declaring its independence and enjoying statehood for eight years, Kosovo is currently enduring political hardships as a direct result of Serbia's official state policy of not recognizing its independence and lobbying against it in international councils of relevance to Kosovo's economic development. It is possible to imagine that these political tensions could be overcome with a proper dialogue format. Although the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo has been ongoing for almost a decade in Brussels and some achievement has been reached in this respect, it is highly unlikely that Kosovo and Serbia will normalize their political relations until Serbia officially acknowledges and apologizes for the violence exercised in 1998/99 and recognizes Kosovo's independence if Kosovo is to aim for a future in the European Union. On the other hand, unless Kosovo addresses its serious corruption issues within the government and public sector, its stagnation and perhaps even regression, both economically and politically, is inevitable.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR THE AUTONOMY

MILIVOJ BEŠLIN

IN THE MIDDLE Age the area occupied by present-day Vojvodina was part of the Hungarian Kingdom. From the 14th century through the 15th century, due to Ottoman attacks on the Serbian Despotate and parts of southern Hungary, the Hungarian population retreated for security reasons further north, while the deserted Hungarian lands were settled by the masses of the Serbian population, fleeing Ottoman invasions. During that period and earlier, as well as after the fall of Serbia (1459), the territory of present-day Vojvodina became ethnically heterogeneous with a volatile and variable population density and ethno-confessional composition. During the following centuries, Serbs continued to settle in southern Hungary, whose rulers used them as a bulwark against the Ottoman Empire and thus granted them privileges. After the Battle of Mohacs (1526) and, in particular, after the fall of Buda in 1541, the area occupied by present-day Vojvodina was also settled by Ottomans, either as the privileged population in fortresses or the underprivileged populace (*raja*) The border on the Danube between the Ottoman Empire, including Serbia as

its northernmost part, and the Habsburg Monarchy, which also included Hungary after the Battle of Mohacs, was only stabilized as late as the 18th century. The southern parts of the former Hungary were already settled by heterogeneous groups of the Serbian population.

In the mid-18th century, when war operations became less frequent, the Serbian population in the southern parts of the Austrian Empire (Habsburg Monarchy) began to demand the expansion of its privileges and rights. The most important assembly before 1848 was the Timisoara Assembly which was held in 1790 and where the creation of a separate territorial unit was also demanded. In a political sense, it laid down the foundation for the demand for autonomy and aspirations for the formation of the Duchy of Serbia. As for the territory demanded by Serbs at that time, it can be said with confidence that it included the whole area of Banat, but not the territories that would later become known as Vojvodina.¹ At that time, Serbs enjoyed support in Vienna against the rebellious Hungarian estates, while the ideas of the Timisoara Assembly were, in essence, made to function by the Habsburg central authorities in order to weaken the disloyal Hungarian aristocracy.¹⁷

The idea of Vojvodina only crystallized and became more consistently formulated half a century later at the well-known May Assembly, which was held in Sremski Karlovci from 12 to 15 May. During the great European Revolution of 1848–49, the rebel Serbs demanded the *vojvodstvo* (voivodeship) of Serbia, including the territories of Srem, Banat with the Kikinda District, Bačka with

17 At the Timisoara Assembly, or even earlier, at the Assembly in Baja (1694), the Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy demanded a separate territorial unit, especially because in an estate monarchy such as Austria, the key question of political influence was the possession of historical territory and the institution of an assembly. Only then could they be equal with other peoples that had already fulfilled these achievements. However, from 1848 onwards, the Serbian demands became nationally motivated and were not estate-based any more.

the Šajkaš District, Baranja and the Military Frontier. This was the first conceptually complete programme of territorial autonomy as the nationally delineated Serbian space. The emerging young nation demanded its clearly determined territorial unit and defined its borders and name within the Habsburg Monarchy. Its national and emancipatory movement proclaimed Serbs as an independent and politically free people, subordinated to the Royal House of Habsburg and the Hungarian Crown. All these decisions, inspired by the revolutionary ideas of national and liberal movements in Europe during 1848, were also founded on the rights and privileges granted to Serbs as an ethno-confessional group by Austrian Emperor Leopold I in 1691 and 1695, which they considered a legal and historical basis for their autonomy. Such Serbian demands would also call into question the territorial integrity of the monarchy and, in particular, the nationally homogenising intentions of the Hungarian revolutionary and national movement. Therefore, the demands of the May Assembly were met with vehement political resistance from the leaders of the Hungarian Revolution, branding them as illegitimate, rebellious, separatist and contrary to Hungarian historical rights and aspirations towards the creation of the Hungarian political nation. Historian Ranko Končar held that “already at that time, Vojvodina’s autonomy clashed with the idea of a nation – state, which would come to be expressed both in the 19th and 20th centuries, and in the 21st century, regardless of whether it will emerge within a foreign or nation state. Historically, this could be designated as a phenomenon of long duration, since in the 19th century autonomy was determined by national (Serbian) reasons and in the 20th century by historical, democratic, anti-centralist and national-pluralist reasons”. (Ranko Končar,). In a word, Vojvodina posed an obstacle to the creation of a homogeneous and centralist nation state both to Hungarian nationalism in the 19th century and Serbian nationalism in the 20th century.

The Serbian national and revolutionary movement of 1848–49, aimed at building a modern nation, brought about the emergence of several draft constitutions that formulated their demands. The draft constitution of March 1849 probably formulated the Serbian demands more clearly than others. According to this draft, Vojvodina was considered part of the monarchy, but as a state that was equal with other federal members. Serbian Vojvodina was autonomous, indivisible and, in all respects, equal with other states within the Habsburg Monarchy. According to this draft, the borders of Vojvodina could only be changed by its assembly. The draft also envisaged Novi Sad as the capital of Vojvodina and its symbols: the coat-of-arms and flag. Vojvodina left foreign policy to the central government, demanding parity in the appointment of officials. The common financial administration was also left to the central government. Management of the revenues deriving from internal sources – state property and taxes covering central government expenses – would fall within Vojvodina's competence as its direct income. Finally, whatever was not left to the central government remained Vojvodina's competence.

In recognition of the help provided by the rebellious Serbs to the Viennese court in its war against the Hungarian revolutionary movement, their aspirations for autonomy were fulfilled, albeit largely modified. Thus, in 1849, the *Voivodeship of Serbia and Temes Banat* was created as a crown land within the monarchy. Its borders were moved towards the east, so that its territorial reach precluded the demographic predominance of the Serbs and thus the national character of this province. This was the period of Bach's absolutism and strict centralisation of the monarchy so that the Voivodeship had no more significant influence on the formulation of state policy and it was abolished just as it had been created – by an imperial rescript in 1860. However, as early as 1861, after the collapse of absolutism and the abolition of the Voivodeship, the Serbs formulated their demands at the Annunciation

Assembly, based on the May Assembly's decisions about their right to political territory and autonomous status.¹⁸ Under the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, the status of Serbian autonomy within the monarchy fell under the legal and political competence of Hungary, which meant that the possibilities for fulfilling the mentioned aspirations on the basis of the radical programme platform of the May Assembly were reduced to a minimum in view of the fact that Hungarian nationalists aspired towards building a homogenous nation state by converting all existing ethnic groups into the so-called Hungarian political nation.

During the following decades, until the beginning of the First World War, Serbian autonomist aspirations would be limited to the confines of the schools and Church, and largely politically marginalized. Nevertheless, from 1848 onwards there existed the awareness of the historical name of Vojvodina, the need for its identity, territorial delimitation and specific identity characteristics – which would provide a basis for the aspirations of its liberal citizens in the Yugoslav phase of their defense of the right to self-government, in other words, the supranational autonomy of Vojvodina and not the Serbian one any more.

EXPLOITATION OF VOJVODINA IN CENTRALISTIC YUGOSLAVIA

The new ideas affirmed during the First World War and its outcome cardinally changed the constitutional position and legal status of Vojvodina. The affirmation of the national principle during this war, under the influence of the historical document of US President Woodrow Wilson – *Fourteen Points*,¹⁹ as well as the

18 The territories delineating the Serbian Voivodeship at the Annunciation Assembly were changed relative to the territorial claims set out at the May Assembly. Thus, the territories of Vojvodina did not include Baranja any more, while Bačka lost its northern part and Subotica. As for Banat, only its western part, predominantly populated by Serbs, was demanded.

19 This refers to President Woodrow Wilson's historical speech delivered at the joint session of the US Senate and House of Representatives on 8 January 1918.

defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary, led to the implosion of the Dual Monarchy. This was a decisive moment in the creation of the common South Slav state in 1918. Different ideological groups and political entities from Vojvodina participated in these historical processes, especially during the last year of the war, when the question of Vojvodina territory clearly imposed itself, too. They reached a consensus on the need for Vojvodina's legal separation from Hungary, but differed a lot in their views on its future status and methods for achieving such an aim. The question that imposed itself was whether Vojvodina would be treated as a historical province with its own subjectivity and thus be politically realized and affirmed within the Yugoslav state, or should it first join Serbia, lose its historical identity and join the emerging unified Serbian state. Thus, there were two tendencies in Vojvodina's political life, which were to characterize it during the following decades – a broader, pro-Yugoslav and narrower Serbian and nationalist conception of the future status and constitutional position of Vojvodina. The Yugoslav idea and broader framework for settling its position were advocated by democratically oriented politicians and some intellectuals, including specifically Vasa Stajić, Tihomir Ostojić, Petar Konjović and others. The opposite conception was advocated by the nationalist Radical Party led by Jaša Tomić. It promoted the unconditional inclusion of Vojvodina in the Kingdom of Serbia as its primary political and national aim. The Radicals also accepted the unification of South Slavs into

Prompted by the strengthening of European nationalisms during the First World War and the victory of the October Revolution in Russia (1917), whose leaders (Bolsheviks) published all secret diplomatic documents and proclaimed the principle of national self-determination – President Wilson presented the new conception of the national question, compatible with the American revolutionary and democratic experience. The crucial principle of the *14 Points* is the principle of national self-determination and the right of peoples to “round off” their nation states. This was one of the fundamental steps towards the destruction of the centuries-long multi-ethnic Habsburg and Ottoman Empires.

a state, but only after the clear delineation of the Serbian ethnic space or, in other words, after the realisation of the great-state idea of pan-Serbian unification. In their aspirations, Tomić's Radicals only reflected the political views of the Serbian government led by Nikola Pašić. This also raised the fundamental question concerning the creation and constitutional foundation of the future state – what are its constituents: South Slav peoples or historical provinces, that is, states?

This was one of the crucial disputes at the Great People's Assembly held in Novi Sad on November 25, 1918. In the presence of only Slavic peoples (about one third of the population), the opinion of Jaša Tomić's Radicals prevailed and the Assembly adopted the Resolution that "Banat, Bačka and Baranja" should join the Kingdom of Serbia and that every effort should be made towards the realization of the unified state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The alternative conception advocated the thesis on the preservation of Vojvodina's political subjectivity, so that it would join the state of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, which had already been acceded by Slovenia, Croatia, Dalmatia and Bosnia – Herzegovina, as a historical province. After the unification of South Slavs on 1 December 1918, the provincial administration of "Bačka, Banat and Baranja" was the first to dissolve itself in favour of the central government in Belgrade, which pursued a policy of compulsory state centralism and national unitarism. This policy was upset by the traditions of historical provinces, especially Vojvodina, which was also evidenced by the heated debates of the leading Serbian political parties, Radicals and Democrats, at the Constituent Assembly.

During the constitutional debates in March 1919, Vojvodina's Radicals, who had merged with Pašić's Serbian Radicals in the meantime, represented the most extreme political wing of the centralist forces. They vehemently opposed the implementation of any historical or "tribal" criteria in proposals for the federal structure of the Kingdom. They often emphasized that Vojvodina

had unconditionally joined Serbia and that it renounced selfish “autonomous separatism” in favour of homogenisation of the Serbs, as emphasized in their party organ *Zastava* in August 1919. The Radical fear of federalist constitutional concepts was motivated by both ideological and demographic reasons. Namely, the Serbs living in the territory of Bačka, Banat and Baranja constituted only about one third of the total population (33.7 %), so that any constitution of Vojvodina as a unit within a decentralized Yugoslavia would result in the outvoting of this ethnic community. In the constitutional debate and drafts of the supreme law of the new South Slav community, which anticipated the creation of a complex state laid on a historical foundation, the Radicals saw the recurrence of hostile influences, the obsolete legal framework and legacy of “Austrianism” and “Compromisism”. Similar views on the system of government were also shared by the Democratic Party. The essential difference lay in the fact that the Radicals were overwhelmingly inclined to a centralist system of government with indisputable Serbian domination, while the Democrats considered national unitarism (Yugoslavism) as the assumption of a centralist system. For the Radicals it was important to delineate a Greater Serbia and Vojvodina, incorporated without any specificities into the Serbian framework first, and then into Yugoslavia. On the other hand, for the Democrats the loss of Vojvodina’s historical identity and name in the Yugoslav state constellation was also acceptable. A strict opposition to “historism” and an aspiration towards the disappearance of any sign of autonomy was still confirmation of the survival of the idea of Vojvodina as a highly specific historical entity, which did not fade away with the act of its unconditional merger with Serbia. Vojvodina’s liberal citizens would use these arguments as a basis for their political aspirations, and would demand autonomous rights in the following decades.

The irreversible process of centralization and unitarization of the new Yugoslav state were to aggravate the intention that its constitutional system also show respect for historical provinces and their specificities, including Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia – Herzegovina and Vojvodina. Precisely for this reason, it is no wonder that the debate on the constitution of the new state was mostly dedicated to the historical provinces as its possible constituent entities. The political parties in Serbia – Radicals, Democrats and their branches in Vojvodina mostly opposed the identification of Vojvodina as a historical province. This was to be the constant of the Serbian political views on Vojvodina throughout the 20th century. All draft constitutions which, to a lesser or greater degree, observed the historical specificities of Vojvodina, were rejected, and Pašić's proposal, which anticipated a strictly centralized state, divided into 33 regions, was adopted on 28 June 1921, owing to political corruption in the Parliament. Despite the unconditional unification of Vojvodina and the unitarist St. Vitus' Day Constitution, which even removed its name from the political nomenclature, and politically marginalized and completely economically subordinated it by an unsuccessful agrarian reform and the highest tax charges, the awareness of Vojvodina as a historical province did not vanish. Instead, the Vojvodina question began to emerge as a political, economic and constitutional question. However, great economic problems would soon divert attention from political issues and replace nationalist exaltation over unification with concerns for daily survival.

Centralization in Vojvodina, which was always hidden behind patriotic rhetoric, brought accelerated pauperisation, caused by the heaviest tax burden in Yugoslavia. Thus, according to the data of the Ministry of Finance for 1925, the first year for which precise calculations are available, tax payments in Vojvodina amounted to 131,336,108 dinars, while in the entire so-called Serbian bloc (Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia), which

had over four times as many inhabitants than Vojvodina, they were lower by almost half – 60,212,689 dinars; in Croatia and Slavonia 66,889,580, in Bosnia-Herzegovina 30,066,204, Slovenia 56,570,775 and Dalmatia 10,787,467. The direct tax burden of each Vojvodina inhabitant was ten times higher than that of a Serbian citizen, which was termed “tax robbery” by historians. According to their estimates, during the period 1919–28, each citizen of Vojvodina paid an annual amount of 939 dinars on average, while each citizen of the so-called Serbian bloc paid only 180 dinars. Slovenia – 507 dinars, Croatia and Slavonia 406 dinars, Dalmatia 406 dinars, and Bosnia-H erzegovina 267 dinars (Lazar Vrkatić, *O konzervativnim političkim idejama...*, pp. 216–217). Despite tax harmonization and state unification, after the imposition of the 6 January Dictatorship (1929), differences in tax burdens among the different parts of the Kingdom remained. The Danube Banate (*banovina*), whose core territory was the former Vojvodina, was burdened by taxation three and a half times higher than the Serbian parts of the kingdom.

As for budget replenishment, the afore-mentioned proportions were just the opposite in the case of expenditure and government investment. According to the first available official data for 1925, the Ministry of Construction invested 16 million dinars in Vojvodina, as opposed to as much as 220 million dinars in the so-called Serbian bloc. During the period 1925–34, according to the data of this Ministry, 63 % of its budget was invested in Serbia and only 4 % in Vojvodina. Similar discrepancies can also be observed in the data of other investment-making ministries. During the period 1920–35, the Ministry of Transport invested 84 % of its budget in Serbia (including Macedonia) and only 2.5 % in Vojvodina. If the mentioned percentages could be justified in the first post-war years due to the destruction of Serbia during the war, the prolonged treatment of Vojvodina and other *prečani* regions as conquered territories was losing justification because such a status was

retained throughout the inter-war period. (Ranko Končar, Dimitrije Boarov).

As early as the mid-1920s, due to the unquestionable exploitation of Vojvodina as a result of state centralism, there emerged political currents aimed at protecting the interests of this historical province. Pančevo lawyer Dušan Duda Bošković, who was an Independent Democrat at the time, put himself at the head of this nationally heterogeneous political movement for the protection of Vojvodina's interests, which included parts of dissatisfied Radicals and Democrats. In a political sense, the position of the *prečani* regions as well as Vojvodina was strengthened to some extent due to the expansion of the front pleading for the revision of the St. Vitus' Day Constitution, which was especially highlighted in 1927 with the formation of the Peasant-Democratic Coalition, comprising Svetozar Pribičević's Independent Democrats and Stjepan Radić's Croatian Peasant Party. The dynamics of political life was intensified. In 1928, the Croatian political leaders were assassinated in the Parliament and on 6 January 1929 King Alexander Karađorđević suspended the Constitution, banned all political parties and divided the country into nine banates (*banovine*). Vojvodina became part of the Danube Banate which, in the south, extended deep into Šumadija, including Kragujevac, thus breaking up the historical regions and ensuring a Serbian ethnic majority. Due to this specific *Gleichschaltung* of the autocratic monarch, political life faded away, but only for a short period of time. The failure of the 6 January regime led to the political radicalization and crystallization of the Vojvodina emancipatory movement, which was growing stronger as awareness of the need for the federalisation of Yugoslavia was ripening. Exposed to repressive dictatorial measures and unprecedented economic exploitation, Vojvodina was witnessing the emergence of a broad autonomist front aiming to change the legal status and constitutional position of this historical province.

SUPRANATIONAL IDEA OF AUTONOMY

The dynamics of political life in the country after the imposition of King Alexander's personal rule was not moving in the desired direction. Instead of calming political passions and resolving various national questions, the dictatorship placed constitutional problems on the agenda and raised numerous questions, including that of Vojvodina. Due to harsh repression, the first to begin arousing the weakened political life in the country was the Peasant-Democratic Coalition with its *Zagreb Punctuations* issued in November 1932, demanding the termination of the dictatorship and radical legal changes. In contrast to the Serbian Radicals, who remained the mainstay of the centralist system, the Vojvodina Radicals defined their stance on the necessary legal status of this province at the Sombor Conference, held semi-legally in Jovan Lalošević's apartment in July 1932. This gathering was also attended by the representatives of other political parties – the Vojvodina wings of the Democrats and Peasants. The host of this gathering and head of the Sombor Radicals, Lalošević, gloomily presented the 10-year achievements of Vojvodina within Yugoslavia, saying that at the time of its entry into the new state it was "rich, organized, abounding in resources and advanced ... in economic, cultural and social terms". He described the current situation in Vojvodina as a "squeezed lemon" because it was "ruined, tormented and pauperized". He saw the main causes of the pauperization and devastation of Vojvodina in its tax inequality and tax burden, dissolution of municipal self-governments, administrative disorder and corrupt and incompetent bureaucracy "brought in from outside".²⁰

20 The Serbian sentiment in Vojvodina was affected in various ways; the notice for state police recruitment in Novi Sad, published by the Ban of the Danube Banovina in the daily *Politika* on 9 August 1930 was often quoted where it said that one of the requirements was that "only candidates from the territory of pre-war Serbia will be eligible for recruitment".

The participants adopted the well-known *Sombor Resolution*, which demanded the establishment of a parliamentary system, the return of civil rights, and freedom of speech and the press, and political activity. Its third and most important item called for the “immediate implementation of the principle: Vojvodina for Vojvodinians, with the same rights that will be enjoyed by other provinces and the same administrative system that will be established in other provinces. We will not tolerate any more that our sons are systematically marginalized and stigmatized as insufficiently reliable, that appointed officials are persons who do not know and do not wish to know our situation, our laws, our customs and our needs, who do not demonstrate a true affinity with the people in this region, who do not make any effort to get to know our mentality and our way of life, who do not respect our customs, traditions and views, and only regard the whole province as a convenient object of exploitation.” (Ranko Končar). It was also demanded that government administration jobs in the territory of Vojvodina should be filled by Vojvodinians and that Vojvodina’s citizens should have their representatives in the government and all state institutions in Belgrade. Finally, the authors of this resolution dismissed the allegations that they were separatists, claiming that they did not call into question state borders. They rather pleaded for the reorganization and consolidation of the existing state.

In fact, the Sombor Conference and its Resolution marked the beginning of the work of the *Vojvodina Front*, a supranational and anti-centralist group of civic political parties aiming towards the reorganization of the state and achievement of its aim – Vojvodina’s autonomy. The Sombor Resolution returned the historical notion and name of Vojvodina comprising Banat, Bačka, Baranja and Srem into the political nomenclature and rhetoric. The centralistic solutions of the St. Vitus’ Day Constitution and segmentation of Vojvodina, allowing more efficient exploitation, were

rejected. The solutions based on the banate system, imposed by the 6 January Dictatorship, were also rejected. In these conceptions Vojvodina was treated as a Yugoslav constitutional question. Therefore, as a historical province, it had to enjoy the same political status as other regions. The Sombor Resolution also showed the unity of all opposition parties over the Vojvodina platform that had two cornerstones – criticism of the dictatorship and deconstruction of state centralism, and the advocacy of Vojvodina's new position.

In their reactions to these developments, the Independent Democrats went the furthest. They took a clear stand together with the Democratic Party. According to them, Vojvodina should enjoy the status of an equal federal unit within a restructured Yugoslavia. The Sombor Conference was followed by the Novi Sad Conference (1932) where various political actors sought to find a legal solution to the Vojvodina question. The least common denominator was still the demand for a federal structure for Yugoslavia, where Vojvodina should have the status of a federal unit. This platform provided a basis for the political activities of the Vojvodina opposition until the beginning of the Second World War in Yugoslavia. It was opposed by leaders of the political parties in Belgrade, especially the Radicals. The Main Committee of the Radical Party called on its Vojvodina branch not to adopt the Novi Sad Resolution, considering it an attempt to “tear up Serbdom”. The Democratic Party also opposed the Novi Sad Resolution, albeit less vehemently than the Radicals, considering it an attack on the “integrity of Serbian national interests” In the opinion of the leaders of the Democratic Party, Vojvodina could only be a governmental and administrative question and not a political and legal one. Although the Agrarian Party, especially its left wing led by Dragoljub Jovanović, showed more understanding for Vojvodina, it also rejected the Novi Sad Resolution. Consequently, all relevant Serbian political parties rejected the ideas and aims presented in

the Novi Sad Resolution as the constituted platform of the *Vojvodina Front*, considering them a paradigm of separatism. These principles were only supported by the the Peasant-Democratic Coalition of Vladko Maček and Svetozar Pribičević, which viewed Vojvodina as part of the federal system of Yugoslavia.

Despite objections from Belgrade, both the Novi Sad and Sombor Resolutions affirmed the ideas of Vojvodina's autonomy and strengthened its self-awareness, as well as its opposition and democratic movements. Nevertheless, the formation of the Vojvodina Movement finally took place in 1935, bringing together the political actors who had supported the Novi Sad Resolution three years earlier, as well as members of the illegal Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) due to their commitment to Vojvodina's autonomy and sharp anti-regime stance. Attempts to integrate the Vojvodina Movement into a single political party failed because its members wanted to preserve their original identity, while at the same time working together on resolving Vojvodina's legal status. The political agenda of the Vojvodina Front, as a politically pluralistic association that would formulate the Vojvodina question as a constitutional one, aspired towards the federalisation of Yugoslavia within which Vojvodina would be a federal unit and equal to other such units. They held that federal status would be necessary as a form of Vojvodina's "self-defense" against abuse and economic exploitation. According to the interpretation of the Independent Democratic Party, the Vojvodina question emerged due to economic problems, "it is led by Serbs over there. That's not separatism. That's Vojvodina's self-defense... Vojvodina's main motive is economic". (R. Končar, D. Boarov). In this way, liberal – mostly Serbian – citizens imposed the Vojvodina question as being both constitutional and democratic, rejecting the narrow Serbian concepts of the nationalist circles opposed to any form of Vojvodina's autonomy.

Serbian opposition parties took a critical stand on the Vojvodina Front not only because they did not agree with the legal status

of Vojvodina, but also because they held that it should come under the umbrella of the United Opposition. In 1940, the leader of the Democrats, Milan Grol, said that Vojvodina “must remain Serbian” and part of a future Serbian unit. On the other hand, the dictatorship regime, which, in the meantime, had become a little more flexible under Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović, harshly accused the Vojvodina Movement of separatism, national treason, tearing up the Serbian nation and the like. One of the fiercest attacks occurred on 12 January 1936 when a group of pro-regime public and political figures and intellectuals of Vojvodina descent, who worked in Belgrade, denounced the Vojvodina Front in their *Memorandum* for separatism, which was leading to the “inevitable” death of Vojvodina because, in this way, “the people of Vojvodina would deny their entire past”.

On the other hand, the stand adopted by the illegal CPY was opposite to these nationalist patterns. Already in 1929, it took a clearer attitude towards the Vojvodina question, which was reflected in its organizational structure. The Communists, especially in Serbia, took a definite stand on Vojvodina in 1935, when the Secretary of the Provincial Committee of the CPY for Serbia wrote that the Vojvodina question had no characteristics of a national movement. It existed as the question of “an oppressed province that should be granted self-government and should not be plundered any more” and that the slogan “Vojvodina for the Vojvodinians” should be accepted. The following year (1936) similar views were also expressed by the top party leadership. On 2 November, there appeared a Letter from the Central Committee of the CPY, better known as “Tito’s Letter to the Serbian Communists” where it was stated that they should consistently stick to the “principle of national self-determination, including secession. In order to be equal, this right must be recognized to every people. The Leftists support a free community of all Yugoslav peoples within the present borders, organized on a federal basis... Consequently, the

Croatian, Slovenian, Serbian, Macedonian and Montenegrin peoples must declare themselves in a democratic way on how they wish to arrange mutual relations within the state community. Likewise, the peoples in Vojvodina and Bosnia-Herzegovina have the right to declare themselves on their relations within the state community". (Ranko Končar). Although the Communists agreed with the platform of the Vojvodina Movement and also cooperate with the civic political parties within the National Front, they proceeded from the social identity of an autonomous Vojvodina. They held that the constitutional question was actually a national question which could only be resolved with a revolution. The Communist platform on Vojvodina was written by Žarko Zrenjanin, the Provincial Secretary of the CPY for Vojvodina, in 1939. He explicitly pleaded for the "federal status" of Vojvodina within the future federal Yugoslavia. "Simply because Vojvodina has special tasks both in the economic and national field, and because it is an autonomous historical entity with its tradition, it cannot be included in any province without affecting its peoples... Vojvodina must be equal with other provinces in the future reorganisation of the country". (Ibid..., p. 100) Due to such a position, the CPY inevitably sided with the Vojvodina Front because it saw the reasons for Vojvodina's autonomy in its specific ethnic composition. Due to all these motives for Vojvodina's autonomous status given by the Vojvodina Movement, the question of Vojvodina and its autonomy began to be viewed in its historical, democratic and multiethnic context.

VOJVODINA IN ANTI-FASCIST STRUGGLE

After the aggression of the Third Reich against Yugoslavia (1941), the capitulation of the Yugoslav army and dismemberment of the state by the occupiers, Vojvodina fell under three brutal occupation regimes. Srem was included in the so-called Independent State of Croatia (NDH), Bačka and Baranja were annexed

by Horthy's Hungary, while Banat was placed under a special German administration. Even before the war, the complex international and intra-Yugoslav circumstances were echoed in Vojvodina's complex ethnic composition. All phenomena, ranging from the mass Nazification of Germans to antagonized Serbo-Croatian relations and Horthy's regime in Hungary, were also reflected in large measure in the political and national circumstances in Vojvodina. They were characterized by the processes of political homogenisation on a national basis, which especially rallied Germans and Hungarians around an anti-Yugoslav platform. National homogenisation also took place among Serbs and Croats, instigated by the views of the leading political parties.

Communists' views had special significance for Vojvodina due to their ideas for resolving the national question and their consistent commitment to Yugoslavia, including Vojvodina as a separate unit. Therefore, one should not be surprised at the success of the People's Liberation Movement (PLM) in Vojvodina to which this province alone made a significant military, political and economic contribution. The specificities of the PLM in Vojvodina were mostly determined by the geographical features of this region – flat terrain intersected by three big rivers, which contributed to the preservation of the unified organisation of the movement, as well as the complex ethnic composition and character of the occupation regimes. Three highly repressive occupation regimes in this region relied mostly on Vojvodina's ethnic composition and, in particular, on its German and Hungarian minorities.

The occupation policy for Vojvodina was characterized by discrimination, genocide, denationalisation and ethnic cleansing. The character of the Ustasha occupation regime was certainly most radical. Its methods were based on the racist policy of "blood and soil", which implied the extermination of the Serbian people, including genocide, forcible conversion to Catholicism and resettlement. These unfavourable assumptions determined

the development of the liberation movement in Vojvodina and its historical possibilities. It seemed that these assumptions did not provide any serious possibilities for real resistance or the success of a liberation movement. The CPY in Vojvodina was convinced that despite these complex political and geographical circumstances, it was still possible to organize an armed liberation movement against the occupiers, although it had only 1,200 members at that time. Thus, special importance was attached to the organisation and development of the liberation movement among all the peoples of Vojvodina in order to prevent the abuse of the national question, that is, the belief in “national liberation”, as part of the political concept of the occupation forces. In that context, the liberation and anti-fascist movement in Vojvodina was to make a truly significant contribution because it would become ethnically pluralistic and not one-dimensional. Proceeding from the assumption that an armed struggle is the only alternative in the current circumstances, the CPY sought to express the liberation, anti-fascist and Yugoslav character of its struggle in its first documents and proclamations. Therefore, in its proclamations the CPY appealed to Serbs, Hungarians, Germans, Romanians, Slovaks and Ruthenians to join it in a common struggle for national liberation and equality in a future free Vojvodina. In the conception of the CPY, which especially insisted on the Yugoslav character of the struggle of the Vojvodina peoples, it was emphasized that the PLM in Vojvodina should have an anti-fascist character because the occupation was an act by fascist countries, apart from the propaganda directed towards Germans and Hungarians. The People’s Liberation Struggle (PLS) was gradually to win the support of almost all the peoples in Vojvodina with the obvious exception of the ethnic Germans on this anti-occupier, social and Yugoslav platform alone.

Consequently, the PLM in Vojvodina organized itself and solidly developed in Bačka, Banat and Srem as early as 1941. A

number of partisan detachments were formed and offered resistance against the occupier under very complex circumstances. In Bačka and Banat, at the end of 1941, the movement experienced a big crisis and defeat, but still managed to survive and develop in the spirit of the political ideas defined by the CPY as early as 1941 and during 1942, 1943 and 1944. Many of the mistakes and failures in developing the movement in Banat and Bačka resulted from inferior leadership, poor adjustment of the movement to geographical circumstances, the overly dogmatic approach of the movement's leaders, and erroneous expectations that the conflict would not last long and that the Soviets would win a swift victory on the Eastern Front...

The anti-fascist movement in Srem achieved more success in an organisational sense. Although it began developing a little later, the movement did not have many weaknesses that characterized the PLM in Bačka and Banat. It grew gradually and had a distinct Yugoslav and liberation character from the very beginning. It also developed into a broader-based social movement despite the many historical prejudices. The political and military processes in Srem encouraged progress in the behaviour of specified social strata vis-à-vis the Communists and their aspirations. The political homogenisation of the Serbs in Srem on the eve of the Second World War did not have a nationalist character. Instead, it took on a Yugoslav and national-liberation character based on the well-known CPY platform. In mid-1942, the movement in Srem already became more massive. This process was preceded by fierce resistance to forceful conversion to Catholicism by the Ustasha authorities. This led to popularization of the movement and its expansion throughout Srem and not just to Mt. Fruška Gora and its surroundings. This kind of development soon enabled it to assume a leading role in the Vojvodina liberation movement. Srem became the crucial political cohesion factor, which had a primary influence on the political development of the movement.

From the very beginning, the anti-fascist and liberation movement also caused the question of Vojvodina in the future federal system to be established during the war and after liberation of the country. This was a clear political commitment to Vojvodina's autonomy in the process of federalizing the Yugoslav state. The development of the PLM in Vojvodina and its political and military institutionalization with a clearly Vojvodinian character (the General Staff, Main People's Liberation Committee of Vojvodina, Provincial Committee of the CPY) provided a basis for a federal solution to Vojvodina's status. A lasting solution to the national question in Yugoslavia was seen in a broader ethnic foundation of the Yugoslav federation. In this sense, the political and military institutionalization of the People's Liberation Movement of Vojvodina and its direct links with Yugoslav institutions, as well as a well-developed anti-fascist movement, decisively anticipated its autonomous status as a Yugoslav unit. In other words, Vojvodina came out of the Second World War with its own bodies of military and civilian authority which were subordinated to the Yugoslav and not the Serbian authorities. Thus, it was expected that the decisions of the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in Jajce (1943) would confirm this political intention and Vojvodina's war and political reality. However, the AVNOJ decisions anticipated the creation of the Yugoslav federation on national, not historical, foundations (with the exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina). From a legal aspect, five Yugoslav nations (Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, Macedonians and Montenegrins) would constitute the Yugoslav federation, based on the principle of national self-determination, including secession, which meant that the federal units had the character of a state.

Already at the time of the Second Session of the AVNOJ it was agreed that Vojvodina would be granted autonomy within a federal Serbia. This solution was justified by the national foundations

of Yugoslav federalism, the interests of the Serbian people, the complex political situation in Serbia upon which, as the largest federal unit, the constitution of the Yugoslav state and character of the federation were also dependent, especially if one bears in mind the prevalence of the quisling and nationalist forces resisting the federalisation of Yugoslavia as being contrary to the interests of the Serbian people. Tito himself pointed out that in Serbia it would be necessary to “solve the question of the system of government, the government-in-exile in London and, in particular, the king”. While interpreting the decisions of AVNOJ in the article “The significance of the AVNOJ decisions for the further development of our struggle and the creation of the federal state community” (March 1944), Tito would explicitly confirm that Vojvodina would undoubtedly be “granted the broadest possible autonomy, like other regions pretending to it, but the question of autonomy and the question of the federal unit to which the relevant province will be added, depend on the people themselves or, in other words, their representatives when, after the war, the definite system of government will be decided” (Ranko Končar).

Up to the liberation of Vojvodina, in October 1944, the development of the People’s Liberation Movement based on the CPY platform contributed to its military strength, large membership and political influence. From that time onward, however, the political processes in Vojvodina reversed their direction. Although there was an attempt to preserve the continuity of previous policy by introducing the Military Administration in Banat, Bačka and Baranja, the movement encountered phenomena and tendencies that largely narrowed it both socially and politically, including repressive elements as well. On 17 October 1944, by the order of the General Staff of Vojvodina, the Military Administration for Banat, Bačka and Baranja was established. It was divided into the Military Administration for Banat and the Military Administration for Bačka and Baranja and assumed executive and judicial

powers. Its establishment was justified by political, ethnic, economic and military reasons, but the political motive was certainly most disputable, since it was based on the barely provable evaluation of the underdevelopment of the people's liberation committees and their lack of readiness to assume power. Without entering into all motives due to which the military administration was introduced, the methods of its short-lived activities (from 17 October 1944 to 15 February 1945) were even more disputable, including specifically its repressive measures against the German and, in part, Hungarian communities. Due to its insufficiently differentiated attitude towards the complex ethnic composition in Vojvodina, it aroused various political suspicions and created great problems in inter-ethnic relations. Thus, the Military Administration also contributed to the suffering of a certain number of Hungarian and German civilians.

Nevertheless, due to the great contribution of Vojvodina's peoples to the anti-fascist victory and the fact that already during the war Vojvodina developed into a separate territorial and political unit, it was necessary to find the modality of its inclusion in the new concept of Yugoslav federalism that was being created. Thus, after the liberation of Yugoslavia from fascism, from 30 to 31 July 1945, the *Assembly of Delegates of the Peoples of Vojvodina* – Serbs, Hungarians, Croats, Slovaks, Romanians, Ruthenians and Jews – was convened and it was decided to constitute Vojvodina as an autonomous province, based on its historical, ethnic and other specificities. At the same time, it was decided that the autonomous province “should join federal Serbia”. Thus, by the will of its peoples, Vojvodina was constituted as an autonomous province and then integrated into Serbia. Each people was represented by one deputy, who delivered a speech and supported the stance on an autonomous Vojvodina joining Serbia – their statements were official and printed together with the Assembly Decision in *Službeni list Vojvodine*. The presence of the delegates of all

the peoples in Vojvodina at the Assembly confirmed Vojvodina's nationally pluralistic identity as the basis of its autonomy, thereby legalising the stance that Vojvodina's autonomy derived from the determination of all of its peoples who thus became constituents of this autonomous province. The Decision of the Assembly of Delegates and nationally and politically pluralistic institutions were verified at the Third Session of AVNOJ held on 10 August 1945. That same day, AVNOJ was transformed into the Provisional People's Assembly of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia – the highest legislative and administrative body of the new Yugoslavia, which also enjoyed full international recognition. AVNOJ “unanimously adopted the decision of the First Assembly of Delegates of the Peoples of Vojvodina that the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina should join federal Serbia within borders that will be determined by the Provisional People's Assembly”.

In the immediate post-war period, Vojvodina and Croatia were delineated, so that the province assumed its final contours. The most controversial question was that of the border in Srem and the status of Baranja. During the Second World War, Srem was ruled by the so-called Independent State of Croatia and the Partisans hinted at the delineation in Srem in July 1943, when the General Staff of Vojvodina was formed. According to Tito's order, the whole area of Srem east of the Vukovar-Vinkovci-Županja fell within the competence of the General Staff. Already at that time there was controversy between the military political leaders of the People's Liberation Movements in Vojvodina and Croatia about whether anticipation of the future borders should also fall within the competence of the General Staff. As the war was drawing to an end, the leaders of the People's Liberation Movement in Vojvodina were increasingly insistent that Srem should form part of this province. One argument why it should be included in Vojvodina was the Ustasha terror campaign in that region during the war. In order to overcome the arguments, at the session of the Politburo

of the CPY's Central Committee held as early as June 1945, the party leadership proposed a five-member commission for "preparation of a proposal to define the border between Vojvodina and Croatia", to be chaired by Milovan Đilas. On 19 June, the AVNOJ Presidency appointed the commission with a clear mandate. The commission went out into the field, examined the population censuses, acquainted itself with the ethnic composition of the region and talked with local government and political representatives in order to prepare the report with its delineation proposals. On 26 June 1945, the CPY Politburo discussed the report and thereafter the commission also submitted its report to the AVNOJ Presidency on 1 July, which forwarded it to the Government on 10 July.

The so-called Đilas Commission listed the following territories as being a matter of dispute between Vojvodina and Croatia: the counties of Subotica, Sombor, Apatin and Odžaci in Bačka, the counties of Batina and Darda in Baranja, and the counties of Vukovar, Šid and Ilok in Srem. As for the counties in Bačka, the Commission stated that an overwhelming Croatian majority existed only in Subotica and that a separation of this county from its surroundings and a merger with Croatia would be unnatural, while Subotica, a big city, would find itself out on a limb with communications directed towards the south and not towards the west. The incorporation of all these counties into Croatia was unacceptable due to a relative Serbian population majority. Thus, the disputed parts of Bačka remained in Vojvodina. As for Baranja, the findings of the commission showed that in both counties (Batina and Darda) there was a relative Croatian majority and both of them were economically and commercially oriented towards the west. Consequently, both economic and ethnic reasons favoured their cession to federal Croatia. Delineation in Srem was especially complex. The commission proposed that the border should be drawn between Šid and Vukovar, whereby the former would remain in Vojvodina and the latter would be given to Croatia. As for Ilok,

the Commission proposed that it should remain in Vojvodina, but already on 1 September 1945, pursuant to the decision of its residents, Ilok was included in the county of Vukovar, in Croatia. (Ljubo Boban).

The Commission also stated in its report that this was just a provisional solution until a “solution is made by the competent bodies responsible for the definite delineation”. Since the question of the borders between the Yugoslav federal units was not raised any more, this “provisional” solution of the Đilas Commission turned out to be permanent. All federal units entered in their constitutions the provision that the borders could not be changed without the prior approval of the highest representative body of the republic. Under these decisions, Vojvodina preserved the whole region of Bačka within its borders. It remained with Baranja, which had seldom been considered as part of it since the 19th century, but obtained a significant part of Srem which had never been considered part of Vojvodina, except for the short period of the revolutionary Serbian Vojvodina and post-revolutionary Voivodeship.

AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE IN THE FEDERAL YUGOSLAVIA

As early as 1 September 1945, despite the unambiguous decision of the Assembly of Delegates, the Presidency of the People’s Republic of Serbia passed the Law on the Establishment and Organisation of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. The Serbian leadership tried, through this law, to legalize the interpretation according to which Vojvodina’s autonomy was formed by Serbia, so that Serbia could also abolish it. The Law raised the question: who established Vojvodina’s autonomy and whether the decision of the Assembly of the Delegates of Vojvodina People and the confirmation by the Yugoslav Assembly of 10 August 1945 were thereby legally derogated? In essence, throughout the 20th century the Vojvodina question was in the focus of both Yugoslav and Serbian political life – at the beginning it manifested itself as

a political and economic question, but most of the time it imposed itself as a question that concerned the constitutional position and legal status of the province.

During the period of Vojvodina's liberation from fascism, then the military administration and immediately after its abolition, the province changed its ethnic composition due to the emigration of the German population. An estimated 200,000 Germans retreated together with Wehrmacht soldiers, while during military rule most of those who remained were sent to camps (about 140,000). Due to the retreat, emigration and killing of people, Vojvodina lost about 350,000 of its inhabitants. Nevertheless, the expulsion of the German population, which had provided an important support to the occupier's terror apparatus, was practised by most European countries with a German minority. A small number of Germans who had supported the People's Liberation Movement or declared themselves as belonging to the Hungarian minority remained in Vojvodina. The property of the expelled Germans and all collaborationists was confiscated as the accompanying penalty for collaboration. The German emigrants were replaced by people from other parts of Yugoslavia in a process of colonisation. During the first wave of colonisation between August 1945 and July 1947, some 225,000 people were settled in 114 places. Pursuant to the decision that Vojvodina should join Serbia, its population was comprised mostly of Serbs – 72 %, Montenegrins accounted for 18 % and Macedonians for about 5 % of its population.

At the end of 1946, nationalisation of the means of production was carried out as part of establishing the socialist system in Yugoslavia. In the first wave of nationalisation, the state seized 894 domestic and foreign-owned industrial enterprises in the province. When the Nationalisation Law (1948) was amended, so that the private sector of industry was completely abolished, 2,593 trade and catering facilities were seized from their owners. (Dimitrije Boarov). As early as 1945–1946, the policy of compulsory

purchase of agricultural products was introduced. Compulsory purchase quotas were too high and the penalties for households that failed to meet them were draconian. Among the top party leadership there was also talk about the repression, torture, beating, incarceration and even killings of peasants.

Thus, due to confiscation, colonisation, compulsory purchase and nationalisation, Vojvodina largely changed not only its ethnic, but also its social composition, thus losing its hitherto inter-ethnic balance and the economic basis of its economy – a developed middle class. Ironically, during the first years of Vojvodina's bolshevization, some aims of the inter-war nationalist circles in Belgrade (such as the Serbian Cultural Club) were achieved, including a change in the ethnic picture of the province and the need for its Serbianization. If we add to these processes in the economy the relocation of industrial facilities to the west of the country because it was believed that Stalin's potential attack on Yugoslavia (after 1948) would be launched through the plain of Vojvodina, as well a rigid centralist system and formal character of autonomy – it was to be expected that Vojvodina would be an economically backward region during the late 1940s and the 1950s.²¹ However, Vojvodina was hit especially hard by the forceful accumulation of capital for industrial development at the expense of agricultural production. According to the calculations of economists, in Yugoslavia, between 1952 and 1966, about five billion dollars were

21 In 1969, Yugoslav President Tito said that Vojvodina's lagging behind in economic development was doubly caused by party policy of which he said that it was forced upon them. First of all, after 1948, almost all industrial facilities were relocated to other regions and, as he said, Vojvodina found itself "discriminated against". These solutions were imposed due to an external threat. As Tito also said, "later on, it was considered how you would make up for that and how you would speed up your development". The second reason should be sought in very low purchasing prices of agricultural products, thus creating accumulation for industrialisation at the expense of agriculture. However, he also mentioned the third reason – colonisation and the arrival of a population from the most underdeveloped parts of the country, unaccustomed to modern agricultural methods.

spilled over from agriculture into industry due to disparities in the prices of agricultural and industrial products. Bearing in mind the structure of Vojvodina's economy, it is estimated that more than two billion dollars were taken from Vojvodina in this way and then pumped into industrialisation. A special problem was posed by the fact that the building of industrial facilities during that period bypassed Vojvodina, while the reverse process – the relocation of industrial facilities from Vojvodina – had an especially disastrous effect. During the period 1945–1951, the following industrial facilities were seized from Vojvodina and reallocated to other parts of Yugoslavia: 59 industrial enterprises, including power stations, foundries, chemical factories, wood-processing plants, printing shops, brickyards, wool mills, sugar refineries, oil factories, flour mills, etc. Moreover, none of the 66 factories, obtained by Yugoslavia from Germany in compensation for war damages, were located in Vojvodina. If one also takes into account the dramatic price disparities between industry and agriculture, the following statement by economist Kosta Mihajlović is not surprising: “Vojvodina made an extremely large contribution to capital accumulation in Yugoslavia, while at the same time losing enormous resources for its own development”. (Dimitrije Boarov). Up to the end of the 1960s, Vojvodina's economic development slowed down and lagged behind other parts of the country.

After the great economic problems encountered by the province during the 1950s, it seemed, already in the early 1960s, that conditions were being created for its political degradation. In search of a regulatory formula for the sustainability of the federation in 1961, shortly before the constitutional changes, top Serbian officials raised the Vojvodina question once again. Prior to the adoption of a new constitution, the Executive Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia attempted to resolve the question of Vojvodina's autonomy to the detriment of the province and ultimately abolish it. Their demands were primarily aimed

at disputing the very foundations of autonomy, attempting to see Vojvodina exclusively as a Serbian province, constituted by Serbia's unilateral decision and whose status could be changed at any moment. This question was to provoke a fierce debate between Vojvodina and Serbian party leaders after the question was raised as to whether the national minorities should be considered as political actors in the creation of Vojvodina's autonomy or, in other words, its constituents. Serbia's leading officials unambiguously rejected such an understanding which, in their opinion, would imply that the territory of Vojvodina also belonged to the national minorities. During the constitutional debate in 1962, Serbian officials demanded that the new federal constitution should stipulate the sovereign right of the republic to create political units with an autonomous status in some parts of its territory and that the Yugoslav constitution should also stipulate that on the basis of this right "the Republic of Serbia created the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Autonomous Region of Kosovo and Metohija in its territory (1945)". (Ranko Končar, Dimitrije Boarov). This *post factum* demand that the Yugoslav constitution should legalize the stand that the autonomous provinces were constituted by Serbia, testified to Serbia's real intentions towards the autonomous provinces and their status. It was actually a question of disagreement with the existence of the autonomous provinces within it, so that an alternative was sought in order to eliminate or neutralize the foundations of their existence. Already in the early 1960s, the prevailing idea among Serbian political leaders involved a complete unitarization of the republic, namely the abolition of the existing autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo) in order to neutralize the real reasons for their existence as autonomous units, especially Vojvodina. In this way, it would be possible to legitimize the constitutional solutions that Vojvodina's autonomy originated from Serbia and not from its historical, national and

other specificities, so that the republic could also abolish it by its decision.

Insofar as Vojvodina's autonomy was concerned, the failure to understand and accept the idea of a complex state was most openly and most convincingly expressed by the Vice-President of the Executive Council of Serbia, Slobodan Penezić: "If we don't unite Vojvodina now, we'll never again be able to do it." At that time, researchers noticed the intention to legalize the view that Serbia could not be constituted as a nation-state due to its complex character, namely the existence of the provinces. The key points in this decisive dispute about Vojvodina were distorted, while interpretations of the motives for the creation of its autonomy and the extent to which Vojvodina's autonomy should be built into the Yugoslav federalist constellation were ahistorical. The Serbian party leadership, which was under Aleksandar Ranković's influence at that time, relativized the historical conceptions and continuity of Vojvodina's autonomy and marginalized the historical significance of its multi-national composition in the process of constituting its autonomy and justification of this autonomy as a category of Yugoslav federalism. The country's second most influential person often pointed to the consequences of "ruinous autonomism" and the emergence of "separatism". For the first time in the new Yugoslavia some provincial leaders (Stevan Doronjski, Geza Tikvicki, Pál Sóti, etc.) were faced with serious allegations in disputes with leading Serbian officials concerning Vojvodina's constitutional position, legal status and investment policy.

The constitutional changes in 1963 did not bring any significant changes to Vojvodina, except that under the new Constitution the Autonomous Region of Kosovo and Metohija was elevated to an autonomous province, thus being equalized in status with Vojvodina. Nevertheless, during the following years, Vojvodina's economic development was tumultuous due to a change in the political situation in Yugoslavia. First of all, at the 8th Congress of the

League of Communists of Yugoslavia they began speaking openly about the fact that the national question in a state with a centralist system was not resolved. That same year, Serbian Prime Minister Slobodan Penezić vanished from the political scene, killed in a car accident. Next year, there began the most comprehensive economic reforms in Yugoslavia with one of its basic aims being that everyone should be remunerated according to their results, depending on the economic feasibility. The following year, 1966, Aleksandar Ranković, the Yugoslav Vice-President, Organising Secretary of the LCY and *de facto* head of the Yugoslav Security Police (UDB), was removed from office at the Brioni Plenum. After his removal, preceded by the 8th Congress and the beginning of a comprehensive reform, there began a ten-year period of decentralization and democratization of the Yugoslav state and society. With the departure of Ranković and Penezić from the country's top political leadership, as powerful centers of resistance to Vojvodina's autonomy, conditions were created for the improvement of its status. Thus, as early as 1967, there began a process of fundamental reform of the 1963 Constitution which, according to its character and content, was a compromise between centralism and substantial federalism, to which it aspired and which characterized the period and transitional political processes within which it was created. The meaning and essence of changes to the character of Yugoslav federalism were based on a new constitutive conception, encapsulated in three sets of constitutional amendments adopted by the Federal Assembly from 1967 to 1971. The first set of constitutional amendments, promulgated by the Federal Assembly on 18 April 1967, did not concern the constitutional status of the autonomous provinces.

On 26 December 1968, the Federal Assembly adopted the second set of constitutional amendments, which brought more fundamental changes to the character of Yugoslav federalism and especially dealt with Serbia's complex character or, more exactly,

the problem of provincial autonomy. This intention on the part of those framing the Constitution was especially evident in Amendment VII, listing all republics and thus emphasizing their statehood, whereby, in being explicitly mentioned in Amendment XVIII, both provinces were actually elevated to an element of federalism, thus emphasizing their more direct link to the federation and describing them both as provinces forming part of Serbia and as elements of Yugoslavia's federalism. Amendment VII also added the attribute "socialist" before the names of the provinces as in the case of the republics. Amendment XVIII stated expressly that the "Federation shall protect the constitutional rights and duties of the autonomous provinces". The 1968 Amendments also stipulated that the territory of the autonomous provinces could not be changed without the consent of the provincial assemblies. The provincial judicial system was equalized with its republican counterparts to such an extent that "the supreme court of the province shall exercise the rights and duties of the republican supreme court in the territory of the province" (*Ustav SFRJ*). Amendment XVI-II regulated most of the provincial competencies and defined this territorial unit as a "socialist, democratic, socio-political community with a special ethnic composition and other specificities in which the working people exercise social self-management, and which shall regulate social relations by provincial laws and other regulations, ensure constitutionality and legality, guide the development of the economy and social services, organize government and self-management organs, ensure the equality of the peoples and nationalities, take care of national defense preparation and organization, and the protection of the order established by the Constitution, and perform other tasks of common interest for the province's political, economic and cultural life and development – with the exception of tasks that are of interest to the whole republic, which shall be stipulated by the republican constitution". The same amendment also stated that the "autonomous provinces

shall also assume responsibility in their territories” for performance of the tasks and activities of the Federation (Ibid...177–178). Amendment XIX, the last amendment, which was adopted in 1968, equalized the rights and duties of the *peoples* and *nationalities* or, more exactly, the South Slav and minority nationalities. Thus, the minority peoples in Yugoslavia became legitimate and equal political actors *de facto* and *de jure* and not only cultural or linguistic ones. Also, the Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, its basic legal act, changed the name into the Constitutional Law of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina.

The third set of amendments, promulgated by the Assembly of the SFRY on 30 June in 1971, brought the most substantial and far-reaching changes to the legislation and empirics of Yugoslav federalism. The first amendment, adopted in 1971, pointed to the essence and spirit of the new constitutional concept. It stated that “the working people, peoples and nationalities shall exercise their sovereign rights in the socialist republics and socialist autonomous provinces (...), and in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia if that is in the common interest...” In almost all cases, the federal organs (Presidency, Federal Executive Council, Federal Assembly) had the constitutional obligation to reconcile their views so that their decisions would have legal force. The method for “reconciling views” was regulated by Amendment XXXIII, which stated that the Federation can only make a decision “on the basis of views reconciled with the competent republican and provincial organs”. In addition, any common decision of the Federation would be preceded by the initiative of the Federal Executive Council, which will “ensure the reconciliation of views” with the republican and provincial executive councils. In fact, the republics and provinces had the right to lodge a veto should they assess that their vital interests were under threat. Finally, the Constitution could be changed by a decision of the Federal Assembly with

the consent of all republics and autonomous provinces or, in other words, by consensus.

It is indicative that all provincial aspirations towards greater competencies were disputed by the Constitutional Commission of the Republic of Serbia, headed by Dragoslav Draža Marković, and that the dispute caused by conflicting views was transferred to the Federal Constitutional Commission headed by Milentije Popović, where the provincial demands were met. This time, the Federation also guaranteed something that was rejected by Serbia. However, the part of the Serbian conservative leadership close to the President of the Assembly, Draža Marković, initiated a debate at the Faculty of Law in Belgrade in March 1971, where a significant part of the Serbian intellectual elite disputed the constitutional changes, fiercely attacking the provincial autonomies as the source of separatism, and the weakening and discrimination of Serbia. (Milivoj Bešlin).

These changes culminated in the adoption of the last Yugoslav constitution in February 1974. Under its provisions, the provinces were granted the right to their own constitutions, but that did not imply their legal equalisation with the republics. Since the Second World War, the federal units, as the states of their peoples, who were the constituents of the Federation, possessed the quality of statehood and the right to self-determination, but this right was never granted to the provinces. In addition, they were elevated to elements of Yugoslav federalism and not to constituent elements of the federal Yugoslav state. Vojvodina adopted its first and only constitution on 28 February 1974.²² The constitution of Vojvodina's genuine autonomy was to provide scope for the most

22 Under pressure from violence, after a change in the Vojvodina leadership in October 1988, the Vojvodina Assembly unanimously renounced its constitutional competencies on 25 February 1989. This was an introduction to the change in the Serbian Constitution in March 1989, as well as the complete destruction of the autonomous rights and all legislative prerogatives of the province.

intensive economic growth and the largest investments in its history. The policy of favouring industrial development, which was conducted by all convocations of the provincial executive council, contributed to the construction or significant reconstruction and modernization of hundreds of industrial facilities operating within the chemical industry: oil, metal-working, food, textile, footwear, timber and wood, and construction industries, as well as agrocomplexes, sugar refineries, breweries, malt factories, wineries, cold storage plants and abattoirs were opened; the old road and bridge infrastructure was reconstructed and a new one constructed, not to mention the construction of modern hydro – irrigation systems and numerous capital business, health, educational, scientific and cultural facilities.

Just as in the previous decades, the pressure to reduce or abolish autonomy did not stop. Only two years after the adoption of the Constitution, in 1976, a group of Serbian political leaders wrote a “Blue Paper” where the status of the autonomous provinces was openly attacked. The initiative for the preparation of the “White Paper” and its circulation at closed party forums in early 1977 is interpreted by historians as an expression of the culmination of dissatisfaction with the degree of provincial autonomy by the then most influential Serbian politician, Draža Marković. This internal document, whose preparation was ordered by the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, headed by Marković, expressed its dissatisfaction and pointed to the controversy concerning the scope of provincial and republic competencies. Like all previous efforts to abolish or significantly restrict Vojvodina’s autonomy, this document also proceeded from the assumption that the Serbian people was not equal since the existence of the provinces prevented them from creating their own nation-state (within Yugoslavia), based on the principle of national self-determination. The existence of Tito’s authority repressed both the “Blue Paper” and the dissatisfaction of the Serbian leaders, who waited for more

favourable circumstances to express themselves again. A few years later, in the mid-1980s, the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts – an introduction to the dismemberment of Yugoslavia – also fiercely attacked Vojvodina's autonomy, considering it anti-Serbian and separatist.

Nevertheless, Vojvodina's position in the Yugoslav federal constellation was equitable, its autonomy was guaranteed by the federal constitution and its veto power. It would turn out, however, that this position could only be changed against Vojvodina's will by violent methods, which the new Serbian leaders were to employ by destroying the Yugoslav constitutional system and abolishing provincial autonomy in 1988–89.

DESTRUCTION OF AUTONOMY

After a series of earlier Serbian efforts at significantly restricting and *de facto* abolishing Vojvodina's autonomy, while the federal leadership protected provincial interests, thus protecting the Yugoslav constitutional system as well, the weakening of the Federation after Tito's death (1980) and accelerated delegitimization led to the last attack on provincial autonomy, which was to prove fatal. Provincial autonomy, considered by the Serbian leadership as a crucial problem in the functioning of the republic, was especially in focus after the protests in Kosovo (1981) and was radicalized after the massacre of a few Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) soldiers in the military barracks in Paraćin (1987), which was committed by an Albanian soldier from Kosovo. Anti-Albanian hysteria in Serbia, which had not existed during the 1980s, now reached its culmination. The atmosphere of nationalist homogenization and the demand for the "reunification" of Serbia, which had been "broken up" by the provinces, was considered a prime political aim. Nevertheless, part of the Serbian leadership accused the campaign leaders, the newspaper publishing company *Politika*, of stirring up hatred, aiming indirectly at Slobodan Milošević,

who controlled it through his cadres. The ensuing conflict ended with the defeat of the moderate President of the Presidency, Ivan Stambolić, at the well-known 8th Session of the Serbian party leadership (1987) and the election of a new leader, Slobodan Milošević. The provincial leadership of Vojvodina did not want to take sides, remaining neutral in the conflict within so-called Serbia proper, knowing that Stambolić and Milošević did not differ substantially in their approach to provincial autonomy. At that time, the model of destroying autonomy was not taken into consideration because if the newly installed regime in Belgrade were to use forcible methods, this would be something absolutely new and beyond the hitherto compromise (agreed-on) patterns of political activity in the second Yugoslavia.

In early 1988, the new republican and provincial leaderships continued their talks about constitutional changes, initiated at the time of Ivan Stambolić, in order to ensure the functioning of Serbia as a specific federal unit. When the republican and two provincial leaderships reached agreement, the conflict was renewed due to the demand of the Serbian leadership that changes should be accelerated and their degree significantly enhanced, thus completely restricting and derogating provincial autonomy. This was unambiguously resisted by the provincial leaderships, especially in Vojvodina. In the summer of 1988, the republican leaders launched an unprecedented propaganda campaign against the provincial leaderships, especially the Vojvodina leadership, in all the Belgrade media. Serious allegations and open threats on a daily basis did not break the provincial leaders; instead, they drew them together. When the pressures of media and party forums did not produce results, mass street protests were staged with the aim of forcibly ousting the Vojvodina leadership. In early July 1988, a group of several hundred “self-organized” Serbs from Kosovo came to Novi Sad and began a protest in front of the provincial assembly building. The relatively small number of protesters

(supported by declared nationalists from Belgrade such as jurist Vojislav Šešelj and singer Olivera Katarina), the ignorance of the resident population and demands that were still insufficiently clearly articulated, would not have attracted so much attention if it had not been for the manipulation of Belgrade's media. Namely, a fleeting incident involving switching off the power to the protesters in order to prevent hate speeches, uncharacteristic of previous public discourse in Yugoslavia, assumed an utterly dramatic tone in detailed reports by Belgrade's media. Day after day, the political temperature in Serbia was systematically raised by rigging and manipulation. Pressure on the disobedient provincial leaders increased. An initiated countercampaign by political activists of the League of Communists of Vojvodina and media loyal to the provincial leadership was not producing any results due to their sticking to old patterns and delegitimized formulas. At the same time, the Belgrade regime was using a new homogenising power in society – nationalism – and a more brutal approach to the media, coupled with an unscrupulous propaganda that was significantly more modern.

The sign for the beginning of the showdown with the disobedient provincial leaderships was given by the newly installed Serbian leader, Slobodan Milošević, in an interview with NIN, the country's most influential weekly, in July of the same year. He said that parts of the provincial leaderships wanted "the provinces to become states in a near or more distant future" due to which they "are negotiating about winning certain rights which, should they be won, will provide a basis for Serbia's disintegration into three independent and separate parts – three states". Thus, the leaders of the Vojvodina and Kosovo provinces were directly accused of separatism, which, in the Serb-dominated northern province, was an accusation that seriously shook up the already fractured legitimacy of the Provincial Committee of the League of Communists of Vojvodina. Coupled with the daily propaganda of Belgrade's

media, which used a systematic *Gleichschaltung* after Milošević's victory in order to support this new policy, further gatherings of citizens across Vojvodina, called "the people have happened," were announced. According to the relevant research, the great majority of the rallies during August and September 1988 were staged in places with a predominant colonist population, settled in Vojvodina after the Second World War. Of the 28 rallies where the abolition of Vojvodina's autonomy was demanded, only two were held in places with a predominantly autochthonous population.

Apart from non-institutional pressure, the provincial leadership was also exposed to increasing institutional pressure. Pressure was exerted in two directions. The first pressure was an attempt to cause divisions within the Provincial Committee of Vojvodina and take over the provincial party's "base" or rather to have the local party committees demand removal of the provincial leadership in Novi Sad. The other form of institutional pressure was exerted by the republican leaders themselves. At the 12th Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, they stated that the ongoing crisis was caused by a conflict between the "democratic aspirations of the people" and the "bureaucratic defense of ... provincial natiocracy", pejoratively called "arm-chairists". The legal leadership of the Socialist Autonomous Province (SAP) of Vojvodina was also accused of an "insolent demonstration of statehood... at an imaginary border on the Belgrade- Novi Sad highway" aimed at creating the "Vojvodina people" and providing support to the "Albanian irredenta". These and similar accusations of anti-Serbism, pronounced for the first time in the public discourse of the second Yugoslavia, in the atmosphere of perennial anti-Albanian hysteria and ebullient nationalism, were a call for the lynching of the provincial leaders who did not accept Milošević's proposal for the voluntary self-abolition of Vojvodina's autonomy. The propaganda of the Belgrade regime, characteristic of the 1990s and especially intensive during the wars in

Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, was postulated and used for the first time *vis-à-vis* Vojvodina. As this propaganda spread and increased, its content was becoming increasingly more extremist, pronouncing accusations like that on the supposed formation of an “anti-Serbian Zagreb-Novi Sad-Ljubljana axis”.

When Belgrade assessed that the provincial leadership was shaken up and thoroughly compromised and that the citizens were sufficiently homogenized and whipped up against it, there began a second round of rallies in Vojvodina in the second half of August. The number of rallies and the turnout of citizens exponentially increased from day to day. The fury of the assembled people was also increasing, while the risks of casualties in clashes between protesters and the police forces, which were still under the command of the provincial authorities, were also growing. For the first time in the second Yugoslavia, the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) took an active part in the ongoing political events. Bishop Amfilohije (Risto) Radović of Banat, who had already affirmed himself as the advocate of a hard-line nationalist stand, supported the protests aiming at abolishing Vojvodina’s autonomy. The basic organisations of the League of Communists of Vojvodina increasingly denounced obedience to their direct party leadership in Vojvodina, thereby leaving the political system and placing themselves under the control of the republic’s party structure against the provincial ones. The centers of resistance to the provincial leadership included the colonist towns of Bačka Palanka, Titov Vrbas, Nova Pazova.

The federal political leaders, who had guaranteed the inviolability of Vojvodina’s autonomy in 1945, seemed confused and disinterested during the *blitzkrieg* against Vojvodina, carried out by Serbia under Slobodan Milošević. Although the constitutional order of the federation was called into question, especially because Serbia began exporting its street methods to other republics in August (first to Montenegro), the federal political center seemed

to be insufficiently interested, hoping that Slobodan Milošević would finish his campaign by subduing the provinces. In mid-September, the federal leadership tried to mediate in the conflict between Serbia and Vojvodina, but this mediation ended unsuccessfully. It was stated that the differences were insurmountable and that the stance of the President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, Raif Dizdarević, was ambivalent. However, all appeals to stop the increasingly violent rallies and increasingly ebullient campaign in the media remained without effect because the federal leadership confined its activity to pleas and appeals. The *modus operandi* of the federal bodies became evident during the final act of destruction of Vojvodina's autonomy that started on 25 September 1988. In contrast to the previous one, this rally of Kosovo Serbs in Novi Sad was much better supported by the local population. It received a broad welcome from the citizens of Novi Sad, party organisations from the interior of Vojvodina and, in particular, several large factories, including "Jugoalat" from Novi Sad. The federal police detachment sent to Vojvodina's capital was instructed to intervene only in the case of serious bloodshed, although it was clear that the country's constitutional order was being destroyed on the streets.

The last act of destruction of Vojvodina's autonomy took place on 5 October 1988. The previous day, the Presidency of the Provincial Committee of the League of Communists of Vojvodina tried to call to account the key organizers of the rally – the Bačka Palanka leaders, Mihalj Kertes and Radovan Pankov. Their response was a procession of 10,000 people heading for Novi Sad with the aim of ousting the leadership of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina with the slogan: "Palanka stood up for a change in the Constitution".²³ With strong support from the

23 Apart from the demonised provincial officials, the 1974 Constitution, which guaranteed substantial and genuine autonomy to Vojvodina, was also at the center of the protesters' negative campaign.

Belgrade media and the Secretary of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, Zoran Sokolović, tens of thousands of people transported from all parts of Vojvodina as well as from Serbia and Montenegro, gathered in Novi Sad. The protesters threw stones and cartons of yogurt at the building of the Executive Council of Vojvodina, the symbol of provincial autonomy, due to which the whole event was later called – the *Yogurt Revolution*. The isolated provincial leadership sought help both from the republic and federal bodies. Despite promises, help did not arrive. The next day, 6 October, Vojvodina's complete leadership and its representatives in federal institutions stepped down. This was a total triumph of the Serbian leadership's policy. Vojvodina's disobedient leaders were soon replaced by Milošević's loyalists (M. Kertes, R. Pankov, N. Šipovac, R. Božović). The media campaign against the ousted leadership continued during the next months and aimed at preparing the public for the final abolition of Vojvodina's autonomous rights. "Radical cadre changes," as they were called, and breakaway from the "autonomist" policy brought the most conservative supporters of centralism into key positions in Vojvodina. The new provincial cadres, as well as the hitherto cosmopolitan media in Vojvodina, became the loudest promoters of nationalist policy and everyday hate speeches. The reality created on the street had to be implanted in the broadest strata of the population. Thus, Vojvodina became an important logistic base of Slobodan Milošević's further campaign against Yugoslavia. The Socialist Republic of Montenegro and Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo were the first.

After the forcible removal of the provincial leadership in October, the constitutional changes and *de facto* abolition of Vojvodina's autonomy were just a formality. The final act took place in March 1989 when amendments to the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia were adopted. Under these amendments, the autonomy of the two provinces was reduced to a minimum

and, in essence, ceased to exist. Thus, the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina willingly stopped being a political actor in the architecture of Yugoslav federalism and soon stopped being any actor at all. Economic journalist and publicist Dimitrije Boarov argues that Vojvodina, a “historical region with a Serbian autonomist tradition and over 40 % of the population who are neither Serbs nor Montenegrins, *by the will of all people* renounces its vested rights and demands of the Serbian national center not to have the right to decide autonomously on any important political issue, that the taxes collected in its territory be distributed and spent outside Vojvodina, that its firms... lose their business independence and their own financial accounts... Vojvodina’s political suicide was committed by the cumulative effect of tremendous political and media pressure from Belgrade and the silence of other Yugoslav political centers, fearing that *their turn will also come*”. (Dimitrije Boarov).

Soon after the removal of the provincial leadership and constitutional changes one of the most thorough purges in Vojvodina’s history began. There are no precise data, but it is estimated that during and after the so-called anti-bureaucratic revolution about 40,000 political officials, senior government officials, chiefs of police, judges and directors of health, cultural, educational, scientific and information centers were removed. In the business sector, about 80 % of executive personnel were removed. In the capital of Vojvodina, Novi Sad, alone the managers of all five banks were removed and so were postmasters, general managers of railways, “Naftagas”... Not one media editor remained. All editorial boards in all the official languages in the province were changed. The Vojvodina investment and retirement funds were abolished and their resources transferred to the republican center. Finally, after the collapse of Yugoslavia and the beginning of the wars (1991), Vojvodina was subjected to ethnic engineering, that is, a change in the composition of its population. Ethnic cleansing

in Vojvodina was especially evident in Srem whose inhabitants, mostly non-Serbs, emigrated, frequently prompted by violence, beatings, threats or killings, as in a number of villages in Srem, and were replaced by Serbian refugees from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, the plans of the inter-war rightist ideologists of “nationalisation”, that is, Serbianization of Vojvodina were realized in the last decade of the 20th century. The strict centralization of the 1990s resulted in the rapid and fundamental impoverishment of Vojvodina, which went from being one of more developed political–territorial entities of the second Yugoslavia to an underdeveloped Serbian region.

After the democratic changes in Serbia and the ousting of the authoritarian regime (2000), the position of Vojvodina improved to some extent. Under the Statute of 2009, it was granted the right to its symbols (coat-of-arms and flag) and its powers were increased. However, all this was very far from the legislative, executive and judicial branches of power and the right to dispose of one’s own assets and collect revenues in its territory as in the second Yugoslavia. However, even such a minimal change was disputed by Serbia and, pursuant to a decision by the Constitutional Court (2012), the crucial provisions of the Vojvodina Statute were repealed. The nominal autonomous status of Vojvodina, as a centuries-long historical province, which originally constituted its autonomy by the will of its peoples in 1945, is probably best presented by Article 182 of the Serbian Constitution of 2006. This states that the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina was established in 2006 by the Constitution and that it may also be revoked by the Constitution, employing the appropriate legal procedure.²⁴

24 In an economic sense, Vojvodina’s overall results within Yugoslavia were devastating. It became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 as the “richest South Slavic region”, as written by historian Bogumil Hrabak. According to the level of development, Vojvodina was equalised with Slovenia; it was more developed than Croatia and much more developed than any other region. Shortly before the collapse of Yugoslavia, in 1986, the ratio in development

CONCLUSION

The historical notion of Vojvodina has at least two different, mutually barely compatible interpretations, two quite incompatible concepts, which largely exclude each other. The first interpretation is nationalist, monoethnic, yet originally Vojvodinian, which derives its tradition from the 18th century and Serbian national movement in the 19th century when the nations were constituted in these regions. Within the framework of the Habsburg state, this Vojvodina, conceived as an ethnically and culturally defined Serbian space, failed to realize itself. Nevertheless, being preserved as an idea, it provided a program basis for all Serbian national parties and political movements. It was finally achieved in the first post-war days of November 1918 by joining the Kingdom of Serbia. In this way, the Serbian nation from southern Hungary succeeded in obtaining its fundamental *testimonial* imperative – organic unity.

However, this self-realisation of a nationalist doctrine was not consensual. A considerable section of the Serbian political public resisted organicist tendencies and direct and unconditional incorporation into Serbia, which was also supported by almost all the other peoples living in the territory of Vojvodina, many of whom were not asked for their opinion. This potential controversy, coupled with radical and unprecedented economic exploitation, was one of the many internal contradictions and lasting problems which the inter-war unitarist Yugoslavia did not wish or was unable to solve, and which would lead to the formation of

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 level between Vojvodina and Slovenia was 1:1.4. After the seven decades of its development within Yugoslavia, Slovenia surpassed Vojvodina by 40% in gross domestic product. However, these calculations seem excellent in comparison with Vojvodina's results in centralist Serbia after the collapse of Yugoslavia. If we take the year 2000 alone for our comparison, then any comparison between Slovenia and Vojvodina must be characterised as a total historical catastrophe, since the ratio is 8:1. Only one decade spent in the strictly centralist Serbia, as a result of the so-called anti-bureaucratic revolution, increased the difference in development level between Slovenia and Vojvodina as much as eight times, to the detriment of the province (Dragomir Jankov).

the *Vojvodina Front* as the nucleus of the new anti-centralist and supranational conception of Vojvodina.

During the People's Liberation Struggle of all of its peoples, this new Vojvodina, conceived in the 1930s, at the time of a repressive monarcho-dictatorship, and realized and affirmed during the Second World War, was founded on the values of anti-fascism, social and national emancipation, modernism and supranational integration. This kind of Vojvodina was realistic and attainable only in the social and political system that was dominant in the second Yugoslavia. And then, as before, Vojvodina's autonomy was a *par excellence* Yugoslav question and could survive only with the support of the Yugoslav political center, despite constant political pressure from Serbia in an attempt to restrict or abolish its autonomous rights. First time when the Yugoslav federation experienced atrophy, Serbia forcibly destroyed Vojvodina's autonomy by annexing the province.

Serbian Vojvodina achieved its aim by self-realising the historical aspirations of its conceptual creators through its unification with the unitary Serbian state and then the Yugoslav state in 1918. The advocates of the narrow-Serbian conception of Vojvodina also tried to continue and reaffirm their orientation at the time of the collapse of *Autonomous Vojvodina* in 1988 by organising the so-called anti-bureaucratic revolution and adopting the constitutional amendments in 1989, as well as through the wars and change in ethnic composition of the province, its political subordination and economic exploitation. There is no doubt that there are two conceptions of Vojvodina. Both of them are based on historical experience – one reflects the character of the 19th century and the other the values of the 20th century. The idea of Vojvodina in the 21st century still does not show any signs of an articulated concept. The ideology of nationalism as the dominant legitimization matrix in Serbia, with the nation as an organic category, has never reconciled itself with *Autonomous Vojvodina*, holding

that this implies separatism and splitting the unity of the nation, and sparing no effort to suppress such an alternative. Nevertheless, the historical, democratic and nationally pluralistic motives of Vojvodina's autonomy as well as the *raison d'être* of Vojvodina itself did not cease to exist, even when its very survival was openly challenged.

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III

Yugoslavia
from a Historical
Perspective
(1918–1991)

FROM THE STAGNATION TO THE REVOLUTION

SRĐAN MILOŠEVIĆ

AT THE TIME it came into existence, the first Yugoslav state was composed of regions differing very much among themselves economically (different stages of capitalist development), socially (primarily the relationship between urban and rural structures), culturally (primarily literacy and education), and religiously (multiconfessionality), not to mention their political institutions and political culture, as well as their legal frameworks (the level of bureaucratization and the rule of law). Taking into account all quantitative and qualitative criteria, it is difficult to imagine a more diverse territory. Some historical regions were sharply divided within themselves by multiple lines separating groups and smaller regions according to various criteria. Class, ethnic and religious differences were dominant for a long time but, with the development of capitalism on Europe's periphery, the class dimension was increasingly important, adding a new quality to the existing multiple relationships.

The Yugoslav state began its life in a territory, which, according to the 1917 Corfu Declaration, was divided into “eleven provincial divisions and thirteen legislations”. With its overwhelmingly rural population and remnants of landed aristocracy, Yugoslavia was a “museum of agrarian structures”, including the remnants of the agrarian relations inherited from the period of antiquity (the colonnate in Dalmatia). The bourgeois and working classes were unequally, but essentially poorly, developed.

The system of a unitary and centralized parliamentary monarchy was very soon replaced by a monarchical dictatorship. After the collapse of the common state during the Second World War, Yugoslavia was restored as a federation, characterized by a more or less pronounced – but permanent – transformation of relations within the federation and its political and economic systems, as well as pronounced dynamics of social change. By making a small modification and paraphrasing one historian dealing with the post-war Balkans, it can be said that socialist Yugoslavia was developed and collapsed as a country with one official ideology, two official scripts, three main religions, four constitutional changes, five (and then six) constituent peoples and as many constituent republics, seven neighbours, eight members of the presidency, nine parliaments and ten communist parties. This was an extremely complex political, cultural and economic environment whose historical basis was founded on a society that was no less complex.

Social structure and political dynamics are in a permanently reversible relationship. This was most clearly formulated by Peter Burke, proceeding from the seemingly simple insight that “change is structured and structures change”. Likewise, significant questions can be raised (in historiography they have already been raised) on the basis of the conception of “modernization without modernity”, which was developed by Ralf Dahrendorf, bearing in mind socialist societies. Research on the discreet nature of the

relationship between the structural features of society (which are changeable and exert influence on the political and economic system) and the economic and political system (which “structures” change, or at least try to do so) would certainly provide important information about, for example, the way in which the specified features of society exert influence on the character of a political regime, regardless of, or even contrary, to the will of their creators and providers. Did the political system reflect social circumstances to a greater extent at every point in development, or was it just a discrepancy between social reality and system architecture? What were the objective restrictions (or advantages) of the existing social structure vis-à-vis changes carried out “top-down”? This paper does not pretend to answer such questions with respect to the entire Yugoslav space. Its goal is much more modest: to point to those aspects of social development which could be significant for answering big research questions in a centennial perspective, relying on previous research.

The society in the first Yugoslav state (1918–1941) as a whole was specific, but each of its constituent parts had its counterparts within the Balkan or Central European framework. Being at the development level of the regions forming part of the common state, overall Yugoslav society reflected a specified development level of capitalism on its periphery: the whole entity was unique within the European framework, while its parts were not. Consequently, the primary historical framework of society in the first Yugoslavia was capitalism on Europe’s periphery. According to its significance, the multinational character of the state took second place. National homogenization of each ethnic group within the Yugoslav community abstracted the inter-ethnic regional differences, which were periodically greater than the differences between the regions within the political-geographic area inhabited by different ethnic groups.

During the Second World War (1941–1945), a unique process involving the national liberation struggle and social revolution occurred in Yugoslavia. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as the organiser of the struggle against the occupiers, held that the unity of liberation and revolutionary struggles was established due to fact that the Yugoslav bourgeoisie aligned with the occupiers and overwhelmingly collaborated with them. Such an explanation appeared only in 1944/45, while until then the revolutionary component of this struggle occurred *via facti*, but without official political and ideological formulations by the top leadership of the movement. The socialist revolution, as a “total revolution”, was related to all segments of society to a lesser or greater degree. Nevertheless, war dynamics brought significant changes to society irrespective of military operations: a general decline in the standard of living, mass migrations, the disappearance of a number of activities, social structural changes and very serious consequences for agriculture – the activity performed by the majority of the economically active population. Considered as a whole, the war brought a substantial change to the primary historical context: from peripheral capitalism to one of the centers where a new, socialist order was built. The national question also obtained a new solution.

As regards the second Yugoslavia (1945–1991), the historical framework, which underwent a revolutionary change relative to the previous epoch, was also transformed: it was soon shifted from state socialism developed immediately after the Second

World War, on the ruins (both figuratively and literally) of the previous socio-political and economic structure, based mostly on Soviet formulas, to the development of relations based on self-management socialism, which also underwent internal transformation during the existence of socialist Yugoslavia. There is no doubt that Yugoslav society underwent dramatic changes in all stages of socialist development, whose main task was its modernization. It had to be increasingly similar to modern (Western) societies as regards its technical and technological achievements and standard of living, while at the same time developing more humane and, as emphasized, more equitable social relations within the framework of self-management socialism, a system hitherto unknown in world history.

However, no matter how revolutionary, the revolution cannot achieve its main goal – to create the “new man” at the pace it was changing the political system. Therefore, the new society was also being built at a pace hindered primarily by its internal obstacles, which made social transformation too complicated, even if we disregard inevitable meanderings such as the dogmatic adoption of Soviet formulas or the search for new ones.

YUGOSLAV SOCIETY

As regards Yugoslav society, the first question that imposes itself is related to the change in the number of inhabitants. The tabular overview (see table overleaf) of population trends already shows dynamics that, at first glance, points to demographic turbulence.

	Population			Number of households	No. of members per household	No. of inhabitants per sq.m.
	Total	Male	Female			
1921.						
a)	11.984.911	5.879.691	6.105.220	2.347.879	5,10	48,4
b)	12.473.000	6.154.452	6.390.548	2.459.803	5,10	49,0
1931.						
a)	13.934.038	6.891.637	7.042.411	2.709.309	5,14	56,3
b)	14.534.000	7.188.371	7.345.629	2.827.626	5,14	56,8
1941. ¹	15.839.364	—	—	—	—	—
1945. ¹	16.601.493	—	—	—	—	—
1948.						
a)	15.772.098	7.582.461	8.189.637	3.609.725	4,37	61,8
b)	15.841.566	7.615.023	8.226.543	3.627.024	4,37	61,9
1953.						
a)	16.936.573	8.204.595	8.731.978	3.954.287	4,29	66,3
b)	16.991.449	8.231.936	8.759.513	3.963.234	4,29	66,4
1961.	18.549.291	9.043.424	9.505.867	4.648.536	3,99	72,5
1971.	20.522.972	10.077.282	10.445.690	5.375.384	3,82	80,2
1981.	22.424.711	11.083.778	11.340.933	6.195.826	3,62	87,7
1991. ²	24.040.721	11.878.047	12.162.648	—	—	91,8

The data under a) and b) differ depending on the territory covered: the data under a) are the data from the current Yugoslav territory at census-taking time, while the data under b) are the population data for the area covered by FPR/SFR Yugoslavia after the delineation of all borders.

¹ The estimated number of inhabitants in 1945, which is implied by the data on the number of inhabitants assuming that there were no war victims.

² The estimated number of inhabitants based on growth trends.

What is especially evident is a negative difference between the population projection for 1945, when it was expected that Yugoslavia would have 16.6 million inhabitants, and that for 1948, when there were about 830,000 inhabitants less than expected in the same (pre-war) territory. This was undoubtedly the result of the ravages of war, which should also include the fact that, according

to the last inter-war and first post-war censuses, the difference between the (previously constantly numerous) female and male populations quadrupled. (According to these censuses, Kosovo and Metohija were the only regions where the male population constantly outnumbered the female).

Although the table does not show such data, according to an estimate of war damages, in the territory of Yugoslavia about 300,000 pre-war households were destroyed, thus accounting for about 8–10 percent of the total number of pre-war households.

Continuous population growth after 1945 coincided with dominant global trends. One can especially observe a high increase in the number of households, which is the result of an increase in the number of nuclear families, one element of the modernization of society in socialist Yugoslavia. Therefore, it is understandable why the average number of members per household was decreasing. However, what is especially striking is an abrupt increase in the number of households with one and two members. Thus, according to the 1921 and 1931 censuses, the number of such households was lower than in the later period: in 1921, there were 119,082 single-member households and 247,327 two-member households; according to the 1931 census, there were 140,277 single-member households and 331,511 two-member households. In 1948, however, we observe as many as 451,184 single-member households and 509,353 two-member households. This trend also continued later on, so that up to 1981 there were 810,915 single-member households and 1,147,798 two-member households. There were various reasons for such a development of this household category: the consequence of war victims, increasing population shift to cities, whereby the oldest household members remained in their old environment, as well as greater opportunities for independent living. As regards households having a higher average number of members, one can observe, as a rule, an increase in the number of 3–6 member households, but it is significantly lower than

the increase in the number of 3–6 member households. Finally, it is indicative that the number of households having 7, 8 or more members was continuously declining.

The improvement of state-sponsored social care for the population also resulted in a great decline of infant and child mortality rates due to which the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had ranked among the most backward European countries. A high birth rate in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia – 26 newborns per 1,000 inhabitants in 1939 – was accompanied by a high infant mortality rate which, in 1931 and 1939 accounted for 16.5 and 13.2 percent of the total number of newborns respectively. From 1947 to 1966, the high birth rate, 20–30 newborns per 1000 inhabitants, continued; since then until 1990, the birth rate was between 14 and 19 newborns per 1000 inhabitants, showing mostly a continuous downward trend. At the same time, the infant mortality rate was decreasing. As for the period after 1945, the first available data are for 1949, when the infant mortality rate relative to the total number of live births amounted to 10.2 percent. During the period 1949–1958, this percentage varied at the Yugoslav level from the maximum 13.9 per cent to the minimum 10.1 per cent, while after 1957 it was constantly below 10 per cent: 1958 – 8.6 per cent, 1968 – 5.9 per cent, 1978 – 3.4 per cent, 1988 – 2.4 per cent. In this domain, there were also significant differences across the republics and provinces. The best situation was in Slovenia where the infant mortality rate was in 1950 – 8.3 percent, 1970 – 2.5 percent and 1990 – 0.8 percent. Although in 1950 all republics, except Slovenia, had the infant mortality rate of over 10 percent, the worst situation was in Vojvodina where the infant mortality rate was 14.5 percent. Here one should bear in mind that Vojvodina was the area of an intensive colonization by the people from regions where mortality rates were high, which was directly attributed to the low level of health culture. In Vojvodina until 1990, the number of infant deaths dropped to 1.4 percent.

Life expectancy was also significantly increasing. In 1931, the life expectancy for females and males was 46.1 and 45.1 years respectively. Already in 1948, the life expectancy levels had increased to 53 years for females and 48.6 years for males, whereby there were significant regional differences, which also remained in the first post-war decade. So, for example, in 1952–54, the shortest average life expectancy was recorded in Kosovo, both for males (48.6) and females (45.3), and the longest in Slovenia – 63.0 for males and 68.1 for females. Up to 1981, the life expectancy at the Yugoslav level increased to 73.2 for females and 67.7 for males. Its increase continued, so that in 1990 the expected life expectancy for females in Yugoslavia was 74.9 and for males 69.1 years, whereby regional differences were reduced (the span was as follows: for males, from 67.4 in Vojvodina to 72.8 in Montenegro, and for females, from 74.2, also in Vojvodina, to 78.2, also in Montenegro). The improvement was especially evident in Kosovo where, until 1990, the life expectancy for males (70.5) and females (74.9) dramatically increased compared to the period of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the first years of socialist Yugoslavia.

Finally, the mortality rate also declined: from 21 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants in 1921 to 15 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants until 1939. After 1945, the mortality rate continued to decline from the maximum 14.2 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants to the minimum 8.1 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants in 1966. At the end of the observation period, the mortality rate was 9 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants, thus being lower than in Germany (9.2), France (9.3) or Britain (11.2). As to the causes of death, such statistics did not exist in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, so that the cause of death for three-fourths of all deceased persons remained unknown.

**SOCIAL STRUCTURE: PEASANTS, WORKERS,
CLERKS, INTELLIGENTSIA**

According to its general and simple definition, social structure represents the totality of social groups and their mutual relations, based immanently on relations of production. In the first half of the 20th century, Yugoslavia's social structure was primarily characterized by a high prevalence of peasants. The process of industrialization was the necessary catalyst for change in the social structure, but during the period of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia it was rather slow. A greater impetus to the economic migration of the peasantry to cities and its employment in the non-agricultural sector was given in the aftermath of the First World War, but during the first two or three years there also began a reversible process, so that the 1921 census showed that in the then Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as much as 83 percent of the total economically active population engaged in agriculture. This percentage slightly declined during the following decade, until the 1931 census, when it amounted to 79.3 percent.

The high proportion of agricultural population is only one side of the story about the backwardness of inter-war Yugoslav society. Its other side is a distinctly low standard of living of the peasants due to the low level of agricultural production, its extensive nature and low yields. In addition, the peasants were heavily burdened with debt, which posed a great social and political problem that the state tried to solve by taking mostly half-measures, from the mid-1920s until the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1941. Social and health care for a large part of the rural population was almost unattainable. Although the political and intellectual elite emphasized with pathos that Yugoslavia was a "peasant country", it was only such a country due to the numerical data showing a high percentage of the agricultural population. The romantic visions of the rural idyll and the peasant as the "foundation of the state edifice" collided with the harsh reality of rural life, which was best

described by the sentence that on his small estate the peasant can “neither live nor die”. The proportionally small number of rural landowners constituted the lower stratum of the capitalist class in inter-war Yugoslavia, which exploited the increasingly poor wide strata of the peasantry in various ways.

From 1945 onwards, the share of the economically active agricultural population in the total economically active population continuously declined. In terms of the general activity of the population in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, it should be noted above all else that its rate was proportionally high: 51 and 46 percent according to the 1921 and 1931 censuses. In socialist Yugoslavia, the activity rate of the population was 49.1 percent in 1948 and 46.3 percent in 1953 (thus increasing by 3.1 percent and 0.6 percent respectively, compared to the 1931 figure. From 1961 to 1989, it was continuously lower than in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, ranging from 44.9 percent to 43.3 percent. A general downward trend in the economically active population was the result of modernization breakthroughs: longer schooling, raising the age limit for gaining the status of an economically active person (a decrease in the number of economically active minors), longer life expectancy and an increasing number of those living long enough to receive retirement pensions.

In 1948, the share of the economically active agricultural population in the total economically active population amounted to 72.7 percent, thus decreasing by 6.6 percent compared to the 1931 figure. However, according to the 1953 and 1961 censuses, this share decreased to 68.3 percent and 56.3 percent respectively. Until 1971, the share of the economically active agricultural population in the total economically active population dropped below 50 percent for the first time: it was 47.3 percent and declined to 26.6 percent in 1981.

When speaking about the fate of the rural population after 1945, it should be noted that the main characteristic of this period was

the social homogenization of the peasantry. By introducing the land maximum (up to 30 hectares in 1945 and then, in 1953, to 10 hectares), compulsory purchase of agricultural products at government-fixed prices and progressive taxation, the peasantry was homogenized, while the survival of private agricultural estates after the failure of collectivization (1945–1953) did not create conditions for capitalist exploitation.

The material status of the rural population did not essentially improve immediately after the war compared to the inter-war period, except in some important respects such as better nutrition, greater access to health care and culture and education, government support for agriculture, etc. Consequently, one can also speak about an increase in the standard of living of the rural population. The standard of living also continued to increase, but at a much slower pace than that of other strata of the population. In addition, already since the 1950s the prospects for peasants' participation in governance structures also began to diminish. In short, the road to the emancipation of peasants was not closed, but only if they changed their status and freely joined the working class or some other social stratum (the intelligentsia, bureaucracy).

Apart from some changes in its standard of living, the peasantry remained the most static stratum in socialist Yugoslavia due to the private ownership of the means of production. According to the 1981 census, as much as 82 percent of arable land was privately owned, while out of 10 million hectares of arable land no less than 8.6 million hectares were also privately owned. This land as cultivated by 2.6 million rural households and the average size of these holdings was about 3.5 hectares.

The socialist state organized society according to collectivist principles, and institutionalized togetherness and solidarity in various ways through the People's Front, trade unions, various and the Party itself. The first post-war years were marked by massive economic, cultural-educational and political campaigns

aimed at developing the concept of the common good, achieving specified goals more rapidly (for example, mass literacy courses), and replacing the lack of specified technical and technological means by joint work (work drives, ranging from agricultural work to the construction of the economic infrastructure). To that end, immediately after the war, effort was invested in concretization of the maxim about “the worker-peasant alliance”. Therefore, during the first post-war years, visits to villages were organized in order to help the rural population in farming and performing specified activities that required skill (repair of agricultural equipment and household appliances, hairdresser services, accounting services in cooperatives, health services, etc.). Those were some of the so-called “Village-Town” activities performed by trade union organizations. Children from cities were sent in an organized way to villages, especially collective farms, while children from villages were sent to urban environments. This was one way to accelerate the social cohesion and solidarity of the “working people of the villages and towns”, although such an activity lost in importance relatively soon, while its volume was significantly reduced in the second half of the 1950s. Afterwards, the main tendency was to transform the peasantry into the working class, although collectivization, which was meant to facilitate it, was a failure.

However, peasant-related policy took a different path towards the same goal. After 1953, the intention of the state was to gradually include the peasantry in the socialist relations of production, so that in perspective it would shift to socialist agricultural production, but without setting any timeframe. However, despite the restrictive land maximum of 10 hectares, “low-intensity” capitalist relations of production were reproduced in various forms in the villages until the end of socialism. At the end, even land lease exceeding the legal maximum and hired labour were restored.

Research carried out in the mid-1980s shows that the peasant family underwent transformation, which was reflected in a

higher evaluation of everyone's individual work; a change in the traditional (postmodern) attitude toward land; the increased independence of every individual from his or her family, relatives and local community itself; the visible (but not overwhelming) erosion of patriarchal patterns of relations between the sexes; the emergence of family planning (fewer unwanted pregnancies), as well as a reduction towards two-generation families; an increased number of women employed outside the household and farm; a more equitable division of work and the strengthening of emotional family ties; and a general weakening of the role and presence of traditional behavioural patterns. These changes were not straightforward and some were largely a tendency, but they still were the main directions. The diversity of peasant families certainly calls in question the possibility of establishing an average pattern, but the mentioned phenomena were present in each type of peasant family. The differences lay in the degree of their presence, which depended on a number of factors: regional, ethnic, cultural, religious and numerous other characteristics.

While the highest proportion of the rural population worked in agriculture, cities were inhabited by people with very diverse vocations: craftsmen, industrial workers, clerks, persons employed in the public sector, as well as a small number of those engaging in agriculture. In all Yugoslavia, a small number of settlements could be considered a city and the relevant criteria differed from one census to another. Up to 1981, there were 37 settlements with over 50,000 inhabitants and the majority population engaged in agricultural activities. Among them there were 14 with over 100,000 inhabitants. The capital city – Belgrade was growing at the absolutely fastest pace: in 1921, it had about 111,759 inhabitants, that is, slightly more than Zagreb (108,674). However, the number of inhabitants in Belgrade more than doubled by 1931 (238,775). In 1961, having only nine cities with over 100,000 inhabitants, Yugoslavia held the penultimate position in Europe (Albania was the

last) according to that criterion. Until 1981, Belgrade had 1,087,915 inhabitants. The fastest-growing capital city was Titograd whose population increased more than eleven times from 1921 to 1981 – from 8,212 to 96,074. High population growth was also recorded by Skopje, whose population increased more than tenfold from 1921 to 1981 (from 40,666 to 408,143 inhabitants).

The increased share of the urban population in the total population in inter-war Yugoslavia was insignificant, due to the lack of sufficient possibilities and incentives for people to move to a city: insufficiently developed urban (primarily industrial) activities, a proportionally low level of cultural and educational needs of the population, and the distinctly low mobility of the rural population in general. An additional problem was also posed by underdeveloped agriculture, which could not satisfy the needs of a larger urban population. In the inter-war period, the state of the Yugoslav economy, especially its industry, was even unable to absorb the proletarianized peasantry that became increasingly numerous over time, but mostly stayed in the village, joining hired labour. Other urban vocations were also not open to people coming from rural regions. As much as 58 percent of all wage workers engaging in productive activities accounted for those engaging in agriculture, and most of them were proletarianized peasants. For all these reasons, according to the 1921 and 1931 censuses, only 16.5–18 percent of the Yugoslav population lived in cities.

After the Second World War, the revolutionary authorities set industrialization as their imperative task. The building of factories, largely for heavy industry needs as well as for the needs of other industries, brought about a massive inflow of the rural population to urban areas. Until 1953, the share of the agricultural population in Yugoslavia declined by 14 percent compared to 1938. As Kidrič said, this de-agrarization was so “unnatural” that at one moment in the early 1950s a part of the labour force had to be returned from industry to agriculture. Up to 1953, the number

of inhabitants increased by 7.6 percent compared to 1939, while the size of the non-agricultural population increased by 39 percent, although not all deagrarized population moved to urban areas. According to the 1961 census, the percentage of the population that moved to cities until 1945 was 15.1 percent, while only in the period from 1945 to 1952 this percentage increased to 28.6 percent, whereby most migrants came from rural areas (consequently, not from one city to another). Up to 1955, however, migration from rural areas could not absorb the overall natural increase of the rural population, which had begun to change.

Agricultural abandonment started with the seasonal and incomplete abandonment of agriculture by agricultural workers, often with a view to making more money in industry, which was needed for the erection of industrial buildings on agricultural estates. Their job in the industrial sector soon became the main one, while agricultural activity was confined to other household members until they also switched to non-agricultural activities and finally moved to a city. Up to 1953, the agricultural population declined by 300,000, but if one bears in mind the natural increase, the actual outflow from agriculture amounted to between 1.13 and 1.5 million people. Until 1960, rural areas were abandoned by 2.16 million people and at the end of this decade the structure of rural households was as follows: 25 percent accounted for elderly households, 40 percent accounted for households having all younger members attending school, while 30 percent accounted for households that retained their offspring at home. From the viewpoint of the socialist state, the reduced reproduction of rural households did not seem to be an unfavourable trend. However, the trend displayed by individual agricultural holdings was their fragmentation. This was evidently due to the fact that the household members who had moved to a city did not entirely renounce their inheritance rights to their hereditary share, or at least some segment of it.

However, as already mentioned, de-agrarization did not imply an equal change in the ratio of urban to rural population. In this respect, the change was significantly less pronounced. Namely, a great number of industrial workers continued to live in their villages, thus increasing the number of so-called “half-peasants”, worker-peasants, that is, people who lived in their villages and engaged in agriculture, but were also employed in the industrial sector; such people had already existed in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Among 10.6 million individual peasants in 1949, there were about 670,000 worker-peasants (6.3 percent). Until the early 1970s, the number of mixed households increased to 44 percent. According to 1960 data, as much as 48 percent of rural population’s income derived from non-agricultural activities. Also, one-third of arable land was owned by those “mixed” worker-peasant households. However, all things considered, the great migration of people from rural to urban areas was a reality, which also relativized the romantic notions of the peasants’ deep emotional attachment to their land, for the prospect of abandoning agriculture seemed attractive to a great number of peasants.

On the other hand, other factors also influenced the reduction of a direct population transfer from rural to urban areas. One of those factors was the urbanization of rural settlements themselves: the construction of roads and other infrastructure, schools, first-aid stations, smaller production plants. On the other hand, despite significant steps in that direction, the development of urban areas was not so dynamic as to absorb and employ a greater number of people from rural areas. Despite all these problems, however, by 1961, the percentage of urban population had more than doubled – from 16.5–18 percent in the pre-war period to 28.3 percent.

In this process one could also observe specific yet not minor regional differences. So, for example, in Slovenia in 1961, the non-agricultural population accounted for 68 percent, but only 27 percent accounted for the urban population, which was below the

Yugoslav average. Due to the urbanization of suburban and rural settlements, good road networks and linkages between suburban and rural settlements with urban centers, the permanent relocation of people to the city was not of the utmost significance for their daily life. On the other hand, in Vojvodina, the non-agricultural population accounted for only 48 percent, but 39 percent of its inhabitants lived in cities. Macedonia was also specific. According to the 1961 census, it experienced an abrupt increase in the urban population – up to 35 percent, but the highest concentration was in its capital city, while the development of other urban settlements was considerably slower. At the same time, the non-agricultural population accounted for only 48 percent. Mention must also be made of Kosovo where de-agrarization and urbanization did not take any deeper root. One more specific feature of Yugoslav cities was the fact that in the cities with 10,000–20,000 inhabitants 10 percent accounted for the agricultural population, with the exception of Slovenia and Montenegro. In Macedonia and Kosovo, 20 percent of the population in the cities with 20,000–50,000 inhabitants accounted for the agricultural population.

Up to 1981, the share of the urban population increased to 46.1 percent of the Yugoslav population. Somewhat more than 50 percent of the urban population was recorded in Macedonia (53.9 percent), Montenegro (50.7 percent) and Croatia (50.1 percent), as well as Vojvodina (54.1 percent), which was the most urbanized region until 1981. The lowest share of the urban population was recorded in Bosnia and Herzegovina (34.2 percent) and Kosovo (32.5 percent). Serbia with 47.6 percent of the urban population (central Serbia with 47.8 percent) and Slovenia with 48.9 percent were around the Yugoslav average. It should be noted that an increase in the urban population was also caused by the change of status of some settlements, which acquired the status of urban settlements: in 1953 there were 0.9 percent of such settlements

and in 1981 – 2.8 percent. Nevertheless, village urbanization was not sufficiently achieved: research on housing quality shows that towards the end of the socialist epoch there were greater differences between village and city within each republic than between urban settlements in different republics, indicating that urban settlements were more rapidly “catching up” with each other. Also, individual rural households were more urbanized compared to rural settlements as a whole: villages remained under-urbanized despite the evident process of their urbanization.

The working class, which mostly lived in cities, was not numerous in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Before the end of the inter-war epoch, it had about 700,000 members (about 4.4 percent of the population). The life of the working class was characterized by scarcity and a low standard of living, which was at the European bottom. According to some later calculations, one employed worker could successfully meet his cost of living, since his wage covered 1.28–1.70 percent of estimated average monthly costs. However, the worker’s family (with an employed husband, unemployed wife and two children) could not cover the cost of living with its earnings. Namely, during the period 1930–1940, the cost-of-living index for a worker’s family ranged from 0.5 to 0.66 percent (where 1 indicates the full coverage of minimum needs). In the inter-war period, the hygienic, health, social, housing and general social conditions of the working class oscillated between more favourable and less favourable. This class was largely disempowered both socially and politically, which is evidenced by brutal clashes with the organisers of numerous worker strikes and their participants.

In 1945, immediately after the war, there were about 307,000 workers, which was less than half of their number towards the end of the inter-war period. Until 1950, however, there were already 1.2 million workers; until 1960 – 1.9 million; 1970 – 2.4 million; 1980 – 3.3 million and 1990 – 5 million. Immediately after the liberation

in 1945, significant efforts were made toward improving the overall social status of the working class. The important political, economic and ideological aim was to have industrial workers live better than the peasants, which speaks a lot about the worker status before and immediately after the war. Thus, various training courses for workers were organized; food was supplied at relatively low prices, and new forms of social protection were introduced. However, industrial development was much faster than the provision of skilled workers, so that, according to the 1952 data, the skills structure of the working class was very unfavourable: there were only 1.5 percent of highly skilled workers; 35.5 percent – skilled workers; 25.5 percent – semi-skilled workers, and 39.5 percent – unskilled workers. The lowest percentage of highly skilled workers came from rural areas – only 17 percent. Such a structure of the labour force implied that only 30 percent of workers were sufficiently skilled for the jobs they pursued. Until 1961, the number of highly skilled workers increased to 7 percent, but there were still 40 percent of unskilled workers; the ratio was 10 percent of highly skilled to 32 percent of unskilled workers.

Immediately after the war, the state-socialist ownership structure still had an unfavourable impact on the abolition of the hireling and petty-proprietor consciousness of new workers, frequently “semi-peasants”, who were employed in industry, but lived in their villages where they also participated in the agricultural work of their households. Only the development of self-management socialism created at least the theoretical presumption for overcoming these forms of workers’ class resistance that were born out of statism. Self-management socialism had to push back the hireling mentality of the working class and develop a free one. Instead of the struggle against the hireling nature supported by the directive plan and state property relations in which it was reproduced, the organization of work based on social ownership and self-management had to further increase workers’ self-awareness.

According to the post-1945 criteria, in Yugoslavia at the end of the inter-war period there were about 492,000 representatives of the industrial and urban bourgeoisie (industrialists, rentiers and big merchants), while by 1948 this number was reduced to less than 12,000 such persons, who lived on income from their property and the sale of valuables. After the implementation of comprehensive measures of nationalization, this social stratum vanished completely by the first half of the 1950s. As regards members of the rural bourgeoisie, landowners with 20 hectares of land or more, there were about 310,000 of them or more at the end of the inter-war period, while in 1948, after the war changes, expropriation of the properties of collaborators with the occupiers, land reform and division of larger agricultural estates, there remained 124,905 members of this social stratum. As regards the number of craftsmen, small retailers and caterers, its decline was smaller in the first post-war years: from 587,994 in 1947 to 469,525 in 1952. They were transformed into small commodity producers and providers of services based on their own work. However, tax and political pressures on them were rather strong, so that a large number of private entrepreneurs gave up private practice and found employment in the state sector. The extent of this revolutionary change is also evidenced by the data that as early as 1950 the private sector's share in the creation of national income was only 0.3 percent. Due to confiscation (as a measure accompanying the punishment for collaboration) and nationalization (as the structural mechanism of primitive socialist accumulation), the inter-war bourgeoisie was completely deprived of its ownership of the means of production, while conditions for the reproduction of rural capitalists disappeared with the introduction of a maximum of 10 hectares of arable land in 1953.

As for employed persons in general, it should be noted that after 1921, when 528,914 employed persons were recorded (4.4 percent of the total population), their number increased to 1,032,344

(about 7 percent of the population) until 1940. After the Second World War, the principal employer was the state, which employed an increasing number of people, so that in the period from 1945 to 1949, the total number of employed persons increased from 450,000 to 2,000,000. Their number was rapidly increasing, so that in 1960 there were 3 million employees; in 1970 – 3.9 million; in 1980 – 5.8 million and in 1990 – 6.5 million. At the same time, remuneration differences were proportionally small and their ratio was 1:3.5. However, instead of decreasing over time, these differences increased. In 1980, the range between the highest and lowest wages was 1:4.5, but this was just the average. In some organizations, the wage span was even 1:30. When considering the cumulative ratios in 1973, it can be seen that 50 percent of households accounted for about 30 percent of total income and that the distribution in 1983 was more even, so that this share was 35 percent. From the viewpoint of capitalist society, this distribution was fairly egalitarian, but one would expect a socialist society to take a different path.

As regards the share of the intelligentsia in the Yugoslav society, if we take into account a simple criterion – educational level, and if we include the population with higher and two-year post-secondary education in this stratum, then the following dynamic is obtained: in 1939 there were about 0.3–0.4 inhabitants with higher or two-year post-secondary situation; in 1953 there were already 0.6 percent and in 1981 – 5.6 percent. In both the first and second Yugoslavia, the intelligentsia was a state project in various ways, to the extent to which its social role was enabled, thanks to more or less generous state support. Here by “intelligentsia” I mean a very wide circle of intellectuals, namely persons active in cultural and educational life, as well as formally educated persons. It should be noted that in inter-war Yugoslavia, despite the widespread belief that the intelligentsia was derived from the “common people”, that is, from the countryside, it was mostly of bourgeois origin, as is

shown by prosopographical studies of the inter-war intelligentsia. It is also important to note that in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia the labour market was unable to absorb even the relatively small number of highly educated experts, including even persons with secondary education. Hence they talked about the “overcrowding of the universities” and “unemployment of intellectual youth”. A specific turnaround occurred after the Second World War in both directions: the access of worker and peasant youth to higher education increased considerably, while the lack of experts remained the chronic ailment of the Yugoslav economy. In socialist Yugoslavia, especially in the first post-war years, greater attention was devoted to the so-called technical intelligentsia (various business experts), which had constituted 12 percent of this pre-war stratum. In 1952, however, it rose to 42.7 percent.

The intelligentsia was also the pillar of the regime, both in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and in socialist Yugoslavia. At the same time, it also played a critical role to a much greater extent than allowed, considering its great dependence on state support, which the regimes had to tolerate and against which sporadically undertook some repressive measures.

In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the bureaucratic-administrative stratum was in essence a subgroup within the bourgeois class. It included in large measure the alienated stratum of the population, closely linked to the privileged ruling class, hence being a synonym for corruption and repression.

In socialist Yugoslavia, the bureaucratic-administrative stratum was recruited from the ranks of workers and peasants or more exactly, revolutionary cadres and, despite alienation tendencies, workers had high access to administrative positions. During the immediate post-war years, in particular, administrative positions were a “revolutionary vocation and not a profession”. Over time, this structure became increasingly detached from the whole of society. During the first years, there were no wage

differences. However, there were differences in the inherited conceptions of the status of a bureaucrat. Bureaucratism was identified as one of the key opponents of the genuine development of socialist relations, but socialist society was unable to resolve this aporia – between bureaucracy and the struggle against this phenomenon – anywhere, including Yugoslavia. In the phase of revolutionary statism, class distinctions emerged as the result of commanding positions and privileges (the “new class”). In this period, about 10 percent of all people employed in the state sector accounted for the bureaucratic-administrative stratum: all literate people became clerks and in 1947 they constituted 54.4 percent of all non-manual workers in the socialist sector.

The privileges of administrative functions also persisted in self-management socialism, which was conceived as a system for overcoming them, whereby under the self-management system the actual differences in material status were significantly more important than the position of power itself, as in the period of statism. Certain privileges also began to be granted for non-manual activities. Namely, they began to be paid better than manufacturing jobs. In short, the working class did not completely dispose of its surplus labour, a considerable portion of which was included in the budget and allocated by the state. The budgetary financing of non-productive activities meant the alienation of the working class from a portion of surplus labour and the tendency of self-management socialism was to have the working class assume full control over expanded reproduction as a whole through self-management communities of interest. The full control of the working class over expanded reproduction would actually mark the end of the bureaucratic setting of high wages in the non-productive sector and the resulting formation of class distinctions. Non-productive activities had to be performed as a result of recognized social needs for which self-management communities would allocate a specified portion of surplus labour on the basis of independent

decision-making, thus realising the concept of associated labour and harmonising the pluralism of self-management interests. In a certain sense, this would mean that those engaged in non-productive activities would become, conditionally speaking, the “hirelings” of the working class. In this way, they would also become the working class and encompass the whole of society, thus ceasing to exist as a class (classless society). Naturally, this was not realized until the collapse of socialism and Yugoslavia. On the contrary, class distinctions became increasingly more pronounced, which was the inevitable price of developing “market socialism”.

Studies of social stratification in the society in socialist Yugoslavia show that not all individuals in positions of power were rich and that not all rich people were the members of the Party and political elite. However, the systemic possibilities enabled some individuals holding leadership positions in socio-political communities to use their privileges and amass wealth. In short, all relevant research shows that social distinctions were greater than they should have been according to the ideological postulates of the ruling Marxist paradigm, but were still smaller than in capitalist countries and, in essence, diffusely distributed: political command functions did not necessarily always imply material enrichment, nor were they a prerequisite for it. They undoubtedly facilitated enrichment, but wage differences were the least reason for this. In fact, indirect channels were a very important form of enrichment – lucrative official trips, various informal channels for the provision of cheap land and building materials for a house, various privileges of high officials based on internal regulations, etc. Thus, their already high personal income was relieved of various liabilities that had to be borne by the underprivileged individuals. It should also be noted that in officials’ families, both spouses were most often employed and, as a rule, neither of them had a low personal income.

In addition, research conducted at the end of the observation period showed that the social mobility of Party members was twice as high as that of non-Party members. At the same time, parental Party membership was highly significant for the social mobility of children. The essential upward mobility channel was still a general transformation that occurred in Yugoslavia after the Second World War.

THE GREATEST MODERNIZATION BREAKTHROUGHS: HEALTH CARE, EDUCATION AND WOMEN'S EMANCIPATION

During the inter-war period, social processes were taking place, to a lesser or greater degree, within the limits of the liberal paradigm of the state that had no possibility or will to intervene in social relations. State intervention was an exception rather than a rule, and if it was carried out, it was closely linked to quite concrete political circles and periodically to personal and group business interests. The government extinguished the “fire” here and there when the situation in some sphere became intolerable but, with the exception of very inconsistent land reforms, there was no greater intervention in the social sphere.

The post-1945 change in the social structure, to which the greater part of this paper is devoted, was a result of the processes of modernization, primarily the industrialization of the country, which falls under economic history, but is also the fundamental generator of social change. Here one should point to another three important modernization breakthroughs that brought significant changes to the general social patterns – health care, education and women's emancipation. Unlike the inter-war period, in all these processes one could observe the strong role of Yugoslav communists whose party was in power and for whom the success in these spheres implied the attainment of the program goals of the Party in its struggle for the “new man”. There was no significant

breakthrough in the mentioned spheres which was not discussed at Party's forums and publicized in its documents.

As regards the health care of the population in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, it was at the lowest level according to the European standards. According to 1930 data, there were 12,204 medical personnel members, including 4,545 doctors and 208 dentists. There were also 172 hospitals and 22,895 hospital beds. In Yugoslavia up to 1939, there were 18,193 medical personnel members, including 5,131 doctors and 380 dentists, implying that there was one doctor per 3,060 inhabitants and one dentist per 41,324 inhabitants. Of this number of doctors, 927 worked in 169 hospitals with 23,534 beds (only 429 more than twenty or so years earlier). The Drava Banovina (the territory of present-day Slovenia) had the greatest number of hospitals per inhabitant: in 1939, it accounted for 21.2 percent of all hospital stays in the country. Bearing in mind that medical experts were mostly concentrated in the cities, the fact remains that a large proportion of the rural population and some smaller environments had no adequate health care. During the period 1930–1939, only the number of health centers increased – from 260 to 552. We do not have reliable data for the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, but it is rather indicative that in 1939 at least 12 percent²⁵ of all deaths were due to tuberculosis – a disease that most often accompanies extreme poverty.

In socialist Yugoslavia, the situation radically improved. Up to 1950, there were only 5,138 doctors and 196 dentists, while already in 1952 there were 6,548 doctors (since the first generations of post-war medical students had graduated), while the number of dentists decreased to 184. Until 1987, the Yugoslav population was treated by 43,869 doctors and 9,232 dentists, which means that there was one doctor per 533 inhabitants and one dentist per

25 The percentage refers only to one-fourth of all deaths, because for three-fourths the cause of death is unknown. Namely, out of 233,196 dead persons the cause of death is known only for 53,228 and it is known that 27,605 died of tuberculosis.

2,535 inhabitants. In 1950, compared to 1939, the number of hospital beds increased more than twofold – there were 53,760 hospital beds. By 1960, this number had also increased more than twofold, so that there were 102,329 hospital beds, while until 1988 this number increased to 142,957. Understandably, the most advanced medical services were provided in urban centers, but spa rehabilitation centers were being developed and basic health care also reached rural areas. Until 1989, in addition to hospitals, 8,384 general and specialist medical centers and 4,425 dental surgeries were opened. In addition, thanks to the development of the road network, better communications and different social policy, health care became accessible to a significantly greater number of people. Apart from doctors, the number of other medical personnel also increased. According to the 1962 data, there was a total of 112,946 medical workers; in 1975 – 193,374, and in 1987 – 303,105.

Throughout the existence of the Yugoslav state, despite the great success in the expansion of health care coverage during the period of socialism, which also strongly influenced the extension of average life expectancy, there remained significant differences among the republics and autonomous provinces. As the most evident example one can take mortality due to parasitic and infectious diseases. Although it is undoubtedly due to the geographical area, it is also largely due to the health culture of the population – a good indicator of the overall quality of life. Thus, in 1990, the death rate due to these diseases per 100,000 inhabitants, by republics and autonomous provinces, was as follows: Montenegro – 9.3; Slovenia – 11.5; Bosnia and Herzegovina – 16.5; Serbia – 18.2; Croatia – 22.2 and Macedonia – 32.1. If we take into account only Serbia, it can be noted that differences within it were quite distinct: in central Serbia 11.7 patients died per 100,000 inhabitants; in Vojvodina – 13 and in Kosovo – as many as 43.

The next important breakthrough was made in the field of population education. In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, despite specific

efforts to raise the educational level of the population, no more significant breakthroughs in this field were made. In 1921, the number of illiterate persons older than 10 years was even 4,402,059 (50.5 percent of the population), while by the 1931 census their number had increased to 4,408,471 (44.6 percent of the population older than 10 years).

According to the 1948 census already, this number was considerably smaller – 3,162,941 (25.4 percent of the population). This decrease was the result of a mass literacy campaign during the war and in its aftermath, but it probably does not give a true picture of the situation, especially if functional illiteracy is not taken into account. Nevertheless, considerable efforts were made towards educating the population, so that the number of illiterate persons older than 10 years continually declined, accompanied by an increase in the total population, so that in 1961 there were 3,066,165 (21 percent) such persons; in 1971 – 2,549,571 (15.1 percent) and in 1981 – 1,780,902 (9.5 percent). Of this number 1,576,238 were aged over 39 or, in other words, born before 1945. As in all other spheres, regional differences were very pronounced. The lowest number of illiterate people was in Slovenia and the highest number in Macedonia, including mostly the Albanian female population.

In 1919, in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia there were 5,610 elementary schools (4 grades) with 658,876 students and 11,064 teachers. There were also 115 civil schools, 120 high schools and secondary schools, and 24 teacher's schools with a total of 63,599 students and 3,279 teachers. By 1939, the number of elementary school had increased to 9,190; there were 1,470,983 students and 34,663 teachers. By 1939, there were 1,086 secondary schools with a total of 213,100 students and 13,515 teachers. Most students attended high schools and secondary schools – 81,688, while others attended various specialized schools. In the whole country in 1922, there were 23 institutions of higher and two-year post-secondary education with 10,568 students and 682 teachers; in 1939, there were

29 two-year post-secondary schools and faculties with 21,253 students and 1,394 teachers. This relatively sparse educational network still produced more personnel than could be employed in the Yugoslav economy and other sectors.

After 1945, the educational network expanded rapidly, both in terms of the number of schools and in terms of teaching diversity, while the number of compulsory years of elementary education increased and in 1958 compulsory eight-year elementary education was introduced. In the territory of Yugoslavia in 1946, there were 10,666 elementary schools with 1,441,679 students and 23,270 teachers which, considering the number of teachers, was a big decline compared to 1939. By 1975/78, the number of elementary schools in Yugoslavia had grown to 13,442, but after that it started to decline, mostly due to the merger of smaller schools, which was made possible thanks to improved transport and greater student mobility. Thus, in 1989/90, the number of elementary schools dropped to 11,841. The number of students also varied. The highest number was recorded in the school year 1975/76 – 2,856,453, while until 1989/90 it declined to 2,798,738. According to the 1987 data, there were 139,167 elementary school teachers. In 1953, 50.2 percent of the population had elementary education (minimum four grades); in 1961 – 55.9 percent; 1971 – 57.4 percent and 1981 – 51.1 percent.

As regards secondary education, in the post-1945 period, emphasis was mostly placed on vocational schools. From 1946 to 1987, the number of secondary schools increased from 959 to 1,248. However, their greatest number was in 1978 – 2,787. In the same period, the number of students increased from 138,393 to 901,351. Finally, in 1946, there were 14,549 secondary school teachers and in 1987 – 63,711. By 1953, 6.6 percent of the population had secondary education; in 1961, this percentage increased to 9.3 percent; in 1971 – 15.2 percent and in 1981 – 25.5 percent.

In Yugoslavia, as early as 1946, there were 39 two-year post-secondary schools and faculties (ten more than in 1939), with 39,239 students and 1,390 teachers. From 1945 to 1953, even 30,000 students graduated from two-year post-graduate schools and faculties, thus accounting for about 50 percent of the total number of inhabitants with university and two-year post-graduate education in 1939. The number of higher education institutions also continued to increase in the subsequent period, so that as early as 1950 there were 84 educational institutions of this type. The greatest number of faculties and two-year post-graduate schools was recorded in 1981 – 357, while the greatest number of students was recorded in 1979 – 447,880. At the end of the observation period, in 1991, there were 306 two-year post-graduate schools and faculties with 325,481 students. As for teaching staff, until 1991, there were 22,626 teachers at two-year post-secondary schools and faculties in Yugoslavia. The share of the population with two-year post-secondary and university education was as follows: 1953 – 0.6 percent, 1961 – 1.3 percent, 1971 – 2.8 percent and 1981 – 5.6 percent.

If we take into account primarily scientific activity, we will see that this activity underwent a real revolution in the second Yugoslavia. In the school year 1919/20, 89 persons completed doctorates,, and in the school year 1938/39 – 296. The greatest number of persons who earned doctorates in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was in 1929/30 – 412. Immediately after the war, 1945–1949, 87 persons completed doctorates. From 1950 to 1959, 1,221 persons earned doctorates; from 1960 to 1969 – 3,425; from 1970 to 1979 – 5,748, and from 1980 to 1990 – 10,376. Apart from two-year post-graduate schools and faculties, scientists were also employed in an increasing number of research institutes.

After 1945, the main problem facing education was the lack of teaching staff. Due to relatively low salaries, teaching did not seem an attractive career choice. On the other hand, in 1975, despite

high achievements in the field of education, 28 percent of industrial enterprises had no highly educated personnel. The educational system could not keep pace with the economy that was developing more rapidly. When one takes into account all work organizations in Yugoslavia in 1975, it can be noted that 57 percent of them had no highly educated personnel. It is also interesting to note that the greatest number of organizations without highly educated personnel was recorded in Slovenia (62 percent), then in Bosnia and Herzegovina (60 percent), Croatia (54 percent), Serbia (56 percent or, more precisely, even 66 percent in Vojvodina and 58 percent in Kosovo), and in Macedonia and Montenegro (51 percent each).

Finally, attention should also be devoted to a very important issue – the issue of women’s status in society. Women’s emancipation in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was the result of individual efforts, while in socialist Yugoslavia it was the result of an organized policy. Although a feminist movement existed in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, it remained on the margins of social influence, while the status of women was best expressed in the Civil Code under which a married woman was denied legal capacity. This anachronous legal provision was abolished as early as 1946, with termination of the validity of the Civil Code. Thanks to women’s equal participation in the National Liberation War (some of them also held command positions and were declared national heroes after the war), the new position of women in the Yugoslav society was more easily accepted. Women understandably obtained the right to vote, marital relations were liberalized, the political activism of women was promoted through the Anti-Fascist Womens’ Front and other mass organizations, and women were increasingly assuming social and political functions, while the legal solutions in all spheres of life tried to ensure gender equality. A considerable increase in the number of divorces can also be considered an expression of women’s emancipation. In the early 1960s,

the attitude towards abortion was liberalized, which was one of the important breakthroughs the socialist state did not make in the aftermath of the war.

At literacy courses conducted during the period 1948–1950 as much as 70 percent of attendees were women, although the literacy and schooling of female children met with resistance in conservative environments, mostly for religious and patriarchal reasons. From 1921 to 1981, the percentage of illiterate women declined from 60 percent to 14.7 percent. However, until the end of the socialist epoch, women still accounted for 80 percent of all illiterate citizens. One of the mitigating circumstances in the process of women's emancipation was also children's social care, which was intended to help women overcome their traditional role as mother.

Here one should point to some characteristics of the ratio between male and female population with respect to the activities carried out by the population in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and socialist Yugoslavia. According to the 1921 census, the share of male and female populations in the economically active population accounted for 64 percent and 62.8 percent respectively, while according to the 1931 census this share was 36.4 percent and 30 percent respectively. After 1945, the share of the male population in the economically active population was decreasing, while the rate of the economically active population within the female population was relatively stable and ranged from 30.7 percent to 35.1 percent. This means that the absolute number of the economically active female population (and thus the share of the economically active population) was increasing in proportion to an increase in the share of the female population in the total population. However, this was not the case with the male population. This is a very credible testimony to women's emancipation compared to the pre-war period, which was especially evident after 1961. Namely, in the pre-war period the highest percentage of the economically active

female population (about 85 percent) was engaged in agriculture, which also refers to the first post-war years (88.9 percent according to the 1948 census). All subsequent censuses revealed that the share of the female agricultural population in the total economically active female population was very distinctly decreasing. The last time that more than half of the economically active female population was engaged in agriculture was recorded in 1971 – 55.4 percent. According to the 1981 census, this percentage had declined to 31.5 percent.

Nevertheless, throughout the observation period, women were more engaged in agriculture than in other activities. Moreover, their share in this activity grew continually since other activities were much more accessible to men. According to the 1931 data, the share of the economically active female agricultural population in the total economically active agricultural population amounted to 36.6 percent, although in the total economically active population women accounted for 32.8 percent. By 1981, as much as 47.5 percent of the economically active agricultural population were women, while their share in the total economically active population accounted for 38 percent. As for males, according to the 1931 census, 66.3 percent of the economically active male population were actively engaged in agriculture, while in 1981 – only 21.4 percent. This difference points to the fact that despite their unambiguous emancipation and faster increase in the activity of women within the female population relative to an increase in the activity of men within the male population, they still had more difficulty than men in finding employment outside agriculture.

In the socialist era, women still failed to achieve full equality with men, including access to all social positions, ensuring equal pay for equal work, and all other social relations where the issue of gender differences is relevant. However, compared to the inter-war epoch, their success in achieving equality is more than evident.

CONCLUSION

In a 20th-century perspective, Yugoslav society shared the fate of the political entity whose material and human basis was constituted by it, just as the fate of the state was determined in many respects by the social circumstances within which different frameworks changed one after another. The state was able to impose itself as the “power standing above society” in a quite literal sense, but the essential characteristics avoided engineering, acting autonomously and imposing strong obstacles on the protagonists of history in pursuing their reformatory, revolutionary or conservative agenda.

When the Yugoslav state was created in 1918, it was primarily an entity on the periphery of European capitalism, with the basic social-class structure which was comprised of peasants as the dominant stratum, a thin working class stratum and ramified yet sparse bourgeoisie, ranging from capital owners to the intelligentsia and bureaucrats. Nevertheless, it was not easy to imagine a more complex structure, primarily due to the very diverse social characteristics of various regions in the new state, in which one should still not seek the causes of its subsequent collapse. The lack of skills and abilities to find creative answers to the challenges posed by a new historical framework is a much more credible explanation for the failure of the first Yugoslavia than the alleged insurmountability of the differences themselves.

The society in the first Yugoslavia was a neglected society, lacking serious efforts to level out those differences that could and should have been levelled out (economic development, disproportions in the cultural level, wealth and the like), while at the same insisting on an alleged national unity as the platform for eliminating those differences which could not be eliminated nor was there a need to eliminate them (national identities). The overall social development of Yugoslavia from 1918 to 1941 was overwhelmingly slow, so that the country was at the lower end of

European trends (population poverty, illiteracy, low level of health culture, poor mobility, etc.), with a rather closed perspective.

The socialist revolution brought the change that, apart from an essentially different political system, implied quite the opposite attitude towards society as compared to that in the inter-war period. The communists' *modus operandi* for achieving their aims was just a specific form of social engineering that objectively had to accelerate the progress of all strata that accepted the new state of affairs, or dictatorship by the proletariat, or at least did not openly oppose it. In socialist Yugoslavia, the communists created a new social structure, which was comprised of workers, owners of the means of production by which, using their own labour (non-exploitatively) they earned their income (peasants, craftsmen), "people's" intelligentsia (opposed to the de-classed – "anti-people" one), and administrative-bureaucratic structure, which was ideologically the "executive committee" of the working class, but was still essentially its avant-garde both in an ideological sense and in the sense of its power vis-à-vis the working class itself, thus even constituting a counter-class according to some views.

However, in these circumstances, in which the idea of dictatorship by the proletariat was, at the very least, inconsistently achieved, for which there were numerous political and economic reasons, modernization breakthroughs – which objectively improved the position of the formerly neglected social strata – were underway. These modernization breakthroughs cannot be overemphasized, especially in the spheres of health care, education and women's emancipation. On the other hand, however, the fact that there were also some failures and stagnation, opens up a debate as to whether the reasons for failure are inherent in socialism, or originated from its "non-socialist" modifications.

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CATCHING UP WITH EUROPE

IGOR DUDA

AS IN MOST of Europe during the past century, the everyday life of the majority of the population in both Yugoslavias was taking big strides toward change. Shorter and traumatic periods of high mortality rates and destruction (during the wars) alternated with long peaceful periods, and the initial and final results of both Yugoslav half-times pointed to an increase in the quality of life. This was especially felt among those strata of the population – workers and most peasants – whose initial position was low and unenviable and their basic material safety uncertain over both the short and long term. After two wars, social, economic and cultural circumstances were guided by the idea of shaping a better environment and significant leaps towards modernization, which was especially pronounced during the second post-war period, when the society was shaped according to the principles of socialist modernization, based on rapid industrialization, electrification and urbanization. New everyday practices and customs were permeated with new conceptions, shaping different identities and gradually changing long-established mentalities.

Due to the initial, predominantly agrarian, structure of the population, the village-city relationship is the paradigm within which it is possible to consider the complexity of social change since the place of residence implied a slower or faster movement towards modernization. The quality of this movement was also determined by distinct regional differences within the country. Moving from one environment to another meant breaking up the centuries-long structure of social relations – usually patriarchal and sometimes even feudal – and entering the world of a more distinct individuality that was integrated, on a different basis, into the collective, ranging from the nuclear family to the broader community. Strict parental authority within the extended family or cooperative community was fading away, while new supportive social networks, like those of neighbors, friends and colleagues, as well as extended family and homeland networks, were taking shape. Within these communities women and children, the group to which the 20th century brought emancipation, were becoming increasingly independent, so that their role in the everyday life of their community was increasingly pronounced, their successes increasingly important and their defeats increasingly hard to accept. The new role of woman who was now entering the world of the labour force and public life, took shape simultaneously with the new role of man, who was more clearly turning to his family and becoming emotionally engaged in it. Social upheavals could mean the loss of old traditions and the adoption of new ones, transition from old rituals to new collective public events, the weakening of religious feelings and the acceptance of secularism, or a different understanding of religiousness. At the same time, literacy and the educational level of the population were on the rise, thus creating conditions for a greater openness of society and the mitigation of class differences. In the 1980s, the grandchildren of illiterate grandparents could play computer games. After growing up in fields or pastures, they could spend their youth working on an assembly line

or at an office desk. The transition from peasant clothes to civilian clothes and blue jeans, from the woman's more or less covered head to coloured hair and perms, from sleeping on straw to sleeping on a comfortable mattress, was very fast. The participants in all these changes included adults and their children who were, for example, mostly called Vesna, Snežana, Ljiljana, Zoran, Dragan and Goran in Belgrade in the 1960s, and Snježana, Gordana, Branka, Željko, Tomislav and Mladen in Zagreb at the very beginning of the 1970s. In many respects, their everyday life, like that of their parents and grandparents, has so far been studied historically, including related disciplines, but it is still necessary to deal with those processes and practices for which there exist only rare data and general notions handed down orally or in print.

APARTMENTS, HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES, A BETTER DIET...

During the past century, the housing situation improved for the majority of the population. In the inter-war period, the housing infrastructure outside cities was either poor or non-existent, lacking electricity, water and sewage connections. Living conditions in municipal workers' or peripheral settlements were poor. Life in the villages located in the northern part of the country was better, but in other regions those who had a bed of their own were rare. In the underdeveloped parts of the country, the bed was usually reserved for the head of the household, grandfather, sick person or small children, while numerous other household members slept on the floor, together with the animals in winter and outdoors in summer. A great wave of urbanization took place in the second half of the century when settlements with larger residential buildings and skyscrapers were built. New cities or larger urban complexes, such as New Belgrade, New Zagreb, New Gorica, Velenje and Split 3, were also built. From the aspect of urban planning, the reconstruction of Skopje after the disastrous earthquake of 1963 was especially successful. These new settlements were based on

contemporary urban planning and architectural concepts such as residential buildings with social amenities, surrounded by green areas and having no direct access to major roads. Kindergartens and schools, parks, health centers, trading and small-scale craft facilities were also built according to plan. The provision of additional amenities was often delayed, so that such parts of the city were often called dormitories: “People go home to the settlement only to eat and sleep, while for everything else they must go into town”. However, due to a higher percentage of young families and a greater number of children, their life was far from the usual notion of alienated urban life. Each year, from the early 1960s through the 1980s, 100–150 thousand apartments were built and one third of them was built by the socially-owned sector. These apartments were given to workers on the basis of their occupancy right acquired in the enterprises and institutions where they were employed. A survey shows that in the years of peak housing construction, that is, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, all three-member worker households had electricity, almost of them had water and sewage connections, one third had central heating and eight out of ten had a bathroom and toilet in the apartment. These above-average results were contributed to by certain rural areas and, occasionally, illegally built peripheral urban settlements. Namely, the state tacitly allowed the illegal construction of entire individual housing complexes in order to mitigate the housing problem among the fast-growing urban population. The state did not succeed in meeting the demand for telephone line connections fast enough. It often took years to get one, so the arrival of the telephone was a reason for celebration and calling up all and sundry to spread the happy news.

Until the mid-20th century, shifts in equipping apartments and houses with furniture and household appliances were modest. In 1938, the price of a kitchen table was equal to 70 percent of a salary on the first and second pay scale, which was received by every

tenth worker. An enamelled stove cost as much as the monthly salary on almost the highest, eleventh pay scale, which was received by every twentieth worker. Laundry was washed by hand and washing was often part of the social life of women who would take this opportunity to get together. Over time, cleanliness standards improved. Home and personal hygiene became increasingly important, especially in the 1960s when there appeared an automatic washing machine that cost as much as three times the average salary. Sales increased rapidly and by 1973 every third Yugoslav household had an automatic washing machine and by 1988 – two out of three households. This machine greatly facilitated housework, so that housewives could also do something else – pay more attention to their children or enjoy leisure time. It was increasingly supplemented by TV sets, record players and tape recorders. By 1973, every second household owned a TV set. In 1978, its price was equal to the average salary, and by 1988 a black-and-white or colour TV set was owned by 96 percent of non-agricultural households and 58 percent of agricultural households, which otherwise lagged behind in the purchase of household appliances. The TV set brought the greatest number of changes into family life; it assumed a central place in the living-room and became the most accessible source of entertainment in leisure time. The light of the TV screen brought together household members as the fireplace had done before. Other appliances also found their way to users, but at a different pace. Up to the end of the 1980s, a vacuum cleaner was used by two out of three households and a refrigerator by nine out of ten; an electric or gas stove was owned by all households and only a very few still used wood-burning stoves. During the same decade, meat shortages and purchases of larger amounts of meat through trade unions or from private sources enhanced the importance of freezer chests and drawers: “I cook a larger amount and then divide it into daily portions. I put everything in the freezer and everyone will reheat their portion later

on. If it weren't for this aid, I don't know how we would eat. The freezer chest is of the greatest help to me. I would sacrifice both washing machine and vacuum cleaner, but I couldn't give this up.”

Food supply problems, shortages and hunger were not only the result of wartime and post-war circumstances; they also depended on weather conditions and the situation in the countryside, which was the only or main source of supply. However, the problems also included overpopulation, fragmentation of land holdings, technological backwardness and the burden of debt. In the 1920s and 1930s as high a percentage as 75–80 of the population earned their living exclusively from agriculture. The years 1935, 1950 and 1952 were especially dry. During the first drought, hundreds of children from Lika, the Croatian coast, Dalmatia and Herzegovina were sent to regions north of the Sava. The wave of droughts in the early 1950s coincided with the already aggravated food supply and decline in agricultural production. Post-war hunger would have been even more pronounced if it had not been for shipments from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). From 1945 to 1952, the government resorted to rationed or guaranteed supply, dividing the consumers into categories and restricting the availability of goods, so that they could only be obtained by presenting a ration book. Thereafter, food supply was normalized, but the average food consumption and the energy values of foods were not satisfactory until the 1960s. According to the statistical data, consumption reached its maximum in 1982. Thus, per capita consumption included, for example, 149 kg of wheat products, 61 kg of potatoes, 96 kg of other vegetables, 52 kg of meat and meat products, 3.8 kg of fish, 101 l of milk and 187 eggs. Accordingly, daily consumption included about 16 dag of fruits and 15 dag of meat, as well as an egg every second day. The food industry gained great momentum in the second half of the century, while a modernized diet also included packet soups and cooking in the pressure cooker. Numerous

cookery books were published; there appeared TV shows giving cooking instructions, and recipes for the preparation of various dishes and cakes were exchanged. Travel and migration within the country contributed to the establishment of culinary linkages, the permeation of different tastes, the mixing of traditional cuisines and the formation of new food habits. Despite the existence of numerous restaurants and cafes, workers' canteens, school cafeterias, the first pizzerias and fast food restaurants, the main cooked meal was most often eaten at home with the family where the womenfolk were still in charge of food provision and cooking.

A RISE IN CONSUMPTION

Nutrition and hygiene greatly influenced the health of the population. In some parts of the country the rural population did not go to the doctor, at least not until the mid-century. They preferred to turn for help to quacks, herbalists and medicine men. Health culture and the availability of doctors in the first Yugoslavia were not sufficiently developed, so significant steps were taken towards changing people's understanding and modernizing the system, with the emphasis on prevention and hygiene activities, as well as the development of social medicine. In the late 1930s, 75 percent of the population was covered by social and health insurance, but the state succeeded in developing a system of two hundred or so hospitals and over five hundred social-medicine institutions, including institutes of hygiene and public health centres. However, the masses still remained without regular health care and were exposed to epidemics of tuberculosis, malaria, trachoma and other diseases.

The post-war development of medicine and health institutions made possible a greater availability of doctors and an almost five-fold increase in the number of hospital beds (in 1986 there were about 143,000), while all services were covered by mandatory health insurance. Regular medical check-ups and mandatory

vaccination of the population were also organised. Occupational medicine and an occupational safety system provided greater security for the employed. Pensions and homes for the elderly instilled confidence in end-of-life care. Thanks to better health and hygiene as well as improved socio-economic conditions, the estimated life expectancy for those born in the early 1980s was 68 years for men and 73 for women, that is, twenty or so years longer than that for the generations born in the 1940s. For the same reasons, infant mortality declined from 143 per thousand in the 1930s to 27 per thousand in the mid-1980s, ranging from 12.6 per thousand in Slovenia to 54.3 per thousand in Kosovo. In the mid-20th century, Yugoslavia underwent a demographic transition: the birth and death rates declined to 15 and 9 per thousand respectively. In the early 1950s, the higher level of development brought about family planning and expansion of the right to abortion. During the 1960s, Yugoslavia also experienced a sexual revolution, while a more liberal attitude toward homosexuality led to its legalization in some parts of the federation.

Trade modernization and the spread of consumer culture were largely changing the consumer's purchasing behaviour and attitude towards goods. Traditional trade at fairs and markets – implying direct buyer-seller relationships, negotiating prices, occasional exchanges of goods and an inevitable backdrop of noises, smells and colours – were preserved in rural and urban environments, but were not the only methods of purchasing goods. Green markets were the meeting place of the urban and rural, or industrial and agricultural worlds, which supplemented each other well since urban citizens needed goods from the immediate vicinity on a daily basis. In big cities there were department stores, which had been known as temples of consumer culture since the 19th century. They represented both selling and exhibition spaces and usually attracted middle-to-upper class customers. However, there were even more smaller and technically ill-equipped shops. In the

1920s, there were more than 100,000 shops of this type, while in the 1930s their number remained at about 86,000, which meant that there was one shop per 182 inhabitants or, more precisely, one food shop per 277 inhabitants. These ratios were two times better in comparison with only 40,000 shops in the post-war period. Due to reorganization and nationalization, their number decreased to 35,000 in 1955, but thereafter began to increase, reaching 100,000 in the late 1980s. Being used to communication with the seller who would show them goods, put them on the counter and collect payment, buyers were faced with an unknown and quite new method of sales when self-service shops appeared. The first such shop was opened in 1956, in the town of Ivanec in northern Croatia. Thus, strolling around the aisles, picking up industrially-packaged goods within close proximity and spending more time on shopping were becoming part of everyday life. In Yugoslavia, less than ten years after the opening of the first self-service shop, there were almost a thousand shops of this type, while in the second part of the 1980s there were seven times more. During the same period, the number of department stores increased at the same rate and exceeded the figure of 700. Modernization of the trade network and methods of sale formed part of the development of consumer culture, whose key features, especially among the upper and middle strata of the population, were already present in the inter-war period. However, consumer culture was only embraced by all strata during the period of higher economic growth and living standards, so that in the late 1950s and during the 1960s one could speak about the formation of a Yugoslav consumer society. At the popular music festival in Opatija in 1958, the winning song *Little Girl*, better known for its refrain *Papa, buy me a car... buy me everything!*, marked the beginning of the consumer revolution.

Daily shortages did not lastingly characterise Yugoslav trade. However, between 1979 and 1985, due to an economic crisis, there were shortages of oil, detergents, coffee, chocolate, corn cooking

oil, citrus fruits, hygiene items and the like. For the first time since the immediate post-war period, citizens waited in line and coped with the situation in various ways. Whatever could not be found in the country between the 1960s and 1980s came through private channels from abroad: people would travel usually to Italy and Austria, and make purchases within a day. Goods were also brought in by Yugoslavs working abroad and tourists. Customs officials at border crossings sometimes met women wearing fur coats in the summer heat, or men wearing several pairs of trousers. The earnings of about one million Yugoslav workers temporarily employed abroad flowed into domestic banks. In addition,, these workers were also bringing new life habits. However, an even stronger engine of consumerism was tourism.

TRANSPORT DEVELOPMENT AND POPULATION MOBILITY

Population mobility in this territory was poor. Life mostly unfolded in the vicinity of one's place of birth. The culture of travel began to develop only in the second half of the century. Up to then, the rural population would most often go only to a fair or for pilgrimage, usually on foot, or emigrate to European and overseas countries, or move within Yugoslavia as part of land reform and colonization. During the 1920s and 1930s, the number of rail passengers doubled and reached over 58 million. The maximum number was reached in 1965 – 236 million. Before the Second World War, there were more than 900 buses providing public transport services on almost 500 intercity lines. In the early 1950s, there were about 15 million bus passengers, while 30 years later there were even 70 times more – over one billion. The bus was absolutely the most popular form of public transport. For example, according to relevant data for the late 1970s and early 1980s, maritime transport services were used by up to about 8 million passengers each year, while air transport reached its peak in the second half of the 1980s, exceeding 6 million passengers. At that

time, the Yugoslav fleet operated about 250 routes with 50 planes. Most of the credit for these figures should be given to Yugoslav Airlines (JAT) which, as the key air carrier, connected 53 cities on five continents. Domestic passengers were attracted by such slogans as “The shortest route to the sun”, or “Turning a trip into a vacation”. The beginnings of the first scheduled passenger airline service, Aeroput, were much more modest. During the ten years of its existence, until the late 1930s, it increased its fleet to 14 planes and carried a modest number of more affluent passengers – about 13,000.

Down on the ground, roads still bore the burden of the greatest number of passengers, but during the inter-war period there were still no larger infrastructure investments. According to statistics, unpaved roads were prevalent until the early 1980s, although the first highway sections were constructed in the early 1970s. The country’s development level and way of life were unable to make possible anything more than a rather slow development of automobile culture. In 1938, only 13,600 cars and 7,700 motorcycles were registered, which means that horse carriages and occasionally bicycles were still the dominant modes of personal transport. After the Second World War, up to the 1960s, people most often drove motorcycles. In 1955, however, there appeared the *Zastava 750*, popularly called “*Fićo*”, “*Fića*” or “*Fičko*”, the first Yugoslav passenger car and the first product of cooperation between the Zastava factory in Kragujevac and the Italian Fiat, which were to roll down the assembly line for 30 years. The importance of this first car in the country’s motorisation was not even overshadowed by Zastava’s later basic models: *Zastava 101* or “*Stojadin*” produced in 1970, or *Jugo 45* produced in 1980. While the price of more expensive Western car models was equivalent to 40 or more average monthly salaries, a *Fića* and *Stojadin* cost 13 and 20 monthly salaries respectively in 1971. However, money was found and the country embarked on a fast motorization process

in which the car was becoming a status symbol. In 1970, one newspaper printed a photograph of a man from Sandžak with his car in front of a dilapidated shack after deciding to invest money first in a *Fića* and then in his home. It was also written about the residents of a Macedonian village on Mount Šar who kept their forty or so cars in the neighbouring town of Tetovo because their village had no connection to a road. In 1972, butcher Štef Galović told journalists that owning a car was not a luxury; it was his right after so many years of service. Many people were guided by precisely this principle. In 1961, there were as many as 238 Yugoslavs per passenger car, 10 years later – 24 and in the late 1980s – seven on average; in Kosovo there were as many as 23 persons per passenger car and only four in Slovenia. After being considered a luxury, owning a car was gradually becoming the sign of a common standard of living. However, it was still viewed as a striking consumption item and the most expensive asset kept outside one's safe home. It enjoyed the status of a pet or family member, so that it could often be found on family photographs. A car was treated with personal or family pride. Its owner purchased accessories for it, its engine was maintained and its body was polished. In return, it faithfully served its owners, helping them to carry out everyday tasks, whose pace and success were becoming increasingly dependent just on it, as well as to conquer new spaces during excursions and travels. Thus, it was becoming the symbol of freedom because one could travel by car almost everywhere at any time, regardless of public transport lines and timetables. Simply enjoying the ride became part of everyday life.

THE RISE OF TOURISM

If the culture of travel had not taken hold, such rides would not have been possible. At the time of the formation of the first Yugoslav state there already existed a good basis for the development of domestic tourism. It included the Adriatic coast, spas in the

interior of the country and regions with a tradition of mountaineering clubs and chalets. In 1923, the Putnik Travel Agency was established as a joint-stock company with the aim of “preparing travel programs and organizing tours, instructional people’s and other tourist travel within the country and abroad”. Four years later, it became a state-owned company and, as such, it restored its operations after the Second World War. A number of independent travel agencies sprang up from this first seed. Tourism did not occupy a special place in the inter-war economy and everyday life. During the 1930s, Yugoslavia was visited by about 900,000 tourists, spending about five million nights each year. In the years preceding the Second World War, domestic tourists constituted the majority, while one fourth were foreign tourists, mostly Germans and then Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, Italians, Britons and Austrians. Domestic tourists included middle-to-upper class holiday-makers, while the other urban population would stick to urban resorts, and seaside and freshwater bathing areas. In the 1920s, the sun-tanned body became the symbol of health and well-being. Otherwise, bathing and wearing a swimming suit in public were not easily accepted by the older generations. A defining moment for the popularisation of tourism was a new approach taken by socialist Yugoslavia by introducing paid annual leave and social tourism. The general workers’ right to annual leave for two to four weeks was introduced in 1946. Going on holiday was understood as an essential part of the standard of living and the right of the entire population. Social tourism anticipated preferential accommodation and transport rates, a holiday bonus, and workers’, children’s and youth holiday homes. Despite some remarks, many workers were satisfied: “Workers’ holiday homes are cheaper and make you feel more relaxed because around here there are mostly your friends and acquaintances. It is more comfortable than being with unknown people. In addition, everything is organised, so

that I don't have to think about anything. So you can spend comfortable and really carefree holidays.”

In the mid-20th century, many people traveled and saw the sea for the first time. The sea was the main holiday destination. Fascination with the sea was a frequent theme in popular songs and media, which regularly reported on the holidays of workers and domestic film, music and sports stars. One of many similar statements published in the domestic press was: “My most favourite encounter is with our blue Adriatic coast and I feel best when I swim.” Thanks to large investments, tourism grew rapidly until the record year of 1986 when over 111 million tourist nights were realised. According to their share of tourist nights, most domestic and foreign guests came from West Germany, Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United Kingdom, Austria and Italy. The surveys showed that during the period of late socialism every second citizen travelled somewhere on annual leave. These were mainly smaller families, better educated, with a higher income, and a permanent address in one of the larger cities in the interior of the country. Commercial and foreign tourism grew stronger during the 1960s when the country opened up to the West and when the importance of foreign exchange earnings from tourism was recognized. The proliferation of beds at private accommodation facilities and an increasing number of family houses exhibiting the sign “Zimmer frei” pointed to the change brought by tourism to the local population, especially on the Adriatic coast mostly in Croatia. With their consumer goods, behaviour and customs, foreign guests brought their hosts closer to the contemporary West, while well-appointed beaches, sports grounds, swimming pools, hotel restaurants and congress halls found a public purpose throughout the year.

In contrast to annual leave, the weekend had to wait to fulfil its complete role of weekly rest until 1965 when the working week was shortened to 42 hours by law. For most workplaces this

implied five 8-hour working days and one working Saturday per month, or working extra two hours once a week. A weekend was often extended by one or more adjacent non-working state holidays. In 1967, every fifth citizen of Zagreb would go on a hal-day or full-day excursion, while in the early 1980s every third Yugoslav used to go on weekend excursions, at least occasionally. People were most often forced to stay at home due to the lack of money or time or the habit or need to spend their leisure time in this way. Weekends were inevitably associated with weekend cottages, whose building began in the 1950s. By the 1980s this practice had spread among different strata of the population. These cottages were mostly built in the vicinity of large cities and industrial centres where they really served for spending short weekly holidays, breathing fresh, clean air and having a barbecue. For many people it was important to have a summer cottage at the seaside: "We live here 'on our own terms'. "It's simply different from being a tourist. It gives you a different feeling, a different attitude. You feel comfortable and free [...] You live life on your own terms."

IN THE RHYTHM OF THE CENTURY

Apart from excursions and travels during this century, popular culture was also increasingly penetrating leisure time, promoted by thousands of daily, weekly and monthly newspapers, as well as programs broadcast by radio stations (Radio Zagreb since 1926, Radio Ljubljana since 1928 and Radio Belgrade since 1929) and television stations (TV Zagreb since 1956, and TV Belgrade and TV Ljubljana since 1958). Foreign radio and television programs were also popular. Cinemas showed domestic, Hollywood and other foreign blockbusters; record companies were producing records and cassettes featuring domestic and foreign artists; and publishing companies were printing literary works by domestic authors as well as translated works by foreign ones. Apart from actors, singers and authors, star status was also enjoyed by

athletes. Sports events were watched live or through the media. Apart from professional sports, amateur sports were also developed, especially in the second Yugoslavia. Young people socialized with each other in the open, in city centres, dance halls and, finally, discotheques, turning evenings-out into nights-out and behaving in accordance with the selected subculture. From the 1960s onwards, leisure time was increasingly occupied by various hobbies, which reflected various life styles and were an increasingly important determinant of identity.

In 1938, the basic living costs per person amounted to 630 dinars each month or, more precisely, 1,500 dinars for an average worker's family consisting of 2.4 members. However, half of all workers earned less than the amount needed for only one person. So there was enormous dissatisfaction and strikes were frequent. In the 1920s, the share of food costs in the living costs of a four-member family in Zagreb amounted to about 40 percent. In the second half of the century, at the country level, a worker's four-member family had to earmark about 50 percent of its income for food, which still represented a high share. The lowest share, about 40 percent, was recorded in the late 1970s when the standard of living and purchasing power were at their highest level. In 1978, the average salary was 5,075 dinars, ranging from 4,084 in Kosovo to 5,903 Slovenia. If the consumer basket contained 1 kg of bread, 1 kg of sugar, 1 kg of beef, 1 kg of apples, 1 l of milk, an egg, a pair of men's shoes, a haircut and a movie ticket, it turned out that in 1978 the average salary could cover the cost of 8.4 baskets. Due to a drop in the standard of living ten years later, the salary could cover the cost of 5.7 baskets; in 1968 – exactly 8; in 1958 – 4.2 and in the pre-war year 1938 – only 3.8. This simplified example shows that in the late 1960s the average purchasing power was about double that of the pre-war year, and it went on increasing until 1978, when it reached highest level in the history of Yugoslavia. This picture of the increase in the standard of living will

become more complete if one takes into account the achieved level of technological development, high health and hygiene standards and higher educational level of the population. Should the question of progress be posed from the aspect of everyday life, it would be reflected in the wish for electricity, paved roads, a comfortable apartment or house, a marriage of love and not an arranged marriage, fertile land, job security, as well as the wish for the children to be better off in the future. It is precisely these issues that are conversation topics in the prize-winning feature film *Train Without a Timetable* (Veljko Bulajić, 1959): “There is also electricity and a state road over there, and you can have a radio in the house. It can play and sing for you all day long! Just like in a dream...” This dream was part of the changes brought by the 20th century to everyday life, including increased opportunities and needs. Yugoslavia was attuning the rhythm of the century to its own development level and political priorities.

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BENEFITS AND COSTS

VLADIMIR GLIGOROV

THE CREATION OF Yugoslavia was not motivated by economic or even social development, but its establishment was rather to serve the usual reasons of the state – above all security, but also equity. The latter, understood as the fulfillment of national – in the sense of ethnic – rights and objectives, was also the basis for its legitimacy. However, no durable agreement was ever reached on the constitutional framework of its national and Yugoslav legitimacy. In the pursuit of an equitable solution to its national issues, the country was in a state of perpetual crisis of legitimacy. This unfulfilled nationalism blocked its democratization and resulted in the adoption of misguided decisions, among others also in the domain of economic policy.

Both the economic and political history of Yugoslavia consists of a series of ill-advised constitutional decisions and then intermittent attempts to implement necessary reforms so as to rectify these decisions. These decisions would regularly go on to prove themselves as untenable since they were guided by the same, mainly ethnic or national motives. Some form of dictatorship was

always seen as justified, above all from the perspective of security. And then one form or other of territorial devolution was used to seek out equity for national-territorial and economic interests.

At the same time, the external circumstances were not favorable. The country needed (i) a liberal-democratic constitution in an era of rising nationalism; (ii) the development of a private-ownership-based economy open for exchange with the world in a time of growing protectionism and totalitarianism and (iii) the rule of law in revolutionary times. Favorable conditions for liberalization and democratization occurred only on the eve of the country's dissolution.

During the last couple of decades after the break-up, seven ex-Yugoslav states co-exist within a system of regional cooperation that suffers from the same shortcomings as the former common state. Thus the current situation seems as temporary and unnatural as any of the Yugoslav structures from the inception of the common state to its disappearance.

Even though the common state was conceived as a project in modernization, both national and social, the overall consequence of the Yugoslav political and economic explorations, which regularly brought about short-lived and misguided solutions, was backwardness, and not only economic at that. This failure should not be taken as proof against the project itself since neither before nor after the existence of Yugoslavia have political instability and a general lagging behind been removed. But history is not suitable for counterfactual evaluation, except when speculating about the future. In real time, let's say towards the end of the 1980s, the project of a democratic Yugoslavia was not inferior to its nationalist alternatives measured by what could be expected from those alternatives. But nationalisms prevailed, and this is now history, which needs to be explained. That the fall was so steep represents a challenge to that explanation. But that is a matter of political choice and not historical inevitability.

This text will deal with a historical overview of Yugoslavia's economic development and economic policy, with attention focusing on the period after 1948. First, I'll set out the theoretical framework then I'll show the most significant institutional and developmental characteristics, then outline above all the fiscal dilemmas of the joint state and finally, sketch out the economic development after the dissolution, that is, during the last few decades. Separately, in short asides, I'll focus on the financial crisis, the collapse of economic reforms from the 1960s, the stagnation of the 1980s, the unequal development of the new states, and the creation of a common market in 2006.

POLITICS BETWEEN NATIONALISM AND LIBERALISM

Political history is not completely positivistic since it is based at least on the tacit assumption that there are certain durable regularities, if not full-scale historical laws. These regularities exist for two reasons. One is the perpetual problems faced by those who make political decisions. On the one hand, there is the need to secure a certain level of public goods, above all security, and on the other, there are changing circumstances, which require adjustability in carrying out political objectives. The other reason is that constitutional or other government solutions constrain the available set of means which can be used to resolve durable political problems in changing external and internal circumstances. This primarily concerns the constitutional framework that is the basis for legitimacy, regardless of the fact how much support one government or another, one holder of office or another actually has.

On the other hand, economic history is at least partially autonomous in relation to political decisions and, in fact, is part of the changing circumstances that have to be taken into account in decision-making since both objectives and especially available means are subject to change. This is due to both the development of technology and changes in the significance and character of

external economic relations. Foreign trade and public finances are undoubtedly of great significance for small countries and small economies. Yugoslavia was certainly a small country, at least from the economic perspective. Even more so are the post-Yugoslav countries that emerged after the break-up of the common state.

Bearing in mind the political circumstances and the economic development of the 20th century, Yugoslavia represented a political solution from the standpoint of the basic political problem, the problem of security as a public good. The problem it perpetually faced, however, lay in the discrepancy between the nationalist conception of politics and the economic need for liberal relations both internally and externally. Consequently, the state could not secure the desired level of equity and justice and was confronted with social discontent regarding the level and distribution of wealth.

On the one hand, the country was supposed to reconcile the nationalist conception of equity with the liberal demands of economic development. The latter, in turn, spurred social discontent. The country fell apart when nationalism became the political expression of social dissatisfaction. At the same time, the liberal-democratic alternative was rejected. After the break-up, the sluggish and indecisive democratization and liberalization were the cause of a relatively unsatisfactory political and economic development, partly also due to misguided economic policy.

Therefore, the discord between nationalist objectives and liberal means is, simply put, the reason behind the perpetual instability of the Yugoslav state and the practically constant adoption of misguided, or at best, short-sighted political solutions.

A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT

The data on Yugoslavia's development is not unknown and therefore it is unnecessary to go into detail. Image 1 shows the GDP per capita in steady dollars. From 1921 to the outbreak of

This can also be seen by comparison with neighboring countries, all of which had successful economic growth in the period after World War II, before the end of 1970 and in the decade that followed. Irrespective of statistical problems, due to which comparisons are not always fruitful, there is no doubt that, for example, Greece, Hungary and Bulgaria, not to mention the more developed countries of Western Europe, also had accelerated economic growth and development.

In fact, the 1980s are the key here. Namely, in that period all socialist countries, including Yugoslavia, underwent economic stagnation and decelerated growth. This can also be seen in Table 1. In the period from 1979 to 1989 there is actually zero growth of per capita income. A similar situation prevailed in neighbouring Bulgaria and Hungary, but, for example, not in Greece. And if to this group we add Austria, it becomes completely clear that this stagnation was not a consequence of European, much less world, economic trends. In order to understand the break-up of Yugoslavia, this is certainly the most important political and economic period.

This is followed by the 1990s, which, up to 1993–1994, brought a reduction of economic activity by about roughly a half, even though it was about a third smaller than in the years 1979, 1989 and 1999. Recovery begins again after 2000 – and for all ex-Yugoslav countries together it is such that on the whole the levels from 1979 and 1989 are reached again. Nevertheless, one has to bear in mind the demographic changes, which are now negative, for a part of the population was lost due to the wars, due to a negative birthrate, and due to emigration. All the same, when the GDP per capita is in question, for about thirty years, for all ex-Yugoslav states taken together, it barely marked an increase. In other words, the country or countries had stagnated for practically three decades.

Finally, economic development ground to a halt or was significantly slowed down – if not completely negative – after 2008, as a consequence of the global financial crisis. Some ex-Yugoslav states

farred better than others – which in itself necessitates an explanation. In this context, the role of the liberalization of trade both with the European Union, as well as regionally by the establishment of a regional free trade zone known as CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement), was of great significance. The European Union had opened its market to those ex-Yugoslav countries that had not joined the EU like Slovenia in 2001. CEFTA, in turn, had inherited bilateral free trade agreements when it was established in 2006. In any case, one cannot stress enough the importance of foreign trade for these very small ex-Yugoslav economies.

In the century between the establishment of Yugoslavia and the present, development was either slow or unsustainable. In the entire period, however, there was no political stability either in Yugoslavia, or between the newly independent states, and not even within them internally. And this irrespective of the great, in reality revolutionary, changes and independently of the different constitutional reforms and political changes, including changes in economic policy. The common country, as well as the independent states, did not aspire towards democratization, while liberalization measures were often confronted by suspicion about who was better and who worse off. Non-democratic solutions and the non-liberal economic policy temporarily contributed to stabilization, but in the long run they signified the abandonment of a more durable political community. The consequence of this discord between nationalist interests and liberal means of economic development is the long-term lagging behind of the Yugoslav countries.

There is no simple explanation for this stagnation. Geographically, Yugoslavia is in the immediate vicinity of the developed world, so this backwardness, if one can call it such, could not be explained by geographic isolation from the advanced part of the world. Moreover, at least at the time of stagnation during the 1980s, external circumstances in fact favored the political changes that were necessary in order for the country to join the developed part of the world. So

that the lack of development and lagging behind, especially during the last forty years, can only be explained by the decisions made by the Yugoslav authorities, the authorities of the Yugoslav republics and autonomous provinces, and the authorities of the newly independent states – and not in the last resort by the citizens.

REGIONAL DIFFERENCES

Bearing in mind the permanent instability of the country, it is not unimportant to see whether dissatisfaction was based on the enduring bias of the political and economic system towards one or another region. Again, the data for development after World War II is better and more easily compared than the data for the period between the two great wars. Also, it can be analyzed more or less in detail. Still, a rough picture of comparative development can be gained on the basis of differences in per capita income.

Table 1: **GNP per capita in 1910** (US dollar exchange rate in 1970)

Germany	958	Dalmatia	650
Austria	810	Bosnia	546
Czech Republic	819	Croatia	542
Hungary	616	Serbia	462
Italy	546	Transylvania	542
Greece	455	Russia	398

Source: Palairret, The Balkan Economy. CUP, 1997. pp. 233.

For the period before the establishment of Yugoslavia there are varying assessments of differences in development and one of these is given in Table 1. The data for Slovenia and Macedonia is missing, but the differences in development could not have been too great because even the differences in relation to Austria and the Czech Republic are not as great as they would be later. In any case, regional differences, which were to dominate the (economic and political) debates in both Yugoslavias, do not appear to be such as to represent an insurmountable obstacle to creating a common state.

For the period between the two wars the quality of the data leaves something to be desired. This was due, among other things, to frequent changes in internal regions. Probably the most influential was the claim by Rudolf Bićanić that more developed regions, which had been a part of Austria-Hungary before the unification (of Yugoslavia), were paying higher agrarian land tax rates than Serbia, Montenegro and Dalmatia. Table 2 provides a cumulative review for the period before the Great Economic Depression.

Table 2: Land tax, 1919–1928

	Indirect taxes (in dinars mil.)	Percentage of the total tax	Tax per capita (in dinars)	Taxes in Serbia 100 dinars
Slovenia	1411	13,9	1336	240
Croatia and Slavonia	2123	20,9	915	160
Dalmatia	296	22,9	454	80
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1312	12,9	634	110
Vojvodina	2550	25,2	1864	330
Serbia and Montenegro	2420	23,9	559	100
Total or average	10.112	100	777	

Izvor: Bićanić

Differences in tax burdens would be the subject of political disputes throughout the entire history of Yugoslavia as the common country. An additional subject of disagreement was the expenditure of public funds in which it was usually claimed that greater investments are being poured into less developed areas – that is, into Serbia between the two wars – and fewer into the more developed. As agriculture was the dominant economic activity in the first Yugoslavia, data on different agrarian land tax burdens is undoubtedly significant. It is important to note that with time the budget was less dependent on indirect taxes – which included

agrarian land tax – and that these made up about 50 percent of the budget immediately after the establishment of the common state, falling to about a third of overall tax revenue before World War II, while the share in the budget from immediate taxes and revenues from state enterprises went up. Before the war the overall sum of the latter was just below from what it was from indirect taxes.

The main objection during that period, however, was that the tax burden of the more developed areas had increased in the transition from Austria-Hungary to the Yugoslav state. This undoubtedly continued to be a hot topic later as well when tax burdens in Yugoslavia were compared to the ones in the newly independent states. It must be said that it is not unexpected that a new state should invest more in its underdeveloped areas because it is reasonable to expect that regional differences should decrease after state unification. After all, this is the key economic rationale in establishing any common state. Therefore, this was to become the second most important topic of debate – could Yugoslavia secure the kind of economic growth that would lead to an evening-out of the level of economic growth in all of its regions, could it lead to a convergence in the per capita income levels?

The data is not reliable in the case of the first Yugoslavia, but since the overall growth was modest, it would not be realistic to expect that a particularly significant increase of regional differences had taken place. Besides, if and to the degree that it happened, the effects of negative international economic trends would in all likelihood have to be greater than any domestic redistribution of funds. This, of course, doesn't change the substance of the problem of equity, both as regards the less developed as well as the more developed regions because all expectations are that, in the long run, the state would secure a convergence of the levels of per capita income between the regions. To put it another way, it would be reasonable to expect that less developed areas have faster

economic growth than more developed areas in order to even out the levels of the standard of living throughout the country.

It is not very likely that this occurred in the first Yugoslavia, but the interesting question here is whether the second Yugoslavia secured faster economic growth for the less developed republics and provinces? This is the subject of enormous amounts of research, but the rough and very general answer is not particularly contentious. In other words, there was no obvious convergence in economic development between the particular regions. This can be seen in Table 3

Tabela 3: GDP per capita (Slovenia = 100, unless stated otherwise)

year	1952	1965	1974	1980	1989	1997 ¹⁾	1999 ²⁾
Slovenia	100	100	100	100	100	100	10.078
Croatia	66.7	65.8	62.5	64.1	64.1	48.0	6464
Vojvodina	49.1	60.9	58.0	57.1	59.6	24.3	6006
Serbia (minor)	56.7	52.2	48.0	49.5	52.0	18.9	5243
Serbia (with Vojvodina and Kosovo)	51.5	50.0	45.0	45.5	46.0	17.1	4632
Montenegro	48.5	41.3	34.0	39.9	36.9	16.1	3716
Bosnia and Herzegovina	52.6	39.1	33.0	33.3	34.3	10.2	3461
Macedonia	39.2	36.4	34.0	33.8	33.3	20.3	3359
Kosovo	25.7	19.6	16.0	14.1	12.6	5.1	1272

1) Data for 1997. refer to gross material product per capita for all Yugoslav republics (including Kosovo) and gross domestic product for other countries.

2) The actual GDP per capita (in USD according to the exchange rate) for Slovenia and the hypothetically achievable level of GDP per capita (in USD according to the exchange rate) for other republics, assuming that the differences in the region (measured according to the GDP per capita) are the same as in 1989.

Source: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies for 1997 and 1999 and the OECD for other years.

Slovenia's GDP per capita equals 100. As can be seen from the table, the Croatian per capita GDP was about two thirds of Slovenia's, the Serbian about half, the autonomous province of Vojvodina's about 60 percent, while the other republics and provinces trailed behind with roughly a third of Slovenia's per capita GDP. Kosovo lagged behind mainly because of its high birth rate – but its overall (economic) growth rate was even a little higher than in other parts of the country. The less developed regions underwent slower progress in the first period after 1952, which, at least in part, was due to isolation from external markets after the introduction of the so-called Iron Curtain. It is also important to note that there were no further negative consequences as regards their development, especially if one takes into account the demographic changes, after the changes in the economic system in the mid-1960s.

Generally speaking, one could not say that Yugoslavia had managed to secure convergent development for different parts of the country. In fact, particularly after the systemic changes in the mid-1960s, it seems that regional development, in better and worse times, was fairly balanced. Regional differences were not small – with the exception of Kosovo, up to a ratio of 1 to 3 – but such differences are not unheard of in many complex countries. However, the fact that over time they did not change significantly, and particularly that they were not significantly reduced, points to systemic deficiencies and also challenges the economic rationale of the political, especially the nationalist, disputes – the latter particularly if one takes into account the difference in employment and unemployment. Table 4 gives the rates of unemployment from 1952 to just before the break-up.


Table 4: Unemployment rate in %

	year	1952	1965	1974	1980	1989
Slovenia		1.8	1.7	1.4	1.4	3.2
Croatia		2.9	5.6	4.8	5.2	8.0
Serbia (minor)		2.5	7.4	11.3	15.8	15.6
Serbia (including Vojvodina and Kosovo)		2.6	7.1	11.5	16.1	17.6
Vojvodina		2.9	4.5	8.9	12.4	13.6
Kosovo		2.6	15.2	21.0	27.6	36.4
Montenegro		3.2	5.1	12.7	14.7	21.5
Macedonia		6.3	13.5	19.7	21.5	21.9
Bosnia and Herzegovina		1.5	4.8	9.7	14.1	20.3

Source: OECD

It is clear from the above that the less developed areas were, partly due to higher demographic activity, much worse off in terms of the labor market than the developed areas. In truth, the high unemployment rate that was especially prominent in the 1980s has remained a structural economic characteristic for the majority of the new independent states to this day. The causes are surely not the same, at least not entirely. It is important to point to the durability of low employment and high unemployment even in Croatia after it became independent, but it is particularly important to do so in the other regions and states. Slovenia is an exception here – and this is of notable significance in explaining the dissolution of the common country – because Slovenia was a leader among the secessionists, at least from around 1988. This casts doubt on the explanation for the country's break-up, which states that it is to be found in Yugoslavia's economic failure and the failure of its economic system, which was biased in favor of the underdeveloped regions and against the more developed ones.

Image 2: National income per capita



Source: Maddison database

After the break-up of the country, there was a great increase in regional differences, that is, in differences pertaining to the economic activity of the states that emerged from Yugoslavia. Table 3 also gives the state of affairs at the end of the 1990s, when these differences, due to the consequences of the wars, were the greatest. In the meantime there came about a relative convergence, which can partly be discerned from Image 2, but nevertheless today's differences are greater than in any period of Yugoslav history and if one is to believe the data from admittedly not very reliable sources, regional differences were also smaller before the establishment of the common state in 1918.

All in all, Yugoslavia was not a country with convergent economic development, but neither was it particularly biased, negatively or positively, towards the less developed areas, at least if we are to judge by the growth of the per capita income. The overall development, expressed as per capita income, can be seen pretty clearly in Image 2. The differences between the republics did not change significantly (Kosovo is the exception due to its demographic growth), and then increased in relation to Slovenia and later in relation to Croatia as well, while the others converged, especially with Serbia.

Concerning employment and social development, the less developed areas were on the whole lagging behind. A more detailed analysis would certainly show that development in different segments and particular fields was not unequivocal, especially where education and the development of industrial production are concerned, but this would not be of crucial importance in explaining stability and the sustainability of the economy and the state.

REFORM AND DEADLOCK

Most attention has probably been focused on studying the self-management system and the economic reforms of the mid-1960s. The motivation was as much political as it was economic. Finances from abroad also played an important role, as did bilateral aid and multilateral credits and finally access to the foreign financial market. The political limitation was maintenance of the one-party monopoly of power.

Generally speaking, socialist reforms followed the strategy – first economic, and then political reform – in other words, first liberalization of the market, and then democratization. The program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia from 1958 contains a clear ranking of alternative systems. A multi-party democracy was more acceptable than the Soviet system if socialist self-management and non-party pluralism proved to be unsustainable, in the sense that they are neither economically nor politically more progressive than alternative systems. One could, therefore, say that democratization was seen as the political exit strategy if it turned out that there was no other way to maintain political stability and economic development.

One problem was the nationalization of investments. A key systemic difference between capitalism and socialism was – and as a matter of fact, still is – who initiates investment decisions? The nationalization of assets was the precondition for the state to monopolize investment decisions. Investments were financed

from the profits of companies that were in state ownership on the basis of a central plan. This is the very essence of the Soviet system which was established by Stalin's collectivization and nationalization of the 1930s. In the beginning, self-management was seen as a transfer of the management role to the economic collectives, that is, companies. The reforms of the sixties brought about a change in ownership relations, state property became social property and thus the central, state-owned investment fund was abolished. With it went the system of central planning, too. The power to decide on investments was conferred, at least nominally, on the companies which themselves – albeit in the name of society – were owned by the workers employed in them. Finally, and probably most importantly, normal trade and financial relations with the world were established, mediated by commercial banks. This, in turn, necessitated conducting the usual monetary and fiscal policy.

The final motivation, however, was that the next reform and future economic and political adaptations would lead to privatization and democratization. And truly, with certain constitutional solutions and changes to the electoral system from the beginning of the sixties, it seemed as if things were starting to move in that direction. To this one should add the opening up of borders and an increase in international cooperation. All these systemic changes had a temporary character and the next changes were to involve privatization and democratization. At least, this is how things looked in the mid-sixties.

The reforms turned out to be a political failure. Their continuation was abandoned, while political changes took a completely different, if not unexpected, course. Privatization was stopped by the student protests of 1968, while democratization was halted by nationalist movements that threatened to bring about the break-up of the country, also occurring in 1968. The result was that the majority of economic changes were kept, although later certain elements of the economic system were modified so as

to harmonize with the political changes. The latter, on the other hand, went mainly in the direction of strengthening the republics and provinces at the expense of the federation. Of key importance here were the changes to the banking system and the system of public finances. In a sense, nationalization (by the republics and provinces – *trans.*) of assets and taxpayers came about.

The research, both foreign and domestic, most frequently focused on the wrong issues. Foreign economic research, which was extensive, focused with special intensity on the performance of self-management companies and their drawbacks that were to be expected if one started out from the assumptions of economic theory. On the other hand, domestic studies were devoted to the country's downgrading mostly from the legal or constitutional aspects, as well as to the shortcomings of a decentralized socialist system in which it was not possible to control wages or investments from a center, since the federation lacked above all the fiscal, but also political instruments necessary..

Of crucial importance, however, was the relinquishing of further democratization, which came about in order to preserve stability – and was achieved by a return to authoritarianism and by a redistribution of national competencies. A debate similar to the one conducted in the first Yugoslavia, above all after the territorial reorganization of 1939, was renewed. This turnabout also determined the political disputes and their solutions which ultimately led to the break-up of the country.

How did a system created to stop economic reforms function? During the 1970s, monetary policy was mainly used to make sure that the economy did business with a negative real interest rate. This was a key macroeconomic fact. As the federal government had very limited powers in the domain of fiscal policy, monetary policy was the most important instrument of overall economic policy. Details are not of paramount importance; it is sufficient to point out that interest rates were lower than the rate of inflation

in conditions of what was practically a fixed rate of exchange. As a consequence, this led to an increase of investment and spending, financed by foreign loans and a growth in imports. As money was cheap globally in the seventies, this kind of economic policy was not at odds with what was going on, not only in the developed countries of the world, but in some socialist countries as well. Yugoslavia probably fared better than most because its foreign debt was to a large degree funneled into investments, while in other socialist countries, for example the Soviet Union, it was directed towards spending (on wheat imports, for example). Nevertheless, a great disparity in the trade balance developed, while foreign debt accumulated. All the way up to the economic crash of the eighties.

The economic system created in the mid-sixties was supposed to increase the efficiency of investments and spur competitiveness on foreign markets. The sum of reform measures undertaken then were not that different from those undertaken by countries at the time of abandoning socialism at the end of the eighties and beginning of the nineties. The regime of the foreign exchange rate was balanced out, central banks were empowered to deal with inflation, while the fiscal system was meant to secure the sustainability of public finances. Finally, commercial banks were established that took deposits in hard currency and gradually became capable of taking out foreign loans and financing the investments of domestic companies. Direct foreign investments were not possible, and neither were private domestic investments – shortcomings that were intended to be eliminated at a later date. The system thus established was capable of recycling foreign assets, as well as of monetary subsidies to the economy – which in fact it did do once further reforms were relinquished. So the system that was established to increase the efficiency of the economy was ultimately used to sustain self-management companies, national budgets and buying stability by increasing spending.

The seventies were the time when this system produced favorable results. Much research sees this period – and the short period of Ante Markovic’s government in 1990 – as the golden age of Yugoslavia. The dinar was strong, imported goods were accessible, investments raised the economy’s capacities, and in the infrastructure was partially renewed or enlarged. Remittances from abroad also made a certain contribution since in the sixties a great number of workers had emigrated to Germany and other countries that enjoyed faster growth than there was available work force. Thus a macroeconomic system was established that in certain elements persisted mainly in Serbia up until the crisis of 2008–2009.

FOREIGN TRADE

Judging by the data of the Yugoslav National Bank, the balance of trade in the first Yugoslavia was on the whole equalized. The economy was pretty closed, measured by the ratio of imports to exports and domestic production. It was a matter of some ten percent, that is, around twenty if overall foreign exchange was taken into account. In part this was a consequence of the economic trends immediately after World War I, when inflation was a problem throughout Europe, and then came the Great Depression when foreign trade was reduced everywhere. In later years, the state attempted to utilize protection measures, which curtailed imports, but also exports since there would occasionally be a ban on exporting agricultural goods, which was the most important export commodity.

In the second Yugoslavia, financing from abroad played a significant role and thus imports were on the whole greater than exports. Still, the trade deficit began to be significant only after the economic reforms of the sixties, and became particularly so after the political stabilization at the beginning of the seventies. Apart from the policies of the exchange rate (relatively stable) and of prices (accelerated inflation), a significant role was played by increasing remittances from abroad. Also, in the second half of

the seventies especially, loans taken abroad also played a significant role. By the end of the seventies, exports covered imports by about 50 percent. The balance of services was positive due to transit revenues, as well as growing tourism, so that, if remittances from workers abroad are taken into account, the current account of the balance of payments showed a lesser deficit. This characteristic will endure in the majority of the newly – independent states, at least until the crisis of 2008–2009.

Table 5: Trade flows in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Including end products and intermediate goods)

Placement on the local market, in % GDP				
	1970	1976	1983	1987
Slovenia	53,6	60,9	42,4	57,5
Croatia	62,6	66,1	59,7	67,0
Vojvodina	49,0	58,8	54,8	58,1
Serbia (minor)	58,9	64,0	52,1	62,3
Serbia (incl. Vojvodina and Kosovo)	67,0	71,3	60,9	69,0
Montenegro	50,8	59,9	54,4	57,5
Bosnia and Herzegovina	50,5	61,4	49,1	56,1
Macedonia	63,2	61,9	55,3	60,8
Kosovo	57,6	56,8	58,2	64,6
YUGOSLAVIA TOTAL	58,6	63,0	53,4	62,2

Placement in other regions, in % GDP				
	1970	1976	1983	1987
Slovenia	28,7	22,0	15,7	20,3
Croatia	21,8	19,0	14,8	18,7
Vojvodina	40,1	30,1	22,5	28,8
Serbia (minor)	23,7	21,1	16,5	17,4
Serbia (incl. Vojvodina and Kosovo)	18,0	14,8	10,9	13,4
Montenegro	40,6	22,6	21,0	25,0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	36,6	22,7	18,6	24,2
Macedonia	23,1	23,1	18,1	21,4
Kosovo	34,7	25,7	19,2	24,0
YUGOSLAVIA TOTAL	26,3	21,9	16,6	19,9

Export, in % GDP	1970	1976	1983	1987
Slovenia	17,7	17,1	41,9	22,2
Croatia	15,6	14,9	25,5	14,3
Vojvodina	10,9	11,1	22,7	13,1
Serbia (minor)	17,4	14,9	31,4	20,3
Serbia (incl. Vojvodina and Kosovo)	15,0	13,9	28,2	17,6
Montenegro	8,6	17,5	24,6	17,5
Bosnia and Herzegovina	12,9	15,9	32,3	19,8
Macedonia	13,7	15,0	26,6	17,8
Kosovo	7,7	17,5	22,6	11,4
YUGOSLAVIA TOTAL	15,1	15,1	30,0	17,9

Source: OECD

Table 5 contains data on domestic and foreign trade. As can be seen, the domestic market was certainly much more important than the foreign market, a characteristic which will again persist even after the break-up of the country, albeit not in Slovenia, while things begin to change under the influence of the crisis of the eighties. The role of this crisis is also visible in Table 5.

Table 6 : Trade in Southeast Europe (1980–1985)

country to/from	Exports in % of total value			Imports in % of total value		
	Bulgaria 1980.	Romania 1981.	Yugoslavia 1985.	Bulgaria 1980.	Romania 1981.	Yugoslavia 1985.
Bulgaria	—	1.4	1.5	—	1.7	1.0
Romania	2.2	—	1.2	1.9	—	1.0
Yugoslavia	1.6	—	—	1.1	—	—
Austria	0.9	2.0	2.5	1.7	1.8	3.3
Germany ¹⁾	2.6	7.2	8.4	4.8	5.7	13.6
Greece	3.8	2.5	1.4	0.5	0.8	0.9
Hungary	1.9	2.0	2.8	1.9	2.0	2.4
Italy	1.4	3.3	9.2	1.4	2.0	8.5
USSR	49.9	18.1	30.5	57.3	18.2	15.5
Turkey	1.1	—	—	0.1	—	—
SEE-1 ²⁾	5.7	3.4	5.5	4.9	3.7	4.4
SEE-2 ³⁾	10.6	6.0	6.9	5.6	4.5	5.3

1) West Germany

2) SEE-1 (Southeast Europe – 1) Includes Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia.

3) SEE-2 (Southeast Europe – 2) Includes SEE-1 with Greece and Turkey..

Source: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies

Right after the outbreak of the crisis at the beginning of the eighties, exports show a significant growth in relation to GDP. Moreover, this whole decade will show a much more equalized trade balance than the previous decade. The overall picture becomes even better if we add the export of services, which became very significant with the development of tourism. Generally speaking, if overall foreign exchange is taken into account, Yugoslavia in the period after the economic reforms (of the 1960s) was trade-wise a significantly more open country than the majority of the successor states after the break-up, but before the crisis of 2008–2009.

Table 7: Trade in Southeast Europe (1990.)

country to/from	Exports in % of total value			Imports in % of total value		
	Bulgaria	Romania	Yugoslavia	Bulgaria	Romania	Yugoslavia
Bulgaria	—	1.9	0.7	—	2.3	0.8
Romania	3.9	—	1.2	1.3	—	0.6
Yugoslavia	1.0	—	—	0.9	—	—
Austria	0.5	1.2	4.0	1.6	1.7	5.8
Germany ¹⁾	4.2	11.0	17.1	10.4	11.4	19.3
Greece	0.8	1.5	1.5	0.3	0.7	1.1
Hungary	1.2	2.6	1.4	0.7	2.4	2.6
Italy	0.8	8.8	17.3	1.9	1.2	13.0
USSR	64.0	25.2	18.6	56.5	23.6	13.0
Turkey	0.4	—	—	0.2	—	—
SEE-1 ²⁾	6.1	4.5	3.3	2.9	4.7	4.0
SEE-2 ³⁾	7.2	5.9	4.8	3.4	5.4	5.1

1) Including West and East Germany

2) SEE-1 (Southeast Europe – 1) Includes Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia.

3) SEE-2 (Southeast Europe – 2) Includes SEE-1 with Greece and Turkey.

Source: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies

It is also interesting to note the change in trade partners during the crisis of the 1980s. Tables 6 and 7 contain some comparative data. The second half of the eighties sees a significant increase of exports to Germany and Italy, which will go on to become the most significant trade partners of the newly-emerged independent states as well. Imports from these two countries were already significant earlier. In any case, Yugoslavia had an increasingly open economy in the period after the economic reforms of the sixties.

THE LOST DECADE

The eighties were of key significance not only for Yugoslavia, but for the European socialist world as a whole. If we look at Images 1 and 2 it is clear that this was a decade in which the economy stagnated. From Tables 3 and 4 it can be seen that certain republics fared better than others, especially where employment was concerned. But in terms of economic growth there is practically little difference between the regions. The case was similar with other socialist countries, even though the reasons were different. In some, like Yugoslavia, the problem was high foreign debt, while in others it was the drop in prices of oil and other raw materials.

Yugoslavia practically went bankrupt in 1981–1982 because it was unable to pay back its foreign debt. The reason for this was that monetary policy had changed in the United States and there was a sudden jump in interest rates. Given that at the time the foreign trade deficit of Yugoslavia was really huge, the further financing of imports through foreign loans was not sustainable and thus it was necessary to rebalance imports and exports. Furthermore, it was necessary to secure the refinancing of already existing loans at much higher, and from the position of the country's trade capabilities, unsustainable interest rates. A reduction of the foreign trade deficit required a significant correction to the dinar exchange rate, while financing of debt called for finding new sources of revenue. The country, however, could not adapt quickly enough and actually never managed to fully adapt all the way up to its very breakup. Why?

The reason was of a systemic nature. It is necessary to bear in mind three key characteristics.

The first was the dispute over the dinar exchange rate. Devaluation would redistribute expenditures among the republics. The issue of hard currency earnings from tourism was particularly sensitive. The export sector, especially tourism, would certainly gain from devaluation, while sellers on the domestic market

would be worse off. There was no mechanism of compensation, mainly because the fiscal system had changed significantly in the meantime so that the federal budget no longer had the necessary means to compensate those who fared worse from revenue achieved by taxing those who fared better. The central bank used the hard currency rate of exchange and selective lines of credit to compensate, but this only increased the disputes because the terms were inequitable in a matter that should have been equitable. In fact, in this way the central bank incurred obligations that could then easily be turned into losses and thus into fiscal expenditure for the republics and provinces.

The second characteristic was the expectation that credit would be worth less when it became payable because a negative interest rate would be ascribed to it. In conditions of loss of value of the exchange rate, it would have been necessary for inflation not to compensate corrections to the nominal exchange rate. This would have, however, required a significant change in the behavior of companies, which, in turn, did not show a willingness to sacrifice implicit subvention through accelerated inflation. And so the entire decade was marked by losses in the exchange rate and a parallel acceleration of inflation. The correction of the trade deficit was more a consequence of the inability to finance it and less a result of exchange rate and monetary policies.

The third characteristic is probably the most important. As a consequence of social and national resistance to economic reforms, one was precluded from selling property as a means to finance foreign debt. At the beginning of the crisis in 1981–1982, foreign debt made up less than a third of the overall Yugoslav product. Interest rate obligations were not small, but they in no way exceeded several percentage points of the domestic product. It would have been relatively easy to turn the debt into foreign investment if companies had been allowed to issue shares so as to secure the necessary financing. This was not feasible because of the ownership system

which precluded the sale of property, especially to foreigners, but also to private individuals in general, and because it could also lead to the spilling-over of obligations and profits across the borders of republics and provinces, which was politically very hard to swallow. It was not until 1988 that agreement was reached with the International Monetary Fund about solidarity in sharing responsibility for the foreign debt of the country.

These obstacles to a relatively quick solution to the problem of foreign debt made it very difficult to start up economic production in improved macroeconomic conditions, which ultimately resulted in the economy stagnating for a whole decade with the constant acceleration of inflation and growth of the unemployment rate. Only at the end of 1989 the government of Ante Marković embarked on changing these systemic characteristics, which in the short term led to improved economic trends in 1990, but also to a renewed economic crisis at the end of that year and finally to the break-up of the country in 1991.

During that entire decade, the advocates of liberal economic solutions and democratic political legitimacy could not garner public support for the necessary changes while, at the same time, the influence of the nationalists grew until they finally prevailed in Serbia, after which the break-up of the country was inevitable. The more developed republics repeatedly highlighted the inequity of the fiscal system, which was the alleged cause of the overspill of their assets to less developed regions, while in Serbia the interest in new territorial delimitation along ethnic lines prevailed. While fiscal problems were solvable, territorial delineation along ethnic lines naturally signified the end of the common state.

BREAKDOWN AND SETBACK

Practically from the very inception of the common state, the distribution of gains and expenditures between its constituent parts was the key topic of debate and dispute. The constitutional

framework was never accepted by certain national (ethnic) communities and in certain places local control of the territory was disputed. In the economic domain, the fiscal system was deemed inequitable by practically all sides. In the end, the country broke apart over the dispute of who was paying how much into the common coffer. This, of course, was just the rationalization. However, this dispute was to be expected given that the diminishment of fiscal powers by the federal government had been a key demand from 1968 up to the break – up itself. There was thus first a fiscal devolution, which was thoroughgoing and practically complete, and then the Fund for the Underdeveloped, which was practically the only remaining fiscal instrument for the reallocation of assets, became the focus of disputes, and then finally even the central bank, which intervened with selective credits thus causing different regional consequences, became a contentious issue.

What was the specific problem with the Central Bank and the banking system as a whole? In the period of adaptation to the crisis of foreign debt during the eighties, the financial picture changed in such a way that the developed republics had a trade surplus in exchange with the less developed republics and the province of Kosovo. In other words, the country had divided itself into creditor and debtor republics. The financial significance of Slovenia grew markedly. In part this was a consequence of the Fund for the Underdeveloped, even though it was precisely the more developed republics, above all Croatia and Slovenia, which sought its abolishment. However, to the degree that money really moved from, let's say, Slovenia to Macedonia, goods followed the money, too. So the republics that had paid more money into the Fund for the Underdeveloped and then left it were also the republics who sold more of their goods to the less developed republics and the province of Kosovo. This was simply the domestic balance of payments: that domestic trade was financed by credits from the more developed republics, turning them into creditor republics, while the lesser

developed regions became the debtors. Because of this financial asymmetry, measures that would in one way or another assist the financial recovery of the debtors were not acceptable to the creditor republics. But if the balance of power at the level of the federal government had changed, that could have become feasible.

In this context, the rise of nationalism in Serbia was of special concern. The motives of the Serbian nationalists were neither economic nor predominantly financial (apart from personal interest, of course). Instead, they sought a change in the balance of power at the federal level with the objective of revising the existing constitution and making possible territorial corrections. And truly, the Serbian nationalist movement was a combination of anti-liberal social demands from 1968 and nationalist territorial demands above all towards the provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo – *trans.*), but implicitly also towards other regions (in other republics) populated by Serbs (so-called ‘Serbian lands’ – *trans.*). These political objectives brought about the break-up of the country. But the country never functioned well economically either, and the necessary reforms were not in harmony with any of the Yugoslav actors’ nationalist interests.

COSTS OF THE BREAK UP

The nineties were economically bad for all the states that emerged out of Yugoslavia except for Slovenia. There was a disruption of trade ties, except for those within the rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro – *trans.*), and between Bosnia-Herzegovina and neighboring Serbia and Croatia, but the scope of that exchange was significantly less than before the break-up and the wars. Table 3 shows the difference of the real per capita income in relation to the income that would have been achieved had long-term relations with the Slovenian economy been maintained. So that during the nineties all other emerging Yugoslav countries started lagging significantly behind Slovenia, but also

behind other European countries. From Image 2 it can be seen that in practically all the newly-emerged Yugoslav states the level of the per capita income at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century was on a par with the level achieved during the seventies or eighties (given that the eighties were marked by stagnation). In other words., the countries in question had lost about three decades of development. If we take into account that the bigger countries – Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina – did not achieve visible growth in the period from 2008 until today, then we can even talk about four decades of stagnation. Only Slovenia had positive growth, even though by certain indicators, today it too is further away from the European developed countries than it was at the end of the seventies or the end of the eighties.

All in all, it is difficult to talk about the economic benefits of leaving Yugoslavia. Furthermore, if one is to compare tax burdens, especially bearing in mind the gains of such tax expenditures, and putting aside defense spending, which in the second Yugoslavia was considerable and today is much reduced, it is difficult to claim that the newly-emerged states are less of a burden to the taxpayers and the economy. It neither runs counter to logic nor simple fact that smaller states pose a greater burden on taxpayers (with the exception of micro-states, but only Montenegro qualifies as such), simply for reasons of the economy of scope.

Finally, in terms of democratization and liberalization, the newly-independent states, with the exception of Slovenia, are more restricted than Yugoslavia, or at least this has only started to change very recently. Democratization is incomplete and a few of the newly-emerged states are going through a constitutional limbo. Slovenia and Croatia have become European Union members, a fact that has a stabilizing effect on the economy and on political relations, but the rest of the former Yugoslavia has not achieved a more durable stabilization of the democratic system of decision-making.

REGIONAL COOPERATION

After the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and particularly after the war in Kosovo, the international community, especially the United States and the European Union, formulated a policy of regional cooperation with the idea that increased economic cooperation would bring about political stabilization and normalization. The European Union has invested substantial effort in mobilizing interest in regional cooperation principally among the former Yugoslav states. Probably the most important such regional project is the regional free trade zone known as CEFTA. It was established in 2006 after existing bilateral agreements on free trade developed into a regional agreement. The European Union additionally supported this project by first removing customs barriers on imports from the Yugoslav countries, and then concluding with them Agreements on Stabilization and Association which would ultimately lead to European Union membership. With CEFTA and free trade with the European Union, liberalization finally prevailed in the newly-emerged Yugoslav states.

What is the possible contribution of liberalization to economic development? This is particularly interesting because the crisis that took hold of the Yugoslav states from 2008 up to the present has a lot in common with the crisis from the beginning of the eighties. In the same way, the period that preceded the crisis has much in common with the period from the seventies. Thus these two distinct crisis periods and their consequences are comparable.

Development after 2000, which represents a kind of new beginning for the entire region since both (Croatian strongman) Franjo Tuđman and (Serbian strongman) Slobodan Milošević exited the political stage, has the same characteristics of uneven progress as the period of the seventies. Trade deficits increase, foreign debt becomes greater, and unemployment has not been reduced to an acceptable level.. The last is noteworthy among other things because many explanations for the growth of unemployment

in Yugoslavia after the economic reforms (of the sixties) can be understood differently today.

Back then explanations saw the growth of unemployment as caused by institutional factors, especially by the system of self-management. Namely, employees as owners have an interest in increasing investments and not increasing the number of employed because that way they increase their own income, which apart from their salary also partakes in the company profits.. This should explain the growth of capital in relation to labor and the limited mobility of the labor force. Nevertheless, when one looks at development in the majority of European post-socialist or transition countries, one notices that the tendency for economic growth to be based on growth in productivity and not growth in employment, is present everywhere. This makes sense if the development in question is financed by foreign assets, as was to a large degree the case in Yugoslavia after the economic reforms because investments will be turned into the most productive technology, due to which, again, employment will grow at a slower rate, particularly if it is a question of those employed in the state sector being pre-qualified for work in the new industries or the services sector. So that in transition economies, and such at the outset was the Yugoslav economy after economic reforms, productivity takes precedence over employment. This to a large degree also occurred in the emerging Yugoslav states in the first decade of the 21st century. Growth was mainly based on productivity, while employment even showed a tendency to shrink.

Therefore the problem lay not in unemployment, but rather in the economic sectors in which investments were directed. During the seventies, Yugoslavia invested in industry, but not an insignificant part of the foreign debt went into spending. Additionally, efficiency was a problem due to negative interest rate subsidies. By contrast, most emerging Yugoslav states, except for Croatia and Montenegro, made use of the post-2000 period of low

interest rates mainly to invest in non-export services. As a result, by and large foreign debt was directed into the production of non-exchangeable goods and into spending. Ultimately, all the former Yugoslav countries faced the financial crisis of 2008 with high foreign debt. Just as at beginning of the eighties, the refinancing of these debts was made difficult, not so much by the higher cost of loans, but by the need for foreign creditors to put their own finances into order. And so the entire region found itself in a similar situation to the one from the 1980s, with the difference that there was now little leftover property, the sale of which would help cover the debts. Thus it was necessary to correct the exchange rate where it was overvalued, or cut spending, by reducing employment if there was no other way, leading to a leveling-out of the current balance of payments with greater exports and reduced imports. This is a process that has been underway for almost a decade in the new Yugoslav states, which, time-wise, is similar to the eighties.

Here it is important only to see what the role of a more liberal trade framework is in relation to the one from the 1980s. The existence of a regional free trade zone was certainly helpful, for it preserved the level of trade inherited from the period prior to 2008. However, access to the market of the European Union had significantly more impact. In the period from 2008 to 2016, all the new Yugoslav countries increased their exports from 30 to 60 percent, with imports stagnating at a level close to that of 2008. The advantage of liberalization today in relation to resistance against it during the eighties certainly influenced adaptability to the crisis. Even though the key problems – foreign trade deficits and foreign debt – are the same.

However, it is worth pointing out that, irrespective of the above, the European Union is increasingly unpopular, that nationalism is on the rise, and that regional cooperation has occurred in spite of, and not as a consequence of, the policies of the new Yugoslav states.

CONCLUSION

Yugoslavia did not succeed in achieving liberalization and democratization, but it was not an obstacle to them either since the newly-emerging states after its dissolution have not displayed a durable affinity for liberal measures or sustainable democracy, nor, for that matter, for regional cooperation either. However, circumstances have changed and so far nationalist and authoritarian forces have not prevailed as they did when they dissolved the joint state. The economic cost of non-liberal and nationalist politics is permanent backwardness due to their unsustainability in conditions of modern development.

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FROM THE ART OF a NATION TO THE ART OF a TERRITORY

NENAD MAKULJEVIĆ

ART AND CULTURE have great significance in the creation of nations and national identities. Art was understood as the embodiment of the national spirit and testimony to its existence, as well as a means for creating a nation. The historical processes of creating Yugoslav art and culture, as well as their fates show just that. The rise and fall of the idea of Yugoslav art occurred during three different historical periods – the period until the unification in 1918, in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia and in the socialist Yugoslav state. The dynamics of the emergence and duration of the idea of Yugoslav art was determined by different political contexts, which never completely interrupted the initiated processes.

UP TO UNIFICATION

The idea of South Slav unity is closely associated with the idea of Yugoslav culture and art. Cultural closeness, understood in the broadest sense, as well as a common space and historical fates contributed to the building of togetherness among the South Slavic peoples. The Yugoslav “Kulturation” gradually took shape within

the scope of the numerous activities of intellectual and cultural elites, individuals and organisations during the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Cooperation between the South Slavic literary and cultural elites began to develop in the first half of the 19th century. National liberation struggles against different invaders, oral tradition and epics, the revolution of 1848, linguistic connectivity and the emergence of pan-Slavic ideas contributed to the recognition and revelation of a common culture of the South Slavic peoples. Over time, South Slavic cultural interconnectivity brought about the creation of a cultural context and network in which a prominent place was assumed by the most prominent cultural figures. Authors such as Vuk Karadžić, Jernej Kopitar and Petar II Petrović Njegoš became well known and gained recognition in various cultural centers – Zagreb, Belgrade, Ljubljana and Novi Sad, thus contributing to the mutual rapprochement of the South Slavic peoples.

The first idea of Yugoslavism coincided with the emergence of the idea of the development of Yugoslav fine arts. The Croatian historian Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski was the first to undertake encyclopedic work in the field of fine arts among the South Slavs. He wrote *Slovník umjetnikah jugoslavenskih* (*A Lexicon of Yugoslav Artists*) presenting the knowledge about Croatian, Serbian, and Slovenian artists. It was published in five volumes from 1858 to 1860. As he emphasized, the idea was to compile the first lexicon of South Slavic artists, since there were no other people, except the Slavs, who had no art history and that “the knowledge and education of every people are judged on the basis of their scientific and art history”.²⁶ It is evident that, in accordance with the dominant ideas of his time, Sakcinski advocated the opinion that national and cultural affirmations were closely related and that art history could contribute to nation-building. He carried out the work on *Slovník*, including the

26 I. Kukuljević, Sakcinski, *Slovník umjetnikah jugoslavenskih*, Zagreb 1858, Predgovor (Foreward), unpaginated.

gathering of material and preparation of the lexicon for publication, in cooperation with other South Slavic intellectuals, writers and artists. As for the artists' lithographs, he said that they were made by "our prominent painter and lithographer, Anastas Jovanović Bugarin".²⁷ Sakcinski's activity was of great significance because it laid the groundwork for Yugoslav art history.

During the second half of the 19th century a cultural rapprochement among the South Slavic peoples continued. At the initiative of Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer, the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts (JAZU) was founded in Zagreb in 1866. It was the first scientific and cultural institution bearing the designation "Yugoslav" in its name. Strossmayer also manifested his commitment to the Yugoslav idea in the paintings commissioned for Đakovo Cathedral. Members of South Slavic peoples are depicted in the compositions of the *Adoration of the Magi*, *Last Judgement* and *Lamentation of Christ*. The events in Herzegovina and Montenegro also played a part in strengthening the Yugoslav idea in the artistic world. Representations of the uprisings and struggles against the Ottoman Empire popularized the peoples in those territories among the South Slavs and beyond. Artists such as Đura Jakšić, Ferdo Kikerec and Jaroslav Čermak were inspired by these events. Strossmayer bought Čermak's painting *The Wounded Montenegrin* and donated it to the JAZU Gallery.

The idea about Yugoslav cultural unity reached its highest point in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. One of its manifestations was the joint Serbian-Slovenian funeral festivity, involving the transfer of the bodies of Jernej Kopitar and Vuk Karadžić from St Marx Cemetery in Vienna to Ljubljana and Belgrade respectively. In October 1897, the exhumation and transfer of their bodies were organized by the Serbian Royal Academy and Slovenska

27 I. Kukuljević, Sakcinski, *Slovník umjetnikah jugoslavenskih*, Zagreb 1858, Predgovor (Foreword), unpaginated.

Matica (Slovene Society). This public manifestation was the testimony to strong South Slavic interconnectivity, based on cultural cooperation.

The year 1904 played a major role in the development of the Yugoslav cultural idea since it brought a great political change in the Kingdom of Serbia. The royal throne was mounted by Peter I Karađorđević, while state cultural policy began intensively to promote the Yugoslav idea. Yugoslavism was already highlighted during the coronation celebrations and served as propaganda for King Peter I Karađorđević.

The First Yugoslav Art Exhibition was organized on the basis of the idea and advocacy of Mihailo Valtrović, a renowned professor at the Great School, about the joint exhibition activity of Yugoslav artists. The exhibition was formally organized by the Great School students in Belgrade, but its initiators were Valtrović and his younger associate, archeologist Miloje Vasić. The Serbian state stood behind the organisation of the whole event. The exhibition was staged on the premises of the Great School in September 1904. It was opened by King Peter I Karađorđević and the works were exhibited by Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian and Bulgarian artists. The exhibition was of crucial importance. It demonstrated the unity of Yugoslav artists, new artistic trends were presented to the public and the paintings of Croatian, Serbian and Slovenian artists were bought for the Yugoslav Gallery in the National Museum in Belgrade.

Up to the World War I, Yugoslav art exhibitions were also staged in Sofia in 1906, Zagreb in 1908 and Belgrade in 1912. At the Second Yugoslav Exhibition in Sofia, the joint artistic society *Lada* was founded. This society became the organizer of future exhibitions. Yugoslav exhibitions made a considerable contribution to the formation of a common South Slavic cultural space, while other similar activities were also initiated. The artists who were dissatisfied with *Lada*, which functioned on the federal principle and had national sections, organized the Yugoslav Art Colony. It operated as

an association of integral Yugoslavs and included Nadežda Petrović, Ivan Meštrović, Ferdo Vesel, Emanuel Vidović, Ivan Grohar and Rihard Jakopič. The First Dalmatian Exhibition in Split in 1908 and the exhibition entitled “Despite Unheroic Times” held in Zagreb in 1910 also had pro-Yugoslav programmes.

The pro-Yugoslav cultural policy pursued by Belgrade after 1904 also resulted in the commissioning of Ivan Meštrović to design public monuments in Serbia. In any case, he had always declared himself a Yugoslav artist. He held that the cultural basis of a common Yugoslav identity should be sought in epic poetry. He saw in the Kosovo Cycle both Serbian and Yugoslav mythology, so he designed the *Vidovdanski Hram* (St Vitus’ Day Temple) as a monument to Yugoslav folk religion.

Meštrović was also entrusted with the design of the Art Pavilion of the Kingdom of Serbia at the International Exhibition in Rome in 1911. At the invitation of the Serbian government, a group of Croatian artists led by Meštrović exhibited their works in the Serbian pavilion. Meštrović, Ljubo Babić, Mirko Rački, Vladimir Becić and other Croatian artists exhibited works inspired by the Kosovo Cycle, the central theme of the pavilion. This was a clear sign of their Yugoslav commitment and a strong political message to the international public. At the same time, Paja Jovanović, celebrated as a great Serbian painter, exhibited his works in the Austrian pavilion.

During World War I, the significance of culture and art in the presentation of pro-Yugoslav ideas did not decline. On the contrary, art became one of the important testimonies to the existence of the Yugoslav nation, as well as a means for spreading the idea of a Yugoslav state. Ivan Meštrović took an active part in the Yugoslav Committee which, within the scope of its propaganda activities, organized numerous exhibitions. The most important propaganda and exhibition projects included Meštrović’s exhibition at the Victoria and Albert Museum in London in 1915 and joint exhibitions by Yugoslav artists in Lyons in 1917 and Geneva in 1918.

IN THE KINGDOM

The end of World War I and the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes represented a new social and political reality. The Kingdom brought together peoples who had lived in different cultural environments. The territory occupied by the new state had a different historical and cultural past, which was reflected in all aspects of public and private life. Urban design, public monuments, artistic life, cultural institutions, the appearance and furnishing of private spaces, as well as the cultural identity of the population differed very much in the region, from Slovenia to Macedonia.

Under the new conditions, the creation of a single state and national cultural and artistic identity imposed itself as an important question. Emphasis was laid on the transition to a new phase in the creation/unification of the Yugoslavs. However, the pre-war enthusiasm of the pro-Yugoslav artistic and cultural elites began to fade away in the complex reality of the new state. The further development and strengthening of the Yugoslav idea gave way to the beginning of inter-ethnic political struggles. In such circumstances, a very complex cultural situation, coupled with different concepts of understanding Yugoslavism was created. This also influenced the adoption of different artistic practices aimed at highlighting and building a state and national identity, as well as monarchist propaganda. Fine arts, architecture and public monuments were building the cultural identity of Yugoslavia, but the process was neither harmonized nor conceptually unique.

Artistic life was marked by the individual commitments and aspirations of artists in displaying their artistic expression, on the one hand, and efforts to create a Yugoslav artistic culture, on the other. In the post-war period, artistic life was gradually restored. The majority of artists turned to the most important European center – Paris, from which new ideas and modernist stylistic beliefs were brought to the country. Thus, there was a generation of artists in the Yugoslav space whose work was harmonized with contemporary

European artistic ideals. The most distinguished artists among them included, inter alia, Sava Šumanović, Marin Tartaglia, Petar Palavičini, Jovan Bijelić, Lazar Ličenoski, Ivan Tabaković, Krsto Hegedušić, Tone Kralj, Lojze Dolinar, Rihard Jakopič... At the same time, authentic avant-garde movements, such as *Zenit*, also emerged in the Yugoslav space. Although the most current trend on the art scene was not primarily concerned with the issues of Yugoslavism in art, various activities were carried out with the aim of contributing to the creation of a common Yugoslav identity.

The organisation of Yugoslav art exhibitions continued in the post-war period, but without the participation of Bulgarian artists. The Fifth Yugoslav Art Exhibition, staged in Belgrade in 1922, was an event that accompanied the wedding ceremony of King Alexander I Karađorđević and Princess Maria of Romania. Due to its connection with current monarchist events, this exhibition resembled the First Yugoslav Art Exhibition held in 1904. However, the 1904 exhibition marked a new pro-Yugoslav state policy, while the 1922 exhibition pointed up King Alexander's authoritarian and personal regime. It can even be said that it represented the humiliation of the Yugoslav art scene and its reduction to an ancillary wedding event. The last, Sixth, Yugoslav Exhibition was held in Novi Sad in 1927. It was part of the celebration of the 100th anniversary of *Mat-ica Srpska* and the accompanying exhibition was dedicated to old Serbian painting in Vojvodina. The organisation of these two Yugoslav exhibitions was supported by the authorities, but they did not achieve great success. It was not recorded that it attracted greater public interest, while the Novi Sad exhibition was largely ignored by the Yugoslav public. Many significant artists did not participate in these exhibitions, including Ivan Meštrović, the most important adherent of Yugoslavism among artists. .

Yugoslav artists continued to jointly exhibit their works in the *Spring Salon* held at the *Cvijeta Zuzorić* Art Pavilion in Kalemegdan. Up to 1931, its sponsor was Prince Paul Karađorđević, who had

distinguished himself as an art lover and collector. However, the crisis of the Yugoslav idea in art was evident. The exhibitions in the *Spring Salon* had a Yugoslav character, but they were not accepted by artists from all parts of the state. Thus, they had great significance for the artistic life of Belgrade, but their political, Yugoslav character was not successfully realized.

While the organisation of artistic life at the federal level was faltering and weakening, integral Yugoslavs were distinguishing themselves in political and cultural life. In Zagreb, Milan Ćurčin launched the journal *Nova Evropa 1920*, rallying integral Yugoslavs. They promoted Ivan Meštrović as the leading Yugoslav artist, while his work was intensively followed and popularized.

The efforts of integral Yugoslavs were not completely recognized. Meštrović, who had been engaged in pro-Yugoslav efforts since 1904 and had taken an active part in the Yugoslav Committee during World War I, did not retain the same position in the newly – created state. His most ambitious project – St Vitus' Day Temple – was not realized. Moreover, some of the Serbian authorities criticized his artistic conception, especially his naked statues of heroes.

Meštrović's work often combined sculptural and architectural projects. The public function of architecture highlighted its significance in mapping and characterising specified spaces. Expressing Yugoslavism in architecture was not monolithic. Meštrović was the exponent of the so-called primordial approach, but different ideas and practices of highlighting Yugoslavism in architecture were still preserved. Thus, buildings with different stylistic and construction features were considered part of Yugoslav architecture. In the 19th century, the Serbian-Byzantine architectural style was created for the needs of Serbian public buildings. In the post-war period, it was primarily characteristic of Orthodox Church buildings throughout Yugoslavia.

The territory of the new state was also marked by public monuments. The monuments to Habsburg rulers in the regions that once

belonged to Austria-Hungary were demolished. Monuments to monarchs from the Karađorđević dynasty were erected throughout the country. Hence, for example, the Croatian sculptor Rudolf Valdec made monuments dedicated to King Petar in Veliki Bečkerek and Bijeljina. After King Alexander's assassination, the erection of monuments dedicated to him began. Monuments were also erected in memory of the Serbian soldiers killed in the Balkan Wars and World War I. One of the most significant monuments, designed by architect Momir Korunović, was erected at Zebrnjak near Kumano-vo. Inscriptions on these military monuments emphasized that they were erected to the soldiers fallen for liberation and unification, thus giving them both a Serbian and proto-Yugoslav character.²⁸

The creation of the new state had a positive effect on presenting the cultural wealth of the Yugoslav peoples. In the period before World War I, when the artistic heritage of the South Slavs was largely denied, especially by the Austro-Hungarian elite, an Orientalist view of the Balkans colored the perception of cultural heritage and gave rise to the belief that folklore was the highest South Slavic cultural achievement. Hence, in the inter-war period, a process of cultural heritage research and presentation was initiated. Intensive medieval and antique heritage research was carried out in the area from Dalmatia to Macedonia. New cultural institutions, such as the Museum of Southern Serbia in Skopje, were also established. Their work was coordinated with the dominant political ideology of the state.

A significant tone to artistic life was given by members of the ruling Karađorđević family. Apart from the constant use of artistic events for their propaganda, the Karađorđević rulers also tried to present themselves as bearers and guardians of the Yugoslav idea. Apart from extensive visual propaganda, two examples

28 In the charter built into the Monument to the Unknown Hero it is written that the monument is erected "To the Serbian Unknown Hero fallen in the wars from 1912 to 1918 for the liberation and unification of the South Slavs".

likewise show the extreme monarchist use of art. King Alexander used the citizens' initiative for the erection of the Monument to the Unknown Soldier on Mount Avala. He demolished the existing monument and the medieval fortified town of Žrnov. He commissioned Ivan Meštrović to design a new monument and left his own imprint on it, which was also confirmed by the text of the charter issued on St Vitus' Day in 1934. It is stated that the monument is his endowment "to the eternal memory to my fallen comrades and as a shining example to future Yugoslav generations". Another example involves Prince Paul Karađorđević. In 1929, he founded the Contemporary Art Museum in Princess Ljubica's Residence in Belgrade. During 1935, at the initiative of Prince Paul, who was acting as Regent of Yugoslavia, this institution and the National Museum of Belgrade merged into the Prince Paul Museum, which was located at the New Royal Palace. In this way Prince Paul distinguished himself in the public eye and placed the museologized artistic heritage of the Serbian people at the service of his propaganda.

IN SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA

After World War II, under new social and political conditions, the role of art in Yugoslav society was significantly reassessed. The most important issue became the ideology of art and its role in building a socialist society. The first post-war years were marked by the development of art based on the Soviet model and efforts to define Socialist Realism. The thematic framework took precedence over artistic considerations, so that art concentrated on memorizing and celebrating the Partisan struggle in World War II and the building of a new socialist society. Early art production in socialist Yugoslavia was also modelled on Soviet art. The best-known Socialist Realist paintings are those like Boža Ilić's "Exploratory drilling in New Belgrade". The Soviet influence also left a significant imprint on memorial sculpture. This is evidenced by the imposing monument to the fallen soldiers of the Red Army in Batina, designed by

Antun Augustinčić and built from 1945 to 1947 and the monument to the fallen soldiers at Iriški Venac designed by sculptor Sreten Stojanović in 1951.

Reactions to Socialist Realist trends appeared after the breakaway from the Soviet Union. A significant event took place at the Writers' Congress in Ljubljana in 1952, where Miroslav Krleža delivered a speech that marked a symbolic turning-point in Yugoslavia's cultural policy. Among other things, Krleža criticized Soviet Socialist Realism in painting, which he perceived as a revival of bourgeois academic forms. He pointed to the many positive sides of the modern experience, "art for art's sake", and added that modern painting "addressed ...a whole universe of details and nuances of lighting and form, motives being authentic and important for the intensity of the realistic human experience of reality..."²⁹ Krleža pleaded for freedom of creativity and concluded that "our own Art will be born with the appearance of artists who will know how to 'express the objective motives of our leftist reality subjectively' thanks to their talent, their knowledge and their taste. If we develop a socialist cultural medium that will be aware of its rich past and its cultural mission in the current European space and time, our Art will inevitably appear"³⁰ Departure from the Soviet model had a great impact on Yugoslav art. Art was freed from the shackles imposed by party policy, while modernist expression became one of the characteristics of Yugoslav artistic practice. Modernism became not only the dominant art trend, but also an important foreign policy element. Yugoslav modern art was presented at numerous international exhibitions, thus demonstrating Yugoslavia's specificity in the socialist world, distancing itself from the Soviet Union and Socialist Realist art, as well as belonging to more culturally developed countries.

29 M. Krleža, *Govor na kongresu književnika u Ljubljani, Svjedočanstva vremena, književno-estetske varijacije*, Sarajevo 1988, 23.

30 M. Krleža, *Govor na kongresu književnika u Ljubljani*, 48.

Modern painting was also accepted to a certain extent by Josip Broz Tito. His personality was promoted in all the media, including the fine arts. Artists were commissioned to paint his portrait. Tito was even painted by Paja Jovanović, the artist who had painted portraits of Emperor Franz Joseph, King Alexander and Queen Maria Karadorđević during his long career. Over time, Božidar Jakac's drawing of Tito in profile and August Augustinčić's sculpture in Kumrovec were selected as the "canonic portraits" of Tito and were widely reproduced. Josip Broz adopted a critical stance towards abstraction and preferred figural art. According to Miodrag Protić, he visited the Contemporary Art Museum in Belgrade only once. On that occasion, he said that he liked Miljenko Stančić's painting. Although Tito disapproved of abstraction, his personal taste and attitude did not stop the trends in modern Yugoslav art. Censorship was primarily practised when Tito's personality was criticized.³¹ In 1974, the opening of Mića Popović's exhibition was cancelled due to his paintings "Richard of Tito's Face" and "Ceremonial Painting".

Miroslav Krleža was one of the most important figures in the conception and creation of the image of Yugoslav art and culture. Apart from pleading for the modernisation of artistic practice, as Director of the Yugoslav Lexicographical Institute in Zagreb and editor-in-chief of numerous encyclopaedic editions, he had insight and partial control in writing about the artistic past. Krleža did not have a high opinion of 19th-century academic artistic practice; he saw the basis of the Yugoslav artistic identity in medieval times. He was one of the main organizers and author of the preface to the catalogue of the exhibition of Yugoslav medieval art, held in Paris in 1950 and Zagreb in 1951. Krleža's basic idea was that the Yugoslav peoples had advanced medieval culture and civilisation, "which vanished in the whirlpool of the 600-year Turkish, Austrian and Venetian

31 Tito's personality was protected under the legal regulations of 1953, 1977 and 1984 (O. Manojlović Pintar).

wars from the 14th to the 20th century”.³² For Krleža, a reference to medieval times was closely related to the contemporary socialist Yugoslav state: “Today, the contemporary South Slavic socialist anticipation is only a dialectical pendant on the whole range of our medieval anticipations, Old Slavic, Glagolitic, the Cyril-Methodian struggle for the equality of ethnicities and languages... the Bogumil lay revolution... and, finally, the anticipation of pre-Giotto and neo-Hellenistic painting... producing several artistic works on our soil, at Sopoćani and Mileševa, which can be compared to the masterpieces of mature Renaissance art in Western Europe which, in terms of their artistic value, can be compared to mature Renaissance masterpieces in Western Europe”.³³ Krleža considered Yugoslav medieval art, especially the Bogumil heritage, to be an antithesis to Byzantium and Rome and the third component of European art of that period. Such views could provide a basis for the cultural and political position of socialist Yugoslavia and its third way.

In socialist Yugoslavia, the issue of Yugoslavism in art was being slowly pushed into the background. Artistic practice and theory were evolving within the framework of global modernist trends. Modern art was becoming the dominant artistic expression, while current art trends were adopted and evolved simultaneously with the world’s artistic centers. Art informel, abstract art, constructivism and conceptual art marked the decades from the liberalisation of artistic practice to the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The openness of Yugoslav society towards modern art was also demonstrated by the organisation of significant exhibitions of world modernity. One of the most important exhibitions was the exhibition of Henry Moore’s sculptures at the *Cvijeta Zuzorić* Art Pavilion in Belgrade in 1955, which marked a turning-point in Yugoslavia’s artistic life.

32 M. Krleža, Predgovor, *Izložba srednjovjekovne umjetnosti naroda Jugoslavije*, Zagreb 1951, 5.

33 M. Krleža, Predgovor, 6.

Artistic life in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was experiencing a rapid rise. Most republics had fine arts academies that educated generations of painters, sculptors and graphic artists. Republican associations of fine artists as well as a similar association at federal level were also established with the aim of contributing to the better status of artists in society. Exhibition activity was developing throughout Yugoslav territory. Apart from salons, staged in the capitals of the federal republics, some exhibitions had a federal character. For example, Tuzla was the venue of Yugoslav portrait exhibitions, the Yugoslav Youth Biennial in Rijeka was staged in Rijeka from 1961 to 1991, the Biennial of Yugoslav Student Drawing was held in the Students' Town Gallery in Belgrade, the Yugoslav Drawing Triennial was held in Sombor and the Yugoslav Ceramics Triennial was held at the Applied Art Museum in Belgrade, while Yugoslav Graphic Art Exhibitions were staged in Zagreb and Belgrade.

The most important public monuments erected throughout the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were memorials dedicated to the victims and heroes of World War II. Monumental culture was undergoing transformation from post-war Socialist Realist memorials to modern monuments. The modernisation and creation of a unique artistic expression is exemplified in the monuments designed by architect Bogdan Bogdanović. By developing archaic visual forms, Bogdanović endowed his sculptures with complex symbolism and humanist meaning. His monuments, erected throughout Yugoslavia – in Mostar, Belgrade, Kruševac and Jasenovac, became universal symbols of the horrors of war, crossing dogmatic-ideological and republican-national boundaries.

An important place in cultural life was held by institutions promoting Yugoslav art occupied an important place in cultural life. One institution with a Yugoslav character was the Contemporary Art Museum. Originally called the Modern Gallery in 1958, the museum was formally founded – according to its founder and

director Miodrag B. Protić – as an institution of the People’s Republic of Serbia but, according to its programme, it had a Yugoslav character. Protić bought up artworks from Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia, thus creating the “most complete and most valuable collections of 20th-century Serbian and Yugoslav art”.³⁴ A new modern building was also erected to serve the needs of the museum. Designed by architects Ivan Antić and Ivanka Raspopović, it opened on 20 October 1965. It was aimed at promoting Yugoslav modern art, while at the same time representing the most significant project in the artistic life of Belgrade and Serbia.³⁵ The museum contained the works of artists from all parts of the country, while 20th-century Yugoslav art was presented at accompanying exhibitions and in programme-related editions. However, Yugoslav art was presented not according to its national characteristics, but according to its style and chronology. Modern art was also promoted by other institutions, such as the Art Gallery of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Modern Gallery in Ljubljana, the City Gallery/Contemporary Art Museum in Zagreb and the Contemporary Art Museum in Skopje.

Artistic life in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not have a unique flow; it also mirrored the dynamics of ongoing events in the country. Apart from positive modern and integration trends at the federal level, disintegration processes were also underway. The republican Academies of Sciences and Arts were gradually becoming the proponents of national culture. At the same time, the country’s highest cultural achievements were denigrated according to local and ideological needs. The non-reconciliation of different views was demonstrated on numerous occasions and one example was the demolition of Njegoš’s chapel and the erection of his

34 M. B. Protić, *Nojeva barka*, Vol. I, 515.

35 According to M. B. Protić, Ivo Andrić argued that the content of this museum exceeds the actual level of the culture of Yugoslav society: M. B. Protić, *Nojeva barka*, Vol. I, 633. These words especially carry weight today when the Contemporary Art Museum and National Museum in Belgrade have been closed for years due to restoration work.

mausoleum on Mount Lovćen, designed by Ivan Meštrović. This idea was opposed by the professional community. Art historians, like Lazar Trifunović from Belgrade and Franc Stele from Ljubljana, held that the chapel should not be demolished. Their view was shared by Miroslav Krleža, who had voiced a negative opinion of Ivan Meštrović's work in the inter-war period. He wrote: "Njegoš's mausoleum by Meštrović will be a mausoleum, if it is ever built, which would certainly be the better option, since it is terribly stupid! And it costs a lot!"³⁶ Despite opposition by a significant number of Yugoslav intellectuals, the Municipality of Cetinje carried through this idea and erected Ivan Meštrović's monument. At that time, he himself was living as an emigré in the United States.

Differences in the conceptions and understanding of culture and art were also reflected in the preparation of encyclopedic entries. As can be learned from Miroslav Krleža's *Marginalije*, a covert war between the republican editorial boards was underway. Krleža was highly dissatisfied with his relationship with the Serbian editorial board during the preparation of a Yugoslav art encyclopedia. He stated bitterly on a number of occasions that his initial advocacy of the promotion of Yugoslav medieval art was being taken over and used in a Serbian national context. In one note made during his work on the encyclopedia it is stated: "... I have continuous clashes with 'experts' like Đurđe Bošković, (Radivoje) Ljubinković, (Dejan) Medaković and the like, who are forever distorting the meaning of the theses of this encyclopedia in their well-known manner where Serbian-Macedonian issues are concerned".³⁷

The examples of Njegoš's chapel and work on the encyclopedia point to the gradual fragmentation of art and culture in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is evident that it was possible to map different interests in the field of culture. The bloody collapse of

36 M. Krleža, *Marginalije*, Belgrade 2011, 463.

37 M. Krleža, *Marginalije*, 559. The names in parentheses have been added by the author of this text.

the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia brought about changes in political circumstances and the cultural scene, as well as the emergence of nationalist elites. Some prominent figures, such as Bogdan Bogdanović, emigrated, while a great number of artists found themselves in a “vacuum”. Educated and doing creative work in the Yugoslav context, they could not identify themselves and their works with the newly-established nation states. Another example is Marina Abramović, the world’s best-known performance artist from Yugoslavia, who periodically emphasizes that she comes from a country that no longer exists.³⁸

The idea of Yugoslav art was closely related to the rise, duration and fall of the Yugoslav idea. From the mid-19th century, South Slav artists began to establish mutual relations and organize themselves with a view to presenting the cultural and ethnic closeness of the South Slav peoples. The formation of a common state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia, did not contribute to the creation of a common art and culture. The cultural differences among the Yugoslav peoples and different political interests weakened the idea of a common artistic identity. A specific phenomenon was the rise of the integral Yugoslav Ivan Meštrović, an artist who embodied the Yugoslav spirit. After World War II, the art of socialist Yugoslavia was geared towards mastering modern artistic expression. The negative trends that were leading towards the collapse of the state were strengthening republican and national movements. The initial idea of creating the art of the Yugoslav nation was not realized. However, the existence of a common state did bring about the creation of a cultural and artistic space and the formulation of Yugoslav art as the artistic practice developed in the Yugoslav territory.

38 “When people ask me where I am from,” she says, “I never say Serbia. I always say I come from a country that no longer exists”; <https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2010/oct/03/interview-marina-abramovic-performance-artist> (accessed on 30 July 2016).

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THE ACTIVE COEXISTENCE OF NON-ALIGNED YUGOSLAVIA

TVRTKO JAKOVINA

THE SAME AS THE SOVIET UNION

The foreign policy of Tito's Yugoslavia was always unusually dynamic, conspicuous and creative. Even immediately after the Second World War, when diplomats were impregnated with revolutionary charge, while the ideologized interpretation of the world and its future, search for allies among ideologically like-minded people, and the belief in restructuring based on a Marxist vision of the world and relying on the Soviet Union, did not mean that the diplomacy of the new Yugoslavia was not active and dynamic from the very outset. It often remained proactive and dynamic, distinguishing itself from the diplomacies of similar communist countries. The first generation of diplomats, including the first three ministers of foreign affairs – Josip Smodlaka, Ivan Šubašić and Stanoje Simić – included a great number of individuals from

civic circles, many of whom enjoyed a great reputation. Until the mid-1950s, the Yugoslavs were primarily oriented towards Europe, while top-level diplomatic contacts and visits were almost entirely confined to the countries with a similar social system. Josip Broz Tito played host to his Polish, Bulgarian, Albanian and other colleagues, but he himself only travelled to East European countries. Europe was the place of contact between the worlds and emerging blocs. It was the space in which Yugoslavia had a lot of unfinished business. After the war, Yugoslavia had an unresolved border issue with Italy. Yugoslav army units had entered Austrian territory from which they had to withdraw just as in the case of Trieste. The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) either intervened or provided military support to the communist guerrillas in Greece. Yugoslav armed forces later entered into Albania, but admittedly they were called upon by Albania to do so. They also worked with Bulgaria on the creation of a Balkan federation. Yugoslavia was a loyal and agile member of the emerging Soviet bloc and sincere Moscow ally in the first few years after the Second World War. However, it felt that its achievements were greater than those of other countries, that its path to victory was different, that the establishment of Tito's power and selection of Belgrade as the seat of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in 1947 were logical and justified. Thus, these should not only be treated as a reward, but also as recognition of a country closest to the ideal of the new world being created in Moscow.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that diplomats and politicians in Belgrade remained blind to developments in Asia or the Near East. Ešref Badnjević, a pre-war communist and Tito's confidential associate, was accused of maintaining contacts with banned communist groups in Egypt where he was the newly-appointed head of the Yugoslav legation. In 1947, the Royal Government of Egypt asked him to leave Cairo to avoid a scandal. His successor Šahinpašić continued to maintain such contacts, which was

considered unacceptable by the Egyptian authorities, but his career ended after a year because he left the post with some staff members and aligned himself with the Soviet Union.³⁹ The Arab countries were ruled by monarchs, so Egypt was a much less desirable ally in the Near East than Israel, which had been founded by leftists. Yugoslavia was one of the countries helping Israeli Jews to arm themselves during their war of independence.⁴⁰ Yugoslavia's relations with Egypt improved only after its revolution in 1952. At that time, the Yugoslav Ambassador was the educated and capable Nijaz Dizdarević. In late 1952, his colleague in Syria, Mihajlo Javorski, informed the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs that Ali Naguib, the Egyptian Ambassador to Damascus and brother of General Naguib, head of the new government in Cairo, spoke with admiration about the Yugoslav struggle for independence and mentioned that the Egyptians "probably like and appreciate the Yugoslavs more than they (the Yugoslavs) know".⁴¹ Thus, excellent relations with Egypt were established very soon after the overthrow of its king. In some other cases, such as Ethiopia, the emperor did not pose a problem, since good relations with the Horn of Africa had been established very early on.

During the first few post-war years, the basic idea of Yugoslav foreign policy was obsessively oriented towards the communists and leftist groups. Due to ideological closeness, diplomats were ready to endanger normal relations with the host country. Although the United States was the main sponsor of UNRRA assistance, which virtually rescued the FPRY in the aftermath of the Second World War, the United States of America (USA) was vitriolically attacked. During the first post-war years, the lives of

39 Životić 2008:486.

40 Shay 2008:475–476. Weapons were imported via rivers in Rijeka and Šibenik. Spitfire fighter planes were also delivered using Yugoslav airspace.

41 DAMSP, 1952, File No. 20 (Egipat), Reel 15, Doc. No. 416758, 17 December 1952.b (I express my gratitude to my colleague Bojan Smode for this source).

American diplomats in Belgrade and Zagreb were often dramatically bad and unpleasant.⁴²

As announced by US president Harry Truman to the US Congress in March 1947, the United Kingdom could no longer ensure the economic stability and military and political security of Greece and Turkey. The United Kingdom intended to retreat from Burma, India, Egypt and Palestine.⁴³ The Truman Doctrine was the American response to the British decision and was directly associated with the aggressiveness of the Yugoslav foreign policy aiding the communist-led partisan guerillas in Greece.⁴⁴ Already in 1947, Belgrade hosted Indian, Burmese and Chinese communists who came to see and study Yugoslavia's development. In January 1948, Belgrade recognized India and Pakistan. During their visit to Calcutta, where they attended the Second Congress of the Communist Party of India, which was held in February 1948, Vladimir Dedijer and Radovan Zogović, the then two hard-core communist believers, talked the Indian communists into starting a rebellion and then waging a guerilla war against Jawaharlal Nehru, who had just been elected prime minister.⁴⁵ The duo probably referred to the Yugoslavia and their own Partisan experience, mentioning how the Yugoslav People's Army had succeeded in taking large areas of Italian territory and entering Austria. Thereafter, Yugoslavia continued to be militant. In the summer of 1946, Yugoslav fighter planes shot down an American military aircraft, while the Yugoslav side was probably also involved in the incident in the Corfu Channel when 54 British sailors were killed.⁴⁶ This kind of country, most loyal and most similar to Stalin's Soviet Union, mili-

42 Jakovina 2003: 134–140, 158–213.

43 Cabot, Reel 6, The National War College, Strategy, Policy and Planning Course, National Security Problem, 17–28 March 1947; Wilson 1979:123.

44 Banac 1990:46–49.

45 Čavoški 529–530; Pirjevec 2011:391.

46 Jakovina 2003:56–77.

tant and often unrestrained, soon stopped being praised and serving as a model to others, while its leadership had to be removed from power.

Yugoslavia's position changed in the summer of 1948. Its expulsion from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) came as a shock to many observers. Although some of the better analysts among the diplomats had predicted Yugoslav-Soviet misunderstandings, the final act, which occurred on 28 June 1948, left them "with their eyes wide open" – the comment by John Cabot, the former US *Chargé d'Affaires* in Belgrade and later the American Consul General in Shanghai. He wrote that he still wondered what stood behind all this and how serious it all was.⁴⁷ The split with Moscow was not easy for Stalin's best students. The Yugoslavs did not plan it or invoke it, but they did not hesitate to accept the conflict. Belgrade's first reaction was to establish good relations with those leftists who were not close to the Soviets. The break-up of relations between the FPRY and Moscow faced the young diplomacy with different challenges. Similarly to the shifts and "differentiation" within the country, it became much more "compact" and was abruptly filled with the proven wartime cadres – loyal young men whose mission was to prove that the split between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was genuine and real. At the same time, the bellicose and impudent Yugoslav diplomacy was given a different role in saving the country's sovereignty. It was still felt that it would be primarily necessary to establish ties with those who were "more similar", like Scandinavia's Social Democrats or those communist parties that had not yet aligned with the Soviet Union in its condemnation of Belgrade. Gradually yet rapidly, it was realized that the only possible way out was to come up with a clear policy and establish ties with those who could be truly helpful. However, the permanent tensions – which

47 Cabot, Reel 12; John M. Cabot to Downs Donald, Esquire, Department of State; American Consulate General, Shanghai, China, 20 August 1948.

arose from the views that Yugoslavia was a communist country and that Western countries were still different, despite being accepted in many respects and being important for the survival of the country, and which lasted until the collapse of Yugoslavia – paved the way for the establishment of relations with those countries which just gained sovereignty or were to be created in the years to come. Something that Yugoslavia had already started in the 1950s became adopted a little later as the norm by the West European Left that was increasingly less concerned with the exploitation of factory workers – which was also formally abolished in Yugoslavia where factories were worker-owned. Instead, it increasingly openly supported emancipation movements and the struggle against colonialism and racism. Thus, the policy that was partly born out of necessity and involved hitherto unimaginable, distant regions and ties with those whose names could probably barely be pronounced, became the most original and most important part of Yugoslav foreign policy, not because the country was neglecting its relations with any superpower, but because it was exerting an influence on all other policies and bilateral relations of socialist Yugoslavia through its role in the Third World. Yugoslav diplomacy was joined by plenty of young people, who were then sent to the countries of Scandinavia and the United States in order to present a different picture of the FPRY.⁴⁸

Yugoslavia established full diplomatic relations with India on 5 December 1948. As stated by Nehru's sister and the Indian Ambassador to London, the Indians were interested in doing the same thing, but at that moment they had no acceptable ambassador who would be sent to Belgrade. The first Indian ambassador accredited to the FPRY was the ambassador in Rome. The Yugoslavs opened an embassy in New Delhi and a consulate in Bombay as early as 1950. The first Ambassador was Josip Đerđa, who

48 Jakovina 2002:905.

was also appointed Ambassador to Burma later on, just at the time when – more than ever in the postwar period – Yugoslavia increasingly leaned towards the West. It was not easy to cooperate with this direct, outspoken and self-educated printing worker. However, his analyses were original and those sent from New Delhi to Belgrade were also far-sighted. Tito and Edvard Kardelj, the Minister of Foreign Affairs appointed after the split with Stalin, were more interested in the establishment of closer relations with the Indians than vice versa. India was a distant and poor country but, judging by the instructions received by Đerđa's successor, Jože Vilfan, the efforts to continuously improve mutual relations were accepted. At the same time, Ivo Vejvoda was sent to Brazil (he was also accredited to Venezuela) with the clear “global” vision of a new Yugoslav foreign policy that also covered South America.⁴⁹ Relations with Burma, which were helped by Tito through deliveries of weapons and experience in thwarting a rebellion, were developing at the fastest pace. The Yugoslavs were selling guns and other weapons to a country endangered by a conflict that could be called a “quadrilateral” civil war.⁵⁰

All this marked the beginning of a systematic and active approach by Yugoslav diplomacy to Asia. Although India was not always ready to cooperate with Belgrade in the way Yugoslavia wished, the very fact that it was behind Yugoslav initiatives or supported them, turned into one of the basic principles of

49 Berić 2008:136–137. One of Vejvoda's first tasks was to establish relations with the South American countries. As he later said, he realized that it would be difficult to normalize relations with Peru, Equador and other countries as long as relations between Yugoslavia and the Holy See were broken. At the same time, the Communist Parties of Venezuela and Brazil were attacking “Tito's Ambassador” as an “American agent” whose task was to divide the workers' movement in Latin America.

50 Cabot, Reel 12; John M. Cabot to Downs Donald, Esquire, Department of State; American Consulate General, Shanghai, China, August 20, 1948; Čavoški 2008:537–542; Jakovina 202:905–906; Jakovina 2003:488–489.

Yugoslav diplomacy, the minimum Yugoslavia needed from this big country.

LEANING TOWARDS THE WEST, THE SEARCH FOR NEW PATHS

The first foreign head of state who paid an official visit to Yugoslavia after its split with the Soviet Union was the Negus of Ethiopia, Emperor Haile Selassie. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established in early 1952. In July 1954, he stayed in the former Royal Palace in Belgrade and then went to Tito's Summer Residence on the Brijuni Islands and Split. Haile Selassie used to say that having more Yugoslavs at different places in Ethiopia meant having fewer Italians. The possibilities that opened up for cooperation exceeded the Yugoslav potential.⁵¹

Relations with the South Asian countries were enhanced during Tito's long voyage aboard *Galeb* in late 1954 and early 1955. This voyage was also historic for India because Tito was the first European statesman who visited this country after its proclamation of independence. Partly for this reason, Tito was welcomed like a king. As for his visit to Burma, the host's behaviour was well-nigh ecstatic. Peaceful and active coexistence, which accepts the struggle for peace, independence and equality, was the idea linking these three countries together. Yugoslavia also needed strong allies in its struggle for independence.⁵² Like his ambassador in New Delhi, George Allen, who served in Belgrade (1949–1953) and was an expert on Yugoslavia, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (1953–1959) did not find the fact that socialist Yugoslavia was spreading ideas of neutrality among the Indians particularly acceptable. At the same time, some American analysts held

51 Tasić 2008:515–516. In honour of the emperor, the Split seafront promenade was decorated with flowers for which soil had to be transported. Everything was arranged, so that the saying "That's all Haile Selassie!" is still used when someone wants to say that something was done in the garden.

52 Pirjevec 2011:394–395; Jakovina 2003:490–493.

that Tito was an excellent example of a communist who was open for cooperation and was not close to Beijing or Moscow. Some American analysts wondered whether Tito could also learn something from the world's biggest parliamentary country during his stay in India.

Tito's first trip across the ocean meant the discovery of a new world and, in many respects, was an eye-opening experience. His stop in Egypt on the way back to Europe marked the beginning of one of the most sincere friendships in the history of the Cold War, that is, the friendship between Tito and President Nasser. American analysts observed Yugoslavia's search for a "middle way" with dissatisfaction, but were still convinced that it would remain oriented towards the West should any more serious tensions emerge. In early 1955, Washington concluded that Yugoslavia would continue to gravitate toward powers such as India and Burma, sensing a certain unity of interest and outlook with them and holding that cooperation would help reduce tension, promote peace, overcome isolation and increase its own prestige.⁵³

This trip also resulted in the strengthening of Yugoslav diplomatic ties with Rangoon. Economic cooperation lagged behind military cooperation, which was flourishing. Burmese leader U Nu was not willing to accept military assistance from big countries, but wished to receive it from Yugoslavia and Israel. Burma was surrounded by India, China and Indochina; it was the seat of the Asian Socialist International and thus Yugoslavia's potential gate to a broader Asian space.⁵⁴ Burmese leader U Nu visited Yugoslavia in 1955, only a few days after the historic repentant visit of Nikita Khrushchev to Belgrade in May 1955. U Nu's visit to Belgrade and Zagreb aimed at emphasizing the unity of the two peoples and a common peace policy. As noted by American diplomats, the arrival of the Burmese leader was announced across

53 NIE 31-55; Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 23 February 1955.

54 Čavoški 2008:541.

the entire front page of *Borba*, while Khrushchev was given only five out of seven columns in the official Yugoslav organ.⁵⁵ A few days after the Burmese leader's visit, Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana were visited by Indian prime minister Nehru. Since the summer holidays were just starting at the time of Nehru's stay in Yugoslavia, he was welcomed by a much smaller number of enthusiastic citizens than the guest from Burma.

U Nu was deeply impressed with the Yugoslavs and how he was welcomed. After returning to his country, he also wished to express his thanks to the Yugoslav *Chargé d'Affaires* in Rangoon. Thus, U Nu organized a dinner for him and his American colleague. One of the topics discussed during the dinner included Tito and the Partisan struggle. In order to illustrate the courage of the Yugoslav people, U Nu picked up a hot pepper from the table and pushed it into the mouth of Miroslav Kreačić, the top-ranking Yugoslav diplomat in the Burmese capital. His tears began to flow, but he did not say anything. The Partisans' courage was proven. There were few such moments in diplomatic life.⁵⁶

In late 1955, *Galeb* set sail for Egypt and Ethiopia. There were some (probably those poorly informed) who were afraid that Tito could infect the Ethiopian emperor with communism. American diplomats commented that the Yugoslavs had a problem with understanding their limitations and the fact that they were not a great power. American consul in Zagreb Martindale said that it was stupid to change a reliable ally like the United States for unreliable allies in the Third World.⁵⁷ The partnerships sought by Tito were based on the wish to remain independent. During these trips, it also became clear that the Third World countries represented a

55 Jakovina 2003:514; Bekić 1988:640–644.

56 Jakovina 2002:905–906.

57 Jakovina 2003:517–522. Based on NARA, Records of the US Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Yugoslavia, 1950–1954, Decimal File 768, Reel 3, 768.00/1–3156.

potential market for Yugoslav companies. Promotion of the “economic independence” of these countries opened up opportunities for the sale of Yugoslav products. However, it was often easier to determine or say something rather than to take action. However, some later examples proved that those who also saw economic reasons for the promotion of relations were right.⁵⁸

After 1955 and the reconciliation between Belgrade and Moscow, Yugoslavia hoped that the Soviets would change their Stalinist interpretation of communism. Parallel with the promotion of its policy toward Asia and Africa since the early 1950s at the latest, Yugoslavia seemed to be increasingly dissatisfied with excessively close cooperation with the West. Likewise, many Yugoslavs were not immune to racism or simply could not understand Tito’s ties with distant Asian and African countries.⁵⁹ Finally, nobody in Belgrade, at least those in power, contemplated abandoning communism as the leading ideology. For such people, the West was only the place where Yugoslavia would be exploited.

In April 1956, at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CC CPY), the highest party body, Marshal Josip Broz Tito said: “I think that we should cancel US military aid. It was only symbolic, but the question that imposes itself now is who are we arming ourselves against.”⁶⁰ Josip Broz Tito concluded that Yugoslavia’s reputation called for stronger foreign policy action and activity. He also said that the disarmament policy was not sufficiently active and that relations with India, Burma and, partly, with Egypt were not sufficiently used in the struggle for peace, which would be mutual-

58 Jakovina 2003:20–521; NIE, CIA, Office of National Estimates, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc, 18 July 1963.

59 The students who had come to study here were often unable to integrate. The example from General Milan Žeželj’s diary is highly illustrative; quoted in: Adamović 2001:95–98.

60 ASCG, CK SKJ, III/66 (2 April 1956).

ly beneficial.⁶¹ At that meeting, Koča Popović, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, emphasized the historical aspect of the ongoing turnabout. Referring to the changes occurring in Moscow in early 1956 and Khrushchev's "secret speech", Popović said that Yugoslavia was the champion of these changes in the world and that the FPRY was in the best position to further deepen these processes and exert influence on them.⁶² Popović also said that we should take a more active approach to the East. Yugoslavia should remain outside the blocs in order to strengthen the "forces of socialism".⁶³ Edvard Kardelj, the second-ranking member of the communist leadership, said that it was now the question of forming a broader, worldwide socialist bloc and not joining a socialist-based link-up with the Russians.⁶⁴ All this called for a more active foreign policy.

Washington recognized this shift in Yugoslav policy. As written by the Operations Coordinating Board in March 1956, Yugoslavia would narrow its relations with the West. One of the Yugoslav policy mechanisms would be to derive maximum benefits from both sides in the Cold War.⁶⁵ Thus, Washington could cope with this position "between" the two worlds, which Belgrade wished to have.

During 1956, Tito and Khrushchev met four times. During Tito's second visit to the Soviet Union, the Yugoslav State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs arranged all the details of the visit of Egyptian president Nasser and tried to arrange for a short visit by Indian prime minister Nehru to Yugoslavia. Despite the great differences between Egypt, India and Yugoslavia, there were several issues linking the three governments. They did not wish to belong

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 EL, National Security Council 889–99, Operations Coordinating Board, 6 March 1956.

to any bloc, but wished to see a world with as few divisions as possible, thereby making it safer for the small nations. All three leaders had great personal ambitions.

Nasser was interested in the Yugoslav economic model and Arab socialism was certainly inspired, at least partially, by the Yugoslav example.⁶⁶ India was probably the biggest, though not best functioning democracy in the world. In any case, it differed politically from Yugoslavia and Egypt. Tito, Nasser and Nehru met on 17 July 1956. This meeting, which was often later described as crucial for the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement, was differently interpreted in these three countries. All sides had different ideas. Indian prime minister Nehru was dissatisfied because Tito and Nasser decided to organize a large press conference, so that this informal meeting suddenly assumed excessive dimensions.⁶⁷ At the same time, both Tito and Nehru tried to restrain the impatient Arab who became aggressive whenever he talked about the war in Algeria.⁶⁸ Undoubtedly, the trilateral meeting considerably increased Tito's reputation. Some Western observers held that 9 out of 13 items in the Final Declaration, which was simultaneously proclaimed in all three capitals, was pro-Kremlin in tone. Others commented that everything was written in accordance with expectations and was satisfactory.⁶⁹ The Soviet press ignored the event and only carried it as agency news.⁷⁰ If leading Western diplomats in Belgrade understood that the platform of the meeting of the Big Three, which later evolved into the Non-Aligned Movement, was not pro-Soviet, the Kremlin was even more aware of

66 PRO, PREM 11/1395, RY 1022/74, 1 August 1956. (Visit to Yugoslavia by President Nasser and Mr. Nehru). Louis J. Cantoni and Sally Ann Baynard, 348.

67 Ceh 2002:515.

68 PRO, PREM 11/1395, RY 1022/74, 1 August 1956. (Visit to Yugoslavia of President Nasser and Mr. Nehru).

69 Ceh 2002:515; Tadić 1976:147–148.

70 Mićunović 1977:25.

this fact. The British held that Tito wanted to profit from Nehru's international reputation because he wanted to dispel any thought that Yugoslavia was mostly aligning itself with the East and the Soviet Union.⁷¹ Nehru and Nasser left the Brijuni Islands for Cairo together. While their plane was still at Pula Airport, preparations were underway for the arrival of Cambodian prince Norodom Sihanouk, another active proponent of cooperation in the Third World.⁷²

The Third World was far from being a unified bloc of countries, but the declaration presented by the three on the Brijuni Islands was also supported by Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah and Indonesian leader Ahmed Sukarno.⁷³ If there had to be a leftist partner in the Third World, it was better for the West that such a partner be Belgrade, which was less dangerous than Moscow or one of its pawns. After the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement in the early 1960s, Yugoslav politicians and political scientists tried to prove that the meeting of the Big Three on the Brijuni Islands in 1956 was the first, or at least the zero meeting that was crucial for the future movement. The meeting of the three leaders from Europe, Asia and Africa was rather symbolic, different from similar meetings of African, or African and Asian leaders, something that did not often occur in international relations during that period. It was one of the important though not decisive initiatives that paved the way for the conference that took place five years later.

In the report of the Operations Coordinating Board released in the summer of 1956, Belgrade was still useful from the viewpoint of promoting US interests, although Belgrade cooled down its relations with the West after Khrushchev's visit in 1955 and the

71 PRO, PREM 11/1395, RY 1022/74, 1 August 1956. (Visit to Yugoslavia by President Nasser and Mr. Nehru); Tadić 1976:147–148.

72 Vjesnik, 21 July 1956.

73 Bogetić 1981:22.

20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956.⁷⁴ Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union shared close positions on many international issues, but “as regards independence” it was clear that Yugoslavia was continuing along a path that differed from that followed by the Soviet satellites, and that Yugoslavia was demonstrating a significant degree of independence in its actions and the way in which it formulated its position. The influence of Belgrade was still felt in the internal affairs of the satellite countries.⁷⁵ All things considered, as was concluded by the United States, Yugoslav foreign policy was closer to that pursued by India and Burma than to that pursued by the Soviet Union or its satellite countries. The neutralist position was not regarded as being in favour of the “free world” since Moscow did not allow the “neutralists” to interfere in the affairs of its satellites, but Belgrade was too small and insufficiently developed to have a decisive influence on socialists/communists in the Third World countries or leftist politicians in the West. Therefore, the Yugoslav influence could be compared to that of India.⁷⁶ This stance allowed space for Belgrade’s ambitions, still being shaped into a coherent policy.

The actual change occurred later that year, after the events in Hungary. The Hungarian crisis broke out in November 1956. During several days of the events that the Hungarians were later to call a “revolution”, the Yugoslavs realized that their reconciliation with the Soviets was considerably restricted and primarily inspired by Moscow’s wish to bring Yugoslavia back into its camp. The Hungarians demonstrated how general rebellions could sweep away communist regimes, which scared Tito at least as much as the Soviet intervention. It was increasingly clear that a rebellion against Moscow, even if it was led by communists, was only an illusion. It

74 EL, National Security Council Papers, Operations Coordinating Board, 2 August 1956.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

was clear that a complete split with Moscow was illusory for any country from the Eastern camp.⁷⁷ In Belgrade, the support given to Khrushchev, who remained the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) until 1964, was partly motivated by the fear that he could be ousted by the hardliners or military circles. At that time, Yugoslavia lost the illusion that Khrushchev's de-Stalinization was sincere and painfully realized its limitations. It became clear that Yugoslavia was entering dangerous waters in its foreign policy and that its position in both the West and the East was worse in late 1956 than ten or so years earlier.

Therefore, the second half of the 1950s was marked by Yugoslavia's search for an anchorage in world politics and different positioning. Europe was still the principal battleground of the Cold War and, after Hungary, Berlin remained the only trouble spot on the Old Continent. Therefore, in the European context, Yugoslavia still stood apart and was important, but not as important as it had been when Stalin was alive. All this prompted the Yugoslav leadership to seek a new doctrine. As was observed in Washington, the constant efforts to maintain special relations with Nasser, Nehru and other leaders of the Afro-Asian bloc was the real space for the strengthening of Tito's prestige, ideological pretensions and even the formation of a group of countries in which he could have an influential, if not dominant, role.⁷⁸

The new program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) was presented at its congress in Ljubljana in 1958. Tito opened the meeting. His speech came after a sharp attack on the Soviet Union delivered by Aleksandar Ranković (the second or third most powerful man in Yugoslavia). All delegates from the European communist countries – the Chinese, Albanians and Czechoslovakians did not attend the congress – stood up at that

77 JFKL, 15 August 1961. George Kennan to Mc George Bundy, Yugoslav Foreign Policy.

78 NIE 31–57, Yugoslavia's Policies and Prospects, 11 June 1957.

moment and left the hall. The only exception was the Polish delegate who fell asleep.⁷⁹ The program was far from being very (counter-)revolutionary. The new basic document of the Yugoslav ruling party criticized the “imperialists and capitalists” and their aggressive policy against “communism and socialist countries”. Neocolonialism was the new way in which the rich exploited the poor. There was an increasing number of Western military bases. Therefore, the LCY would strive towards a world where nations were more closely linked to each other and oriented towards each other, but were also “independent” and able to decide on their own interests and the coalitions useful to them. The new nations represented “positive forces” tending toward peace. Should they be independent, they could contribute to world peace, which was the aim of Yugoslav diplomacy. A real peace policy implied active coexistence, including the full understanding of independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries or nations, and non-affiliation to any bloc. The economies of all countries should be inter-linked. Yugoslavia now obliged itself to follow such a line in international relations through the world organization, aiming to make it universal.⁸⁰

The new party program caused a new break in relations between Moscow and Belgrade, but not as serious as that of 1948. In late 1958 and early 1959, Tito again visited the Third World countries aboard *Galeb*. He visited Indonesia, Burma, India, Ethiopia, Ceylon, Sudan and the United Arab Republic (UAR), as Egypt and Syria were called. Tito’s deputies and associates went to other countries. In October 1959, Koča Popović, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, went to Cuba after the session of the United Nations General Assembly (UN GA). Although his visit was announced as breaking news, he did not meet with President Dorticos; there was no joint press conference or short encounter with the leader

79 Jakovina 2002:124.

80 Program SKJ 75–89.

of the revolution, Fidel Castro. The party organ, *Hoy*, “completely ignored” Popović’s visit as well as the visits of other Yugoslav high officials.⁸¹ Although the misunderstanding was only partially linked to their different interpretation of Marxism and was largely due to an internal crisis on the island, it was significant and proved to be the first in relations between the two countries.

In 1960, the leaders of five Third World countries, Indonesia, India, Egypt, Ghana and Yugoslavia, met on the premises of the Yugoslav Mission to the United Nations, on the margins of the jubilant 15th anniversary of the United Nations General Assembly. The gathering took place under the impact of the U-2 spy plane incident and failure of the meeting of US President Dwight Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev in Paris, while the Berlin crisis was deepening. The Tunisian town of Bizerta was still under French occupation.⁸² Tensions between the Unit-

81 PRO, FCO 28/559, Report on the Visit to Havana of Yugoslav Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 3 November 1959, British Embassy, Havana. See my brochure on Fidel Castro, published after the death of Cuba’s revolutionary leader: *Globus, Globusov specijal: Castro, El Comandante (1926.-2016.)*, Posljednja legenda komunizma; Zagreb, 30 November 2016.

82 Africa’s northernmost town Bizerta was a French military port since 1880 and remained under French control even after the proclamation of Tunisia’s independence. Tunisian military forces attacked the town on 19 July 1961. In a three-day conflict with 7,000 French parachuters some 700 Tunisian soldiers were killed and 1,200 were wounded. Only 24 French soldiers were killed and 100 were wounded. Bizerta and a small part of the Sahara remained under French control until 1963 despite being condemned by the UN GA. This incident was probably what led Tunisian President Habib Bourgiba to participate in the NAM Conference in Belgrade in 1961. Relations between Tunisia and Paris remained strained until the 1970s. Members of the French and Italian communities in Tunisia mostly left the country after the outbreak of the crisis. Bourgiba refused to attend the conference in Casablanca, but remained one of the most loyal American allies in the Arab world. As Nkrumah said to Tito, Bizerta is an example of what could happen to any small non-industrialized country. During the crisis, the Yugoslav press was almost hysterically on the Tunisian side. It fitted into the existing policy toward Algeria. Bizerta became Tunisian only after the recognition of Algeria as an independent state. Arnold 2006:181–182; White/Entlelis/Tessler 2002:465; Mandić 2005:54–55; APR, Of the Yugoslav-Ghana

ed States and Castro's Cuba were increasing and war was being waged in Angola, Algeria and Vietnam. Tito and his guests wrote a letter to the United Nations General Assembly. The initiative of the five leaders was intentionally over-ambitious and unrealistic. It called for the immediate resumption of the talks between the White House and the Kremlin, which showed that the participating Third World countries were also ready to act globally. Concern for the world should not only be left to the great nations.⁸³

Although the above-mentioned actions probably had their own *ad hoc* partial reasons, they were later included in a narrative, which logically ended with the Belgrade conference in 1961 and the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In this sense, the final breakthrough was Tito's longest trip in his career – a 72-day-long journey around Africa in 1961. It was clear that in the “Year of Africa” Belgrade was trying to develop its own “African policy” that would not fit into any existing mould.

THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT IN BELGRADE

On February 1961, Tito's ship *Galeb*, escorted by four military ships with 1,200 sailors, three special planes and more than 100 officials, set off on a 72-day journey to Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia and the UAR. Tito's entourage had barely left the Adriatic when news of the assassination of Congolese president Patrice Lumumba shocked the world. Mass rallies attended by tens of thousands of protesters were organized throughout Yugoslavia.⁸⁴ Only the protests against the US involvement in the Vietnam War, organized a few years later, reached the same proportions.

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official talks held in Belgrade, 4 August 1961 (excerpts); JFKL, 15 August 1961, George Kennan to Mc George Bundy, Yugoslav Foreign Policy.

83 Bogetic 1981:23.

84 In many Yugoslav cities protesters were shouting: “Kasavubu, Mobutu and Tshombe were throwing bombs on Lumumba!”. Ostojic 1966:339.

Before starting his journey, Tito talked with the American ambassador to Yugoslavia, assuring him that the idea of this journey was to reduce tensions in the world. There would be talk about colonialism, but not one country would be attacked. Ambassador Karl Rankin was aware that Yugoslavia's criticism of the West was always sharper than that of the East. Tito spoke in a conciliatory manner but, at the same time, was brutally open: "Moreover, Congo and similar countries were primitive and backward". Thus, it would be justified to interfere in their internal affairs for ideological reasons and the wish to have them adopt a certain ideology.⁸⁵ Ambassador Rankin was suspicious of the real motives behind Tito's journey. He wrote to the State Department that, bearing in mind previous experience, it was to be expected that his statements and actions were motivated by other reasons and not his concern for the well-being of the Africans. The American diplomat probably had something else in mind, but it was clear how much Yugoslav diplomacy had matured. The Yugoslavs were less naive and were prepared to adjust their policy towards the Third World to serve Yugoslav interests.

While sailing along the coast of West Africa, Tito proposed organizing a conference of Third World countries.⁸⁶ Yugoslav telegraphists sent the messages to prime minister Nehru, Ghanaian president Nkrumah and Indonesian leader Sukarno, sounding out their interest in the idea. Sukarno accepted it. Nehru accepted with some hesitation. With Nasser, Tito's closest associate, he talked about everything while cruising the Nile up to Helwan. The approval of Nasser and Nehru was crucial for mobilization of the Near East, Asian and African countries. The failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuban émigrés, which occurred on the same day as

85 JFKL, 7 February 1961. (Ambassador Karl Rankin to the Secretary of State).

86 APR, Memorandum of the Conversation between President Tito and Sukarno, held on 16 June 1961, VII odeljenje, DSIP, Adamović 2001:33; Mandić 2005:29–61; Tadić 1976:149–154.

Tito arrived in Alexandria (17 August 1961), on which the two politicians issued a joint statement, was used to emphasize the need to organize those countries that did not belong to any bloc. The failed invasion of Cuba contributed to giving the new American President, J. F. Kennedy a bad image at the very beginning of his term of office. Moreover, in this period, the notion of an imperialist state ready to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries was enhanced, while the positive notion of the Soviet Union was strengthened.⁸⁷ In the end, the Belgrade Conference was attended by representatives of all the countries visited by Tito, with the exception of Liberia and Togo.⁸⁸

From the very outset, Yugoslavia played a crucial role in organizing the First Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement.⁸⁹ A preparatory meeting at ministerial level was held in Cairo in early June 1961. From the start, Yugoslavia was resolute in its intention to host the conference, which could clearly be perceived from the Yugoslav press and private encounters with leading politicians.⁹⁰ The Egyptians and Cubans were also interested in playing host. Cairo had a certain advantage; it was closer to the majority of the countries wishing to participate in the conference and had more hotels, but the Cold War started in Europe, so that it was much more logical to hold the conference in the courtyard of opposing parts of the world. As the Yugoslavs discovered while sailing all the way around Africa, Nasser was not popular among some Africans. Many Arabs did not like him either. Nkrumah “had serious doubts about cooperation with Nasser” and was not prepared to take “a back seat”.⁹¹ Moroccan king Hassan II preferred Yugoslavia to Egypt, as his envoy Amet Balafreze said during his visit

87 Taylor 2009:115; Mates 1982:36–37.

88 Mandić 2005:60.

89 Mates 1982:36–44; Jakovina 2003:162–165.

90 JFKL, Belgrade to Secretary of State, No. 972, 31 May 1961.

91 JFKL, A Yugoslav Interpretation of Certain Current Topics, CIA, 30 March, 1961.

to Belgrade in May 1961. Yugoslavia's hosting could "increase the possibility of wider Arab participation".⁹² It seems that the invitation to Tunisia to participate came at the proposal of the Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, who himself was not altogether happy at the prospect of Cairo hosting the conference.⁹³ The former French colonies were considered pro-Western and were not invited to attend.

The ideas advanced by Indonesian President Sukarno were too radical and thus hardly acceptable to a number of Asian leaders. This primarily referred to the Indians, but they still wished to be one of the sponsors of the conference. The Indians were constantly trying to expand the list of pro-Western neutral countries. Nigeria was invited at India's insistence, but Lagos turned down the invitation.⁹⁴ Venezuela also rejected the invitation to attend. At first, Nehru was not willing to participate in the conference, holding that it would be just an expanded meeting of the Big Five, like the one held in New York a year earlier.⁹⁵ New Delhi hoped that the meeting would pass without open attacks on the East or the West, that sensitive issues, involving Berlin, Mauritania, Pashtunistan and Israel, would be skipped and that the debate would focus on global issues.⁹⁶ Burmanese prime minister U Nu wished to let Belgrade clearly know what his position was with respect to a number of global issues. At the same time, he was resolutely against the Soviet proposal for the re-organization of the United Nations.⁹⁶

92 JFKL, Belgrade to Secretary of State, No. 972, 31 May 1961.

93 Agung 1973:335–336.

94 KPR, Office of Koča Popović, Pov. br. 424983, Belgrade, 17 August 1961; Notes on a conversation between State Secretary Koča Popović and Soviet Ambassador Epishev, held on 16 August 1961, at 1:00 p.m.

JFKL, Belgrade to Secretary of State, No. 42, 15 July 1961.

95 JFKL, Cairo to Secretary of State, No. 1893, 22 May 1961; Belgrade to Secretary of State, No. 193, 14 August 1961.

96 JFKL, CIA, Burma; U Nu's Comments Concerning the Forthcoming Neutral Nations Conference, 8 August 1961.

Budimir Lončar, an advisor to Koča Popović in 1961, was assigned the task of securing Belgrade's hosting at the preparatory meeting of the Host Country Committee. Ethiopia, which was important as a pro-Western African country, was distinctly in favour of Yugoslavia, like a considerable number of other countries.⁹⁷ Cuba was the only country which resolutely opposed Yugoslavia's hosting until the end. "The Cuban President even threatened that the Cubans would not participate should the Conference be held in Yugoslavia", Tito himself said to Indonesian President Sukarno. Cuba's insistence on the "liquidation of capitalism" and putting pressure on one big power was unacceptable.⁹⁸ On the other hand, the Americans were interested in keeping the "uncommitted" countries together, without deepening the division into pro-Western and pro-Eastern blocs, which would be detrimental to them. Kennedy's Ambassador to Belgrade, the famous George Kennan, wrote that it was felt that the Yugoslavs had enough power to deal with the other nations in Cairo in order to avoid such a development and that they hoped that something like that would not happen.⁹⁹ The famous American diplomat was right.

George Kennan visited Tito on Brijuni together with Undersecretary Bowles on 30 July 1961. The case of Brazil, another country which decided not to participate in the conference as a full member, was not discussed. Yugoslavia blamed the United States for this because of the pressure it had exerted, which was evident from a letter sent by US Ambassador John Cabot to the Brazilian Government in the newly-built Brasilia. It would be embarrassing if Cuba was the only Latin American country to attend the Belgrade conference, Tito said, showing clearly once again that

97 Jakovina 2011:92 (Up and Underground).

98 APR, Memorandum of a Conversation between President Tito and Sukarno, held on 16 June 1961, VII odeljenje, DSIP.

99 JFKL, Belgrade to Secretary of State, No. 979, 1 June 1961.

relations between Belgrade and Havana were strained.¹⁰⁰ At the same time, it did not seem problematic to Belgrade that some other neutral European countries were not invited to come to Yugoslavia. The Americans were not overly concerned about the fact that the Belgrade Conference would be the largest gathering of anti-American and anti-Western nations, excluding those belonging to the communist camp. At the same time, the British lobbied among moderate neutral countries in favour of attending the conference. They hoped that these countries, together with Yugoslavia, would ensure a more moderate course at the conference. In his last letters to some world leaders, Tito asked them to display “maximum constructiveness” and “minimum propaganda.”¹⁰¹

In his memorandum to President Kennedy, George Kennan wrote that there was not much left that could be done; rather, one should wait for the natural process of disintegration.¹⁰² It would be wise to send journalists, especially “Negro journalists”, which would testify to American diversity. The evident Yugoslav anti-Americanism was still not personal and based on the experience of mutual relations; rather, it was the reflection of a deep and frank disagreement about the wisdom of certain actions in international relations.¹⁰³ At the same time, the Yugoslav media propaganda was much harsher and much more negative than Tito’s private statements. As Kennan wisely wrote in his report to the State Department, the history of his nation had taught him to be unusually sensitive to any sign of the oppression of small nations by large ones.¹⁰⁴ CIA analysts were also aware of Yugoslavia’s ambi-

100 JFKL, Memorandum of a Conversation, 17 July 1961 (Josip Broz Tito and George F. Kennan); Jakovina 2002:164).

101 JFKL, From Belgrade to Secretary of State No. 69, 21 July 1961.

102 JFKL, Memorandum to the President, Belgrade Conference, 3 August 1961 (Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.).

103 JFKL, Belgrade to Secretary of State, No. 115, 31 July 1961.

104 JFKL, Memorandum of a Conversation, 17 July 1961 (Josip Broz Tito and George

tion as one of those small countries which alone do not have great influence, but aspire to broader leadership and the creation of a bloc of countries that agree with the general principles of foreign policy and can express their views “collectively”.¹⁰⁵ Likewise, as long as there are tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States, there is a golden opportunity for small countries, like Yugoslavia, to fish in muddy waters, American diplomats wrote.¹⁰⁶ The member countries of the Non-Aligned Movement could not create a third bloc because they lacked discipline, coherence and economic inter-dependence, while some of their leaders also lacked maturity. At times, there were even fewer political ties among them, but the common denominator was so broad that it could satisfy all participants. This proved to be sufficient to keep all the NAM countries together.

Tito was an excellent conference host. The guests from Africa and the Near East were impressed with the efficient administration and economic and political vitality of a country living its most brilliant years. All conference participants were provided with excellent accommodation. Black politicians were welcomed with true enthusiasm, which seemed a miracle to countries that had won independence only a few months earlier. The summit was organized in early September, shortly before the UN GA session, in order to enhance the message to be sent from it.¹⁰⁷ Tito’s speech was a different story. The Yugoslav leader spoke out against blocs and conflicts, which were not normal and were dangerous. The uncommitted countries should take a stand on issues of general interest for peace and humanity.¹⁰⁸ American anxiety over

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F. Kennan).

105 CWIHP Document Reader; CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA NLK-77-996, 7 August 1961 (The Nonaligned Nations Conference).

106 JFKL, From Belgrade to Secretary of State No. 968, 30 May 1961.

107 JFKL, Cairo to Secretary of State, No.1871, 19 May 1961.

108 JFKL, Belgrade to Secretary of State, No. 352, 2 September 1961 (Belgrade

the conference was not unfounded since Tito almost completely justified the announcement of the Soviet Union that it would lift a three-year nuclear test moratorium. The question that remains unanswered is whether this Soviet move, which took place on the first day of the Belgrade Conference, was prompted by the Non-Aligned Summit or to overshadow criticism of the erection of the Berlin Wall a few weeks earlier. Whatever the reason, US Ambassador Kennan was disgusted by Tito's speech, although many American diplomats did not agree with the vitriolic reaction of their superior.¹⁰⁹

Prince Daoud, prime minister of Afghanistan, raised the mood of the conference by interrupting the speech and announcing that the Kabul government would recognize the Algerian revolutionaries as the legal representatives of Algeria. Ghana, Cambodia and Yugoslavia did the same a few days later.¹¹⁰ There were moments when the extremist participants bombarded the conference with their views, but there were also a number of much more moderate views. Moroccan king Hassan II condemned France for the creation of an artificial state called Mauritania, Spain for its occupation of the Sahara, Portugal for its presence in Angola, as well as the tolerance of the violation of Arab rights in Palestine. Saudi Arabia was in conflict with Nasser and viewed the conference as a way to affirm itself in the Arab world. The aggressive Algerians, who were still not recognized by the majority, could sense that the future was likely to bring conflict with Morocco. The leader of the Algerian revolution, Ben Bella, contemplated how to unite the Maghreb countries, which was viewed as a direct threat to the

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Conference).

109 JFKL, September 25, 1961 (Letter to Mc George Bundy, Esq. from Foreign Affairs Review).

110 JFKL, Belgrade to Secretary of State, No. 357, 2 September 1961; No. 408, 5 September 1961; No. 426, 6 September 1961 (Belgrade Conference).

stability of the Kingdom of Morocco.¹¹¹ Like all subsequent conferences, the first one was also a demonstration of an emotional anti-colonial and anti-Western pattern of behaviour, partly in conformity with the Soviet view.¹¹² Some of the political leaders of the countries that just won independence, who were later important and active NAM members, like Cheddi Jagan from the People's Progressive Party of British Guiana, sent telegrams to the attendees.¹¹³

The Soviet acceptance of the conference was not as sincere as one might assume.¹¹⁴ The entire tone of the speeches was much more pro-Soviet, but this was not sufficient for Moscow. It was quite clear that Yugoslavia would not return to the East. Representatives of the liberation movements gathered in Belgrade, but a number of the adopted resolutions were contrary to Soviet wishes. Although there were attempts to appeal for the recognition of two German states, such a statement was not included in the final document. This was a blow both to the leader of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Walter Ulbricht, and the entire Soviet bloc. Only nine countries supported the idea of recognizing "existing reality", while fifteen were adamantly against recognition of the division of Germany. The non-aligned countries refused to

111 Petrović 2007:194–195. Although Đera Petrović served in many countries throughout the world, his memories should not always be trusted. While he was the Yugoslav Ambassador to Tunisia, he allegedly talked with American Vice-President Stevenson about the role of more than 300 Yugoslavs, geologists, veterinarians and the like, who built dams, ports etc. Stevenson was an American Vice-President, but in the 19th century. In the year Petrović refers to, 1970, this position was held by Spiro Agnew.

112 JFKL, Belgrade to Secretary of State, No. 42, 15 July 1961.

113 JFKL, Belgrade to Secretary of State No.426, 6 September 1961 (Belgrade Conference).

114 KPR, Kabinet Bogdana Crnobrnje (Office of Bogdan Crnobrnja), Pov. br. 416191, 23 May 1961; Notes on a conversation between Soviet Ambassador Epishev and Minister Counsellor Dedushkin at the reception given by the Cubans on 22 May 1961.

support the Soviet Troika initiative, to include one Western country, one communist country and one non-aligned country with voting power, instead of having the UN Secretary General. The non-aligned countries also refused to support Soviet proposals concerning disarmament and a nuclear test ban.¹¹⁵ The rights of Palestinian Arabs were emphasized, while the condemnation of Israel in the final document draft was rather vague. Nevertheless, the Soviets were not criticized during the conference, while the West, especially Portugal and France, were constantly attacked.

Some countries were considered pro-Western, particularly Ceylon, Afghanistan, Nepal, Cambodia, Burma, Sudan and Ethiopia. The conference also demonstrated India's "middle" position. As was emphasized by the media, the Indians were always against blocs and bloc logic, which colored the nationalisms of many African countries. It was clear that New Delhi took a different stand on many issues broached in Belgrade from Yugoslavia, for example. The US Ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbright, informed the State Department that J. Nehru was not at all satisfied with Tito's speech at the conference.¹¹⁶ Although Indian prime minister Nehru and Ghanaian president Nkrumah were selected to travel to Moscow in order to present the "Statement on the Danger of War and Appeal for Peace", which was adopted by the conference participants, the Indian leader was reserved. Nehru's visit to Moscow was agreed after the Belgrade conference. At first, he was against playing the role of "postman". However, on 5 September, Nehru confirmed to American journalists that he and Nkrumah would ask for a new Khrushchev-Kennedy meeting on behalf of

115 JFKL, Frederick Kuh (*Chicago Sunday Times*; not dated); Belgrade to Secretary of State, No. 407, 5 September 1961 (Belgrade Conference); London to Secretary of State No. 1111, 14 September 1961. The countries opposing the recognition of the division of Germany included Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, UAR, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, Burma, India, Cambodia, Cyprus, Ethiopia and Somalia.

116 JFKL, New Delhi to Secretary of State No. 876, 21 September 1961.

the Non-Aligned Movement.¹¹⁷ Moscow was informed that the renewal of nuclear tests had come as a shock to all in Belgrade. The CPSU General Secretary held that nuclear tests strengthened the forces of peace just as the Non-Aligned Countries were easing the world situation as a moral factor. Nehru's impression after the meeting with Khrushchev was that the latter certainly did not plan an armed conflict.¹¹⁸

Indonesian leader Sukarno and Modibo Keita of Mali took the same letter to Washington. This was a golden opportunity for the Malian.¹¹⁹ He was persuaded by Tito to participate in the conference during the latter's travel around Africa. Now, about a year after the proclamation of Mali's independence, Keita, who was much more introvert than Sukarno, was received by the American president in the White House as a representative of 25 states.¹²⁰ Thus, non-alignment produced results almost instantly for the poorest nations, which became more visible and found protection under the roof of the Non-Aligned Group.¹²¹ The ultimate aim written down in both letters was to resume the dialogue between the superpowers. Berlin and the German issue – less than a month after the erection of an “anti-fascist protective rampart”, as the Wall was called in the East – were the subject of many discussions. Anyway, as written by *Chicago Sunday Times* journalist Frederick Kuh, the initiative was part of a “propaganda tactical

117 JFKL, Belgrade to Secretary of State No. 418, 5 September 1961 (Belgrade Conference); Minić 1979:171–172.

118 KPR, Embassy of India, Belgrade, Joint Message from Jawarharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, and His Excellency M. Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana, to His Excellency Marshal Josip Broz Tito, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 27 September 1961.

119 Jakovina 2002:165.

120 Mandić 2005:48–50.

121 JFKL, Frederick Kuh (not dated); NARA, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Presidential Talks between President Kennedy and Presidents Sukarno and Keita, 12 September 1961 (611.61/9–1261).

deception”, since the course of history itself was pushing the East and the West toward negotiations. According to Kuh, despite its odiousness, the conflict over Berlin was a small problem, while the struggle between the two blocs over alliance with the non-engaged world was crucial and the most important phenomenon of our time in the long term.

The Cubans constantly demonstrated insufficient respect for their Yugoslav hosts, but, in the end, they could be satisfied with the results of their stay in the FPRY.¹²² Egypt was primarily interested in Arab problems. Tunisia decided to attend the conference due to its unpleasant experience with the French in Bizerta. Since all participants at the Belgrade Conference supported Bourguiba, the Tunisians now had a somewhat better position for their talks with France.¹²³ Never completely cured of megalomania – which was, in general, the common characteristic of a number of statesmen participating at the Belgrade conference – Tunisian president Bourguiba was convinced that this conference was a step further away from “positive neutralism” toward “non-alignment vis-à-vis both the East and the West” and that all this was based solely on his, Tunisian, ideas.¹²⁴

The conference showed increasing differences between Indonesia and India. Immediately after his return to Jakarta, Indonesian president Sukarno finally announced a new view of the world according to which “old established forces” were afraid of “new emerging forces”.¹²⁵ This was simply an elaboration of the thesis presented by Sukarno in Belgrade: “The conflict between the new emerging forces for freedom and justice and the old forces

122 JFKL, Belgrade to Secretary of State No. 435, 7 September 1961.

123 JFKL, Belgrade to Department of State, Embassy Despatch 155, 14 November 1961 (The Belgrade Conference in Retrospect).

124 JFKL, Tunis to Secretary of State No. 421, 13 September 1961 (Belgrade Conference; Meeting with Bourguiba, No. 3).

125 Agugng 1973:338 et seq.

of domination...” In any case, worldwide tensions were generated by imperialism, colonialism and the imposed division of nations. There can be no coexistence between “independence and justice, on the one hand, and imperialism and colonialism, on the other”.¹²⁶

Yugoslavia did not pose a problem for the West as long as it remained independent of Moscow. The NAM Conference increased Yugoslavia’s prestige in the world, while at the same time improving its economic situation.¹²⁷ In a certain way, non-alignment became the path to salvation for Yugoslavia and Tito personally. Yugoslavia’s isolation from the West and the East was serious and genuine. Tito could now play the role of leader. The path sought since the early 1950s was finally found. Aligning with any alliance was wrong and fighting against such policies was worth the effort. Yugoslavia supported anti-colonial revolution, true independence and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. As George Kennan commented, this practically meant that the policy of any Western country or the United States towards any small non-NATO country could be criticized.¹²⁸ True, Yugoslav actions were sometimes anti-Western and anti-European, but even some Yugoslav politicians criticized them. In the Third World, the Yugoslavs traded in ideas, in which they often abounded. The Foreign Office concluded in 1961, just before the conference, that from its viewpoint Yugoslav influence in Africa was altogether more positive than negative. Although the Yugoslavs were Marxists, they were viewed as “revisionist heretics” and their activities did not lead to the “inclusion of African countries

126 JFKL, Belgrade to Secretary of State, No. 353, 2 September 1961 (Belgrade Conference, Sukarno’s Speech, 1 Sept. Session).

127 JFKL, Belgrade to Department of State, Embassy Despatch 155, 14 November 1961 (The Belgrade Conference in Retrospect).

128 JFKL, 15 August 1961. George Kennan to Mc George Bundy, Yugoslav Foreign Policy.

in the Soviet-Chinese bloc”. Belgrade was often over-ardent where criticism of neo-colonialism was involved and this was not good from the standpoint of Western economic interests. According to the British, the Yugoslavs supported “true neutralism”. In any case, in countries like Ghana and Guinea, which were already lost to the West, this posed much less danger than from the Chinese or Soviets.¹²⁹

NON-ALIGNMENT AND TITO’S YUGOSLAVIA: ONE AND THE SAME

Consequently, it is not surprising that in 1964 the British diplomats who complained about what they saw as preferential treatment of the Yugoslavs in official Foreign Office bulletins concerning communist activity in East Africa, received a patronizing answer from London: the reason why this was not done (i.e. why Yugoslavia was not condemned), referring specifically to Africa, lay in the fact that the Yugoslavs had created a desirable perception of themselves. Should they be depicted in the same colour as that used to depict the Russians, Chinese, Cubans and others, this would benefit the Russians and their cronies rather than harm the Yugoslavs. Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, for example, had a very high opinion of the Yugoslavs and often regarded them as being equal to the Israelis – benevolent, non-aligned, and against colonialism.¹³⁰ Since the Cold War in Europe froze, after the erection of the Berlin Wall and Albania’s abandonment of the camp, it became clear once again that tensions were moving from the Old Continent towards the Third World. At that time, radical countries, like Indonesia before the failed coup of 1965 and the Cubans, advocated either a second gathering of Asian and African

129 PRO, Foreign Office Minutes, East European Section, Yugoslavia and the Uncommitted Countries; British Embassy Belgrade, 24 May 1961.

130 PRO, Foreign Office, C. R. R. Barclay to J. L. Pumphrey, Esq., C. M. G. Belgrade, 10 March 1964.

countries, Bandung 2, or a three-continent conference (including only the Asian, African and Latin American nations), which was the Cuban idea. Yugoslavia was excluded in both cases. The global idea of non-alignment was reduced to regional gatherings of countries with colonial experience.

Tito's regime never became really moderate, at least not from the Western viewpoint. This was not its aim, nor was it in conformity with Tito's ideology and world view. However, being extremely pragmatic, talented and determined to keep his own independence, he did not make any compromise involving leaning towards the Soviet Union. In April 1964, the Cuban newspaper *Hoy* published a fierce attack on Yugoslavia using words that were usually "reserved for Yankee imperialism" and other "devilish figures from Castro's mythology". Since Yugoslavia had advocated the participation of Venezuela at the Second Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Cairo in 1964, Belgrade was deemed "offensive" and was accused of "hostility and dishonesty". The Canadian diplomats in Havana wrote that *if the Yugoslavs held that the Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement should be used as a lever for spreading neutralist ideas and a cautious promotion of the communist view on certain world problems, it would be necessary to try to avoid the extremist position that was regularly taken by the Castro regime at international gatherings, because this would turn away those very countries which Yugoslavia was trying to attract. Moreover, the Yugoslavs even welcomed the opportunity to present themselves publicly as being different from Cuba, thus avoiding being painted the same colour as the Cubans.* Admittedly, Yugoslavia did not give any significant aid to the Cubans, but the war with Belgrade could hardly be in the Cuban interest.¹³¹

The Second Non-Aligned Summit Conference in Cairo only deepened some tendencies that were already evident in Belgrade.

131 PRO, FO371/174031, Canada House, Cuban/Yugoslav Relations, Editorial Attack Against Yugoslavia, 15 April 1964.

India finally decided to embrace membership wholeheartedly, feeling isolated and surrounded by a hostile China, Pakistan and Burma. The Indians were afraid of the initiative for convening Bandung 2, advanced by Sukarno and Zhou Enlai.¹³² Therefore, Tito's and Nehru's interests finally overlapped. Tito, who was less radical than in 1961, wanted the Cairo summit to be Belgrade 2 and avoid, at all costs, a gathering of Asian countries, where the pro-Chinese countries would play an important role. For this reason, the position of the Yugoslav ambassador to Jakarta was also of special significance. Therefore, all efforts were made to slow down Sukarno's radical withdrawal. The failure of the principles of Pancasila, after the Chinese attack on India in October 1962, did not leave any room for manoeuvre for the Indians. After the worsening of relations between China and the Soviet Union, the improvement of Soviet-Yugoslav relations accelerated,¹³³ since the platform under which the NAM countries had gathered, excluded countries like China. Over the following months, the isolation of Beijing only deepened. All this had a positive impact on these countries, despite the fact that India was represented by Nehru's successor Krishna Menon in Cairo.

The crisis in Congo had a strong influence on the organization and course of the First NAM Conference in Belgrade. The Second NAM Conference headlines were stolen by Moïse Tshombe, the legal Congolese prime minister and the person responsible for Patrice Lumumba's assassination. It pointed to the deep divisions among the Third World countries. Although it was legitimate, his participation irritated Tito and some other participants. The Marshal of Yugoslavia said resolutely: "I won't participate in the conference if Tshombe will be present." In the end, the Congolese

132 Agung 1973:341–346, 360–361

133 PRO, FO371/169625, Soviet-Yugoslav Rapprochement; the USSR's Dispute with China; Sir H. Trevelyan, Moscow, 5 January 1963; Agung 1973:351; Taubman 2003:608–613.

prime minister did not attend because he had been placed under house arrest. In all other respects, Tito moved towards the middle and took up a moderate position.¹³⁴ For the Non-Aligned Movement leftist radicalism was much more dangerous than the pro-Western countries, which mostly remained passive in this movement. Since the Cairo conference was the last one in which Nasser participated – six years later he refused to go to Lusaka, knowing that Soviet criticism (at that time he was in alliance with the Soviet Union) would be too unpleasant – while other great names in the early history of the Non-Aligned Movement during the 1960s had either been deposed or died (Ben Bella, Sukarno, Nkrumah, Keita), this strengthened Tito's dominant position. The Yugoslavs were aware that many conclusions of the Cairo conference were "maximalist and unrealistic", but this had already become common practice at NAM meetings.

After the Cairo Conference, the NAM entered a period of crisis. The joint meeting of Tito, Nasser and Indira Ghandi, India's new prime minister and Jawaharlal Nehru's daughter, in 1966 was only symbolically important, although it called for additional explanations to the other participants that this was not a meeting of the "elite" or informal leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement. Apart from its symbolic significance, this meeting really carried no political weight.¹³⁵ Of greater importance to the whole world, including the NAM, was the Arab, especially Egypt's, defeat in the

134 Tadić 1976: 177–190; Bogetić 1981:50–53; Mates 1982:56–65; Jakovina 2011:49–53; Agung 1973:348–355, 366; Jakovina 2011:95 (Up and Underground).

135 APR, I-4-A, Tripartite Meeting in New Delhi, 21–24 October 1966; Consultative Meeting of the Representatives of the Governments of the Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, 8 December 1969; Preparatory Meeting for the Third NAM Conference in Dar Es Salam, 13–17 May 1970; Grupa za analizu i planiranje DSIP, 17 October 1966; Državni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove, Belgrade, 14 May 1968, Str. Pov. br. 583/2, Pregled i ocena dosadašnjih reagovanja na inicijativu za sazivanje konferencije na vrhu (A Survey and the Appraisal of the Hitherto Reactions to the Initiative for Convening a Summit Conference); Jakovina 2011:56–60.

war with Israel in 1967, which simply pushed them into the arms of the Soviets. Shortly afterwards, in 1968, Yugoslavia undertook a broad diplomatic offensive to revive the Non-Aligned Movement. Tito's diplomats visited all potential and former NAM members, proposing a new summit conference. The initiative preceded the intervention of the Warsaw Pact countries (except Romania) in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Some old divisions were still present, such as India's opposition to Pakistan's membership, but there were also some new, interesting and different initiatives. The Spanish ambassador to France, Generalissimo Franco's representative, approached his Yugoslav colleague in Paris, Ivo Vejvoda, to express the interest of Madrid in the next NAM conference. This proposal was rejected.¹³⁶

The Lusaka conference in 1970 was largely a Yugoslav project and Yugoslav conference. The relevant documents were written in Belgrade and Yugoslav diplomats did their best to make this conference successful. After the Lusaka Conference, the NAM countries met regularly every third year, without exception. In an analysis of this summit conference, leading Yugoslav politicians concluded that the "Arab lack of interest had been marginalized", and that the left radicals and participants from right-wing countries were moving towards the center. The most extremist countries included Congo Brazzaville, Cuba, Sudan and Libya, and the most conservative ones Lesotho, Swaziland and Liberia. In the end, the decision of Gamal Abdel Nasser not to travel to Lusaka hurt the reputation of Egypt rather than adversely affected the entire Non-Aligned Movement. In fact, the NAM was reaffirmed.¹³⁷

The reaction of Slovenian politician Stane Dolanc, one of the most influential individuals in the Yugoslav security system, was

136 Kreačić 1988: 89–92; Jakovina 2013: 66–68.

137 BL, Državni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove, Izveštaj o Trećoj konferenciji nesvrstanih zemalja (Report on the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries), 14 September 1970.

amazing: “Non-alignment was accepted as a political movement and there are extraordinary chances that such a policy encompasses not only Africa, Asia and possibly Latin America or, so to say, the non-civilized world, but that all others also accept it as an alternative to the current constellation of international relations”.¹³⁸ This statement was not only politically incorrect, but also partially offset the constant criticism that Yugoslav foreign policy was not sufficiently European and pointed out that the element of pragmatism in the NAM was one of the important motives of Yugoslav policy.

During the 1970s, after several successful interventions throughout Africa, Cuba’s self-confidence increased enormously. Its policy was increasingly oriented towards the transformation of the NAM into the “strategic reserve” of the socialist bloc and all this had to be achieved by Cuban diplomacy. During Tito’s meeting with the highest-ranking officials in 1979, Macedonian politician Aleksandar Grličkov defined the Yugoslav position within the Non-Aligned Movement as being “truly leftist”, “the most leftist program and most leftist philosophy within the NAM on offer... there is none more leftist than that”. In essence, Fidel Castro offered the break-up of socialism as a world process, which was actually a rightist position, the Yugoslav ideologist stated.¹³⁹ Since Fidel Castro was designated as the host of the Sixth NAM

138 APR, I-4-I, Third Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries, Lusaka, 8–10 September 1970, Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries, Georgetown, 8–12 August 1972, Preparatory Committee of the Non-Aligned Countries, Kabul, 13–15 May 1973; Extract from notes on the conversations held by members of the Yugoslav delegation after the Lusaka Conference, 19 September 1970; Jakovina 2013:78.

139 BL, Kabinet Predsednika Republike, Služba za spoljnopolitička pitanja (Cabinet of the President of the Republic, Office for Foreign Policy Issues), Str. pov. br. 200/3, Stenographic records of the 1st Session of the SFRY Coordinating Commission for the Preparation of Yugoslavia’s Participation in the 6th Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, held at Brdo pri Kranju on 9 May 1979, at 10 a.m.; Jakovina 2013:131.

Conference, with the idea of redirecting the movement, the SFRY diplomacy was faced with a serious task. The actual threat was not posed by the few agile and radical countries that rallied around Cuba. A greater threat was posed by the numerous passive countries. The host country could always organize the auditorium, journalists, distribution of speeches and order of speakers, as well as use various types of manipulation. Castro did all this in 1979. In Havana, Egypt was represented by the number-two man in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the future UN Secretary General. The reason for such a low level was an attempt to partially mitigate the blow should the Arab countries – Iraq was especially vocal – expel Egypt from the NAM due to its signing the Camp David Accords. The Cubans still advocated the idea that the socialist bloc was the natural ally of the non-aligned countries, many of which were building socialism in their own way, but did not want to allow usurpation of the name of this historical process.¹⁴⁰

Tito (now at the ripe old age of 88) and Yugoslavia succeeded once again in preserving the “authentic principles of non-alignment” at the Havana conference. At that time, both the West and the United States appreciated such an effort. When President Richard Nixon was about to come to Yugoslavia in 1970, his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger wrote in the material prepared for the President that he should mention the NAM, which had little relevance, but was “dear to his (Tito’s) heart”.¹⁴¹ Nixon’s visit to Belgrade, Zagreb and Kumrovec coincided with Lusaka and the Yugoslav side really believed that the success of that meeting was

140 BL, SSIP, “Pristup pojmu Levice i Desnice u PNZ, istorijske dimenzije odnosu na pragmatско postavljanje nesvrstanosti i socijalizma” (Approach to the Notion of the Left and the Right in the NAM, historical dimensions relative to a pragmatic approach to non-alignment and socialism (not dated; written after the Havana Conference in 1979).

141 NARA, Nixon Presidential Material Project, National Security Council Files, President’s Trip files; (Yugoslavia, Objectives-Issues-Talking Points-Background).

the reason behind Nixon's decision to visit Yugoslavia for the first time in the history of the White House and a socialist country for the second time in its history. Nine years later, Zbigniew Brzezinski, chief advisor to President Jimmy Carter, said that Yugoslavia, together with the United States and the Soviet Union, was the only country that had affirmed itself as a global factor. Belgrade's position in the Non-Aligned Movement was constructive. In the light of the dying détente, parallel to an increase in the number of conflicts in the Third World, behaviour of Cuba and Vietnam, Yugoslavia really seemed like an "American communist ally".¹⁴²

After the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, a non-aligned and socialist country, which was not a Warsaw Pact member, in December 1979, Belgrade became panicky. In January 1980, Tito was admitted into hospital which he never left. Was Moscow merely waiting for Tito to die in order to renew its pressure on Belgrade? In an effort to prevent this possibility and mobilize the world's attention as much as possible, Yugoslavia insisted that the NAP organize a special ministerial meeting where Soviet intervention would be condemned for the first time ever. Until then, this kind of condemnation was always reserved for Western countries. However, fearing the strengthened position of Pakistan and China, which was in sharp conflict with Moscow, India was not ready to support the Yugoslav initiative that was directed at the then important Indian ally. With Cuba as Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement, coupled with the passive stance of the important countries, the Yugoslav initiative could hardly be accepted. Admittedly, an extraordinary meeting was held, but one year after the Soviet invasion, when Moscow's wishes and possibilities

142 JV, SSIP, Služba za istraživanje i dokumentaciju (Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, Department for Research and Documentation), Str. pov. br. 843, 29 December 1979 Pregled obaveštajnih elemenata za procenu bezbednosnog položaja SFRJ (A Survey of the Intelligence Elements for the Security Status of the SFRY).

became evident. The efforts of Yugoslavia's Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Josip Vrhovec, to have Moscow condemned, was a clear indicator that the NAM was the main lever of Yugoslav diplomacy, since the Non-Aligned Movement was often used in Yugoslav politics.

The government installed in Kabul by the Soviet Union after its intervention was never recognized by Western countries nor by Yugoslavia. Belgrade recognized the "Afghan people", but not Babrak Karmal, so that diplomatic representation in Afghanistan remained at the level of *chargé d'affaires*. There were no top-level visits. The Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Raif Dizdarević, for example, refused to greet his Afghan colleague at the airport as late as 1988. There were no official receptions or joint statements after the meeting. The public humiliation of the Afghans was Yugoslavia's message to Moscow.¹⁴³

The crisis in Yugoslavia, which was becoming increasingly serious during the 1980s, also affected the position of the SFRY within the NAP. Although Raif Dizdarević did his best to lobby for having the 1986 Eighth Conference held in Belgrade, the battle was poorly prepared and conducted, and the host became Zimbabwe. In any case, it was Africa's turn to be the host and it was one of the rare conferences which was not regional and was held in Africa. For Zimbabwe, which had won independence several years earlier, this conference was a historic event, which had yet to show its maturity. The next summit conference was held in Belgrade three years later when Budimir Lončar became head of Yugoslavia's diplomacy. There were numerous reasons for Yugoslavia's hosting the conference, but a great number of them were just local and

143 Drašković 2009:305, 333. Although Drašković spent more than four years as *Chargé d'Affaires* in Kabul, in his memoirs he constantly misdated the Saur Revolution by one year (it occurred in 1978, and not in 1977). For more details about the Soviet invasion and Yugoslav reaction see: Jakovina 2011:253–391.

important for a country that was breaking apart – the hope that some negative processes could be slowed down in this way.

During the Cold War, the first and the last Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement took place in Belgrade. The first conference demonstrated the importance and prestige of Yugoslavia among the Third World countries, while the last one was held in a disintegrating country, in 1989. One of the reasons for selecting a country in crisis was the wish of most countries to circumvent Nicaragua, which was strongly lobbying to take the chair. In the late 1980s, with a change in Soviet policy and Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow, it would not be wise to have Nicaragua as Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement. The country was extremist and opposed to changes, especially those in the socialist world. Ultimately, shortly before its collapse, Yugoslavia did something useful for the Non-Aligned Movement. At the same time, it did a lot of things that could be considered selfish. Belgrade wanted to remain a player, that is, to be present on the international scene. Proportional visibility, which was ensured by holding the Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement, the fact that in this capacity the country would be invited to attend numerous international meetings, could help those forces in the country itself which pleaded for responsibility, tried to stabilize the situation and thus transmit true messages to international factors.¹⁴⁴ The Western countries also hoped for Belgrade instead of some radical country. All such intentions proved futile. Only the Ninth NAM Conference, which was successful and modern in many respects, took place in Belgrade in 1989.

During 1990, while the Yugoslav federation was falling apart, after the Non-Aligned Movement was ignored by the Yugoslav public, leading Yugoslav diplomats were given recognition for what the NAM had meant for the world in concrete circumstances

144 Jakovina 2011:622–627.

at the end of a historical period. On 18 January 1990, Vaclav Havel, the first democratic president of Czechoslovakia, told Budimir Lončar, Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that he dreamed of a world “in which all countries will be non-aligned”. According to him, “Yugoslavia played a very important role and was non-aligned during the Cold War”.¹⁴⁵ When the world mobilized to punish Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, American Secretary of State James Baker thanked the SFRY on 3 October 1990 for its “views on Iraqi aggression... and the actions taken in its capacity as the Chair of the NAM”.¹⁴⁶ Hans Dietrich Genscher, West German Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, was probably the most vocal. On 1 September 1990, he “highly evaluated the role of Yugoslavia as the Chair of the NAM and its efforts within the NAM and the UN at finding a peaceful solution” to the Iraq crisis. “He stated that it was a true blessing for the world that at this critical time Yugoslavia chaired the NAM”.¹⁴⁷ This had no effect on the situation in the country any more. It probably could have had an effect on the diplomatic status of the SFRY had the country not been moving in a completely different direction.

WHY WAS IT IMPORTANT?

The First NAM Summit Conference held in Belgrade is a good illustration of all the important problems faced by Yugoslavia as an informal, yet real leader of this movement. The whole idea could not have succeeded without the participation of India, a country

145 BL, SSIP, Embassy of the SFRY in Prague, No. 38, 18 November 1990, (Lončar-Havel conversation).

146 BL, SSIP, SFRY Mission, New York, No.428, 3 October 1990. 45th Session of the UN General Assembly, Bilateral conversation between Federal Secretary Lončar and J. Baker.

147 BL, SSIP, Information on the conversation between Federal Secretary Budimir Lončar and H. D. Genscher, Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FRG, held in Belgrade on 31 August and 1 September 1990; Belgrade, 6 September 1990.

that was larger than all the NAM member countries put together. However, the Indians were adult enough to have their own political ideas regardless of the NAM and were often upset about the radicalism of some member countries, the excessive emphasis on anti-colonialism and the resentment towards former colonial, that is, Western countries. Some countries turned to the Soviets, who began to penetrate the Third World on an increasing scale. The Egyptians were also primarily interested in Arab issues. Indonesia was sliding toward extremism and the end of Sukarno's rule, after which it moved strongly towards the other end of the political spectrum. African countries were often radical, but were never sufficiently influential or had the necessary administrative capacity to play a dominant role. After the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in 1966, Ghana lost its prestige. Algeria, the host of the the Fourth Summit Conference in 1973, was in conflict with Morocco as well as with Egypt. Iraq, which became more visible after the overthrow of the Hashemite dynasty, was vying for the leading position in the Arab world, sometimes using the NAM to this end. If the war between Iraq and Iran had not broken out in 1980, the Seventh NAM Summit Conference would have been held in Baghdad and not in New Delhi in 1983. In the end, Yugoslavia was the only country whose interest in the Non-Aligned Movement was constant and increasing, had no ups and downs, and whose political options were strongly tied to the movement. Therefore, in a certain sense, Yugoslavia was non-aligned to a greater degree in the 1970s than ten years earlier. Therefore, the country was sharply criticized for its allegedly Europhobic policy. It could seem like that at first glance and to an uninformed observer. To those who read the long and frequent statements published by the non-aligned countries, Yugoslav foreign policy could seem ideologized and that it was pulling the country out of its natural, European environment. Underneath the not so deep ideological shroud lay a foreign policy whose actions were sophisticated, which was

pragmatic and which enabled a small but ambitious country to play a globally important role in the United Nations. Without its special role in the Third World, Yugoslav foreign policy would not have acquired a global dimension. For example, during his visit to Yugoslavia in 1981, the Libyan leader asked the Yugoslavs to mediate in the dispute between Tripoli and Washington. The Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States, Budimir Lončar, informed the State Department about Libyan efforts to normalize relations with the United States, although the US Government closed the Libyan People's Bureau (Embassy) in Washington.¹⁴⁸ Yugoslav trade in secret data on terrorism was probably the most secretive. Those who were labelled as terrorists in West were often regarded as ordinary "freedom fighters" by the Belgrade authorities, which used to take care of these fighters themselves or educate their children. Dissidents, like Dr Najibullah from Afghanistan, were hidden in various parts of Yugoslavia.¹⁴⁹

In May 1988, Josip Vrhovac, the former Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs and then a member of the Presidency of the SFRY, met with American president Ronald Reagan in Washington. The American president first thanked his Yugoslav colleague for everything Belgrade had done "in the case of Colonel Hawari, as an important step in the struggle against international terrorism". Belgrade had helped locate a group headed by Abdullah Abd Al Hamid Labib, known as Hawari, which was responsible for planting a bomb aboard TWA Flight 840 flying from Rome to Athens in 1986.¹⁵⁰

148 JV, SSIP, Kabinet saveznog sekretara (Office of the Federal Secretary), Pov. br. 424364/1, 9 May 1981.

149 Jakovina 2011:271.

150 JV, SSIP, Pov. br. 431832, 27 May 1988, Report on the visit of Josip Vrhovec, a member of the Presidency of SFR Yugoslavia, to the United States, 5 and 6 May 1988; Note on the conversation between Josip Vrhovec, member of the Presidency of the SFRY, and US president Ronald Reagan, 6 May 1988.

Yugoslav firms were not sufficiently sophisticated to sell their products or build plants in Norway or Germany, but were excellent and desirable for projects in distant countries. They built congress centers in Accra, Liberville, Lusaka and Harare, the Naval Academy in Tripoli, the Ministry of Oil in Baghdad, irrigation systems in Peru, a hydro-electric power plant and dam in Panama, port facilities in Tartous in Syria, Assab in Ethiopia and Bombay in India, a trade center in Lagos, a hospital in Guinea, and trade centers in Mali.¹⁵¹ The Libyan authorities wanted Yugoslavia to build a chemical industrial plant and laser equipment company. They also wished to conclude an agreement on the use of nuclear energy with Yugoslavia. At times, Yugoslav companies were more expensive than others, but the Libyans wanted them, convinced that Belgrade would not abuse their hospitality.¹⁵² The most profitable projects were realized with Iraq. Since the outbreak of the conflict between Iraq and Iran the Yugoslav Secretariat for Foreign Affairs became unusually silent. It is quite clear that Iraq was the aggressor, but due to pressure from military circles, Baghdad was not condemned because Saddam Hussein, the sole master of Iraq since 1979, was an excellent buyer of equipment and all kinds of materials from Yugoslavia. Iraq also became Yugoslavia's biggest trade partner in the Third World. Some 16,000 Yugoslavs worked there and many of them built 34 military projects throughout the country. Yugoslav companies constructed the most sensitive facilities for Iraq: underground nuclear-proof bunkers for Saddam

151 Jakovina 2011:480; Jakovina 2003:520; Mandić 2005:465–566; Rendulić 2004:306.

152 JV, Predsedništvo SFRJ (Presidency of the SFRY), Str. pov. br. 280/1, 2 October 1981, stenographic notes on a conversation between Sergej Kraigher, President of the Presidency of the SFRY, and Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the leader of the Great First of September Revolution of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, held on 28 September 1981, beginning at 11:45 a.m. at the White Palace in Belgrade.

and factories where Kalashnikov weapons and missile systems were manufactured.¹⁵³

The music school, built in the capital city of Gabon, was named after Croatian composer Josip Štolcer Slavenski. The author of the first Ethiopian constitution was Croatian lawyer Leon Geršković, founder of the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb, the first such faculty in a socialist country. Yugoslav experts were asked to establish universities in Angola and Madagascar. Yugoslav experts also taught in Addis Ababa, while thousands of foreign students came to Yugoslavia to study. In the late 1970s, three Ethiopian ministers were Yugoslav students. Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, who was supported by the SFRY in various ways, expressed his gratitude to Tito for “training Palestine pilots” in Yugoslavia.¹⁵⁴ Libyan dictator Gaddafi did the same thing. His naval cadets studied at the Naval Academy in Split. While visiting secret military facilities in Bosnia, including an underground explosives factory, Gaddafi said that Libya was ready to receive “not thousands, but hundreds of thousands of Yugoslav experts and workers”.¹⁵⁵ Malta, which became a NAM member, was extremely important for Yugoslavia, which

153 JV, Predsedništvo SFRJ (Presidency of the SFRY), Str. pov. br. 3/7, 20 January 1982. Stenographic notes on a conversation between Petar Stambolić, Vice-President of the Presidency of the SFRY, and Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, Vice-Chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council, held on 11 January 1982, beginning at 10:30 a.m. in Baghdad – Iraq; Rendulić 2004:322–324.

154 JV, SSIP, Savezni savet za međunarodne odnose Federal Council on International Relations), Tape recording of the 25th Session of the Federal Council on International Relations held on 24 October 1979; SSIP, 9 February 1979, Notes on a conversation between President of the Republic Josip Broz Tito and Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, in Damascus, 9 February 1979; Jakovina 2011:129–130, 242–243.

155 JV, SSIP, Kabinet saveznog sekretara (Office of the Federal Secretary), Str. pov. br.23, 30 April 1981. Notes on a conversation between Colonel Gaddafi with President Mijatović, in the presence of the Yugoslav and Libyan Ministers of National Defense and Foreign Affairs, 29 April 1981 (the conversation took place at Gaddafi's request).

was interested in having a greater number of NAM members from Europe. Therefore, Belgrade built a small factory on the island. In the early 1980s, Maltese leader Dom Mintoff asked the SFRY to donate a ship to La Valetta, which it did.¹⁵⁶

The Yugoslav state also helped in supplying weapons and arming. As emphasized by Robert Mugabe during Tito's funeral, Yugoslavia donated "50,000 tons of wheat and armaments" to Zimbabwe.¹⁵⁷ Yugoslavia also armed Algeria, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Namibia's resistance movement SWAPO, Zambia, Sri Lanka, Angola ("the Yugoslav tanks we sent were small, but were still tanks", said Stane Dolanc). The Ethiopians also obtained 70 old tanks when they were attacked by Somalia.¹⁵⁸ This old equipment was part of the equipment given by the United States in the 1950s; under the agreement, they could not re-sold to anyone. Although their value was initially estimated at 12 million dollars, Mengistu Haile Mariam and the Addis Abeba authorities never paid for them. The Americans knew about this transaction, but never put more pressure on Yugoslavia for this very reason.¹⁵⁹ The

156 JV, Predsedništvo SFRJ (Presidency of the SFRY), 25 November 1981, Presentation by Federal Secretary J. Vrhovec at the session of the Presidency of the SFRY, held on 25 November 1981 and devoted to the first item on the agenda.

157 JV, SSIP, Stenographic notes on a conversation between Lazar Koliševski, President of the Presidency of the SFRY, and Ambrosio Lukoki, Member of the Politbiro of MPLA and Minister of Education of PR Angola, held on 9 May 1980, beginning at 6:00 p.m.

158 JV, Kabinet Predsednika Republike, Služba za spoljnopolitička pitanja (Cabinet of the President of the Republic, Office for Foreign Policy Issues), Str. pov. br. 274/2, Belgrade, 8 June 1979. State secret. Notes on a tête-à-tête conversation between Comrade President and Algerian President Chadli on 30 May 1979, in the villa of the recreation center in Algeria; JV, SSIP, Kabinet saveznog sekretara (Office of the Federal Secretary), Str. pov. br. 23, 30 April 1981. Notes on a conversation between Colonel Gaddafi and President Mijatović, in the presence of the Algerian and Yugoslav Ministers of National Defense and Foreign Affairs, 29 April 1981 (the conversation was held at Gaddafi's request). Rendulić 2004:320–321.

159 CL, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Papers; Memorandum for Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The White House, Report to Congress on Unauthorized Yugoslav

most important assistance was probably provided by Tito to Egypt in 1973. President Sadat's special envoy came to Belgrade to ask for assistance. Tito said that he "asked for tanks". Sadat personally thanked the Yugoslav leader for assistance in the Parliament in Cairo, mentioning that the Yugoslav President had sent 140 tanks with full equipment, including ammunition, straight to the battlefield, thus preventing Israel's occupation of Cairo.¹⁶⁰ The Yugoslav planes *Galeb* and *Jastreb* were sold to Zambia and Libya. Some of them were still operable during NATO's attack on Libya in 2011.¹⁶¹

Some projects in the Third World were not lucrative. In the end, everything that was donated or remained unpaid in the Third World did not particularly improve Yugoslavia's position. However, since the NAM idea was so broad and acceptable in various respects – it was about the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, racism, hegemony and occupation – for countries wishing to act within such a framework, it was an excellent medium for the activities of a country which evidently understood that, in a certain way, the Cold War framework and peace were crucial for its survival. For smaller and poorer countries, the NAM was the only way to make their voice heard, feel equal and be treated like richer and bigger countries. For other countries, especially those who were in a better position and had a more stable internal situation and clearer idea of foreign policy, the Non-Aligned Movement could be an excellent way to

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Transfer to Ethiopia of US Origin Tanks; 12 July 1977.

160 JV, Kabinet Predsednika Republika (Služba za spoljnopolitička pitanja (Cabinet of the President of the Republic, Office for Foreign Policy Issues), Str. pov. br. 8/1, Belgrade, 11 June 1979. State secret. Notes on a conversation between President Tito and President Gaddafi held on 1 June 1979, while sailing aboard a yacht in Libya; notes on the continued conversation between President Tito and President Gaddafi, 2 June 1979, in President Gaddafi's tent; Jakovina 2011:171.

161 Rendulić 2004:305–310 A *Galeb* was shot down by a French pilot on 24 March 2011, (<http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/svijet/118521/Francuski-lovac-oborio-libijskog-Galeba.html>).

help them remain visible and important, adopt a stance and play the game that was usually reserved for the biggest countries. The Cold War enabled small countries to play an important part during one period in world history. The same situation applied to Yugoslavia. The Non-Aligned Movement and the country's leading role in it could not prevent war or be an alarm bell that would be loud enough to activate world consciousness, despite the flattering accolades from the most important Western and world politicians in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, the Non-Aligned Movement represented an important idea and dynamic policy that allowed a small country to become a world player, albeit with a limited range.

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THE YUGOSLAV REAR-VIEW MIRROR

MITJA VELIKONJA

What you cannot take away from the oppressed is their memory, and the revolt of such people, people with such memories, is only a scratch beneath the surface.

—HOWARD ZINN, 1999: 413

IN THE FOLLOWING text I'll try to do the impossible: review Yugoslavia from the perspective of “memory studies” – currently a very invigorating interdisciplinary branch at the productive intersection of historical anthropology, the sociology of time, cultural studies and transition studies. Already at the outset, one encounters a series of problems. Namely, which Yugoslavia to review: the Yugoslavia from the time of the *Karađorđević dynasty* (1918–1941)¹⁶², *Tito's* (1945–1991) or *Milosević's* (1992–2006) Yugoslavia? Should all three be reviewed at once? What kind of memory will be considered: collective or personal? Cultural or political? Or memory based on memoirs – that much-loved but factually unre-

162 Ideological discourse as well as the titles of books and films are given in *italics*.

liable literary form? Will the subject-matter be based on official, that is, institutionalized memory, or unofficial, minority memory: established or subversive? Oral, written, recorded, engraved in monuments and memorials, or memory on the Internet, in the social media? Memory from first-hand or second-hand accounts or those passed-on, retrieved, “inherited”? And should these include the subjects of nostalgia and anti-nostalgia, bitter-sweet, heavy and traumatic memories? Retro and reproductive cultures, which in current cultural forms elicit traces of memory of previous times? Spontaneous amnesia or its opposite – contrived and systematic amnesia? Memories as a means of emancipation?

An answer to each of these questions would necessitate a broad and deep study of every question in its own right. The objective of this text however lies elsewhere: I will focus on the ways of remembering Yugoslavia that I have followed during decades spent studying the various views of its past. The main research question I pose here is what are the specifics of the ways of remembering a common Yugoslav past? Therefore I won't tap into the memory *of that time*, as expressed in its artifacts, personalities, events, music, culture and the like. That would be too much, more than too much: thousands of hard-copy and millions of Internet pages have been written about them. Quite the opposite: I will ask how and in what specific ways ex-Yugoslavs, that is post-Yugoslavs, remember their former common country.

SPECIFICS OF THE YUGOSLAVIAS

The geopolitical picture of the Balkans at the end of the 20th century is reminiscent of the one at its beginning: a conglomerate of small, mutually bickering, half-colonized *independent states* with huge territorial appetites, *burek republics* (akin in meaning to ‘banana republics’ but with a local pastry dish substituting for banana – *explanation by trans.*), as I contemptuously call them, politically and economically dependent on the Great Powers,

so-called *Allies*. The Yugoslav *intermezzo* lasted for almost 90 years in the Balkans. The first Yugoslav state came about through a unification of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Montenegro with the southern parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, populated by southern Slavs, on December 1, 1918. Viewed from a somewhat longer-term perspective, it emerged from the ruins of two former powerful empires that had carved-up the Balkans for centuries – the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian empires. The unitary Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, renamed Yugoslavia in 1929, was destroyed and dismembered during World War II, only to re-emerge as a socialist federation and with some territorial gains in the west in its aftermath. It, too, broke up in a series of wars, beginning in 1991, only to continue in its final form in the alliance of Serbia and Montenegro, also under the name of Yugoslavia from 1992 to 2003 when it changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro, which then continued until 2006 when these two republics, in an agreed separation, became independent states.

In order to understand more easily the specific ways of remembering Yugoslavia, I will quote several historical facts that have contributed to this specificity. First of all, all three Yugoslavias emerged as the consequence of wars in the region: World Wars I and II and the wars of the Nineties during its break-up. Therefore, all three had a powerful and dramatic beginning, always with Giraudoux-like “foundational violence” and the “sacrificial myth”, according to which there was only one truth – that of the victor. The three Yugoslavias did not emerge as the result of a considered and protracted process of association, but rather through deep fractures and historical contingencies in which certain pre-existing convergent tendencies and traditions of varied Yugoslav ideas were realized. Second, the internal and external changes were swift and deep: borders, symbols, political and economic systems, social structures, privileged / exploited classes, foreign

policy alliances etc. were all subjected to change. In circumstances of perpetual change, the memory of everything previous also constantly changes. In western and northern Europe, the virtually unchanging state and political frameworks last for centuries – frequently with serious upheavals (civil wars, occupations, dethronements, revolutions etc.), but they are nevertheless more enduring than those on the territory of the former Yugoslavias. I can illustrate this with the example of my own family. Although residing virtually in the same place, each of the last five generations was born into a different country and a different political system, while the men bore the military insignia of five different armies.

Third, there is the position, mobility and uniqueness of the Yugoslavias. Because they were always “somewhere in between” (in between East and West, in between one or other political order, in between different geostrategic determinants and ‘independencies’), all three developed their own ideologies of uniqueness and exceptionality. The feeling that we are something special leaves, of course, strong memory traces for succeeding generations as well. Hence Tanja Zimmermann (2010: 181), who studies memory in the Balkans, speaks of the *ambiguous image* of the second Yugoslavia: there were “two (ideological) ways of reading (Yugoslavia): for the East, it was a socialist idyll, and for the West, a tourist paradise”. Literally, “the new continent,” in other words, “the third way.”

Fourth: all three Yugoslavias were the result of the simultaneous workings of internal and external factors. On the one hand, the very idea and ideology of Yugoslav-hood – cultural or political, integral or organic, unitary or multi-ethnic, centralist or federalist – has a long history with the South Slavic peoples that extends back to the 18th century and which, in the last century, because of the influence of different political factors, went through three state incarnations. Of the intrinsic factors, one cannot overlook those that pertain to the domain of international politics: the

first Yugoslavia was part and parcel of the Versailles power structure; the second of that belonging to the Cold War, while the third belonged to a transitional power structure with its new divisions into a European center and its periphery. Furthermore, Yugoslavia was always comprehensively heterogenous: economically, socially, ethnically, culturally, linguistically, religiously, politically and historically. Inside its own borders, there was always the Other: during the period of joint life this Otherness was understood as an inspiring complementarity, while in the period of conflict it was an insurmountable opposite and *primordial enmity*. The fifth factor is modernization. The era of Yugoslavia overlapped with the era of modernization of the society within its borders: from the largely agrarian and pre-modern before unification to the post-industrial and post-modern at its dissolution. Especially during the second Yugoslavia there was a “radical emancipation” (Suvin, 2014: 314–345) of different groups within its borders – nations, classes, women and minorities – in the words of Ernst Bloch, there was a fulfillment of their “concrete utopias”. Be that as it may, the speed of social change, by definition, influences the process of memory –the faster everything in society changes, the more there is to remember.

Finally, I think it is important to separate the concept of *the former Yugoslavia* (or *ex-Yugoslavia*) from the concept of post-Yugoslavia. The first, more prevalent during the nineties in the frenzy of *independence, democratization, market economy, human rights, national sovereignty* and other transition ideologies and practices, represents angry attempts to sever all ties with the former state. Yugoslavia is (and was) the negative obsession of nationalists, just as socialism is (and was) the negative obsession of neo-liberals. Its name disappeared from the vocabulary and instead, at best, discursive euphemisms like *before independence* or *in the former period* were used. The concept of *the former Yugoslavia* represents a discursive and concrete institutional shift in the new dominant

forces of the successor states by which they sought to wrench themselves from the heritage which was for them compromising.¹⁶³ In other words, in their half-history it was as if Yugoslavia had never been.

The concept of *post-Yugoslavia* arose rather imperceptibly, and then gained increasing momentum during the more sober 2000s, when it became clear that the majority of unrealistic transitional promises and expectations had been betrayed. It represents a distinct continuation of identification with Yugoslavia coming from both within, from the successor states, but also from without, from international agents. In a positive but also negative sense, its past and legacy still equally influence, events in these states as it does their development, for they are after all still part of the *Yugo-sphere*, to use the term coined by Balkans expert Tim Judah (2009). It's a matter of, to paraphrase, *a continuation of Yugoslavia by other means*. Yugoslavia is returning “through the back door”, naturally, under a different name: any other name except Yugoslavia is welcome. The best are, obviously, “neutral” geographical concepts: hence music programs named *MTV Adria*¹⁶⁴, *Western Balkans* in diplomatic newspeak, and road maps¹⁶⁵, *X Factor Adria* for talent shows¹⁶⁶, the *Adriatic Water-Polo League*¹⁶⁷, the *Adriatic League* in basketball, *Former Domestic* as a label for music from Former Yugoslavia at music stands, and the list goes

163 The Croatian Constitution even contains a provision banning the initiation of any proceedings “associating the Republic of Croatia into an alliance with other states in which such an association would result, or could result, in a renewal of the Yugoslav state union, or any Balkan state unions of whatever form.”

164 Since 2005 with coverage of all six former Yugoslav republics.

165 With an important distinction: diplomats take the Western Balkans to mean the states of former Yugoslavia minus Slovenia but plus Albania, while in road maps we find all seven successor states of the former Yugoslavia.

166 Since 2013 all the former republics except Slovenia.

167 Since 2008, at the beginning with the participation of Montenegrin, Croatian and Slovenian clubs.

on. In that sense, Yugoslavia is very much alive: at a round table dubbed “Do you remember Yugoslavia?” in Belgrade in October 2010, author and essayist Miljenko Jergović (2010: 17) noted that, “what Yugoslavia was built upon, a common space made up of a certain kind of cultural identity, as well as similar historical and pre-historical experiences, has not only remained the same, but is again increasingly operating.” At the same event, cult Yugoslav film director Želimir Žilnik slam-dunked the same view with “to my recollection, the previous cultural communication between Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Sarajevo, Skopje and Podgorica was not that different from present-day communication. At the level of communication, things are perhaps even faster today and we are better informed than ever.” To sum up: post-Yugoslavia is like a fate from which one cannot escape that easily.

Before I examine the unique qualities of remembering Yugoslavia, it is necessary to give a few additional terminological and theoretical clarifications. According to that classic in the sociology field Maurice Halbwach, “to a large degree memory is a reconstruction of the past arrived at through data borrowed from the present, or through preconceived reconstruction or, furthermore, through reconstructions of earlier periods in which representations of the past have already undergone changes.”¹⁶⁸ In the same vein, French sociologist Pierre Nora writes that memory “is always a current phenomenon, a connection between us and the eternal present”, while history on the other hand is a “representation of the past” (1989: 8).¹⁶⁹ For the Serbian scholar Todor Kuljić, collective memory “to differing degrees permeates official memory, historiography and the memory of the ordinary individual”; it

168 Put a different way, “memory is a representation sealed in other representations, a generic representation which has been transposed into the past” (Ibid: 71).

169 Also: memory “is in constant evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its many deformities, subject to manipulation and appropriation” while history is “reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, that which is no longer” (Ibid).

is “the process of remembering and forgetting by which we classify and organize our experience, our thoughts and our imagination into the dimensions of the past, present and future” (2011: 10, 13). For his Dutch colleague, Mieke Bal, the culture of memory is “an activity in the present by which the past is constantly modified and described anew and which continues to shape the future”. At the same time, she divides memory into non-reflective/spontaneous, narrative and traumatic (1999: vii, viii).

Personally I would define memory as the past useful to the present, which appears at different levels (personal, group), in different forms (spontaneous, institutionalized), in different mediums (oral, written, petrified, in national holidays and holiday-making, via symbols etc), and for different purposes (sentimental, subjective-escapist, or instrumental, functional). More than a recording of the past, it is a question of current narration: more than just inertia, but rather the creation of a past which will for certain of its bearers create certain effects in the present. Memory therefore is not a neutral, or just an abstract concept, but rather it is active, performing, and, as a rule, is a concrete cultural idea, social practice or political project. It is not a simple objective copy, but a selection of the past: not a reconstruction of the past but rather its deliberate construction, intended for the current aspirations of specific individuals and groups. Not only a thought or feeling about the past, but also its realization in a specific practice or artifact. Memory is narration, interaction, and communication. It is not only integrative on the inside and exclusive on the outside, but is primarily, phrased in an Althusserian way, the materialization of a specific historical ideology. Or more succinctly, there is no such thing as non/political memory. Memories of the past are part of the “regime of truth” of a certain society which is “already well along its way marching ‘towards truth’ – that is, a society that produces and distributes discourse in the function of truth, passing itself off as such and thus acquiring certain power”

(Foucault, 1990: 112). Therefore, every society contains a hierarchy of remembering in relation to the balance of forces within it. Particular memories are not only different, but also socially relevant or “valuable” in different ways.

The division into official, that is institutional, and unofficial, that is spontaneous memory is of special interest and particularly pertinent for this discussion. The first I would call “hard” memory because it has been written down, printed, immortalized, sculpted, monumentalized, supported by decrees, romanticized, renewed in a network of museums, galleries, national collections, archives, school curriculums and textbooks, monuments, state symbols (seals, flags, currency), in the system of national holidays and commemorations, national mass media, the (re)naming of streets, institutions and awards, official historiography¹⁷⁰ etc. In a word, it is found in hegemonic discourse and dominant institutions. These are the “supports of collective memory”, to borrow the apt metaphor of Slovenian ethnologist Božidar Ježernik (2013:9). On the other hand, the “soft” memories of groups and individuals remain not canonized, unwritten, hidden, introvert and they have their own mediums and channels of transmission that frequently act in opposition or as an alternative to the first.

WAYS OF REMEMBERING YUGOSLAVIA

More than the cultural expansiveness of memories of Yugoslavia I am interested in their ideological depth: the systemic, command-like, imposed and sanctioned ideological depth of official memory, as well as dissipated, heterogeneous and diversified individual memories. In my view, there were nine specific ways (of remembering the Yugoslavias), both during their existence and after their dissolution. There are many concrete examples for each of these ways and I will enumerate here only a few of the most

170 “History is the memory of states” as Henry Kissinger phrased it once (1973: 331).

typical for each and point to the most relevant literature, which reviews them in depth.

The Vocal Discontinuity of Memory

On the territory of Yugoslavia the 20th century was markedly, to use Hobsbawm's phrase, an "age of extremes". Dramatic political, military and social events contributed to the breaking up of straightforward and longitudinal collective memory. While in stable states with long-term political and social evolution collective memory can also be linear and develop cumulatively, in the case of Yugoslavia this wasn't so: there is no *longue durée* of collective memory. Instead of a historical totality, radical cuts and new period classifications had to be made. The previous cultures of national memory in all three Yugoslavias merged into a single culture of trans-national pan-Yugoslav memory only to be "de-Yugoslavized" and broken up again into individual national memories from the end of the 1980s. Since in the hegemonic interpretation of history it appeared that everything had begun in 1918, or in 1941 (1943 or 1945), or in 1991, so the collective memory of the previous period was likewise deliberately silenced and expelled from public discourse and remained to linger mainly at the informal level. For example, the end of the second Yugoslavia brought with it the destruction of many monuments to the WW II so-called 'National Liberation Struggle' of Tito's Partisans (NOB is the acronym used in Slavic languages – *trans.*): 3,000 of them disappeared on the territory of Croatia alone. There is also significance here in the practice of renaming streets: a cultural scholar from Banjaluka (in the Serbian part of Bosnia – *trans.*) Srđan Sušnica (2015) demonstrated empirically and with precision the percentage of changes in the names of places and streets since 1992.¹⁷¹ national holidays:

171 47.06 % of the street names in downtown Banja Luka were 'Serbianized', 30% in the suburbs, while in rural areas only 9.68 % of the place names were subjected to change. Before the Bosnian war, in downtown Banja Luka The distribution of

practically no one remembers – or is trying to reinstate – those belonging to the first Yugoslavia; the ones from the second Yugoslavia are remembered only by older generations and still celebrated only by those ‘Yugo-nostalgic’, while the national holidays from the third Yugoslavia never had time to take root.¹⁷²

Joint and Simultaneously Separate Memory

In fairly recent studies on sexuality and youth, the phrase *living together apart* became accepted as signifying new forms of life relationships, both in terms of partnerships as well as family, which are maintained from a distance. I will borrow this phrase and modify it into “parallel memory”, as a form of collective memory with significant internal distinctions, something we *remember together apart*. Modernization introduced pluralism into the sphere of memory, too. Parallel memory means that different memories peacefully coexist at best, are ignored in neutral instances, and conflict in confrontational instances. In ideologically and politically increasingly complex Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav societies there were and are parallel compositions of memory: between individual groups, like nations, but also within each ‘unit’ itself. For example, one-sided memories on issues from WW II are kept alive not only by veteran anti-fascist organizations, but also by their opponents, the different collaborators: the *New Slovenian Alliance*, neo-Ustasha movements and various neo-Chetnik movements.¹⁷³ Croatian anthropologist, Vjeran

.....
 ethnic names for streets was the ethnically neutral individuals, 28.1% after Serbian names, 21.2% after Muslim and 13.7 % after Croatian names. After the war, Serbian names were dominant with 69.4%, ethnically neutral names went down to 20.3%, Croatian to 3.2% and Bosnian-Muslim to 1.1%

172 A comparative review of their transformation during the period of transition is to be found in the work edited by Saric, Gamelgard, Ra Hauge (2012).

173 In this regard, it is worth mentioning the documentary film *Happy Country* (*Sretna zemlja*, Goran Dević, 2009) which concurrently follows a May pilgrimage of followers of the Ustasha movement to a commemoration in Bleiburg

Pavlaković took the example of present-day commemorations of events from WW II to note that “commemorative culture is still incredibly politicized and divided in both the ethnic and ideological senses” (2012: 166, 167). So on the one hand, we encounter negative memories of socialist Yugoslavia for example, among others, as collected in the exhibit (later edited in book form) from Ljubljana called the *Temna stran meseca* (The Dark Side of the Moon) from 1998, or the exhibit (later also in book form) from Belgrade,

In the Name of the People – Political Repression in Serbia 1944–1953 from 2014¹⁷⁴ and on the other, we have a whole series of books, which in a critical, and sometimes humorous, fashion review different aspects of life in socialist Yugoslavia.¹⁷⁵

Drawing parallels and leveling out memories in the sense that *the good is always mixed with the bad* is frequently a deliberate strategy by official institutions. For example, this can be seen in the fact that high-level political officials are given to laying wreaths, frequently within the same day, at the monuments of fallen Partisans as well as collaborationists, which is coupled with an

(Austria) and Tito-era-nostalgics to Kumrovec (Tito’s birthplace in Croatia) for a celebration of Tito’s birthday.

174 The first book was compiled and edited by Drago Jančar (Published by Založba Nova revija, Ljubljana, 1998) and the second written by Srđan Cvetković (Evro book, Beograd, 2014).

175 I will mention only a few: Iris Andrić, Vladimir Arsenijević, Đorđe Matić (editors), *Lexicon of YU Mythology* (Leksikon Yu mitologije, Rende, Belgrade; Postscriptum, Zagreb, 2004); Renate Hansen Kokorus (ed.), *Facing the Present: Transition in Post-Yugoslavia – The Artist’s View* (Verlag dr. Kovac, Hamburg, 2014); Slavenka Drakulić, *How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed* (Norton, London, New York, 1992); Dejan Novačić, *SFRY – My Country* (SFRJ – Moja dežela, Orbis, Ljubljana, 2003); Lazar Džamić, *Flower Shop in the House of Flowers – How We Adopted and Lived* (the comic book) Alan Ford (Cvjećarnica u Kući cveća – Kako smo usvojili i živeli Alana Forda, Naklada Jesenski i Turk, Zagreb; Heliks, Smederevo, 2012); Tanja Petrović, Jernej Mlekuz (ed.), *Made in YU* (Založba ZRC, Ljubljana, 2016) and Martin Pogačar, *Little Fiat Across Yugoslavia – The Star of the Yugoslav Car Industry on Roads and in Memory* (Fičko po Jugoslaviji – Zvezda domačega avtomobilizma med cestama in spomini, Založba ZRC, Ljubljana, 2016).

appropriate *balanced* reporting of these events by the media; in the political statements they make, in different calls for reconciliation and the like. Giving equal weight in memory to the fascist and anti-fascist side renders historical fact relative and such practices are the first serious step towards revisionism.

Memory Wars

Like any other narrative form memory, too, is a matter of competition and antagonisms, that is, it poses the question of *who remembers correctly*. Confrontations of memories are very different: from those intimate and full of piety, to those in public, loud and full of rage. In the Balkan region the culture of memory “is characterized by synchronic coexistence, even rivalry of different national and transnational concepts” (Zimmermann, 2012: 16). In the hegemonic discourse of every Yugoslavia, or their successors, each of the previous Yugoslavias (and even more so the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires before them) was criminalized as the *dungeon of nations*, above and most of all, obviously, of *our nation*. I cannot remember a single positive word about the first Yugoslavia uttered by a politician of the second, nor about any of them by current politicians. Such are also the reconstructions of memory in different ideological institutions. School textbooks in the second Yugoslavia had very little to say about the first, just as present-day textbooks say very little about all the former Yugoslavia. The Belgrade historian Dubravka Stojanović writes about the “simmering fire of history textbooks as the source of (new) conflict” and using the example of Serbian history textbooks convincingly demonstrates the neglect and suppression of the Yugoslav dimensions of Serbian history with accompanying and inescapable national self-victimization and historical essentialism, the exclusion of problematic historical individuals and events, the militarization of history, ethnocentrism and xenophobia (2010: 85–158; see also Kuljić, 2011: 156–183).

On the other hand, the counter-memory of (individual) people is being soured by the new discursive uniformity of governing institutions. For George Lipsitz, a scholar of American popular culture memory, this kind of memory “is not a negation of history, but only the discarding of its false priorities and hierarchical divisions” (1997: 223).¹⁷⁶ I will illustrate this with some data from public opinion research. According to research done by the Serbian public opinion survey agency *Tvoj stav (Your view)* from August 2010, 82.95% of Serbian citizens polled claimed that they lived well in the former Yugoslavia (only 17.05% thought the opposite): and 51.14% were for its renewal, while 48.86% were against.¹⁷⁷ The Croatian *Jutarnji list (Morning Paper)* of June 25, 2011 reported how residents of the Western Balkans assessed their present living conditions: the conviction that in 2011 they were better off than in 1991 was expressed by 26.5% of the residents of Slovenia, 24.8% of Croatians, by 15.4% of people polled in Serbia, and 12.1% in Bosnia, while the distribution of those who thought they were worse off was: 68.6% of the residents polled in Serbia, 59.1% in Bosnia, 43.6% in Croatia and 38.6% in Slovenia.¹⁷⁸ A survey of the residents of the *Western Balkans* born in 1971 and 1991 in autumn 2011 showed that, in their view, life would be better in a state that existed today, but was modeled after life in socialist Yugoslavia was held by 81% of those polled in Republika Srpska (Bosnia-Herzegovina), 69% of respondents in Serbia, 65% in Montenegro, 62% in Macedonia, 58% in the Federation of B-H, 30% in Croatia and 25% in Kosovo. The greatest cultural affinity (music, literature, art, entertainment) with other Western Balkan nations is felt in Kos-

176 Counter-memories “seek in the past hidden events excluded from the dominant narratives” and “look for a revision of existing narratives offering new perspectives on the past” (Ibid: 203, 214).

177 <http://www.tvojstav.com/results/d/Maf5fZx1hhhY8EMWdtN>, retrieved December 25, 2015.

178 <http://www.jutarnji.hr/velika-anketa-jutarnjeg-lista--20-godina-nakon-jugoslavije/955249/>, retrieved December 25, 2015.

ovo (58%), in Macedonia (50%), in Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Albania (between 44 and 39%), and the least is felt in Croatia (28%).¹⁷⁹ In January 2015, in a survey conducted by the aforementioned Serbian agency, 64.81% of respondents chose *Tito's self-management socialism* as the political system they would like to see in a possible future Yugoslavia.¹⁸⁰ It is also interesting to note that according to a survey from February of the same year, more respondents who are citizens of Serbia knew the words of the socialist Yugoslav anthem better than the words of the Serbian anthem (81.3% compared to 68.29%), as well as knowing better the sequence of colors on the flag of socialist Yugoslavia than on the flag of the Republic of Serbia (83.7% compared to 80.49%).¹⁸¹ The results of a survey, conducted amongst the citizens of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in spring 2015 who were 45 years of age or older, in other words, those who had some kind of Yugoslav experience, are also indicative: 92% of those from Bosnia and 86% of those from Croatia claimed that life in the former socialist Yugoslavia was better than their present life. Tito was a positive historical figure for 65% of those polled in Bosnia and 40% of respondents from Croatia.¹⁸² In sum: the difference from the official memory of the *Yugoslav reign of terror* is more than striking.

The Dialectics of Remembering and Forgetting

Every politics of memory or remembering is also a politics of forgetting. The dynamics of changes in the region of Yugoslavia dictated a quickened dialectic of remembering and amnesia: as

179 <http://documents.mx/dokuments/20-zears-after-1991-the-tale-of-two-generarions.html>, retrieved December 26, 2015.

180 <http://www.tvojstav.com/results/rVs2THlu1DWhQvOmZVkJM>, retrieved December 26, 2015.

181 <http://www.tvojstav.com/resuls/k7sBOO4hgxrXsuxOT>, retrieved December 25, 2015.

182 <http://www.mojevrijeme.hr/magazin/2015/04hrvatska-i-bih-slozne-u-sfrj-se-zivelobolje/>, retrieved December 25, 2015.

soon as something had to be remembered, something also had to be forgotten. This is the pendulum effect. At the time of Yugoslavia, one had to “officially” forget pro-Yugoslav, anti-Yugoslav or un-Yugoslav traditions, just as one had to “officially” forget Yugoslav traditions after the country’s dissolution. Older examples for this are the monuments to fallen soldiers. In the first Yugoslavia, the *victors* (Serbia and Montenegro) proudly established them, while the *vanquished* (the so-called Habsburg South Slavs) did not.

Current ruling policy in Croatia depends on amnesia, while in Serbia it takes the form of a contradictory mixture of amnesia and integration. This is the conclusion reached by anthropologist of the contemporary Balkans Stef Jansen (2005: 256); a similar combination of imposed official memory, partial lustration of cultural memory and deliberate amnesia can also be discerned in the other successor states. But compulsory amnesia dialectically swings back like a boomerang. The revenge of oppressed national memory cultures during the time of the Yugoslavias was obvious after their dissolution: both during World War II and during the wars of the Nineties. Suppressed and proscribed traumatic memory return with a vengeance: for this it is enough to recall examples in the memoir-type literature of obsession with Jasenovac (the infamous concentration camp in Croatia – *trans.*) and Bleiburg (the so-called ‘Bleiburg massacre’ events at the end of WW II – *trans.*), or with the assassinations of Stjepan Radić (Croatian MP in the parliament of the first Yugoslavia – *trans.*) and King Alexander I, the fates of Alojzije Stepinac (the Croatian cardinal during WW II – *trans.*) and Draža Mihajlović (leader of the Chetnik movement during WW II – *trans.*); with the *liberation* or *occupation* of 1918, 1941, 1945, and 1991 etc. In these upheavals of memoirs, former heroes become criminals – and vice versa, former villains become heroes, former achievements become delusions – and vice versa; the former state becomes a tyranny – and vice versa. Slovenian

national television is currently broadcasting a series of talks on the *suffering* of Slovenes at the hands of the Partisans and later, during socialist Yugoslavia, called *Witnesses*, whose format and discourse is reminiscent of radio talk shows from the seventies titled *Do You Remember, Comrades?* which did the reverse – celebrated the Partisans and the post-war political system.

The Uses of Memory

The instrumentalization of memory is the systematic use of memory to achieve certain precisely defined objectives in the present – objectives that can be political, commercial, pop-cultural and so forth. In short, the *past sells*. In the case of Yugoslavia, this takes place in different ways. For example, in politics. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, wings have been added to museum collections dedicated to the memory of the Partisan struggle which this struggle connects to that during the Bosnian War from 1992–1995. In Republika Srpska, the Serb entity in Bosnia, Partisan resistance is linked to resistance against the Bosniak-Croatian side during the last war, while in the Federation of B-H the Partisan struggle is tied to resistance against the Serbian side during the last war. The revisionist mantra of veteran organizations in Slovenia is that without the Partisan movement an independent Slovenia would not have been possible. Things are similar in Macedonia – where continuity between the resistance of the 1903 Kruševo Republic has been established with the Partisan resistance 40 years later. Croatian presidents Stjepan Mesić and Ivo Josipović have tried to connect “the multi-ethnic anti-Fascism of the 1940s to the ethno-centric and chauvinist Homeland War of the 1990s as having the same liberating character and as two equally important pillars of Croatian statehood” (Kuljić, 2011: 84). In pop culture, memories of Yugoslavia in the form of Yugo-Rock or Yugo-Pop melodies are present in *oldies-goldies* bands and certain performers (Zdravko Colić, Neda Ukraden, *Novi Fosili* (New Fossils),

Zabranjeno Pušenje (No Smoking etc.), as well as in Yugo-Nostalgic bands (*Rock Partyzans*, *Zaklonišče prepeva* (Singing Shelter etc.)). In advertising, the rare surviving Yugoslav trademarks and products, like *Životinjsko carstvo* (Animal Kingdom – chocolates – *trans.*), *Vegeta* (all purpose seasoning or spice – *trans.*), *Gorenje* (kitchen appliances – *trans.*), *Cedevita* (fizzy vitamin supplement – *trans.*) or *Domačica* (Housewife) biscuits, had have great success in selling memories of past times. *Kokta* (a Yugoslav brand of cola – *trans.*) is thus still the drink of *our and your youth*. In all the large supermarket chains like Lidl, Hofer, Interspar and Mercator these products are part of sales drives called *Nostalgia Week*. In design, memories of socialist-style design is at the core of new retro-cultures and vintage styles. In these products we find the aesthetics of *Borosana shoes* (originally a brand of women's working shoes that symbolized working women and gained a special place in the urban lexicon of socialist Yugoslavia – *trans.*), *Top-er* and *Rasice* winter wear (Slovenian sportswear made in socialist Yugoslavia – *trans.*), *Tomos* (Slovenian motor company – *trans.*) mopeds, the Yugoslav tiny version of Fiat popularly called *Fića*, parts of JNA (the Yugoslav military – *trans.*) uniforms and many other things.

One History, Many Memories

On the one hand, historiography, says Slovenian sociologist Rastko Močnik (2008: 46), frequently falls into “retroactive legitimizing”. In this respect it is of interest to compare permanent exhibits in the main historical museums in the post-Yugoslav capitals, what one might call the canonized memory of the successor states, that is, examples of how “historicism paints an ‘eternal’ picture of the past” (Benjamin, 1998: 223). Belgrade student of Yugo-nostalgia Milica Popović (2016), in her comparative study of the historical museums in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana, convincingly shows that the *Museum of Yugoslav History* (in Belgrade)

continues to cultivate the memory of the former state, both with its permanent exhibit and its occasional exhibitions; the *Croatian Historical Museum* (in Zagreb) and the *Museum of Modern History* in Ljubljana, on the other hand, have to a large degree distanced themselves from the Yugoslav past and are, in effect, national museums proper.¹⁸³ The Sarajevo *Historical Museum of Bosnia-Herzegovina* does not have a permanent exhibit that covers the Yugoslav decades, but only sections covering the last two wars, in other words, the years 1992–1995 and 1941–1945. According to the fairly well-balanced permanent exhibit of the *State Museum of Montenegro* in Cetinje, in 1918 Montenegro *lost its state identity*, in 1945 it *completed the process of renewing its state identity in the period between the two world wars*, while in 1992, through a

183 The permanent exhibit in the latter, named *Slovenians in the 20th Century*, has, in my view, several serious shortcomings. The main billboard describes Slovenia's entry into Yugoslavia (in 1918) as involuntary: *The association into the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, on a platform of centralized government which ran against the dominant desires of the Slovenes, occurred on December 1, 1918.* The already mentioned exhibit *The Dark Side of the Moon* has been partially incorporated into this collection. While this exhibit justly points out and criticizes the violence of the (Yugoslav) socialist system against its opponents, it nevertheless does so in a very crude and biased way (individual showpieces are signed with captions like *Bolshevik Racism*, or *Party Paradise and Party Hell*, or *Rule of the Secret Political Police*, it calls party officials *red barons* etc.). Slovenian industrial products of that time are dispersed in what is named as *the industrial fertilizer*, a photograph from the 1980s shows *crowds in lines in front of stores*, implying that shortages were widespread during the time of Socialist Yugoslavia. The period of independence, democratization and Europeanization is also showcased uncritically, there is strong adherence to the official interpretation of history without mention of newly – made errors and problems [like the rise of xenophobia, disintegration of the welfare state, misappropriation of former common property by tycoons, the new – to use the same word – *barons*, social and political unrest, the re-emergence of patriarchy, pauperization and exclusion (for example, there is no mention of the phenomenon of erased undesirable citizens or residents, discrimination against the Roma or members of other minorities, barbed wire against refugees in 2016, not to mention the under-representation of women)]. To sum up, the exhibit *The Dark Side of the Moon* is more an apologetic view of the present than a critical review of the past.

referendum, it *opted for life in a joint state with Serbia*. The most revisionist (and in its very display the most grotesque) is without doubt the newly-opened (in 2011) *Museum of the Macedonian Struggle for Sovereignty and Independence*, which portrays the Yugoslav period as the most difficult in the history of the Macedonian nation.¹⁸⁴ In conclusion – national memory seen through the institution of museums has been, since the 1990s, more or less completely “de-Yugoslavized”.

On the other hand, according to the view of the American scholar of holocaust memory Michael Rothberg (2009: 12), “multi-directional memory assumes that collective memory is partially free of the ballast of exclusive versions of collective identity and accepts that memory both intersects and connects different places across space, time and culture. The post-Yugoslav period is replete with examples of such trans-national memory, memory about the same past that is unorthodox and characterized by a non-exclusive pluralism and which can be seen in different media: in documentary films¹⁸⁵, comedy series,¹⁸⁶ Yugo-nostalgic music,¹⁸⁷ in the theater,¹⁸⁸ and on television channels such as *Klasik TV* based

184 Its full name being the Museum of the Macedonian Struggle for Sovereignty and Independence – Museum of the VMRO – Museum of the Communist Regime Victims. In that sense, it is infamously similar to the Budapest House of Terror and the Communist Museum in Prague.

185 Noteworthy are the Serbian documentary and entertainment series SFRY For Beginners (screenplay by Radovan Kupres, from 2011 onwards), as well as documentary films In War and Revolution (Ana Bilankov, 2011) and My Yugoslavia (Miroslav Nikolić, 2004) about an imaginary “fourth Yugoslavia”.

186 A good example is the Croatian TV series Black and White World (Goran Kulenović, from 2015 on).

187 For the Slovenian example see Hofman, 2015 and Velikonja, 2013. I have ascertained that the most frequent memory narratives in this kind of musical production are antifascism, multiculturalism, social justice, Tito, solidarity and socialist easy living.

188 I mention here only the more significant plays: Lexicon of YU Mythology from Pula (Oliver Frljić, 2011), Yugoslavia, My Homeland from Ljubljana (Ivica Buljan, 2015), Born in Yu from Belgrade (Dino Mustafić, 2012) and Perica Jerkovič's

in Zagreb, which broadcasts Yugoslav films and other similar programs, or *Jugoton TV* with ex-Yugoslav music. Today on the walls of buildings in cities from Vardar (Macedonia) to Triglav (Slovenia – *trans.*) we can find a plethora of Yugo-philic and Yugo-phobic graffiti and street art (Velikonja, 2016). Even if I turn around the focus of research and microscopically study the memories of individual people, I find a similar multi-directionality of memory and nostalgia, for example, amongst the users of social media and Internet discussion forums, on blogs and web pages. The same applies to memorial books, placed in museums showcasing events from World War II in different parts of the former *Yugo*.¹⁸⁹

Nostalgia as Memory Minus Pain

The above is the shortest definition of nostalgia introduced in the mid-seventies by American columnist Herb Caen, to which I would add another: “retrospective utopia”. The narration of nostalgia is always anti-ethical (on one side is the ‘better yesterday’ and on the other, the ‘uglier today’). Its diction is melancholy and bitter-sweet and its relationship towards the present is escapist (the intimate yearning for that which is gone), or critical and restitutorial. Nostalgia is a romanticized story about an idealized past which as such never existed: about an idealized ‘us’ which we never were and about that past which had a future. Yet one should not overlook the social potential of nostalgia: it is not just a sentimental fairy tale by people who cannot make their peace with the present (the so-called *transition losers*, to cite the

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stand-up comedy from Ljubljana Born in Yugo (2009).

189 During my field research on the collective memory about Yugoslavia and of Yugo-nostalgia, I rummaged through some of these in the museums of that era in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. Of the numerous records I have singled out only the most indicative: This should be preserved and never forgotten; Thank God someone has preserved these old memories so that future generations can see this as I have wonderful memories of SFRY! Good old times! And the life we had should never be forgotten.

rough characterization of the anti-nostalgics), but possibly also a strong cultural and political force with practical effects in its environment.

Yugo-nostalgia appears regardless of, or precisely because of, the ethno-nationalist and neo-liberal *damnatio memoriae* in the successor states and is similar to the other *red nostalgias* that have surfaced since the nineties from the Baltic to the Balkans, and from the Czech Republic to the former Soviet republics. It is a kind of (non)reflective resistance – passive, sentimental, or active and loud – against, above all, systematic demonization or at least the deliberate amnesia of the Yugoslav era of the peoples concerned and also, against new tragedies, injustices and exploitation brought about by *democracy, independence and a market economy*. Jansen concludes that the main themes of Yugo-nostalgia are a common (pop)cultural space, that is, “home”, better times and normal life (2005: 223–250). It first appeared informally during the traumatic nineties, softly and covertly, at home and in closed groups, only to surface and during the last ten to fifteen years penetrate mainstream discourse, practice and institutions. But the characterization *Yugo-nostalgic* remains a usable curse word to signify left-wingers in current political conflicts.¹⁹⁰

Today I find nostalgia for the Yugoslav past at every turn – in the media, in advertising, in consumer and popular culture, in tourism, in urban and even alternative culture. Yugo-nostalgics in the successor states, but also the diaspora,¹⁹¹ are joining societies and clubs with the name *Josip Broz Tito* (in Bosnia-Herzegovina

190 It is interesting to note that the concept of Yugo-nostalgia applies only to the second Yugoslavia and not to the first (or in the case of Serbia and Montenegro also not to the third). Kuljić cites the results of public opinion surveys in Serbia in 2010: to the question: “When was this country at its best?” 81% of respondents chose the socialist era, 6% chose the nineties and only 3% the period between the two World Wars i.e. the first Yugoslavia (2011:129).

191 For a study of cases of Yugo-nostalgia in the Diaspora see Hadžibulić, Manić, 2016.

alone there are over 40); in Macedonia they even have a political party – *The Alliance of Left-Wing Tito's Forces*. Again I will choose only a few from the many possible examples. Toponyms of Yugoslav memory, Pierre Nora's *lieux de memoire* (places like Dedinje, Dražgoše, Tjentište, Brioni, Kumrovec, Jablanica etc.), as the “supreme embodiments of memorial consciousness which barely survived a historical period because it is no more call out to be remembered” (Ibid. 12) and have in recent years become profitable destinations for nostalgic pilgrimages. Furthermore, across the former Yugoslav republics several resounding and well-visited exhibitions are circulating which showcase everyday life, popular culture, fashion and sports of that time in an exceptionally favorable light. I will only mention that in 2013 an exhibition was first put on display in Belgrade under the noteworthy name *Živio život* (Living the Life); in Ljubljana (in its largest shopping and entertainment mall BTC City!) as *An Exhibition of the Good Life from the '50s to the '90s*, and a year later in Podgorica again under the name *Living the Life* (yet again in some shopping mall). At the end of 2014, a similar exhibition, first in Belgrade, then in Sarajevo and Ljubljana, was organized on the modernization of everyday life and leisure time in Yugoslavia under the name *They Never Had It Better?*

The survival of these nostalgic relics demonstrate two things: that Yugoslavia “was not only the sum of its constitutive national cultures, but rather that during the seventy years of its existence it managed to create a supra-national, common cultural layer of all Yugoslavs” (Milutinović 2013: 75). And that ‘Yugoslavhood’ in the sense of a specific cultural syncretism and a social cosmopolitanism of the nations and social groups living on its territory preceded Yugoslavia as a state, that is, as a political community; that it survived in that space in different forms over the years and that it even survived Yugoslavia after its dissolution in 1991 and, again, in 2006.

Cathartic Memory

In the politics of memory one always finds more guilt in others and what they did to *us*, rather than what we did to *others*. *We* are always the victims, never *they*. On the other hand, the memory of historical tragedies in which responsibility lies with members of one's own group having wronged others can assist in reaching a more thoughtful attitude to historical misconceptions and errors and also facilitate reconciliation with the other side. The *Never Again!* of memory can be equally cathartic and liberating towards the inside as it can towards the outside. Kuljić defines negative memory in the following way: “in question is the practice, which comes about only slowly and with much resistance, of creating social memory with the premise that memory can have humanistic and democratic consequences only if it also includes memory about the history of injustice and crime for which we are responsible or are at least accomplices” (2012: 223). This means that primarily one should remember the vanquished – about which, to take a Croatian example, historian Dragan Markovina (2015) writes so well.

Willy Brandt's ‘Warsaw Genuflection’ in front of the monument to the Jewish victims of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in 1970 consolidated German negative memory of the barbarity of *their* Nazism. It is probably too early to expect similar sincere and mature gestures on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Those that have occurred have frequently been merely symbolic, insufficient, misleading or made by former war-mongers.¹⁹² Neverthe-

192 In the summer of 2000, Montenegrin president Milo Đukanović apologized to the Croatians for the crimes committed against them; in 2003 Serbia-Montenegro president Svetozar Marović and in 2007 and 2010 Serbian president Boris Tadić apologized for the same crimes. To the Bosniaks apologies for crimes committed by the Serbian side against them were given by Serbian presidents Boris Tadić (2004) and Tomislav Nikolić (2013), while Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić apologized by laying flowers at the memorial complex of Potočari in 2015 (for the crimes in Srebrenica – *trans.*); and for the wrongful

less, there are some noteworthy examples: in the *State Museum of Montenegro* there is a photograph of Dubrovnik in flames from autumn 1991 with the acknowledgement that this act was committed by *members of the regular forces of the JNA from Montenegro*.¹⁹³ The act that went furthest in this respect was probably the confession, apology and plea for forgiveness uttered by Alfred Pichler, the Roman-Catholic Bishop from Banjaluka in 1963, for the crimes committed by those *who called themselves Catholics* against Orthodox Christians simply because they *were not Croats or Catholic*.

For example, significantly more self-criticism – and the catharsis in collective memory connected with it – can be found in art and the so-called alternative scene than in the dominant institutions (the state, church, political parties and movements). For example, in film: even before the shaping of the most formative myth of the second Yugoslavia, the Partisan myth, and during its existence, one can discern clear diversity not only in genre and aesthetics, but also in ideology.¹⁹⁴ Towards its end even more complex Partisan films were made,¹⁹⁵ then films that critically treated difficult

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 policies of Croatia against Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Nineties also Croatian president Ivo Josipović (2010). For crimes committed against them the Serbs received apologies from Croatian presidents Stipe Mesičin 2003 and Ivo Josipovićin 2010 (specifically for those committed in Paulin Dvor). A series of apologies for crimes committed by the Bosnian army against other nationalities were initiated by Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović(in May 2000) and repeated by member of the BH Presidency Bakir Izetbegović in 2010.

193 In the caption it reads that the attack (on Dubrovnik) was *inflamed by serious manipulation in the public media*; and that this attack was *one of the darkest pages of Montenegrin history*. Massacres in Bukovica and Štrpci are also mentioned.

194 Plenty has been written by scholars in the field: generally about Yugoslav Partisan films by Jurica Pavičić (2016) from Split, and, taking the example of 26 Slovenian Partisan films, by Peter Stanković (2005) from Ljubljana.

195 For example, *See You In the Next War(Doviđenja u sledecem ratu*, Živojin Pavlović, 1980), or *Silent Gunpowder (Gluvi barut*, Bata Čengić, 1990).

post-war events,¹⁹⁶ or offered thoughtful and critical reflections on the Yugoslav socialist system,¹⁹⁷ while the Nineties brought with them an about-face towards the other side.¹⁹⁸ Furthermore, in the post-Yugoslav period, many initiatives and organizations appeared that nurtured the memory of, and warned against, the crimes by *our side* against *others*: from Helsinki Committees and *Amnesty International*, to pacifist and humanitarian groups that act in continuity or *ad hoc*, in different left-wing counter-cultural and counter-political groups. Here are some examples. In Serbia, ever since the time of the breakup of the Federation, the *Women in Black* group¹⁹⁹ has been very active. Through its various activities it has confronted the domestic and wider public with crimes from the last wars, especially with crimes committed by the Serbian side and it continually advocates bringing to justice the perpetrators responsible and dignified commemoration for the victims. To this end, they participate in a highly visible way in commemoration events in Vukovar, Srebrenica, Višegrad and elsewhere.

In Croatia, the *Centar za ženske žrtve rata* (Center for Female Victims of War) draws attention to military and patriarchal violence against women from the beginning of the nineties, while the pacifist organization *Zamir* (For Peace) has provided an anti-war platform for NGOs. During the past decade, a group of multimedia artists and theoreticians from different parts of the former

196 For example, *Red Boogie* (*Crveni bugi*), or *What A Girl* (*Šta ti je devojica*, Karpo Godina, 1982), *Father Away On Business* (*Otac na službenom putu*, Emir Kusturica, 1985), *My Father, A Socialist Serf* (*Moj otac, socijalistički kulak*, Matjaz Klopčič, 1987), or *Tito and Me* (*Tito i ja*, Goran Marković, 1992).

197 To mention only the films of Želimir Žilnik and Dušan Makavejev from the Sixties onwards.

198 For example the film *Long Dark Night* (*Duga tamna noć*, Anton Vrdoljak, 2004) and especially *Fourth Layer* (*Četverored*, Jakov Sedlar, 1999), the second half of which premiered on Croatian national television on the very eve of the 2000 election, with the intent to dissuade voters from voting for the Left.

199 Defining themselves as a *women's pacifist group with a feminist-antimilitaristic orientation*.

Yugoslavia called *Spomenik* (Monument) have, with their performances, lectures and discussion panels, critically reviewed the recent wars, crimes against civilians and the general normalization of violence in the post-socialist transition in this part of the world. All together these present irritating, “overlooked” memories and therefore it is no surprise that they have been branded by militarist and nationalist circles as Yugo-nostalgics, secret police mafia (udbomafija), traitors, foreign mercenaries etc.

Engaged Memory

Official memory that is in the hands of the ruling group homogenizes the past, while unofficial memory pluralizes it; the first totalizes, the second diversifies and particularizes it; the first constructs a unified view towards the past, the second deconstructs it; the first orders and bans, the second resists. Unofficial, “heretical” memory can serve as a basis of resistance to the powers that be, it is – in the words of James C. Scott – the “weapon of the weak” because it resists historical revisionism, opportunism, conformism and amnesia which destroy the “historical continuum” (Benjamin, 1998: 223). Kuljić lucidly defines the critical culture of memory as that which “advocates investigation of the interest base of groups mediating the past (class, political, family and generation factors)” and for which “the key question is not what the remnants of the past tell us, but how these remnants are interpreted” (2012: 23; and more extensively 207–252).

In the post-Yugoslav context it is therefore not surprising that pictures, symbols and slogans *from the old times* constitute a mandatory part of the repertoire of different anti-regime demonstrations everywhere. Using the example of present-day Sarajevo, Alenka Baretulovič, an anthropologist from Ljubljana, has demonstrated that “memory of the (idealized) past has really served as a method of resistance” (2013: 221). The main protagonist of the Sarajevo protests of 2008 was no other than *Valter, the protector*

of the city from World War II, popularized in the film and television series from the Seventies;²⁰⁰ his revival would protect the city from its final downfall (Ibid: 276, 277). At other, similar gatherings, and not only in Bosnia, demonstrators carried pictures of Tito or waved the flags of the second Yugoslavia or one of its socialist republics.

MEMORY FOR THE FUTURE

Research into collective memory has not as yet dealt sufficiently with its social foundations, ideological potentials and political consequences. Frequently, they are understood in a fashion that is too objectivist, in the sense of remembering the past – putting it in the words of von Ranke– *the way it really was*. One must, however, always be aware of the fact that the position of memory in time “is always in the present and not, according to a naïve epistemology, in the past” (Huysen, 1995: 3). In the words of Stojanović (Ibid: 19), “the politics of memory’ is therefore also a *par excellence* history of the present”. Memory speaks of the past precisely as much as the present allows it.

Mnemonic reconstructions, therefore, should be investigated not only from the perspective of the present, meaning who/ what/ how and, primarily, why someone remembers, but above all from the aspect of social conflict. Put another way: not all memory is equally socially relevant and influential and cannot be investigated in the same way. Starting from Benjamin’s maxim that “the subject of historical knowledge is the very rebellion of the oppressed class” (Ibid. 221), one should ask not only what and who is remembered, but primarily what effect that memory has on a better present and a better future too (if any at all!) Does memory only reproduce what exists, aligning itself with it or does it also offer alternative and different visions? Here again, we can draw

200 Directed by Hajrudin Krvavec.

an important parallel with historiography as the “memory of the state”. Just as “critical historiography is productive to the extent to which it confronts us with discontinuities and internal paradoxes, acting as a bulwark against the myths of glorious history and the dogmas of antiquarian history” (Kuljić, 2012: 218, 219), and just as “a history that nurtures the memory of peoples’ rebellions also proposes new definitions of power” (Zinn, 1999: 610), so too is the active and critical memory of an oppressed group one which, instead of simply referring to the past, or even unreflectively recycling it, grabs it and uses it as a means of transformation for the better.

In the post-Yugoslav field, too, there are things to be remembered that have an emancipating character: the idea and practice of an autochthonous anti-Fascism (that is, a wider, rebellious, anti-imperialist tradition) and an equally autochthonous socialist system, but, of course, in all their complexity, with the necessary criticism of their fallacies and errors. Memory of these brings into question and abolishes the monopoly of official historiography over the past, as well as the overview of dominant politics over the present, from the position of those who have lost the most in the post-Yugoslav and post-socialist transition. This kind of memory is in contrast with the “kitschification of memory culture”²⁰¹ – in other words, the other side of the de-politicization of “Project Yugoslavia” through its commoditization, banalization, trivialization, romanticization, sentimentalism and its incorporation into tourism and consumerism. First, the Yugoslav idea “in the current circumstances represents a purely humanistic and anti-nationalist platform”, that frightens nationalists in all the successor states (Markovina, 2015: 130). Memory of the specific, Yugoslav brand of multi-culture undermines ethno-nationalist forms of provincialism. And second, memory of Yugoslavia

201 Something that has, in the context of American popular memory culture, been effectively demonstrated by New York cultural scholar Marita Sturken (2007).

affirms its fairly high degree of social justice, solidarity, security and social mobility, which to a great extent runs counter to the contemporary ideas and practices of neo-liberalism (in the circumstances of the post-Yugoslav space it might be more appropriate to talk about Manchester capitalism). In this sense, memory of Yugoslavia – anathematized by the present-day powers that be – is a subversive political activity that produces political consequences: destroys the monolith of official anti-Yugoslav memory, brings political imagination back into the game, that is, thinking about alternatives after the desolation of the *new world order*, after the self-styled *end of history*, after the *end of ideology*, after the *end of society* and finally after the *end of Yugoslavia*. I believe Yugoslavia should be remembered only to the degree that it also contained rebellion, modernization, emancipation and (the possibility of) an alternative, in other words, to the degree that it contained an effort to attain a more just future.

To return to the title of this text: the Yugoslav rear-view mirror should be turned forward.

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IV

Closing Remarks

After Yugoslavia

SOCIETIES TRANSFORM AT a snail's pace

**MILIVOJ BEŠLIN
SRĐAN MILOŠEVIĆ**

THE EU SUMMIT Conference in Salonika in 2003 opened up clear prospects for membership of the EU to all the Balkan countries, thereby ensuring their respect for detailed political, economic and value-based criteria. In order to meet these criteria, each and every Balkan country had to undergo a transformation most of all towards the rule of law as a vital precondition to any social progress regardless of how close it was or is to membership of the EU. In fact, the process of accession to the EU is nothing but an adjustment of domestic legislation to EU standards put into practical effect.

Among the first steps all the countries emerging from Yugoslavia had to take towards membership of the EU was admission to the Council of Europe to ensure stronger respect for the human, civil and political rights of citizens in the region. Partnership with NATO was another major pillar of regional stabilization helping

overcome the region's turbulent past scarred by wartime experience and a series of frozen conflicts. On the subject of NATO and what these countries have achieved, they differ considerably from each other, and same holds true for the levels they reached in European integration. All of them are members of the Council of Europe. Of all the states emerging from the dissolution of Yugoslavia, only Croatia and Slovenia are members of the EU and NATO. The rest are moving slowly towards EU membership, while Serbia has notably sharpened its attitude towards NATO. Montenegro was admitted to NATO in June 2017. Macedonia and Serbia are EU candidate countries, while Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo have signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU.

All the countries that were created out of Yugoslavia's disintegration have been undergoing transition with different degrees of success. Slovenia has made the biggest progress in transition although it too had to cope with many problems that were further multiplied by the global financial crisis. As for the rest, it is difficult to say that they were at least as successful as Slovenia in overall economic and social transition. They are caught up in a vicious circle of poverty, corruption and the enrichment of privileged individuals, and have been at the bottom of the European scale for a long time according to many major indicators of development and quality of life. A stagnant economy provides no grounds for more comprehensive social transformation and opens up no real prospects. The war deeply scarred the tissue of all the societies, especially their human resources, in every sense: demographic, healthcare, anthropological and educational. Stagnant, poor, with high unemployment rates and bleak social and political atmospheres (violence, intolerance, conservativeness, etc.), all these countries are faced with serious brain drain problems.

Regional political élites are incapable, and still less, willing to undertake serious reforms towards building economic and

especially social models compatible with global trends that ensure sustainable economic development on the one hand, and progress in human rights on the other. With few exceptions, they still generate nationalism, which gives them ideological control over their own, homogenized ethnic communities. They have no systematic ideas about the development of modern societies with efficient mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of internal conflicts, which emerge pathologically in rare breaks in national homogenization. Despite evident signs of popular discontent, neither mechanisms nor a critical social mass that would shape and back up far-sighted policies and programs for their implementation have been created up to now.

National identities are being defined and redefined all the time in an atmosphere of permanent “national revolution” and gibberish about threats from or injustice done by one’s neighbors or minority communities. Hardly any country in the region is willing to face up to its past, least of all Serbia which persistently refuses to confront its role in the 1990s wars and even fails to make any sense of its entire history in the 20th century, especially the second half. Against this backdrop of confusion about the second half of the 20th century, the history of World War II is – retroactively and still under the impression of experiences of the 1990s – being re-vamped in Croatia and, to some extent, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Macedonia is still at the stage of “tradition fabrication”, characteristic of all identity-building processes, although it would have been only logical that if it now, in the 21st century, distanced itself more from the concepts of the 19th. Serbia and Montenegro’s separation raised identity questions in Montenegro, while border disputes between Croatia and Slovenia were not simply treated as matters of geography or law but were turned into a question of national honor. Unsettled “national issues” (borders, the status of minority communities in neighboring states, bilateral relations between all of Yugoslavia’s successor states, etc.) logically

provide fertile soil for myth-making and stereotypes. However, as logical as this is, the question of why it is that all these problems have not been solved for such a long time, keeping all the societies involved in a whirl of vital identity-building problems, remains unanswered.

Each country is relying more on the international constellation and balance of power than on the potential benefits of bilateral agreements. Serbia's élites stick out by their dependence on Russia for the protection of what they define as their national interest, while almost all the others see their future in membership of NATO. In this constellation Bosnia-Herzegovina remains in limbo: the West has turned out to be far less influential there and left room for other actors, Russia and Turkey above all. Under the burden of its own problems, the EU has lost some influence in the Western Balkans and that loss is only partially compensated for by the strong presence of Germany, the country that is most concerned about the region as compared with the rest in Europe. One cannot deny Germany's obvious economic interest in the Balkans, but neither, on the other hand, its most significant support to regional democratization. The initiative known as "the Berlin process" is likewise most important as it sets the criteria for the progress made on the road towards the EU. Up to now, regional cooperation has mostly remained on the political level. Some infrastructural and economic initiatives for regional integration have been launched, though not followed through by concrete economic projects. Differing "geopolitical orientations" resulting in the absence of a unique security framework are obstructing regional integration. This is a propitious climate for tension and doubts about the future of a region that has a long track record of war.

causes and consequences

VLADIMIR GLIGOROV

WHEN A COMMUNITY disintegrates, it looks as if this was its fate whether or not such a final outcome benefited or disadvantaged all or each and every one individually. This is in the nature of historical interpretation. Indeed, different outcomes are possible at any point, but when they have been realized, all they leave behind are ruins. And re-starting from these ruins, one has to face the challenges of the times. As these challenges stubbornly persist, we believe with good reason that some patterns outlive changing historical circumstances and deeds, and independently of them.

The territorial problems that persisted on the ruins of Yugoslavia that were among the reasons why that country was composed, but also decomposed can be counted among such regularities, hence the frozen conflicts that also persist on the ruins of Yugoslavia are charting a geography of the conflicts on its territory. These frozen conflicts owe their tenacity to the fact that they are both the causes and consequences of either unsuccessful secessions or annexations. And these secessions and annexations, in turn, are the reasons that motivated the policy for Yugoslavia's

disintegration, practically from its very creation. The history and geography of the frozen conflicts the wars left behind and violent inner conflicts over the past three decades is given in Table 1.

Table 1: Typology of major frozen conflicts on the territory of Yugoslavia

	<i>de jure</i>	<i>de facto</i>
secession	Kosovo (2008)	Kosovo 1991–1998
annexation	Croatia (1991)	Republika Srpska
	Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–1995)	North Kosovo

The difference between the legalities – *de jure* and *de facto* – lies in involvement of the international community which treated factual conflicts as domestic, and legal conflicts as international. Apart from those presented in Table 1, lesser conflicts – some internationalized and some not – can be detected either in each and every Yugoslav country or between them (the Croatia-Slovenia dispute is under arbitration; Kosovo’s dispute with Montenegro over borders affects its political stability; inasmuch as is possible in a country under international supervision, the conflicts within Bosnia-Herzegovina proper also await resolution; there are definitely internal problems in South Serbia, and, finally, there is the problem of Prevlaka affecting Montenegro-Croatia relations).

All this charts a complex geography of enmity, which, in turn, charts unfinished disintegrations or insufficiently successful integrations after Yugoslavia’s break-up.

In its several constitutional incarnations, Yugoslavia was an attempt to find a solution to territorial disputes almost in accordance with Jean Monnet’s well-known stand that in Europe these are settled through internalization, in other words, through enlargement of the political community. This surely and most

convincingly justifies the creation and renewal of a common Yugoslav state. Nations can settle mutual disputes over territories in a Yugoslav political community, but, of course, if only they can muster the courage to settle these internalized disputes with the necessary political legitimacy.

In Yugoslavia, however, nations persisted in their territorial claims. The undemocratic character of the state was probably the main reason why Yugoslavia's political efforts turned out to be unsuccessful. Moreover, the permanent denial of liberal ideas, plus dedication to nationalism and socialist etatism, made it hard to settle political disputes through the autonomous functioning of institutions, a civil society and a common market economy. This is why there has always been instability to some degree, depending on both resistance to authoritarianism and changes in international relations.

The history of Yugoslavia is a history of instability because of non-existent legitimate constitutional agreement, undemocratic decision-making, disrespect for the rule of law and an unliberal economic system.

The country was falling apart for almost a decade (or longer if we take into account Montenegro's declaration of independence in 2008 and Kosovo's in 2008). In addition, the newly-emerged states have been re-integrating into international and European institutions at a snail's pace and the process is still underway. Almost three decades since their formal establishment, more than a few new states have not been fully integrated into the international community. This refers as much to their membership of the United Nations system (Kosovo) as to European institutions (the Council of Europe and European Union). The list of problems Yugoslav countries have with the international community is pretty long. Indeed, the international and European communities, such as they are, have resorted to almost all possible means to manifest their dissatisfaction with the policy of Yugoslavia's disintegration

and dismemberment – from suspension from the United Nations, through sanctions, military intervention and imposed constitutional order to conditional integration into European institutions and a series of other penalties.

It is this adverse outcome that makes the thesis about inevitable disintegration barely acceptable as does the fact that some political solutions to, for instance, frozen conflicts imply approaches similar to those that motivated the establishment of Yugoslavia in the first place. Economic and social regression, manifest for almost four decades in a considerable part of the Yugoslav territory, as well as the setbacks of the early 1990s that have never been made up for only added their contribution. The cost of disintegration is evident in demographic trends, as well as in the levels of development and standard of living. Probably the simplest way to picture this is to assess where Yugoslav countries would have been in demographic, social and economic development had they only followed the course of, for example, the Central European countries in transition, though there are reasons why such a comparison could be considered pessimistic given that a change in the economic system would have been a much simpler task for Yugoslavia than for any of the Central European countries.

The data presented in the Annex show major economic developments after 2000. From the historical point of view, these developments are not uncharacteristic of the Yugoslav countries and economies. There is no doubt that the year 2000 was a turning-point as it put an end to armed conflicts (at least to greater ones) and autocratic régimes in Serbia and Croatia. Besides, this was when the process of integration into the European Union was launched (especially after the 2003 Salonika Conference). Developments in the first decade were nevertheless uneven, for which practically all the economies paid a high price following the global crisis of 2008. This is comparable to developments in the 1970s when a change in monetary conditions worldwide cut short the

economic growth that relied on foreign financing. A lost decade followed, much like the period after 2008 up to now. This indicates that development characteristics in all of Yugoslavia's successor states have not changed in any substantial way.

The same can be said of all regional developments, a vital factor of which is probably regional cooperation. In the Yugoslav era, development problems within the country itself caused discontent, notably because of the chronic gap between the developed and less developed regions. The developed and less developed alike complained that the common market and economic policy were slowing down their progress. After the disintegration, however, small, closed markets – along with frozen conflicts and political instability – only added to unsatisfactory trends in development. This made clear the necessity for regional cooperation, which first led to bilateral agreements, and later to a regional agreement on free trade (CEFTA), aimed at the gradual establishment of a common market. There is no doubt that reintegration of the market seriously questions the argumentation of advocates of Yugoslavia's inevitable break-up, at least when it comes to economic reasons.

From the historical perspective – either looking towards the past or the future – integrative and disintegrative stimuli look rather constant. Security and well-being surely call for cooperation and removal of the barriers along their path. For historical reasons, they also call for justice. Yugoslavia was dismembered when wrongs – usually righted slowly or never righted – were extra accumulated. Looking towards the future and independently from inherited wrongs, today's constellation in the entire region looks like a permanent source of new wrongs and injustices; practically at all levels and in all forms – individual, collective, human, property rights, political and, finally, all forms of legal protection.

Unlike historical circumstances, more often than not disadvantageous to stability and maintenance of a common political


space, the prospect of a united Europe drops anchor regarding the much needed cooperation between the Yugoslav countries. On the other hand, established political systems and significant political interests not only retain existing disagreements, but also further disintegration. Added to this are foreign influences, above all from Russia. Therefore, as throughout Yugoslavia's entire history,, encouragement to extra Balkanization is not lacking.

And so, regardless of attainment of the idea of Yugoslav statehood that has had many setbacks, but triumphs as well (in World War II and in 1948), disintegration has been costlier whenever resorted to, while the problems plaguing the states, nations and people in the Yugoslav territory definitely call for cooperation. After almost four decades of stagnation, disputes, wars and unresolved political, and social and economic problems , most Yugoslav states are now considerably lagging behind Europe's developed countries. Their major deficiencies are the same as at the very beginning – disinclination towards liberal thought and unsustainable democracies.

The problems have remained the same as have their solutions, and much needed conceptual and political capacity is still limited.


**STATISTICAL DATA FOR THE NEWLY FORMED COUNTRIES
FOR THE PERIOD 2000–2016**

GDP per capita, purchasing power




BIH	3.900	4.100	4.400	4.500	4.900	5.400	6.000	6.600	7.000	6.700	6.900	7.200	7.300	7.500	7.700	8.100	8.300
CG	5.700	5.900	6.100	6.200	6.600	7.100	8.600	10.200	10.900	9.900	10.400	10.900	10.500	10.900	11.300	12.100	12.400
HR	9.400	10.100	10.900	11.500	12.300	13.000	14.400	15.900	16.500	15.200	15.100	15.600	16.000	15.900	16.100	16.700	17.400
KS					5.000	5.300	5.400	5.800	5.800	5.800	6.000	6.200	6.500	6.500	6.700	7.400	7.800
MK	5.400	5.300	5.500	5.600	6.100	6.700	7.200	7.700	8.300	8.400	8.700	8.800	9.000	9.300	10.000	10.500	10.700
SLO	15.800	16.500	17.400	17.900	19.300	20.300	21.300	22.700	23.400	20.900	21.200	21.700	21.800	21.700	22.800	23.900	24.600
SRB	5.000	5.300	5.800	6.100	6.800	7.400	8.000	8.600	9.400	9.000	9.200	9.800	9.900	10.100	10.100	10.500	11.000

GDP, growth




	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
BIH	5,49	2,42	5,03	3,87	6,33	3,90	5,38	5,73	5,48	-2,87	0,77	0,91	-0,93	2,39	1,08	3,07	2,30
CG	3,15	1,10	1,90	2,48	4,43	4,18	8,57	10,66	6,92	-5,66	2,46	3,23	-2,72	3,55	1,78	3,39	2,70
HR	3,77	3,43	5,25	5,56	4,08	4,16	4,79	5,15	2,05	-7,38	-1,70	-0,28	-2,19	-1,06	-0,49	1,63	2,80
KS		5,12	-0,70	5,42	2,61	3,85	3,41	8,30	7,22	3,60	3,31	4,38	2,81	3,44	1,22	4,30	3,60
MK	4,55	-3,07	1,49	2,22	4,67	4,72	5,14	6,47	5,47	-0,36	3,36	2,34	-0,46	2,92	3,63	3,80	2,50
SLO	4,16	2,95	3,84	2,84	4,35	4,00	5,66	6,94	3,30	-7,80	1,22	0,65	-2,69	-1,08	3,11	2,31	2,60
SRB	7,76	4,99	7,12	4,42	9,05	5,54	4,90	5,89	5,37	-3,12	0,58	1,40	-1,02	2,59	-1,84	0,76	2,70

Industrial production growth rate




	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
BIH							13,97	6,40	10,33	-6,49	4,34	2,38	-3,93	5,15	0,20	3,10	4,40
CG	4,20	-0,70	0,60	2,40	13,80	-1,90	1,00	0,10	-2,00	-32,20	17,51	-10,20	-7,06	10,59	-11,39	7,90	-4,39
HR	1,49	6,01	4,98	3,20	3,21	4,55	4,16	4,94	1,27	-9,30	-1,38	-1,20	-5,57	-1,82	1,20	2,70	5,36
KS										11,46	1,77	-5,73	14,94	6,52	-1,29	5,00	3,54
MK						5,90	3,90	5,10	-8,74	-4,85	6,90	-2,71	3,17	4,85	4,89	3,37	
SLO	6,34	2,86	2,43	1,36	4,91	3,51	5,65	7,20	2,45	-17,36	7,18	1,30	-1,09	-1,00	2,22	5,62	6,26
SRB		0,21	1,75	-2,84	6,58	0,69	4,09	4,21	1,43	-12,64	1,21	2,50	-2,24	5,49	-6,53	8,30	4,67

Unemployment rate, poll on labour future




BIH							31,1	29	23,4	24,1	27,2	27,6	28	27,5	27,7	25,4	
CG	19,26	23,66	20,73		27,7	30,3	29,6	19,3	17,2	19,3	19,6	19,7	19,7	19,5	18	17,6	17,5
HR	16,1	15,9	14,8	14,3	13,8	12,7	11,2	9,6	8,4	9,1	11,8	13,5	16	17,3	17,3	16,3	13,5
KS		57,1	55	49,7	39,7	41,4	44,9	43,6	47,5	45,4		44,8	30,9	30	35,33	32,9	26,5
MK	32,25	30,52	31,94	36,69	37,16	37,3	36,03	34,93	33,8	32,2	32	31,4	31	29	28	26,07	24
SLO	7	6,4	6,4	6,7	6,3	6,5	6	4,9	4,4	5,9	7,3	8,2	8,9	10,1	9,7	9	8,2
SRB	12,09	12,23	13,28	14,63	18,5	20,8	20,9	18,06	13,6	16,1	19,2	23	23,9	22,1	18,9	17,7	16,1

Current account, % of GDP




	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
BIH	-7,19	-12,92	-17,90	-19,49	-16,36	-16,43	-7,76	-9,19	-13,84	-6,45	-6,01	-9,49	-8,65	-5,30	-7,37	-5,51	-6,00
CG								-39,92	-49,95	-27,78	-23,01	-17,43	-18,82	-14,47	-15,20	-13,32	-17,03
HR	-2,19	-2,92	-7,07	-5,90	-4,05	-5,18	-6,50	-7,14	-8,78	-5,10	-1,07	-0,70	-0,05	1,01	2,11	5,10	3,69
KS					-7,15	-8,24	-7,24	-6,18	-11,87	-9,19	-11,72	-12,70	-5,79	-3,36	-6,91	-8,56	-9,85
MK	-2,73	-6,34	-9,48	-3,87	-7,90	-2,43	-0,43	-6,91	-12,73	-6,75	-2,03	-2,51	-3,16	-1,65	-0,50	-2,06	-1,99
SLO	-2,78	0,04	0,87	-0,81	-2,69	-1,79	-1,83	-4,13	-5,32	-0,56	-0,12	0,19	2,58	4,82	6,23	5,18	6,88
SRB								-18,58	-21,14	-6,63	-6,84	-10,94	-11,59	-6,12	-5,96	-4,71	-4,98

Internal debt, % of GDP



	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
BIH	41,90	40,10	34,80	30,60	25,50	25,60	22,00	29,80	30,80	36,20	39,30	40,80	44,30	43,50	44,00	45,00	45,20
CG			84,48	47,10	44,46	38,59	32,62	27,50	29,00	38,25	40,66	45,56	53,42	55,71	56,19	62,81	61,00
HR		34,15	36,59	38,12	40,38	41,25	38,87	37,74	39,56	48,97	58,31	65,16	70,68	82,18	86,61	86,74	84,00
KS										6,12	5,92	5,27	8,10	8,94	10,47	12,90	13,20
MK	54,24	51,47	45,91	42,06	40,23	43,47	37,08	31,64	27,68	31,41	34,57	32,00	38,33	40,22	45,69	46,64	50,00
SLO	25,85	26,06	27,27	26,71	26,85	26,29	26,00	22,83	21,80	34,64	38,36	46,63	53,90	71,01	80,89	83,15	80,20
SRB		97,71	68,33	61,71	52,59	50,20	35,95	29,86	28,34	32,80	41,81	45,41	56,21	59,57	70,44	74,63	74,00


External debt, % of GDP



	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
BIH	59,20	46,40	38,90	49,10	47,50	51,30	47,90	47,50	49,00	55,00	51,60	48,90	52,20	52,20	51,90	53,40	54,80
CG			65,69	30,56	29,26	28,28	23,45	17,24	15,61	23,48	29,20	32,58	40,70	42,62	45,16	53,97	52,97
HR	52,00	52,41	53,06	64,76	68,53	71,19	73,95	76,77	82,62	97,81	104,23	103,78	103,10	105,33	108,00	103,50	96,04
KS								15,04	18,97	29,28	31,16	29,67	29,99	30,19	31,20	33,26	40,00
MK	40,63	40,92	37,12	33,58	45,44	50,24	45,75	46,62	48,79	55,87	57,76	64,24	68,18	64,05	69,99	69,43	80,01
SLO	43,29	44,67	46,00	50,28	55,32	70,11	76,26	98,95	106,42	115,21	116,19	112,94	119,08	116,56	124,59	116,55	109,52
SRB	37,87	81,53	56,73	53,25	48,25	59,33	58,48	59,02	62,25	72,66	78,98	72,17	80,94	74,85	77,07	78,76	79,14


Note: Montenegro state debt only

Netto salaries, real growth



	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
BIH	3,39	6,54	7,65	7,34	3,51	2,85	2,36	8,45	8,44	5,59	-1,04	-1,44	-0,84	0,22	1,35	0,97	2,00
CG				9,30	9,69	6,67	12,04	15,00	14,60	7,64	2,94	-2,22	-3,29	-3,41	0,06	-0,76	3,90
HR	3,40	1,60	3,30	4,04	3,70	1,50	1,90	2,20	0,80	0,20	-0,50	-0,40	-2,60	-1,50	0,50	3,70	2,99
KS							-0,60	-1,51	-5,27	23,34	12,26	13,40	-0,75	-1,22	16,39	9,00	3,00
MK	-0,30	-1,91	5,00	3,60	4,40	2,00	3,90	5,50	1,90	25,00	1,40	-2,38	-2,90	-1,60	1,50	2,70	2,00
SLO	1,40	3,10	2,10	1,80	2,10	3,50	2,50	4,20	2,02	2,51	2,10	0,30	-2,10	-1,20	0,60	0,90	1,76
SRB	5,50	16,50	29,90	13,60	10,10	6,40	11,39	19,50	3,87	0,20	0,70	0,20	1,10	-1,50	-1,50	-2,10	2,50

Population



	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
BIH	3.781.000	3.798.000	3.828.000	3.832.000	3.842.000	3.843.000	3.842.762	3.842.942	3.842.265	3.843.000	3.843.126	3.839.737	3.836.377	3.831.555	3.827.000	3.819.000	3.816.000
CG	604.570	607.224	609.485	611.362	612.817	613.265	613.867	615.084	616.350	618.079	619.426	620.079	620.601	621.207	621.810	622.218	625.000
HR	4.468.302	4.300.450	4.305.439	4.305.555	4.308.293	4.311.674	4.313.009	4.312.749	4.310.882	4.306.322	4.296.352	4.282.921	4.269.062	4.254.475	4.236.063	4.207.993	4.190.000
KS					1.592.024	1.622.239	1.651.011	1.678.355	1.719.558	1.747.369	1.774.985	1.796.413	1.807.126	1.818.119	1.812.788	1.788.274	1.780.000
MK	2.026.350	2.034.880	2.020.157	2.026.775	2.032.544	2.036.855	2.040.228	2.043.559	2.046.898	2.050.671	2.055.004	2.058.539	2.061.044	2.064.032	2.067.471	2.070.226	2.085.000
SLO	1.988.925	1.992.060	1.994.530	1.995.733	1.997.012	2.000.474	2.006.868	2.018.122	2.021.316	2.039.669	2.048.583	2.052.843	2.057.159	2.059.953	2.061.980	2.063.531	2.064.000
SRB	7.516.346	7.503.433	7.500.031	7.480.591	7.463.157	7.440.769	7.411.569	7.381.579	7.350.222	7.320.807	7.291.436	7.236.519	7.201.497	7.166.533	7.131.787	7.095.383	7.000.000

NOTES ON THE AUTHORS

MILIVOJ BEŠLIN

He works full-time at the Institute of Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade University. He graduated in history (2004) and earned his master's degree (2008) and doctorate at the Faculty of Philosophy, Novi Sad University (with the thesis "The Attempt at Modernization in Serbia, 1968–72: between "a Revolutionary Course" and Reformist Aspirations." He has published numerous studies, articles, arguments and critical reviews in domestic and international scholarly magazines and collections of papers. His empirical and theoretical research focused on the political and social history of socialist Yugoslavia, nationalism, theories of modernization, theories of history, attempted reforms in the Second Yugoslavia, the national question in Serbia in the second half of the 20th century, Soviet-Yugoslav relations, the student riots of 1968, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and its attitude toward the Spanish Civil War, fundamental elements of Yugoslav federalism, Serbian-Croatian relations in the Second Yugoslavia, antifascism vs. revisionism, World War II in Yugoslavia, the autonomy of Vojvodina within Yugoslav federalism, Yugoslavia's role in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, intellectual engagement vs. nationalism, etc.

IGOR DUDA

Visiting professor at the Faculty of Philosophy, Department of History, *Juraj Dobrila* University in Pula, he graduated in history and Croatian Studies from the Faculty of Philosophy, Zagreb University (2000), receiving his master's degree (2004) and doctorate in history (2009). His research work mostly focuses on social history and the history of everyday life in the second half of the

20th century, Croatia in socialist Yugoslavia, the history of leisure time and tourism, and the history of consumerism and childhood. He is the author of three books: *U potrazi za blagostanjem. O povijesti dokolice i potrošačkog društva u Hrvatskoj pedesetih i šezdesetih* (2005), *Pronađeno blagostanje. Svakodnevni život i potrošačka kultura u Hrvatskoj sedamdesetih i osamdesetih* (2010), *Danas kada postajem pionir. Djetinjstvo i ideologija jugoslavenškoga socijalizma* (2015), co-author of the publication *Nikad im bolje nije bilo? Modernizacija svakodnevnog života u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji* [*They Never Had It Better? Modernization of Everyday Life in Socialist Yugoslavia*] (2015) and co-editor of the collection of papers *Social Inequalities and Discontent in Yugoslav Socialism* (2016). He is currently leader of a team working on the research project *Stvaranje socijalističkoga čovjeka. Hrvatsko društvo i ideologija jugoslavenškoga socijalizma* (2014–17, HRZZ). likewise a member of teams engaged on a number of scholarly and other projects and is co-founder of the Center for Cultural and Historical Research of Socialism in Pula. Head of the History Department as of 2013.

VLADIMIR GLIGOROV

Born in Belgrade in 1945, he received his master's degree at Columbia University, New York (1973) and Belgrade University (1977). He was assistant professor at Columbia University, New York and the Faculty of Political Sciences, Belgrade (till 1991) and also visiting fellow at the Center for the Study of Public Choice, George-Mason University, Virginia, US; fellow of the Center for East-European Studies, Uppsala University, Sweden; fellow of the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Vienna, Austria. Researcher at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies; professor at Webster University, Vienna, Austria; lecturer at Vienna University and visiting professor at Graz University.

He is the author of many books in Serbian and English.

IVO GOLDSTEIN

Born in 1958 in Zagreb, he graduated in history from the Faculty of Philosophy, Zagreb (1979), earned his master's degree in 1984 and doctorate in 1988. From 1980, he was an assistant lecturer at the Department of History, Faculty of Philosophy, Zagreb, and after other academic ranks and titles, was elected full professor in 2007.

At the beginning of his career, he focused on Byzantology and Croatian history in the Middle Ages, and the history of the Jews in Croatia, and, as of the mid-1990s, on various aspects of the 20th century history of Croatia. He obtained three internships abroad: 1981–2 from the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en sciences sociales, Paris; 1987–8, Athens; and 2011 from the Imre Kertész Kolleg Friedrich Schiller Universität, Jena.

Goldstein's opus consists of more than twenty books and about 200 studies published at home and abroad.

The series of Goldstein's integral studies on the history of Croatia begins in 1999 with *Croatia: A History* (London – Montreal, 2nd ed. 2001, 3rd ed. 2011), to be followed by editions in the Croatian language – *Hrvatska povijest* (Zagreb, 2003, 2nd and 3rd revised editions, Zagreb, 2008 and 2013), in Slovenian – *Hrvaška zgodovina* (Ljubljana, 2008) and in Albanian. An edition in Russian is in preparation.

He is a permanent research fellow at the *Miroslav Krleža* Lexicography Institute and, as of 2003, editor of historiography chapters, and a research fellow of the Croatian Encyclopedia of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

He has edited a number of volumes for the Croatian History Institute of the Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb, the Jewish Community "Bet Israel" in Zagreb and the *Novi Liber* publishing house.

He translates from English and French into Croatian.

TVRTKO JAKOVINA

A full professor (20th century world history) at the Faculty of Philosophy, Zagreb University, he is author of the books *Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici* (MH, 2002), *Američki komunistički saveznik; Hrvati, Titova Jugoslavija i Sjedinjene Američke Države 1945–1955* (Profil/Srednja Europa, 2003), *Treća strana Hladnog rata* (Fraktura, 2011), *Trenuci katarze. Prijelomni događaji XX stoljeća* (Fraktura, 2013) and editor of *Hrvatsko proljeće, četrdeset godina poslije* (Sveučilište u Zagrebu/Centar Tripalo, 2012). He has written a series of articles on foreign policy in Tito's Yugoslavia and Croatian and Yugoslav history in the 20th century and was awarded the highest government prizes in 2004 and 2014 for his works, as well as the Cyclops /Kiklop/ Prize (2013) and the Award of the Association of University Professors and Other Scholars. He graduated and earned his doctorate at the Faculty in Zagreb. He attended courses at the University of Kansas and Boston College, and was a Fulbright visiting researcher at Georgetown University, Washington. He received his master's degree at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium. He was a visiting fellow at the London School of Economics. In charge of post-graduate studies of diplomacy at Zagreb University and the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, he was a visiting fellow at the Istituto per l'Europa centro-orientale e balcanica, Bologna University, a lecturer at the University of Split, and in charge of Ph. D. courses at the Faculty of Philosophy and the Faculty of Political Sciences.

LJUBICA JANČEVA

A professor at the National History Institute in Skopje, Macedonia, she graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy's History Department at the *Ćirilo i Metodije* University in Skopje in 2006. Her research work is mostly focused on Macedonian history (of the SR of Macedonia and the Republic of Macedonia) and the history of the Balkan countries after World War II. She is the author of many publications on these subjects.

HUSNIJA KAMBEROVIĆ

Born in 1963 in Mionica near Gradačac, he graduated in history from the Faculty of Philosophy, Department of History, Sarajevo (1987), and earned his master's degree (1991) and doctorate (2001) at the Faculty of Philosophy, Zagreb. He worked at the Institute of History in Banjaluka (1988–89) and the Institute of History in Sarajevo (1989–2016). He was elected assistant professor (2005), visiting professor (2010) and full professor (2016) at the Faculty of Philosophy, Department of History, Sarajevo, and was director of the Institute of History (2002–16). At present, he is a full professor at the Faculty of Philosophy, Sarajevo University.

In 2006–9, he headed Bosnia-Herzegovina's research team on the international project “New and Ambiguous Nation-Building Processes in South-Eastern Europe: Collective Identities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova and Montenegro in Comparison (1944–2005),” produced by the Institute for Eastern European Studies, Department of History, FU Berlin (Germany). In 2013, he was head of Bosnia-Herzegovina's research team on the project “Repräsentationen des sozialistischen Jugoslawien im Umbruch” (Humboldt-Universität, Berlin). He is the author of nine books and over 100 studies on the 19th and 20th century history of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

MRIKA LIMANI

She attended Ph. D. courses at the *Hasan Prishtina* University, Department of History, Prishtina. In 2011, she earned her master's degree in the same department. She completed her post-graduate studies at Uppsala University, the Hugo Valentin Center, within the program for Holocaust and Genocide Studies in 2014. She is a researcher at the *Ali Hadri* Institute of History in Prishtina, focusing on mass violence, genocide, inter-ethnic violence and civil war. She has written a number of magazine and newspaper articles.

ALEKSANDAR LITOVSKI

Born in 1967 in Bitola, he completed his elementary and secondary education in his home town, then graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy, Department of History, in Skopje in 1992 and was appointed professor. In 2017, he finished his master's degree (with the book/thesis *Saradnja narodnooslobodilačkih pokreta iz svih krajeva Makedonije tokom 1943*) and in 2007 his Ph. D. with the book/thesis *Makedonska narodnooslobodilačka platforma u Drugom svetskom ratu*. He works at Bitola Museum, is a member of the Department of Historical-Geographic Studies and of the Board of the Macedonian Academic Society in Bitola. He writes for several newspapers and magazines and is a member of the Journalists' Association. He is the author of a number of critical reviews, historical studies and exhibitions and president of the Editorial Board of the Collection of Papers issued by the Bitola Museum. He has written 15 books and a number of brochures.

NENAD MAKULJEVIĆ

A professor at the Belgrade Faculty of Philosophy and head of the Department of Art History, the main fields of his research are 20th century Serbian art, the visual culture of the Balkans, the historiography of the arts, arts vs. politics and Ottoman-Christian-Jewish contacts in visual culture.

He earned his doctorate at Belgrade University in 2004. Among others, he has written the books *Umetnost i nacionalna ideja u XIX veku: sistem evropske i srpske vizuelne kulture u službi nacije* and *Osmansko-srpski Beograd: vizuelnost i kreiranje gradskog identiteta (1815–1878)*. He has taken part in many international projects and conferences and organized two international conferences entitled “Visual Culture of the Balkans: State of Research and Further Directions – Belgrade 2014” and “Creating Memories in Early Modern and Modern Art and Literature – Belgrade 2017.”

SRĐAN MILOŠEVIĆ

Born in 1982 in Čačak, he works full-time at the Institute of Modern History of Serbia in Belgrade. In 2007, he graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy's History Department at Belgrade University (with the thesis *Ideološke osnove agrarne reforme u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*). In 2016, he completed his doctorate with the thesis *Agrarna politika u Jugoslaviji 1945–1953*. His research fields include the revisionism of history, agrarian history, historical anthropology and history of the law. He has participated in a number of domestic and international scholarly projects and conferences. His major publications include: *Istorija pred sudom. Istorijski i pravni aspekti u rehabilitaciji kneza Pavla Karađorđevića*, Fabrika knjiga, Belgrade, 2013; *Politička upotreba prošlosti: o istorijskom revizionizmu na postjugoslovenskom prostoru*, ed. M. Samardžić, M. Bešlin, S. Milošević, Novi Sad, 2013; *The Agrarian Reform – A 'Divine Thing'. Ideological Aspects of Agrarian Reform in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes/Yugoslavia; Transforming Rural Societies: Agrarian Property and Agrarianism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, eds. Dietmar Müller and Angela Harre, Innsbruck, Wien, Bozen, 2011, pp. 47–62; *The Arrested Development: Mythical Characteristics in the 'Five Hundred Years of Turkish Yoke, Images of Imperial Legacy'*, eds. Tea Sindbaek and Maximilian Harmuth, Lit Verlag, Berlin, 2011, pp. 68–78; *Kritički istoričar i društvo: istorijski osvrt na dominantnu recepciju dela Ilariona Ruvarca u srpskom društvu in Snaga lične odgovornosti*, Belgrade, 2008, pp. 202–236.

LATINKA PEROVIĆ

Born on October 4, 1933 in Beloševu, Kragujevac, she finished high school in Kragujevac in 1952 and in 1956 graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade University. In 1958, she enrolled in post-graduate education and in 1965 earned her master's degree with the thesis *Kulturna politika u Jugoslaviji* and in 1975 a doctorate at the Faculty of Philosophy (thesis: *Debata o nacionalnom pitanju u Nezavisnoj radničkoj partiji Jugoslavije 1923. godine*).

Up to 1972 she was politically active, holding a variety of posts. As secretary of the League of Communists of Serbia, she tendered her resignation in 1972 along with Marko Nikezić. She was a member of the Presidency of the Youth Association of Serbia and the Youth Association of Yugoslavia.

A research fellow at the Institute of the History of the Workers' Movement in Serbia from 1975 to 1998, and then at the Institute of Modern History of Serbia, she was mostly focused on the history of Serbia in the second half of the 19th century, especially on the history of ideas and Serbian-Russian revolutionary ties.

She has written a number of monographs and edited many books on historical extracts from the 19th-21st. centuries.

Her works have been translated into German, French, English, Russian, Polish, Slovakian, Bulgarian and Slovenian.

BOŽO REPE

He is a full professor of contemporary history at the Faculty of Philosophy in Ljubljana and from 1999 to 2000, was head of the History Department. As of 2009, in charge of the program on Slovenian history, the fields of his research are contemporary Slovenian, South Slav and Middle European histories, as well as curricula in Slovenia in South-West Europe. He is the author of many textbooks. His articles and books have been published in many languages in over 16 countries.

He was a visiting professor at the Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas, Lithuania and also lectured at other universities and institutes such as the universities of Vienna, Bratislava and Graz, Charles the Great University in Prague, the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim, and the universities of Brussels and Ghent. He worked on several academic studies at the Österreichische Ost-und Südosteuropainstitut, Vienna, and Institut d'histoire du temps présent, Paris. He was head of the Slovenian team in the Slovenian-Macedonian research group and in the Slovenian-Austrian Commission that issued a book on Slovenian-Austrian relations in the 19th century – *Slovenisch-österreichische Beziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert* (2004). He is currently engaged in several international projects.

DRAGO ROKSANDIĆ

Born in 1948 in Petrinja, he is a full professor at the Department of History at the Faculty of Philosophy, Zagreb University and head of the Middle and South-East Europe Department, in charge of the graduate module on early modern history, and likewise head of the Center for Comparative Historical and Intercultural Studies. He teaches a postgraduate course devoted to the theories and methods of modern historiography as part of the doctoral program of study of Croatia's contemporary history.

He is the coordinator of the international academic project "Triplex Confinium: Croatia's multi-frontiers in the Euro-Mediterranean Context (established in 1996), and of the long-standing research and cultural program *Desničini susreti* that also involves coordination of an inter-faculty project aimed at establishing a university center in Zadar.

In 1990, he was a visiting lecturer at Yale University, US, in 1991–97 a fellow at the Vienna Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (together with Tony Judta, Jan Gross, Daniel Chirot and Istvan Deak, he co-founded and coordinated the research

program “Re-Thinking the Postwar History of Europe”) and in 1995–2000, he was a regular visiting professor at the Central European University /CEU/ in Budapest and he is also a participant in the academic project “Phantomgrenzen” at Humbolt University, Berlin.

ŠERBO RASTODER

Born in 1956 in Radmanci, the municipality of Berane, he completed his elementary and high school education in Bar. In 1981, he graduated from Belgrade Faculty of Philosophy, History Department. He completed his postgraduate studies and earned a master’s degree in 1987 (with the thesis *Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica u Crnoj Gori 1935–1939*) and a doctorate at the same faculty in 1993. Branko Petranović, professor at the History Department of Belgrade’s Faculty of Philosophy, mentored his B. A, M. A. and Ph. D. dissertations. He was awarded the highest government prize for academic achievement and many other prizes. He is a visiting professor at the Faculty of Philosophy and Faculty of Political Sciences, at the University of Montenegro and is in charge of this university’s history curricula. He is a member of the Doclean Academy of Arts and Science /DANU/, the Bosnian Academy of Arts and Science /BANU/ and the Montenegrin Academy of Arts and Science /CANU/.

His major research fields are the histories of Montenegro, Bosniaks/Muslims and Yugoslavia in the 19th and 20th centuries, and theoretical-methodological problems of the science of history. He is the author or co-author of over twenty academic monographs, co-author of a history textbook for high school students and the author of several university textbooks, also editor and reviewer of over 80 special editions, author of more than 200 scholarly articles and as many critical reviews, essays, expert commentaries, etc. He edits and contributes to *The Historical Lexicon of Montenegro*. He has organized many international academic meetings and

participated in the development of international projects, round tables and public debates on history, human rights, interethnic relations, the media and culture. He has lectured on Montenegro's history and multiculturalism in several West European countries, the US and Turkey.

MITJA VELIKONJA

Professor of cultural studies and head of the Center for Studies of Culture and Religion at Ljubljana University, Slovenia, the main fields of his research include Central European and Balkan political ideologies, the subculture and culture of graffiti art, collective memories and post-socialist nostalgia. His latest monographs in English are *Rock'n'Re-New Yugoslavism in Contemporary Slovenian Music* (Ljubljana, 2013), *Titostalgia – A Study of Nostalgia for Josip Broz* (Ljubljana, 2008; <http://mediawatch.mirovni-institut.si/eng/mw20.html>), *Eurosis – A Critique of the New Euro-centrism* (Ljubljana; 2005; <http://mediawatch.mirovni-institut.si/eng/mw17.htm>) and *Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (TAMU Press; 2003). He is co-author of the book in Serbian *Nebeska Jugoslavija: Interakcija političke mitologije i popularne kulture* (Belgrade, 2012) and co-editor of *Post-Jugoslavija – nove kulturne i političke perspektive* (Palgrave, 2014). He has been awarded four domestic and one international prize for his achievements. He has been a visiting professor at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow (2002–3), Columbia University in New York (2009–14), Rijeka University (2015) and New York University in St. Petersburg, and also a Fulbright visiting fellow at Rosemont College, Philadelphia (2004–5).

At last! At long last we have a comprehensive insight into Yugoslavia, which is prerequisite to understanding its two disintegrations and two renewals alike. It also preconditions understanding of the present and all the crises shaking the states that emerged after Yugoslavia's end. A history book as this one was unimaginable while we still had Yugoslavia because all the attempts at keeping it alive failed in "negotiations" over particular issues. Neither was it possible to have it later on in the corpus of national historiographies that are "closed" as a rule, mostly anti-Yugoslav and hence unready for digging deeper into problems. A history book as this one turned into a reality only as an outcome of individual historians' irresistible need to explain – to themselves and to others - what had actually happened. And that is the one and only reason that motivates a true scholar.

—**Professor DUBRAVKA STOJANOVIĆ,**

Faculty of Philosophy, the Belgrade University

Understanding the process of Yugoslavia's disintegration, the wars waged on its territory in the 1990s, but also transitions of post-Yugoslav societies from a one-party system to a parliamentary democracy is not possible without the knowledge about the emergence and development of both the Yugoslav idea and the Yugoslav state. Besides, it is the experience of Yugoslavia's functioning and the way its political, economic and cultural elites but "ordinary" citizens too carried on in most complex international and domestic circumstances of the 20th century that should be used in having the newly established states and societies positioned against the equally complex backdrop of the 21st century.

—**Dr. HRVOJE KLASIĆ,**

Faculty of Philosophy, Zagreb

This is a textbook that scholarly reconstructs many relevant factors that led up to the constitution of the Yugoslav state, and the times of its existence and its disappearance from the world's political map in the early 1990s. Apart from the unavoidable national question this textbook offers to its readers the knowledge about sociopolitical, socioeconomic and cultural life in Yugoslavia, its regional differences, foreign policy standing but also about the culture of memory of the Yugoslav experience.

—**Dr. VERA KATZ,**

University of Sarajevo, the Institute of History

