

THE RISE AND FALL OF FULANI RULE

IN ADAMAWA 1809 - 1901

BY

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ABSTRACT

The study comprises three themes, the rise of the Fulani to power, the establishment and consolidation of the central administration, and the overthrow of Fulani rule.

The gradual migrations of Fulani from the Senegambia region towards the east had resulted by the end of the eighteenth century *in* Fulani settlements south of Bornu. In response to Uthman's call to make jihad, Adama, having received a flag from Uthman, gave over forty Fulani leaders the authority to further the aims of Uthman's jihad. The result was the creation of Adamawa as an emirate of the Sokoto empire.

Adama set up a central administration over the conquered territory. The leaders who had previously been governors of districts opposed Adama, but support from Sokoto helped maintain a single overall leadership. Further developments in the administrative institutions at the centre assured Yola's pre-eminence over the districts.

From exploring missions, European expeditions to Adamawa developed commercial and political interests. European competition, the rise of ^{the} Mahdist state in Adamawa, and Zubeiru's uncompromising stand against any interference with the exercise of his political authority finally brought about the overthrow of Fulani rule.

PREFACE

This decade has witnessed a sudden increase in research into the history of the Sokoto empire, the bulk of which lies in present day Northern Nigeria. In 1964 the Northern Nigeria History Scheme, dedicated to this pursuit, was launched. The research has been either on the Sokoto empire as a whole, for example, the works of Anjorin, Hodgson and Kirk-Greene, Johnston, and Adeleye, or on the individual emirates as M.G. Smith and D.M. Last on Zaria and Sokoto respectively. Now practically all the emirates are the subject of historical investigation, attempting to combine the reports of early administrative officers with personal field work on oral tradition and local written sources. (For a list of the theses in preparation see First and Second Interim Report, Northern Nigeria History Scheme, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.)

These studies have become a matter of urgency for a variety of reasons: firstly, with the accession to nationhood, there is a great demand to know as much of precolonial history as possible. Secondly, those considered as the local experts on oral tradition are for the most part now old men, who are fast passing away. All efforts must be made to meet them now, for the death of any old man who was interested in history is indeed the loss of much needed information for historical investigation. Thirdly, oral tradition as historical evidence is no longer in dispute. The advances in

science, for example, the manufacture of economic and reliable portable tape recorders, have also facilitated and refined the techniques of collecting oral tradition such as was never the case before.

If these observations only explain in a general way the relevance of the study, a number of other reasons make the study particularly necessary. There have been only two serious attempts in the past to reconstruct the history of Adamawa. The first was by Professor P.F. Lacroix, formerly an administrative officer in the then French Camerouns. His findings resulted in a scholarly essay, 'Matériaux pour servir à l'histoire des Peuls de l'Adamawa'. The other was by A.H.M. Kirk-Greene who as a young administrative officer at Yola in 1951 took a special interest in the history of the emirate. He published his results in Adamawa Past and Present.

Both these attempts have not claimed exhaustive research; Dr. Kirk-Greene's purpose was 'to give the officer posted to Adamawa a background to the history of his province and a guide to where he may be able to develop his interests and research'.

Outside these, the major works on Northern Nigeria history have devoted only small sections ~~to~~ Adamawa. For instance, O. Temple, Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates and States of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria, 1922 devotes seven pages out of a total of 675; C. Niven, A Short

History of Nigeria, has one page; S.J. Hogben and A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria, 1966, nineteen pages out of a total of 585 and H.A.S. Johnston, The Sokoto Empire, 1966, eight pages out of 252 pages.

Collectively the chief merit of these books has been to point to the need for a more embracing study of Adamawa with the aim of establishing greater accuracy of the events, and of working with the available sources to reconstruct the political history before the Europeans came and during the period of European intervention. Many of these events are very little known. In other words, the history of how the Fulani rose to power, of how they ruled the emirate for almost a century before the advent of Europeans, and of how within less than two decades of European involvement in the emirate, Fulani hegemony was undermined, discredited, and overthrown through military action by the German and British acting 'in friendly concert'.

In undertaking this study I am conscious of the all pervading influence of Islam, and I think its importance merits a separate study; for instance to elucidate the Islamic nature of the Adamawa administration, the state of Muslim rituals and observances, the question of Islamic sects and the responses to them, and how indeed they affected education, the administration of justice, and worship. My emphasis in this study has been on the political evolution of the emirate, and if my work should form a foundation for more specialised studies on Islam, then I would have achieved one of my aims.

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There are also others who have been of much help to me. R.A. Oliver, D.Jones, D.W. Arnott, J. Wansbrough, J. Carnochan, all of the School of Oriental and African Studies; E.F.C. Smith, D.M. Last, J. Ballard, M.A. al-Hajj, Ibrahim Mukoshy, A.H.M. Kirk-Greene and Alhaji Garba Saidu in Nigeria; P.F. Lacroix, J.C. Froelich, J.P. Lebeuf, J. Lestringant in France; H. Mayssal, E. Mohamadou, Tanyi Mbuagbaw, E. Ardener, in Cameroon. During field work in Adamawa in addition to the list of informants given in the bibliography, I enjoyed the hospitality and was actively assisted by the Lamido of Adamawa, Aliyu Ibn Mustafa,

Alhaji Junaidu-Waziri Sokoto, Galadima Aminu, Alhaji Bakari, Muhammadu Song, Alhaji Bashiru, Malam Usuramu Mayo-Belwa, Abdulrahman and Giddado. There are many others whose names have not been listed here, but who assisted me immensely. To all of them, I am very grateful.

I wish also to thank the Cameroon Government for sponsoring me throughout the preparation of the thesis, and also the staffs of the various Archives and Libraries (see list in bibliography) in which I consulted documents. Last, but not least, my wife Dorothy, who, despite pressure from her own Ph.D. work has patiently rendered me invaluable help.

GLOSSARY

Ag̃ia	Treasurer
Alhaji	A courtesy title given to a man who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca.
Alkali	A Judge in a Muslim court.
anīr al mu'ninīn (Hausa, Sarkin Musulni)	Commander of the Faithful.
anṣar	Close companions of a military ruler; originally the helpers of the Prophet Muḥammad in Medina.
Arḍo (pl. arbe or arḍo'en)	leader of a group of nomadic herdsmen.
Arnado	Fulani title for a non-Fulani chief.
Bellaka	Mbum title for a chief.
bērō (Hausa, Kōfa)	host, guest, 'official intermediary'.
Dan (Arabic, bin, ibn)	, son of
Galadīma (anglicized in the thesis)	A Bornu title for prime minister
hijra	emigration for religious purpose
jīhad (anglicized)	fight for the faith.
jizya	tax on those of a tolerated religion in an Islamic state.
Jauro (pl. Jauro'en)	Fulani title for Fulani chief of a town.
Kaigana	A Bornu title for the commander of the cavalry.
Lānīdo, Lando (pl. Laniḍe, anglicized)	Supreme ruler or governor of

mahdī	A Muslim figure, often expected in an apocalyptic setting somewhat resembling the Christian Messiah.
Mai	Bornu title for chief, also adopted by Mandara in the eighteenth century.
Mōdibbo (Hausa, nalan) pl. Mō-dibbe	Fulani courtesy title given to a learned man.
nujaddid	Muslim reformer
pulaku	Fulani virtues
runde	slave settlement
sans ani	a war-camp or military out-post
sarauta	office, title or rank with power to appoint subordinate staff to other titled offices.
Sarki(n)	Hausa title for a chief or Emir (of)
Sarkin Yaki	Hausa title for the chief's commander of the troops.
<u>sharī'a</u>	Islamic Law
sunna	the practice of the Prophet.
ṭarīqa	path in Islamic mysticism, brotherhood.
Uthmani	the followers of Uthman dan Fodio.
Wazīri (anglicized)	from the Arabic wazīr, minister.
Yerīna	heir apparent or son of a ruler.
Zakāt	canonical alms required of all Muslims.

ABBREVIATIONS.

ANY	Archives Nationales, Yaoundé.
BCAF	Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française.
BSOAS	Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
CHEAM	Centre des Hautes Etudes d'Administration Musulman, Paris.
CMS	Church Missionary Society Records, London.
CO	Colonial Office
DDF	Documents Diplomatiques Français 1ère serie.
enc(s)	enclosure(s)
FO	Foreign Office.
IM	Infāq al-maisūri
JAH	Journal of African History.
JAS	Journal of the African Society.
JHSN	Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria.
KF	Kitāb al-farq'
memo	memorandum
M.F.O.M	Archives du Ministère de la France d'Outre Mer, Paris.
NAK	National Archives, Kaduna.
RJ	Rauḍ al-jinān
R.N.C	Royal Niger Company
TI	Tanbihu'l Ikhwan
TW	Tazyīn al-waraqāt
U-Sec. S.C.	Under-Secretary of State for Colonies
WS	Wathīqat ahl al-sūdān

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CHAPTER ITHE SETTING BEFORE THE JIHAD.a) Physical features and climate:

Nineteenth century Adanawa lay south of Lake Chad within latitude 6° and 11° north, and longitude 10° and $14^{\circ}.30'$ east, covering a total surface area of about 40,000 square miles. As a result of European Agreements in 1893 and 1894 (see below pp.355ff.) parts of Adanawa can today be found in the Central African Republic and Nigeria. But by far the largest portion - about three quarters, is in the Cameroon Republic.

The altitude of much of the country is low with an average height of 2,000 feet above sea level. In the south, the country begins with the Adanawa plateau, called by the Fulani lesdi hosere, with a general elevation of 4,000 feet. It forms the water-shed whence streams drain into the Benue (or Binuwe 'Mother of Waters' in the Batta language), Djaren and Vina, and into the inland basin of the Chad.

The central region stretching north from the Adanawa plateau across the Benue to the southern limits of the Chad basin is characterized by Kopjes and inselbergs which rise above the plain, some by over 1,000 feet. Great altitudes of between 5,000 feet to 7,000 feet are encountered only towards the western border. These are sections of the Cameroon - Bamenda - Adanawa highlands which form a

record height of 13,350 feet on the Coast and steadily decrease northwards to just under 4,000 near Yola. North of Yola the line of these highlands is continued by the Mandara range (over 4,000 feet) before finally dying away into the Chad basin.

The most important physical feature of Adamawa is the river Benue. Rising from the Adamawa plateau it first of all flows north, then in a generally westerly direction until its junction with the Niger at Lokoja. The Benue has many of its tributaries in Adamawa, including the Kebbi, Luwe, Tiel, Deo, Faro, Kilengi, Beti, Ine, Belwa, Kunini and Lamorde. It is greatly affected by the rainfall with a difference of as much as 35 feet being recorded between high and low water. Its flood plains form good farming as well as grazing grounds.

At high water during August and September the river forms wide navigable water ways, ^{about a} ~~several~~ miles in width from bank to bank, and it is then possible to ascend it as far upstream as its junction with the Kebbi with large river-steamers of shallow draught. During the 'dry season' the Benue shrinks considerably exposing large sand-banks which divide the river into several channels. The Benue begins to fall in October and reaches its lowest level in March and April when it can be forded at several places. At this time also many of its tributaries are entirely dry and there is no problem in crossing them.

Hence the 'dry season' was the favourite time for travelling and for waging wars.

The seasons fall into two well defined periods based not on temperature, but on rainfall. These are the rainy or wet season, and the dry season. The dry season begins in October and ends in April. The chief characteristic of this season is the Harmattan, a dry north-easterly wind which brings along with it a thick haze containing sand particles from the Sahara. The Harmattan affects the whole region. During the period - December to February - when its influence is greatest, the nights and early mornings are cold, but the days are very hot. High diurnal variations in temperature are recorded during this period when within a few hours the thermometer could jump from 50°F. to over 100°F.

The rainy season lasts from May to September. The beginning and end of the rainy season is heralded by frequent tornadoes. The total rainfall decreases in volume as well as in frequency from south to north from an annual average of 40 to 60 inches at Tibati in the south to under 28 inches at Marua in the far north. During this season the country is traversed by south-westerly winds. Travel by land is difficult because most of the rivers and valleys are flooded during this season.

The vegetation is mainly a reflection of the decreasing rainfall to the north. Generally speaking the region falls within the tropical savanna belt. The southern portion is clothed with thin forest of broad-leaved savanna woodland or orchard vegetation type, but the country becomes more and more of open grassland towards the north. The vegetation was strong inducement to Fulani settlement in Adanawa and during the jihad it offered no serious obstacle to the extension of military power based on cavalry.

b) Fulani migrations:

Whereas the controversy over Fulani¹ origins is still unsettled², there is no doubt from the records that the early Fulani migrations into Adanawa³ were largely from

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1. Variouslly called Peuhl or Peul(s), Fula, Fellata, Fillani, Bororo. They call themselves, 'Pullo' in the singular and 'Fulbe' in the plural. I will refer to them as Fulani in both singular and plural in keeping with Northern Nigerian usage.
 2. H.A. Ba, 'Des Foulbé du Mali et de leur culture', (also in English) ABIA, No.14-15, 1966, p.25; D.J. Stenning, Savannah Nomads, Oxford, 1959, pp.18-20; A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Adanawa Past and Present, Oxford, 1958, p.22; for some important contributions on Fulani origins, see M. Delafosse, Haut-Sénégal-Niger, ed. Clozel. 1ère série, tome, 1, Paris, 1912, pp.198-226; H.R. Palmer, 'M. Delafosse's Account of the Fulani', Journal of the African Society (JAS) Vol. XIII, 1913-14, pp.195-203; M. Dupire, Peuls Nomades, Paris, 1962, pp.28-37.
 3. 'Wa' is a suffix in Hausa which means 'people of'; hence Adana-wa means 'people of Adana'. We do not know precisely when the word was coined. At Yola, I was told it was first employed in Sokoto to identify those who accompanied Adana to receive the flag. It appears from D.Denham
/cont...

Bornu¹. This was however, only a part of gradual Fulani migrations from the Senegambia region towards the east along the savanna belt of Western Sudan. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the Fulani had attained the region of Darfur, or in modern times the Sudan Republic².

Delafosse estimates that the great waves of Fulani migrants from Futa Toro and Macina towards the east occurred between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries³. But the

F/n. 3 cont. from previous page.

and H. Clapperton, Narrative of Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa, London, 1826, pp. 115, 144, that by 1824 the name referred to the region around Gurin, Adama's capital; while in H. Clapperton, Journal of a Second Expedition into the Interior of Africa, London, 1829, pp. 160, 176, its use suggests that it embraced a wider geographical region under Adama's jurisdiction. I used it to refer both to the territory south of Bornu which before the jihad was vaguely referred to as Fumbina, as well as all other territory which, during the nineteenth century, depended directly or indirectly on the sovereignty of Yoŋa.

1. H. Barth, Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa, 1849-55, London, 1857-8, Vol. II, p.481; R.M. East, Stories of Old Adamawa, being a collection of Mss. compiled by members of the Yoŋa School Staff, Lagos and London, 1934, p.19. For Hausa readers, see Labarum Hausawa da Makwabtansu, Vol. II, Zaria, 1934; P.F. Lacroix, 'Matériaux pour servir à l'histoire des Peuls de l'Adamawa', Etudes Camerounaises (Etud. Cam.) 1952, p.19; Kurk Stumpel, Die Geschichte Adamawas, Hamburg, 1912, p.6. There are translations in English and French at the National Archives, Kaduna (NAK), and the Archives Nationales, Yaounde (ANY). My page references are from the English translation.
2. Clapperton, 1829, p.336; for recent accounts see Stenning, 1959, p.9; Dupire, 1962, pp. 16 - 17. 'Fellatà' is substituting Takruri as the Middle Easterners' popular generic term for all West Sudanese mainly because of the movement of Fulani into the Middle East and possibly also because of their role in spreading Islam in the Western Sudan. replacing
3. Delafosse, 1912, p.232.

earliest known reference to the Fulani in the east, beyond the Hausa states, is the arrival of a party of Fulani as envoys of the Emperor of Malle at the court of Kanem during the reign of Kachim Birir (c.1242-1262).¹ Almost a hundred years later, during the reign of Yakuba, the nineteenth Sarkin Kano (c.1452-1463), the Kano Chronicle reports that more Fulani came to Hausaland from Malle bringing with them many books about Islam and etymology to supplement the Quran and works on the law and traditions, the only religious books found in these regions until that time. Some, tired of journeying further, settled in Kano while the rest proceeded to Bornu.²

However, it would appear that after the fifteenth century, on account of political pressures, and possibly of over-population, there was a steady flow of Fulani immigrants, mainly Oualarbe (Wollarbe), Salsalbe and Torobe Fulani, into Hausaland and Bornu. The result was that towards the end of the sixteenth century Fulani became numerous in western Bornu, and some infiltrated into Adamawa, and the lower Gongo-la where they settled among the Jukuns.³ Some passed to

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1. Barth, IV, p.150. Y. Urvoy, Histoire de l'Empire du Bornou, IFAN, Paris, 1949, pp.64, 95-96.
 2. H.R. Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs, Lagos, 1928, vol. III, p.111.
 3. Delafosse, 1912, pp.230-34; H.R.Palmer, Bornu, Sahara and Sudan, London, 1936, p.258; Lady Lugard, A Tropical Dependency, London, 1906, pp.382-83; E.W. Bovill, The Golden Trade of the Moors, London, 1968, 2nd ed., pp. 228-29.

Baghirni where they fought as allies to Dokkenge or Birni Besi when he captured and built the town of Massenya early in the sixteenth century¹.

These pieces of evidence are fragmentary and leave gaps of many years in our knowledge of the history of the migrant Fulani between when they left the Senegambia regions and when they settled at Bornu. Nevertheless, while in Bornu some of the Fulani immigrants gained distinction on account of their learning and understanding of the Faith. According to a Bornu Mahran, Mai Dunama (Idris) Ibn Hajj Ali (c.1476-1503) gave official recognition to their contribution by issuing an injunction to the Muslim community.²

By this injunction, he conferred upon a Fulani Gabidama 'a distinction without measure' and struck off his name 'from the Treasurer's list of tax-payers and from the customary obligations which were due to the official called Mulina Garazanna'.³ Severe punishment was attached to the Order, following the normal practice in such documents.⁴

1. Barth, III, pp.432-33; Lady Lugard, 1906, p.284; Strumpel, p.6; Urvoy, 1949, p.96; J.S. Trininghan, A History of Islam in West Africa, Oxford, 1962, pp.136-38.

2. Palmer, 1936, pp.36-37.

3. Ibid. Gabidama was ardo or chief of the Fulani (p.39) and thus he was intermediary between the Fulani and Bornu authorities. As the Mahran indicates the privilege was to Gabidama and all the Fulani under his leadership.

4. See e.g., Palmer, 1928, pp.23, 24, 26.

Whoever changed it after he heard it would be guilty of the offence of those who innovate. Then for those who transgressed or contested the grant of privileges, God would not accomplish their desires or their purposes in this world or in the next; instead "God would fill their bellies with the fire of Johannana".¹

Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries all the subsequent Mais ratified the injunction and it could be said that these centuries were the golden age of prosperity for the Fulani in Bornu. It was even customary for the Mais to go to war with other tribes simply to lend protection against raids on Fulani. Special mention is made of the untiring efforts of Mai Idris Aloom (c. 1571-1583) who maintained an expensive war against the Tuareg for making raids on Fulani homes and cattle, 'until he forced the Tuareg to repentance and gave the Muslims rest and deliverance and peace'.² The Fulani, in turn, joined Aloom's troops to form a Muslim contingent that waged distant wars to Mandara, Wadai and Baghirmi.³ Such co-operation apparently created a very healthy atmosphere for the Fulani to flourish, as well as encouraged more Fulani to immigrate and settle in Bornu.

But there is apparently no evidence that the con-

1. Palmer, 1936, p.48.

2. Ibid., p.240; H.R. Palmer, History of the First Twelve Years of the Reign of Mai Idris Aloom of Bornu, Lagos. 1926, pp.31, 36 - 37.

3. Palmer, 1936, p.240.

cessions which the Fulani enjoyed in Bornu in the seventeenth century were continued in the eighteenth century. On the contrary, perhaps due to the political ambitions of some of the Fulani, the Bornu princes became ostensibly hostile to the Fulani in general. We are told that Mai Hadj Handu ben Dunana (c.1723-1736) failed to ratify the privileges, and that the Fulani began to be molested openly.¹ Furthermore, as Bornu became plagued by successive famine and border attacks by the neighbouring state of Ahir, and even suffered military defeats at the hands of Mandara in 1728,² many Fulani would have found Bornu an inconvenient place to continue to live in. It was probably to escape from these problems that many of the Fulani left Bornu in search of new homes in Adamawa.³

1. Ibid., p.249.

2. Ibid., pp.240, 255; Urvey, pp.85-86.

3. The view that many of the Fulani settled in Adamawa in the eighteenth century is generally supported by oral tradition. See Strumpel, p.6; Lacroix, 1952, p.19; H. Labouret, 'Les Sultan Peuls de l'Adamawa', Togo-Cameroun, 1935, p. 88. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.127. Gazetteer Adamawa Province, 1936 (unpublished typescript) National Archives Kaduna (NAK). This is a revised version of the Gazetteer Yola Province, compiled by C.O. Nigeod, London, 1927. Much of the information from both these Gazetteers was incorporated in Kirk-Greene, 1958; I have indicated below wherever I take information from the Gazetteers which is not in Kirk-Greene, 1958; otherwise I have cited only his published and thus more readily available version.

The important groups or clans¹ which migrated from Bornu into Adanawa are the Wollarbe (or Wallarbe, or Oularbe in some French sources, sing. Bolaro), Illaga'en (or Yllaga'en sing. Illagadjo), Badawa, Ngara'en (or Gara'en or Barle), Ba'en, and the Mbewe (or Sugur). The Ba, Bari or Sangare, So or Sidibe and Diallo are held by some traditions to be the four ancestors of the traditional major divisions of the Fulani in the Niger-Senegal region.² It does not appear that the total number of Ba'en which entered Adanawa was as considerable as that of the Illaga'en and Wollarbe.

The migrations were undertaken by single extended families or groups of families. The timing of the movements of course, differed from one group to the other. But it is generally accepted that before they decided to change course from a generally eastward movement to a southward movement into 'Fombina', i.e. south of Bornu, they had received information that there was a great river, Benuwe in the southlands

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1. For an operational definition, see Stenning, 1959, p. 54. The members of a clan are called 'bandirabe' (lit. 'people of the same body').
 2. Barth, IV, p.148; Stenning, 1959, p.19; for more details on these clans, see A.H. Ba and J. Dagot, L'Empire Foul du Macina, Paris, 1962, pp.75-76. Two years after the foundation of Hamdalla as capital of Macina, Shaikh Ahmadu conducted a census of all the Fulani groups in his country and its neighbourhood. The count revealed that the Diallo clan had 120 families; the So, 130; the Ba, 100; the Bari, 85.

beyond the Mandara Mountains.¹ The river basin offered excellent grazing lands and the natives in these regions were not so organized politically as to pose a similar threat to them as the more organized states of Bornu, Mandara and Baghirni. The hostilities of these states against Fulani in the eighteenth century enabled only a trickle of Fulani to settle in them.²

An Illaga tradition carefully preserved by the head of this clan, Lando Rai, recounts twelve successive leaders gradually moving from Malle through Bornu, and then to Mubi in Adamawa before finally settling at Rai.³ The tradition further claims that those who led the Vollarbe and Illaga'en were Vaja and Rendi respectively and they left Malle at the same time. This agrees with a tradition of the

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1. Strumpel, p.6; Lacroix, 1952, pp.18-19. This would normally be in keeping with pastoral traditions where meticulous care was taken to send scouts and advance parties before any major migration was embarked upon. F.W. de St. Croix, The Fulani of Northern Nigeria, Lagos, 1944, pp.10-11, 19-21. Stenning, 1959, pp.206-08. Also same author 'Transhumance, Migratory Drift, and Migration; Patterns of Pastoral Fulani Nomadism', Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol.87, 1957, pp.56-73.
 2. Vickers Boyle, 'Historical Notes on the Yola Fulani', JAS, Vol.2, 1910-11, p.73; Strumpel, p.10. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.127; Denham and Clapperton, 1826, pp.115-119.
 3. P. Husson, 'Notes sur la situation de la subdivision et du landat de Rey Bouba' in Rapport Annual, 1957, Archives sub-Prefecture, Tchollire-Rai. As far as I know, this is the most detailed oral tradition collected at Rai; see also Strumpel, pp.10-11, 66-73; E. Mohandou, 'La Chronique de Bouba Njidda Rey', IBBIA, No.4, 1963, pp.17-26.

Wollarbe which gives eleven successions since they left either Malle or Futa Toro through Hausaland to Bornu, and then south through the Mandara country into the Benue regions, notably at Turua¹. The Ba'en, with their claim to be the first to settle around the Benue regions, say that as early as the fourteenth century, their ancestors were driven from western Bornu by the Kanuri and this marked the beginning of their entry into Adamawa through the Yedseran valley.² The Ngara'en and Badawa on leaving Bornu did not venture as far south as the other clans, but settled immediately to the south of Lake Chad where they pastured their herds on the extensive plains of the Diamara region.

It is not possible to sketch all the steps and routes through which the Fulani passed during the years they wandered in Adamawa before the jihad of Uthman dan Fodio started in the region. Strumpel has however traced three routes which the major waves of Fulani migrants followed³, and these have been generally confirmed by my informants at Yola and Rai:

1. The route across the Logone and Chari into Baghirni. Owing to the persistent hostilities of the Musgun and Massa against the Fulani only a few Fulani used this route.

1. Informant 2, Yola.
 2. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.127.
 3. Strumpel, pp. 8-11; on the patterns of migrations generally, see also Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp.126-28; Lacroix, 1952, pp.14-16.

2. The route east of Mandara. It was not quite so popular because of its exposure to the Mandara settlements including Dolo and Mora on the eastern slopes of the mountain range. The Badawa and Ngara passed through this route and formed settlements principally at Bilmiti and Makabay near Marba (Marua), the home ^{and} ~~of~~ the chief town of Arnado¹ Guissiga.

3. The route west of Mandara. This was the most popular route. The majority of the Fulani including the Mbewe, Illaga'en, Wollarbe and Ba'en entered Adamawa through this route. It was the nearest to western Bornu, Damaturu, where most of the Fulani were concentrated before their southward migrations; secondly the valleys of the Yedseram and Kilengi afforded an easy passage from north to south. Being on the opposite and less approachable direction from Dolo, the capital of Mandara, the risk of Mandara inspired attacks was consequently less on this route.

The Wollarbe and Ba'en are said to have preceded the Illaga'en on the western route through the Marghi country. They kept along a narrow corridor offered by the valleys of the Yedseram and Kilengi avoiding the rocky slopes of the western Mandara on the left, and taking care not to venture

^{"Appointed to lead"}
 1. [^] Fulani title for a non-Fulani chief from the same root (arda) as ardo, the Fulani title for their leader.

into the Shellen country where the Lala and Yanguru, like the Mandara, were wont to refuse the Fulani to settle in their countries.¹ Some of them halted at Kilba and stayed there for many years; they intermarried with the Marghi and gave birth to a new tribe (lenyol) called 'Fulani Kilba'.

The main body of the Illaga'en halted at Mubi immediately they passed the Mandara country. Their tradition,² which is to date the best preserved in Adamawa, relates how before they entered Adamawa, they had journeyed from Malle through Gobir and Bornu. The man who led them out of Malle was Jajo, a descendant of Bondi one of the sons of Ukubatu, whom Fulani tradition regard as the father of all Fulani.³ The Illaga tradition further states that their clan inherited the war drums (tumbal /chardi) or 'silver drum' which Ukubatu brought from Mecca to Malle. Jajo, the

1. Strumpel, pp.8-11; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.128; J. Lemoigne, 'Les pays Conquis du Cameroun Nord', Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française, (BCAF), Renseignements Coloniaux, 1918, pp.68-69.
2. See Husson, 1957; Strumpel, pp.10, 64-73; Mohamadou, 1963, pp.17-29.
3. E.J. Arnett, The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani, Kano, 1922, pp.137-38; being a translation and part paraphrase of M. Bello's Infaku'l Naisuri, henceforth IM (Arnett); Abdullah ibn Muhammad, Tazyin al-Waraqat, edited and translated by M Hiskett, Ibadan, 1963, p.97, henceforth, TW (Hiskett); Alhaji Junaidu, Tarihin Fulani, Zaria, 1957, p.7.

eleventh leader since Bondi, led the Illaga'en through the Mandara country carrying with them the precious inheritance. Near Mubi as Jajo was nearing the end of his time, a quarrel broke out among his sons each wishing to be the inheritor of the drum. Jajo hid the drum in the mountain saying that his successor would be whomsoever he would reveal the spot where the sacred drum lay hidden. On his death bed he confided the secret to his eldest son Bondi la Malle. Unfortunately Bondi la Malle did not recover the drum, but having gained his father's sanction to become leader, he immediately had a replica of it made and this is still carefully preserved at Rai.

After the death of Jajo, Bondi la Malle decided to move to new lands. Like the earlier Fulani, he and his people could not go south-westward because of the hostilities of the Yanguru and Lala against Fulani, and not wishing to mix up with the Wollarbe and Ba'en who had preceded them to the Benue basin, they turned to the east to establish communities among the Fali who seemed accommodating enough.¹ From around Golombe on river Kebbi, they spread out forming settlements all along a belt that stretched from as far north as Mindif and Bindir in the Guissiga, Toupuri and Massa territories, to Bibemi and Liporo in the south. These settlements formed the nuclei

1. Strumpel, p.10; Husson, 1957.

of Illaga districts like Mindif, Bindir, Baseo, Golombe, Mubi etc. which held out under Fulani leaders until the period of the jihad.

The ~~remarkably~~ ^{relatively} wide dispersal of the Illaga'en into so many small groups does not seem to have been a centrally planned operation from the clan leadership, but the result of the action of splinter groups who wanted to form settlements that were detached from the main leadership. The ambition of the male children of the leader was also an important factor. Many of them desired to possess territories where they would be the lord and master and hold the same status as the eldest son who would normally succeed the father.¹ It is said that some fathers often encouraged the sons to venture into new lands as a way to avoid internecine ^vstife for the succession. Thus what came to matter among those who could command a following among the Illaga'en, whether they belonged to the ruling family or not, was not so much the succession, but the opportunities for founding new settlements.²

The Kiri'en in Adamawa formed part of a larger vigorous group of Fulani called 'Kiri' who had their parent settlement in Gombe. Around the 1880's Haman Ruwa,

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1. Informant 15, Rai; This has been an unbroken rule in Rai's history where succession has remained consistently from father to son. Cf. genealogy in Husson, 1957, or Mohamadou, 1963, p.21. For the Illaga attitude on chieftainship, see infra, pp.87, 167.
 2. Informant 15, Rai.

brother of the celebrated Buba Yero of Gombe, led a group of Kiri Fulani to found a new settlement further south on the Benue districts during the dry season transhumance.¹ Hamman Ruwa and his paramilitary followers chose a site for their settlement at Muri and imposed themselves over the local Jukun populations around Muri on the north bank of the Benue.

This migration of Kiri Fulani into Muri has been seen by some authors as part of Buba Yero's jihad schemes to secure not only Gombe but also the vast territory bordering Gombe to the east and south before Uthman's jihad.² During discussions with some local scholars both at Muri and at Tibati their arguments put the initiative for the expedition on Hamman Ruwa and those who followed him. They say that it is true Buba Yero was leader of the Kiri'en in Gombe and he had great ambition for the subjugation of non-Muslim countries even before Uthman raised the standard of his jihad, but it was also a very common custom among Fulani of that epoch that whenever they became too many in one

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1. L. Mizon, 'Les Royaumes Foulbés du Sudan Central', *Annales de Géographie*, Vol. IV, pp. 250-51 [In part, this article is an edited version of what Mizon entitled in his Ms notes, 'l'Histoire du Muri et de l'Adanawa' found among his papers at the Archives Nationales, Section Outre-mer, Paris. *L'Afrique III*, Mission Mizon. Not everything in the IB was published and, in such a case, this will be indicated by reference to the MS.]; J.M. Freemanle, Gazetteer of Muri Province, London, 1922.
 2. Junada al-Akhira, History of Buba Yero, translated by R. Abraham, 1926, N.K, SNPI7/8 (typescript); Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp. 153-54.

area and some among them felt strong enough, they migrated to new lands. According to them it was the desire to migrate to new lands that made the Kiri'en leave Gonbe to Muri.¹ One tradition which Eldridge Mohamadou recorded, but which has not been confirmed, states that the Kiri left Gonbe after an abortive attempt to capture the leadership from Buba Yero.² As evidence to support this point of view, the tradition suggests that the name 'Kiri' by which the Fulani are called in both Muri and Adamawa, signifies 'one who has come too late', and is a reference to the fact that the coup against Buba Yero had been uncovered before the Kiri'en struck.³

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1. It has been difficult to establish this point with absolute certainty because some traditions at Tibati and indeed at Muri deny any (blood) association between Haman Ruwa and Buba Yero (cf. S.J. Hobgen and A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria, London, 1966, p.447, for an example of the attitude of dissociation in Muri). The traditions seem to have been greatly influenced by the attempt of Buba Yero to secure the Gonbe throne for his son Kwairanga by treacherously murdering both Haman Ruwa, who had good prospects of succeeding him at Gonbe, and Haman Ruwa's son Bose during a visit to Gonbe. Henceforth the ties between Muri and Buba Yero's Gonbe were destroyed. (See Freenantle, 1922; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.154; Abrahami, 1926.)
 2. E. Mohamadou, 'L'Histoire des Lamidats de Tcharba et Tibati', ABIA, No.6, August, 1964, p.25.
 3. Ibid.

On linguistic grounds alone this does not sound convincing. 'Kiri' does not mean 'too late' in Fulfulde. It does not even appear in any of the standard dictionaries.¹ If it is thought to be a corruption of 'hiri', - nearing the late hours in the evening - which could have the sense of 'too late', it is unlikely that the Fulani would themselves have made such a slip in their own language. It would have been a more likely proposition if they were called 'Kiri', instead of 'hiri', by non-Fulfulde speaking people. But this does not seem to be the case. What is more probable is that they derived the name Kiri from a non-Fulani tribe called 'Kiri', in the south of Gombe.²

During the stay of the Kiri Fulani in Muri some of Hamman Ruwa's men, now led by Modibbo Hay, travelled to the east grazing their cattle all along the northern banks of the river Benue, in the Bachama and Batta country. As soon as they passed the Batta and Verre countries where earlier groups of Ba'en and Wollarbe were already installed,

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1. e.g. F.W. Taylor, A Fulani-English Dictionary, Oxford, 1932; A. Dauzats, Lexique Français-Peul et Peul-Français, Paris, 1939.
 2. Cf. C.K. Meek, Tribal Studies in Nigeria, London, 1931, p.331; also J. Carnochan 'The coming of the Fulani: a Bachama oral tradition', BSOAS, Vol. XXX, Part 3, 1967, p.633, for an allusion of the influence of the Kiri tribe before the Fulani. It was customary for the Fulani to take names from localities or tribes with whom they had long contacts, hence Kilba'en, Gudu'en Jaffu'en, Dilara'en. It was hardly ever the name of the founding ancestor (see Stanning, 1959, p.54).

and, seeing that the lands further east had been occupied by Illaga'on, not wishing to fuse with any of these earlier groups, they crossed the Benue and became the largest Fulani group to settle among the Chambas.¹

Chamba, situated immediately south of the confluence of the Benue and Faro, was a suitable settlement. There was plenty of water and unlike the marshy nature of Muri, the elevation of the Ilantika mountains afforded hard ground on which the cattle could roam without the risk of suffering from too much dampness. Chamba also probably appeared as one of the natural gateways to the south immediately after the rugged countryside of the Verre and Mambila to the west. Also a halt at Chamba so close to the Benue and its southern tributaries seemed a highly prized aspiration for the nomadic Fulani, especially those who sought for more permanent settlements. Later, Hamman Sanbo, another follower of Hamman Ruwa from Gombe, left Jalingo in Muri with a considerable following and followed closely on the heels of Modibbo Hay.² The death of Sanbo's father, Hamman Jan, and possibly insistence from Sanbo's mother to be near the brother, Modibbo Hay, were responsible

1. Mohanadou, 1964, pp.25-27.

2. Informant 20, Tibati and Jalingo. In Mohanadou, 1964, Sanbo, Hay and Hamman Adana left Gombe apparently directly to Chamba all at the same time. Perhaps the difference is due to his visit to Chamba where I did not go.

for at least the timing of this second wave of Kiri migrants into Charba.

By the second half of the eighteenth century those Fulani who had reached the Benue fanned out all along the course of the Benue from Tuman to Garua with major settlements around Zurmo, Malabu, Song and Kilba, and began to reduce the frequency with which they moved from place to place. The picture was one of Fulani settlements dotted all over Adamawa with a heavy concentration around the districts of the Benue and its tributaries the rivers Faro, Kebbi and Tiel. On the northern bank they settled along the river Luwe as far as Guiddor, Golombe, and Figuil, and towards the south, along the river Rai until Rai. On the south bank, and this was the limit of the southern penetration of the Fulani, the settlements spread around the confluence of the tributary rivers of Faro and Deo with the heaviest concentrations at Gurin, Turua, Charba, and Bundang.

c) Non-Fulani peoples, and patterns of Fulani settlement:

The earlier settlers of non-Fulani stock who were already settled in Adamawa consisted of several tribes or sub-tribes forming communities that varied widely in size from a few huts representing one or two families to well-organized chiefdoms of twenty thousand inhabitants or more. These tribes did not preserve written records of any sort, so that very little was known about their origins,

culture and affinities before the remarkable anthropological researches of Dr. C.K. Meek in the 1930's.¹ Since then J.P. Lebeuf has also conducted detailed ethnological studies on the Fali,² while in 1961 Bertrand Lembezat published a rather comprehensive account covering all the tribes that are represented in Northern Cameroon.³

Numerically, and in terms of social and political organization, the Batta were the most important tribe with whom the Fulani came into contact.⁴ Batta traditions reveal that after a dispute involving the family of their leader, Jarò Palani, and that of the king of Gobir, Jarò Palani travelled by way of Bin and Maifoni to the region around Garua.⁵ Nowadays there are many ^{speaking languages probably related to Batta} ~~Batta speaking tribes~~ who go by their own local names such as the Marghi, Burra,

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1. C.K. Meek, Tribal Studies in Nigeria, London, 1931, 2 vols; A Sudanese Kingdom, London, 1936.
 2. J.P. Lebeuf, L'habitation des Fali montagnards du Nord-Cameroun, Paris, 1961. See also J.C. Froelich, 'Le Commandement et l'Organisation sociale chez les Fali', Etud. Cam. 1956, pp.20-49.
 3. B. Lembezat, Les populations païennes du Nord-Cameroun et de l'Adanaoua, Paris, 1961.
 4. Barth, II, p.510; Meek, 1931, vol.1, pp.2, 69-127.
 5. Meek, 1931, Vol.1, p.2; Carnochan, 1967, pp.622-633.

Kilba and Wuba, but who have some Batta elements in the ruling kindred or clan. Meek distinguishes two types of Batta: a riverain Batta and an inland Batta.¹ The riverain Batta occupied both banks of the Benue from Garua to the Numan -- border, a distance of about two hundred miles. The inland Batta or Njirai are based on the Zummo - Malabu hills. The Fali also form part of this group. They occupy the water-shed of the Benue and Chad basins.

The Battas seemed to have established themselves partially through military means and partially through the influence of their powerful rain cult, Nzeanzo.² Meek says that their domination of these regions did not occur at any very remote date for the royal kindred in many of the Njirai groups - Zummo, Bulai, Malabu, Koga, Muleng, Bolki - still speaks a different dialect from the aboriginal kindred and in some cases observe different customs. Moreover a fairly accurate route taken by the immigrants from Mandara can still be indicated. They first established at Wuba, then they proceeded to Baza in the Upper Yedseram valley, and it was from Baza that they scattered to different

1. Meek, 1931, Vol.I, pp. 69-71.

2. Cf. Meek, 1931, Vol.I, pp.25-49. J. Carnochan, "Nzeanzo and Won". A Bachama Folktale', Journal of the Folklore Institute, Vol.IV, June-Dec. 1967, (1967^B) pp. 230-39. Kirk-Greene, 1958. pp. 208 ff. for some recent changes in the ceremonies.

parts in a southerly direction.

As they moved south, in some places, they disrupted tribes whose names are no longer preserved, imposing upon them their own language and culture. Other tribes like the Mbun, Charba and Verre withdrew out of the reach of the Batta south of the Benue. Their individual traditions relate of a time when they lived north of the Benue, but they had taken refuge across the Benue owing to pressure from successive Batta and later on Fulani groups.

Originally the main factor in the unity of the Batta speaking peoples was not military but the cult of Nzeanzo. Over centralization around the priest of the cult, probably resulted in the rise of other minor cults which in due course led to political fragmentation among the Batta into small independent units.¹ This process seems to have proceeded fast, and to have facilitated Fulani settlement among them. Consequently, there were many Batta chiefdoms; but only a few like at Kukoni, Bulki, Densa and Bagale, had a comparatively strong political and military organization to be able to resist Fulani pressures on the land the Batta needed for their usual extensive cultivation.

1. Barth, II, pp.510-11; Meek, 1931, Vol.I, pp.25-49; Carnochan, 1967. A useful source I have drawn from generally for the Batta, has been Mr. J. Carnochan's recordings of Bachama and Batta oral traditions. They are largely unpublished. I am grateful to Mr. Carnochan and his research assistant Mr. Nadah for lending me the translations and for discussing many points.

Besides the Batta¹, the Fulani also settled among the Fali who occupied the water-shed of the Benue and the Chad basins. They infiltrated through the Gudu'en into the heterogeneous Hjai of the Maiha hills. The Marghi together with some Fabir, Kanuri, and Mandara elements occupied a strategic position on the Yedseran-Kilengi route followed by the bulk of the Fulani during their centuries of immigration into Adanawa. The original centre of the Marghi was a large town west of the Mandara mountains and a few miles to the north of Uba. The Marghi did not offer any serious opposition to Fulani settlement among them. On the eastern side of the Mandara, the main Fulani settlements were located on the Diamare plain where the Guissiga and Musgun people predominated. To the south and south east of these were the Massa, Toupouri and Mundang. For several years these peoples, for the most part living in thin and scattered clusters, were subjected to the predatory slave-raids of their stronger and better organized neighbours like Bornu, Mandara, and Wadai.² Further south across the river Kebbi to the upper reaches of the Benue were the Mono, and the Dana who were famous smiths.

1. For these tribes generally see footnotes 1-3, p.34; also Barth, II, pp.351 ff; J. Lestringant, Les Pays de Guider au Cameroun, Yaoundé, 1964.

2. Cf. Denham and Clapperton, 1826, pp.116-119; Lemoigne, pp.94-114.

Although a certain degree of uniformity was created among these non-Fulani tribes by the fact that many of them were primarily occupied with cultivating land, yet there were considerable differences in their customs and attitudes to groups other than their own tribes. There were no supra-tribal organizations for administering military or economic co-operation. Each local group more or less devised its own means for keeping alive and was regarded as a separate entity.¹ The predominant unit of effective authority was either the chief-priest or chief who held office by virtue of his contribution or that of his ancestors in founding and maintaining the survival of the village.

In many instances, such as among the Gaanda, Higi, Verre, Sugur and Marghi, there was a complete absence of secular chieftainship. The priest or local guardian of the tribal cult acted as the uniting agent, so that it was customary to have several villages that lacked political cohesion uniting together only because all of their people looked to the same priest as the guarantor of their welfare.² It is therefore easy to see how during the jihad such acephalous tribes avoided confrontations with Fulani at the political level and either converted to Islam or opted to maintain their traditional cults and pay tribute. The cults or fetishes, especially where these were

1. Barth, II, p.512;

2. for examples see Meek, 1931, Vol.II, pp.25-49, 369-70.

popular, would seem to have been their real sacred cow and not the retention of political authority, since under the Muslim tribute system their priests continued to exercise their socio-religious functions as before.

The Fulani who entered Adamawa were mostly nomadic and semi-nomadic Fulani who devoted much of their time to cattle culture, leading their cattle from one pasture land to the other in an almost endless search for fresh pasture. The number of years they stayed on one spot was often dictated by two conditions - the reaction of the earlier settlers in the locality to their presence, and how satisfactory the conditions were for their cattle.

Neither the very early immigrants, nor those who joined them afterwards, seem to have been driven by the thought of domination and conquest nor by zeal for the wholesale conversion of other tribes into Islam. Even where the tough nature of the occupation of the nomadic Fulani had made them enduring and armed for their defence, the Fulani were not warlike, and so, their infiltration to the south took a peaceful character, not causing any general upheaval. As Masson puts it:

'Depuis le XV^e siècle ils s'étaient introduits dans le pays de la manière la plus inoffensive, sollicitant des maîtres du sol l'autorisation de faire paître et d'abreuver leur troupeau. Attirés par les riches pâturages, plusieurs des chefs des familles s'établirent dans ces territoires en qualité de clients des populations locales. 1

1. M. Masson, 'Islamisation au Tchad et au Cameroun', *CHEAM*, No.265, 1938, p.7; Cf. also Strumpel, pp.4-12; Vicars Boyle, 1910, pp.74-75.

They avoided conflicts especially in those areas where they were in a minority. Some authors say that wherever the Fulani settled they constituted a minority,¹ but this was not always the case. More often if a Fulani group wished to remain aloof from the neighbouring tribes it chose the site of its settlement some distance from that of the other villages and farms, otherwise, the group settled in the towns and villages and inter-married with the local people and became a part of the population.

The Fulani ardo'en tried to establish good working relations with the local tribes, and this sometimes involved giving and sometimes exchanging presents with the neighbouring village leaders. In the absence of strong political organizations in several parts, the non-Fulani settlers did not always interfere with the Fulani. They regarded the Fulani as simply new settlers because the habit of migration among both Fulani and non-Fulani to new lands was widespread.² The Fulani wandered from place to place owing to their nomadic habits; the agricultural tribes moved as a

1. Lacroix, 1952, p.15; Lestringant, p.109.

2. Cf. C.K.Meek, Tribal Studies in Nigeria, 2 vols., London, 1931; B. Lenbezat, Les populations païennes du Nord-Cameroun et de l'Adamaoua, Paris, 1961.

result of shifting cultivation or in search of new and richer hunting grounds.

There were no rigid boundaries between the villages; in some places an outstanding geographical feature or tree represented the territorial limits of a village. In other places some chiefs wielded considerable power over a district and would demand recognition even from those who lived outside the limits of their territory. In matters of land ownership and use the chiefs of such states were like the guardians of communal land and it would be customary, especially for strangers, to obtain permission to use any piece of land. The Fulani who settled or simply did transhumance into such regions recognized the claims of the chiefs and often made pacts with them or bought the right to use portions of the chief's territory by payments of 'grass money' (chede hudo).

Some authors have, rather wrongly, seen in such demands and payments evidence of general Fulani subjection to non-Fulani. For example, Lemoigne:

Leur soumission était complète puisqu'ils ne refusaient même pas le droit.....
du seigneur à leurs maitres. 1.

And Lestringant:

'Le droit de parcours sur le territoire d'un village exigeait, à tout le moins, la remise d'un ou plusieurs boeufs et un tribut journalier en lait.

1. Lemoigne, p.134.

'C'était là une école de servilité et de perpétuelle soumission extérieure qui marqua de manière indélébile la psychologie peule ...'¹

It is true that in many parts of Africa claims to land were often based on the right of the first settler; and thus as a general rule the Fulani population were usually not the 'owners' of the land on which other tribes had previously settled. In such instances the Fulani were subordinated to the organized authority.² But conditions differed from one Fulani group to the other and also among the non-Fulani; it seems that the Fulani were free whenever they wished to leave the territory of a chief they did not like;³ also they were not in any way bound to the chiefs by enforced allegiance. In this light the Fulani can not therefore justifiably be said to have been subjected to non-Fulani. The

1. Lestringant, p.110; see also Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.128.

2. See R. Jobson, The Golden Trade, London, 1932, for an interesting analogy of Fulani subordination to organized local authority in early seventeenth century Gambia. 'In some places they have settled Townes, but for the most part they are still wandering, uniting themselves in kindred and families, and so drive their herds together; where they find the ground and soyle most fitte for their Cattle, there, with the Kings allowance of the Country, they sit downe... The people live in great subjection to the Mandingo, under which they seeme to groane, for he cannot at any time kill a beefe but if they know it, the black-men will have the greatest share, neither can hee sell or barter with us for any commodity hee hath, but if it be knowne the other will be his partner, in so much as when the men come unto us, they will watch the black-mans absence; or hiding their commodities, draw us covertly to see it, that they may have their returne private.....'

3. Lacroix, 1952, p.15; Oral evidence. This is true even nowadays irrespective of whether the ruler is Fulani or non-Fulani.

absence of many strong centralized states, meant in many localities these payments were not usually imposed on the Fulani. They were usually not a fixed amount¹ and in origin they began as a courtesy, before developing into an established practice.²

Socially and politically the nomadic Fulani, who, as has been pointed out constituted the bulk of the Adanawa Fulani, were often an amorphous group among the non-Fulani. They were never forced to identify themselves with any particular tribe, nor did they pledge loyalty to local chiefs simply by virtue of where they lived. Those who made rules for the Fulani and administered their common interests were their ardo'en.³ An ardo was often a successful and influential man around whom others flocked and recognized as the one who would march in front of or lead their herds to the pasture grounds.⁴ It is said that Fulani cosmology sees men as being shut in a house and the ardo is the man who opens the doors so that his companions could enter.⁵ By implication it was to the ardo that the ordinary Fulani looked up for guidance. He

1. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.74; C.J.Orr, The Making of Northern Nigeria, 2nd ed., London, 1965, p.69.

2. Informant 9, Song.

3. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.128.

4. Cf. Stenning, 1959, pp.50-52; St. Croix, 1944, pp.10, 19; Ba and Daget, 1962, p.103.

5. Ba and Daget, 1962, p.103.

acted as the intermediary between his Fulani followers and the non-Fulani chiefs and authorities.

His powers and routine functions, no doubt, varied from one locality to the other. In some parts of Nigeria he is said to have had 'little or no authority beyond his closer relatives',¹ while in Macina, he had 'the right of life and death over his subjects'.² However, generally, it was the ardo who after consultation with the important personalities, decided on all major issues, such as where and when to go for transhumance. He usually officiated at marriages, and funerals, settled disputes, and, where they were Muslims, led the faithful at prayers, particularly on Fridays, and the important Muslim feast days.

Fulani pressure on the good land, seemed to have created what could be described as 'land hunger' around Densa Poa near present day Garua. The major Fulani clans directly concerned were the Ba'en and Wollarbe. They and the Batta had common interest in the flood plains. These lands were the best for cultivation, fishing and hunting and for pasturing cattle. In order to avoid perennial conflicts with the Fulani some Batta groups, notably Batta Densa, migrated west into the neighbourhood of Numan where

1. St. Croix, 1944, p.19; Stenning, 1959, pp.50-52.

2. Ba and Dagot, 1962, p.103.

they built Donsa Mosu (new Donsa), and occupied the surrounding low lands on the north bank of the Benue. Still, some of them were probably not satisfied that settling on the north bank of the Benue freed them from Fulani ~~harassment~~ ^{troubles} once and for all, and afforded the Batta sufficient protection against future Fulani encroachment. They therefore broke off from the parent group to form a sub-tribal group, Bachana, taking with them the sacred pot of the rain cult, the most important heritage of the tribe.¹ The Fulani were thus allowed to settle in these abandoned areas without any serious fighting or involvement in the indigenous systems.

Understandably this was only one group of Batta. Other chiefs like at Kukoni, Song, and around present day Yola, did not allow the Fulani to become a threat to them; they instead insisted on the customary rites which included the jus primae noctis from all including Fulani within their areas of jurisdiction.² Some Fulani are said to have conformed in order to live in peace with these chiefs. Many of the families however, evaded the custom by payment of a bull or two and this was universally accepted as a substitute from the Fulani.³

1. Carnochan, 1967, pp.622-33; Meek, 1931, Vol.I, pp.2-3.

2. Barth, II, p.479; Strunpel, p.11; Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp. 22, 128. This was confirmed by my own enquiries at Yola, Song, and Gurin from both Batta and Fulani informants.

3. Informant 1, Yola; 8, Song; 11, Gurin; 7, Garua.

At first when the Fulani population was small such demands could only affect a few families at a time. But as Fulani immigration to the Benue districts increased, the regularity of such demands became even more worrying. Unlike in the interior regions where any custom that hurt the pride of the Fulani would lead to emigration from the chief's jurisdiction, in the Benue districts the conditions were thought to be so favourable for more permanent settlements that they had no wish to abandon the area.

Apparently the rich Fulani did not worry having to pay to avoid the jus primae noctis with their daughters, but the real problem was with the way the payments were often exacted. The chief would send his collectors to go either to the father or the head of the family of the girl when he suspected he would not get all they wanted through the local ardo, and select the required number of cows. Oftentimes, those selected were among the best cows in the herd. My informants pointed to this as what made the custom oppressive to many Fulani.¹

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, possibly around 1803, a remarkable crisis developed, resulting directly from opposition to the jus primae noctis. Ardo Njobbo, a local leader of Ba Fulani, residing near Song, refused to make payments against the jus primae noctis or to surrender his daughter to the waiting Batta

1. Informant 1, Yola; 8, Song; 11, Gurin; 7, Garua.

prince.¹ The Batta prince ignoring his words proceeded to make his selection of the cows he required. Ardo Njobbo in anger ordered his men to kill him, and this was a signal for hostilities against the Fulani. Many of the informants who recall this revolt confirm that it was during the skirmishes that malam Hassana, father of Modibbo Adana, died.²

The closeness of this event to the outbreak of Uthman dan Fodio's jihad seems to have led some writers to interpret the event as the actual beginning of the jihad in Adanawa.³ Others have gone so far as to see in it the chief motive for Adana proceeding to Uthman to obtain the standard of the jihad for the Adanawa Fulani so as to revenge the death of his father.⁴ For Strumpel this event,

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1. Glenny, Assessment Report, 1911 (unpublished typescript) NAK, p.13; Cf. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.128 for another tradition, which identifies Ardo Njobbo as Ardo Borongo Njobdi, head of the Wollarbe. Ardo Njobbo appears to be more acceptable because the route of migration said to have been followed by Ardo Njobdi was for the Ba'en rather than for the Wollarbe - see Strumpel, pp.5-11; Malum Maoude, 'Emigration des Peuhls Wollarbe du Mali au Cameroun', being a translation from an Arabic MS at the Lycée du Garua to be published in IBBIA. I am indebted to H. Mayssal for drawing my attention to it.
 2. See also Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp.128-29; Glenny Report, 1911, p.14; G.N. Barclay, 'History of Yola Province', (unpublished typescript) 1907, J1, NAK. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.76.
 3. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.128; Glenny Report, 1911, p.14; Barclay, 'History of Yola Province'.
 4. Barclay, 'History of Yola Province'; Glenny Report, 1911, p.14. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.76 refutes this interpretation though without stating his reasons.

and possibly the clashes between Modibbo Hamman Njundi of Garua Winde and some sections of the Demsa Batta, put both the Fulani and local tribesmen before Uthman's jihad at daggers drawn with each other waiting only for a signal to start general hostilities.¹

These interpretations do not seem to be entirely true for the following reasons: The conflicts referred to were from all evidence a local matter. There is no evidence that similar revolts or conflicts followed immediately in other parts of Adamawa. Ardo Njobbo's action appears to have had a limited aim: to emphasise that he was master in his own home. After all, it was not on the Benue that Uthman's jihad was first introduced in Adamawa but in the north, south of Bornu. (See below p.71). And the first move of the Fulani who were settled around the Benue towards Uthman's movement did not come until 1808.² The conflict should be seen rather as that part of a continuous search by Fulani groups for security, and as resistance to involvement in certain customs that were foreign to them and from which they did not derive any profit.

The results of the Illaga and the Kiri settlements reveal a different pattern. When Bondi la Malle died and the clan leadership passed to his eldest son, Buba Joda,

1. Strumpel, pp. 11-12.

2. See Appendix, 'Chronology of events.'

the new leader decided to move out of Unata Lane where his followers had been staying for some time to honour an invitation from his friend the arnado of Mundang Mono.¹ However the lands which contained the best pastures in the region were owned by Bebe, arnado of Dana Ndoro. Joda made a pact with Bebe, who in return for payments of royalties in cattle, permitted the Fulani to graze freely throughout his territories. As a further gesture of goodwill, Bebe gave Joda his daughter in marriage. The marriage proved fruitful, and Buba Njidda, successor to Joda, was one product.²

Despite the desirability for each group, Fulani and Dana, to understand the ways of the other, apparently the closer the intercourse between the Fulani community and the ruling élite of the Dana Ndoro became, the more the conflicts of personality grew. This was particularly so when Joda moved from Liporo to Badjari, a more centrally placed village in respect of the three Dana sub-tribes of Dana Ndoro, Dana Ngodi, and Dana Arci. Among those who most resented the favours extended to Joda and his followers were some of the sons of Bebe.³ They probably saw the influence the Fulani gained, as a definite threat to their traditionally held positions.

1. Husson, 1957; confirmed by informant 15, Rai.

2. Husson, 1957; Strunpel, p.71; Mohanadou, 1963, p.21.

3. Husson, 1957, confirmed by informant 15, Rai.

Bebe's eldest son nursed increasing feelings of hostility and sought for an opportune moment to show this. One day, coming across a group of Fulani grazing their cattle near the river Godi, he pointed to a certain calf in an arrogant manner and asked his people to bring it to him. Then he turned to the Fulani and said, 'from now this calf is mine; your father is friendly not to me but to my father'. A scuffle ensued in which the Dama prince was killed.¹

This brought the entente cordiale between Joda and Bebe to an abrupt end. The Fulani were indiscriminately attacked, but partly through luck, and partly through the support they received from those who disliked Bebe or felt his son had been in the wrong, Joda finally brought the situation under control. His position vis-à-vis the Dama arnado'en became stronger. This position was further reinforced when Ganyei, arnado of Dama Arei died and the dispute over the succession led one of the contestants to invite Joda to his aid. Joda and his ally successfully inflicted a crushing defeat over the other contestants to the chieftanship. Joda was thus well entrenched, while the majority of the Dama and Mono converted to Islam and agreed to pray and fast.²

The sequence of events leading to Joda ~~establish-~~ing dominance over the Dama and Mono was fairly typical of how

1, Informant 15, Rai as an explanation to Husson, 1957.

2. Husson, 1957, Mohamadou, 1963, pp.21-22.

many of the Fulani, scattered all over Adamawa, secured settlements over which they exercised jurisdiction. Firstly, the Fulani made friends with some local tribe. Then if their security were menaced either by some dissident elements within the tribe, or by other neighbouring tribes hostile to the tribe to which the Fulani had become friends, the Fulani and their local friends would wage war jointly against their enemies, and, in the event of victory, the Fulani would continue to stay, or if defeated would emigrate to other regions. It was seldom a situation where Fulani fought exclusively on one side against the non-Fulani. Nor were all those who fought on the side of the Fulani, Muslims. The overriding consideration would seem to have been the question of security.

It is important to stress that although the knowledge of belonging to one clan was very much alive among all the Illaga'en, there was not sufficient solidarity among the various groups to make the fact of their common ancestry functionally useful against other tribes. Each group fended for itself.¹ Whenever one faction split from the main leadership, it regarded itself as a separate entity and developed its own local interests and leadership, and the degree to which one group of the same clan could have recourse to another in times of difficulty would depend largely on other factors than simply common

1. Informant 15, Rai.

clanship. The weight of evidence, mainly oral evidence, points to the fact that there were no occasions when the clans as a whole co-operated as a single family. However, some Illaga'en groups maintain bonds of kinship through marriages and the exchange of visits and presents, and this again would depend on what had been responsible for the initial separation of the groups from the parent body.

With the Kiri'en, after the first wave of migrations from Muri into Chamba (see above p.31), the second group led by Sambo greatly reinforced Modibbo Hay, and this evoked fear and misgivings on the part of the Chamba chief, Desi. Relations between the Fulani and Desi quickly deteriorated and the Fulani attacked his town Diddo.¹ Desi fled the town and took refuge among the Koma on the Alantika mountains. He enlisted the support of the Koma who, together with his residual force made several raids on the Fulani in an effort to compel them to leave Chamba. Desi's efforts were in vain, and the Kiri Fulani firmly entrenched themselves in Chamba, making it an embryo of a Muslim state similar to Buba Joda over the Dama and Mono countries.

The most important relation between the Fulani on the one hand, and non-Fulani on the other hand, was economic. Common social activities were very small due to differences of religion and of the nature of their occupations and cultures.² The Fulani relied on their agricultural

1. Mohamadou, 1964, pp.25-27; confirmed by informant 20, Tibati.
2. Lacroix, 1952, p.24.

neighbours for their supplies of honey and fish, grain and other products from their farms. For these, the Fulani gave in return meat, butter, milk and hides.

Such living in symbiosis and the need to retain it, it is true, differed from village to village, and in some it tended to be stronger than in others. But wherever the initial hurdles for accepting to live with each other had been surmounted, petty misdemeanours or conflicts were often settled on a personal level. For instance complaints about Fulani cattle destroying crops, or about pilfering Fulani cattle were treated on a man to man basis and not as a conflict embracing all Fulani against all non-Fulani.¹ Open ethnic conflicts were the exception rather than the rule. Sometimes some tribes would refuse to let the Fulani settle in their territory, and at other times relations between the Fulani community and their neighbouring non-Fulani would deteriorate and provoke general hostilities, but wherever the Fulani were pushed into a tight corner, they simply continued on their migration avoiding those areas where they were not wanted.² This was the general pattern, often animated by the desire to avoid generalised conflicts as far as possible, and go to other districts where they were assured of better treatment.

1. Lacroix, 1952, pp.19-20; generally confirmed by oral tradition. Such conflicts over livestock appear to have been general and indeed caused dismay amongst the Fulani; see e.g. M. Hiskett, 'Kitab al-farq: A Work on the Habe Kingdoms Attributed to 'Uthman dan Fodio,' BSOAS, Vol.23, No.3, 1960, henceforth KF (Hiskett) p.568. Ba and Daget, 1962, p.83; here some of the measures which were eventually adopted to protect Fulani cattle included regulating the transhumance and providing armed escorts to the herdsman.

Although their attitudes towards the indigenous population varied according to local conditions, all the Fulani seem to have maintained a high degree of consistency in encouraging marriages between cousins, or failing that, within the group or clan. Exogamous marriages for Fulani girls were very rare, and this was particularly so among the purely nomadic Fulani. The men of the settled or town Fulani did however take wives from outside the tribe. But as the cultural achievement of the tribes south of Bornu was generally low, the inclination of the Fulani, as a whole to be integrated and become a full part of the indigenous societies was correspondingly weaker.¹ The result of this has been that in Adamawa unlike in Hausaland, the Fulani have been able to keep their racial characteristics and language in a relatively pure state.²

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1. See footnote, 2 below ; elsewhere on the Bautchi plateau this has been attributed to a sense of racial superiority by the Fulani; see St. Croix, 1944, pp.9-10.
 2. See Barth, II, p.366; East, pp.6-7; Adamawa, and to some extent Gombe is the only emirate in Northern Nigeria where Hausa is learnt as a second language. In Northern Cameroun, Fulfulde is the lingua franca and many of the Fulani would not speak any other language.

e) Some aspects of Fulani Islam:

Let us now pause and briefly examine the Islamic side of the pre-jihad migrations and settlements.¹ Source material on Muslim activities in Adanawa before the jihad is scarce. Nor has oral tradition been of much help in this regard, since informants tend to extrapolate from modern practices within their experience, with little concern for chronology. Our knowledge of pre-jihad Islam is therefore based on scattered references which at the moment produce only a general picture.

Among all the various Fulani categories² or sub-cultural divisions, the nomadic Fulani have held themselves aloof from Islamic influences and generally remained non-Muslim.³ Following this general pattern

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1. For some general survey on Islam in Adanawa, see M. Masson, 'Islamisation au Tchad et au Nord Cameroun', CHEAM, No.265 1938. Prestat, 'Marua - Ville D'Islam', CHEAM, No.2176, 1953; H. Geneuil, 'L'Islam sa Position, son Influence Actuelle sur une Tribu Faienne du Nord Cameroun', CHEAM, No.2708, 1953; Gr. Beyries, 'L'Islam au Cameroun', CHEAM, No.2936, 1958; Dubie, 'Christianisme, Islam et animisme chez les Banoum', CHEAM, No.2541, 1950; P. Alexandre, 'Islam in Cameroun', in J. Kritzack and W.H.Lewis, Islam in Africa, New York, 1969, pp.270-77.
 2. There are for example, Fulbe na'i (cattle Fulani) or Fulbe laide (bush Fulani), Fulbe siire (town Fulani); cf. Hopen, pp.1-3; Stenning, 1959, pp.4-11.
 3. Dupire, 1962, pp.26-28; Stenning, 1959, p.4. O. Temple, Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates and States of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria, London, 1922 (2nd. ed.), p.399.

it could be easily assumed that the nomadic Fulani, who formed the bulk of the Fulani immigrants in Adamawa, were non-Muslims. In his geographical and historical account of the Western Sudan, for example, Bello did not even mention the Fulani-Muslim communities in Adamawa.¹ This would indicate that as late as the first decade of the nineteenth century the Muslim communities south of Bornu, that is, in Mandara and Adamawa, were neither widely known nor important enough to have deserved mention by such a well-informed author. Indeed Triningham has gone further to suggest that before the jihad the Fulani in Adamawa were 'pagan':

In Adamawa at the beginning of the Fulbe revolution all the inhabitants, including Fulbe nomads who had discovered the land to be especially suitable for their cattle, were pagan, and though a Muslim Fulbe dynasty was founded and was kept in existence by the British, the majority of the tribes (except for former slaves) remain unaffected by Islam. ²

A similar view was also expressed by Mizon:

Les Foulbés étaient encore soumis aux chefs païens du Foubina et du Garoua; ils n' étaient pas encore convertis à la religion du Prophète. ³

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1. M. Bello, 'Raudthât'ul Afkâri', translated by H.R. Palmer, *JAS*, Vol.XV, 1915-16, pp.261-273; *IM* (Arnett), pp.2-17; Palmer, 1936, pp.270-73.
 2. J.S. Triningham, Islam in West Africa, Oxford, 1959, p.20.
 3. Mizon, 'Les Royaumes Foulbés', p.354. His view was probably due to incorrect reading of Denham and Barth whom he cited as supporting sources.

However, the evidence clearly suggests that there were Muslim Fulani in Adamawa before the jihad. The early Fulani migrants from Malle into Hausaland (Kano) and Bornu included Muslims who performed various Islamic functions.¹ The earliest European record on the Adamawa Fulani, just over ten years after the debut of the jihad, noted:

They (the Fulani) are a very handsome race of people, of a deep copper colour, who seldom mix their blood with that of the negroes, have a peculiar language of their own, and are Moslem. 2

Similarly an early description of Adamawa in an Arabic manuscript (written before 1824) recounted * ← that two-thirds of Adamawa's inhabitants were infidels and one-third 'Felan Mohamedans'.³ There is also the circumstantial evidence as seen in the action of the Fulani when they joined Uthman's jihad (see below, p. 77), though this particular evidence might point to only an Islamic leadership, that is, only the ardo'en or a small élite were Muslims, not their followers. There is no evidence however to justify this in Adamawa where Islam

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1. See above, p. 19; see also Barth, IV, p.150; M.Hiskett, 'Islam in Nigeria', in J. Kritzcek and W.H. Lewis, eds. 1969, pp.287-300.
 2. Denham and Clapperton, 1826, p.115.
 3. Clapperton, 1829, Appendix III, p.335

does not appear to have been regarded as a caste or class religion. Thus it is reasonable to conclude, as indeed many recent authors have expressed, that before Uthman there were Muslims in Adamawa.¹

The Islam of the Muslim Fulani in Adamawa showed certain distinctive features: a) It was non-proselytizing; b) it permitted a tolerant syncretistic synthesis between the non-Islamic and Islamic beliefs that was emphasised by Adamawa's remote position and the attitude of the non-Muslims to religions in general.

In Hausaland and Bornu the Fulani settled among people who at least professed Islam, and who through the visits of sharīfs, pilgrims, clerics or scholars and traders from other Muslim lands, remained constantly exposed to currents of Muslim ideas. The situation in Adamawa was entirely different. Here, the Muslim Fulani were introducing Islam into the region for the first time, and also, before the jihad, Adamawa lay geographically

1. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.74; Strumpel, pp.6-7; Masson, p.6; Beyries, p.1; Lacroix, 1966, pp.401-2; Maybe the two opposing views expressed above are only a contradiction in terms owing to the difficulty of defining who was a Muslim. The Uthmaniyya (see below, p.70, n.1) definition of a Muslim was hardly consistent, apparently owing to the difficulties of forming a consensus of opinion over what constituted polytheism and unbelief. Cf. D.M. Last and M.A. al-Hajj, 'Attempts at defining a Muslim in 19th Century Hausaland and Bornu', Journal, Historical Society of Nigeria JHSN, III, 3, 1966, pp.231-240. For purposes of this thesis I am using the term Muslim in its operational sense of anyone who calls and regards himself a Muslim - see M. Lewis, ed., Islam in Tropical Africa, London, 1966, p.58.

outside the normal trade and pilgrim routes that linked the Sudan to North Africa and Asia.¹ This naturally affected the manner in which the Fulani comported themselves among the non-Muslims. Added to this was the fact that the Fulani had not in the first instance entered the region for the sake of extending the frontiers of Islam, but to pasture their cattle (see below, p.22). Being in the main nomadic or semi-nomadic Fulani they were constantly on the move, and for the Muslims among them, such mobility seldom allowed sufficient time for their Islamic influences to make the strongest impact on the vast population of non-Muslims.

They were thus not 'religious revolutionaries', teachers or fanatics of the faith. And as Lacroix puts it,

L'absence de tout fanatisme religieux et la finesse des premiers, les rivalités intestines des seconds facilitèrent largement les choses. Certains arabe Fulbe en vinrent ainsi à posséder une réelle autorité sur les population chez lesquelles ils vivaient. ²

1. For relation between Adanawa and pilgrims' route, see O. El-Nagar, West Africa and the Muslim Pilgrimage: An Historical Study with Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century, Ph.D thesis, S.O.A.S., 1969, pp.251 ff.

2. Lacroix, 1952, p.19; also see Masson, p.7; A. Guintini, 'L'Influence de l'Islam dans la Region du Logone et du Mayo Kebbi', CHEAM, No.298, p.15; Lestringant, pp.109-10.

The story of Adana and Ahmadu Maiha is of considerable interest and further illustrates the non-proselytizing feature in the Adanawa Islam. Around 1806 during Buba Yero's jihad east of the Gongola river into Marghi country, (see below, pp.71-72) Maiha was one of the non-Fulani settlements which accepted Islam without a fight and its chief took a Muslim name Ahmadu. Buba Yero left some Fulani to teach Ahmadu and his men how to pray. However in 1809 when Uthman gave Adana these territories, the progress of Buba Yero's Fulani instructors was found to be very slow. So Adana recruited more teachers from Kilba, but after five years, there was still little progress and some of the teachers had left Maiha, due to, as the tradition reports, their trying to take too much power into their hands. With this fiasco, Ahmadu wrote Adana to employ more Fulani from Garua. Although there were many learned men at Garua none was willing to go and settle in Maiha.¹

The attitude of the non-Muslims to religion in general before the jihad was also important. They accepted the existence of and even the need for different religions or cults.² They regarded one's religion as part of one's

1. 'The Story of Ahmadu Maiha', in History of Yola Notable Families, 1932, being a file at the Yola Provincial Secondary School containing unpublished MSS and type-scripts which were collected together with the stories published in R.M. East, Stories of Old Adanawa, London, 1934. I am most grateful to Dada, wife of R.M. East, and Alhaji Ahmed Joda for drawing my attention to this file.

2. See below, p. 63.

heritage. Religious observances, were a tribal or 'state' affair, and there was hardly any clear-cut ⁱdichotomy between 'state' and 'church'. Among the Batta and their apparenté(s), for instance, although the chief was distinct from the priest of the cult, Nzeanzo, the chief's coronation rites made him 'a son of the tribal cult' and his 'entire prestige and strength was bound up with the cult'.¹

It was clear that one's basic religion was something one was born into rather than something one consciously acquired. A man was Muslim because that was what his father practised; similarly a non-Muslim adhered to his cult, because that was the cult of his father or ancestors. In Gobir it was exactly such a restriction to the faith of one's father that Sarkin Gobir tried to impose on Uthman. In Adanawa the Muslim-Fulani accepted the restrictions, and the thought of proselytizing or attempting to persuade communities to abandon their natal worship was unusual.

Therefore neither the Muslim-Fulani, nor those practising other religions, tried to impose or deny the other the basic right or freedom to worship as they chose, but permitted competition among what they regarded were

1. Meek, 1931, Vol.1, pp.25-49.

different 'gods'. This attitude was well represented during the jihad period and in some sense the wars were seen as part of this competition (see below, pp.153ff.). If one 'god' proved overwhelmingly stronger, then it attracted the adherents of its rivals. This sort of competition was given free play and there was a noticeable absence of mutually exclusive categories in religion.

But the zeal, the interest, and the capacity for better understanding of Islam was ever present among the Muslim Fulani, and some, especially from among the Ngara and Wollarbe, went either to Haysaland or to Bornu to learn under famous teachers. Modibbo Adama was one of such students who is said to have been in Bornu for several years where he pursued higher studies in Islam under the famous malam Kiari, who also taught another flag-bearer of Uthman, Ibrahim Zaki of Katagum.¹ Tradition also credits Modibbo Hamman Njundi of Garua Winde with having studied in Sokoto before Uthman's jihad.² It is further remarkable that Fulani from Adamawa were present among the helpers (anṣār) of Abdullah in Gobir at the beginning of hostilities against the Hausa chiefs.³

1. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.75; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.129; Urvoy, p.99; Strumpel, p.12.

2. Strumpel, p.47.

3. Gidado dan Lana, Raud al-jinān, translated by H.G. Harris (typescript) NAK, Kadcap. 1:23; henceforth, RJ (Harris). Cf. Hiskett, 1957, pp.565, 569 for reference to one Ibrahim al-Barnawi from Mandara who taught Abdullah before the jihad.

The homes of reputable malams served as schools. Most often parents taught their children enough to enable them to say their prayers in Arabic. In the daily practice and comportment of the Muslims, it was the external forms of Islam that were stressed, for instance observing the hours of prayer and the rituals before prayer, keeping the fast during Ramadan and not eating pork.¹ Otherwise, other familiar prescriptions, for instance that the men should go about with head-gear, that women should wear the veil were never rigorously enforced.² Also, we are told, no attempt was made to impose purdah. During the dances or tribal celebrations, both male and female mixed and danced together.

Oftentimes, as the need arose, an individual might avail himself of some functional aspect of a religion or cult to which he did not belong. A non-Muslim might, while maintaining his cult, look to Islam to help provide him with wealth, or general prosperity. For example, sometime before the jihad the people of Guduk, twelve miles north of Song, are said to have worshipped the books of a Muslim who lived and died among them, in order to secure the benefits which the books were thought to offer.³

1. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.74; Strumpel, pp. 6-7.

2. Oral evidence from informants at Yola, Garua, Rai, Marua.

3. Glenny Report 1911, p.26; 'The Story of Ahmadu Maiha', History of Yola Notable Families, 1932. A tradition recorded in Meek, 1931, Vol.1, pp.124-25, confirms that
cont...

What was important about a religion for Fulani and non-Fulani alike seems to have been its contribution to the well-being of the individual or community. People saw differences in the religions not so much in their doctrines, but in their practice and effectiveness. The religions of the non-Muslims took the form of rituals and were never encumbered by copious doctrines. Islam entailed both practice and doctrine. The doctrinal aspect of Islam was largely ignored or inadequately learnt. A good knowledge of the Quran, tradition and the Law, was only possible where the facilities for such training were available. Adamawa was cut off from the main centres of Islamic learning and traffic, and such facilities as books, qualified teachers and writing material were available to very few if at all.¹

Thus the search for security, which also consisted of finding effective remedies against evil spirits and jinn, magic, and witchcraft by both Muslims and non-Muslims, led Islam to a state of tolerant synthesis with non-Islamic practices. This was chiefly visible in the extensive use of amulets, and in mixing various cattle

F/n. cont. from previous page.

the people of Guduk were Muslims before the jihad, but in Meek's own estimation Islamic influence among them was not considerable. See also Temple, p.567 for an observation in 1911 that 'they worship a hill where the mark of Muhammad's foot can be seen as he stepped over from Mecca'.

1. Cf. Barth, 11, pp.266-67; Beyries, p.2, for the role of pilgrims and Hausa traders in trying to meet the demands for books and writing material in Adamawa.

rites with Islam.

There were strictly speaking three kinds of amulets (laiya, sing. laiyaru) in existence in Adamawa, depending both on their content and who made them. Firstly, there was the laiyaru made by a non-Muslim containing concoctions of various 'medicines'; secondly, one made by a Muslim encasing verses from the Quran mixed with local medicines; thirdly, one made by a learned Muslim encasing only verses from the Quran written on clean material.¹ In Iya'al-sunna, Uthman accepts the third type as Sunna and condemns the rest as pagan or at best dangerous and unnecessary.² He adds that the names and attributes of God can also be used as long as the words are not cut up and the letters taken out of order. This was generally accepted by the Muslims as a form of silent prayer,³ but it was customary in Adamawa for Muslim and non-Muslims alike to mix up the three types of laiya, using as their only standard the ability of the amulet maker to communicate with the supernatural.

The experience of Barth some forty years after

1. Oral evidence, Gurin.

2. Balogun, p190.

3. For a general study on amulets see A.E.W. Budge, Amulets and Superstitions, London, 1930.

the jihad illustrates how strong the feeling was to possess laiyaru irrespective of from whom it was received. In Yola itself many Muslims called on him for laiya and for medicines.¹ At Holna a group of non-Fulani Muslim converts went as far as to identify him with one of their gods, 'fete', whom they thought might have come 'to spend a day with them to make them forget their oppression and misfortune'.²

In this respect, Muslims apparently acquiesced in the general attitude of the non-Muslims who by and large regarded Islam as just another source of supernatural power. At Gurin, for instance, it is reported that the Fulani had a special place where remains after birth were dumped because it was believed the area had been cleared of all evil spirits that might harm newly born babies.³ They also had a custom whereby a piece of the afterbirth was preserved in an amulet, to be tied round the child's leg or neck to protect it from witches.

Besides, both Muslim and non-Muslim Fulani used charms in order to make their cattle flourish. Some wore bracelets on their wrists, some sought for woods with much

1. Barth, 11, pp.495, 499, 517, 523; Cf. also Ibid., p. 449 for a cleric's interest in Barth's amulets.

2. Ibid., p.429.

3. Informant 11, Gurin.

sap, like the fig (Ibi) or the gutta fig (dundehi), and as part of a ritual would drink part of what they collected, and pour or sprinkle the rest on the cattle.¹ While in Yola as Resident, Brackenbury observed one of such ancient customs which demonstrates the synthetic pattern.

Their (cattle Fulani) whole life centres round their cattle, and their religion is apparently based on the propitiation of any evil influence which may harm the cattle. When sickness is rife among the cattle, or when there is a shortage of rain, the herdsman will go into the bush with his cattle, strip himself of his clothes, and standing among the beasts will ceremonially anoint their horns with milk. Muhammadan Mallamai are also employed to walk round a cattle enclosure seven times, repeating portions of the Koran. These ceremonies are supposed to avert evil influences. Spitting is used to avert the work of evil spirits, who are called Ginaji (Jinns). They also have recourse to cross twigs and pieces of broken pots, which are placed at cross roads to propitiate the spirits; ... My impression is that they are prepared to use any form of rite, pagan or Muhammedan, which will bring prosperity to their cattle. 2

This state of affairs which Trimmingham describes as 'dualism' and 'accommodation' between Islam and non-Islamic forms of religion probably led Barth who shared the experience in the nineteenth century to observe while

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1. F.W. Taylor, 'Notes on the Fulani', 1923 enc. (b) in Monograph on Fulani, CSO 261/06098 NAK; for other customs connected with cattle, see Ba, 1966, pp.67-70; Gulla Pfeffer, Les Djafun - Bororo, leur société, leur économie et leur sédentarisation sur le haut-plateau du Ngaundere, 1953 (typescript) ANY, pp.46-54; St. Croix, 1944, pp.56-69. During the jihad in places like Macina (cf. Ba and Daget, 1962, pp.84 ff.), where attempts were made to abolish the traditional cattle rites, tensions developed between the orthodox Muslims and some of the ardo'en.
 2. E.A.Brackenbury, "Notes on the 'Bororo Fulbé' or Nomad 'Cattle Fulani' " JAS, Vol.XXIII, 1923-24, p.276.

in the Logone that

their Islam, was of a poor character; and the whole knowledge of religious matters which they possessed, with the exception of a few elevated persons, consisted of a few phrases which they learnt by heart without understanding their meaning and the practice of circumcision. ¹

Although the degree of 'dualism' and 'accommodation' between Islam and the other forms of religion was considerable before the jihad, yet within the theoretical framework of Muslim belief, there existed in Adamawa the Muslim dichotomy of dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam) and dar al-harb (the abode of war). This committed the Muslims to several courses of action should a man with sufficient religious authority summon them, for instance, 'commanding of righteousness, emigration (al-hijra) from the abode of war (dar al-harb), the appointment of the Commander of the Faithful (amir al-mu'ninin), and the waging of Holy War (al-jihad). ²

Here, locked in these injunctions, was the potential source of conflict between the Fulani, who constituted the abode of Islam, and the non-Fulani indigenous population who lived in the abode of war. They

1. Barth, III, p.304; see also Ibid., II, p.376; for an earlier observation on the Fulani in general, see Clapperton, 1829, pp.223-24.

2. See Uthman dan Fodio, Wathiqat Ahl-al-Sudan, edited and translated by A.D.H. Bivar, Journal of African History. (JAH), Vol.II, No.2, 1961, pp.139-40; henceforth WS (Bivar).

provided 'the flag, the ideology and the ammunition', when Uthman dan Fodio summoned them to begin the jihad. The existence of a tolerant synthesis was upset during the jihad through insistence on differences between Muslims and non-Muslims. The next chapter is an attempt to examine the effects of this new development.

CHAPTER II

THE JIHAD IN ADAMAWA

a) From Uthman to Adama:

The jihad in Adamawa was an off-shoot of Uthman dan Fodio's movement. Uthman's movement gradually built up during the late eighteenth century, and reached a turning point in February 1804, with the hijra from Degel to Gudu, both to the west of the capital of Gobir, and with the unanimous election of Uthman dan Fodio as amīr al-mu'minīn. This was immediately followed by the declaration of jihad against Sarkin Gobir, Yunfa, son of Nafata. Following its successes at Gobir and Kebbi, the Uthmaniyya¹ movement spread eastwards throughout Hausaland, to Bornu, Adamawa and Baghirni, and westwards to Macina, within less than twenty years of the outbreak of war.²

The causes that led up to the call to arms have been elaborately stated from the point of view of the

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1. First used by Adeleye et al. (p.3) as an adjective; the term has been used in this thesis (noun Uthmani(s)) to refer to the followers of Uthman dan Fodio. The Fulani groups who joined the jihad did so (a) as part of Uthman's movement, and (b) with a desire of remaining a part of his empire, accepting Uthman's standard of Islam as theirs.
 2. For further details see Last, 1967, pp.23-45; F.H. El-Masri, 'The Life of Shehu Usman dan Fodio before the jihad', JHSN, 11, 4, 1963, pp.435-48; H.L.S. Johnston, The Fulani Empire of Sokoto, London, 1967, pp.35-91.

Uthmanis in a series of letters to a contemporary opponent of the jihad, al-Kanemi, effective ruler of Bornu.¹ According to the Uthmanis, the jihad was both defensive and offensive. It sought to defend the right of the Muslims to teach and convert people unimpeded, and, also to defend the Muslim Community and its property against attacks from the Hausa chiefs. On the offensive side, the jihad sought to destroy non-Muslim practices among the Hausa Muslims and reform Islam, replacing non-Muslim with Muslim rulers.²

Uthman's jihad did not become a serious matter among the Fulani Muslims in Adamawa until five years later in 1809.³ For those in the Benue district, this time lapse was probably connected with problems of communication and also a habit of thought among the Fulani based on peaceful co-existence with the non-Fulani population. The situation in the north was rather different. Before the jihad, between 1800 and 1806, Bautchi Gordi, a Fulani Muslim warrior from Gombe, as a lieutenant of

1. IM (Arnett) pp.100-26; ^{See} Johnston, 1967, pp.102-112 for a discussion of the correspondence. TW (Hiskett) pp.108-09; Uthman dan Fodio, Tanbikhu'l Ikhwan (TI) translated by H.R. Palmer, JIS, vol.XIV, 1914-15, pp. 189-192.

2. This was in keeping with Uthman's maxim that 'the government of a country is the government of its king without question'. TI (Palmer) JIS, Vol.IV, p.53.

3. See Appendix, 'Chronology of Events.'

Buba Yero crossed the Gongola valley, and ravaged the Lungunda and Lala tribes as far as the Marghi country. Here he was joined by the Illaga Fulani at Uba and together they established nuclei of Muslim Fulani rule at Uba and Bazza, acknowledging Buba Yero as their Emir and becoming one of his tributary states.¹

In 1808 Buba Yero himself visited these regions as a lieutenant of Uthman dan Fodio and Emir of Gonbe. He came with a large force of cavalry and infantry and with the help of local Fulani, easily overran the scattered Marghi settlements as far east as the river Luwe near Guidder.² By this time, the Fulani war against Bornu was well under way. Early in 1808 Ibrahim Zaki, Buba Yero and Gwoni Muktar, Fulani leaders who had obtained flags from Uthman, launched a concerted attack on Bornu and took its capital Ngazzareganu. Nine months later, the Bornu leader, Mai Ahmed with the help of al-Kanemi reconquered Ngazzareganu and drove out the Fulani.³

The news of these events in Bornu reached the Fulani who were settled around Marua through the refugees

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1. W.H. Paul, History of Uba District, (typescript) NAK; Strumpel, pp.12-14.
 2. Gazetteer, 1927, pp.12-13; Abraham, History of Buba Yero; Strumpel pp.13-14.
 3. Prestat, pp.2-3; for a description of the early events of the jihad in Bornu, see IM (Arnett), pp.100-01; Urvoy, pp.98-100; Stenning, 1959, pp.30-35; Last and M.A. al-Hajj, 1965, pp.231-240; A. Schultze and P.A. Benton, The Sultanate of Bornu, London, 1968, pp.19-21.

who fled from Bornu to Gombe, Bautchi and parts of Adamawa. The news aroused a spontaneous feeling of involvement among the Fulani Muslims who gathered around their local leader, Hamman Selbe, and started praying by day and by night.¹

Such expressions of Fulani solidarity did not pass unnoticed. They alarmed Leta, the Arnado of Guissiga. He may have seen in this a general determination by the Fulani to attack all established authority. Consequently, he attacked the Muslim community or village of Bilniti on river Sannaga (Tsannaga) and a few miles from Marua. The Fulani rose in self-defense. Several Fulani were killed including Selbe.² Kawo Yero, one of the Marua Fulani, assumed the leadership through his military talents. He had very little education. He felt that if Muslim agitation were to continue, the military strength and preparedness of the Arnado would lead to the annihilation of the Fulani.³ Kawo Yero therefore negotiated a truce with Leta.

Kawo Yero's stand was not acceptable to many Fulani. Ardo Alkassum, leader of the Fulani group at

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1. See p.148 for comments on the role of prayers during the jihad; here probably both as a weapon against the enemies of Islam and as a discipline.
 2. Prestat, pp.2-3; Zeltner, 'Notes Relatives à l'Histoire du Nord-Cameroun', Etud. Cam., Nos.35-36, 1953, pp.13-17; Modibbo Bakari, 'Histoire des Sultans de Maroua', IBBIA, No.3, 1963, pp.77-92; Lemoigne, p.138.
 3. Informant 12, Marua.

Makabay, felt so disappointed that he emigrated with some of his followers to Bogo.¹ Hamnan Danraka, a well read Muslim who had attained the status of modibbo, openly challenged Kawo Yero. Danraka was originally from Bornu and he was well known to the Fulani at Bilniti, his new home town, at Makabay and at Marua. Before hostilities broke out, he came every Friday to Marua to preach and explain Islam. Kawo Yero was assassinated, and that very year Arnado Guissiga died and his son Magreng, also called Bi Marua, replaced him.² Fulani morale was greatly boosted by the death of the Arnado, which was attributed to divine providence.³ The Fulani lost no time. Danraka summoned Magreng to submit to Islam. He answered by attacking the Fulani, but this time the Fulani were successful. Having been deserted by many of his people Magreng was defeated and killed by the Fulani. Danraka constructed a mosque and set up a Muslim government at Marua. About 1809-10, he left Marua with a delegation to go to Sokoto to receive

1. Prestat, p.3.

2. Prestat, p.3 reports that Kawo Yero was assassinated by Magreng, son of Arnado Guissiga, but this is neither supported by Zeltner nor by the informants at Marua, who said nobody knew. My impression is that if anybody had a motive for assassinating Kawo Yero, the least likely person was Leta or his son. It was rather with his tribesmen, the Fulani, in particular those who itched for the jihad, that Kawo Yero had trouble. Besides, Prestat's account appears suspect since it also makes Magreng the assassin of Hamnan Selbe whom Modibbo Bakari, op.cit., p.77, identifies simply as 'un païen'.

3. Throughout the jihad it was customary to attribute any incident which advanced the cause of the Muslims to divine providence, or the will of God, nothing was /cont..

the flag of jihad from Uthman, but on his way, he learnt that Modibbo Adama from Gurin had already been given a flag and that Marua was within Adama's emirate. Danraka then visited Gurin and received a flag from Adama to continue the jihad.¹

For the majority of the Adamawa Fulani however, the foundation, at least initially, of the jihad was different. The legality of the jihad was not founded on self-defence, so that, for instance, the much publicized Uthmaniyya defence of fighting against the Hause rulers because the Muslims had been attacked, because they had been forbidden to propagate their faith among any not born Muslim, was not applicable. Unlike the Fulani in Gobir, the Fulani in Adamawa were not under any threat; they were not living through any major conflict with the non-Fulani rulers; the situation was basically an atmosphere that was not charged with any social, political or economic crisis.² Besides, except the Kingdom of

F/note cont. from previous p.

claimed as an exclusive mark of personal merit. See below, p. 86, n.1.

1. Modibbo Bakari, p.78 leaves open the question whether or not Danraka went to Sokoto with Adama to receive the flag, but Seltner, pp.14, 17 and also Mal Hammadou Bassoro, p.65, state that Danraka and others went to Sokoto with Adama - see comments below, n. 1, p.79. ff

2. Besides the argument advanced above pp.42/this could be inferred from the lack of mention of any crisis as the Fulani prepared for the jihad. See East, p.19; Lacroix, 1952, pp.14-17; The nearest to a crisis was Ardo Njobbo's revolt against the jus primae noctis (pp.46-49), but I argued that this conflict was a local affair. My view is opposed to an interpretation which presents the events in the emirate before the jihad, as leading /cont.....

Mandara, all the non-Fulani peoples south of Bornu were non-Muslims with a wide variety of different forms of worship. The depth of Islam among the Fulani was in many respects only superficial, and some especially the Mboron^men, remained non-Muslim. (See above pp.58 ff.) Islam was in no danger of suppression by non-Muslims. On the contrary, in some parts Fulani leaders had entrenched themselves as Muslim rulers before the jihad, forming what could be technically described as the abode of Islam.

The conflict in Adamawa was between those who professed Islam, by far the minority, and the rest of the population who did not. Unlike in Hausaland and Bornu, of the four instances¹ in which Uthman stated that his followers could legally make jihad and set up a new government, the Adamawa Muslims experienced only two:

- (xii) And that to make war upon the heathen king who will not say 'There is no God but Allah' is obligatory by assent, and that to take the government from him is obligatory by assent;

F/note cont. from previous page.

inevitably to a head-long clash between the Fulani and non-Fulani; e.g. see Strumpel, pp.11-12; Mizon, 'Les Royaumes Foulbés', pp.249-51; Lestringant, pp.110-11. It seems that the result of Fulani and non-Fulani interaction before the jihad was not spontaneous hostility, but a constant search for a modus vivendi that was generally acceptable to all.

1. WS (Bivar) p.240, xii-xv; for further details, see M.A. al-Hajj, 'The Fulani Concept of Jihad; Shehu Uthman dan Fodio', Odu, 1, 1964, pp.45-58.

- (xiii) And that to make war upon the heathen king who does not say 'There is no God but Allah' on account of the custom of his town (bi-sabab 'urfi'l-baladi), and who makes no profession of Islam, is (also obligatory by assent; and that to take the government from him is obligatory by assent;

Thus the initial predicament of the Muslims in Adamawa did not involve legal definitions about the status of their opponents,¹ but the timing of the jihad. Was it to be immediate, or were they to wait until the strength of the Muslim force was seen to be capable of transforming the abode of war to the abode of Islam? Were they to perform hijra as Uthman had himself done, or following the example of the Fulani in Bornu ^{immediately begin a jihad,} or were they to take counsel among themselves and select an amir al-mu'minin? Would other Muslim communities accuse them of revolt, and condemn them for innovation? It was questions of this nature which made the scene in Adamawa so uncertain when the news about Uthman reached them:

When they met they had already heard the news of the Hijra of Shaihu Usmanu dan Fodio. They said to Modibbo Adama, 'It seems best that you go and visit this Reformer, so that you can tell us (or get the chance to cause us to hear) what is to be done'. 2

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1. This was very much a problem among the Fulani in Southern Bornu who sent a delegation to Uthman to define the position - see Last and M.A. al-Hajj, 1965, p.237. It was also the underlying problem in the controversy between al-Kanemi and Bello over the justification for attacking the Hausa and Bornu rulers who were Muslims. Probably some of Uthman's post 1809 works, for example, TI (Palmer), KF (Hiskett) were written as a legal defence of the jihad as well as to demonstrate Uthman's conception of a Muslim state.
 2. East, p.19.

This situation was however not peculiar to the Fulani in Adanawa. For at the beginning of the jihad in Macina, the Muslims were also in a similar predicament over the timing of the jihad and they also sent a delegation, apparently to Uthman, for clarification of the legal implication of their intended action.¹

There are three principal traditions on how Adanawa became a part of the Uthmaniyya movement.

One view, which even today is told in Sokoto, relates that Modibbo Adana was one of the brave warriors who fought in Uthman's army in the first encounter against Yunfa in 1804. After this battle Adana was sent to organize the Fulani in Adanawa and carry on the jihad there.²

The second view is that Adana was a student-teacher at Ngazzaregaru when in March 1808 G'woni Mukta sacked the town and forced Mai Ahmed to flee. Adana left Bornu as a result of the disturbances and returned to his clansmen the Ba'en, who during his absence had moved successively from Beltunde, Guriga, Gurin Nyanyare before finally settling at Gurin. He spread the news of the jihad and of Uthman dan Fodio.³ A number of Fulani Ardo'en

1. Ba and Daget, 1962, p.36.

2. Niven, P.83, I heard this in Sokoto and it was later confirmed at Garua. Cf. Bassoro, p.65, where the date of Adana's journey to Sokoto is put at 1801, i.e. three years before Uthman's hijra to Gudu.

3. Vicars Boyle, 1910, pp.74-75; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.129; Glenny Report, 1911, p.14.

assembled at Gurin and travelled to Sokoto hoping each to receive a flag from Uthman authorizing them to ^{begin} ~~being~~ the jihad in their respective areas. Among these leaders were Njobdi, Ardo Borongo; Danraka of Marua; Buba of Bindir; Mustafa of Mindif; Hamnan Njundi of Garua; and several others.¹ The tradition further adds that Kukoni, a Batta Chief, recognizing that the Fulani were bound to win, threw his lot with them and also accompanied the Fulani leaders to Sokoto.²

After some days in Sokoto, Uthman summoned all the delegates from Adamawa and asked them to choose one among them to lead them all. They unanimately chose the Ardo Borongo, after Adana declined all secular responsibilities. When it became known that the Ardo Borongo did not wish to comply with all of the conditions attached to the flag, in particular making regular visits to Sokoto, Uthman withdrew the flag from him and gave it to Adana to become the sole leader of the jihad in Adamawa.³

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1. Bassoro, p.65; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.129. Many of the traditions of the district recollect that the original flag-bearers travelled together with Adana to Sokoto, but they could not establish whether it was on his first or on subsequent visits. See comments on the possible purpose of such traditions, below, p. 82, n.4.
 2. Kirk-Greene, 1958; p.129.
 3. Ibid., 1958, pp.129-30. The withdrawal of the flag from Ardo Borongo, if credence is to be given to the tradition, might have been connected with Uthman's belief that authority should not be given to whoever seeks it -KF (Hiskett), p.570; for further comments on the position of Ardo Borongo, see below, p.121.

The third tradition¹ also makes the first move for the jihad an Adanawa initiative. After several years of study in Bornu, Adana returned to his people who were then stationed at Guriga. Malan Hamman, the clan leader, gave Adana his younger sister in marriage.² After a plague, malan Hamman and his people left Guriga for Gurin Nyanyare because they found the place was infested with filaria-carrying flies.³ The next site was Gurin, situated near the flood plains of the river Faro, at a small tributary locally known as "mayo Kesun". While they were settled here, news about Uthman reached the Benue Fulani principally through the activities of Buba Yero of Gonbe.⁴ After some delay the neighbouring ardo'en assembled at Gurin, and Adana was chosen to go to Sokoto and learn more about Uthman's movement and report back to them on what they should do.⁵ Adana left with a small party for Sokoto. Uthman presented him with a flag and asked him to make

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1. Mainly a collection of the oral tradition at Yola and Gurin that are at variance with the first and second traditions plus the account in East, pp.19-21.
 2. Informant 11, Gurin; i.e. after Adana's years of study at Bornu and some years before the jihad.
 3. This site was shown to me; it is today uninhabited.
 4. Informant 6, Yola. The view that Adana returned from Bornu and lived with his people as a teacher before the jihad is also found in Strumpel, p.17; Temple, p.566.
 5. East, p.19.

similar flags for all the Fulani leaders in Adamawa who should recognize him as their spokesman.¹

Comparing the three traditions, the first tradition is a typical Sokoto version of how the jihad spread outside Sokoto to other lands, romantically giving the entire responsibility to Uthman.² It ignores the previous efforts of the Fulani in Adamawa to found Fulani dominated states. Adama was never a good warrior: indeed, this was one of his greatest handicaps during the jihad, that while his lieutenants won military victories, he had not himself achieved the same. Prior to the jihad he had no personal following upon which he could have built his power and support in Adamawa had he **simply** been sent by Uthman. The main weakness of the Sokoto tradition is that it was **not confirmed** in Adamawa where at Yola it is felt that the tradition confuses an earlier war against Yunfa with the final battle in September 1808 in which Adama is more likely to have been present.

The second tradition, except for the information that the flag was first given to the Ardo Borongo, is very

1. East, p.19.

2. IM (Arnett) pp.125,128; Orr,1965, pp.70-73; Ahmadu Bello, My Life, London, 1962, pp.10-11; Last, 1967, p.53. See n.4,p.82 for comments.

commonly heard throughout Adanawa, especially among district governors when they narrate the history of their districts separately. Many of them say the first governors of their provinces accompanied Adana to Sokoto to receive the flag.¹ In some districts, for example Rai, where it is admitted that the leader did not go to Sokoto, some reason is offered.² It is not unlikely that during Adana's subsequent visits to Sokoto, some of his flag-bearers accompanied him;³ but the insistence that the flag bearers went with Adana on the first occasion to receive the flag, seems artificial and may simply be a device to claim greater affinity between the respective leaders and Uthman.⁴

This tradition implies that before the Adanawa delegation left for Sokoto, it had already been decided that each leader was going to get a flag to start the jihad in his area. If indeed such a decision had been taken, it would seem most probable that it was taken in the area of origin of the leader. Why then did they have to meet at Gurin,

1. See for example, Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.75; Bassoro, p.65; Zeltner, pp.14, 17; Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp.129 that Adana had been a student at Sokoto before the jihad.

2. See Strumpel, p.68; Mohamadou, 'La Chronique de Bouba Njidda Rey', ABBL, No.4, p.22.

3. This is probably what Temple, p.566 refers to when he says Adana went several times to Sokoto to get flags for his followers.

4. See J.S. Boston, 'Oral Tradition and the History of Igala', JAH, 10, 1, 1969, pp.38-41 for observations on how oral tradition is sometimes initiated to serve a political purpose. In Macina also where the Fulani sent a delegation apparently to Uthman the traditions claim that Shaikh Ahnadu of Macina received instructions from Uthman in 1818 to start the jihad despite the insur-

completely out of the way, for Fulani from Mindif, Marua, Garua, etc.[?] This point perhaps strengthens the report in the second tradition that Adana brought the news of Uthman's jihad to Gurin. All the traditions agree that there was an assembly at Gurin before Adana's departure for Sokoto; the reason for this assembly may have been the news which Adana had brought of the jihad.

A Yola manuscript, which I have entitled "Memorandum of the Jihad in Adanawa"¹, helps reconstruct the sequence of events more accurately. It was written on March 1809, and it is fair to assume that Adana left Gurin late in 1808. Further references in this document indicate that Uthman was addressing Adana as one who had been sent to him, and not as one who had been selected to be leader of a people who were themselves present on the scene:

...since you tell me that some of the Fulani leaders did not come with you, but they sent you to come and receive the flag of the jihad from me and take it back to them. I instruct you to tell them that it is you to whom I have given this jihad flag, and tell them that whoever obeys you obeys me, and whoever swears fealty to you, it is exactly as if he had sworn fealty to me. 2

F/note cont. from previous page.

mountable chronological discrepancy (Ba and Daget, 1962, pp.40-41.).

1. See Appendix A
2. Memo. on Adanawa jihad.

Another version elsewhere:

When you return tell them this is what Shaihu gave you. Say also that I accept their greetings. Bid them place their hands in yours; whoever gives his hand to you, joins hands with me. Tell them I greet them. Make flags for them like this that I have given you, give them the flags, with the orders I have laid upon you. You are the envoy; whatsoever they desire let them tell it you, then do you come and tell me. ¹

Adana's ascendance to power has interested local scholars. According to them many factors weighed against Adana becoming leader of all Fulani in Idamawa. He had very humble origins. His father, Hassana was an ordinary ~~malan~~ while his mother, some say, was a Shuwa Arab.² He lacked both the wealth and the personal following which gave prestige and distinction in his society.

1. East, p.19.

2. Very little is known for certain about Adana's ancestry. All attempts to trace his genealogy beyond his father Hassana failed to produce any reliable results. His pedigree, some say, could be traced back to a Persian great grandfather thus, Run-Njobbo-Hassana-Adana. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.129.

Strumpel who interviewed informants who knew Adana in person described him as 'lean and of tall stature, his features sharp and somewhat disfigured by small-pox, his nose slightly curved. Thus he present the type of the noble Fula of pure race as also in his character and personality' (Strumpel, p.20). I first heard the suggestion that Adana's mother was Shuwa Arab during random conversations in Yola, but this view was again reinforced at Garua. The Yola royal family however denied this. My suspicion is that owing to the similarity between Fulani and Shuwa Arab (see Barth, II, pp.356-57) the feeling might have arisen from Adana's close association with Shuwa Arabs while he was in Bornu and in Yola.

His greatest qualification was his learning. He had obtained ijazas or licences to teach his subjects of specialization from malam Kiari of Kukawa. When he returned to his people, he built a reputation for being capable of expounding and explaining Islam.¹ Consequently when the news of the jihad, an affair which was considered to be concerned primarily with religion, reached the Fulani in the Benue districts, (that is assuming he did not bring the news) he was seen as a man whose training matched the event. He was as well an honest man, God fearing and unambitious for possessions.²

Such unpretentious aspects of his background were an important consideration in his initial appointment to lead the Adamawa delegation to Uthman. The Fulani leaders thought that a man with such humble origins would not be appointed to the supreme magistracy.³ But Uthman took their choice of Adama in another light. For Uthman it signified a large measure of trust in Adama, which Uthman accepted by appointing Adama to be their leader.⁴ However,

1. Vicars Boyle, 1910, pp.74-76; Strumpel, pp.19-21; Temple, p.566.

2. MS in the possession of Chizoma Yola. It attributes several good qualities to Adama, e.g., honesty, generosity and simplicity. Informant 3, Yola, mentions Adama's self-reliance, earning his living by making and selling ropes. See below, p. 170 Belle is also reported to have depended (for a living) on only his personal earnings. (See al-Hadj Sa'id, 'Tarikh Sokoto' in Tedzkiret en-Nisian, translated by C.V. Houdas, Paris, 1901, pp.318-19.)

3. East, pp.19-21.

4. Mono on Adamawa Jihad.

many of those I interviewed gave a simpler religious explanation that Uthman appointed Adana because 'God gave Adana leadership'.¹ Uthman himself, according to a Yola manuscript, said before he gave the flag to Adana, 'To you (Adana) God has given it'.²

Adana returned to Gurin in mid. 1809 with the document appointing him "Lando Fumbina" which also contained Uthman's instructions and prayers for the success of Adana's mission. He was accompanied by Fulani (Toronkawa) and Hausa warriors who formed an important section of his fighters.³ On his arrival he was enthusiastically welcomed, but no sooner were the results of his journey to Sokoto made known than the excitement began to alter.

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1. Compare with Lacroix, 1965, p.433, B.12, 7, 'Ahidjo a obtenu (la souveraineté) par le pouvoir du Tout-Puissant'. From my experience during field work this way of viewing events is very common among the Fulani generally, learned or otherwise. They often saw historical evidence as going beyond the simple mundane processes of cause and effect. History can best be interpreted in relation to an attempt to understand how the supernatural reacts on men and their actions. The way history unfolds itself is reflective of the will of God among men. History therefore appeared to them as a revelation, and not as an inductive or deductive science, cf. Lacroix, 1965, especially Ch.II; also Ba and Daget, 1962, pp.13-14 for the Fulani in Macina.
 2. East, p.19.
 3. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.76; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.130; 'History of Lando Katsena' in History of Yola Notable Families, suggests that Adana also recruited Hausa fighters from Katsena and other emirates in Hausaland. The Toronkawa Fulani are reputed for their number of Islamic scholars throughout West Africa, among whom was Uthman dan Fodio. They probably came to Adamawa chiefly as teachers.

Evidently the delegation to Uthman was intended to be fact-finding so that Uthman could tell them 'what is to be done', and possibly how they could join forces with him.¹ By accepting Uthman's appointment Idana seemed to have forestalled the hopes of many of the Fulani leaders. Ardo Gamawa who could not hide his feelings burst out saying, 'This is too much! A wife called Idana, a son called Idanu; and is my chief to be Idanu too? But you have forestalled us'.²

The fact that Idana was welcomed with such mixed feelings marked a setback to a smooth link up of previous Fulani expansionism with Uthman's movement. This had profound importance in deciding the nature of the jihad in Idanawa. The leaders of two large groups of Fulani in Chamba and in Rai tried to limit Idana's leadership to religious matters and instructions coming from Sokoto. They held the view that it was for each clan to decide who its leader was going to be on other matters.³

1. East, p.19, confirmed by Informant. 1, Yola.

2. East, p.19.

3. Lenoigne, p.135; Strumpel, p.17. This was confirmed by my enquiries at Rai and Tibati. It was explained that what Buba Njidda and Hamman Sambo wanted was for the different clan leaders to govern their own people, but make room for a wider cooperation of all Muslims. See Last, 1967, p.230, for the view that Bello contained the power of the clan leaders and strengthened the central administration, in order to assert the Islamic character of the jihad.

In any case both the leaders of Chanba and Rai were very ambiguous in their attitude towards Adama. They undoubtedly espoused the aims of Uthman's reforming movement and felt it had much relevance to their situation; they were willing to be a part of the movement, but in such a way that their traditional secular position remained intact.¹ Thus, though they joined the other Fulani leaders and did homage to Adama receiving the white flag as the authority to start the jihad, they nevertheless made jihad in their areas independent of Adama, so that, as later events were to demonstrate, when their strength was proved, they would apply for flags directly from Sokoto.

Apart from these two important cases many of the Fulani leaders, accepted Adama and registered their full support for the movement by receiving each a flag from him. (See below pp. 178 ff.) This marked a major stage in the transformation of the Fulani mentality away from being purely pastoralists, respecting the political rights of those among whom they lived, avoiding conflicts where possible, and generally speaking unconcerned about territorial acquisition and government, to a new psychological position where they started asserting claims on the local populations. This mental mutation seems to have been sudden and complete.

1. For the strife arising out of this, see below, pp. 171 ff.

The ideological framework was provided by the Muslim religion, and belief in Uthman as a divinely inspired teacher with the gift of baraka, that is, the power to bestow blessings on people.

In a large measure, submission to Adana was closely connected with the political and economic situation in Adanawa itself. The stories about Uthman, which probably reached Adanawa through traders or Uthman's messengers to the East,¹ were such that they moved many individual Muslims to become identified with the movement in their feelings even before their leaders had decided what their approach would be.² The stories raised their hopes for the dawn of a new era in which, by being assertive, the Fulani would form Muslim States in which those economic and political problems which in the past disturbed them both individually and collectively in their relations with the other tribes, would be settled by Muslim chiefs in accordance with Muslim laws.³ The quick victories which

1. IM (Arnett), p.63; TI (Palmer), p.189.

2. This is evident from the oral traditions, see e.g., Strumpel, pp. 12 ff. Mohamadou, 1964, pp.17 ff.

3. This is evident from Uthman's teaching both before and after the jihad and would receive wide attention throughout Western Sudan. For more details see IM (Arnett) pp.20-46; Hiskett, 1962, pp.577-96; same author, 1957, pp.550-78; El-Masri, 1963, pp.435-48; Balogun, pp.23-42.

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the Uthmanis had over the powerful Hausa Chiefs were astounding,¹ and they served to demonstrate the ethnic potentiality and political future that awaited the Lamana Fulani once they took up Uthman's mantle.

This made the jihad in Lamana a focus for personal ambition to satisfy a latent sense of ethnic superiority which religion, wealth and the Muslim culture gave to the Fulani,² as well as to fill the gap between the actual achievements of their kinsmen in Hausaland and their ill-defined relations with their own local populations. Strunpel describes the phenomenon as a mixture and confusion of personal ambition with a renewed religious zeal.³ Indeed the struggle was as much a search for an ideal, or rather, an intellectual conception of an Islamic state, as a search for an actual state of affair or experience that had occurred in Hausaland between 1804 and 1810, where Fulani had replaced the Hausa chiefs as rulers.

As few if any non-Fulani had become Muslims before the jihad, it had at its inception the character of a Fulani movement aimed at conversion to Islam and

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1. IM (Immett), pp.64-99; East, 1967, pp.23-45.
 2. cf. Lacroix, 1952, p.24; F. Daniel, 'Shohu Dan Fodio', JAS, xxv, p.279; Orr, 1965, p.68; St. Croix, 1944, pp. 9-10; Hopen, p.146, supports the view with a myth which relates how Uthman said when God created man he made the Fulbe 'superior' to the Haŕe .
 3. Strunpel, p.9; also Cardaire, 'Contribution à l'étude de l'Islam noir', Mémoire IFAN, Dakar, 1949, pp.64-65. It is implicit in East, pp.19-21.

Fulani pre-eminence. All Muslim Fulani, no matter their stations in life, were convinced of the necessity of the jihad in Adamawa. Those who had any form of leadership among groups of Fulani could not afford, even where they showed fundamental disagreement with Adana's leadership, to stay out of the movement or soft pedal it. Many of the non-Muslim Fulani too, though remaining unconverted, either kept out of the conflict or supported their kinsmen in the fighting.¹ If they failed to join, someone in their group would supercede them, as the example of Marua proved², and he would, in the excited state of mind of many Fulani, gain popular local support. The leaders knew they had to move along with the current of rising aspirations which the movement had engendered.

The greatest military advantage of the Fulani themselves was their skill as horsemen. Before the jihad there is no evidence that the non-Fulani possessed horses. My informants felt that horses were used in warfare only in Mandara and Bornu where they were plentiful.³ In the

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1. Taylor, 'Notes on the Fulani'; no cases of organized resistance by non-Muslim Fulani against the jihad fighters were recorded as far as I know.
 2. See Abawa, pp. 73-74 also the tradition of Mohamadou, 1964, pp. 25-29, though for reasons stated elsewhere (see p. 112) I have not considered this particular incident likely.
 3. See Denham and Clapperton, 1826, p. 111; also M. Delafosse, Haut - Sénégal et Niger, Vol. II, serie 2, Paris, 1912, for a study of horses in Western Sudan, their origins, their uses, the various types of breeds, etc.

Idanawa region before the jihad horses were scarce and were used for sports during ceremonial occasions and as a means of transport for the wealthy.¹ Donkeys were the popular beasts of burden. They were more plentiful and less costly than horses and so many families could afford to own them. It was through riding donkeys that the less wealthy Fulani probably had their elementary training which proved useful in cavalry warfare when horses became available from the northern districts, like Uba, Marua and Madagali, during the jihad. (See below, p.211)

Moreover, their foreign connections with Hausaland made it possible for them to procure war equipment like chain-mail, different varieties of swords and daggers, steel helmets, horse trappings and quilted cotton for the protection of their horses, all of which were out of the reach of the other tribes in Idanawa. One of the obligations for receiving a flag was that the flag-bearers were to send fighters as well as supplies at the Emir's request.² With this common understanding, and the unity of purpose that the religious call of Uthman had made possible, the

1. Oral evidence.

2. Cf. F.H. Ruxton, *Maliki Law*, London, 1916, pp.73-74, for various obligations in a jihad. It does not however appear as Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.129 says that Uthman made the grant of a flag 'conditional upon the sending of a yearly deputation to Sokoto with a regular quota of slaves'.

balance of power between Fulani and non-Fulani was tilted in favour of the Fulani in many parts where the non-Fulani tribes remained small, scattered and unorganized. Although the Fulani as a single ethnic group constituted a minority, * they were able to mobilize adequate forces against those settlements they desired to attack.

This unity, no matter how tenuous at times, was paramount not only in affording confidence to the Fulani as a whole, but also in putting the non-Muslims on the defensive. Non-Muslims knew that if they attacked a Muslim settlement, which alone might be militarily weaker, this would bring other Muslims to their aid and thereby reverse the situation against the non-Muslims.

Adama's first move in the direction of the jihad was to emphasise ~~on~~ the ideological unity that existed among the Fulani. He appealed to the Fulani leaders to abandon divisive attitudes for the sake of their religion.¹ He began to talk to non-Muslim leaders about the appearance of Uthman and his call to all people to convert and enter the Muslim confederation, where all would believe in one Almighty God, and where there will be no discrimination based on race or ethnic origins.² In response to this

1. Strumpel, pp.19-20; Mohamadou, 1964, p.23.

2. Informant 1, Yola; MS in possession of Chirona, Yola. He would neither part with it nor allow me to film it.

appeal from Adana, and also from his flag-bearers, some non-Muslim communities accepted Islam. The Batta of Zummo, Malabu and Holna in particular, embraced Islam and sent many of their young men to swell the Muslim force at Gurin.¹ By the dry season of 1810-1811 the Muslim forces had been greatly reinforced by local recruits and by refugees from Bornu, many of whom were Fulani and Shuwa Arabs,² and the disposition of many villages, friendly or unfriendly disposition towards the new Islam was becoming more and more apparent.

Uthman gave Adana instructions not to initiate war against the Batta and Verre among whom the great bulk of the Fulani lived.

'... I enjoin you not to conquer the pagans of the Batta and Verre or enslave their children. Because even if they oppress you, you are forbidden to retaliate in force and recover by force what they seized from you. But if God grants you victory over them you must let them live their own lives and not disperse them completely, and if they ask for peace you should agree. 3

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1. Vicars Boyle, 1910, pp.75-77; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.132; The term Muslim force here is used in a general sense to refer to all those who fought on the side of the Muslims against non-Muslims.
 2. Barth, II, pp.355, 456, 481, 489; Mizon, 'Les Royaumes Foulbés', p.355
 3. Memo. on Adamawa jihad; Meek, 1931, Vol.I, p.2. states that Uthman commanded Adana not to fight the Batta because the Fulani of Gobir and the Batta were cousins.

The Batta were numerous and where they were well organized socially and politically, as at Bulki, Bagale, Bilei and Densa, they were indeed a formidable force.¹ They were known for their determination and their fighters were skillful archers who used poisoned tipped arrows. The Fulani probably feared that though the Batta were segmented into many more or less independent groups, when subjected to a common threat from Fulani, all or some sections might coalesce to fight the Fulani and in this way the jihad would be nipped in the bud. A war with the Batta would most probably be long drawn out, creating perpetual insecurity at Adama's base, and making it difficult for Adama to leave his capital for distant campaigns.

The Verre were in a slightly different position. They were fewer and not used to waging wars. They had been forced to flee the plains where it is thought they were the original inhabitants, and to take refuge on the rocky Verre hills by the onslaught of the Jukun and Batta in the eighteenth century.² The Verre had given sanctuary to Ba'en Fulani under Ardo Hamman Gurin when they were driven from further north by Batta. Both groups formed a defensive alliance against Batta raids; and so at the time of the

1. Cf. East, pp.39 ff.; Barth, II, pp.510-11.

2. District note book, Verre, District Office, Yola.

jihad the Fulani and Verre lived on friendly terms.¹ It was in the overall interest of the jihad for the Fulani to maintain the old-time cordial relation with the Verre. Verre was a great source of supply for iron in the Benue regions. The Verre smiths formed a class apart in their society; they skilfully manufactured arrow heads, knives, hoes, spears etc.² Their alliance with the Fulani was therefore a much prized guarantee for the weapons supply which the Fulani needed to supplement supplies from elsewhere.

Adama and the rest of the Muslim forces preferred peaceful submission and conversion at least from the militarily strong chiefs like Mandara, Densa, Kukoni, etc., to having to fight them; but the sudden demands to be the rulers over such vast regions were naturally opposed by force by the Chiefs who enjoyed political power in their regions as a birth-right. The chief (Mai) of Mandara, was one of the important rulers who preferred to resist any Fulani claims over his territories. Fulani attempts to force Mandara to submission were the central feature of Adama's campaigns against the peoples to the north of the Benue.

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

b) Campaigns in the North.

Of all the states south of Bornu, Mandara was probably the best organized and most powerful Kingdom.¹ She had for several years withstood and sometimes defeated Bornu forces sent against her, and this was particularly so during the reign of Mai Bukar Gjiama (1773-1828), when the decadence of Bornu permitted Mandara to attain her apogée in state power.² From his capital at Dolo, the Mai Mandara exercised his influence over vast territories which were limited to the north by the flood plains of "Yaere", the popular pasture land of Shuwa Arab nomads, to the west by the Yedseram and the hills overlooking the Gongola, and to the east by the territories of the Guissiga, Musgun and Massa.³ It is not clear whether Mandara laid political claims to the territories south of the Diamare, but it would seem that only those hunting for slaves made some daring expeditions beyond the rocks of Mindif to Mundang country and the basins of rivers Bindir and Kebbi without establishing any form of Mandara hegemony.⁴

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1. Denham and Clapperton, 1826, pp.110 ff.; J. Vossart, 'L'Histoire du Sultanat du Mandara', Stud. Can., 1953, pp.33-45; Lt. Von Duisburg, 'Contribution à l'histoire du Sultanat de Mandara', Tk-21, LNY, p.10. (Published in German in Amtsblatt, 1911.)
 2. Palmer, 1936, p.258; Urvoy, pp.92-, 85-86; Vossart, p. 41; Lemoigne, pp.132-33; Stenning, 1959, p.29.
 3. See Denham and Clapperton, 1826, pp.104-147.
 4. Vossart, p.42.

When Adana was being made leader of the Fulani in Adamawa, the title "Lamido Mandara" was considered, but was not representative enough of Adana's mission.¹ The population of Fulani in Mandara was small and insignificant in view of the consistent policy of the Mais of Mandara to keep Fulani and Shuwa Arabs away. (See above, p. 23) The bulk of the Fulani were settled in the Benue regions and it was with these Muslims that the new emirate was expected to be formed.

However, after a few skirmishes with a few of the old enemies of the Gurin Fulani, notably the small village of Ferma, Mandara was made the first important target in the Adamawa jihad.² The war in Bornu, al-Kanemi's intervention in it coupled with the exploits of Buba Yero, and the agitation of the small groups of Fulani bordering on Mandara, had, it seemed, aroused much more enthusiasm for the jihad among the Fulani in the North than elsewhere in Adamawa. It was here that there was the greatest sense of urgency. Throughout 1809, several delegations of Fulani ardo'en from the north had visited Adana at Gurin and

1. Informant 2, Yola.

2. Informant 1, Yola; contrast with Vickers-Boyle, p.76, and Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.131, which I think are exaggerations. Batta traditions support the view that it was during Lauwal's reign that the major wars were fought against the Batta.

pledged their support and loyalty.¹ When they returned to their various localities they organized the Fulani and their local associates for the jihad. With the disagreement among the southern Fulani over Adama's leadership still unresolved,² the inclination for Adama to begin the jihad in the north became obvious.

Mandara was important as the only Muslim state south of Bornu. Despite frequent contacts with Bornu the Mandara dynasty remained unconverted to Islam until the beginning of the eighteenth century during the reign of Bukar al-Hajj, the twenty-eighth King (tixe).³ It is not clear why the Mandara rulers resisted Islam for so long and what precisely influenced the conversion of Bukar Hajj. What seems clear however, is that after the conversion, Bukar Hajj assumed the Kanuri kingly title of Mai, in place of the Mandara tixe, a factor which probably suggests strong official Bornu influence. Nevertheless, tradition attributes the conversion to a Moroccan Malam Muhammad Guro and his son Umar during their return from Mecca through Baghirni.⁴ Could there have been a connection between the

1. From a collection of oral tradition at Yola and in some of the northern districts.

2. Infra, pp. 87-88.

3. Duisburg, 'Contribution à l'histoire du Sultanat de Mandara'; J. Mouchet, 'Note sur la conversion à l'Islamisme, en 1715 de la Tribu Wandala', Etud. Can., no.15-16, 1946, pp.105-107; E. Mveng, L'Histoire du Cameroun, Paris, 1963, pp.190-94. Hajj here is descriptive and only symbolic of his role in the conversion of many non-Muslims. (Mouchet, p.106.)

4. Mouchet, pp.105-107.

Morrocans and the Bornu court?

Islam in Mandara at the outbreak of the jihad presumably shared the general tendency of dualism and accommodation between Islam and pre-Islamic forms of worship. However, Adana does not seem to have been critical of Mandara Islam as say Uthman and Bello had been of the Hausa and Bornu leaders.¹ Mandara's prestige among its vassal states made its allegiance or capture a key to Adana's success in Adamawa. His forces would be greatly augmented by incorporating the defected into his army, and the way would be open to embark upon the subjugation of the less important tribes many of whom already acknowledged the sovereignty of Mandara.²

There were other factors which made it expedient to begin the jihad in Mandara. Having lived several years in Bornu, Adana was also perhaps concerned about the esta-

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1. This opinion perhaps reflects only a weakness in the sources. But it seems highly improbable that if indeed Adana had criticized Mandara Islam, it would have been completely ignored by the Fulani chroniclers, (see East, pp.19-25) when this would have in fact provided the only real legal basis for Adana's attack on the Muslims of Mandara. Cf. WS (Bivar) pp.240-41 which gives eight instances when jihad is considered legal by consensus; see particularly, XIV-XVI; also Ruxton, p.73; M. Khadduri, The Law of War and Peace in Islam, London, 1940, pp.36-37, an even stricter view makes jihad a duty only when the enemies of Islam are the aggressor.
 2. Denham and Clapperton, 1826, pp.104-118; Vossart, pp.33-42; Duisburgh, 'Contribution à l'histoire du Sultanat de Mandara'.

blishment of Fulani rule there.¹ If Mandara fell, Adama would be able to bring relief to the Fulani then fighting desperately against the combined forces of Bornu and al-Kanemi. The strength of Mandara had recently been considerably eroded by the success of the Badewa and Ngara-Fulani under Madibbo Danraka over the Guissiga one of the principal clients of Mandara.² Persistent raids by Shuwa Arabs on Mandara's north-eastern frontiers, sapped Mandara's strength.³ The Tuaregs to the north, and these Shuwa Arabs were equally a thorn in the flesh of the Bornu authorities, and during Denhan's visit ~~the~~ Mai was anxious that the Shuwa should see the effect of Denhan's rockets.⁴ The Shuwa raids in particular, and the lack of effort on the part of the Mai Bornu to check them, strained the relations between Bornu and Mandara and stood in the way of receiving instant help from Bornu in the event of a Fulani attack.⁵

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1. Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp.131-32 for further speculation that as a youth Adama had herded his father's cattle in the Mandara country and this was a contributory reason for his interest in Mandara.
 2. Prestat, pp.3-5; Strunpel, p.74.
 3. Denhan and Clapperton, 1826, p.116.
 4. Ibid., p.74; Schultze and Benton, 1968, p.19. Mockler-Ferryman, British Nigeria, London, 1902, p.134.
 5. Denhan and Clapperton, 1826, p.116.

The question of co-operating with the other flag-bearers of Uthman, Buba Yero, Yakubu and Gwoni Muktah cannot be discounted from Adama's overall plans. It was necessary for Adama to demonstrate that he held a place of primacy among the other Fulani ardo'en over whom he had been made leader. Any aid he gave to fellow Muslims and followers of Uthman dan Fodio, in the critical situation they were facing in Bornu, would be highly appreciated, and in this way, his prestige as a leader would increase both at home and abroad.¹

Late in 1810, almost two years after his elevation to leadership in Adanawa, Adama set out with a large force from Gurin going north on what was to be his first major effort in the jihad, following persistent reports of Mandara hostilities against Fulani.² Keeping close to the valley of the river Tiel, virtually dry at this period, Adama reached Guidder. Together with the local Fulani, he attacked Mulli Mali, the chief of Guidder, when he refused to submit. Mulli Mali was killed and many of his

1. The impact of this could be gauged from the defeat inflicted on the joint Bornu-Mandara force in which the English explorer Denham was a member in April, 1823. The news was immediately flashed all over Hausaland much to the credit of Adama that the Muslims of Adanawa had won a major battle against a large force from Bornu including Christians. Clapperton felt that 'it had been a lie deliberately spread by Arabs to save their credit'. Clapperton, 1829, pp.161, 194.

2. Cf. Denham and Clapperton, 1826, p.115. Adama returned to Gurin before the rains of 1809 and would have had to spend some months informing the Fulani leaders of his mission and waiting for at least the next dry season before launching any campaigns. This put the date of the campaign at either 1810 or early 1811.

people were captured. His son managed to escape west to the Libe mountains where Fulani cavalry could not ascend, leaving Guidder in the hands of the Fulani.¹

From Guidder Adana pressed on northwards. On his way he accepted the submission of many villages, while people who did not wish to be under Fulani rule took shelter, some permanently, other temporarily in regions not easily accessible to the Fulani cavalry. As Adana approached Dolo, the capital of Mandara, he camped first at Pette a few miles south. From here he sent a letter to Mai Bukar Djiana explaining that by the commission Adana had received from Uthman, Mandara fell within his jurisdiction and in the interest of Islam the Mai should come and do homage.² In Bukar's reply, he recognized Adana's overlordship over the Fulani and sent him presents including a female slave, but absolutely refused to compromise his own sovereignty over Mandara.³ But Adana would not

1. Strumpel, p.23; Maurice Baudelaire, Rapport Annuel de Guider, 1958 (typescript), Archives sous-Prefecture, Garua Vt/12/378; J.H. Shaw, Report on Madagali District; Adanawa Emirate, 1935, NIK, 25073; Lestringant, pp.277-280.

2. East, pp.23-31. All the European accounts -Strumpel, Lenoigne, Kirk-Greene, Lestringant - have relied almost exclusively on Denhan for the Fulani expedition against Mandara and without exception have given the date of Adana's attack as 1823 curiously ignoring his allusion to the destruction of Dolo about ten years back from 1823. From a collation of East and Denhan, it is most likely that the battle referred to in Denhan and Clapperton, 1826, p.115 is what is described in East, pp.23-31, and it is unlikely, unless the Mandara-Bornu attack had been anticipated for a long time, for Adana to have been present at Mosfei when the 1823 attack took place.

3. East, pp.23-31.

tolerate anything short of total submission.

Adama moved his forces from Pette to Pata, situated on the open field, where his horsemen were better able to fight. The Mandara army attacked Adama's force here, but the attack was repelled, and Adama strongly reinforced by Ngara Fulani pursued the Mandara to their capital which fell without prolonged resistance.¹ Meanwhile Bukar fled east to Mora another Mandara town that was more naturally defended against cavalry attack. Dolo was ravaged by Adama's men. For about a month Adama tried to set up a nucleus of government, but this was not possible because all the able bodied Mandara had either fallen in battle or fled the town with Bukar. Moreover there were no local Fulani at Dolo or its immediate neighbourhood. This meant that for Adama to consolidate his victory he had to stay in Mandara for as long as it was necessary to get a Muslim Government that was directly responsible to him actually functioning.

But as it happened, this option was made even more difficult by Adama's followers. Exhilarated by their swift victory, they became puffed up and difficult to manage.²

1. Ibid., pp.23-31; Denham and Clapperton, 1826, p.115; Lemoigne, p.134; Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp.131-32.

2. East, p.23.

In the enjoyment of their pleasures they neglected the duties of the Faith. Their hearts were turned only towards what booty they could collect and not on the defence of the town from a counter attack by the Mandara. All hopes of retaining Mandara eluded Adama, who, angered and disappointed, 'prayed for Mandara, that everyone should have back his home'.¹ The Mandara warriors returned and recaptured their town and put Adama's forces to flight and pursued them until they were well away from Mandara territory. The rainy season was fast approaching and so very little could be done to strike a second time that same year. Adama hurried to reach Gurin before the heavy rains started.

Though Adama had failed in his main objective of having a Muslim government that was subservient to him at Mandara, yet his initial military success had revealed the potentiality of his fighting force. The problem had not been one of military strategy but apparently of insufficient religious motivation among all of his men. In this battle many men were trying their skill in an organized combat for the first time. Some traditions state that there were several later encounters between Fulani and Mandara forces and that more than one of these were led by Adama in person, but on none of these occasions did the Fulani succeed

1. Ibid., p.23.

in replacing the old regime with one subserviant to Yola.¹

These events brought the Mandara-Fulani relationship to its worst level, ushering in a period of unrestrained hostilities. Bukar sent bands of armed Mandara to raid isolated Fulani camps and seize their property.² Meanwhile, the Fulani established at Marua, Mindif, Gudder and Bogo were consolidating their grip on the Diamare, and on the people of Mundang, sometimes by co-operating among themselves, at other times by fighting single-handed in their respective spheres.³ Before, the jihad, the Mai of Mandara claimed these tribes as being under his domination and ravaged their settlements for slaves for the Bornu and North African markets.

But with the increase of Fulani power in these regions, Bukar found himself virtually stripped of both political and economic influence all round him. On some occasions the Mandara slave hunters succeeded in raiding what had become Fulani districts and took along with them many slaves that included Fulani Muslims.⁴ As a measure against these predatory raids over the years, the Fulani

1. East, pp.29-31; Gazetteer, 1927, pp.16-17. Denham and Clapperton, 1826, p.115.

2. Denham and Clapperton, 1826, pp.112-116; East, p.29.

3. Lemoigne, pp.97, 134; Vossart, pp.45-46.

4. East, p.29. Informants 12, Marua; 13, Bogo.

constructed defensive outposts with enormous barricades at certain strategic points to strengthen their positions against Mandara cavalry. These defences seemed to have effectively checked both Bornu and Mandara from successful slave-raiding over territories where they formerly had no difficulties.

As a result, Bornu and Mandara decided on a cessation of hostilities between themselves in order that they might concentrate against their common enemy the Fulani, whose ambitions caused them serious economic and political problems.¹ The Mai of Bornu started by taking measures against the Shuwa tribes bordering on the North-eastern frontiers of Mandara to prevent them from sending marauding parties into Mandara.² This, at once opened the way for a treaty of alliance in 1823. By this treaty both parties decided to combine their efforts against Fulani aggression, and to further strengthen the detente, Bukar gave his daughter as wife to the Mai of Bornu, Ibrahim Ahmed, with the understanding that the bride price would be the produce of an immediate expedition into the country of the Musgun to the south-east of Mandara by a joint Bornu and Mandara force.³ This expedition was a great success to

1. Denham and Clapperton, 1826, pp.114 ff.

2. Ibid., pp.115-116.

3. Ibid., p.116.

the invaders. Bukar felt encouraged in his desire for a suitable occasion to inflict a similar defeat on the important Fulani settlements and reassert his authority which the Fulani so vigorously challenged.

By the end of the year, mounting tensions between Fulani and Mandara reached their peak. A delegation of Fulani notables, animated by a desire for a peaceful settlement left Mosfei and the neighbouring districts for Mora to negotiate with Bukar in particular concerning the detention of property belonging to their people.¹ Bukar admitted them in conference, but on their way back to their homes they were savagely murdered to a man, ostensibly by Bukar's eunuchs and the eunuchs' slaves.² Early in 1823 the presence of well armed Arabs from North Africa at the court of Bornu provided Ibrahim with the opportunity to aid his ally on another expedition. Bukar decided to direct the expedition against the Fulani strongholds at Mosfei and Zuay. Bukar apparently did not

1. Ibid., pp.116-17.

2. Ibid., p.117. The account, which appears as a footnote, is not quite explicit about who gave the orders to put the delegates to death, nor whether or not the eunuchs and slaves belonged to Bukar. But from the textual statement that Bukar had been 'for some months seeking for an opportunity to commence hostilities', pp.116-117, it is reasonable to infer that Bukar seized on the visit of the Fulani to commence hostility by ordering his eunuchs and their slaves to kill the Fulani.

want to take any chances; thus in his preparations he took meticulous care to keep the destination of the force as secret as possible. Moreover it would appear he summoned his immediate tributaries to send men, horses and provision for the giant army he was assembling even when this meant holding up the anxious troops from Bornu at his capital much longer than they had wanted.¹

Finally, the attack was launched against Mosfei and Zuay, two major Fulani strongholds, immediately after Musgow.² The Fulani forces, well entrenched behind high palisade barriers, rained poisoned arrows at the allied forces. The fighting went on for several hours, and the invaders could not dislodge the Fulani from their strong defences. The Bornu-Mandara army soon lost the initiative and became 'a flying mass plunged in the greatest disorder' despite their possession of fire arms.³

The period after this was marked by attacks and counter attacks from both Mandara and the Fulani. Bukar was forced to fortify Mora even more and to make the town his business capital, while the royal town of Dolo became

1. Ibid., pp.116-119.

2. Ibid., pp.131-141, for an eye witness account of the battle; see Clapperton, 1829, pp.161, 194 for some of its political after effects. It appears from Clapperton's account that the reason why the Fulani valued Denham's clothes (Denham and Clapperton, p.135) was to display them as ^{positive proof} ~~an alibi~~ that Christians had fought in the Bornu-Mandara army.

3. Clapperton and Denham, 1826, p.134.

like the Versailles or Windsor of Mandara with the Mai living there only part of the year.¹ All the important people of the Kingdom had their treasury and residence there, and until today, it is to Dolo that the Mais of Mandara go to wear the ^{leopard}~~tiger~~ skin and other attributes of the hunter Gayae, who founded the Kingdom, on the occasion of their accession to power.

The Fulani gained a firm footing to the east of Mandara and all efforts by Mandara to re-capture Fulani positions failed. The districts of Mubi, Moda, Madagali, Mitchiga, Guidder, and several others became firmly established with Fulani chiefs at the head of their administration. In the Fali country, south east of Guidder, Buba Kotshobi who had connections with Buba Yero's earlier expedition, extended his rule over Bashee as far as the Buri mountain.² Malan Sambo subdued the Fali of Burmi and founded the little district of Dembo. Yusufa of Maesso and his son Tunari, later known as Irdo Badessi, captured the town of Golonbe and thus pushed the boundary of the emirate to river Kebbi. Towards the north-east of Marua, a small but powerful group of Fulani had taken refuge at Kalfu from Baghirni. Their leader, Muhammad al-Hajj,

1. Vossart, p.45; Lemoigne, p.102.

2. Strumpel, pp.23-25; Baudelaire, Rapport Annuel de Guider.

like Adana, had received a flag from Uthman to carry on the jihad in Baghirni.¹ His attempts to seize power, however, failed and it became impossible for Fulani to continue to live in Baghirni. Before Uthman died (1817) he withdrew the flag he had given to Baghirni Fulani and asked them to do homage to Adana and be subject to the Adanawa flag.²

c) The Campaigns in the south:

The campaigns to the south were embodied in three major efforts by Hamnan Sanbo, leader of the Kiri'en, Ardo Njobdi, head of the Wollarbe, and Hamnan Dandi. When Adana came back from Sokoto he sent letters to all the important Fulani ardo'en to come forward and receive the flag which Uthman gave him to give them. Modibbo Hay was the leader of the Kiri Fulani in Chanba. He was already an old man, so he sent Hamnan Sanbo to get a flag for their group.³ Another tradition says Modibbo Hay refused to go to Yola when summoned by Adana, and in order to become Adana's flag bearer, Sanbo 'avec des gens de son

1. RJ (Harris) p.44; Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.84; Strumpel, p.85.

2. Barth, III, p.339; Strumpel, pp.85, 74; Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.84; Last, 1967, p.54. MS Bello to Adana (c) in my possession, to be deposited at LNY instructs Adana to give all help to the Fulani from Baghirni.

3. Informant 20, Tibati.

parti il (sic) parvient à capturer son oncle qu'il livre prisonnier à Adama'.¹ This was however not confirmed in my enquiries. It is unlikely as the tradition holds that so early in the jihad Adama asked the Fulani leaders either to submit or face Adama's army;² rather, Adama's initial approach was to win the Fulani round Uthman's flag through appeal to their common faith.³

Ahmadu, son of Modibbo Hay, was by birth the right person to have succeeded his father, since Hamman Sambo was only a nephew, the son of Hay's sister. But that same year (1809-1810) one of Hay's children had during a dispute killed a member of Sambo's house, and when the case was tried the house of Hay was found guilty. Sambo's appointment to succeed Hay was therefore a compensation for the loss his house had sustained.⁴

At first, when Sambo swore fealty and did homage to Adama he considered this as a simple religious gesture - one of showing recognition and respect to a great religious figure, Uthman, through his representative, Adama.⁵

1. Mohamadou, 1964, pp.27-29.

2. Ibid., p.27.

3. Strumpel, p.31.

4. The principle of retaliation and compensation is supported in Muslim practice, see Ruxton, pp.311-318.

5. Infra, pp. 164-65.

Sanbo received the flag as his authority to continue the jihad and convert new non-Muslim territories to Islam. It was a sign of his affiliation with Uthman's spiritual movement to reform Islam. He did not consider that he was called upon to subject himself to the rule and overlordship of Adana; that he must look up to Adana for both moral and political leadership such ^{as} Uthman and his descendants demanded of those who had sworn fealty to an Emir.¹

For a while after Sanbo received the flag, he occupied himself with consolidating his power over the tribes around Chamba in the spirit of Uthman's instructions. Adana, on one early visit to Sokoto, went in the company of some of his flag-bearers including Sanbo.² Sanbo seems to have been fired the more in his ambition of becoming a flag-bearer of Uthman himself without the intermediary of Adana. He convinced himself and his followers that the way to achieve this was to cease making jihad around Chamba, then considered part of Adana's sphere, and to go much further south where no Fulani had ever been before.³ This would be an entirely new territory outside Adana's jurisdiction. The Kiri'en, already

1. ^{See} KF (Hiskett), pp. 566-67; MS Aliyu Babba to the Community (Adanawa), see Appendix. B.

2. Informant 20, Tibati, see above, pp. 75, 79. This was before 1817 as the tradition reports that by then Uthman was still alive.

3. Informant 20, Tibati.

accustomed to this sort of adventure when they migrated from Gonbe to Charba, gave little thought to the hazards.

Towards 1820 Sanbo travelled south along the river Faro.¹ On his way he fought against the Nyan Nyan and Kutin. The region from south of Poli, the Nantchi country, through to the small Fulani outpost of Mayo Bantaji, to the edge of the Adamawa plateau, was very sparsely populated on account of the density of its forest. Sanbo made a quick march through until he reached Tingere on the north-western edge of the Adamawa plateau. The tribal settlements here were for the most part small and unorganized, and there was no attempt to resist Sanbo's demands for submission. The Manna, Woka, Tingere, Gabin, and eastern Kotopo sent representatives to Sanbo and agreed to recognize him as ruler. According to tradition collected at Tingere, Sanbo did not try to impose Islam on these people but was satisfied with their friendship and contribution in men to his troops.²

After one or two years he set off westward until he reached Delbe, the principal town of Bellaka Mbun. The Bellaka gave Sanbo assurances that his men would remain friendly with the Fulani and he would allow them to graze

1. According to the informants, nearly ten years after Adama brought the flag, i.e. 1819-20.

2. Gentile, Rapport Annuel, Tibati; Mohamadou, 1964, pp.29-37; Informants, 18, Ngaundere; 20, Tibati.

their herds in his territory during the dry season, when many Fulani herdsmen moved south to graze on the Adanawa Plateau, the present district of Ngaundere. In addition the Bellaka recognized Sambo as the head of all the Fulani who came to his territory.¹ Despite such favourable conditions, Sambo was still not content to make his final settlement in the Bellaka's country. He left one of his lieutenants Ardo Unaru as his personal representative at the court of the Bellaka. He did not build a mosque nor did he leave learned men to instruct would-be converts in Islam.²

He continued on his southward journey and immediately he left the Bellaka's territory into the Voute country he chose a settlement at Tibati on the river Mban, a distance of over two hundred miles from his original base at Chamba. Tibati was probably considered a suitable place to settle on account of its strategic position at the junction of three river courses - the Meng, Djerem and Sanaga. The vegetation was very luxuriant and supported a large population.³ Moreover Sambo wished to consolidate his influence over the vast regions he had traversed. Tibati was rich in pasture and its being so centrally

1. Informant 2, Yola; confirmed at Tibati and Ngaundere.

2. Informant 16, Ngaundere.

3. Cf. Barth, II, pp.621-22; Gentile, Rapport Annuel, Tibati.

located among the densely populated territories of the Tikar, Voute, Mbun and Baya, offered Sambo opportunities for building a new Empire in areas where no Fulani had settled before.¹ Tibati was outside the tse-tse fly zone, and the rain forest belt. Thus in due course many more Fulani would settle in Tibati without the risk of losing their cattle.

Sambo's reception at Tibati was also cordial. The Voute chief gave him land to settle with his people. The immigrants took wives from the natives and some families converted to Islam through intimate contact with the Fulani. Sambo felt so pleased with his success that he had no fear leaving behind his eldest son, Ahmadu Nyambula, while he returned to Chamba to meet the rest of his family and followers. On his return he found that in his absence the Kora and some unreconciled Chamba had attacked Laro, one of the principal towns in Chamba, and inflicted severe defeat on the Fulani.² Ardo Hamman Joda and Samaturu, with the blessing of Adana, led a campaign which successfully re-imposed Fulani authority over the town. Following

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1. Mohamadou, 1964, pp.29-37; Gentile, Rapport Annuel, Tibati. Over twenty years after Sambo's conquest of Tibati, Barth wrote that 'the town was inhabited for the most part by slaves, and not by Fulbe'. (Barth, II, p.622)
 2. H. Relly, 'Grandeur et décadence du Lamidat de Tchamba', 1954, Archives sous-prefecture, Garua; Informant 20, Tibati.

this Adana gave Joda a flag and recognized him as ruler of Laro.¹

Sanbo felt very much aggrieved by the loss of a town in an area where he had initially been the first Fulani leader to impose Fulani rule.² He thought Laro formed an integral part of his sphere from Chanba to Tibati. As a matter of courtesy Adana ought to have consulted him before giving the flag to Joda. This simply added to his longheld conviction that as long as he stayed within or near Adana's sphere of influence he would always receive a raw deal, and all his efforts to win new territories would not bring any benefit to himself. (See above p. 113) This encouraged him in his desire that the Sultan of Sokoto, Muhammad Bello, grant him an independent flag.

Sanbo left Chanba under the lawanship (lawan lit. deputy) of his cousin, Ahmadu and proceeded to take up permanent residence at Tibati intending to develop those territories with which he had initiated relations.³ Some of the Voute chiefs around Tibati submitted to Sanbo without a fight, and joined forces with him to make jihad against those peoples who neither converted to Islam nor

1. Relly, 1954; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.133; Mohanadou, 1964, pp.39-43.

2. Relly, 1954; Mohanadou, 1964, pp.39-43.

3. Relly, 1954; Mohanadou, 1964, p.41.

accepted Fulani rule. The effective use of the cavalry gave the Muslim forces an overwhelming advantage over many of the local tribes, who after defeat, were carried off as slaves to Tibati town.¹

The more Sambo's power increased the more his ambitions grew to venture even beyond the savanna into the rain forest. Here he came against Bamum or Panon expansionism under Mbuembue, the eleventh King (Mfon) of Fumbar.² According to the records Mbuembue's reign marked the peak period of Bamum state building. He is well remembered as the ruler who declared that he would fix the limits of his Kingdom 'with blood and black iron'.² After two initial successes at Fumbar in which Sambo scattered the population and took much booty back to Tibati,³ the Bamum people dug a trench six feet deep and four feet wide round Fumbar. This device, ironically reminiscent of the Muslim defense of Madina in the time of the Prophet, frustrated all later attempts by the Fulani to invade Fumbar by cavalry and so put an effective limit in the south to Fulani conquests.⁴

1. See n. 1, p.116.

2. H. Martin, 'Le pays des Bamum et le Sultan Njoya', Etud. Cam. No.33-34, 1951, pp.9-10; M.Littlewood, 'Peoples of the Central Cameroons', Western Africa, part II, 1954, p.55.

3. The first Fulani attack is said to have occurred during the reign of the 5th Mfon of Fumbar, Ngu 1st. The chronology of the events is obscure - see I. Dugast, 'La langue secrete du Sultan Njoya'. Since Sambo reached Tibati around 1820, it is unlikely that the first Fulani attack on Bamum was earlier than 1820.

4. Martin, 1951, pp.9-10; Kirk-Greene, 1958; pp.130-131.

Being very far from the Fulani bases, such expeditions would normally be very expensive to equip and consequently less frequent. The climatic conditions and the woodland vegetation might have also had an adverse effect on the Fulani armies, but the deciding factor was the distance which made even a single unsuccessful expedition a great disaster.¹ As a result Fulani expeditions to these regions more often took the form of raids for slaves and booty without the intention of occupation and setting up Muslim administration.

In this way, Sambo's treasury in slaves increased by leaps and bounds. Under the influence of such prosperity and security, with the ultimate hope of even carrying the jihad as far as the Atlantic Ocean,² Sambo reopened his case for a new mandate to govern his conquests independently of Adama. Bello still refused to change his father's decision to have Adama as the sole ruler of the Southlands.³ In 1837 Bello died, and his brother, Atiku, became Sultan of Sokoto. He granted Sambo an independent

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1. Cf. Von Kamptz, 'Expedition Voute-Tibati, 1899-1900', TI-45, LNY. Where Tibati had gained complete victory in the Tikar country, e.g., as at Bani, the Fulani were actually in occupation; but they could not do so at Ngambe where several years of fighting, had seen Ngambe armies driving back the Fulani.
 2. Barth, II, pp.624-26; 507-08; 302. According to a Hausa informant, Sambo actually led an expedition as far west as Ibo country near the sea and many Christians were enslaved.
 3. Barth, II, p.508; Strumpel, p.85.

flag; but his sudden death and the accession of a pro-Adama Sultan, Iliyu Baba, son of Bello, quickly reversed the decision of Atiku.¹ The result of this episode or "Sambo affair", as far as the pursuit of the jihad was concerned, was that in the end when Sambo rededicated himself to Adama, all Sambo's conquests were reintegrated into Adama's jurisdiction.

The second successful thrust southwards from the Benue districts was that led by Irdo Njobdi of the Wollarbe clan. The majority of the Wollarbe, as we have seen, were settled at Turua in Bundang at the outbreak of the jihad. (See above, p. 26) They were very rich in cattle. It was among them that some of the richest Fulani could be found.² They tended to be more sensitive about anything that put their property in jeopardy. Right from Malle they had not hesitated to emigrate from any area on the slightest provocation, and so avoid open confrontation with hostile peoples. They tried to win the friendship of those among whom they lived, and they refrained from conquests.

When the news of Uthman's jihad reached them, they joined the Fulani at Gurin to send Adama to Uthman. At this

1. For full story see infra, pp. 193 ff.

2. This survived into the jihad period and is true today. Cf. J. Donergue, 'La Region De l'Adamaawa', Monographie Camerounaise, No.22, 1953, LNY; Froelich, 1954; Mizon, 'Les Royaumes Foulbés', p.355.

tine the head of the Wollarbe at Turua was Ardo Umaru Julire, also called Umaru Borongo, a descendant of a long line of Wollarbe leaders who had led the group out of Malle. (See above, p. 24) Ardo Julire was unprepared to dispute Adana's leadership. He sent his eldest son Ardo Njobdi to go and receive the flag and do homage to Adana on behalf of his people.¹ Although they were ^{aware} of the responsibilities of the flag, which charged them to embark upon systematic conversion of non-Muslims, the majority of the Wollarbe were apparently unprepared to foresake their cattle husbandry for constant warfare. They feared the repercussions of so doing on their property.²

Njobdi had very limited elbow-room for expansion to any direction but the south. The river Faro formed a natural barrier to the West, and all hopes of uniting with the Fulani to the north of Turua were removed when early in

1. Informant, 2, Yola.

2. The general conservative attitude of the Wollarbe and their strong position in terms of wealth in cattle at the outbreak of the jihad are probably responsible for two types of tradition which, like for no other clan, emphasise either Wollarbe indifference to the jihad, or their importance as a group. Compare for instance Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.129 with Vicars Boyle, p.76 or Cardaire, p.65: "... Le foubé Bâ ne se fit pas fait prier pour devenir le lieutenant de Dan Fodjou mais il se souvint qu'à Touroua, Ardo-ben-Yobdi, chef des Vollarbé, et ses gens pouvaient prendre onbrage de cette investiture qui donnerait à un enfant d'un clan subordonné le pas sur eux. Il refusa donc respectueusement la récompense suprême, vint à Touroua et invita le chef Vollarbé à venir prendre le drapeau des mains de Shaihu. Ardo-ben-Yobdi, était un homme prudent mais peu conscient de ses vrais intérêts, il refusa de quitter ses troupeaux mais sagement pria Adana de se rendre auprès d'Ousmanou pour prendre sa 'parole'". Indeed according to this tradition Uthman gave Adana two flags, one red and /cont..

the jihad Jauro Dembo, Adana's son-in-law, established himself at Malabu and received a flag from Adana. As a matter of fact during the boundary settlement between Jauro Dembo's district and Ardo Njobdi's Chikito, part of Njobdi's land was ceded to Jauro Dembo.¹ The east of Turua led to territories claimed by Rai.

As a result Njobdi and his followers continued to maintain virtually the same position as before the jihad for over twenty years. For some time before 1833, the Fulani of Turua were accustomed to drive their cattle to graze on the Adanawa Plateau, or Lesdi hosere (Fulfulde), or Lahore (Mbun), during the seasonal transhumance to the south. Thus whenever expansion was contemplated by the Turua Fulani it was to the south, to the Adanawa plateau.

After the death of Unaru Julire, Ardo Njobdi and some cattle magnates began to advocate permanent settlement on the plateau.

The chief reason for this would seem to have been economic, namely, the discovery of the enormous potentialities of the Adanawa plateau for cattle breeding.² The

F/note cont. from previous page.

the other white and ordered Adana to place ~~them~~ before Njobdi; if he chose the white flag he should become leader, but if he chose the red, he should submit to Adana.

1. Informant 2, Yola; confirmed at Ngaundere.

2. Informant 16, Ngaundere.

reports brought back by those who went on transhumance to the plateau were often very encouraging. The grass on the plateau remained healthy and green all the year round. It was observed that the cows grew healthier and put on more weight faster than in many other regions. Moreover, the temperature on the plateau is mild with a mean average of 70° F to 80° F. The rainfall is fairly evenly spread out all the year round with an annual average of "45". The region is free from tse-tse flies, so that the animals could multiply and remain in good health. Ngaundere itself was situated a few miles from the right bank of the river Vina, an affluent of the Djerem. The river Vina and the small water basins that take their source from it, provided adequate water, which contained common salt (manda), and natron, very useful ingredients for cattle.¹ This concentration of so many favourable conditions in one region made Ngaundere look like a treasure house, an Eldorado for the Fulani. But many of the malams were unwilling to leave their houses, especially since they knew that the area was being claimed by Hamman Sanbo, on the grounds of having been the first Fulani to penetrate these regions, and open up relations with the chief, Bellaka Koiya.² Unless they

1. Cf. Délcroix, 'Enquête sur le lahoré de N'Gaundéré', Étud. Can. No.2, 1937, pp.43 ff; Domergue, 1953, for further observations on the economic potentiality of the Adanawa plateau for cattle ranching.

2. Strupel, pp.50-51; Informant 2, Yola.

were prepared to subject themselves to Sanbo's jurisdiction, they would inevitably come into conflict with Sanbo. The problem was further complicated by Sanbo's apparent indifference to Adana and the spirit with which he had undertaken his adventures into these southern districts.

On the other hand Njobdi was aware of Adana's suspicion of Sanbo; since he received the flag, Njobdi had remained on the best of terms with Adana despite the rather inconsistent attitude of the other two clan leaders, Sanbo and Buba Njiada, to Adana's leadership. Njobdi was therefore in a great dilemma since Adana was opposed to the Wollarbe taking up permanent residence on the plateau, because he felt that this might drive Njobdi into the hands of his rival, Sanbo.¹ If this happened, Adana would lose one of his richest group of followers, or at least the question of Njobdi's loyalty to Adana would be put into further uncertainties. Wakili Kawu explained that Adana was rather mistrustful of Njobdi's real motives for moving south, which he probably thought stemmed from the cession of some of Njobdi's northern territories to Adana's son-in-law, Jauro Dembo.

The more thought Njobdi gave to these problems, the more perplexed he became. About 1833 his patience

1. Strumpel, pp.50-51; Lacroix, 1952, pp.28-29; Mohanadou, 1964, p.39; Froelich, 1954, p.11.

virtually ran out. He had to provide a solution which balanced the agitation of the cattle magnates on the one hand, and the counsel of Adama and the malams on the other hand. Together with some very trusted malams he worked out a secret plan to settle the Wollarbe on the plateau. Describing the plan Wakili Kawu narrated as follows:

Three years before the Fulani fought the Mbun, during the season of transhumance to the Adamawa plateau, that is Ngaundere, Njobdi consulted with some of his trusted malams, and decided to encourage a big emigration (eggol) that year. The plan was that when the men and the cattle had been there for two years they should ¹ be prevented from coming back to Bundang. The operation of the plan was entrusted to Njobdi's chief servant Gabdo, the son of Janyi. When the Fulani were in Ngaundere, Gabdo would stage a fake revolt which would be seen as if he was going against Njobdi's orders to return to Bundang. In this way those who had sent their wealth would be induced to go to Ngaundere, and those who had not known the plan would think that Njobdi was forced by circumstances to go to Ngaundere. ²

This plan seems to have been aimed at three goals: to reassure Adama that Wollarbe settlement on the plateau was not motivated by a desire to support Sambo in his schemes against Adama; secondly, to diminish the

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1. The split household, the split herd, and the powerful influence of favourable pastoral conditions in deciding the movements of pastoral Fulani were normal practice. Cf. Stenning, 1959, pp.4-9 and pp.206-24 for a fuller discussion on Wollarbe Fulani pastoral movements from transhumance to permanent migration.
 2. Informant 2, Yola.

appearance of outright disobedience to Adama; thirdly, to avoid going through the process of seeking special permission from Sambo to extend his previous permission to graze in the region to one of permanent settlement.

The plan worked out handsomely for Njobdi and served all his purposes. About 1835 many of the Wollarbe, except the very old and very young, moved to Ngaundere from Turua in Bundang. At this point there was no thought of going on a jihad. The assertion or implied assertion, found in some recorded traditions, that the Fulani settlement of Ngaundere was inspired by a desire to make jihad in these regions is somewhat false as their primary interest was in the land and what it offered to Fulani cattle. This view is also confirmed by Mbum traditions:

When the Fulani came from Turua, there were other Fulani in Ngaundere, but they were Kiri and they were ruled from Tibati. The men of Tibati had only a few cattle; Njobdi had many cattle and so he wanted to settle at Ngaundere. Lamdo Tibati said Ngaundere was ruled by Bellaka Koiya and if Njobdi wanted to settle there, he must meet Koiya personally. The Wollarbe came and met Koiya at hosere Ngau'ha. Njobdi demanded that he and his people wanted land to live and graze their herd. Koiya asked Njobdi where he wanted to stay? Njobdi said at Lahore, and Koiya said no; because that was a hunting area for the people and it was from there that the people obtained their salt. Koiya showed them another place Ngau'hora. The name Ngaundere is got from the name of a man called Nyandere. He ruled the mountains. The Fulani stayed there and often gave cows to Koiya. He also gave them plenty of food. ¹

1. Informant 19, Ngaundere.

The settlement at Ngau'hora grew rapidly as more and more Fulani came to join the avant garde, and within three years the pressures on the land, especially around the Vina, began to tell on the Mbum population. The cattle found the salt and natron water so good that they often led themselves there.¹ Moreover the Mbum people had never been accustomed to such large herds of cattle, and so cattle theft became a problem for the Fulani. Many Mbum became servants or serfs of the wealthy Fulani and they joined their families and became Muslims.² This sort of mingling of Fulani and Mbum went on for a while; ^{it was} over two years before the pressures began to develop on Njobdi to invite Koiya to convert to Islam and enforce Muslim Law throughout Mbum country.³ The Fulani malams estimated that the Mbum would not risk a war with the Muslims, for though the Muslims were in the minority they were better armed.

Njobdi yielded, and Koiya was informed that according to an order from Adama, he should convert to Islam and do homage to Njobdi the leader of the Muslims in Ngaundere. This followed a series of disputes and riots

1. Delcroix, p.44; Informant 16, Ngaundere.

2. Informant 2, Yola; 18, Ngaundere.

3. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.134; Informant 2, Yola; 18, Ngaundere.

between Fulani and Mbum over the use of the waters from the salt lake.¹ When Koiya refused to submit to a Muslim authority the Fulani population gathered their auxiliaries and decided to force Koiya to submission. Koiya was virtually helpless, without weapons and not being used to war, he left Ngau'ha with his followers and retired to Ngauk'or, a better protected settlement against Fulani horses. He fortified the town and declared general hostilities including nocturnal raids on the Fulani.²

The situation became desperate for Njobdi whose followers were very much in the minority. Njobdi ceased to rely on his own resources alone, and sought for urgent help from Buba Njidda of Rai, and Sambo of Tibati. Partly to advance the cause of Islam, and partly for prestige reasons, these two great leaders sent assistance to Njobdi. After three months of siege, Koiya acknowledged defeat.³ In the peace settlement, Koiya accepted Islam as the religion for himself and his people. He further agreed not to interfere with Fulani administration of the entire district. Njobdi continued to recognize him as the ruler of his people

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1. Gazetteer, 1927, pp.15-61; Informant 2, Yola; 18, 19, Ngaundere.
 2. Strumpel, pp.50-51; Gazetteer, 1927, pp.15-16; Froelich, 1954, pp.10-12; Lacroix, 1952, pp.27-29.
 3. Strumpel, pp.50-51; Gazetteer, 1927, pp.15-16; Froelich, 1954, pp.10-12; Lacroix, 1952, pp.27-29.

subject to directives from himself. Njobdi agreed not to enslave the Mbum, but to work together with them to make jihad and bring other tribes into the Jama'a.

This marked the beginning of effective Fulani rule over the plateau region. Despite the lack of support from Adama, Njobdi nevertheless continued to remain loyal to Adama sending him regular tribute especially in cattle and slaves until his sudden death at Bundang, some say by poison.¹ With Ngaundere as a base, the Fulani made distant campaigns in the direction of the Congo and reduced the Baya and Kaka of Betare, Batouri and southern Meiganga into tributary states of Ngaundere. The Fulani, however, never succeeded in settling and setting up on-the-spot administrative machinery in these new lands, but contented themselves in either raiding and transporting the people of entire villages to Ngaundere, or visiting the subdued population from time to time to collect tribute.³ But as they approached the Congo and the coastal belt, they were effectively checked by tribes who also probably hunted for slaves in these areas, using guns obtained from Europeans.⁴

1. Cardaire, pp.65-66;

2. Strumpel, p.51; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.134.

3. Strumpel, p.52; Lacroix, 1952, p.29; Froelich, 1954, p.12.

4. Nizon, 'Les Royaumes Foulbés', pp.355-57.

The third southern campaign was further to the west of Ngaundere and Tibati. The leader was Hamman Gabdo Dandi. He was the son of Ardo Sannatu Jainu who led a group of Fulani at Bundang. At the outbreak of the jihad, Jainu sent his son Dandi to receive the flag for his group from Adama. The receipt of the flag did not change the leadership and Jainu continued to direct the affairs of his group.¹ However at the death of Jainu, possibly in the late twenties, the flag and the leadership became fused and Dandi moved his people from Wasandu to Toango, south of Chamba.

During the period of transhumance to the Voute or Babute country, and east of the Manbila plateau, he established pacts of friendship with the rulers and individual Voutes. As a result of this there was considerable inter-marriage between Voutes and the Fulani, and Dandi moved to take up permanent settlement among the Voutes near Kontcha. Though the Fulani were few, their power, especially the belief in the effectiveness of their prayer, was often recognized.

The Tikars of Kontcha were in the habit of attacking the Wollarbe Fulani from Toango who grazed their cattle on the slopes of the Manbila mountains. Dandi led an expedition against their stronghold at Kontcha which soon fell into Fulani hands. Dandi built a mosque and set up a Muslim administration at Koncha. The prestige, wealth

1. Strumpel, pp.53-54; Informant 21, Banyo.

and cultural attraction that marked out the Fulani made the task of conversion to Islam, especially among the Voute, a relatively easy matter around Kontcha.¹

While he was established at Kontcha, Dandi was invited by the Voute chief at Banyo to aid him crush a revolt by certain of his notables.² Dandi left the administration of Kontcha in the hands of his eldest son, while he proceeded south to Banyo with a large force of Fulani horsemen and Voute auxiliaries. On his way he attempted to conquer the Voute of the Mati hill who had been reinforced by unreconciled Chamba elements from further north, but the hills proved difficult to take by cavalry assault. He left and proceeded to Banyo.

At Banyo many Voutes embraced Islam including the Voute chief who had invited Dandi. The appearance of Dandi at Banyo did not deter those in opposition to the chief from pressing on with their schemes. According to tradition collected recently at Banyo Dandi met four Fulani Ardo'en Alkassum, Yakubu, Ambarka and Njidda of an earlier migration who had close connections with the "opposition"

1. Lacroix, 1952, pp.24-25; Strumpel, pp.53-54; Monographie de L'Arrondissement de Tibati, 1962 (typescript) archives Sous-Prefecture, Tibati and Banyo. It incorporates earlier administrative reports from German times.
2. Monographie de Tibati, 1962; Informant 21, Banyo.

persuaded Dandi to turn his support to the "opposition" and when this failed they attempted to kill Dandi.¹ The plot was however uncovered. The plotters and their allies were attacked and many of them were killed. Not long after this, the chief died and the Muslim community chose Dandi to be their next chief.² He took rigid steps to wipe out opposition, and to enforce Islam. None of the neighbouring tribes which refused to convert were given any option of becoming tributary states; instead their houses were destroyed and the inhabitants taken as slaves and sent to Yola. The cooperation of the Voutes made Dandi's task easier and Banyo became more important than Kontcha.

The town of Banyo grew by leaps and bounds and the Muslim force of Fulani and Voutes, levied jihad on the Wawa and Munchi peoples to the west sometimes as far as Igboland across the Cameroon highlands, and at other times, directly south against the Tikar of the kingdom of Bamum, where like Sambo, they too met with little success. In the process of consolidating his powers over the region, Dandi built another major settlement at Gashaka on the foot of the Mambila mountain. He left its administration in the hands of one of his sons Yaji. Both the governors of

1. Informant 21, Banyo.

2. Monographie de Tibati, 1962; Informant 21, Banyo.

Kontcha and Gashaka went to Yola where they too received formal recognition of their authority from Adama.

After Dandis death his successors continued to send expeditions to Bamum, Bansa and Bamenda, further to the south of Banyo, where many groups of Tikar had taken refuge after swearing never to see again the face of a Fulani.¹ But the long distance from Banyo as well as the climate and forest vegetation made it practically impossible for Fulani to settle even in the intervening areas which submitted to them. These expeditions inspired by a desire to bring more lands under Muslim rule were probably also a way of satisfying a sudden realization of excessive power. They had the effect of providing jobs and opportunities for a host of idlers, who on becoming Muslims, saw themselves as part of the ruling aristocracy and therefore spurned agriculture, the only occupation they knew, as the work for slaves.² In addition the expeditions could be seen as an emotional outlet for the several newly converted young men who were inspired by the adventure of going abroad to dominate other groups. This was the current way of life

1. P. Kaberry, Workers of the Grassfields, London, 1952, pp.4-5; McCulloch, 'Peoples of the Central Cameroons', Western Africa, Part IX, 1954, pp.20-24.

2. Monographie de Tibati, 1962.

and the way to demonstrate the strength of one's newly acquired faith.

During the reign of Lamdo Umaru at Banyo, (1893-1902) Fulani expeditions into Bamum started paying dividends in terms of permanent results. About 1895, Njoya,¹ one of the greatest rulers that had ever sat on the throne of Bamum, was threatened by a rebellion of some of his most influential councillors. He invited Umaru to aid him under definite conditions, that Umaru would receive as payment for his services all those who were opposed to his administration and return with them and their property to Banyo. This was probably a political move both to establish friendly relations with Banyo and to forestall any of the rebellious subjects asking similar aid from Banyo. It is also likely that as the power of Banyo became felt in those regions, Njoya wanted to project a calculated image aimed at winning recognition from Banyo. In the end it proved to be a way of weeding trouble-makers and all opposition to Njoya's rule. After successfully putting down the rebellion Umaru returned to Banyo with over fifteen thousand

1. For a detailed account of this most remarkable ruler see the account of his son Iddrisu Njoya, 'Les Pays de Bamum et le Sultan Njoya, translated by H. Martin, Etud. Cam., No.33-34, 1956, pp.5-40; for further reading see full bibliography in 'People of the Central Cameroons', Western Africa, 1954, pp.84-86.

prisoners, one of the greatest number that any single expedition had ever brought back of men and women, as well as wealth amounting to one hundred and seventy loads of salt, and three hundred pots of palm-oil.¹ After this episode, Njoya and his court became converted to Islam and maintained close relations with Banyo.

History does not deal with what did not happen, but it is of interest to imagine what would have happened with the good relations that had been opened between the Muslims at Banyo and the sultanate of Bamum.² It was no doubt one chiefly based on the personal relationship between Umaru and Njoya, but it was from such relations that Dandi, Umaru's grandfather, had won great expanses of territories that included Banyo itself and brought them under Muslim rule. In 1902 Umaru was murdered by the German expedition of Captain Nolte to Adamawa. This saw the dawn of a new era, the era of European domination, which checkmated the southward advance of the Fulani and Islam through jihad wars.³

1. Martin, 1951, p. 19; Dubic, 1950, pp.5-6; Littlewood, 1954, p.56.

2. Cf. M.D.W. Jeffreys, 'Banyo: A Local Historical Note', Nigeria Field, Vol.XVIII, April, 1953, pp.87-91; Martin, 1951, pp.19, 31-32.

3. The mosque at Fumban was destroyed in 1902 and Christianity was introduced by the German Basel Mission. The experiment came to an abrupt end when after the defeat of the Germans in Cameroon, in 1917 Njoya sent a delegation of notables to Yola to formally receive the investiture from Lamido Abba.

3) Campaigns after Adama.

Adama died in Yola as the tradition say , of pneumonia on Sunday, 14 February 1847,¹ and the task of organizing the affairs of the emirate passed on to his eldest son, Muhammad Lauwal. He was of outstanding courage and immense personal resourcefulness.² At the time he took office, he had over thirty years of experience in the jihad. His background was very different from his father's, having lived the greater part of his life in a situation of constant fighting. Encouraged by his father's dying wish not to abandon the jihad (See below, p. 215) he made it one of his foremost concerns. Hitherto his father's military control over his flag bearers had been minimal. There was no central army, nor a central command. Moreover Adama had himself led very few expeditions in person, and even where he led an expedition, such as the famous Mandara campaign, he relied much on others.

Lauwal's approach seemed somewhat different. He organised and conducted many campaigns in person. He charged the Muslims to be on the offensive and to assert their religion. He did not consider it enough for the

1. Adama Gana, Marthiyyat modibbo Adama, Adamprof 5/9 NAK. The main sources on Adamawa history have hitherto given either 1847 or 1848. The discrepancy may be that some authors take 1808 when Adama left Gurin to Sokoto as their starting point, while others, 1809 when he returned with the flag.

2. East, p.33.

Muslims to attack their enemies only when the non-Muslims gave cause for it through provocation or when there was some immediate benefit to be derived from the attack.¹ He saw all those areas which his father's flag-bearers had subdued, or which lay within their various spheres of action, as his land.

But in many of these districts the Fulani conquests were still uncompleted. In 1851, Barth gave us a glimpse into the reality of the situation when he remarked that Adamawa

is as yet far from being entirely subjected to the Mohammedan conquerors, who in general are only in possession of detached settlements, while the intermediate country, particularly the more mountainous tracts, are still in the hands of the pagans.While the country north from the Bénuwé, between Yola and Hamarruwa, (Muri) is entirely independent, 2

In some parts notably around Yola itself, the Fulani still lived as before the jihad, recognizing the overlordship of some Batta and Verre chiefs in their areas. He therefore forbade all Muslims from paying any form of compensation to non-Muslim chiefs for grazing in their territory, and reminded the flag-bearers of their responsibility to continue making jihad.

1. Informant 1, Yola.

2. Barth, II, p.503.

A new enthusiasm was kindled. The Batta around Yola whom Adama had refrained from attacking were requested to convert to Islam, or retain their administration and forms of worship, but recognize Lauwal as overlord and pay him tribute.¹ Many of the Batta, for example, Bagale, Demsa, Bilei, Bachama, Mbulle who had since the beginning of the jihad rejected Fulani attempts to impose Muslim rule continued to refuse to surrender to Lauwal. Bagale was the nearest of these Batta settlements to Yola, only seven miles away. The mountain supported eighteen little hamlets of independent Batta clan. The mountain consisted chiefly of granite and had a very rugged surface. This rendered their hill-tops inaccessible to cavalry and gave them a large measure of confidence which a Fulani minstrel described as vain self-esteem.²

This position had hitherto enabled the Batta to repel all attacks which Fulani made against them, and encouraged them to assert themselves as owners of the plains below the hills.³ For many years before the Fulani jihad, these Batta controlled the movements of cattle herders in these regions. With the outbreak of hostilities

1. Infra, pp. 136 ff.

2. East, p.41; ^{see also} Barth, II, p.478; Carnochan, 'The Bagale War', Translations from Recordings.

3. East, p.41; Carnochan, 'The Bagale War'.

they tried to bar the Fulani from pasturing their cattle along the stream of river Chuchi, a very popular grazing site, by descending from their hills and carrying off Fulani cattle.

Around 1850, three years after Lauwal ^{assumed} ~~ascended~~ the sarauta,¹ Lauwal decided to make war on Bagale.² Lauwal was in a weaker position militarily, since he could not dislodge the Batta from their stronghold through the joint action of both infantry and cavalry. This combination in other parts largely accounted for Fulani victories since the non-Fulani, except Mandara, could not afford both cavalry and infantry.

For two years Lauwal did not make progress and the cost of maintaining a large standing army on dried meat and other preserved food was becoming unbearable.³ A new idea was developed. Instead of periodic sieges mounted from Yola, Lauwal settled his troops permanently at strategic points on the plains, so that in this way the soldiers could be permitted to live their normal family lives,⁴ and perhaps also, alleviate Yola's civilian trepidations about

1. Sarauta is a Hausa word in common use meaning office of position of authority.

2. East, p.39; Barth, II, p.479.

3. East, p.39.

4. Ibid., p.39; Yola District Note Book (Mainly touring notes (on Namtari, Girei, Malabu, Holma, Gurin and Song) by W.O.P. Rosedale, 1916, still in MS).

war. As a military strategy, this would enable the troops at these points to fight all the year round and so prevent the enemy from farming. The annual dry season campaigns would not accomplish this.¹ The first of such military settlements was Girei, which was closely followed by Namtari. These were linked by a number of other small settlements.

These devices did not immediately bring victory to the Muslims. Further down the river Benue, the Fulani were hard pressed by the Demsa Batta and this dispersed the attention of Lauwal's forces. The Demsa lived on open country, and had very able fighting men, who were probably inspired by the apparent invincibility of their fetish, Nzeanzo at Farai.² An attempt to put a quick end to their menace ended in an ignominious defeat for Lauwal.

At Yola, a diviner probably Malam Abubakar from Digino,³ had told Lauwal that the Bagale war would not be

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1. Strumpel, pp.33-34; Such military strategy was followed by Idris Alooma of Bornu and in the Sokoto empire by Bello (see Last, 1967, pp.77 ff.).
 2. Cf. East, pp.43-47;
 3. See East, p.39; The actual role of malam Abubakar in the conquest of Bagale appears uncertain. The account that he received great rewards from Lauwal immediately after the Bagale wars were over, is confirmed in Yola as true, but it is doubted that his song of praise to Lauwal was alone sufficient to deserve the reward he received. On collating the tradition in East and what I collected at Yola it seems most likely that malam Abubakar was the fortune teller.

won unless Lauwal made his brother Mansuru leader of the army. Lauwal had opposed the idea when it was first mooted, because if he won under such circumstances it would look as if he had put his whole trust on this man and not in God. In 1853 however, he succumbed, since the situation was further aggravated when the Yola mosque was burnt by a Bagale man.¹ He made Mansuru commander in-chief of the army.

By some coincidence that same year one of Lauwal's concubines, pretending ~~as if~~ ^{that} she had escaped from her master, was given refuge by the Batta on their hills.² She led some of Lauwal's men secretly at night up the hill and showed them the houses of the leading warriors. Then she started a fire on one side of the village early in the morning, and the Batta thinking it was the Fulani who had started war, rushed to the direction of the fire; but as they came out of their houses Lauwal's men shot them down and set fire to their houses.³ Even in defeat, some

1. Rosedale, Yola District Note Book. Malam Hamman, the first Lamdo Song, died in Yola when he went to help repair the destruction caused by the fire.

2. Ibid., Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp.138-139; Carnochan's traditions identify the woman as a Batta from Girei.

3. Rosedale, Yola District Note Book; Strumpel, pp.34-35; Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp.138-39; Barth, II, p.479 reported that the Fulani took Bagale 'with the assistance of a few muskets'. See East, p.79 for another reference to the use of firearms in Adamawa during the reign of Lauwal (1847-72). During the Zubeiru-Hayatu war, Strumpel, p.40, claims that Hayatu used guns. It is difficult to establish their types and sources of supply. What is clear beyond doubt is that firearms never became important weapons of war in Adamawa until war with the Europeans was contemplated. At Sokoto where guns are re-

of them refused to live under a Fulani regime and fled to join other Batta groups and continued the struggle against the Fulani. Others who ^{submitted} ~~acquiesced~~ to the Fulani were settled on the plains at Lugga Bagale where they became Muslims and received excellent treatment from Lauwal. At the end of the battle, Lauwal gave thanks to God and rejoiced exceedingly; he thanked his people and prayed that they should be granted prosperity and true religion on earth.¹

After Bagale, Lauwal felt very much reinforced; firstly, since a formidable enemy so close to the capital had been removed, and secondly, since he incorporated many of the Bagale fighters into his forces. He attacked Bilei, Demsa and Limadi, where, adopting the same tactics of building military camps close to the scene of battle, he was able to conquer his enemies.² The more secure Yola became, the freer he felt to send distant expeditions especially to the north either to reinforce local troops against incursions from Mandara and Bornu, or to help consolidate Fulani power over partially subdued tribes. This went on until his death in 1872.

According to Fulani historians, the jihad continued into the Lamidship of Lauwal's two immediate

F/note cont. from previous page.

reported to have been in use, only slaves bore them.
(see Last, 1967, p.73).

1. East, p.39.

2. East, pp.43-45, 55-57, 61-69; Yola District Note Book.

successors, Umaru Sanda and Zubeiru, and was terminated only by the intrusion of the Christians.¹ After Lauwal however, the subsequent wars did not add substantially to the territorial frontiers already set at the end of Lauwal's rule and the wars were more in the nature of consolidation within Adamawa.²

e) The Jihad in retrospect.

In retrospect how has the jihad in Adamawa been seen? Mizon, Strumpel, and others saw it as a Fulani revolt against oppression from non-Fulani who were the masters of the land.³ Barth called it 'a religious war'.⁴ that Professor M.G. Smith and Marilyn Waldman have demonstrated/ the nature of the jihad in Hausaland as well as in Adamawa was far too complex for a single definition.⁵

Today the Fulani themselves argue that the Uthmaniyya movement in Adamawa represented no more and no less than a jihad. They point to the fact that they got initial legal clearance before beginning war.⁶ And during

1. East, p.15.

2. Cf. East, pp.88 ff.; Strumpel, pp.43 ff.

3. Mizon, 'Les Royaumes Foulbés', p.349; Strumpel, p.12; Masson, p.7; Lestringant, pp.110-11.

4. Barth, II, p.468.

5. T. Hodgkin, Nigerian Perspectives, Oxford, 1960; M.G. Smith, 1966, pp.408-424; Waldman, 1965, pp.333-55; also H.F.C. Smith, 1961, pp.169-85.

6. See above, pp.77 ff.

the jihad scrupulous efforts were made to act within the Islamic laws governing the conduct of jihads. Without this, there was general agreement that Uthman's jihad would have been a failure. But in the opinion of the Adamawa Muslims the jihad succeeded, as indeed they assert, 'the Faith was purified and exalted and none said nay'.¹ On account of the importance attached to the way the jihad was conducted I have thought it worthwhile to quote the tradition at length:

When the Lamido or district governor decided in advance to make jihad on a non-Muslim village, the Lamido and his councillors met and selected a group of non-Muslims. The Lamido would send messengers to the Arnado, to convey by word of mouth the wishes of the Muslims that his people should convert to Islam.² The messengers would greet the arnado on behalf of their chief and inform him that should he accept Islam he and his people would be equal to the Fulani and other Muslims and would be all subject to the same Law. His people would trade freely and intermarry with other Muslim people. There would be peace between his people and the Muslims. He would be protected against attack and no one would molest or enslave his people.

After consultations with his councillors, the arnado would either accept or reject the Lamido's request. If the arnado accepted Islam,³

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1. East, p.19.
 2. This was in keeping with the obligation of the amir al-mu'minin to summon the non-Muslims to Islam. (Ruxton, p.73; Khadduri, pp.19 ff; WS (Bivar) pp.239-40; Memo. on Adamawa jihad).
 3. i.e., the five duties initially expressed in the form of learning a few phrases in Arabic to enable them to pray. (See Barth, II, p.376.)

he or some of his most important men would accompany the Lamido's messengers to express their wish to become Muslims. The Lamido would immediately appoint some Fulani malams ¹ to go and settle with the converts, to teach them how to pray and what was required of them by the law ² and Traditions of Islam. From then they would enjoy the status of Muslims or free men as well as be involved on the side of the Muslims to make jihad against non-Muslims.

On the other hand, if the arnado turned down the request to convert to Islam, before the Lamido's messengers left his presence, they would further suggest that to avoid hostilities the arnado should accept tributary status. ³ In this way his village would not be attacked, he would be allowed to practice his traditional forms of worship and he would continue to govern his people according to their own laws and customs but from time to time he would send tribute and fight on the side of the Muslims.

If the arnado refused this offer also, the messengers would express the peaceful intentions of the Lamido, and the privileges the arnado would miss if he persisted in living outside the Muslim community. The messengers would ride off to report to the Lamido that the arnado had refused all persuasions to convert or to pay tribute. The Lamido would confer again with his councillors upon what strategies to adopt. If there were any doubts about the military disposition of the arnado, the Sarkin Yaki, commander of the troops, would send out scouts to study the military details of the village - its natural defences, the nature of its approaches, the quantity and nature of weapons of its

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1. 'Malam' is a Muslim teacher. In Hausaland it has the same meaning as Modibbo in Adamawa, i.e. learned man.
 2. The law referred to here is Maliki law which was enforced throughout the Sokoto empire to the exclusion of the ~~other~~ orthodox schools, Hanafi, Shafi'i, Hanbali.
 3. In the early days of Islam, this status (dhimmi) was considered a step higher than that for those without a recognized faith, e.g. idolaters or polytheists, and was reserved for Christians and Jews - the People of Scripture. It was applied in Adamawa within the general sense of 'tolerated infidels'. For more details cf. H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, Oxford, 1957, Vol. I, part II, pp. 207 ff.

inhabitants, the peoples' morale, and suitable sites for pitching camp.

Meanwhile, the Lamido would write to all the district governors, or, if a district governor were himself acting, he would inform the central administration in Yola and the neighbouring district governors of his intentions and solicit their prayers, and if necessary, material aid. He would tell them of the date and time of the attack. The Lamido would begin to move in the direction of the attack about a week before the D-Day. On his way, he would send messengers again to the arnado giving him about five days within which to decide on submission or war.¹ In his message the Lamido would inform the arnado that he had come himself because the arnado had failed to comply with his request; 'your obstinacy has annoyed me and I have come personally with all my power. I know one of my district governors can defeat you, but I have come personally because of the consideration I have for you. I have given you several alternatives but you reject all. This is my last warning!

As each district governor or leader arrived with his division he would be met by his bero² who would inform him that the Lamido had heard of his coming and he was extremely pleased with the preparations and sacrifices he had had to make. The bero would, after consultation with the Lamido, inform him when the Lamido would receive him in audience. In the presence of the Lamido, the district governor would in very carefully selected words flatter the Lamido and boast that his division alone could destroy the enemy. He would ask why the Lamido had taken the trouble to come himself, why he had not simply instructed him to do the job? Each division would make similar eulogies and

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1. The Muslims were forbidden to take the non-Muslims by surprise.
 2. bero means host and guest; see a full discussion, pp. 233 ff.

claims. Back at the respective camps, the district governors would exercise their men who would make cries and gestures affirming their loyalty to them and the Lamido. Some would assure their governor that they would be the first to ride right into the heart of the non-Muslim village and teach them how to obey. 'When I come back', they would say, 'I'll show you my spear. No one will do it before me. I promise'.

On the eve of the battle the Lamido would assemble all the leaders of the divisions. He would thank all of them for coming. 'I have seen you as I heard you; that was what I expected. I am sure you are going to fight on the day of the battle, but let me assure you again that the war is not for my own sake. It is not for the sake of my family; it is not for the sake of any individual; it is for the sake of Islam; it is for the sake of Islam as it is written in the Koran.¹ If you do well you will be rewarded in the next world. My concern is only to organize you, to see that you fulfil your religious obligations, to lead you, to instruct you so that you attain success. Let everyone rest assured that if he falls sick I'll provide him with medicine; if anyone should sustain any losses it would be my responsibility to compensate him. I am very pleased that you answered the call of God. I am sure we will win but let us remember that everything we do is in the name of God and for the sake of our religion'.

After exhorting them in this way, the Lamido would distribute presents of horses, weapons, and clothes among the leaders of divisions saying: 'You know your men, go and distribute these to them'. All would retire to their camps and at the end of the day the Lamido would lead a special prayer which all would

1. The verse probably referred to is Quran, IX.29 'Let there be in you a nation summoning unto the good'.

attend.¹ Early in the morning of the day of the battle, the Lamido will once again send a messenger to inform the arnado when the attack would commence. He would let the arnado know that if he decided to convert or pay tribute, the Muslims would retire without striking a blow, but if he still insisted on having his own way he would be attacked, defeated and enslaved.

At the appointed time, usually during the day time, the Muslims would advance against the arnado. The horse men charged first following a sign from the Sarkin Yaki, and the cry, "Alla'ukbar". The horses gave the Fulani greater mobility in combat, and this together with the heavy protection they had against arrows made it possible for them to penetrate right into the line of the enemy and engage them in close combat, for which the non-Muslim forces were usually ill-protected. The horse men broke up the enemy forces while the foot soldiers chased and captured them as they tried to run away. The Muslim forces had overwhelming advantage over their enemies on the open fields because it afforded suitable opportunities to put their horses to the most effective use.

Children, women and the aged were left untouched during the fighting. All men were either captured or killed. In some instances, where the resistance was strong and protracted, the houses were set on fire at the first opportunity.²

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1. Throughout the thesis instances of prayer, especially during campaigns, form a recurrent feature (see e.g. pp.105, 73,185) Generally speaking among Muslims prayer serves a variety of functions as an index of reforming zeal, or of a community being or having become dar al-Islam, an instrument for state craft, and a weapon against one's enemies. During campaigns prayer served as a form of military discipline providing the sense of community involvement as well as cohesion. Since prayer provided an explanation or rationalization for success or defeat, it allowed the Muslims to withdraw in good order or to accept death with dignity.
 2. The houses and farms of the non-Muslims may be destroyed in warfare provided such destruction does not injure the Muslims themselves (Ruxton, p.76). Uthman's specific instructions were: 'In war you are not to kill women and children and old people, and you should not destroy cont..

At the end of the battle the booty would be assembled before the Lamido who would share it among the leaders of the divisions while retaining some, usually estimated at one-fifth for himself.¹ The non-Muslims who escaped capture either went to found new settlements out of the reach of the Fulani horses, for instance, on rough or mountainous regions, or to join other settlements to continue to defy Fulani supremacy.

There can be little doubt that the Fulani viewpoint, if ever it represented the usual practice, shows many theoretical elements. It could be generally said that in a large movement, such as the jihad in Adamawa, with a leadership that was initially very weak militarily vis-à-vis some of the district governors, and with activities ranging over such large expanse of territory, and involving people with such diverse backgrounds, one thing that would not be produced would be the degree of harmony which the simple expression "jihad" presupposed. The movement was often very complex, and possessed in-built tendencies that sometimes reversed the ideal. A problem is the absence of contemporary sources on the conduct of both the Muslims and non-Muslims during the jihad campaigns. The Batta traditions, where they admit defeat by the Muslim

F/note continued from previous page.

farms, and useful fruit-trees except for eating' (Memo. on Adamawa jihad).

1. See discussion immediately following.

forces, consistently say the Fulani used lies and subterfuge to achieve their aims.¹ But what constituted 'lies and subterfuge'? The problem, at this stage, would seem to be one of sources rather than of interpretation.

However looking at the jihad as a developing process throughout the nineteenth century, there is substantial evidence which would considerably modify the Fulani view-point. Barth, who was the first European to make observations on the jihad in Adamawa remarked that the wars destroyed the 'natural germ of human happiness, which are spontaneously developed in the simple life of the pagans, and spreading devastation and desolation all around'.² Then Mizon who actually was in Yola and witnessed preparations for a war remarked as follows:

La tactique des Foulanis consistant à les surprendre brusquement avec leur cavalerie, le secret est gardé jusqu'au dernier moment; ce n'est que lorsque la cavalerie sera réunie, bannières déployées, que le sultan indiquera à son frère le peuple à ramener à l'obéissance.³

From Mizon's account, it is explicitly stated that the people concerned were 'les tribus revoltées, so that it is not clear whether such tactics were also employed against

1. See e.g., Carnochan, 1967, pp.629-33.

2. Barth, II, p.468.

3. Alis, 1894, p.250.

those on whom jihad was being made for the first time.

Besides such generalized observations which fill the pages of European accounts, there were many more specific instances of undue emphasis on material aspirations often at the expense of the spiritual ideals.

The Mandara campaigns are a classic example of how much some Muslims put material considerations before the spiritual mission they had assigned to themselves. (See above p. 105) The attitude of Adama's followers confirm what some informants said, that no fixed pattern prevailed in the sharing of booty. This example and the experience among the followers of Bello,¹ suggest that the legal precepts were often difficult to enforce and the motives of the principal leaders were sometimes mixed and estranged from each other.

The Muslim conquerors had the spiritual obligation to invite those they conquered to pray and initiate them into the Faith,² but any systematic conversion before enslavement was against the material interest of the Fulani conquerors who wanted the captives as slaves for the market and as serfs to work for their profit both at their homes and in the fields. Some conducted their

1. al-Hadj Saïd, pp.306-07.

2. Memo. on Adamawa jihad.

campaigns in spite of Adama, and directed much of their attention to soliciting flags directly from Sokoto. Njidda went so far as to refuse Adama help in a critical campaign against the Namtchi who for several years had harrassed the Fulani on their western frontier. This led directly to Adama suffering a disgraceful defeat. (See below, p.171) Also the district governors considered the unsubdued regions in their neighbourhood as a sort of "private reserve" (chasse gardée), in which they maintained clients, or which they attacked to capture slaves in times of need.¹

This induced plenty of rivalry among the Muslim leaders. For instance when Hammidu Nyambula of Tibati saw Ngaundere superceding Tibati as the most important Fulani district on the Adamawa plateau, and since this had involved levying war on regions he considered belonged to Tibati, he began to make war against Ngaundere and later on against Banyo and Tignerq, which escalated into a confrontation between Hammidu Nyambula and Lamido Lauwal:

...After that Lamido Lauwal set out, collected his army, vast beyond number, and went to Tibati to attack Ardo Hammadu. Then he called in the Chief of Ngaundere and the Chief of Koncha. They both came to his aid. When they arrived at Tibati they pitched camp. Then Ardo Hammadu went out with his army to meet them, and engaged them in a fierce encounter. The armies of Yola and Ngaundere and Koncha were stung to anger

1. Lacroix, 1952, p.30.

and fought a hard battle with much slaughter. The struggle continued till they arrived at the town wall, where the fight grew more furious still. 1

Likewise when Lando Bibemi, Hamman Joda as ally of the non-Fulani chief, Peve of Dari, attacked the Lane, Buba Njidda of Rai ran to the support of the Lane whom he considered his protégés, though this involved Muslims fighting against Muslims, and worse still, Fulani belonging to the same clan of Illaga.² The attachment to the Faith, which in well ordered jihads should discipline and bind the faithful together, was apparently not always evident. Perhaps the harshest stricture on the jihad in Adamawa has been that of Lestringant:

Tout est venu d'une dégradation de l'idéal spirituel. Les redevances versées par les vassaux à l'emir ne furent plus consacrées à renforcer les actions d'extension de l'Islam. 3

This said, it is agreed by both Muslims and non-Muslims that an essential character of the jihad was that it signified a struggle between two religions, Muslim and traditional. The wars were not merely the outward physical confrontations between peoples, but also a trial of strength for the supernatural forces which buttressed their respective beliefs. Thus the adherents of a cult

1. East, p.59; for more e.g. of rivalry among the districts see Ibid., pp.51 ff. Strumpel, pp.52-53; Lacroix, 1952, pp.29-31.

2. Strumpel, p.55; Lacroix, 1952, p.31.

3. Lestringant, pp.113-14; see also Strumpel, p.32.

surrendered or expected defeat only after the superiority of their opponents' religion had been proved. This is strongly portrayed in the account of Lamido Lauwal against Demsa: *

...the pagans told Lauwal, it was impossible to come to Demsa, unless he pierced with his spear the house of their fetish, called Njanja Farai... Afterwards when the pagans realised that it was Hana Gewal who had speared the house of their fetish and was thereby the cause of their defeat 1

As a further illustration, about 1895 when Lamdo Umaru of Banyo assisted Sultan Njoya to crush a revolt of his notables, Sultan Njoya asked Umaru what magic he had used? Lamdo Umaru replied that 'his strength lay in his Mohammedan faith and prayer'.²

An adjunct to this was the close identification of the jihad, and all that it entailed, with the Fulani.³ This was so in spite of the fact that the composition of the rank and file of the Muslim forces became largely non-Fulani as the jihad progressed, being made up of Shuwa Arabs, Kanuri, Hausa and the local Adamawa tribes who virtually constituted the entire infantry core. As long as the non-

1. East, pp.43-47.

2. Littlewood, 1954, p.56; See also J.A. Burdon, 'The Fulani Emirates of Northern Nigeria', The Geographical Journal, XXIV, 1904, pp.640-41 for a similar comment after the Muslim victory over Yunfa, Sarkin Gobir.

3. Cf. Mizon, 'Les Royaumes Foulbés', pp.346-68; Labouret, pp.88-93; Carnochan, 'Translations from recordings' suggest that the wars were also seen by the Batta as ethnic wars between Fulani and non-Fulani.

Fulani acknowledged the religious superiority of the Fulani, though both might call themselves Muslims, the non-Fulani would accept an inferior position in the new social and political hierarchy that was creeping in with Muslim successes in the battle field. The standards of the Fulani were taken as ideals by the non-Fulani. Unlike say in Nupe, another border emirate of the Sokoto empire, no non-Fulani tribe took over Islam as a medium to pursue its traditional political role.¹

There was thus no attempt by the non-Fulani Muslims to challenge the religious leadership of the Fulani, who, in Lacroix's apt description, continued to exercise 'une sorte de confiscation de l'Islam à leur profit qui explique pour une part leur peu d'inclination à faire du prosélytisme'.² This phenomenon also accounts for the jihad as an instrument for the spread of Islam ^{why} ~~being~~ ^{was} limited mostly to the areas which the Fulani were able to occupy, a factor which in turn was dictated by suitability for pastoral culture.

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1. S.F. Nadel, Nupe Religion, London, 1954, p.233. Here for a long time Islamization of the region became inextricably bound up with the pursuit of local political interests and since the chief was the first to convert to Islam, he had a political as well as a religious interest in its propagation.
 2. Lacroix, 1966, pp.402-03; also Masson, p.6.

Nevertheless, the revolution in terms of political and social integration was plainly visible. By the end of the jihad (1901), the Fulani initiated movement had succeeded in setting up a Muslim regime on the ruins of several non-Fulani chiefdoms.¹ It had introduced a new type of cohesion.

1. Barth, II, p.393; for an exaggerated view-point of the achievements see Orr, 1965, p.59.

... In place of hidden huts, we find great walled cities; in place of a naked pagan, we find the cultivated follower of Islam, clothed in flowing robes; in place of the witch doctor, the grave and learned judge, ...

CHAPTER III

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CENTRAL
ADMINISTRATION 1809-1847.

a) 'Lamido Fombina'.

The administrative task of the Uthmanis in Hausaland was relatively easier than in Adamawa. In Hausaland there was already in existence an administrative system which they easily adopted for their purposes.¹ In Adamawa the principal administrative problem was setting up a central administration. The responsibility for this fell on Adama.

According to tradition, Uthman officially conferred on Adama the Fulfulde title, 'Lamido Fombina' (Ruler of the Southlands).² The word 'Lamido' in Fulfulde means 'ruler', from the verbal root, lana (to rule) and the noun lamu (sovereignty). Among the Fulani the title Lamido

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1. Cf. M.G. Smith, Government in Zazzau, Oxford, 1960, pp. 124-136 for an analysis and comparison between Hausa and Fulani systems.
 2. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p84; Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp.125, 130; 'south' here refers to south of Bornu. It has not been possible to trace exactly how far back this tradition goes. The nearest documentary source, 'Uthman's Memo on the Adamawa jihad', has been recovered only in its Hausa translation. Here Adama is spoken of as 'being made ruler of the Southlands' (na shugabantadda Kai Kasar Kudu) without any reference to a title. Another geographical title, 'Emir of the West' i.e. west of Bornu, was conferred on Muhammad Foma.

was originally strictly reserved for a sovereign overlord, and expressed absolute power.¹ It would be employed to refer to God, thus, Allah Laniido, God Almighty. Lando Julbe, for instance was the Fulfulde form of amīr al-mu'minīn or Commander of the Faithful, and was used to refer to the Sultan of Sokoto as an indication of his position of supreme head over several other leaders in the emirates.²

In theory the Laniido's word was law, and wherever he led his people, they followed him without questions. This image has today been best preserved in poetry. For example:

Quand le laaniido leur ordonne de s'arrêter,
ils (his subjects) font halte au coude à coude
et, même s'ils ont alors trouvé une tête de
serpent, pas un ne bouge. 3

Also

Dieu Très-saint établi les (souverains)
pour qu'ils veillent sur ses créatures
et pour que le mal ne soit pas fait
en leur pays.

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1. On the authority of Alhaji Umoru, . Rai; Wakili Kawu, Yola; Comité Historique, Garua. They say before the jihad the word Laniido would conjure a sense of mysticism and would normally not be used for an ordinary ruler.
 2. Lando Julbe was also commonly used of Ahmadu b. al-Hajj Umar, ruling at Segu - he too had adopted the title amīr al-mu'minīn. I am grateful to Professor D.W. Arnott, and Ibrahim Mukoshy (SOAS) for further illumination on the various uses of the word 'Laniido'.
 3. Lacroix, 1965, p.157.

La souveraineté (laamu) n'a pas été créée afin qu'ils régnerent pour corrompre, mais pour qu'ils rendent claire la Vérité, que brillent sur les pays l'ordre et la règle, que soit affermie la Guerre Sainte. Le Dieu Très-Saint sait comment il les récompensera. 1

During the nineteenth century however, with the introduction of political organizations which encompassed several ardo'en within one political leadership, the titles Lamido and Lando became popularly used among the Fulani to mean 'governor of', and with this the sense of absolute power quickly faded away.²

The fact that the title 'Lamido' unlike anīr had no religious significance³ has led some to doubt why Uthman gave such a title to Adama on a mission that was primarily religious.⁴ Uthman's reasons are not altogether obvious. It is unlikely that Uthman intended to give Adama

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1. Lacroix, 1965, p.57; for a discussion on the position of a lamido based on ideas from poetry in Fulani society, cf. Ibid., pp.79 ff.
 2. Stenning, 1959, pp.74-77; Lacroix, 1965, p.91 note 1; See Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.125 for an opposite view that "at first the meaning of the title was restricted to 'being governor',... but the word quickly took on the nuance of absolute sovereignty". This view seems unlikely since those who bore the title, e.g. Lamido Adamawa, Lando Gombe, continued to remain subordinate to the Sokoto Sultanate. The same is true of many other instances in which the term Lando was used, e.g. Lamdo Song and Lando Garua (Governor of Song and Garua). They were dependent on Yola.
 3. Explanation owed to Professor D.W. Arnott; for anīr cf. Encyclopaedia of Islam, art. anīr.
 4. F.W. Taylor, A Fulani-English Dictionary, art. 'Lamido'. suggests that the title is generally reserved to the ruler of Adamawa based at Yola. Nowadays the usage of the term is widespread among Fulani, especially where the Fulani language is less affected by other languages, e.g. Hausa.

at a different status from the rest of his flag-bearers in Hausaland. Firstly, in Uthman's teaching on government, he spoke disparagingly about Muslim leaders assuming non-religious titles as did the 'unbelievers in their government'

Address your chief emir as 'Commander of the Believers', he said to the Muslims, and, the emir of each province as 'Emir of such-and-such a province' and the emir of each place as 'Emir of such-and-such a village', and he who has charge of God's statutory punishments as 'Emir of the statutory punishment'. 1

Secondly in outlining Adama's responsibilities, Uthman laid emphasis on consultation and seeking advice from the important Muslims in the emirate. He asked Adama to be careful, always to respect them and behave 'correctly' to them without deceit.² Such instructions and limitations would obviously not be important under the absolutism of a Lamido, using the term in its original sense. Appointing Adama, Uthman stressed that he had made Adama leader, not because Adama was superior to the rest of the Fulani, but because of the trust which the Fulani of Adamawa had shown in Adama.³

1. KF (Hiskett), p.570.

2. Memo. on Adamawa jihad.

3. Ibid.

However, gleaning through the sources some probable explanations suggest themselves. It was customary among contemporary Sudanese historians before the jihad to see the states of Central and Western Sudan as falling into three categories. The great, the middle, and the lowly, corresponding to those states that were Muslim, those which mixed heathen and Muslim practices, and those that were non-Muslim.¹ Adamawa fell within the last group. Consequently, little was known about this region. Bello makes only a brief reference to it in his account on the history and geography of the Sudan as, 'the lands south of Baghirni inhabited by Sudanese speaking different tongues!'²

In one sense therefore, the people of Adamawa lacked true leadership and a recognized authority. This is also borne out in Uthman's definition of Adama's sphere. In the "South-lands", 'he gave recognition only to the governments of Buba Yero and Gwoni Mukhtar.'³ The political

1. Palmer, 1936, p.267; IM (Arnett) p.125; TI (Palmer) JAS, Vol.XIV, 1914-15, pp.53-55 here Uthman merges groups two and three into one - 'unbelievers' - since he accepted as an article of faith that those who mingled Islamic and Heathen practices such as the Hausa chiefs were unbelievers.

2. IM (Arnett) p.4.

3. Memo. on Adamawa jihad.

systems of the tribes were very different ranging from the divine kingship of the Mbum and Chamba to the secular leadership of many Batta and Marghi villages. One of the intentions in the jihad was to open a new chapter in the government of these territories, a title that took account of the wider implications of the diversity in the role of a leader, was, in this particular respect, appropriate. A possible suggestion could be that the title was principally to indicate Adama's authority over non-Fulani, and it was in this non-Fulani context that it was meant to be applied, or at least to serve only a specific purpose.¹

b. Uthman, Adama, and the Former Governors.

The corner-stone of Adama's administration consisted of the written and oral instructions and advice of Uthman and his successors, received either through the office of the Waziri Sokoto² or during Adama's visits to Sokoto. Other obvious contributory sources were the literary works on theology and Government by authors in the

1. Last, 1967, p.53, suggests that all Uthman's lieutenants from Hausaland, probably including Adama, were given flags and the title amir al-jaish. Adama however never used any title. See below, p.171.

2. The Waziri was Kofa or intermediary between the Sultan and the Emirs of Adamawa, Muri, Zaria and Kano.

Sokoto empire, especially, Uthman, Abdullah and Bello, whose works more or less set a frame of reference for the Fulani rulers all over the Sokoto empire.¹

In Adamawa itself, there were the modibbe who constantly advised Adana. To be able to estimate the impact of the modibbe on the development of Government in Adamawa, an essential element will be the recovery of either their literary works or oral traditions on them which will be studied against specific events. But neither the literary works nor specific incidents have survived in any large measure. Generally, the major influence of the modibbe, to which Adana also contributed, was mainly in making distinctions between what was permissible and what was objectionable.²

On his return from Sokoto, Adana's immediate problems as head of the Muslims were three-fold. The first was to bridge the immense psychological gap that existed between his charismatic pull and that of his mentor, Uthman, to enable his 'imposed' leadership to be recognized and accepted by the Fulani as a whole. While Uthman's pre-

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1. For a comprehensive list of their major works see Last, 1967, pp.237-248. The major works were widely distributed and read at the mosque during the Friday prayers and other relevant occasions throughout the Western Sudan; WS (Bivar), p.239; KF (Hiskett), p.579.
 2. Oral evidence, Yola.

eminence had been so acknowledged, it was left to Adama to make himself acceptable to the people with many of whom he had never had previous contacts or established working relations.¹ Secondly, he had to organize and re-structure the states of Adanawa into a new Muslim polity in which his role as Lanido would be effective. And, finally, he had to channel the efforts of the emirate to pursue the other aims of the jihad as outlined by Uthman in his instruction to him on his appointment and on subsequent times, by Uthman's successors.

The divinely-inspired nature of Uthman's mission was not questioned, and even if the Muslims in Adanawa did not believe he was the Mahdi, they accepted him as a Mujaddid, or a man who having received divine favours was able to summon and show men the right path to God.²

However, Uthman's influence did not produce the same reaction among all the Muslims in Adanawa. Some were attracted by the personal 'charisma' of Uthman, strengthened by the military victories of his followers over the Hausa chiefs; others were most influenced by his ideas; while others still, by the sort of community that would result from the jihad. This was revealed in the divergence of

1. For pre-jihad relations cf. Chapter 1.

2. Cf. East, p.19; Bassoro, p.55; Uthman was frequently referred to as Mujaddid al-Islam (Reviver of Islam) and Nur al-zaman (Light of the Age).

emphasis that the Adamawa leaders put on some aspects of the movement and not on others, especially on the question of its leadership.

Hanman Sanbo (Chamba.), Buba Njidda (Rai), and to a less extent Ardo Buba (Bindir), Hanman Njundi (Garua), belonged to the group which was attracted more by his ideas and the desire to express religious solidarity and less by a reorganization of the political status quo. (See above, pp. 87 ff.) Thus Adama was in their view not a ruler (Lamido) but a messenger (Vakili) of Uthman in Adamawa serving as an intermediary between Uthman and the Muslims in Adamawa. The second group was made up of the rest of the Fulani and apparently they did not take any dogmatic stand on what had to be or not to be done. They were the majority of the Fulani who lived in small and scattered communities sometimes dominated by hostile powers such as Bornu, Mandara, Yanguru, Musgum and some Batta groups. The Fulani in Marua and its neighbourhood in particular must have been conscious of what failure in the jihad would mean - total loss of property and expulsion from the region - from their proximity to the abortive attempts by Fulani to conquer Bornu. (See above, p. 72) The total submission of Hamman Song, Musa Chebowa, Daudu Kilba

and in particular Modibbo Danraka to Adama was indicative of the desire of the smaller groups of Fulani to use the power of a central Muslim government to guarantee their security. As the examples of Moda and Madagali show, Adama did in fact give definite assurance of prompt military aid to those who were particularly oppressed by more powerful neighbours.¹

However, the divergent views of the leaders were based not on religious conflicts but on differences in attitudes to leadership and the redefinition of roles that was envisaged in Uthman's plans. Adama's appointment, as far as it affected the pre-jihad leaders, involved a change of roles in two ways: firstly, they were to continue to make jihad not because it brought them more territory and personal power, but "in order that the Empire of Islam might grow".² Secondly, whereas previously they were independent, they were now required to subordinate themselves to Adama and become his helpers and advisers. This meant a loss in status and in some ways, identity which could not easily be reconciled with their previous self-sufficient positions and independent outlook.

The majority of Fulani in Adanawa, it is true, were Muslims, but centuries of separate migrations and

1. Strunpel, p.57; Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp.131-32.

2. Memo on Adanawa jihad.

interningling with tribes of different cultures and political systems had produced some basic differences in their general ideological conception of chieftainship. The history of both the Illaga'en and Kiri'en reveals that they regarded the institution of chieftainship as having a distinct and precious value of its own. (See above, pp. 26 ff.) One sought for it, and it was principally this quest for chieftainship that had led the Kiri'en in the first instance from Gombe to Muri, and then from there to Chamba.

The history of independent rule among the Illaga'en, according to their tradition, dated as far back as when the parent stock was still in Malle. As has already been observed they had a custom whereby after the election of one of the brothers to become chief, those who felt strong enough broke away from the parent group to found settlements where they would be chiefs. Moreover, among the Illaga'en, there was a strong prejudice to give authority to someone from amongst families holding positions of great influence; so that claims to authority had often to be backed by birth. Persons with obscure genealogies, such as Adana, would normally be regarded as impostors.¹

1. Informant 15, Rai.

Adama, as Uthman's appointee, was in charge of the general affairs of the emirate. Thus according to Uthman's argument, Adama had full jurisdiction over the emirate.¹ However, unlike Adama's western neighbours, Buba Yero and Yakubu who undertook the major conquests of the non-Muslims in their spheres in person, (or under their direction) the principal conquests in Adamawa were undertaken by leaders acting independently of Adama, and indeed, by leaders like Buba Njidda and Harman Sanbo who were already governors before Uthman's jihad. Though the etymology of the name Adamawa - people of Adama - suggests a close connection between people and leader, even at the peak of his popularity in the "Sanbo affair", Adama was not said to "own" Adamawa in the same sense that Buba Yero, or Yakubu, "owned" Gonbe and Bautchi, respectively.²

As a matter of fact the former leaders were very much in the saddle as before in their districts and their followers still attached themselves and looked up to them for guidance. Adama was in his own way just one of the leaders (maube) in Adamawa. This was a further weakness in Adama's position and it called for much caution in dealing with the other leaders.

1. KF (Hiskett), p.566; Memo. on Adamawa jihad.

2. The popular expression was: Buba Yero or Yakubu 'no mari' i.e. 'who possessed' Gonbe and Bautchi respectively - explanation owed to Alhaji Junaidu, Waziri Sokoto .

Fulani unity was hard to bring about, just as the unity of the other many small non-Fulani tribes dispersed all over Adanawa. This was due to the limited contact among the Fulani, in part exacerbated by differences in clan and times of immigration into Adanawa as well as by the distances that separated their settlements. ¹ ^{But other factors helped:} Adama, ^{for example,} astutely appealed to the common faith of the majority of the Fulani, and in this, his task was immensely facilitated by the medium of a common language. ² Already, in Hausaland, the progress of the jihad had proved very favourable to the Uthmanis. It is difficult to estimate the over-all influence of the stories brought by the messengers Uthman sent to the east, ³ or that of the traders and pilgrims on the Muslims of Adanawa in the early years of the jihad, but that they evoked continuous enthusiasm among the Muslim population and further strengthened their determination for the jihad cannot be doubted.

This was a situation that was particularly favourable to Adama, and as long as he nurtured this enthusiasm he was assured of a large measure of success. His early strategy for winning personal support was therefore

1. Strumpel, p:19; Lestringant, pp.110-11.

2. Strumpel, pp.19, 31.

3. IM (Arnett), pp.25, 46, 63.

directed principally to intensify and sustain the religious sentiments of his people.¹ Adama is not reputed to have been a writer and no written evidence has survived about what he actually taught or said,² but from oral tradition, he addressed the Muslims in Adamawa about their religious obligations as Muslims. He told them about Uthman's jihad and their responsibility in it. He tried to be an example, practiced asceticism and lived an austere life:

... many Fulani grew rich because they received slaves in the wars. Modibbo never had any concubines;³ Sometimes he never ate food - for a whole week. Whenever the people gathered and were working Modibbo would come and say prayers for them with his rosary, or would pray and make ropes out of which he bought things for himself and his family.⁴

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1. Strumpel, pp.17, 19; Cardaire, pp.64-65.
 2. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.80; Strumpel, pp.3, 21. A Shuwa Arab is said to have written a biographical account of Adama and a historical account of Adamawa but the author took this along with him to the pilgrimage and was never heard of again.
 3. It was customary to regard all non-Fulani wives as 'concubines' and this has probably led to the mistaken notion that because one of Adama's wives, Yara, was a Marghi she was a concubine - see Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.136. Strumpel, pp.20-21, corroborates Nenne Manu's information that for Adama 'it was the question of the spread of Islam and not of the increase of his harem and the filling of his slave compounds as was exclusively the case of his successors'. For Bello and Adama's modesty in dressing see Clapperton, 1829, p. 185. Lauwal seems to have followed his father's example in simple dressing, cf. Barth II, p.491.
 4. Informant 3, Yola; see p. 85 n. 2 for a similar tradition on Bello.

Modesty and magnanimity were some of the virtues Uthman recommended to his lieutenants.¹ Adama reflected these; for instance, though he was "Lanido Fumbina" he never allowed himself to be called Lanido throughout his rule.² This was to his credit, and though the gesture was agreeable particularly to those Fulani leaders who conceived of Adama's importance as only limited to religious affairs.

Nevertheless, there was still the question of whether the Muslims were to be led by one or as before by several leaders. The failure of Adama's initial military campaigns, especially the Mandara campaign, had shown how weak Adama's foundation was. The division in the attitude of his flag bearers rendered it impracticable to raise armies from among the entire Fulani population as he thought fit and put them under his single command. There was, for instance, the outstanding case of Adama's jihad against the Nantchi who for several years drove back Fulani forces from Garua and the neighbouring districts. Njidda's contribution was crucial to Adama's success. He, however, withheld his support,³ and Adama's feeble attack

1. See e.g. IM (Arnett), p.37; Balogun, p.81 ff; KF (Hiskett), p.570; here Uthman enjoined that authority must not be given to anyone who sought for it.

2. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.84; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.130.

3. Tradition at Rai claims that Njidda did not deliberately withhold support from Adama, but forgot the date of the attack (See Strumpel, p.69). It has been difficult to accept Rai's version since much publicity would normally have preceded such a battle in which the Lanido himself took part. He would send several messages before the

was easily routed by the Nantchi. As Adana retreated, Njidda, apparently to demonstrate that his forces could defeat the Nantchi single-handed, moved in and inflicted a severe defeat on the Nantchi. He sent the captives to Yola and followed this up with a visit to Yola.¹ Besides, from a purely tactical point of view, the formation of large armies was not a dire necessity, since the tribes against whom the Fulani fought were segmented and for the most part fought on the defensive. Consequently, a widespread sense of crisis and a common programme of operation for all the Muslims did not develop.

The effect of this was a heavy reliance on moral support from Sokoto. Adana visited Sokoto about nine times² despite the great distance of over 700 miles that separated the two emirates, and, according to tradition, many more times than any of Uthman's other flag-bearers. The objective was probably two-fold: to pay his respects and give a personal report on the progress of the jihad, but, it also probably served as a practical way of demonstrating to Adana's followers what was required of his own

F/note cont. from previous page.

battle day. If it was a question of forgetting, then, it seems, this did not convince the Yola authorities either who are reported to have planned Njidda's assassination by drowning. (See Strumpel, p.70; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.135).

1. Strumpel, pp.69-70; Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp.134-35.
2. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.82. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.136 says the visits were no fewer than eleven, and in Yola some informants gave a higher number. I am inclined to accept nine or even fewer. After 1837 the informants agree that Adana visited Sokoto only twice. This leaves seven times between 1808 and 1837 or an average of one journey per four years period. This appears more realistic than an

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flag-bearers. Before he went to Sokoto Adama sent messengers to all the district governors who then made a special effort to bring or send tribute to him to take to Sokoto.¹ In the early days of the jihad this helped to shift and concentrate the base of the power structure in Adamawa on Adama. In this way reliance on Sokoto encouraged attachment and obedience to Adama, just as, in the first place, the Muslims had followed him because of the reputation that Uthman enjoyed among them.²

Uthman's memorandum for the jihad in Adamawa, except for some references to specific situations in Adamawa, corroborates Uthman's exposition on jihad and government in his works like the Kitab al-farq, Tanbihu'l Ikhwan, and the Wathiqat ahl al-Sudan. These works, read together, form a comprehensive charter of not only what Uthman was striving to do in Hausaland, but also of what he ordered, and of the standards he expected his lieutenants to maintain in the various emirates.³

Uthman's constitution envisaged a hierarchy of

F/note cont. from previous page.

average of one journey per three years or less for a journey which took between eight months and one year, and for which it was sometimes necessary to make much preparation before departure.

1. East, p.21; Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.82.

2. East, p.19; sentiments of reverence to Uthman's memory were again expressed (see below, p. 373) during the last two decades of the nineteenth century when the Adamawa Muslims were called upon either to attack or submit to Uthman's great-grandson, Hayatu, through his Mahdist activities at Balda.

3. Last, 1967, p.56.

rulers forming at least three levels of administration with the 'Caliph' at the head of all. He appoints the 'Sultans' in each of the provinces, and they in turn appoint 'Enirs' of the towns.¹ Each of these leaders was to establish four separate departments at the head of which would be a Waziri to act as a catalyst to the ruler and remind him if he forgot; then a judge, 'whom the blame of a blamer cannot overtake in the ministry of God's affairs', then a chief of police, and finally a tax collector.² All the leaders and their assistants were committed to building a theocratic state grounded on the Shari'a and obedience to the Sunna of the Prophet. In other words "to follow the habits of the Muslims in their government and avoid the habits of the unbelievers in their government".³

No doubt this was saying very much in a few words, and in Adamawa, except for the Muslim Fulani, these words would be unintelligible for the non-Fulani populations, *which*, especially, would be experiencing Muslim government for the

1. KF (Hiskett), p.566.

2. Ibid., p.570.

3. Ibid., pp.566-67.

first time. For then government had never before been organized on a large-scale. Thus Adana's responsibilities were indeed immense and called for great ability, talent and imagination.

Uthman sees himself to have been wary about the sheer administrative problems. In addition to references of "difficult times", and "leadership in these disturbed times in which we are", Uthman called upon Adana to make sure he understood his injunctions very well and held fast to them.¹ As a means of coping with his responsibilities, Uthman asked Adana first to put all his faith and trust in God, and secondly, to come to terms with the former Fulani leaders 'who had been chiefs in their own right under the rule of the infidels'.²

On matters of day to day administration, Uthman charged Adana always to consult the elders and learned men and appoint some of them governors of districts by giving them flags. He warned Adana against prevarications once a decision had been taken on a course of action. But in pursuing his policies Uthman pleaded that he should avoid 'oppression (zālunci), wanton damage (barna), spilling of blood (zub da jini) without the sanctions of Law, and,

1. Memo on Adamawa jihad.

2. Ibid.

nepotism (banbancin dangi), because if you indulge in partiality and class distinction, your authority would be broken, and this would destroy satisfaction, understanding, and good relations, and if good relationship is lacking, the Holy War would suffer and a destructive war would start, and this would bring harm even after it has been settled".¹

Such pleas for compassion and moderation in government permeated Uthman's advice to Adama and this was also an indication of Uthman's concern for the non-Fulani populations who would be entering the 'Community of Believers' for the first time either voluntarily or as captives or prisoners of war. Uthman instructed Adama to pay special attention to them. He told Adama to make them Muslims, and not to force them to any task that was beyond their power. He continued:

Treat them as well as you possibly can, do good to them first if possible before you do it yourselves. If you teach them how to read, and they complete the Koran and they acquire understanding of the Muslim religion, you may intermarry with them, and liberate those

1. Memo on Adanawa jihad. Compare with Balogun, p.97, 'You are at liberty to repudiate everything that is known to be harmful, but if its repudiation will lead to a more detestable act then keep away from it - not because of itself; but because of what it will lead to. This is a time of tribulation and temptations and there is no way of objecting to the affairs of the public by coercion and rough treatment for that will lead to damage and destruction'.

who have had the opportunity of becoming true Muslims, as it is written in the Holy Koran. 1

While Adama was to be as pragmatic as possible, in order to attain the status of first leader in Adamawa, it was incumbent on him to build his own position and image rather fast, and to avoid being overtaken by events he had to keep the rate at which his flag-bearers acquired temporal power under careful surveillance. In no other emirate were so many flags issued as in Adamawa where Adama manipulated the privilege of issuing flags to achieve those political aims which were not so obvious at his appointment.²

At first Adama gave flags to only those leaders, mostly clan leaders who had districts under their rule before Uthman's jihad.³ It was among them that Adama had to contend most for a place of primacy in order to establish a central administration and make it effective. From a collation of oral traditions about these leaders, it would appear that they, or their representatives accompanied Adama during his second or subsequent visits to Sokoto to be presented to Uthman. The attitude of some of the leaders to his authority was disappointing to Adama.

1. Memo. on Adamawa jihad.

2. e.g. whether Adama was the ruler over all of Adamawa.

3. See Appendix, 'List of flag-bearers'.

They sought for flags that would make them independent of Adama, and only the adamant stand of Uthman against this constrained them to continue to do homage to Adama.

The signs on the wall were not too difficult for Adama to read that the hopes for establishing a dominant administration over the emirate might not be achieved. Hamman Njundi of Garua, like Njidda and Sambo, wanted to be independent of Adama. As an early check against open defiance Hamman Njundi's attitude was brought before Uthman. Hamman Njundi was summoned to Sokoto and detained there for seven years while his son Ardo Bakari received a flag from Adama to administer the district. ¹

Partly as a precaution against revolts, and partly in order to induce more Fulani to take an active part and become more personally involved in his administration, he gave consideration to new types of flag-bearers, as at Bibeni, Wuro Mayo, Laro, Kontcha, Be, Gashaka, Mubi, ^{and} Bogo. On the whole he gave over forty flags. ² The new flag-bearers had not before been governors in their locality and therefore owed their rise to power directly to Adama's movement. They were put on an equal footing with the former rulers. In this way Adama put the embryonic structure of his central administration on a more broadly

1. Bassoro, 1965, p.56; Strunpel, pp.47-48.

2. See Appendix, 'List of flag-bearers'.

based foundation. These new leaders readily attached themselves to the idea of a strong central government that would be capable of defending the entire emirate against its enemies.

As a way of further integrating the districts to the centre, Adama is said to have presented a scheme to Bello in which he proposed to appoint his sons to be governors of some of the districts; but this did not meet with a favourable response.¹ This probably provoked Bello's circular letter 'to all Muslim Communities in the Fulani Kingdom' instructing them that a vacant post for an Emir or leader should be filled by the most popular candidate, but if there happened to be more eligible candidates, his advice should be sought for.² From other sources, unconnected with Adamawa, Bello advised against automatic filial succession.³ Among Adama's own associates it was feared that such a plan would only temporarily achieve the desired political integration, and as soon as Adama died his sons in the districts might not be willing to regard whoever

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1. Informants 6 and 4, Yola; Adama however gave his sons important commissions, e.g. during the Mandara campaigns (East, p.29). Of all of them only Haridu was allowed to be governor of the district of Hibango. (Vicars Boyle, 1910, pp.78, 83, 84.)
 2. MS Bello to all Moslem Communities, NAK, Adamaprof, File I, No.7.
 3. Hadj Sa'īd, p.320. Before he died, Bello cautioned his son Aliyu Baba not to vie for the throne as of right but to wait for the decision of God; Johnston, p.146; Last, 1967, p.81; Balogun, p.85, that Uthman also preferred to leave the decision of succession in the hands of God and the people. See Last, 1967, p.64, for comments on a claim that Uthman appointed Bello his successor in his will.

succeeded him at the centre with the same respect as they did Adama, and this might lead to civil wars.¹

Consideration for the progress of the jihad also dictated the expediency of widening the scope of the flag. During the early years of the jihad, Fulani were inclined to emigrate to what could be described as "safe zones", those regions that had submitted to Muslim rule. They grew contented with the few conquests. This slowed down the pace of Muslim expansion, and contrary to Adama's desires, seemed to swell the population and prestige of former rulers. It was easier to set up Muslim administration only in those areas with an already Muslim nucleus, and at that time this could be provided only by Fulani. For the Fulani ardo'en to give them a flag was a recognition of their potentiality; it was an elevation in their status; and as far as Adama's goals were concerned this was an effective bait to encourage them to stay at their posts.

Just as with Uthman, Adama did not lay down any special training or qualifications for becoming a flag-bearer. According to my informants at Yola and Garua, any Fulani needed to satisfy three basic conditions to be

1. Informants 6 and 4, Yola.

given a flag; firstly, he must be a male practising Muslim; secondly, he must be recommended by a group of Muslims for a flag in order to lead them; thirdly, the group must have in view some non-Muslim villages not already within the sphere of another flag-bearer on which he intended to make jihad, or, if already subdued, to teach the ways of Islam. It was the exception rather than the rule to give flags to non-Fulani.¹

Such extensive use of the privilege of distributing flags had been aimed at achieving political equilibrium within the emirate and at creating a situation where the affairs of the emirate were to be decided from a central source. In doing this, on the one hand, many had been encouraged and made to serve as props for a more securely based central administration, and on the other hand, the wings of the more ambitious leaders had been regulated. This made Adama's authority felt over the entire emirate, but in so doing he had permanently alienated the goodwill of his opponents Buba Njidda and Hamnan Sambo, who being Muslims had hoped apparently to reinforce

1. Informants 6 and 4, Yola;

Paka and Maiha were perhaps the only non-Fulani districts that received flags from Adama. During Buba Yero's earlier campaigns, they had embraced Islam without a fight.

and not to weaken their former administration through association with the Uthmaniyya movement. They were conscious of their wealth, military might, noble birth, all of which Adama lacked, and what these meant in terms of Adanawa politics. The result was that they looked at Adama's efforts to wield secular authority with dissatisfaction.¹ This, as was obvious, thwarted an early realization of greater direct influence from the centre in their districts, and impinged on the development of administrative institutions at the centre.

c) The War against Njidda.

As the years unfolded themselves, so did it become clear to both Njidda and Sanbo that the proceeds of their personal exertions before and during the jihad accrued more to the benefit of the Yola administration than to theirs. Moreover, their hopes of justifying separate flags through conquests undertaken by themselves had come to no avail by the repeated refusal of Sokoto to climb down on its previous decision to have only one flag for Adanawa. Dissatisfaction and frustration set in, and these were reflected in a number of ways, for instance, Njidda's boycott of the Nantchi campaigns (see above p.171),

1. Lacroix, 1952, p.21; ~~See below, pp. 189 ff.~~

and Sanbo's growing hostilities against Banyo, Tingere and Ngaundere which came to a head during Lauwal's reign (see ^{above}~~below~~, p. 152).

A laissez-faire attitude to the problems posed by both these leaders was not the answer if Adama wished to see the administration of the emirate organized according to his convictions. As the Mandara, Ngaundere and Nantchi campaigns had shown, Adama needed help from the established districts to aid the less favourably placed leaders to establish themselves; secondly, the strategic position of Rai and Tibati on the eastern and southern limits of the emirate made them the greatest potential slave winners. Towards the late 1820s it began to appear that a confrontation with these leaders was imminent, because on several occasions Sanbo, and more particularly Bubba Njidda had failed to send tribute to Yola and answer Adama's call for military aid. The critical point had been reached for Njidda over the Nantchi campaigns and the attempt on his life during the crossing of the Benue after his visit to Yola (see above, p. 171). After this episode Yola was virtually at war with Rai.

Adama's first problem was now to convince and get the co-operation of his other followers to take up arms against their fellow Muslims, and for some, their clansmen.

The causis belli must perforce be religious infringement.¹ This was not difficult to establish in Njidda's case for, according to Uthman, to raise 'the flag of earthly power above the flag of Islam' made a man an unbeliever and disobedience ~~to~~ an Emir to whom one had sworn fealty was sufficient grounds for apostasy against which war was obligatory.² Njidda had accepted Adama's mission and sworn fealty to him. This gave Adama both the moral courage, and religious justification to mobilize against him. Perhaps Adama was also influenced about the rightness of his action by similar measures taken by Bello against Abd al-Salan of Kwarre and his ally Banaga dan Bature soon after Uthman died.

Adama's first move was to win the support of the rest of his district governors by appealing to their religious obligation.³ He kept then constantly informed of

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1. Muslims were forbidden to take up arms against their fellow Muslims, but there were some instances, for example, rebellion backsliding and apostasy, when it was sunna to do so. (See WS (Bivar), p.240; Ruxton, pp.323-27)
 2. Cf. TI (Palmer), JAS, Vol.XIV, p.53; TI (Hiskett), pp. 18-20. The subject of rebellion gave rise to theological controversy between Bello and Abdullah on the occasion of the revolt of Abd al-Salan against Bello. Bello took the hard view that disobedience against one's leader amounted to unbelief and apostasy. Abdullah however held that it was not apostasy until it had been established that such disobedience was injurious to the cause of Islam or was in aid of unbelief.
 3. Informant 1, Yola; confirmed at Rai.

the steps he took. He sent a delegation of his dignitaries to go and dissuade Njidda from rebellion. It soon became clear that Njidda could not be talked out of his resolve, and so Adana sent letters to the neighbouring districts of Bibemi, Garua, Ngaundere, Chebowa, and others, to advance on Rai giving the date and time of arrival. As they approached, Njidda ordered that all the fruit trees around Rai should be destroyed and that the gates of the walled town of Rai should be shut against them.¹ Adana and his supporters besieged the town for over three months. Their main objective seemed to have been to wear down Njidda's Muslim supporters by psychological methods. They refrained from open hostilities and for several weeks concentrated on saying prayers.²

Adana could not afford to lay a long and sustained siege being very far from his principal bases. His party was made up of some of the most renowned Muslims and businessmen who could not afford to abandon their homes, families and business indefinitely, no matter how desirable such an absence was from the religious point of view. There was also the problem of obtaining good drinking water and enough food to support the besiegers, who could hardly be

1. Strumpel, p.70; Husson, 1957; Mohanadou, 1963, p.32.

2. Informant 15, Rai. On the role of such prayers, see above, p.148 n. 1.

supported by a very sparse population near and around Rai. However, the siege came to a dramatic end when Njidda is said to have uncovered a plot hatched by some Fulani to desert him and appoint his eldest son Shehu to replace him.¹ In the dead of night he escaped to Tchollire, about thirty kilometers south of Rai. Adana took this for victory, and installed Shehu as ruler of Rai by giving him a flag and turban at a big religious ceremony.² Meanwhile, hunger and weariness had greatly reduced the number of Adana's men and made prolonged stay insupportable, even to the point where Adana could not raise a force strong enough to resist the expected return of Njidda. Soon after Adana left, Njidda returned and recaptured Rai by assault, killing Shehu in the engagement.²

The rights and wrongs of Adana's action evoked so much controversy among the local scholars and the contentions on both sides have been eloquently handed down from one generation to the other especially at Yola and Rai. In summary, the opponents of Adana³ blamed him for being over enthusiastic in his belief and for having acted

1. Strumpel, p.70; Husson, 1957; Mohanadou, 1963, p.32;.

2. Strumpel, p.70; Husson, 1957; Mohanadou, 1963, p.32; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.135.

3. Informant 15, Rai especially; Oral tradition. Tibati also held the same point of view as Rai on Yola's exercise of authority over the districts.

too hastily. He had precipitated the conflict by insisting on false claims of sovereignty over Rai. Uthman himself was no ruler but a good man, and Adama had gone to Sokoto because of religion (hala dina) and not for leadership (hala lamu). They felt that Adama had therefore misunderstood Uthman. When Adama returned from Sokoto with Uthman's flag and he was asked what new, he replied, 'Uthman has asked us to renew Islam according to the law and that we should fight the Habe¹ together, if they refused to embrace Islam on their own accord for the sake of God'.² It was for this reason and no other that Rai joined with the rest of the Muslims, including Adama, to make jihad.

In any case, they considered that disputes such as between Rai and Adama were beyond Adama's jurisdiction to take a final decision. According to Muslim tradition, since they both recognized a superior authority, namely the

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1. Habe was the popular term used for non-Fulani in Hausaland. In Adanawa kirdi seems to have been a fairly widespread word for referring to the indigenous people. Denhan's usage of kirdi suggests that it was also a common term in Bornu and Mandara (Denhan and Clapperton pp.115 ff.).
 2. Informant 15, Rai; East, p.19 records a similar but less explicit tradition, 'I went and I found him. He greets you and accepts your greetings. He told me that when I return each of you must place his hands in mine; whoever gives me his hands joins hands with him. See, moreover, that which he gave me, bidding me prepare one like it for each of you'. There is here an implied sovereignty but this is subject to another possible interpretation, and this is the crux of Rai's case, when looked at from the initial premise that Uthman was essentially a religious reformer and not a governor or administrator.

Sultan of Sokoto, Adama should have turned to him for arbitration.¹ They further argued that the analogy of Uthman's wars against Bornu, or indeed Bello's against dissident Muslims, could not apply in Adama's dispute with Njidda because in either of these instances there was no supreme and competent authority readily available to act as arbitrator.

Those on Adama's side,² on the other hand, contend that Njidda was a self-conceited man who, since Adama's appointment as leader in Adamawa, had for the most part acted with indifference to him. He had refused to honour his pledges of submission to Adama. His refusal to participate with the rest of the Muslim forces in the Nantchi expedition had been largely responsible for Adama's disgraceful defeat. In this way he was indirectly aiding the non-Muslims by weakening the fighting morale of the Muslims and exposing their weakness. Furthermore, his repeated overtures to enter into direct relations with Sokoto showed his lack of confidence in Adama. These were evidence of rebellion against Adama and indirectly against Uthman who gave Adama the emirate.

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1. There is no indication from the sources on whether or not Adama tried to get special authority from Sokoto to wage war against Njidda, but it is clear that Sokoto was strongly against any attempt by the district governors to disobey Adama's authority.
 2. Informant 1, Yola; majority of Garua informants were inclined towards Yola's view point. Those who did not support Yola's stand did so not because they felt Yola had no jurisdiction over Rai but on the very general principle that it was wrong for Muslims to fight each other.

The debate continues; but the crux of the matter lay equally in Rai's love for untrammelled independence to manage its own affairs and its remote geographical position in the heart of a dense tropical woodland, rich in wild game but sparsely populated by men. The nearest tribes were the Dana and Mono. Njidda was of a Dana mother and many of his maternal relatives had become Muslims before the jihad. (See above, pp.49-50) Likewise, several of the Mono villages had submitted without a fight and joined Njidda. There was, therefore, no question of making jihad against them or enslaving them indiscriminately. As a result Njidda depended very much, almost exclusively, for the expansion of his district and for his slave supply on tribes that were often situated outside his immediate vicinity. The Lakas, and Mbun Mbere in the south to the region of Meiganga for instance, were settled at distances of over a hundred kilometers from Rai, but their country was Njidda's hunting ground for slaves as well as the region to which Rai's herdsman went for the summer pasture. Njidda's eastward expansion to the Logone was handicapped by the state of Baghirni especially after the failure of the jihad there (see above, p. 110) . Thus settlements such as Bibeni, Nantchi, Wuro Mayo, Mayo Jarendi and even far north Balda, were regarded by Njidda as tributary areas, and objected

to Adama giving them flags.¹ As it happened their allegiance and loyalty to the central administration was strong and often unqualified. This therefore meant for Njidda a loss of prestige and sources of income which was bound to cause resentment, if not open conflict.

Furthermore, the political organization in Rai was rather unique throughout the emirate and thus made the way for quick integration a difficult one. As chief of the parent group of the Illaga'en the chief of Rai had a certain built-in sense of superiority which made him always feel the best and this characteristic was reflected in his mode of leadership. The chief of Rai (or "Baba" (father) as his subjects call him) is considered even today by his people to be more than human:

... le laaniido est réputé prier et jeûner 'pour tous ses esclaves', est censé ne pas nourrir, mais demeurer après sa mort sur le sommet de la montagne de Tcholliré d'où il veille sur son peuple et où, naguère encore, on enterrait vivants avec lui à son décès deux esclaves destinés à l'accompagner dans son dernier voyage. 2

He held the power of life and death over all his subjects in a way which was certainly beyond that which

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1. Strumpel, p.69; Husson, 1957; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.134.
 2. Lacroix, 1966, p.404; see also J. Brackenbury, 'Notes on Rai', ~~1915~~, in Glenny, Report, 1911, pp.74-76; Strumpel, p.73; M. Fiévet, 'Rai Buba', National Geographical Magazine, August, 1959. (Mainly pictorial)

was permissible in Islam. For example, he would send his men to go and bring him a living lion, not minding how many of them would lose their lives in the venture, and none would raise objections.¹ Again during the reign of Buba Jirun a Hausa architect was employed to design and build part of the Lando's palace; however, because his work was considered exemplary he was killed so that no other man could avail himself of the architect's talents.²

How he administered the state was his personal affair, and theoretically everybody worked and lived for him. Until today, he is rarely seen in public. Much of his administration and diplomacy is carried out in great secrecy, and usually very little is known about what goes on outside court circles. Foreigners usually have to satisfy a series of formalities and protocol before being granted admittance to his presence. Communication with him is still through a curtain so constructed that he alone can see the addressee, but he cannot equally be seen by him. The people are compelled to show him a considerable degree of servile reverence, which in turn, he surreptitiously

1. Oral evidence, Rai.

2. Strumpel, pp.71-72; this story was confirmed at Rai, but the explanation given was that his fate was due to the general feeling of mistrust, bordering on hostilities, against Hausas at Rai because of their cheating habits. See Cardaire, p.68; also MS Buba Jirun to Zubeiru, for Rai's unfriendly disposition towards Hausas. I am indebted to Ibrahim Mukoshy for drawing my attention to the MS especially since it is misclassified as a Sokoto correspondence at NAK.

manipulates to enforce a more or less martial discipline.¹
 Writing about the state of Baba's court in 1910, Bracken-
 bury observed as follows:

I found Buba Janoa, a Fulani chief, ruling over a mixed population of pagans which include Mbun, Dana, Fali, Tikar, Dui, and Ndoro people. These pagans regard their Fulani chief with great awe almost as a god with the discipline and barbaric state of his title (sic). His court was remarkable. All his pagan subjects had to approach him naked except for a loin cloth. Many of them possess clothes but could not wear them before him. 2

There was also in the Adama-Njidda conflict a succinct clash in personalities. Adama, humble, learned and primarily dedicated to the course of Islam and its institutions, epitomised the new spirit of religious revival. Njidda, proud, egocentric, suspicious and conservative was the embodiment of the orientation of the old order of chiefs.

Victories in the jihad or a demonstration of ability was necessary to build Adama's image and enhance his role as the architect of a central administration. But Adama led very few campaigns in person. At least two decades had elapsed since Adama assumed leadership in Adamawa,

1. Much of Rai's royal ritual shows close resemblance with several of the non-Islamic Sudanese Kingdoms which practice divine-kingship; e.g. the Oba of Benin, the Fon of Dahomey and others. Cf. D. Forde and P.M. Kaberry, eds. West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century, Oxford, 1967, pp.28, 84.

2. Brackenbury, 'Notes on Rai', p.75.

and the over-all balance of power was still in the hands of the non-Muslims in several parts of the emirate. Adama lived in Gurin after he received the flag. Although the town was popularly known as Adama's headquarters,¹ it continued to be governed by its former leaders headed by Hamman Gurin.² The sum effect of all this, especially the fact of being Hamman's son-in-law, was that Adama could not sufficiently assert his authority without inhibitions.³ It was an uncomfortable situation for a leader to find himself, especially if his task was one in which he needed to be free from such emotional shackles conditioned by the presence of a "superior". Thus as long as he was in Gurin he could only afford to play second fiddle to the natural leader, Hamman. Njidda and Hamman Sarbo were aware of these limitations. No doubt then they were inclined to consider Adama's demand for unconditional obedience from them as irregular.

d) Foundation of Yola, the 'Sarbo Affair'.

Meanwhile the pressures on Adama to leave Gurin and found his own town reached their peak. Hamman Gurin

1. Clapperton, 1829, p.335.

2. i.e. Hamman continued to decide the times and areas for the annual transhumance, to mediate between members of the clan and others, and to organize communal labour.

3. What was involved here was the customary sense of obligation and avoidance that exists between a father and son-in-law. Cf. M.F.Smith, Baba of Karo, Oxford, 1954, pp.26, 138 ff. for avoidance relationship among the Fulani and Hausa generally.

had welcomed Adana's appointment for a variety of reasons; firstly, Adana was his son-in-law having married Hamman's daughter Yasebo, shortly after Adana's elevation to leadership.¹ Secondly, Adana and Hamman belonged to the same clan, the Ba of which Hamman was leader, and he had been greatly instrumental in the initial selection of Adana to go to meet Uthman. Their clan was very small compared to the Illaga'en, Wollarbe and Ngara'en, so that Hamman may have seen in Adana's appointment a source of prestige for the clan and by that same token an enhancement of his own personal position. It is however not clear whether much significance should be attached to the fact that Adana left Gurin soon after the war against Buba Njidda² because we do not know the attitude of Hamman Gurin towards the war. But Adana's domestic troubles with his wife Yasebo, Hamman's daughter, would seem to have been a strong factor. Yasebo was Adana's second wife after Astajan, the mother of Lauwal, Mansuru, Ahijo and Sanda.³ According to Fulani custom she was expected to be completely submissive to Adana and to respect the hierarchy of the harem. Encouraged by her royal birth and the fact that

1. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.81; Informant 11, Gurin.

2. Informant 11, Gurin; this was confirmed at Rai where it is stated that Njidda met Adana at Gurin. Perhaps the use of Yola in the sources is posteriorly as, for instance, Sokoto is often referred to as Uthman's capital for events which occurred before 1808.

3. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.136 collated with Oral tradition Yola and Gurin.

Adana lived in her father's town, Yasebo put her pride before many other considerations. The simmering tensions came to the surface when one night Yasebo refused to receive Adana into her hut and left him standing in the rain.¹ It looked as if the matter would jeopardise Adana's relations with Hannan and possibly split the Gurin population. That same year 1831, after the heavy rains Adana left Gurin for Ribadu without Hannan or Yasebo accompanying him.²

Much as this migration was motivated by personal and political considerations, it is the political considerations which have received prominence in the sources; there was the need for instance to establish a suitable base for the conquest of those Batta settlements which continued to show hostilities to the Muslims.³

Today in Gurin, although the strained relations between Adana and Yasebo are confirmed, the reason why Adana left Gurin is ascribed to over population.⁴ More important was the fact that many of Adana's sons had already attained manhood and the people had started to think

1. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.136; Strunpel, p.56. The tradition in Vicars Boyle, p.78 records that Yasebo was involved in an incident of infidelity. It is doubtful that what is meant was conjugal infidelity.

2. Informant 11, Gurin.

3. Gazetteer, 1927, p.14; Glenny, Report, 1911, p.18; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.201.

4. See also Mizon, 'Les Royaumes Fulbés', p.354.

about who would succeed Adama. There is a tradition at Yola of how once when Adama fell seriously sick he sent Lauwal to Bello, and Bello gave Lauwal a turban, so that, should he on his return find his father dead, he might present himself to the people as the approved successor. Adama recovered, but his close associates Sanbo Holna, Nuhu, later Kaigama, Alkassun, Sarkin Katsena, later Lando Katsena, under Lauwal pressed on him to found his own town from where his children could continue his work conveniently after his death. He left Gurin about 1831 for Ribadu, stayed there for eight years, after which he left in the direction of Yola.¹ He camped at Joboliwo, eight miles from Yola, during the rainy season of 1839, though he did not intend to settle there, and then left for Sokoto in the dry season.²

After Adama's war with Fjidda, he abandoned all attempts to solve his conflict with Sanbo by force and left both Rai and Tibati in virtual independence.³ In 1842 however, Adama had to face a new crisis from Sanbo. The

1. Vicars Boyle, 1910, pp.78-79; Glenny, Report, 1911, pp.18-19. Yola is the augmentive form of 'Yolde' in Fulfulde, meaning an extensive rising ground. Barth, II, p.501, suggests that Yola took its name after the princely quarter of the town of Kano. It might equally be that the name was the result of a combination of both the topographical feature of Yola and Barth's suggestion, since Adama had just returned from Sokoto and would normally have passed through Kano. See Kirk-Greene, 1958, Appendix A for an interesting account of Yola's later history.

2. Oral tradition Yola and Gurin.

3. Barth, II, p.508; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.135.

background to this, the 'Sarbo affair', lies equally in events in the Sokoto sultanate and in Adanawa. In Hausaland the majority of the Fulani Emirs had adopted the main structure of the Hausa system of administration. The most serious phase of the jihad was over, but the Muslims were continually plagued with crises of succession. Whenever these occurred and the local electoral colleges proved incapable of handling them, the Sokoto administration intervened through the office of the Waziri.¹ Such interventions were frequent in Zaria and Kano and often enhanced the role of the Sokoto administration in these emirates, and consequently the recognition that the emirates had a voice in the election of the Sultan. Besides, this privilege appears to have been supported by the constitution; for before Bello's death it was his wish according to one tradition that his successor should be elected by an electoral college consisting of the Emirs.²

When in October 1837 Bello died, Adana's preference for the succession was Aliyu Babba, the eldest son of Bello who represented the house of Bello.³ Perhaps Adana's main

1. M.G. Smith, 1960, pp.73 ff.; Last, 1967, pp.200-02.

2. Arnett, Gazetteer of Sokoto Province, p.32. In practice according to Alhaji Junaidu, the principal councillors to the Sultan sounded the feeling of the Emirs about their preferences, more often before the post actually fell vacant.

3. G.J.F. Lethem and G.J. Tonlinson, A History of Islamic Political Propaganda in Nigeria, London, 1927, Vol.1, p.69; here the authors were tracing the historic connections between Adanawa and the Bello family to explain Hayatu's popularity in Adanawa.

objection to Atiku despite his mature age of fifty three as against Aliyu's thirty sprang from Atiku's rather difficult nature.¹ Atiku's relations with Adama were further strained by the fact that throughout his short term in office Adama only made one personal visit to Sokoto two years after Atiku's accession to the throne.

Atiku is known to have tried to create a different image from that of his brother Bello. For instance, he abandoned Wurno, which during the last ten years of Bello's reign had virtually become the capital, and returned to Sokoto.² In Adanawa the opportunity was given him by Hamman Sanbo to change the 'ways' of Bello. Uthman and Bello had been adamant in their refusal to give Sanbo and Njidda separate flags and annul their allegiance to Adama. Atiku, however, soon after becoming Sultan entered into direct negotiations with Sanbo.³ There is little doubt that Adama's support for Aliyu had been partially responsible for this, and possibly Atiku desired to build support for his own administration in Adanawa on someone whom he could trust more than Adama. Besides, Hamman Sanbo was an energetic warrior and administrator who had conquered more lands than

1. Last, 1967, pp.65, 81-82.

2. Arnett, Gazetteer of Sokoto Province, p.31; Johnston, pp.146-47.

3. Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp.135-36; Glenny, Report, 1911, p.24.

any other leader in Adamawa (see above, pp. 114ff). He was certainly a leader whose potentialities for extending the frontiers of Islam exceeded those of Adana.

In 1841 Atiku invited him to Sokoto and gave him a flag marking his independence from Adana. All the preparations had to be carried out with the utmost secrecy for fear of Adana's intervention before the plans materialized. When finally the news of Sanbo's visit was confirmed in Yola, it raised a storm of indignation and apprehension as to the exact motives of the Sultan. In the unsettled state of Yola, scarcely a year after its foundation, Adana sent a delegation of dignitaries to the Sultan reminding him of the traditional stand of his successors by which Adamawa had been allowed to remain as one entity despite political differences within it. He added a threat that he and the rest of his followers would leave Adamawa, and go to Mecca and after that give their allegiance to the Sultan of Istanbul.¹ They were all willing to make the sacrifice in honour of Uthman, "who must be outraged in his grave at Atiku's reversal of his decision".²

This was not only for outside consumption but for internal as well. Adana's propagandists were quick to

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1. Glenny, Report, 1911, p.24. It is remarkable that before Lauwal expelled Barth from Yola he intimated that a letter of credence from the Sultan of Istanbul would have recommended him more advantageously at Yola. (Barth, II, p.494.)
 2. Informants 6, 3, Yola. It is today (1966) denied in Yola that for reason of age; Adana actually left Yola. See Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.135.

seize on the issue. Their tactics were to represent Atiku's action as disobedience to his father's decision and that his ultimate intention was to cause strife and civil war in Adamawa. While they waited for the reply from Sokoto, Adama sent letters to all the district governors exhorting them to say prayers for peace and be loyal to Uthman and their religion.¹ The sense of a religious crisis developed; and by the time Sanbo arrived from Sokoto with his flag the minds of the people, except for Tibati and possibly Rai, were made up to reject his new flag. Tempers were however, suddenly calmed by the unexpected appearance of emissaries from Sokoto announcing the death of Atiku in 1842. The first political measure of the new Sultan, Aliyu Babba, had been to rescind the unpopular decision of his predecessor concerning Adamawa. Then in a letter to Sanbo he withdrew Atiku's flag and instructed Sanbo to renew his loyalty to Adama. In another letter to the entire people of Adamawa he encouraged them to hold fast to their allegiance and rededicate themselves to their religion.²

Aliyu Babba's letter was important in two respects. First, it was essential for its restatement of the purpose and requirements of the jihad, and secondly, for

1. Informants 6, 3, Yola.
2. Aliyu Babba to the Muslim Community (Adamawa).

its criticism of the Muslim community. With quotations from Koran, Hadith, and works of Muslim authorities, he stressed that jihad was made for the sake of God and must therefore not be regarded in terms of personalities. It appeared that by Atiku's decision to give Sanbo an independent flag an essential principle in the organization of the community had been ignored, that of allegiance to one's leader. On the subject of allegiance he showed that it was necessary not only because the oath of allegiance is a contract with God, but also because it is commanded by the Prophet.

Aliyu's sincerity is impressive, and this is manifested throughout by the tone of the letter. He argued that it was not enough to take an oath of allegiance without fulfilling its duties. One should not withdraw one's allegiance from one's erring leader but rather try to guide him, to teach him what he did not know, and to assist in the gathering of solidarity (Kalina) and in the reinstating of those souls which stray. There was to be no equivocation in giving a leader his rights, even though he oppressed and robbed his people. The people should seek their recompense from God.

There is no doubt that such arguments were primarily aimed at justifying Aliyu Baba's action in a situation where he genuinely felt his uncle and Sanbo and their

supporters had gone wrong. But in so doing, the second importance of the letter, as a criticism of the state of the jihad in Adanawa became apparent. Although Aliyu insisted on maintaining allegiance to the Emir, he was nonetheless fair minded enough to recognize that the jihad in Adanawa was displaying certain failings - the Muslim community did not seem sufficiently up and doing, but rather asleep and neglectful.

Aliyu's decision and message seemed to have been received favourably. Sanbo was then in Chamba and the following year, 1843 during the great Sala^h, Muslims from all over Adanawa assembled ^{near} Gurin in what has been described as the greatest collection of horse and foot ever known in Adanawa.¹ The central attraction of the celebrations was reading and explaining Aliyu Babba's letter to the entire community followed by Sanbo handing over Atiku's flag to Adana.

The outcome of the 'Sanbo affair' thus fortuitously increased Adana's prestige as the overall leader in Adanawa. The affair was a personal triumph for Adana who became very popular and respected since, no matter his military shortcomings, "God had given him the power to rule (lamu)".

1. Glenny, Report, 1911, pp.24-25; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.136; Informant 1, Yola.

Among a people to whom prayers were sometimes felt to have direct practical effect many drew connections between the issuing of the flag to Sambo and Atiku's sudden death after an unsuccessful expedition against Tsibiri. They felt it was indicative of divine intervention in favour of Adana's earlier prayers. Almost five years after these events, in February 1847, at a ripe age of 77 years, Adana died, it is said, of pneumonia.¹ His prestige was at its highest, and the Muslims all over the emirate were most united.

e) Some aspects of Adana's administration.

Since his appointment, he had worked to establish a central administration in which his leadership would be preponderant. He had neglected Uthman's command, and distributed flags without distinguishing the various capabilities of the leaders,² thus causing offense to those, notably Buba Njidda and Hamman Sambo, who had prior to the jihad their own organized administration, and who had hoped to reinforce their positions through association with the jihad movement. Consequently they impeded progress towards centralization, and created a rather fluid relation between

1. Adana Gana, 'Marthiyyat Modibbo Adana';

2. Memo on Adanawa jihad.

the capital and the districts.

Administrative initiative lay equally with the capital and the districts without any rigid division of spheres of competence beyond the generally accepted obligations of a vassal to his chief. In such a fluid situation, homogeneity was never established in the administrative systems that operated in the districts. In Macina where in many respects the political situation before the jihad was very similar to Adanawa all the district governors derived their authority from Shaikh Ahmadu at the capital.¹ A large measure of uniformity was thus established in all the districts. In Adanawa each district evolved its own hierarchy according to its size, wealth and the personality of its leader. The population and state of political organization of the non-Muslims before they were conquered also mattered. Where the non-Muslims had a comparatively sophisticated political organization and had not been utterly vanquished by the Muslim force, two sets of parallel hierarchies of councillors were evolved under the Lando as a means of integrating diverse interests. We shall see how this operated in greater detail later in the next Chapter.²

What interests us at this juncture is the creation and acceptance of Adama's administrative machinery for the entire emirate. Before more records, say letters between

1. Ba and Daget, 1962, pp.59 ff.

2. Infra, pp. 242 ff.

the capital and the districts, state and personal accounts, records, of officials etc., are brought to light, a detailed examination of the various departments of the administration, legal, police fiscal, military and political organization, must remain rather general. In general terms the Sokoto empire was a theocracy and by implication Adana's state was theocratic; but the civil administration could be closely identified with what Max Weber called 'traditional authority', where 'the organized group exercising authority is primarily based on relations of personal loyalty, cultivated through a common process of education'.¹

In such a system, Max Weber explains that

the person exercising authority is not a 'superior' but a personal 'chief'. His administrative staff does not consist primarily of officials, but of personal retainers. Those subject to authority are not 'members' of an association, but are either his traditional 'comrades' or his 'subjects'.

Adana's administration was dominated by such personal relationships, and obligations of loyalty permeated the system.² Adana resisted the idea of appointing council-

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1. Max Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by A.N. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, London, 1947, p.313.
 2. I have relied very heavily for the sections on administration on my principal Yola informants, Wakili Kawu, Nenne Manu, Ahmadu Marafa and Galadina Yola. As well as adapting it to my particular situation, I closely followed the methodological approach outlined by M.G. Smith for a similar investigation on the Zaria administration in the nineteenth century; see M.G. Smith, 'Field Histories among the Hausa', JAH, II, 1 (1961) pp. 87-101.

lors vested with formal titles. As the circumstances arose, he called upon those he considered capable to sit with him and discuss a particular point. He often conducted meticulous consultations before decisions were taken. Once these decisions had been taken, they were obeyed and executed promptly without question by all concerned. Obedience and prompt execution of orders from superiors seemed to have been the hall-mark of loyalty and a criterion for continuing to enjoy the confidence of the Emir. Some of the consultations were held in private, behind the scene, and for each case he could call different people to sound their opinion. This had the effect of winning the adherence of many who felt a sense of personal involvement in the administration.

Although there was no title-holder during Adana's period, yet from the regularity with which certain individuals, like Sanbo Holna, malan Abdullahi from Wadai, Modibbo Hassan, and Njobbo, a Batta prince of Kukoni, who was among the first leading Batta to embrace Islam, were called upon to perform similar duties, one could associate their names with the titles of Galadina, Waziri, Alkali and Magaji respectively, even before Lauwal gave them the titles. (See below, pp.219ff.) This often inspired satisfaction in them; they considered the gesture as indicative of the confidence Adana had in them.

Matters of administration were accepted as Adana's personal responsibility, and the role of others in this was one of rendering assistance. There was therefore a tendency to refer all matters to Adana personally, and later to his successors, for a decision.¹ The principles behind the organization which Adana developed for the recurrent discharge of governmental functions took into account Islamic political ideas. These ideas stimulated the necessary loyalties which ensured both stability and effectiveness. What is not clear and could be a subject for further investigation as more of the local sources become available is the extent of the gap between orthodox Islamic theories of social, political and economic organization and the actual practices in Adamawa.

Of all the various forms of taxation known to Islamic communities² it seems only two - the zakat and the jizya were of real importance in Adamawa. During Adana's reign, and indeed throughout the nineteenth century, taxation and tribute gave the emirate a large measure of cohesion. They provided the most important material link between Yola, the districts and the villages. Taxation and

1. This is also evident from the accounts of the European visitors from Barth onwards. See eg., Barth, II, pp.485-95; Zintgraff, 1895, pp.299 ff. Alis, 1894, pp.216 ff.; Mockler-Ferryman, 1892, p.93.

2. For example, see Gibb and Bowen, 1957, Chapter VII.

tribute served two important functions for the central administration, as an early factor for political integration and as a source for revenue.

Zakat is one of the Five Pillars of Islam and it is obligatory on all individual Muslims. During the first years of Islam zakat was the basis of the Muslim public treasury. Its assessment and uses were regulated.¹ The jizya was the levy on non-Muslim peoples who surrendered to Islam and were granted the status of dhimmi.²

In the Sokoto empire as a whole there is no doubt that the financial prescriptions of Uthman and Abdullah were, in principle, the official legal frame of reference for the empire's tax system.³ In practice however, as Dr. Last's study shows, it does not appear that the Law was always scrupulously followed.

In Adanawa much flexibility prevailed, as there was no formal assessment.⁴ Payment of the zakat was left entirely to the discretion of the Muslims. Zakat was usually in the form of contributions, as before the jihad, to solve

1. Ruxton, 1916, pp.31-53; E.I., art. Zakat. In theory zakat was expected to be redistributed locally for charity and religious purposes.

2. See above, p. 145.

3. Last, 1967, p.103.

4. Gazetteer, 1927, pp.37-38. It is held that no regular taxation existed except 'a small fee paid by certain craftsmen appears to have been in force ... even the conquered pagans paid no taxes'. (See also Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.102)

communal problems, for example building a mosque, clearing rubbish from a stream to permit cattle to drink from it, as well as meet the demands of charity including the payments the ardo made to the non-Fulani rulers as 'grass' or 'protection' money. (See above, p. 41). What determined the size of one's contributions at any particular time was his personal involvement and wealth, as well as the nature and magnitude of the problem as it faced the community as a whole. Closer study and extrapolations from present attitudes towards zakat might show that many other forms of professional taxes, for instance, trade tax, tolls, etc., were all in the early days of the jihad generally regarded as zakat so long as those involved were Muslims.

The levies on non-Muslim communities, whether they submitted to Muslim rule with or without a fight, constituted the jizya or capitation tax. It was not imposed on individuals, but collectively on whole populations whose chiefs, by contracting to pay the jizya, made their settlements dependencies of Yola either directly or indirectly through the district governors.

Periodically, especially during the harvests, the Fulani rulers sent collectors to cooperate with the local leaders to ensure that the tax obligations on the community were met and the proceeds were transferred safely to their destination. Depending on the pressing needs of the time, some of whatever was thus received, usually of an unspecified proportion, was shared among the public officials, while the rest was either passed on as part of the tribute to Sokoto or used locally to support state institutions, including charities. Failure to make payments would often lead to sanctions of either a punitive raid or deposition of the local leader where the Muslims were able to do so.

The tribute which came to the capital, broken down into its component parts, was often made up of partly zakat,¹ jizya and booty.² Levies for military purposes were sometimes considered as a form of tribute though they fell more appropriately within the obligations incumbent on every free man to fight when called upon by the Commander of the

1. See above, n. 1, p.208

2. Legally 1/5 of the spoils; for difficulties encountered in enforcing the law, see p. 151 n. 1.

Faithful or his lieutenant. The items or amount the districts sent to Yola differed with the location, size and wealth of each district and was principally a matter for the individual districts to decide. Tribute like taxes was paid in kind. The tribute from northern districts such as Marua, Bogo, Mindif and Madagali for the most part consisted of horses, Bornuans (a type of locally woven cloth often dyed with blue or black stain), honey, salt and potassium. Honey and potassium had a very high local demand among all classes of people. Honey was particularly valued as one of the most important ingredients for preparing wedding cakes, and in a society where the incidence of marriage was so high due to polygamy, early marriage, divorce and re-marriage, its value tended to be inflated even the more. Potassium, mined principally in the Mandara region to as far south as Mubi was important both as a laxative and as a means to ease digestion in animals, especially horses and cattle. It was also used for boiling ~~meat~~ to ~~make~~ it soft. C. Rai, Garua, /Tcheboa and the other predominantly agricultural regions sent farm produce including live-stock and poultry to Yola. Ngaundere, Tibati and Banyo, the principal cattle producing regions, sent cattle and slaves.

These came to Yola in the form of 'presents' (gaisuwa) which is indicative of the voluntary nature of the payments.¹ The total receipts by the middle of the nineteenth century were certainly considerable. In 1851 Barth estimated that in slaves alone, Lauwal received 5,000 from the districts annually² and out of this number Vicars Boyle, probably working on the fact that the official Sokoto rate was put at one fifth of receipts, suggested that Lauwal sent over 2,000 to Sokoto so that at least 1,000 could get to their destination.³ Whatever it was, the revenue Yola drew from the districts enabled the town to grow

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1. See e.g. Mizon, 'Les Royaumes Foulbés', pp. 361-62. 'chaque lamido, quel que soit son rang, prélève des taxes dans son appanage et chaque année envoie un présent au grand lamido, à la fin du Rhanadan'. Also Strumpel, p. 71; Barth, II, p. 507. The tribute from Yola to Sokoto was also seen as a present (Last, 1967, p. 105) despite Monteil's observation in 1891 which gives the impression of a more formal and rigid system:

'Le Kaziri a la haute main sur les provinces de Kano, Zaria et Adanaoua. Sa charge principale est d'aller hâter sur place la rentrée des impôts de Kano, du Muri et de l'Adanaoua. Chaque année Bandawaky se met en route pour faire cette tournée qui dure sept ou huit mois'. P.L. Monteil, De St. Louis à Tripoli par le Lac Tchad, Paris, 1894, p. 255. The frequency with which the Sultan's representative visited Yola during the closing years of the century was probably due to the fewer number of times Lamibbe Sanda and Zubeiru visited Sokoto.
 2. Barth, II, p. 503. The other European sources I have consulted, except Mockler-Ferryman, 1892, p. 99 that Garua sent yearly 20-30 slaves to Yola, though referring to tribute, do not give any figures. Oral tradition simply talks of 'considerable wealth'. We cannot rely solely on Barth's figures since he appeared to express doubt about the accuracy of his informant.
 3. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p. 82.

rich faster than any of the districts as well as become the attraction of fortune seekers, traders, scholars, pilgrims and itinerant sherifs. In the early days of the jihad an inducement for paying tribute was that it served as an index of the measure of success that had attended the efforts of a leader, since there was often a correlation between the size of the tribute and success in war. It was a form of showing one's regard and respect for the Lamido and ultimately to the Sultan of Sokoto. Non-payment was a mark of bad relations, and as we have seen, Njidda withheld tribute to Adama after Adama gave flags to some of his northern districts and made them independent of Njidda (See above p.189). Also there were the notorious cases of Njidda, Sanbo and Buba Bindir who evidently used tribute to indicate dissatisfaction, even disregard for Adama by sending their tribute directly to Sokoto hoping to obtain political advantage.¹

At the end of Adama's reign much had already been done to establish a central administration for the emirate. Much still remained to be done; for example, the problems of consolidating and extending its institutions. The next Chapter is about the efforts of the sons of Adama (Lauwal, Sanda and Zubeiru) to solve these problems.

1. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.135; Strumpel, p.75.

CHAPTER IVEVOLUTION UNDER ADAMA'S SONS(1847 - 1901) — — I

:

a) Lauwal and the Administration.

Adama died six years after he settled in Yola. Lauwal, his eldest son, was over 50 years old. Adama had no brother and none of his close associates achieved sufficient popularity to be a rival for the succession. The five great clan leaders, Modibbo Danraka, (Ngara), Hamman Sanbo (Kiri), malam Hamman Gurin (Ba), Ardo Njobdi (Bolaro), and Buba Njidda (Illaga) had not sought for a place in the central government. This was in contrast to the situation in Zaria, for example, where a system of political competition developed, based on four dynasties - Mallawa, Bornuwa, Katsinawa and Suleibawa.¹ Consequently, even during Adama's life time, Lauwal was looked upon as his inevitable successor (see above, p. 196).

Lauwal was away on jihad when Adama died. But before Adama died, he made his dying testament, which he

1. Cf. M.G. Smith, 1960, pp. 74 ff.

had sewn on the gown of Kaigama Nuhu to be handed to Lauwal on his return.¹ The document was addressed primarily to Lauwal, but/^{it}applied also to the entire Muslim community of Adamawa. In it Adama made four points.

First, he instructed Lauwal to succeed him, and his first act as ruler should be to write to all the district governors to stick fast to Islam; their first task should be to strive to increase their knowledge, for lack of knowledge made a man handicapped and blind to truth; he would neither know how to follow the laws of God well, nor how to rule or be ruled. The next point stressed ~~on~~ the necessity for true brotherhood and charity. He called upon all Muslims to unite and love each other, and to achieve this, they should start by avoiding gossip and slander.

The third point was about the jihad. He charged them to continue to levy war on the non-Muslims. If they stopped the jihad the non-Muslims would consider this as a sign of weakness. They would go on ~~the~~ offensive and would begin to attack the Muslims right up to their homes. Even those over whom Muslims had gained victory would rebel, and all the Muslims had struggled so hard to build would come to nought. The final point concerned the economy and the necessity to diversify it. He entreated his Fulani followers

1. Informant 2, Yola; see bibliography, p. 464 for the way I treated Wakili Kawu's evidence.

to focus as much attention on the cultivation of food crops as ^{on} their cattle.¹ Generally, the Fulani considered cultivation of the soil degrading, a job for only slaves or the uncultured people.² But Adana saw in Fulani involvement in agriculture a sure means towards a healthy economy, and probably an occupation that would free their minds from attacking their enemies out of lust for their granaries in contradiction to the lofty principles of the jihad.

When Lauwal arrived the entire town of Yola and the neighbouring districts went out to welcome him. The palace musicians and the drummers played the royal salute (takiyare lanu) to indicate the presence of the Lanido and without any formalities Lauwal was acclaimed Lanido by all and sundry.³ The enthusiasm and release of emotion is said to have been immense. The entire population assembled at the mosque which had been constructed "in the true likeness of

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1. This was very much a problem to the Fulani nomads as was the jihad itself - how to incorporate nomads into a Muslim state as the ruling élite and have them maintain the required discipline. (For a general appraisal of the problems see D.J. Stenning, 'Cattle Values and Islamic Values in a Pastoral Population', I. Lewis, Islam in Tropical Africa, London, 1966, pp.387-400.) In Macina, during the early days of the jihad, encouragement to Fulani participation in agriculture was among the nine urgent spheres of actions recommended by Shaikh Ahmad's councillors. (See Ba and Daget, 1962, pp.43-44.)
 2. Masson, p.8; Froelich, 1954, p.19; St. Croix, 1944, p.15; 'uncultured people', i.e. people who are ignorant of cattle husbandry. There is a myth that the Fulani are not good at cultivating the soil because their hands are too small.
 3. Informant 2, Yola.

Adama's first mosque in Gurin".¹ Lauwal read his father's message and then addressed the congregation. His address, in the main a reiteration of the points his father had raised, also touched on some other problems.

The first topic was his personal position and the constitutional significance of his office. His father, he said, did not rule but only acted as a religious leader. He was going to be both ruler and leader at the same time. Uthman had given his father power over the emirate and the people did not refuse him, but for personal reasons his father had not used the powers.

The second problem he touched on was the question of the jihad. He supported its continuation and called for bolder initiatives. He had, from the beginning of the jihad, distinguished himself as an able fighter. The traditions more than do justice to his fighting zeal.²

1. The Gurin Mosque, constructed soon after Adama's return with the flag from Sokoto, stands today as one of the most ancient historical monuments in the emirate, a heritage of which the Gurin people are very proud. Its original form has been carefully preserved until today. In it is found the same pot (restored and reinforced a few times) from which Adama drew water for the ablutions before prayer, and the baobab tree under which Adama stood and read Uthman's message to the people of Adamawa on his return from Sokoto. It is about 40 yards by 30 wide. [On the spot explanation gratefully owed to the District Head, Gurin and his councillors, Dec. 1966] The Yola Mosque was set on fire during the Bagale wars (1854) and again by the British troops in September, 1901. In 1959 a new Mosque was constructed, and today its imposing brick structure stands as one of the greatest achievements of the present Lanido, Aliyu Ibn Mustafa, great grandson of Adama.

2. Cf. East, pp.33-65; Rosedale, District Note Book, Yola.

He paid special tribute to those ardo'en who had already established Muslim governments, and brought light where there was nothing but darkness by conquering 'obstinate unbelievers'. He recommended their efforts and sacrifices to the people of Yola, who, he said, were still being dominated by non-Muslims in the sense that the non-Muslims continued to hold their old-time positions and beliefs and were indifferent to the Muslim administration. He contended that all these were signs of Fulani weakness, or an inability to face their responsibilities as commanded in the Quran. The next phase of the jihad would be the most difficult and it was going to be principally around Yola itself.¹

Thereafter he sent messages to the Batta chiefs informing them of the changed situation and summoned them to abandon their former ways and embrace Islam. We have already examined the development of the jihad in its military aspect after Lauwal's assumption of power. (See above, pp. 136 ff) What principally concerns us now are the administrative developments during Lauwal's reign, their impact both in the capital and in the districts. and, of course, on the leadership or office of Lamido.

I. Informant 2, Yola.

The example of the Sultans of Sokoto after Uthman seems to have been the main influence on the way Lauwal modelled his government. Its structure was very much on the lines of what existed in Hausaland, though he could not use his discretion to appoint the governors in the districts, as Uthman suggested in his constitution about the appointment of subordinate rulers (See above, p. 174). The districts had evolved their own independent system of hereditary succession, much in keeping with the pre-jihad system where local groups of Fulani, whenever the need arose, selected an ardo and the succession generally remained within his family. Nevertheless, the broad outline of Uthman's recommendations seems to have been enforced.

Much of Adana's administration had been informal, but with Lauwal's accession many formal elements crept into the administration, and these survived into the reigns of his successors. The details of the administration I have considered below under Lauwal were not entirely peculiar to his time. Some of my examples have therefore necessarily come from the preceding and subsequent periods.

At the summit of the administrative hierarchy of the emirate was Lauwal. Below him were the district governors, who, though initially the choice of their electorates colleges, held subordinate titles and pledged allegiance to Yola. The Lamido and district governors each had a body of

councillors with whom they shared the burdens of government. For the first time under Lauwal's organization, the councillors assumed formal titles and became heads of specific departments in the administration directly under the Lamido's supervision and command.¹ Each councillor was individually responsible for his own portfolio (najalis). A host of junior officials assisted in running the departments.

There were five major departments in Yola at the outset under the Waziri, Galadina, Alkali, Agia and Sarkin Yaki.² The Waziri was closely associated with Yola's relations with Sokoto, Baghirni, Bornu, the Hausa emirates, and with the affairs of foreigners in Adanawa. Modibbo Abdullahi, an expert in Arabic from Waɗai, acted as Waziri, but apparently did not assume the title.³ During Sanda's

1. It is generally agreed in Yola that it was under Lauwal that office holders assumed titles.
2. All attempts to identify the people, their background and histories did not yield any fruitful results; names were often confused and there was difficulty in agreeing under whose reign individuals served; the result was that the subject became unpopular with my informants. The fundamental problem is that except with the offices of Waziri, Galadina and to some extent of the Alkali, where single individuals held the office for long periods, the offices were essentially non-hereditary and once an officer was dead he passed literally into oblivion. There has, so far, been no evidence that the Yola aristocracy wrote books or kept records as say in Sokoto where this has made possible a study of the 'Vizierate'. (See, Last, 1967, pp.145 ff.) Too much emphasis on the deeds of the Lamido as against those of his immediate entourage, has always been a custom among the Adanawa Fulani. (Cf. Lacroix, 1965, pp.249 ff.)
3. Barth, II, p.449 refers to him as Secretary of State.

reign Aliyu Ibn Alkassun, one of the grown up sons of Lauwal's full sister, took both the title and functions of Waziri.¹ The Galadina, who has been compared to our modern prime minister, was in charge of the internal administration, the relations between Yola and its districts. He was often consulted in filling vacant posts. He received reports from the quarter-heads (Lando Fatude) in Yola town and worked closely with the magaji'en or mayors (usually two, one Fulani and another non-Fulani) of Yola to maintain discipline and correct behaviour (pulaku) in the market places, grazing fields, and generally, in the observances of the hours of prayer.² Sambo Holna, a close associate of Adana from Holna is generally held to be the first to occupy this office. In Sokoto the office of Waziri was second to only the Sultan;³ but in Adamawa there was the tendency to regard either the Galadina or Waziri as the chief councillor to the Lamido, depending on which of them was older and more experienced. Subsequently however, especially during the final years of the reign of Zubeiru

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1. See Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.90 who puts the date of his appointment at 1877 and his death, 1891. The date of his death 28th October 1891, is confirmed by Mizon who was present at Yola. (See Alis, 1894), pp.318-19.)
 2. In some Fulani society, for instance among the Wodabbe, there was a special official (naudo lawol pulaku) whose function was to enforce the standards of pulaku. (See Stenning, pp.55-56.) Permitting for local emphasis, the essential ideas of what constituted pulaku were generally the same to all Fulani. Cf. L.N. Reed, 'Notes on some Fulani Tribes and Customs', Africa, Vol.V, 1932, p.427.
 3. Last, 1967, pp.145-49.

(1890-1901) it was more a case of whoever among the councillors the Lamido decided to take most into confidence, and this partially explains the dominant role Alkali Ahmed Joda played during Zubeiru's reign. (See below, pp.284ff.)

The Agia was the state treasurer, perhaps holding the same position as the Sa'i or official responsible for the collection of zakat and jizya at Sokoto in the early days of the jihad.¹ The Agia kept the revenue that came to the Lamido but it is unlikely that he played any significant role in its collection. In Yola, there was practically no distinction between ^{the} public treasury and the Lamido's private treasury, so that the Agia in effect was in charge of both. The tribute, and various revenues collected in Yola itself, came to him as well as revenue from the Lamido's private farms or runde. Some say he kept written accounts, others that he simply remembered all the details of what he had in his possession. There was no system of budgeting² and from time to time, ^{he} disbursed payments on behalf of the Lamido on the Lamido's instructions.

The Sarkin Yaki was the commander of all forces. He had under him a series of military title-holders like Kaigana, Baraya, Chanaki, etc. In collaboration with these

1. Last, 1967, p.51.

2. Mizon, 'Les Royaumes Foulbés', pp.360-64 for some useful observations on Yola's administration generally.


men, the Sarkin Yaki organized the purchase of arms which were often distributed by the Lamido as presents, and the exercising of troops from time to time. These troops were nothing like a standing army but people who, in and around Yola, would regard such training as part of their general training for manhood. Attendance was voluntary and depended on one's interest. The Sarkin Yaki kept himself well informed about the military dispositions among both the Muslims and non-Muslims throughout the emirate.

The Alkali administered justice and in the early days the sub-departments of police and prisons fell under his control. He enforced Muslim Law, and together with certain aides or assessors (mufti), malams who were also learned in the Shari'a, he dispensed justice in the court that was established in Yola.¹ Among all the departments, the Alkali's was the only one that was supposed not to be subject to the Lamido's control. The Lamido's responsibility was in appointing him, but after his appointment, he was to serve God and the cause of justice rather than be subject to the Lamido's instructions in the same way as the

1. For a general background to the legal situation in the emirates see J.N.D. Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, London, 1954, pp.171 ff.; J. Schacht, 'Islam in Northern Nigeria', Studia Islamica, Vol.8, 1957, pp.123-46.

other councillors.¹ It was rather the structural organization of the judicial system that integrated the Alkali's department within the Lamido's control.²

Over and above all the courts in the emirate stood the Lamido's to which appeals could be made as a last resort. The structure of the Courts represented by diagram would be as follows:



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1. My principal source for this section has been my informants at Yola, and the Comité Historique, Garua, with the chief Alkali, M. Bassoro acting as the porte-parole. Their evidence was played back on tape to the Alkali Ngaundere and Tibati and some additional information was obtained. The examples of cases provided were all within this century and not directly relevant to this thesis.
 2. For an instance of the exercise of the Alkali's independence, see below, pp. 287 ff.

The Alkali's Court in Yola was a Court of first instance for all the inhabitants of Yola town, as well as the Court of Appeal for the districts. Minor offences and misdemeanours involving breaches of the peace, even in Yola itself, would be referred first to either a Councillor or a quarter (fatude) head.¹ Even during the early days of the establishment of the Court, there was the tendency to bring before the Alkali's Court only those cases involving interpretation of the Law. The court in Yola could in some exceptional instances become the court of first instance for cases originating in the district, such as :-

1. Boundary disputes.
2. Serious cases connected with inheritance, property, slavery and divorce.
3. Cases in which one or more district governors were involved.
4. Any serious crimes like murder, arson or adultery.

Otherwise, the district governors or their Alkali settled cases within their respective districts. Appeals against their judgements to the Yola Court are said to have been rare on the whole, because, although the right to appeal was there, there was little protection for anyone who

1. See Schacht, pp.128 ff., for illustrations of how attempts were often made in the emirates to thrash out cases by the families involved or by local headmen before they were brought before the Alkali's court.

desired to appeal against the wishes of his district governor. Very often, the decisions of the district courts or the district governor were immediately followed up by their enforcement. The social pressures against disobeying one's Lando also weighed against appeal. Opposing a Lando's decision or orders was by itself a serious crime quite apart from the rights and wrongs of the man's case. A prospective appellant had, therefore, to take into consideration the repercussions of 'disobedience' to his district governor before he resorted to an appeal in Yola.

Sometimes the expense involved in transferring a case from the districts to Yola may also have acted as an inhibitory factor. The litigants would have to suspend, or appoint caretakers to carry on their business during the period they would be in Yola; secondly, they would have to provide not only for the members of their families but also for the witnesses, while their cases remained pending. Perhaps the most far-reaching restriction on appeals was not the human factors involved, but the fact that the majority of the rich and comparatively sophisticated districts such as Rai, Tibati, Ngaundere, Banyo and Marua were too far from Yola. Moreover Tibati and Rai never quite so much identified themselves with Yola's institutions.

In his analysis of Government in Zazzau in the nineteenth century, M.G. Smith distinguishes eight types of state officials: the Emir, the officials of the inner

chamber, the household officials, the senior and junior public officials, the royal officials, vassal chiefs, nalams and slave officials.¹ In Yola administration however, except for the vassal chiefs, who were not officials of the central administration and the cunuchs who do not appear to have been an important entity, these degrees of officials were represented by four classes of officials, though the basic structure of government remained the same.

At the head of the administration which was the same for the entire emirate was the Lamido, and no special training or preparation was needed for a successor to the reigning Lamido.² The required qualification was to be of royal descent. Assisting the Lamido were the public officials who consisted of the Lamido's councillors and those who served regularly under them, irrespective of their racial origins. The third was the household officials; this class was predominantly men and women of non-Fulani extraction, often the very trusted ones among slaves.³ For most of the time they served as the Lamido's personal retainers, they ran errands and formed the Lamido's body guard. Their services did not fall under the supervision of any of the

1. M.G.Smith, 1960, pp.36 ff.

2. Informant 2, Yola.

3. At Yola the role the slaves played in public administration was rather small, but this varied considerably from one district to the other; for instance, at Ngaundere some slaves featured prominently in public administration (see Froelich, 1954, p.22.).

public officers, though recruitment to the group was often initiated by one or more of the Lamido's councillors. The ~~councillors~~^{household officials} had their own hierarchy of officials under the over-all supervision of the Lamido's chief slave. The public officials relied on the Lamido to curb the influence that the household officials played at any time on public affairs.¹

The fourth class was the order of malans. This was the least organized, but from time to time they performed services which were both public and private in nature; for instance, officiating during special occasions at the Lamido's court and the Alkali's court, constituting important personalities among the Lamido's entourage during state visits, or acting as school masters, and of course attending to a host of religious duties; for example, reading and explaining verses of the Quran during Ramadan, making amulets and performing special prayers. It was mainly from this class that officials were recruited for public offices.

The salient feature of the administration was that these classes were mutually exclusive of each other. No one could belong to more than one category at a time. In fact,

1. There is no evidence that any of the nineteenth century Lamibbe failed to do this but Bobo Ahmadu whom the British installed after Yola's conquest, relied so much on only his favourites and the slave officials that his usual public officials became alienated from his administration (Vicars Boyle, 1910, pp.88-89).

except for the malans or the heir apparent (Yerina) who before his accession to the throne could hold one of the public offices, there were no allowances for nobility from one category to the other. Just as during the days of Adana, what dominated administration was personal relations, and the most important commitment or requirement of all officials was the obligation of loyalty. Personal initiative, creativity and efficiency were highly regarded, but these must, of necessity, be complemented by loyalty, that is, prompt and effective execution of the Lamido's orders for any official to continue to hold office and be taken seriously. There could be no compromise about obedience, and this was often reflected in the meticulous attention shown over whatever the Lamido had commanded.

Appointments to office were seen as a mark of recognition and distinction. Competition for positions of influence consisted in seeking either to establish close relations with an already important man such as the Yerina, or by marriage to one of the important families, or by winning distinction through education or at war. There were no salaries, but from time to time, the Lamido and senior officials rewarded those directly under their service with a fraction of benefits accruing to their departments. This varied, but since in addition to being a public servant, one was actively engaged in private business,

dependence on the perquisites of office was often secondary.

Lauwal's far-reaching reforms and firmness have in retrospect earned for him the reputation of a "beau idéal of Fulani administrators".¹ His reforms were remarkable for his situation, but they were never a reversal of the broad lines that Adama had striven so hard to lay down. The re-organization of the departments was new, but the people who operated the system were the same and his relation with them continued to be dominated by ties of personal relationship and clientage.²

Lauwal also took into account the popularity which members of the royal family enjoyed in Adanawa, and he associated them with his administration. He entrusted his brothers in particular with much public responsibility especially as leaders of great expeditions.³ He confirmed Hamidu as governor of Hibango and boro for Chamba and Tibati, in addition to being closely associated with the Gurin aristocracy through his mother.⁴ Ahijo was given the very

1. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.139.

2. Clientage was a common feature in many of the Sudanese centralised states; for example, see M.G. Smith, 1960, pp.6-9; S.F. Nadel, A Black Byzantium, Oxford, 1942, pp.122-23.

3. Barth, II, p.449.

4. He was the first son of Yasebo Gurin, and a full brother of Bakari. His grandson Muhammad Bello, best known as Maigari, governor of Nassarawo in German Adanawa, was unexpectedly elected Lamido in 1924, when he came to Yola to pay his condolence at the death of his cousin Lamido Abba.

important and influential post of bero for Sokoto. After his untimely death his son Hammoa inherited the job, and he was host to the redoubtable Hayatu ibn Sa'id ibn Bello when he came to Yola in 1878.¹ After the death of Sarkin Yaki Njobdi, Sanda was put in charge of Rai, Wuro Mayo and Bibeni. Mansuru, renowned for his gift of diplomacy, took charge of Bornu affairs, a post for which his talents were much needed in view of the recurrent hostilities between Bornu and Adanawa.² Besides these prominent appointments, Lauwal also assigned minor commissions to his other relatives as the situation arose.

More names could be obtained, but my informants were all not agreed as to their exact roles. The difficulty here has been to remember the genealogies of men whose ^Sdescendants did not continue to play a major role in the affairs of the emirate. In addition to the Fulani mentioned earlier, the important non-Fulani appointment was retained by Njobbo, supposedly the eldest son of the famous Batta

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1. Ahijo does not appear in Vicars Boyle's elaborate genealogical tree, p.86, but he is mentioned by Barth, II, p.449, as one of Lauwal's 'full-grown up brothers'. Perhaps Vicars Boyle confused Ahijo with Usumanu whom he gave as father of Hammoa.
 2. See Barth, II, pp.449-50, 490-98 for Mansuru's role as bero for Bornu during Barth's visit. Barth probably misunderstood the reason for Mansuru's friendship, and thought he had sent him a pot of honey and generally showed interest because he wanted to qualify for presents from him.

chief Kukoni.¹ He was given the title of Magaji which throughout the century remained with his descendants. He was among the first leading Batta to be converted to Islam and to throw his whole support to the cause of Islam. Even during Adama's time he was put in charge of all matters concerning the Batta. He acted as go-between among the principal Batta and the Adama administration. Whenever complaints came up involving Batta he was called upon to advise.² His confirmation, and indeed his original appointment to this post at a time when suspicion between the Batta and Fulani communities was high, appears to have been an attempt to win supporters among the Batta nobility.

The Fulani were those on the attack; they wanted to create a new order with themselves as rulers. The problem that faced the Fulani, especially after some Batta had converted to Islam without war, was how to integrate the interest of these converts and would-be converts into a Fulani dominated administration. Njobbo was of noble birth and his conversion to Islam had been apparently self-inspired. He was therefore strategically placed for forming

1. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.129. It is today denied in Yola that Kukoni went with Adama to Sokoto, and converted to Islam. He made an Agreement of non-belligerence with Adama and did not forbid any of his followers from becoming Muslims.

2. Cf. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.88.

a bridge, as it were between Batta and Fulani.

b) The bero system.

Further, Njobbo's position as intermediary highlighted one other new element in Lauwal's administration, the 'bero' or 'host' system.¹ It was a device which Lauwal formalised to enable him to rule effectively and to base his decisions on upto date information about the districts. Its roots would seem to be found in the customary method of extending hospitality to strangers, whereby the jauro or ardo called upon one of his subjects to be responsible for the welfare of a stranger during his stay with them, and every communication between the stranger and the ardo was done through the intermediary of the stranger's host.

The bero system itself became much more involved than this under Lauwal. Lauwal appointed important personalities in Yola to be more or less permanently responsible for the affairs of the districts. Very often these personalities were either the Lamido's councillors or members of the royal family because they had easy.

1. Bero is a Fulfulde word meaning both host and guest. My attention was drawn to the subject by my bero at Yola, the Galadina who is my principal source. Documentation for the earlier period has not been possible, but there is no reason to ~~doubt~~ that there was any considerable change in the working) of the system.

suppose

access to the Larido and were free to contact him at any time without formalities. The Galadina was in charge of Ngaundere, Tcheboa, Tignere, Hamdala and Bé; the Waziri had Bindir, Mubi, Figil, Golombe, Garua; Kaigana, Marua, Bogo, Mindif, Guidder and a host of other small neighbouring districts such as Madagali, Moda, etc.; Sarkin Yaki, Rai (during Sanda's reign Rai was given to his son, Yerina Iya). (See below, p. 271)

The Shuwa Arabs, Arabs from North Africa and the Middle East, men from Baghirni and Wadai as well as Europeans, came directly under the charge of Ardo Ganawa or as some of the Europeans called him, "King of Arabs".¹ Besides his councillors, the post of bero afforded Lauwal an opportunity to place his brothers and nephews in positions of responsibility. Hamidu, the most enterprising of all, besides being confirmed as governor of Hibango was made bero of the very important districts of Chamba, Tibati, Banyo, Kontcha and Gashaka. When he died in 1872, his brothers, Zubeiru and Bobo Ahmadu, jointly took over his responsibilities. Mansuru was in charge of non-Arabs from

1. Cf. Barth, II, pp.488 ff.; Mockler-Ferryman, 1892, pp. 93-94; Alis, 1894, p.223; Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.88 gives his name as Lowan Hamidu Zoruba. The attention he received in the European sources is a reflection of his functions as bero rather than the influence he actually wielded at court. His influence was considerable, but not as the Europeans were made to understand. See e.g., Alis, 1894, p.278, Mizon describes him as the most important councillor in Yola.

Bornu. Those districts which were say within a twenty-mile radius of Yola, for example, Girei, Nantari, Gurin, Joboliwo and Daware, came directly under the Lamido and their peoples would normally be introduced to the Lamido by the Galadina or the Lamido's secretary.

The general features of this system seem to have been common practice all over Western Sudan, though here and there one observes some dissimilarities in origins and main functions. Between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries the Mais of Bornu evolved the system as a means of ruling the majority of the 'unassimilated tribes'. They were allowed to retain their own natural chiefs, but were represented at the Mai's Court either by a representative whom they chose for themselves or more often by a notable of the Court who was responsible for supervising their affairs, and also very probably, for the collection of taxes from them with a part of the revenue being reserved to himself.¹ Here, as in the case of the Adanfos in the Court of the Asantehene of Kumasi in central Ghana, the emphasis was on representation at Court, though it must be said that the appointment of an Adanfo arose more out of demands of Court etiquette than out of administrative pressure.²

1. Urvoy, 1949, p.88; also Palmer, 1936, p.37.

2. R.S. Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution, London, 1929, pp.95-97; Forde and Kaberry, 1966, p.221. Perhaps some differences could be detected on the basic conception of the systems on linguistic grounds. 'Kofa' is a Hausa word meaning 'door' or 'gateway'; 'Adanfo' in Akan means 'friend' or 'patron'. Befo has the implied meaning of friend, but in actual fact means both host and guest.

However, what came close to the beraship system, and probably influenced its formalization within the Adanawa administration, was the 'Kofa system' of the Fulani-Hausa emirates of the Sokoto empire.¹ The details of how the 'Kofa system' operated have not yet been written, but from scattered references it would appear to have been an ancient custom carried over from earlier Hausa usage. Under the Fulani, the emphasis was on supervision of the administration of the emirates.²

The bero's responsibilities were both political and non-political. On the non-political level, he was responsible for the welfare and upkeep of anyone who presented himself from his districts. If anyone of them brought any personal problem he discussed it with the bero who offered his advice. He would find him legal aid if necessary. Likewise, if the visitor came to study or look for a job, he lodged with the bero until he was established.

Transit visitors to his districts also came to him. He furnished them with necessary information and gave them escorts or letters of credence. ~~It was enough for the visitor to mention the bero's name on arrival at the district to be regarded as a bona fide visitor.~~ Thus, for

1. M.G. Smith, 1960, pp.75, 79; Johnston, pp.129-29, 175-76; Last, p.204.

2. Cf. Last, 1967, p.189; Mockler-Ferryman, 1902, p.157; Monteil, 1894, p.255.

instance, Mansuru was well known to the Bornu authorities,¹ and it was necessary for Mizon to see the Waziri and Galadima and receive advice and letters before he set out first to Garua and later to Ngaundere.² However the aspect of a bero's function which has received most attention is the political. This is probably so because the majority of the beros were at the same time members of the Lamido's Council. For, as Mizon observed in 1891,

Le conseil est formé de deux espèces de membres: les ministres foubé et les ministres étrangers. Les premiers appartiennent tous à la famille royale sont chargés soit du commandement d'une armée, soit de la surveillance d'une province et des relations des gouverneurs [of the provinces] avec le sultan. Un district leur est donné en apanage. ... Ils [all foreigners in Yola] ne relèvent de l'autorité royale que par l'intermédiaire de leurs chefs, qui jouent auprès du sultan le rôle de nos consuls à l'étranger. 3

The Lamido's dealings with the districts were in close consultation with the beros individually. All that the Lamido had to give the district governors was done through the agency of the bero. A district governor, on his part, approached the Lamido through his bero, unless a special request to do so in private had been previously

1. Barth, II, p.450.

2. Ali, 1894, contains numerous incidental references to the working of the bero system see e.g., pp.279-80, 295, 321.

3. Mizon, 'Les Royaumes Foubés', pp.360-61.

granted. It is easy to see how much influence the bero exerted during such audiences with the Lamido. The bero was as the consul of the district Governor at the capital, except that he did not belong to the district he was supposed to represent, and he was never accredited to Yola by the district governor. For example, the Galadima, Waziri, and the 'king of Arabs' were all Yolans.

Even more important whenever there was a dispute between the Lamido and the district governor, the bero was best placed to understand the points of view on both sides and could therefore arbitrate. His advice or arbitration however, had no constitutional means of enforcement, and very often the bero, as a mark of respect, would remain silent if the Lamido expressed displeasure at his views or on a topic. Nineteenth century European sources on Adamawa allude to this about their bero Ardo Gamawa:

This individual, though born in Yola, is said to be of Arab descent. He is independent of the Emir, and is admitted to his friendship, and consequently, has a certain amount of power... he is afraid to go against him in anything; and he proceeded to put me off in every way he could think of. The Emir, he said, was afraid to receive white people without the orders of his suzerain at Sokotu; the wuzeer was away, and therefore an interview was impossible; the Emir was unwell - and such-like petty excuses. The most I could get out of him was a promise.....¹

1. Mockler-Ferryman, 1892, pp. 93-94.

The boro sometimes offered an avenue through which discussions could start on potentially explosive issues. This was the case when Lauwal succeeded Adana and Njidda refused to go to Yola and pay homage. The boro, Sarkin Yaki Njobdi, offered to go to Rai and make a final effort to settle the dispute. On his way he camped near Rai and waited until the day of the Festival when Njidda and the entire population would go to pray outside the walls of the town. During the prayers Sarkin Yaki appeared and delivered his message apparently in a threatening manner. In front of the congregation Njidda accepted to go to Yola and do homage, but when Njidda went back into the walls, he refused to compromise and Sarkin Yaki's mission was thus a failure.¹ With Lando Abbo of Ngaundere however, Galadina Fariku achieved more success. After some years of Abbo's defying Lamido Zubeiru's orders to come to Yola, Galadina Fariku secured a settlement acceptable to both parties. (See below, pp. 251)

On the economic plane, the boro's main preoccupation was with the tribute, and presents from the districts to Yola. He organized their transfer to Yola either by going to the district himself or sending representatives.

1. East, p.37. The incident started a tradition at Rai of not saying the prayers marking the Muslim Festivals outside the town walls, as is the case all over the major towns in Northern Nigeria and Adamawa in Cameroon.

The presents sent to Yola to relatives or friends went to the bero, chiefly for security reasons, and he acted simply as a postal agent. Many people preferred to send valuable 'parcels' through him because he guaranteed their delivery and one could always check if one's parcel actually reached Yola. As a distinguished personality in Yola, he knew the people, and since they called frequently to greet him,¹ he would probably know of their movements if and when they were out of Yola.

In addition to the presents, some revenue came to people in Yola by virtue of the positions they held in the administration. Whenever an important personality visited Yola, especially during the great Muslim festivals, he brought along presents for the Yola notables. Also, whenever tribute came to Yola it was customary for the district governor to attach something over and above the tribute to be delivered directly to the bero and other favourites. During prolonged illness of an official, it was customary to send salutations to him, accompanied by presents for those who could afford them. Sometimes such presents also came through the bero.

1. Greetings are exchanged every morning and evening and this is a social obligation. (See Barth, II, pp.425-26, 'The Fulbe of Adamawa are especially rich in compliments, which, however have not yet lost their real and true meaning... the form of many as used in Adamawa, varying greatly from that usual in other countries occupied by the Fulbe, and of course all depends on the time of the day when friends meet'.)

Reviewing the situation as a whole, the bero was weakest whenever there was a conflict and both sides were unreconciled. His influence depended very much on the trust and confidence both the Lamido and the district governors were willing to grant him. Being of subordinate rank in the political hierarchy, he could not coerce any one to accept his point of view in a dispute. He owed his appointment solely to the Lamido and on the presumption that his services would be accepted by the districts. A very high degree of tact was required because it was easy for him to be stigmatized with partiality by either party. This gravely limited the possibilities of a bero in matters of conflict.

Through his own visits and frequent contact with people to and from the district, he was well informed about events in the district. This put him in a position to explain or raise objections to what went on in the district. Thus he, above all, assisted the rulers to form their attitudes on facts. He made it possible for views to be heard and even to be discussed without loss of face on either side. The bero relied as much on his own resources as on presents from his clients, including the Lamido, to discharge his duties and in the case of the tribute that came to the Lamido, as we have just seen, something was often attached for him personally.

All these reforms in the administration affected the development of government in a variety of ways. Henceforth Yola's role became enlarged. Its institutions were adapted to cater for wider and more diversified interests beyond those of Yola's immediate vicinity.

c) Yola, the districts and Sokoto.

The structure of the district administration was a microcosm of the central.¹ At the head of each district administration was the Lando or district governor whose ancestor had received a flag from Adama. Under him were councillors with similar titles - Galadina, Waziri, Alkali, Agia, Kaigana, etc. In some of the districts with outlying villages, the Lando appointed jauro'en or Lawans to administer their affairs and be answerable directly to him.

It was however not possible to achieve absolute uniformity due to pressure from local conditions. These were mainly two: first, the nature of the conquest, whether it was complete or only partial; and secondly, the degree of social and political organization of the non-Muslims before their conquest. In those regions where the Fulani

1. Cf. Mizon, 'Les Royaumes Foulbés', pp.360-61, compares it with France in the Middle Ages. Labouret, 1935, pp. 88-93; Domergue, 1953, pp.6-7. In many of the large districts like Ngaundere, Tibati, Rai, Marua, the main features of the administration of the nineteenth century have remained intact.

established themselves without substantial non-Fulani aid, notably in Gurin, Bindir, Garua, Bogo and Turua, the district administration was almost exclusively in the hands of Fulani.

But where the Fulani only had a partial victory, or where they were aided by non-Fulani allies to become the dominant force, the administrative hierarchy had to reflect this by incorporating all the important elements responsible for the victory into the administration. Thus, in Tibati, Marua, Rai, and more especially in Banyo and Ngaundere, there are until now two distinct groups of councillors, one Fulani, the other non-Fulani, aiding the Lando to administer the districts.¹ Each set of councillors was considered to be the competent authority on those matters that directly affected its own ethnic group.²

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1. At Rai, the non-Fulani councillors are called hohobe while the Fulani councillors, hirobe; elsewhere najalisa machube (lit. council of slaves), and najalisa Fulbe (council of Fulani) respectively.
 2. This is still true today, and as I was told at Marua, Rai and Ngaundere, the large size of the non-Fulani population meant the actual responsibility and consequently the influence of some individual non-Fulani councillors tended very often to be greater than that of the Fulani. In such a case it was the role of the Lando to find an equilibrium that was satisfactory to the Fulani aristocracy. Failure to do so was often a source of perennial trouble with the Fulani aristocracy. Cf. Lt. Schnitz, Rapport sur la mort de Hamadou Gabdu Lando de Banyo, 1904, ANY, TA57 for an incident in Banyo when the entire Fulani aristocracy abandoned their chief and went and settled at Wuro Kessun because the young Lando paid more heed to the non-Fulani councillors. On the role of the non-Fulani councillors at Ngaundere see Froelich, 1954, pp.22-23.

This dichotomy was important only as an administrative convenience, because where vital decisions affecting the district as a whole were to be taken, though the opinion of the non-Fulani hierarchy was consulted, the final say was often left with the Fulani councillors, since they had a better understanding of the Islamic ways.¹ Instances of this were in deciding upon war and in the selection of a new Lando. At Rai, or at Ngaundere, the election of the Lando was the exclusive prerogative of the Fulani councillors, who also decided, at least officially, on the most important issues.²

This device was necessary to keep the balance of power always in favour of the Fulani, and to perpetuate their dominance in the administration. By according the Fulani councillors such an exclusive right in matters of leadership, cross-competition between Fulani and non-Fulani for higher positions of influence was ruled out and so a large measure of stability was guaranteed between the ruling hierarchies. Also, the Lando often consulted each group separately and balanced the various points of view in private. This made it impossible to avoid a headlong

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1. Domergue, 1953, p.7; this was so mostly at the beginning of the jihad with the first generation of rulers. Later however this was difficult to follow by some of the Lambe who were only partially Fulani. (See e.g., Strumpel, p.71.)
 2. Fulani here really means any one who had Fulani blood in him irrespective of how far away his physical features stood from the usual Fulani ideal of long hair, straight aquiline nose, light skin and thin lips.

collision of opposing interests based on ethnic origins.

As we have already noted in the composition of the Yola administration, some districts like Gurin, Song, Malabu, Guidder and Fubi, instead of having the double-stream system of Fulani and non-Fulani councillors, have integrated the Councillors into a single stream, although certain titles, such as Magaji, Barade (a military title for non-Fulani cavalry leader) were traditionally reserved for non-Fulani.¹ A factor that accounted for the single-stream system, was the smallness of the population of a district which made a large body of councillors unnecessary.

The similarity in the structures of the district and central administration simplified one of the major problems of the Yola administration, that is, the question of allegiance and loyalty to the centre by giving greater emphasis to a system of ranks and hierarchies. Indeed the operation of the system has been likened to the administration of a family.² My informants at Garua laid stress on this point and indicated that the factors at work could be perceived only by an understanding of what held the members of a family together and how they conducted their affairs.

1. Mizon, 'L'Histoire du Muri et de l'Adamaoua', gives a list of titles but without the people who held them. For a list of title holders in Zubeiru's council see Vicars Boyle, 1910, pp. 87-89.

2. Froelich, 1954, pp.26-31; Donergue, 1953, p.6.

In the family, the father's authority could be compared to the jauro in a village, the Lando in a district, and the Lamido in the emirate. Any other persons who held positions of authority, or were senior by reasons of age, were like senior brothers to their subordinates and implicit obedience was required at all times by superiors. This is not to argue that Lauwal started or introduced these sentiments in the emirate, but during his reign much prominence was given to them and they were orientated towards making his structural re-organization of the political system of the emirate more meaningful.

The Lando's were allowed to rule the districts just as a father would run his household as he thought fit, subject, of course, to certain overriding Muslim principles. Yola seldom interfered in the internal affairs of the districts unless invited to do so. Each district had its own electoral college which was solely responsible for selecting its governor. Whoever was selected went to Yola to be turbaned and confirmed in his position.¹ Strictly speaking his election was not complete without receiving the turban and

1. Apart from tribute, this was another important aspect of Yola's sovereignty over the districts. After the conquest and partition of Adamawa, the German authorities strove to abolish the sending of tribute to Yola as well as the custom to be turbaned at Yola. The Fulani rulers objected to this. Cf. Zimmer "Les troubles en Adanaoua, 1908", ANY, TA-32. What appeared to have been a compromise was that tribute ceased, but after the election of a Lando he sent a delegation of notables with presents to Yola to inform the Lamido who would send the new Lando a gown and turban confirming the appointment. (See Lacroix, 1965, p.81.)

blessings of the Lamido in Yola. The local election conferred only the right to hold office on the elected, without the religious sanction which traditionally only Yola could provide.

According to Uthman dan Fodio, the right to appoint district governors was vested in the Emir.¹ but in Adamawa, this right was traditionally exercised only indirectly through the electoral colleges in the districts. The custom of going to Yola to receive the turban could therefore be seen as an attempt to ensure that while the Lamido exercised his constitutional right, the choice should at the same time be acceptable to the people over whom the district governor ruled. Yola accepted whoever was elected unless there was strong opposition from within the district as the examples given below indicate. On the other hand, the districts also accepted whoever the Yola electoral college elected as Lamido because those in Yola were considered best placed by reason of proximity and intimate acquaintance to know who was the best candidate.

In the case of rival claimants to the governorship, the matter was usually referred to Yola after all attempts had been made to settle the matter locally. The approach the Lamido would adopt to settle the conflict differed with the circumstances. Sometimes, all parties sent delegations

1. KF (Hiskett) p.566.

to the Lani-do to state their respective claims. The Lani-do would decide and send a mission consisting of senior councillors, including the bero of the district, to speak to the people and try to win popular approval for the Lani-do's decision.

At other times when the chances of such a delegation avoiding civil war were slim, the Lamibbe of Yola resorted to the method of detaining one of the contestants in Yola. For example, when Ardo Njobdi of Ngaundere died during Lauwal's reign and none of his sons was grown up to succeed him, Lauwal appointed Modibbo Adama Gana from Turua in Bundang to act as regent by popular consent,¹ but after eight years, the majority of the Fulani feared that if Adama Gana died in office, the throne might pass to his descendants and not to the sons of Ardo Njobdi, who won the district for the Fulani. They therefore appealed to Lauwal to abrogate the regency and install Njobdi's eldest son, Hamman, as Lando. Adama Gana felt the move had been

1. Vicars Boyle, 1910, pp.85-86; Informants 2, Yola; 17, Ngaundere. Modibbo Adama Gana is remembered as one of the greatest men of his time. He studied together with Adama in Bornu though it is not certain whether he also like Adama studied under malan Kiari of Kukawa. He specialized in medicine administering treatment to both men and animals, and it was because of this that in the first place he won distinction; later he won fame and a following because of the effectiveness of his laiya (charms) and special prayers for people. He had several children some of whose descendants can be found today in Yola, Ngaundere and Tibati. In Yola and Ngaundere his descendants and students perpetuate his memory and revere him as a saint.

inspired by jealousy and by office seekers who had gathered around Hamman Lawan. He therefore refused to step down.¹ Lauwal then summoned both Modibbo Adama Gana and Hamman Lawan to Yola where he turbaned Hamman Lawan and detained Adama Gana in Yola in very luxurious circumstances. He however escaped to Tibati which was then in rebellion against Yola. He was later rearrested and brought back to Yola.²

A more troublesome case was the son of the successful ruler of Madagali, Njidda (1811-1854).³ His son and successor Buba Sjuto was disliked by the elders who appealed to Lauwal to replace him with his twin brother Bakari. Buba Sjuto was arrested and taken to Yola. But at the death of Lauwal, he fled from Yola and with the help of some loyal villages in Madagali he attacked Bakari who immediately appealed to Lauwal's successor Lamido Sanda for aid. Buba Sjuto

1. MS in the possession of Modibbo Usumanu, Alkali Ngaundere. In this lengthy poem in Fulfulde, Modibbo Adama Gana strongly condemned the decision to terminate his regency. He cursed Hamman Lawan and prayed that none of his descendants should become Lando. This was in fact not so; cf. Froelich, 1954, p.13; Modibbo Adama Gana's regency is omitted in Froelich's list; this is usual for a king-list obtained at Ngaundere where not many of Modibbo Adama Gana's supporters survived Lawan's purge.
2. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.86. Informants 2, 5, Yola; 17, Ngaundere, state that this move was also partly due to Lauwal's policy to bring all learned malams to Yola so that he could exercise more control over their schools and what they taught; see infra, p. 262.
3. For his career in the early phase of the jihad see Strumpel, pp.57-58.

was again captured and taken to Yola where he died in captivity in 1874.¹

Another incident occurred during the reign of Lamido Zubeiru (1890-1901). In March 1893, the throne of Banyo fell vacant and Unaru, the son of the deceased Lando was elected by the local electoral college. His uncle, Sambo who was then Lando Gashaka invaded Banyo and deposed Unaru.² Unaru appealed to Lamido Zubeiru who supported his claim and summoned Sambo to Yola. Without suspecting anything, Sambo came to Yola, but he was detained there while Unaru was confirmed ruler over Banyo.³

This method of detention was often effective, but its weakness was that if any of the candidates felt he could have sufficient control within the district, and there was a possibility that he would not be confirmed at Yola, he could refuse to go to Yola. In such circumstances the Lamido would be powerless. This was the case when in 1890 Hamman Gabdo died. Bello, his most energetic son, who had been tipped to succeed him, was away on a distant campaign against the Baya. The non-Fulani councillors decided to

1. Strunpel, pp.58-59; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.140.

2. Banyo, Kontcha and Gashaka were founded by one leader, Hamman Dandi; see above, pp.130 ff.

3. Mizon, 'Les Royaumes Foulbeés', pp.357-58. Mizon met Sambo and his party at Yola and had interviews with them. See above, pp.134-35 for more on Lando Unaru, Banyo.

maintain the throne vacant until Bello returned, but Muhammad Abbo, brother to Hamman Gabdo and uncle to Bello, gathered around himself some Fulani and convinced them that the intention of the non-Fulani was to make one of themselves Lando, and that the Fulani should support him to intervene to stop this.¹ He received their support and proclaimed himself Lando. The supporters of Bello fled to Lamido Zubeiru. Meanwhile Bello returned from his campaign only to find that he was barred entry into the town by a heavy force mounted by his uncle, Abbo. Greatly disappointed, he continued with his men through Handala, Be, Turua and finally reached Yola after a two weeks march.

Zubeiru and all his councillors supported Bello's case and invited Abbo to Yola. Abbo refused to come to Yola and continued to do so even when his bero Galadina Fariku was sent specially to try to persuade him to come.¹ However, Abbo never ceased to send rich tribute to Yola. In these circumstances, the Lamido appointed Bello Lando of Turua, which since the foundation of Ngaundere, had been administered together with Ngaundere by one Lando resident at Ngaundere, and sent Galadina Fariku with a turban and gifts to go to Ngaundere and confirm Lando Abbo in office.¹

1. Mizon, Exploration en Afrique Centrale, p.24;
Strumpel, p.52.

Besides the occasions when Yola was invited to intervene in the districts, Yola left the districts to manage their own affairs without dictation. The districts maintained their allegiance and loyalty to Yola on a rather voluntary basis. The district governors would do all in their power to go to Yola to be turbaned because that had been the tradition since the foundation of the emirate, and was a way of acquiring prestige and respect among their own people and those who witnessed or heard of the event.

Relations between the districts and Yola never remained constant all the time even within one district. Apart from the respect the Lambe received from their people, if they remained on good terms with Yola, they sought and found Yola's support necessary when threatened by attack or internal divisions. We have seen how the northern districts remained closely attached to Yola on account of the persistent hostilities of their powerful neighbours, Bornu and Mandara (see above, p. 23). During Adana's reign when a serious dispute broke out between Bindir and Mindif over Bobewo, both groups were willing to put down arms only after Adana's mediation. which, though not satisfactory¹ to Mindif, was nevertheless accepted as a basis for a detente.

1. Strumpel, p.76.

During Lauwal's reign Ngaundere, Tignere and Banyo called upon Lauwal's aid to stop Hanidu Nyambula of Tibati from making war against them, and this ended up by Lauwal mobilizing the rest of the districts, except Rai, against Tibati (see above p. 152). Similarly, during the reign of Sanda and Zubeiru when Marua Bogo and Mindif felt threatened by Hayatu's Mahdist movement, they called upon Yola to rescue them and this eventually led to the Zubeiru-Hayatu confrontation.

The relation between Yola and Sokoto was theoretically similar to the one between Yola and its districts. The sources represent this in two ways based on the author's conception of the political organization of the Sokoto empire. One view is that the Emirs derived their authority from Sokoto and governed on behalf of the Sultan.¹ The other view is that the Sokoto empire was a sort of confederation of independent states, in which, however, the Sokoto sultanate played a dominant role.² In this view, the emirates were not subordinate to Sokoto, but were associated with it in a traditional manner that guaranteed the pre-eminence of a central authority, and the overall defence of the Muslim empire. The Lamido of Adanawa was consequently not a representative or messenger. He was ruler in his own right.

1. Cf. Barth, II, p.496. Last, 1967, p.53.

2. Mizon, Exploration en Afrique Centrale, p.58; Orr, 1965, p.73.

The relation between Sokoto and Yola would seem to have wavered between the two views just mentioned. At one time Yola felt very strong sentiments of subordination to the Sokoto sultanate because the Sokoto administration was, to begin with, recognized as the administration not only of Sokoto emirate, but of the entire empire of which Adama^{wa} was a part.¹ The people of Adamawa were aware that the initial stimulus and encouragement that led to the creation of the emirate had come from Sokoto. On this basis, the Sokoto sultanate exercised sovereignty by issuing directives and advice which had real effect in Adamawa. For instance, when the jihad failed in Baghirni, Uthman ordered the Fulani of Baghirni to abandon their independence and submit to Adama and become part of his emirate. (S. J. V. p. 100). Also in 1842 Aliyu Babba changed the fortunes of the emirate when he withdrew Atiku's flag to Sanbo and ordered him to continue his former allegiance to Adama's administration. Likewise, there was also the case of the refusal of the Sokoto administration to accord any of Yola's districts an independent status, despite the persistent requests of some like Rai, Tibati and Bindir. These were decisions which were of great import to the emirate and to the continued existence of Adamawa as we knew it by the end of the nineteenth century, and the fact that they were

1. Last, 1967, pp.63-65.

considered to be only within the competence of Sokoto, suggested to what extent, even without Sokoto's physical presence in Adamawa, the emirate was subordinated to the Sokoto administration.

On the other side of the coin, Yola ran its own affairs for the most part without reference to Sokoto, and Yola's rulers were not regarded as officials of the Sokoto administration. Yola waged its own wars with its own resources and each Lamido decided on when to visit Sokoto and there was no compulsion on the part of Sokoto. In other emirates like Zaria and Kano frequent succession disputes, and possibly proximity to Sokoto, offered the Sokoto administration the occasion to interfere directly and exercise sovereign rights within the emirates;¹ but in Yola, throughout the nineteenth century there were only two succession crises both of which were limited enough for the Yola aristocracy to solve. Yola's electoral college remained the key to its succession and even where Sokoto did not like Yola's choice as in both 1872 and 1890, the Sultans always followed the lead of the Yola people.²

1. See e.g. M.G. Smith, 1960, pp.74 ff. Last, 1967, pp. 200 ff. For Sokoto's intervention in Muri see Mockler-Ferryman, 1892, p.124.

2. Infra, pp. 263 ff.

In all this, the element of convenience seemed to have been the golden rule. Whenever there was fear of an external enemy, and it was convenient for the rulers of Yola to refer to Sokoto, there was much talk of submission to Sokoto. Lauwal, for instance, described himself to Barth in 1851 as 'the slave of the Sultan of Sokoto', and intimated that if Barth brought a letter of introduction from Sokoto, he would receive him with open arms.¹ It is however unlikely that Barth's visit would have met with such disappointment were it not for the diplomatic attempt of the Bornu authorities to use Barth's visit to achieve their own political ends, as well as Lauwal's suspicion of Barth, when this fact became evident to Lauwal.² Further, during Sanda's reign, after a series of disappointing relations with the Niger Company, Sanda refused to parley with the Europeans unless they brought letters of credence from the Sultan of Sokoto. But when this was done in 1886 and 1887 he took only such measures as he saw fit.³ When Zubeiru ascended the throne, he stayed for up to two years without going to Sokoto and there was fear that he might not go at all. But no sooner had the threat of Mahdism, preached by Hayatu Balda, arisen than Zubeiru made haste

1. Barth, II, p.491.

2. Ibid.

3. Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp.43-44; Mockler-Ferryman, 1892, pp.90-95; Alis, 1894, p.256.

to go to Sokoto and receive the turban.¹ Otherwise if the people were pressed to make a choice between Hayatu and Zubeiru, Zubeiru's opponents might exploit the fact that he had not been turbaned.

Besides the tribute that Sokoto received from Adanawa, the emirate was of special significance to the rest of the Sokoto empire in other ways too. Bello had striven to come to terms with the Bornu potentates on Adanawa's northern frontier.² Adanawa's position as the most eastern emirate, after the failure of the jihad in Baghirni, put it nearest the region where the Mahdī was expected to appear.³ In this respect, Adanawa's position was strategic in two ways. It would be the first to learn of the Mahdī's appearance and to pledge allegiance, and would become a thorough-fare for all those from the west desiring to meet the Mahdī.

Mahdist expectation was important because it came from Uthman himself; the ruling aristocracy at Sokoto made it part of their credo.⁴ Uthman had predicted that

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1. This was during the dry season of 1894-95 as he is reported to have passed through Kano during the civil war between Ali and Tukur and avoided being embroiled in the disputes. (See Last, 1967, p.136.)
 2. MS Bello to Adama (c). Bello informed Adama that he had sent a delegation to Bornu to settle the frontier between Adanawa and Bornu. Apparently this was done and by 1850 mutually recognized boundaries existed between Adanawa and Bornu. (Cf. Barth, II, pp.347-49.)
 3. For an account on Adanawa and Mahdism see below, pp.361ff.
 4. See M.A. al-Hajj and S.O. Biobaku, 'The Sudanese Mahdiyya and the Niger - Chad Region', in I.M. Lewis, Islam in Tropical Africa, London, 1966, pp.425-37; also, M.A.al-
/cont..

the Mahdī would appear before the end of his jihad, thus adding a fillip of urgency. Bello never ceased to remind Adana of his duty to send immediate reports about the Mahdī when he appeared. He instructed Adana to send a certain celebrity, Ibn Hajj Emin and other men to the South of Wadai and Dafur. Adana was to provide them with a comprehensive description of the qualities of the Mahdī so that immediately the Mahdī appeared, these men would recognize him, and there would be no loss of time before the Sokoto regime offered its allegiance to him.¹

Adamawa's position on the pilgrims' route further gave it a special importance. The successes of the jihad in Adamawa had led to a diversion of some pilgrims to follow a more southerly route that passed through Adamawa to Baghirni, Dafur and finally to Mecca.² Although the rulers of Sokoto did not go on pilgrimage, they always showed concern for the safety of pilgrims. For example Bello instructed Adana to give all assistance to one malam Wuli on all matters concerning the jihad in Logone and Baghirni so that the region also would become safe for pilgrims.³ One of the complaints Bello apparently launched against the Bornu

F/note cont. from previous page.

Hajj, 'Mahdist Expectations in the Sokoto Caliphate', pp.100-13.

1. MS Bello to Adana (B).
2. Clapperton, 1829, pp.203, 229-30. The new route did not become a substitute for the northerly route through Bornu and Wadai since it was often closed due to frontier wars against Baghirni.
3. MS Bello to Adana (D).

regime very early in the jihad was its obstruction on pilgrims.¹

The wealth of Adamawa, especially in slaves offered the most attraction for traders and other travellers through the Sokoto empire. They could sell their goods and receive a cheque from the Sultan of Sokoto as the French explorer Monteil did, or make a request for subsidy from the Sultan or Waziri in Sokoto, as a certain Sherif El-Habib who came from Timbuktu requested from Aliyu Babba and was given an 'order' for the rulers of Zaria, and Adamawa.² This way, pilgrims and other important people could travel light, only carrying with them a cheque or an 'order' to Yola where it would be honoured by the Lamido.

For these reasons Adamawa enjoyed a lot of popularity throughout the Sokoto empire. A new type of immigrant both Hausa and Fulani, was attracted from Hausaland into Adamawa. These went to various parts of the emirate but many of them stayed in or near Yola, or passed after a few years to Ngaundere and Banyo. Among the immigrants were traders, fortune seekers and non-professional men, but those who made the most impact on the administration were the intellectuals.

1. IM (Arnett), p.115.

2. Hadj Sa'id, pp.351-52; see also Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.82; Monteil, 1895, pp.251-53; 293. Monteil did not wish to go as far as Yola; although the cheque was to be cashed at Yola, he negotiated for it to be bought over at Kano, and before it finally reached Yola it would probably pass through several hands. Barth II, p.384, relates Barth's encounter with an Arab pilgrim from Morocco in Adamawa endeavouring to obtain wealth 'by begging and the parade of learning'.

Men like Modibbe Muhammad Raji b. Ali, Muhammad Nakashiri, Mo Allayidi and Alkali Bilkijo were accompanied by very large followings, including students, arriving this time with pens and not swords as some of their predecessors had done a few decades before then. They were generally men of high reputation and erudition in their countries of origin.¹ Some of them came to make permanent homes in Idanawa because of the opportunities that were open to them there to command even greater authority such as keen competition at home seldom allowed them.

These immigrants created new problems for Lauwal's administration and so added to the growing feeling of insecurity which sometimes characterised Lauwal's administration. They were inclined to adopt a more placid attitude towards the military side of the jihad. Their sentiments were shared by a strong section of the Yola aristocracy who felt that constant fighting had impaired the growth of Yola as capital of a rich emirate. The enthusiasm enkindled at the beginning of the jihad was on the decline by

1. See e.g. a brief sketch on Modibbo Raji et. al, D.M. Last, 'Literature of the North: Additions to the Collection of Manuscripts on Microfilm at Zaria 1966-67', Northern History Research Scheme, Second Interim Report, Zaria, 1967, pp.31 ff.

the 1860's.¹ The pioneers of the jihad had passed away and those who spent all their youth under the uncertainties of war were now of mature age.

Moreover, the influence and prestige the immigrants acquired among the virtually illiterate population was out of proportion to the actual services they had rendered in the building of the emirate. Through the schools they opened, they gradually gained a firm grip on the intellectual life and the youth, whose attention they now wanted to divert from war aims to learning, and such sectarian practices like the Tijaniyya tariga of which Modibbo Raji ibn Ali was its chief exponent.² According to oral tradition, Yola, these immigrants preached that the jihad would last for one hundred years. One half of this period was for installing Islam and the other for consolidating it through learning. It is not certain how widespread this belief was in Hausaland but the prediction that the jihad would last for one hundred years was advanced to justify British victories

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1. Strumpel, pp.28 ff., states that the decline started immediately after Adama's death. Although all the conquests of the major districts were achieved during Adama's reign the major conquests by the Yola people themselves were achieved under Lauwal. See above, pp. 136 ff.
 2. See Last, 'Literature of the North', p.32. In a more detailed treatment of the controversy over Bello's affiliation to either the Qadiriyya or Tijaniyya sects, Last, 1967, pp.215 ff.; Dr. Last argues the case against a Tijaniyya affiliation, and by extension this was probably so with Lauwal and his successors. See also Lacroix, 1966, pp.403-04, for a general observation on the role which the rulers of Adanawa have played to exclude the inroads of sectarian practice in Adanawa Islam.

over the emirates.¹ Lauwal's concern over the activities of the malams increased, and he subsequently intervened to control what they taught. Firstly he forbade the teaching of subjects outside religious studies, for example, the art of fore-telling the future or numerology or reading peoples' characters and fortunes from a computation of figures and symbols.² Secondly, he recalled some of the influential malams, among whom the best remembered name is Modibbo Raji, and their students to come and take up residence in Yola. Another important man was Modibbo Adama Gana (see above, pp.248-49). After his escape from Yola and settlement at Tibati, Lauwal had him sent back to Yola where he was compelled to conduct his schools.³ The effect of Lauwal's rigid attitude towards the malams was disenchantment with Lauwal's policies, and this lingered on as one of the dominant internal political issues until his death in 1872 at the age of seventy five years.

1. Cf. Annual Report Northern Nigeria, 1902, .

2. Informant 1, Yola, divination and future telling are most prevalent among the Tijanis.

3. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.86.

CHAPTER V

EVOLUTION UNDER ADAMA'S SONS - IIa) A difficult succession

Lauwal's death led to a crisis of succession, chiefly inspired by Lauwal's policies towards the malams and by the ambition of a section of Yola's ruling aristocracy centred around the houses of Sanda, Lauwal's brother and successor, and Alkassum, one of Adama's closest associates.¹ In principle, all the district governors had a vote in deciding who should be their Lamido. Whenever the Lamido was seriously sick the district governors under ideal conditions should visit Yola. If he then died the district governors and the councillors of the Yola administration would immediately assemble and elect his successor, so that the mourning for the deceased Lamido would proceed simultaneously with the celebrations marking the accession of a new Lamido to office.²

For one reason or the other only the neighbouring Lambbe could afford to be in Yola on such occasions and

1. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p. 82. Alkassum married Ayi, Adama's first daughter and full sister of Lauwal, Mansuru and Sanda. Of this marriage were born Aliyu (made Waziri under Sanda, Fariku (made Galadima under Sanda) and Pate who succeeded Aliyu as Waziri when Aliyu died in 1891.

2. Informants 2, 6, Yola.

consequently it was they and the councillors who elected the new Lamido, and whoever was elected was accepted by the rest. There were no cases when a district governor refused to accord recognition to any of the Lamibbe at Yola because he had not taken part in his election. The elections did not operate on the majority system, but on the opinion of some important personalities. Usually those close to the Lamido sounded the opinion of others, or made their own personal preference known through informal conversation, and in this way obtained or formed a concensus of opinion behind a candidate.

Those most advantageously placed for the search of a consensus were the councillors. But since before Sanda's reign the position of the councillors as a separate power group interposing between the Lamido and people was not yet established (see below, pp.272 ff), the entire Yola aristocracy, made up of Adama's family, the Lamido's close associates and the influential malams, became directly involved in the election of Lauwal's successor. They had to be guided by three general principles:-

- (1) The new Lamido must be a member of the male line of the reigning family.
- (2) Where there were many eligible candidates, preference should be given to age.
- (3) As head of a Muslim community he should have no religious disqualification or permanent physical disability, for example, being blind or deaf.¹

1. Informants 2, 6, Yola.

It was on the basis of these principles that Lauwal had been accepted as Lamido though his smooth accession was aided by the expressed wish of Adama that Lauwal should succeed him. Lauwal (and later Sanda also) had tried to perpetuate this practice of a reigning Lamido naming his successor before he died in the Adamawa constitution by nominating his son Sudi to succeed him, but this was not successful.¹ The way was thus left open at Lauwal's death for only two serious candidates, Hamidu and his younger half-brother, Sanda. Yola and the neighbouring district governors were sharply divided into two factions - the Hamidites and the Sandites - when it became clear that the majority of the Yola aristocracy were in favour of Sanda.²

Hamidu drew his strength from his districts of Hibango and Nassarawo, his mother's home of Gurin, until 1831 Adama's capital, and above all from his full brother Bakari and his clients at Yola.³ Sanda had a more broadly based support. He had the backing of many of the impor-

1. East, pp. 83-85.

2. Ibid., p. 85.

3. Yasebo Gurin and Adama had two sons, Hamidu and Bakari. Bakari was father of Hammoa Alikura (popularly known as Hammoa Petel to distinguish him from Hammoa Ahijo) whom Zubeiru appointed Sarkin Yaki at the age of about 30 years, see Alis, 1894, p. 321. Today his descendants are mainly to be found in the district of Mayo Ini.

tant malams at Yola, the House of Alkassum, Hamman Sambo, the influential Sarkin Shanu, whose father had been one of the prominent fighting leaders under Adama and finally Lamdo Katsena, who was paramount head of all the Hausa communities in Yola and represented Hausa interest in the Lamido's council.¹ Apart from these there were many others who stood aloof and waited to pledge their allegiance to whoever became Lamido.

In character, Hamidu was very similar to Lauwal, courageous, full of self confidence and very proud of his heritage.² To him the greatness of Adamawa was synonymous with the jihad to which he felt personally committed, and had dedicated his whole life time.³ His views about the

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1. Foreigners in Yola, e.g. Arabs, Hausa etc. lived in separate communities or quarters under their own headmen. The Hausas were further split into the emirates from which they came. Lamdo Katsena was the only representative of the Hausas at court and so he acted as intermediary between the Lamido and the Hausas in Yola. (See 'History of Lamdo Katsena', Yola Notable Families, for an account of the family including its connections in Katsena.)
 2. See e.g. East, p. 71; Hama is a form of addressing the eldest son or an elder brother. Lauwal was often called Hama, so also was his half brother Hamidu, the first son of Yasebo Gurin. The reference here is obviously to Hamidu.
 3. Among all of his brothers he was apparently the only one Adama gave a flag with authority to found a district. He was among the three sons of Adama (the others being Lauwal and Yerima Haliru) who are mentioned as having fought during Adama's campaigns against Mandara. (See East, pp. 27-31.)

jihad were unequivocal and well known. The jihad could not be halted as long as there were "unbelievers" in the emirate. Despite his birth and capabilities, his attitude towards the jihad alienated the Sandites who wanted a relaxation in the wars. It is said that many malams offered special prayers for Sanda to become Lamido. The psychological impact of this could be gauged only if one considers the high significance that was attached to these prayers.¹

For some time, the malams and the Sandites had been advocates for an end to the jihad. Sanda's election was to them the one occasion when they could achieve their ambitions honourably. Hamidu was governor of the district of Hibango and it was there rather than in Yola that he spent much of his time. Like the other sons of Adama he had a palace at Yola but his patronage and influence at Yola were small. The Lamido's councillors feared that since he had his strongest attachments at Hibango, it would be rather difficult to persuade him to come and settle in Yola knowing how divergent his attitude was from their own. At Hibango he would be inclined to rely on the Hibango aristocracy whom he trusted most.

But to disqualify him, his opponents required a technical reason, either based on the three principles of succession mentioned above, or some other precedent. This was hard to find, because Hamidu was the eldest surviving

1. The need for and the efficacy of prayer for a particular course of action is a common Muslim tradition; but recourse to prayer as a way of selecting the Lamido was new and did not become a feature in the constitution.

son of Adama; he was besides a keen Muslim and supporter of jihad; he was learned and capable, having had a successful period of training in government at Hibango.¹ The shrewd supporters of Sanda were aware that on personal merits alone, Hamidu excelled Sanda.

However, they were also aware of two other factors: firstly, that Adama's "legend" was very high throughout Adamawa and many myths had, since his death, grown around his name.² In the eyes of many he was a saint and his undertakings had a priori divine sponsorship. Secondly, that Adama had some marital difficulties with Hamidu's mother, Yasebo Gurin. A combination of these facts and the use to which they could be put became the main stock in trade for the Sandites. They justified their support for Sanda on the grounds that Adama had said after Lauwal, Sanda should succeed, and after Sanda, Zubeiru; hence the well remembered phrase "La-u-zu," meaning Lauwal, Umaru - Sanda's name was Umaru Sanda - Zubeiru.

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1. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p. 83; Rosedale, District Note Book, Yola; see East, p. 71. Three things made him proud, the possession of knowledge, being Adama's son, and in his own words "if I meet a hundred horsemen of the enemy, when they see me they will not stop and wait for me, for they feel that they are standing on my old home."
 2. See e.g. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p. 80 "until his death in 1848 Moddibo Adama never ceased fighting, nor remained in the same place, for three months consecutively." Or Kirk-Greene, 1958, p. 130, "As a special mark of favour and honour, the Shehu is said to have unwound Adama's turban and crowned him with a fez from his own head."

On the strength of this apparent fabrication,¹ the Sandites immediately dispatched a letter to Amīr al-mu'minīn in Sokoto informing him that Sanda was the choice of the majority of the people and he would be coming to Sokoto to be turbaned in accordance with the tradition. The Hamidites also sent a delegation to Sokoto to state their case, which essentially was that Hamidu was the legitimate successor to Lauwal.² Amīr al-mu'minīn, Ahmadu Rufai replied that he had considered both claims and in the interest of the religion, Hamidu should be given the sarauta because of his age, learning, and the part he had played in the jihad.³ He further stated that he did not dispute that it was the wish of Adama to have Sanda succeed Lauwal, but he implored them to accept God's decision and install

1. East, p. 85; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p. 136. The suggestion that Adama said the succession should follow the order "La-u-zu" appears to have been an excuse rather than the reason for excluding Hamidu from the Lamidship. My informants on the subject were vague and had very different views on when and where Adama said "La-u-zu". Some said it was on his death bed, others that it was on the very day Yasebo refused him admittance to her room and left him standing under the rain, while still others claim it was a prediction that Adama made to some friends when Zubeiru was still a boy of eleven. "La-u-zu" has no other significance than standing for Lauwal, Umaru and Zubeiru (source, Wakili Kawu). If this was Adama's wish about the succession, it ought to have been commonly known and Sanda would have been prepared for the succession before Lauwal died. It appears even Lauwal did not know of it, because during his life time he tried to have his son, Yerima Sudi to succeed him and the reason then advanced for thwarting his plans was not the "La-u-zu" formula (East, pp. 83-85). In any case, where it was possible or desirable it was common practice that one ruler could only designate but not appoint his successor.
2. East, pp. 83-85; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p. 140.
3. East, p. 85; confirmed by informants 2, 6, Yola.

1
Hamidu.

The councillors remained undaunted, but the case of the Sandites had however been punctured now that the Sultan of Sokoto had thrown his moral authority and support behind Hamidu. The Sandites were, as it were, between Scylla and Charybdis. If they climbed down they feared recrimination from the Hamidites; on the contrary, if they fought on, their actions would lead directly to civil war in which Hamidu would most probably emerge triumphant on account of his superior forces.

The crisis grew; Yola was on the verge of civil war. Hamidu now backed by Sokoto assumed the initiative; hitherto he had been content to be on the defensive. He began to amass all his supporters at Hibango and sent messages to the councillors at Yola to capitulate and accept the arbitration of the Sultan.² He gave them seven days within which to cease their rebellion, otherwise he would move his forces into Yola, and it would be they who would render account to God for the blood of the Muslims who would be killed in the battle. The conflict was suddenly resolved when Hamidu was found dead in his bedroom before the expiry of the ultimatum. No reason is advanced for Hamidu's death. Perhaps the malams at the time might have ascribed the cause of the death to their support for Sanda. The councillors

1. Informants 2, 6, Yola.

2. East, p. 85; confirmed by informants 2, 6, Yola.

seized on this and wrote another letter to the Sultan explaining what had happened and beseeched him to accept Sanda in the light of the changed situation. Sanda was confirmed in his appointment. The Hamidites, struck by the sudden death of their leader, agreed to abandon their plans and withdrew their forces to Gurin and Hibango.

b) Sanda, the councillors, Zubeiru and the struggle for authority.

At the beginning of his reign Sanda had some advantages which were not present during the reigns of his predecessors. The foundation for the emirate's government had been laid. Its single leadership had been institutionalized and was no longer in doubt. Sanda's credit however lay in the fact that he simplified this role by undertaking fewer campaigns and thereby making fewer demands on the district ¹governors.

There was a general reconciliation between Yola and the districts. In this respect Sanda's greatest achievement was with Rai. During part of Lauwal's reign, Sanda was bero for Rai. When Sanda became Lamido, Buba Jirum, Lamdo Rai, saw this as an opportunity to blot out the stain in his relation with Yola. In a letter to Sanda, he asked for a return of the territories Adama had taken from Rai. The matter was referred to Sokoto. The Sultan granted Buba Jirum's request and the territories were re-incorporated

1. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p. 86; East, p. 139 fn. p.88; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p. 140.

into the district of Rai. Pleased by this decision, Buba Jirum sent huge presents, including 1000 slaves each to the Sultan and to Sanda, and 100 slaves to Rai's bero in Yola, Yerima Iya.¹

Sanda's accession to power marked a new development in the relation between the office of the Lamido and the councillors. Sanda had naturally to take into consideration the interest and wishes of the Yola factions which had worked strenuously to put him into power. He identified the malams more closely with his administration.² No doubt personal relations still counted as they did during the reigns of his predecessors, but the feeling which seemed to have been crystallized during the succession crisis was that the councillors, or indeed a group of influential people, could act in concert on their own initiative to force events to go the way they wanted. It was a further step towards broadening the base of the administration, and the councillors began to emerge as a corporate body.

Several factors contributed to this. Sanda was a man of little learning and was content to play a minor role in the affairs of the emirate. His disposition was favourable for ambitious men to operate without undue interference. By nature he lacked the forthrightness of Lauwal. He is said to have been very generous, always

1. See Strumpel, p. 73; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p. 140.

2. Informant 1, Yola.

trying to have good relations with everybody:

Lamido Sanda was a man of fine character and kindly disposition, wherefore in his time the Fulani greatly loved him, and gave him the flattering title of 'Sanda Man of Pleasure'.¹

Among the old alliance of Sandites, Galadima Fariku and Waziri Aliyu assumed much importance. At the time of their appointment they were hardly forty years old. But at the close of Sanda's reign these men were nearly sixty, older than all the surviving sons of Adama including Zubeiru who succeeded Sanda.² They consequently had an acquired experience in the government of the emirate which inspired a large measure of confidence in them and of respect for the importance of their office. They had played a decisive role in making Sanda Lamido despite Lauwal's attempts to forestall this before his death, and again, after Lauwal's death, despite the superior claims of Malam Hamidu. Their influence established their mother's house as an important force in the politics of the capital. It even became commonly said that while the sons of Adama reigned as Lamido his daughters appointed and counselled the Lamido.³

1. East, p. 89; see also Vicars Boyle, 1910, pp. 86-87; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p. 140.

2. Cf. Alis, 1894, p. 287. Waziri Aliyu informed Mizon that he was 55 years old, and Zubeiru was 52 years old.

3. Informant 1, Yola. Hence the belief in Adamawa that Waziri is an office to be given to the Lamido's sister's son. (Cf. East, p. 140, n. p. 90.)

Sanda held regular Friday meetings with his¹ councillors. Since the Galadima and Waziri were the most important councillors, such meetings only lent more weight to the significance of their offices, which became other "pivots of power", though in theory subordinate to the Lamido. Moreover, the sanctions of Tradition gave the Waziri a pre-eminent position in the constitution of the emirate as the first minister of state, one who wakes "the ruler if he sleeps, to make him see if he is blind, and to remind him if he forgets".² Also in Sokoto, this was the period when the able stewardship of the descendants of Waziri Gidado had very much enhanced the office of Waziri. His influence was felt in addition to being "Kofa" for Adamawa, Muri, Bautchi and Zaria through his secretariat which wrote the official letters to these emirates as well as through his virtual powers to "bind or loose" in the appointment and deposition of Emirs.³

However by the end of Sanda's reign, although the influence of the councillors had greatly increased during

1. Cf. Alis, 1894, p. 314; Zubeiru continued the practice. It is not absolutely clear if the Friday meetings started only with Sanda's accession. Barth arrived in Yola on Friday June 20th 1851 and though he spoke of "courtiers" or attendants of the governor being with Lauwal, (Barth, II, p. 486) he did not specifically mention Lauwal holding a meeting with councillors.

2. KF (Hiskett), p. 570; Last, 1967, pp. 146-49.

3. Cf. Last, 1967, pp. 149-77.

the reign, they could not force through issues which were generally considered as untraditional or unconstitutional. The outstanding cases in point were the two attempts when the succession to Sanda was being considered, once about three years before he died and again immediately after his death.

There were three factions based on different connections within the Adama family vying for the succession while Sanda was still Lamido. First, there were the surviving sons of Adama, all from one mother, Zubeiru, Aliyu and Bobo Ahmadu; then a resuscitation of the old alliance of Sandites, made up of the majority of the councillors and learned men, the descendants of Sanda and of the daughters of Adama; and finally the descendants of Ahijo, Adama's third son. From all appearances this was the direct result of the fact that over almost a century the descendants of Adama had become so numerous, and the power and influence of the office of Lamido so important, that competition among them for this high office was almost inevitable.

About three years before Sanda died he expressed the wish to be succeeded by his son Iya.¹ The Sandites welcomed this, because Iya resembled his father in many ways, and seemed the candidate most likely to continue his father's policies. Moreover, Sanda liked Iya and confided

1. East, p. 85.

in him more than Sanda did with any of his own brothers.¹ Some important malams in Yola were known to offer special prayers for Iya's succession as had been done to his father over a decade ago. The councillors acting as the local electoral college permitted Sanda to inform the Amīr al-mu'minīn, Umaru, that because of age and the desire of the people he intended to relinquish his office to Iya. Umaru sent him a gown and a turban as a symbol that he confirmed the wish of the Yola people.² However the snag was that all was done in secret and the aim of the councillors seems to have been to face the Yola people with a fait accompli.

The difficulty before the Sandites on this occasion was that their action had no precedent, and was in fact against the rules of succession (see above p. 264). Much would therefore depend on the reactions of the interested parties. When the news of the intention to celebrate Iya's accession was finally made public Sanda's brothers vigorously objected and threatened civil war, probably the most detested bogey of the Yola aristocracy.³ One of them, the

1. Sanda's high regard for Iya was common knowledge in Yola and this had led Major MacDonald to stake his last hope for obtaining an audience with Lamido Sanda on Iya, see Mockler-Ferryman, 1892, pp. 93 ff.

2. East, pp. 85-87.

3. This is evident from East, pp. 83-87, and oral tradition, Yola. The fear of civil war is the popular reason advanced to explain why succession to the Yola sarauta has since the birth of the emirate remained in the hands of only the descendants of Adama.

extrovert Malam Aliyu, spoke out to the Yola people that it was useless and impossible to propose such a plan. He challenged the right of Sanda to put his son in power when his brothers were still alive. He felt it was an insult and insisted that "every one of us must hold office until such time as God ends his days, then another must rule, and only when all are finished can our sons finally succeed."¹

Aliyu's reasoning finally triumphed, but the scars remained, and this single event even before Sanda died cast suspicion in the minds of Sanda's brothers about the standpoint of the majority of the councillors and learned men in as far as the succession to Sanda was concerned. The Sandites however did not give up. They saw the setback as only a suspension of their plans and hoped that given the time, the people of Yola would come round to their idea and they would achieve their ambition without strife.

The next occasion was provided when Sanda fell seriously ill; the councillors met and decided on a plan which they thought would make Iya get the sarauta. On the death of Sanda, the councillors would not make any formal appointment of a successor, but a situation would be created in which Iya would be proclaimed by the entire population as they came up to mourn for Sanda.²

1. East, pp. 85-87; perhaps Aliyu was here viewing the order of succession in the light of the traditional system of inheritance among Pastoral Fulani where first consideration is given to the sons of the original holder of the "estate". (See Stenning, 1959, pp. 48-49.)

2. Informant 5, 3, Yola.

What made the plot seem feasible was that each of Adama's sons had his own palace: and even when one became Lamido he continued to stay in it. As has already been observed, in Adamawa there was the custom that the death of a Lamido and the installation of his successor were two events that were celebrated simultaneously (see above, p. 263). The people expressed their double feelings of sympathy for the loss of his predecessor, and of joy by congratulating the new Lamido on his elevation to the sarauta. If Iya were able to retain the corpse of his father in the house in which they both lived, and if Sanda's slaves, who would in any case normally dig the grave, did so in that house before Sanda's brothers intervened, then the Sandites might succeed; for people coming to offer condolences at the grave would also in effect be coming to compliment the new Lamido at his home. Zubeiru, on the other hand, was living in the house of his father Adama. When Adama had died, he had been buried in his own compound, which Zubeiru, at that time still a teenager living with his mother, later inherited and made his permanent home.

The weakness was that much as the councillors wanted Iya to be Lamido, it was clear that they were taking a risk, attempting something that was against tradition and which was likely to bring great disrepute on them should they fail. During the succession crisis after Lauwal's death, they had committed themselves to the formula, "La-u-zu". Many people who stood for "legitimate"

succession, that is for Zubeiru, and who did not know what part ^{the} _^ councillors had played in the first attempt to install Iya, would expect them to be consistent. Thus Sanda was again left with chief responsibility for preparing the plan, with only the guaranteed support of the councillors.

Before Sanda died, he commanded the head of his slaves or household officials, Daba, to ensure that he was buried in his house, and that when people come to mourn, Daba and his staff should behave to Iya as though he were already Lamido.¹ Sanda died and the execution of the plot rested almost entirely on Daba, who, though substantially important while the Lamido lived, had nonetheless no formal or official power in public affairs.²

As Daba's men dug the grave and waited for the Imam to perform the last rites, malam Aliyu received word of Sanda's death, and before the councillors appeared on the scene he ordered Daba and his men to take Sanda's corpse and bury him beside his father,³ "so that he too might receive his father's blessing." Adama's tomb was in Zubeiru's house. It was here that the mourners would go, and Zubeiru as owner of the house and as next of kin

1. East, p. 87.

2. See above pp. 227 ff for division of responsibilities of officials.

3. East, p. 87.

would be automatically greeted as Lamido, unless he was immediately disqualified by the king-makers. The dispute theoretically ended when the corpse was transferred to Adama's house and the trumpeters and palace musicians played the royal salute (Maigari) and the drums to herald Zubeiru's accession to the sarauta. The councillors however did not immediately appear, and Zubeiru sensing their aloofness sent for them specially and did all in his power to be reconciled with them by giving them assurances that they would be allowed to continue in their offices.

However although it was clear that the councillors had in these two instances failed to achieve their objectives and Zubeiru had become Lamido against their wish, yet the councillors continued to exercise great influence on the Lamido and this was recognized as a part of politics. As Mizon observed:

Le pouvoir du sultan n'est pas absolu; il ne peut rien décider sans l'avis de son conseil, et le cadi, gardien de la loi musulmane, peut lui faire des observations dont il tient toujours compte.¹

The way Zubeiru succeeded to the sarauta made him suspicious both of the councillors he inherited from his brother and of Sokoto. He started by ignoring the malams whom Sanda had gathered around him and more or less turned into a state institution to advise and pray for the Lamido.²

1. Mizon, "Les Royaumes Foulbés", p. 360.

2. Mizon, L'Histoire du Muri et de l'Adamawa, confirmed oral tradition, Yola.

Above all, Zubeiru was angry with Sokoto. He had indeed lost faith in Sultan Umaru and openly said he did not care for him since he sanctioned Sanda's wish to have Iya succeed him and also since instead of the usual white turban, Umaru had sent him a black turban on the occasion of his accession to the sarauta.¹ He had taken that as a personal insult and there was every chance that he would ignore Sokoto entirely. Also, it came to light that some important persons in Sokoto had promised another grandson of Adama, Hammoa Ahijo, the post of Lamido as a compromise² solution between Iya and Zubeiru.

Hammoa was bero for Sokoto, having inherited this important post after the untimely death of his father, Ahijo, Adama's third son. Hammoa had himself made several visits to Sokoto where he had many acquaintances at court. He even had malams in Sokoto who prayed for him. Though keeping it a secret, Hammoa had become confident that his faction would win since after the first attempt to install Iya failed, neither Sanda nor the councillors were known to have abandoned their hopes. It was therefore probable that a deadlock might develop for which a compromise candidate would be most acceptable. Moreover, he was older than both Zubeiru and Iya, and his father, Ahijo, had been

1. Alis, 1894, p. 256; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p. 144.

2. Informant 1, Yola.

senior to both Sanda and Zubeiru.^X Consequently he based his claim on being the eldest surviving male of Adama's family. When Zubeiru was acclaimed Lamido, Hammoa felt so disappointed that he sent a letter of protest to Sokoto, and some say until his death five years later he confined himself to his house, in other words ceased to be active in public life.²

All these things worried Zubeiru and he held Sokoto principally responsible for such a confused state of affairs at the beginning of his reign. As if even nature were angry with Zubeiru, a year after his accession, and before he had settled his mind finally whether to go to Sokoto or not, Adamawa was hit by one of its worst plagues³ of rinderpest which took several herds of cattle. This gave Zubeiru a plausible reason for not going to Sokoto since his chances of collecting tribute had been made much more difficult. Zubeiru probably reckoned that he might be arrested and detained in Sokoto. In their letter to Sokoto, the councillors had told the Sultan that Zubeiru was the

~~1. See Appendix, Genealogical Tree of Adama.~~

2. Informant 1, Yola; Mizon, "Les Royaumes Foulbés", p.360 states that Hammoa Ahijo was elected to succeed Sanda but he refused in preference to his uncle Zubeiru. This might indicate that Hammoa did not take his candidature all that seriously.

3. Cf. Passarge, 1895 (A), p. 52; Mizon, "Les Royaumes Foulbés", p. 349.

popular choice and they wished him to accept Zubeiru. They further assured him that they would do their best to see that Zubeiru remained loyal to him and came to Sokoto to be turbaned as soon as possible. The more Zubeiru hesitated to go to Sokoto, the more the pressure the councillors tried to bring to bear on him, and in turn, the more Zubeiru became suspicious about their motives.

Zubeiru hated to see the initiative in deciding what was to be done in the hands of his councillors as had been the case under Sanda; but he could not get rid of them and appoint councillors who were more amenable to his ways. There was no ~~antecedent~~ ^{precedent} for this and the people were unlikely to accept such an unprovoked and unilateral action as dismissing men like Galadima Fariku or Waziri Aliyu who commanded much respect. Much as Zubeiru mistrusted his nephews, any vindictive act on his part was bound to have a back-lash, and it was the gravity of this possibility that acted as a constant deterrent on Zubeiru, preventing him from doing anything that would be seen as a drastic change in the composition of his councillors. A way round the problem was that in the course of time Zubeiru created an inner "cabinet" or group among his councillors.¹ This group consisted of those whom he trusted most and with whom he often associated. The "king of Arabs" was

1. Informant 2, 2, Yola.

among this special group. So was Zubeiru's brother, Bobo Ahmadu who often acted as deputy during Zubeiru's absence from Yola.¹ The chief of the group was Alkali Ahmed Joda, who was in addition to being a councillor, Zubeiru's personal teacher as well.

The career of Alkali Ahmed Joda² is perhaps the most fascinating in the history of Adamawa personalities and embodies the underlying conflicts and tensions existing between Zubeiru and a section of his councillors. Ahmed Joda was a pure Fulani. His father Modibbo Nayri was settled at Chikari in the district of Rai. Nayri was a commoner without royal or chiefly connections though it would appear that during Adama's war against Njidda he received a sword and a flag from Adama to conduct jihad³ against some neighbouring non-Muslim tribes. Through hard work and sacrifice, Ahmed Joda made use of his talents to become the most travelled and most learned man in Adamawa during the last decade of the nineteenth century and until

1. Cf. Maistre, 1895, p. 248.

2. Some of his descendants (Alkali Hamman Gabdo, Ahmadu Marafa) informed me that when Ahmed Joda came back from his sojourn abroad he wrote his autobiography which contained accounts of his stay in the Sudan and Egypt, and the conflict within Zubeiru's council including the celebrated court cases involving both Zubeiru and Galadima Fariku. There is a brief biographical sketch by his son Alkali Hamman Gabdo who served as chief Alkali of Yola for over 25 years before his retirement. Cf. Yola Notable Families, "Alkali Ahmed Joda". I have collated his account with oral evidence from Ahmadu Marafa based on information derived from Alkali Ahmed Joda's autobiography (reported missing) for the purpose of this thesis.

3. Hamman Gadbo, "Alkali Ahmed Joda".

his death on 10 February 1908.¹

At the age of about seventeen years Ahmed Joda left Chikari for Ngaundere to study under the Liman. Since Ngaundere was a rich town he hoped to take up part time work while he studied, as was the custom then with many of the talented youths who found limited opportunities in the small districts. From Ngaundere he went to Girei where he joined Modibbo Raji's school.

After a brief stay in Yola where he made friends with Sanda about 1870 (see below p. 286 n. 3) he attached himself to a caravan bound for Mecca with the intention of stopping somewhere on the way to further his education. He found Kordofan in the Sudan such a place. Here he became a student of Shaikh al-Qurashi. This was a particularly tense period for Muslim scholars in the Sudan on account of the theological, and later political conflicts which centred around the Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad.² About 1881-82 Ahmed Joda broke off his studies and headed for Cairo with some friends of Egyptian origin. Life was not at all easy in Cairo for Ahmed Joda after consuming virtually all his savings. For a while he suspended full-time studies and together with his two wives from Adamawa they worked and saved enough money to enable him to enter al-

1. Cf. G.W. Webster, Annual Report, 1908.

2. For a detailed study see P.M. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881-1898, Oxford, 1958.

Azhar University in Cairo where on completion of his studies he specialized in Law.¹ After at last making the pilgrimage to Mecca he returned to Adamawa. He returned to Yola about 1886² after a total of some sixteen years abroad to find that his friend Sanda had become Lamido. Sanda honoured him with wealth and brought him into his council by effecting some changes in the structure of the Yola judiciary. He created the new post of Alkali Alkalin or chief Alkali, to which he appointed the then Alkali Yola, whose original post, thus vacated, Ahmed Joda was then given. A year later the chief Alkali Hamidu died and Joda became head of the entire Judiciary until his death in 1908.

What seems to have been remarkable about Alkali Ahmed Joda was his rare talent for satisfying people of different attitudes and backgrounds. The evidence for this is the fact that despite the sometimes irreconcilable differences inherent in the three administrations of Sanda, Zubeiru and the British Resident under whom he served, he was able to render satisfactory service to all to his credit.³ He was not only capable and efficient, but also

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1. As a matter of custom Ahmed Joda would have most likely lived in the Bornu riwāq, i.e. hall of residence for students from Bornu. See Lethem and Tomlinson, vol. II, for further details.
 2. See Hamman Gabdo's account that Ahmed Joda was in Yola for 15 years before the Europeans came, and he died 7 years after.
 3. In his annual report of 1908, G.W. Webster paid the following tribute to Alkali Ahmed Joda: "The death of the Alkali which occurred on February 10th 1908 is a serious loss. He completed the Hadj 37 years ago (sic)- 37 years from 1908 would mean he returned to Yola in 1871. This is

honest and impartial. He spared nobody in his courts, his fellow councillors, members of the royal house, and even the Lamido, were all summoned and treated equally before the law.

In this respect three particular cases stand out as examples. The case of Yerima Karimu, Zubeiru's nephew, who was found guilty of being involved in highway robbery on the Yola-Banyo route. Alkali Ahmed Joda recommended the death penalty to which Zubeiru acceded to and Yerima Karimu was hanged.¹ The second example concerned Galadima Fariku, the most senior councillor.² Around 1895-96 someone lodged a complaint that some slaves of his had absconded into the runde of Galadima Fariku and they were there with the knowledge of the Galadima. Alkali Ahmed Joda summoned Galadima Fariku to appear in court and answer the charges. The Galadima decided to ignore the summons, probably because he suspected that it was an arrangement between Zubeiru

f/note 3 cont'd from previous page:

not in agreement with Hamman Gabdo's account and oral tradition which hold that he returned to Yola during Sanda's reign which started in 1872. Perhaps 37 years is a reckoning based on the approximate date Ahmed Joda left Adamawa for the East, i.e. about 1870.— and a sojourn of 3 years in Egypt gave him an enlightenment by which he has been invaluable in exercising a restraining influence at Yola. There is no one to take his place and there is all the more reason for keeping in close touch with the Emir and his entourage." For a similar tribute, see Vicars Boyle, 1910, p. 90.

1. Strumpel , p. 29; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p. 144.
2. This event is popularly remembered in Yola. I interviewed the descendents of both sides and they agree on the facts of the case.

and Alkali Ahmed Joda to discredit him in public.¹ Alkali Ahmed Joda reported the matter to Zubeiru and Zubeiru made a statement in the mosque to the effect that whoever refused to answer the summons of an Alkali is an unbeliever. The conflict became personalized as one between Zubeiru and Galadima Fariku, and Galadima Fariku refused to make any move. Zubeiru ordered a raid on Galadima Fariku's rumde. The slaves belonging to the plaintiff were recovered and given back to him.

Galadima Fariku took this without any attempt to cause a rash public hue and cry but set his own supporters at work to take revenge on Zubeiru through the courts. They discovered that during one of Zubeiru's campaigns he had run out of provisions and had had to borrow cows to feed his people, but since then he had never paid them back. The owner of the cows was encouraged to come to Yola and to report the matter to Alkali Ahmed Joda. Alkali Ahmed Joda summoned Zubeiru to court. When Zubeiru appeared at a full sitting, Alkali Ahmed Joda removed his turban and gown which the Lamido gives his officials on appointment as a public gesture that he was trying Zubeiru not as a representative of the Lamido, but as a representative of God's laws. At the end of the case Zubeiru was found guilty and asked to pay his debt and provide an escort for the man to his home. It is said that Zubeiru and others were so pleased with

1. See above, pp. 275 ff for background for mutual suspicion.

Alkali Ahmed Joda's performance that after the case, Zubeiru walked up to him and raising his hand, said "gorko" three times, meaning he had proved himself a hero.

The mutual suspicion between Zubeiru and his friends on the one hand, and Zubeiru's nephews and their supporters led by Galadima Fariku on the other hand, continued in other forms. But perhaps its greatest political significance as will be observed later was that it provided a leverage for the British post invasion settlement with the Fulani without the British being aware of it (see below p. 444 ff). It also imposed a certain discipline in Yola, and made many fear Zubeiru.¹ Nobody felt safe from disciplinary action, if the highest councillor could suffer such prompt disciplinary action. Subsequently, when the Europeans came to realize the cleavages that existed within Zubeiru's council they read the case of mutual suspicion² as mutual hatred and hostility. Even postulating several attempts by Zubeiru's subordinates to poison him.³ The truth in the assassination attempts was not established, but the available evidence points to the fact that the majority of Zubeiru's councillors would not have hesitated

1. Cf. Passarge's remarks quoted below, p. 351.

2. These feelings survived Zubeiru into his brother Bobo Ahmadu's term of office (1901-09) see Vicars Boyle, 1910, p. 88.

3. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p. 141.

to abandon Zubeiru if he were to be deposed by the Sultan of Sokoto on any grounds, the reason being his strict way of governing and the frequency with which he called upon the people to undertake jihad war usually with disastrous results for the Yola forces.¹


1. See East, pp. 97-119; Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp. 141-44.

NORD - CAMEROUN - ITINERAIRES SUIVIS AU XIX^e SIECLE


Carte n° 6

Taken from J. Lestringant (1964)

Echelle 1:2000000



- Explorateurs**
- - - - - major DENHAM
 - - - - - H BARTH
 - · · · · FLEGEL
 - - - - - VOGEL
 - · · · · NIZON
 - - - - - MAISTRE
 - - - - - PASSARGE
 - + + + + + NACHTIGAL
 - → → → → MAC-DONALD
- Limite très approximative de l'ADAMAOUA peul



C H A P T E R VI

ADAMAWA AND EUROPEANS

During Adama's reign no Europeans visited Adamawa with the purpose of opening up relations between Adamawa and their countries. Denham, in April 1823, the first European to enter Adamawa territory, came only as a part of the Bornu-Mandara army (see above p.109). The war went against the Bornu-Mandara army, and Denham's participation on the side that lost was later interpreted in some parts of the Sokoto empire as a sign of European weakness in war.¹ It is not clear how wide-spread and lasting this feeling was. Three years later, in July 1826, Adama met with the Clapperton mission at Sokoto. Nothing precise is recorded about Adama's attitude to Clapperton. But there is the suggestion of a favourable disposition in the recommendation of the Waziri Sokoto, Gidado, that Clapperton should go with Adama to Adamawa after the rains, and that Adama should provide all Clapperton needed.² Clapperton had no plans of going to Adamawa, and so the invitation was not followed up.

a) Lauwal

There were no other reported contacts until Barth

1. Clapperton, 1829, p. 161.

2. Ibid. pp. 176-77.

visited Yola about four years after Lauwal succeeded Adama. Barth's visit was a part of the Central African Mission (1849-57). The Mission, originally under Richardson's command, was a logical sequel to increasing British interest in the Sahara.¹ It was also part of the general desire in Europe to make the routes of communication, especially river communication, into the interior regions of Africa known in Europe.

The Germans Barth and Overweg, were employed in the Richardson mission through Richardson's request for qualified scientists.² After the unfortunate death of Richardson near Kukawa in March 1851 the command of the expedition passed to Barth who was then to execute the instructions of the expedition.³ These included explorations into the east and south of Lake Chad to ascertain the connection between the river 'Chadda', as the Benue was then known in Europe, and the Nile. At that time it was not known whether there was a direct link between the Benue and ~~the~~ ^{Lake} Chad by a continuous water system. Adamawa was relevant because of its position on the Benue. On 20th June 1851 Barth finally reached Yola from Bornu using the

1. A. A. Boahen, Britain, the Sahara and the Western Sudan, Oxford, 1964, p. 181.

2. For a vivid and interesting biographical sketch and the background to Barth and Overweg's employment as members of the Central African Mission, 1849-57, see A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Barth's Travels in Nigeria, London, 1962, pp. 1-44.

3. C.f. Boahen, 1964, pp. 185-187.

northern route through Uba, Mubi, Holma and Song.¹

Barth came to Yola against a background of political tension. Lauwal as we have seen (pp.136ff) was very much occupied with the pursuit of the jihad - fighting to subdue the non-Muslims, and to uphold the allegiance of the districts to the central administration at Yola. Bornu and Mandara were still a source of worry to Yola on account of their incursions into Adamawa. The latest of such incursions was that of the Bornu officer Kashella Ladan into northern Adamawa.² This act had been viewed so seriously in Adamawa that Lauwal had immediately sent a delegation of notables to Kukawa to protest to Mai Omar of Bornu.

Thus, if Barth was full of expectation with his discovery of the Benue, his hopes were soon to be frustrated due to the circumstances under which he came to Yola. Firstly, he had no letter of introduction other than one from Mai Omar who, by the incursions referred to above, was virtually at war with Adamawa.³ Secondly, he had come in the company and apparent protection of Bornu officials, one of whom bore 'secret' letters to Lauwal, laying claims over territories which were within Adamawa.⁴

1. See below pp.303ff for the principal routes linking Yola to the districts and the outside world.

2. Barth, II, p. 402.

3. Ibid, p. 491.

4. Ibid, pp. 491-92.

Barth's intentions of entering into friendly relations with Lauwal, and of signing a treaty with him, were blocked because his demands were treated within the framework of Adamawa's relations with Bornu. As Barth himself put it reporting on the only audience he was allowed with Lauwal:

Having, as the first European that had ever visited his country with the distinct purpose to enter into friendly relations with him, paid him my respects on behalf of my countrymen, I delivered my letter of introduction from Sheikh 'Omar, ... Lowel read it, and evidently not quite displeased with its contents, although he took umbrage at some of the expressions, handed it silently over to the Mallem and Mansur. Hereupon Billama delivered his letters, of which not only the contents, but even the very existence had been totally unknown to me ...

As soon as these various letters were read, all of which laid claim, on the side of Bornu, to the territory of Kofa and Kobchi, a storm arose, and in a fit of wrath Lowel reproached my companion with daring to come forward with such pretensions ... Having given vent to his feelings towards Billama, his anger turned upon me; and he told me to my face that I had quite different reasons for coming into his country from those stated in Sheikh 'Omar's letter;¹

After this meeting Lauwal never again met Barth who left Yola the following day.

There is no way of judging whether or not the real purposes of Barth's visit were understood at Yola. There was however an attempt to distinguish his intentions

1. Barth II, p. 491-92.

from those of the Bornu officers; for example, Mansuru, whom we have seen was bero for Bornu (above p. 234) assured Barth that the unkind treatment was in no way related to him, but had been intended for the Bornu officers.¹ The visit had been short and vexatious; but it was never a rejection of Barth as an individual. He had experienced no personal hostility. On the contrary in Yola and in the districts through which he passed, there was much desire to communicate with him.²

The lasting significance of Barth's visit to Adamawa was however in the wider context of his mission, namely exploration of the country south of Bornu. Barth became the first European to draw attention to Adamawa, and the opportunities it offered to commercial and philanthropic enterprise, through his reports to the British Foreign Office and to the German Geographical Society, and more important still, through the publication in 1857-58 of his monumental account of the whole mission.³

His most startling discovery in the region was that the Benue was a water system separate from both the Chad and the Nile basins, but that it was a tributary of the Niger. Though Bornu could not be reached from the

1. Barth II, p. 493.

2. Ibid. see e.g. pp. 420, 493. At the end of his audience with Lauwal Barth was greatly vexed but 'several people who saw my emotion endeavoured to console me,....'

3. H. Barth, Travels and Discoveries in Western and Central Sudan, London, 1857-58, Vols I-V with special reference to Vol. II, pp. 283-637.

coast by river transport, the Benue was sufficiently navigable for large boats into the heart of Adamawa.¹

Besides scientific discoveries, Barth also turned his attention to the opportunities which Adamawa offered to European enterprise. The navigable nature of the Benue and its main tributaries the Faro, Kebbi and Tiel, all within Adamawa, made Adamawa the key to European enterprise on the Benue. Along these waterways European influence and commerce could penetrate into an extensive area and abolish slavery, or rather those infamous slave-hunts and religious wars.²

Almost all opinion - commercial, philanthropic, scientific - would find a reason to be interested in Adamawa, because Adamawa was rich in waterways and commercial opportunities and was suitable for colonies. Barth suggested that the difficulties of the liberated slaves would at once be solved if Britain should turn its attention to Adamawa. He mentioned Sarawu as a town in which to begin a colony for the liberated slaves on account of its being the point where the roads from Logone and all the north-eastern parts of Adamawa converge, and also, since the region included some 'very considerable centres of industry

1. Barth, II, p. 348.

2. Ibid. p. 468.

and commerce', particularly Fatawel, an entrepot of ivory trade which joined the direct road from Kukawa to Yola.¹ Barth observed that such a colony would serve as a centre for stimulating wider contracts, and would have no problem supporting itself, and 'the total lack of religious hostilities would give the colony the chance to thrive.'²

Barth's reports evoked a quick reaction at the British Foreign Office. In early 1853 the new Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon, in close co-operation with the Admiralty, despatched two separate expeditions under the command of Baikie and Vogel to conduct further exploration on the Benue, and try to meet Barth who was expected to come back to the Benue after his visit to Timbuctu.³ Baikie's instructions added that he should take every opportunity for opening trade with the natives at each large town on the river and within a moderate distance on either side. For this purpose he was given presents and samples of goods worth £100, to be given 'freely on all occasions in conform-

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1. Barth, II, pp. 443, 456, Although Barth's sincerity is not in doubt, it is nevertheless surprising that Barth thought a colony of freed slaves would flourish in an area which, as he himself observed, (pp. 502-503) was deeply committed to slavery.
 2. Like the preceding remark this is also surprising (see pp. 468 ff.). Could he have meant religious hostilities against white Christians?
 3. FO2/18, FO to Admiralty, 23.5.53; Ibid. Admiralty to FO, 7.5.53 (?); the instructions were originally drawn up for Beccroft, but the responsibility for executing them fell to Baikie owing to the sudden death of Beccroft. See FO 2/18, Admiralty to Beccroft, May, 1854.

ity with the customs of the country'. Among the places of interest he was detailed to visit were Koana, Hamarrau, Yola and Wukari.

Baikie did not reach Adamawa, but his observations in Muri (Hammarua)¹ and those of Vogel in parts of Zaria, Bauchi, Gombe and Adamawa² confirmed Barth's earlier reports on the need to extend British interests in these regions. All these notwithstanding, and despite the popularity of Barth's publications,³ no more Europeans came to Adamawa during Lauwal's reign. (see Map B, p.291).

b) Sanda

In 1872 Sanda succeeded Lauwal. His attitude was liberal. As we shall see trade flourished during his reign.

The effects of this on the volume of trade was probably brought to the knowledge of the European traders on the lower Niger-Benue through the Hausa traders who were the chief traders in the Sokoto empire. Towards the end of the decade, it was no secret to the Europeans trading on the Niger and Cameroon coasts, that the

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1. C.f. W. B. Baikie, Narrative of an exploring Voyage up the Rivers Kwora and Binue in 1854, London, 1856. pp.150-65.
 2. A brief account of Vogel's journey can be found in his letter to Herman, British Consul-General in Tripoli dated 4.12.1855. See FO 101/45, Herman to Clarendon, 19.4.56. His personal papers were never recovered after his death at Wara, capital of Wadai in Feb. 1856. For further bibliographical details see Kirk-Greene, 1958, p. 29, note 1.
 3. C.f. Kirk-Greene, 1962, pp. 29-33. The popularity and interest in the volumes was shown in the number of editions and translations into other languages, notably French (contd. on next page)

bulk of the merchandise they bought from the coastal middle men was obtained from the hinterland regions. Thus during the reign of Sanda many Europeans visited Adamawa, coming either through the Niger-Benue waterway, or overland from the Cameroon coast.

Sanda's first European visitors did not reach Yola until 1879. They were Ashcroft, Flegel and Hutchinson - of the Church Missionary Society. They ascended the Benue from the Niger coast on board the Church Missionary Society's ship 'Henry Venn' to as far as the confluence of the river Kebbi and the Benue.¹ Their visit, like that of Barth, and the other attempts to reach Yola during Lauwal's reign fell within the strictly exploratory-type visits. The Flegel-Ashcroft exploration seems to have impressed upon the trading houses on the Niger coast the urgency of opening direct trade and communication with Yola. This is revealed in the immediate steps trading houses of each nationality, German, French, and British, adopted to extend their interests into Adamawa.

In 1882 Flegel himself, now as a representative of a German trading house at Lagos, led a trade mission to Yola. Between the years 1882 and '83 he visited several

3. (contd. from previous page) and Dutch soon after the simultaneous appearance of the English and German editions in 1857. Recognition of Barth's personal accomplishments included a grant-in-aid of £2,000 for the publication of his Volumes and arrears of salary of £500 p.a. by the British Government from the date of Richardson's death to the return of the expedition.

1. E. Hutchinson, 'Ascent of the River Binue in August 1879; with Remarks on the System of the Shary and Binue', Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, Vol. II, pp. 289-305.

parts of the emirate to as far south as the ivory markets of Banyo and Ngaundere. According to a letter he wrote to his brother in Germany, Sanda was willing to grant him a monopoly of the ivory trade, for which he wanted to form his own company.¹ His sudden death however put an end to what appeared a promising venture.

Closely following on the heels of Flegel was the National Africa Company. In 1883 Sanda warmly received William Wallace, one of the Company's agents, and gave him permission to trade at Yola. In addition he gave him a piece of land on which to build a trading factory.² This could not be done that same year, and as the water level of the Benue was falling, Wallace left some Company agents at Yola and returned to Ibi about 100 miles down the Benue.

The French traders were not so swift off the mark. Their government sought for a more grandiose scheme that would put Adamawa under the domination of France commercially as well as politically.

1. Flegel did not write an account of his explorations but an attempt was made by his brother and friends to reconstruct an account based on his correspondence, hence, E. Flegel, Vom Niger-Benue: Briefe aus Afrika, Leipzig, 1890. See in particular pp. 70ff; also FO 84/1691, 'Account of Flegel's exploration in the Benue; memo by Mr. Hill, 27.10.84. Flegel became very popular in Yola through his intimate friendship with Sanda. For rumours surrounding his death see Mizon's account in Alis, 1894, p. 245.

2. Mockler-Ferryman, 1892, p. 93; Kirk Greene, 1958, p. 43.

On the Niger, from the Delta up to its confluence with the Benue, our only aim must be to make sure of the freedom of our trade ... But on the Benue we can win a more privileged position by signing political or commercial conventions ... Such a policy if it is skilfully pursued, would give our traders a route to Lake Chad and to the rich markets of Adamawa and Bornu.¹

After Wallace's first visit, trade between the National Africa Company, Yola and other parts of Adamawa became a regular affair, with annual visits to Yola and beyond due largely to the hydrographical state of the Benue which permitted vessels of heavy draught to reach Yola only between the months of July and September. Trade became the most important single factor of common interest between Europeans and the people of Adamawa. Indeed the 1880's could be properly described as the decade of trade. A brief description of trade in the emirate before the European arrived may provide the necessary background.

Trade assumed its greatest importance beginning in Sanda's reign, but the foundations are to be sought from Adama's time.

That trade is intimately related to political factors has been demonstrated as an axiom among pre-European

1. Minister of Marine and Colonies to Duclerc (Foreign Minister), 25.1.83, A.E.M.D. Afrique, 86, quoted by R. Robinson and J. Gallagher with A. Denney, Africa and the Victorians, London, 1961, p. 166.


African Societies.¹ Mutual recognition of political rights would seem to have been an essential prerequisite for harmonious inter-territorial trade. Without this recognition of spheres, claims and rights of ownership to the essential commodities of trade become blurred. In the Adamawa situation before the jihad the political existence of the tribes south of Bornu was unrecognised; indeed sometimes Bornu, and at other times Mandara, claimed sovereignty over them.² The result was that rather than trade, the region south of Bornu was subjected to a long period of raiding which continued intermittently even after the Fulani had established a political order over the region as a whole.³

The establishment of a Fulani hegemony in southern Bornu radically altered not only the political relations, but also Adamawa's trading patterns and responses to the trans-Saharan trade. Side by side with these intermittent raids a number of frequented trade routes, came into existence to link the economic centres of Adamawa to

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1. See J. Vansina, 'Long-Distance Trade-Routes in Central Africa', *JAS* III, 3, 1962, pp. 375-90; R. Gray and D. Birmingham, 'Pre-Colonial Trade in Central and Eastern Africa', Paper for discussion, Graduate African History Seminar SOAS, Oct. 1968 (to be published by Oxford University Press).
 2. See above pp.97ff ; Denham and Clapperton, 1826, pp. 72, 332. The feeling at Bornu was that the lands to the south were inhabited by 'kaffirs or savages'.
 3. Barth, II, pp. 347, 417; Denham and Clapperton, 1826, pp. 116ff.

ADAMAWA MAIN TRADE ROUTES

Scale: approx. 1:2,000,000 km



Key

--- 7°

— Trade Route

~ River

6°

To Bakundi, Jebus Ibi and the Benue

To Bannum and the coast

To Yoko and southern Cameroon

To Bornu and North Africa

To the East

To Hausaland

To Hausaland

Jalingo

Benue

To Hausaland

BORNU

BAGHIRMI

Dolo

Manjafa

Bangor

Maxaa

Bindir

Lerg

Mada

Alba

Mabi

Hilba

Zamma

Sarawo

Garia

Chibana

Namtchi

Pali

Mayo

Bantaji

Be

Tignere

Ngaundera

Tibati

Maiganga

Kunde

To the Congo

11°

10°

9°

8°

7°

6°

12°

13°

14°

15°

especially Bornu and Kano, the two most important southern termini in the trans-Saharan trade, as well as the Congo and the Atlantic coast. There is little doubt that these routes and their off-shoots were those established and kept open during the jihad campaigns.¹ After its foundation in 1841 as the capital of Adamawa, Yola became the focal point, or entrepot for routes converging from all the cardinal points.

There were at least five trade routes of considerable importance radiating from Yola. (See Map C).

(1) the northern route:

It led from Yola through Mubi directly to Kano, or passed along either the western or eastern slopes of the Mandara mountains to Bornu, where it joined the main thoroughfare of the trans-Saharan and trans-Sudan routes to North Africa and to the Middle East. This route was densely populated by both Fulani and non-Fulani settlements. It was one of the most frequented routes and Barth was led through it during his visit from Bornu to Yola. The main imports through this route were natron and salt, camphor, paper, turkedi, beads, striped manchester, calico, quilted cotton, chain mail. Horses came down through this route chiefly

1. C.f. Zintgraff, 1895, p. 298. The interest of the Hausa in trade became inextricably bound up with the jihad campaigns and in order to open up new areas for trade, the Hausa traders often acted as the spies and scouts of the Fulani armies - an aspect of the jihad flag following trade.

from Darfur and Uba following the official ban both Bornu and Mandara placed on exporting horses to Fulani regimes until 1854.¹ The export consisted mainly of slaves, food-stuffs, ivory, kolanuts, ostrich feathers, some iron and skins.

2. The Eastern route:

From Yola it followed closely the course of the Benue to Garua, Bibemi and Rai Buba or Bindir, and thereafter leaving the emirate to Logone and Baghirmi; or alternatively, Yola - Gurin, cross the river Faro to Turua, - Cheboa, - Adumri, - Rai Buba or Bindir. The Garua-Bibemi-Rai Buba route was often used by traders coming from the north who did not wish to report first at Yola, and also by those who wished to use river transport. The second route through Cheboa was preferred because it passed through many towns. This was the route that Buba Njidda is said to have taken during his momentous visit to reconcile with Adama after the Nantchi fiasco (see above p. 172). The imports were generally the same as on the northern route, but a remarkable export was iron work, like arrow and spear heads, and iron bars from the Dama region, wild animal skins and ivory.

3. The Southern route:

The southern route left Yola to Gurin, crossed the river Faro into Bundang, then following closely on the valley of

1. Barth, II, pp. 315, 507.

the river Faro, it passed through Be and Mayo Bantaji until it finally reached the immensely rich plateau regions of Ngaundere. From Ngaundere, one branch of the route went to Tibati through Tignere and either continued to the south through Yoko, or, eastwards through the Fulani settlement of Banyo, and further south, to the sultanate of Bamum. The second branch from Ngaundere went eastward through the densely populated Baya regions to the Congo. In 1891 the French explorer Louis Mizon passed through this route to join de Brazza in the Congo, and reported that before him, the German Flegel had used the route between Yola and Ngaundere.¹ The main exports through this route were cattle, slaves, fruits, kola nuts and the imports consisted of European manufactures from the Atlantic coast as well.²

(4) The south-western route:

It led from Yola through Gurin to Chamba, leaving the river Faro to the east, it followed the course of the river Deo and avoided the rough precipices of the Mambila ranges until it reached Kontcha from where it descended to Banyo and then to Igboland and the Gulf of Guinea. Alternatively, from Yola it went to Wukari in Hamarrua, turned sharply to the south through Munchi country to Gashaka on the eastern slopes of the Mambila and then finally to Kontcha, Banyo,

1. Mizon, Exploration en Afrique p. 56.

2. C.f. Denham and Clapperton, 1826, p. 145.

Igbo country and the coast. It was a popular route for slaves, ivory, kola nuts and beniseed.

(5) The western route:

From Yola it led westward along the Benue valley through Bachama country from where it assumed a northerly direction through the emirates of Gombe and Bautchi into Hausa land proper. This route was considered safer and shorter than the northern route into Hausaland, but its disadvantage lay in the fact that it was uninhabited for most of the way.

The traffic on these routes would appear to have been considerable, owing to the extensive demands for products like ivory, kola nuts, potassium, raw cotton, tobacco, ostrich feathers, skin, and above all, slaves in the distant markets of Bornu, Kano and Darfur.¹ The professional traders were either Arabs, Kanuris or Hausas, since neither the Fulani, nor any of the native tribes in Adamawa showed an inclination towards long distance trading. The Arabs, Kanuris and Hausas might have been encouraged in their enterprise by the fact that Hausa and Arabic were the two widely spoken and understood languages throughout the Sudan. The interests of Arab merchants were mainly concentrated on the northern route to Bornu.

1. See Denham and Clapperton, 1826, pp. 332-34, the Moorish traders at Bornu would accept only slaves for their articles owing to the huge profits, sometimes as much as 500%, they made on slaves, at Fezzan, Bengazi and Egypt. For an interesting account on Kano's role as a market during the early years of the century see Denham and Clapperton, 1826, Journal of an Excursion, pp. 44-52.

Among the principal carriers of trade, the Hausas have earned the reputation of being the most travelled and versatile traders in Adamawa on account of their courage, endurance and adaptability.¹ We have no evidence so far to indicate when precisely Hausa traders started visiting the Adamawa regions. It is however, unlikely that this was at any time in the distant past or even before the nineteenth century when the Kano market became linked to Air and Ghadames² and thus created the need to recruit many more traders to meet the ever growing demands of visitors and traders with products from distant sources of supply as Adamawa. Barth provides the earliest certain reference to the presence of Hausa traders in the Adamawa region, and from his account it would be reasonable to infer that the Hausa traders were already quite active throughout Adamawa before 1851.³ We know that since the outbreak of the jihad in 1809 a steady flow of Hausa immigrants had entered Adamawa for various reasons: some as volunteers or mercenaries to make jihad; others simply as malams in search of new homes where, in the conditions of Adamawa at the time, they would form part of the élite of

1. L.H. Moseley, 'Regions of the Benue', The Geographical Journal, XIV, 1899, pp. 636ff; All the European travellers to Adamawa make reference to Hausa traders.

2. Boahen, pp. 104-08.

3. C.f. Barth, II, pp. 623ff; Baikie, 1856, pp. 150ff.

the newly installed aristocracy; and others still, in search of new opportunities for trade. However, what seems certain, and this is confirmed by my Yola informants, is that a considerable number of Hausa settlers and traders flocked into Adamawa only during the reign of Sanda, (1872-1890) and this was due to a coincidence of a number of events.

The first is that Yola saw the visit of many prominent personalities from Hausaland during Sanda's reign including Hayatu, grandson of Sultan Bello, and the Sultan's tribute collector, malam Maunde. Sanda came to power when he was over fifty years old and so he made only two visits to Sokoto himself.¹ This inversely increased the number of times malam Maunde came to Yola to collect tribute.² It was the custom for such important men to be accompanied by a large following and also for traders to attach themselves to such caravans with the hope of trading in the regions through which they passed. Secondly, Sanda's peaceful policies may have offered additional incentive by diminishing the risks on the routes and so made travelling relatively easier. Another incentive was the desire to satisfy European companies operating from the Niger and Benue in

1. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p. 86.

2. According to Monteil, 1894, p. 255 and Mockler-Ferryman, 1902, p. 157, the visits were made annually.

the second half of the nineteenth century. The Hausa traders were either in the employment of these companies or worked independently, but with the assurance of disposing their products immediately they arrived at the company's factories.

The methods of organizing trade in Adamawa seem to have varied with the personalities engaged in trading. The commonest method was for a wealthy trader to invest part of his wealth by purchasing articles of exchange at the capital and distributing these to a number of trusted employees who would be placed at the head of caravans or small parties. Very often for security reasons the investors would wait until the Lamido was sending a mission or was going himself to some part of the emirate before fitting out an expedition which they would attach to the Lamido's party, often by making some contributions to the equipment of the expedition.¹ Some traders travelled on their own accord, but the common practice was that they attached themselves to travelling parties or military expeditions. Some of Barth's best informants at Yola were Hausa traders who had joined many expeditions. One assured Barth that he had accompanied Hamman Sambo in 1848 as far as the

1. C. f. Maistre, 1895, p. 254; Alis, 1894, pp. 315-317; S. Passarge 1895A 'The German Expedition to Adamawa', The Geographical Journal, 1895, pp. 50-53. Barth, II, p. 376. Some local traders attached themselves to Barth's party for security reasons.

Guinea coast through Igboland and many Christians were taken as slaves.¹ The essential factor in this system was that the traders went themselves to the sources of supply and met those they traded with in their homes.

From the diary of a certain Abdullah,² the son of a Kano merchant, another method consisted in setting up bases of clients at a major source of supply. Sometimes when the traders found a town that was particularly rich, as in the case of Abdullah's uncle, Fumban, the capital of the sultanate of Bamum, he settled there and became in many respects the clearing house both for his relatives and other Hausa traders who from time to time visited the town, and for the local inhabitants such settled traders were also foci for the spread of Islam.³

These traders, dotted all over the emirate, gave a fillip to the overall trading potentialities of Adamawa, and this, together with the combination of a cattle and an agricultural economy under one political banner, placed the emirate on an economically sound foundation at a time when European commercial interests were seeking to share in the emirate's trade.

1. Barth, II, p. 626.

2. Abdullah al-Kanawi, Nubdha Min Dhikr Awsaf al-Bilal Adamawa IAS acc.no. AR/128, Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana. It is a 14 page document and was obtained from the library of al-Hajj Umar ibn Abubakar of Kete Krakye, Ghana. I am grateful to Ibrahim Mukoshy for assistance in its use. It is likely it was written after 1917 when Islam was re-established at Fumban by Njoya.

3. Maistre, 1895, pp. 252-54; Dubie, 1950, p. 8.

The arrival of the National Africa Company in the Adamawa markets does not seem to have caused any major disruption of the traditional pattern of trade. Its methods were simple and for the most part in no way different from the procedure followed by the Arab and Hausa traders, the chief traders in Adamawa before the Europeans. The agents of the National Africa Company would call first at Yola to obtain authority to trade.¹ They would be received by 'the King of Arabs' who was equally the bero for the Arabs and for the Europeans. He provided them with lodgings and introduced them to the Lamido. They made 'presents' to the bero and Lamido. No special significance was attached to these presents beyond that they were a form of courtesy which often indicated the worth of the visitor. After these formalities the Company's agents proceeded to exchange their goods usually through the intervention of local brokers, mainly by barter, or by using articles like cloth, salt and beads which found ready sale in the market.²

There was nevertheless one essential difference between the agents of the National Africa Company and the Hausa and Arab traders. Whereas the Hausa and Arab traders

1. This authority does not seem to have been in the form of a contract as the Lamido could change or refuse to grant it at will. C.f. Mockler-Ferryman, 1892, pp. 93-95; Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp. 43-44, 54.

2. See Barth, II, p. 502; Maistre, 1895, p. 250; A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, 'The Major Currencies in Nigerian History', JHSN, Vol. II, 1960, pp. 132-138.

were closely identified with a prominent local agent, and were Muslims and so had little problem of social adjustments, the Company operated through non-Muslims and non-indigenous Agents mostly brought from the coast. In such a situation not only the economic but also the social activities of the Company's agents had a bearing on the Company's prospects in the emirate. It is in this light that one can understand why during the first year of the Company's presence at Yola, owing to interference with ladies of the royal household, Sanda decided against the Company building a factory at Yola.¹ This meant that unless Sanda later relaxed this policy, the distance of Adamawa from the coast, and the nature of navigation on the Benue to Yola, would restrict the Company's interest in Adamawa to mere annual trading missions, without actually getting a foot-hold in the territory.

However, enjoying the privilege of being the only European trader operating in Adamawa, the Company's establishment at Ibi co-ordinated the activities of its agents who tapped the trade in gum, beniseed, rubber, natron, skins, and ivory on all the trade routes, except the northern route leading directly from Yola to Bornu. The Company exchanged these commodities for salt, beads, English and Indian cotton, mirrors and other English

1. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p. 43.

manufactured goods. Sometimes through its own agents, at other times through the Hausa traders, the Company traded as far south as the ivory markets of some parts of Banyo, Tibati and Ngaundere, via either Gashaka, Kontcha and Yola, or via Gashaka, Bakundi and Jebu, or further west still, via its depots at Donga and Wukari.¹ In some parts of Adamawa concessions were given the Company to build factories on land, for instance, at Garua and Bibemi near Rai. Except for Yola and its dependencies, the Company signed treaties with Bachama chiefs inhabiting the intervening regions between Hamarrua and Yola.²

Until after Sanda's death in 1890, the Company's involvement remained limited to trade. Two factors chiefly account for this apart from distance and the nature of navigation to Yola. Firstly, as long as the Company was the only trader in the region it felt secure. Secondly, Sanda made special efforts to ensure that the Company operated within the local systems. For example, when in 1887

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1. C.f. Zintgraff, 1895, pp. 280-90; Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp. 53-54; same author, 'Expansion on the Benue 1830-1900', JHSN Vol. I, 3, 1958 for a general survey.
 2. Gazetter, 1936, p. 140. A quotation from Hewby's report, 1899, claims that the Company made a treaty with Gashaka. Such a treaty could not have been important since Gashaka was only a district of Yola. If the treaty was made before 1890 as it seems from the report, then no notice was taken of it by Major MacDonalld who states that 'From Bula to Garua, in the Ribago Province, the Company's highest trading station on the Benue, a distance of 95 miles, no Treaties of any kind are in existence'... Macdonalld's Report, p. 14.

and 1888, agents of the Company committed incidents of gross indiscretion and murder,¹ he sought to have them tried according to local custom, and felt offended when the Company took the cases into its own hands.² The result of this was that Sanda virtually brought the Company's activities to a halt throughout the emirate.³

It was so serious that Sanda though continuing to be hospitable to Europeans became very suspicious of their intentions and did all in his power to refuse their various requests, starting with Zintgraff who visited Yola in July, 1889:

I was greatly mistaken in thinking that I should have to spend a long time in Yola in seeking my requirements. Two days alone were enough in the English capital of German Adamawa to convince me that under no circumstances would permission be granted to me to travel to Banyo. True, of my actual reception I have no cause for complaint. The Sultan immediately on my arrival had a good compound prepared for me, and provided me with equally rich provisions such as sheep, chickens, butter, milk, beer, flour and corn for my followers and horses.⁴

From Yola Zintgraff proceeded via Bakundi and Gashaka, and then back to the Cameroon coast where he

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1. For correspondence connected with these incidents see FO 84/1875 R.N.C. to FO, 29.11.87. enc. 'Proceedings of a Judicial Court held at Ibi', 4.10.87; FO 84/2006 FO to R.N.C., 8.11.89; FO 84/2007 R.N.C. to FO, 26.11.89.
 2. Alis, 1895, p. 246; confirmed oral tradition, Yola.
 3. FO 84/2109 Report on the Administration of the Niger Territories by Major Claude MacDonald, submitted 9.190. p. 14, henceforth, cited as MacDonald's Report.
 4. Zintgraff, 1895, p. 299. English translation is by Kirk-Greene.

arrived at the end of 1889. He was so impressed by the opportunities for trade that on his arrival in Germany in April 1890 he wrote to the new Chancellor Caprivi to urge that a German agent be immediately stationed at Yola; but curiously he was to be responsible to the German Consulate at Lagos, and not, as would have been expected, under the Imperial governor on the Cameroon coast.¹

Scarcely a month after Zintgraff left Yola, Claude MacDonald, the British Commissioner, who had been sent to enquire into the administration of the Niger company, arrived in Yola, but Sanda refused to see him despite all efforts by the Commissioner's secretary, Captain Mockler-Ferryman.² This was the last visit Sanda had to contend with before his death about a year later in September/October, 1890.

In April of that year, however, the German, Kurt Morgen³ was sent from the Cameroon coast as a follow-up of Zintgraff's mission to precede a trading mission which was being organised by commercial firms in Hamburg. He visited the southern districts of Adamawa, including the ivory markets of Njilla, Yoko, Tibati and Banyo.

1. H. R. Rudin, Germans in the Cameroons, 1884-1914, London 1938, p. 81. In Germany Adamawa had always been regarded as forming part of the German protectorate in Cameroon.

2. Mockler-Ferryman, 1892, pp. 90-95, 117-119.

3. C. Morgen, Durch-Kamerun von Sud nach Nord, Berlin, 1893.

He attempted to make treaties with the local rulers and give them German flags, but he was referred to Yola. Being perhaps conscious of Zintgraff's failures with Sanda he left Adamawa territory without calling at Yola. His visit, though giving the Germans a good description of the districts he visited, was of neither political nor commercial consequence.

Within the space of ten years European, mainly British, enterprise had touched several parts of the emirate. Though still inferior in terms of the number of local debtors it had, the Company had become a formidable competitor to the Arab and Hausa traders.¹ But the impact of the Company was small and limited, taking the emirate as a whole. Unlike the Hausa and Arab traders who had local clients as the base of their operation, the Company worked through its own agents, who remained as a small foreign element.² Moreover Sanda took precaution against the Company's inroads that went beyond trade and this at the time of his death had made it impossible for the company to build factories in the emirate and start its own settlement. Mockler Ferryman has fairly summed up the situation as follows:

1. Zintgraff, 1895, p. 293. Passarge 1895A, 'The German Expedition', pp. 50-53.

2. It is difficult to estimate the number of people who were directly employed by the Company in Adamawa at any time since it has not been possible to find any of the Company's staff list or pay sheets for Adamawa. But the total number in Adamawa would have hardly surpassed fifty employees, out of which less than ten would have been Europeans.

The whole affair (Company's relations with Sanda) has been certainly unfortunate, and a chapter of accidents from first to last, but I fancy that Umoru (Sanda's other name) is obdurate, and until his death, there will be little real trade in Yola. One cannot altogether blame the Emir, but at the same time it seems a pity that his subjects who are all anxious to trade, should be prevented from doing so through his obstinacy.¹

c) Zubeiru

Zubeiru succeeded his half brother Sanda immediately after his death. According to the nature of navigation on the Benue, it was not possible for him to receive European visitors coming from the Niger coast until the following year. By this time European attitude to their interests in Africa in general had undergone a remarkable change and this profoundly affected the nature of European demands on Zubeiru.

During Sanda's reign there was just one Company trading in Adamawa. At the beginning of Zubeiru's reign three different European groups, representing British, French and German interests, were converging on Yola. They wanted not only trade as before, but with it, political influence such as would put Adamawa within a wider sphere of their already acquired possessions. This led to competition among the European nationalities to be the only Europeans to establish themselves in Adamawa. The period

1. Mockler-Ferryman, 1892, p. 119.

of competition and conflict started in 1891 and lasted until 1894. To maintain the right balance of this study it is not possible to go into the details of the history of European diplomacy.¹

But briefly, Britain's claims on Adamawa were based on the Niger Company's treaties with the Sultan of Sokoto in 1885 and 1890.² Also relevant was the Anglo-French convention of 5th August which laid out the Say-Barruwa demarcation line separating the French sphere in North Africa with 'all that fairly belongs to the Kingdom of Sokoto', which was recognized as being under British protectorate.³ The basic British argument was that the above agreements applied to Adamawa since Adamawa formed part of the Sokoto empire.

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1. For works on European diplomacy in Africa in the closing years of the nineteenth century see Robinson and Gallagher, 1962; W.L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902, 2nd ed., New York, 1951.
 2. See E. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty, 3rd ed. London, 1909, Vol. 1, pp. 129-30. According to the wording of the 1885 treaty, the Sultan of Sokoto granted and transferred to the National Africa Company, or others with whom they may arrange, the 'entire rights to the country on both sides of the River Benue and rivers flowing into it throughout my dominions for such distance from its and their banks as they may desire'.
 3. Hertslet, Map of Africa, Vol. 11, pp. 738-39.

Germany's claims were based solely on diplomatic settlements in Europe with Britain and France respectively. These were the Franco-German Protocol of 1885 which separated the French Congo from German Cameroon,¹ and the Anglo-German treaties of 1886 and 1887 which extended the German Protectorate of Cameroon north to a point near Yola.² These Agreements made at least part of Adamawa fall within Germany's Cameroon hinterland, which Germany considered to extend naturally to as far north as Lake Chad. By 1890 France had not established any vested interest in Adamawa either through the activities of French explorers or traders or through diplomatic settlements. Indeed the agreements of 1885 between France and Germany limiting French action to the east of the 15° E. Longitude, and the Anglo-French Convention of 5 August 1890 seemed to have excluded French actions in Adamawa.

But France suddenly became interested in Adamawa and the region to its eastern frontier because of an ambitious colonial scheme to link France's possessions in the Congo with those in West and North Africa.³ To realize this scheme it was important to occupy the region between

1. Hertslet, Map of Africa, Vol II, pp. 653-56.

2. Ibid. pp. 868-74; 880-81.

3. G. Hanotaux et A. Martineau, Histoire des Colonies Française et de l'expansion de la France dans le Monde Tome IV, Paris, 1931, pp. 442-46; Alis, 1894, pp. 1-32.

the Chad and the Congo which was then unoccupied by any power. In the year 1890 alone, three separate missions led by Paul Crampel, Monteil and Mizon left France with the aim of converging on Lake Chad.¹ Crampel was to travel through the Congo, Monteil through Western Sudan from the Senegal, while Mizon was to ascend through the Niger and Benue.

Of these three, and indeed of all the Europeans who visited Adamawa, none had such a profound influence on the course of the European competition for Adamawa (1891-94) as Mizon. The timing of the 'race to Yola', the nature the race took, all revolved around the two missions which Mizon led to Adamawa between 1891-93. The aims of Mizon's first mission were clear, though they were kept very secret. In one sense it was mainly exploratory.² Mizon was to study the Niger and Benue and, since they were important means of communication and by the Navigation Act of Berlin open to free navigation of all nations, to draw up a chart for navigation. He was to explore the connection between the Niger and Congo basins and find out to what extent the Muslims had penetrated to the south.

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1. Accounts of these missions are to be found in two publications by Harry Alis, the Secretary-General of the French Colonial group, Comité de l'Afrique Française and editor of the Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française (BCAF) 1. A la Conquête du Tchad, Paris, 1891. 2 Nos Africains Paris, 1894. See bibliography for the personal accounts of Monteil and Mizon.
 2. Afrique III, 15 Mizon to Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 'Project de Voyage' (approved) 26.7.90. (M.F.O.M.); Alis, 1891, pp. 122-27.

In another sense his mission was commercial, to advertise French industrial products in the regions he traversed and in particular to hold bazaars at Kukawa and Massenya. He was also to study what products the inhabitants of these regions could offer in exchange and at what points commercial posts could be built for this purpose.¹ In addition he was given powers to conclude commercial and friendship treaties with the chiefs.² The diplomatic reason for the mission was undoubtedly to prepare France for impending boundary demarcations in West Africa.

These ambitions and claims by the European powers over Adamawa were unknown to Zubeiru, though the sharp increase in the number of Europeans who passed through Adamawa between 1890 and 1893, each making his own demands, might have indicated that the Europeans wanted much more than trade in his emirate. Zubeiru was more intelligent and resolute than his brother Sanda. Zubeiru was imbued with a sense of optimism and confidence in himself.³ He felt that, relying on diplomacy and statecraft, he could

1 and 2 Afrique III, 15 Mizon to Under-Secretary of State for Colonies, 'Projet de Voyage' (approved) 26.7.90 (M.F.O.M.); Alis, 1891, pp. 122-27.

3. For various observations on Zubeiru's character see Vicars Boyle, 1910, p. 87. 'He was in every way a strong man and a law giver', Annual Report Northern Provinces of Nigeria, 1900-01. 'Zubeiru was a fine type of the Fulani ruler, well educated, but possessed with a religious fanaticism which rendered him extremely intolerant of European infidels'. See also Kirk-Greene, 1958, p. 143.

put the Europeans and their agents in their proper place, while at the same time benefit from trade with them.

Consequently he relaxed Sanda's embargo on Europeans, and permitted trade. He however imposed precise rules not only to govern trade, but also to regulate the social activities of the foreign agents. From a collation of information from Mizon's account and Niger Company reports, these were:¹

- a) that traders must pay taxes to the value of one-tenth of all trade transactions.
- b) all Europeans and their employees must first of all call at Yola before going to the districts.
- c) They should not build factories at Yola.
- d) They should not interfere with native women, and should instantly be punished when found stealing.
- e) They should not employ run-away slaves.
- f) They should not in any way interfere with the religious principles of the Adamawa people.

1. See in particular Alis, 1894, pp. 227 ff. covering Mizon's day-to-day account of his stay at Yola for nearly five months, FO 27/3161 R.N.C. to FO 7.9.93 enc. report of Spink 30.5.93.

There is little doubt that these regulations were not based entirely on happenings at Yola where no European settlement had ever come into existence. It was partly as a result of the advice of Zubeiru's spies who had been sent to enquire into the activities of the Niger Company at Nupe early in 1891.¹ As indeed also under his predecessors, the kind of reception the European expeditions to Yola received from Zubeiru depended on the internal political issues at the time of their arrival.

From 1890 there were two main issues upon which European interests were superimposed. These were Zubeiru's attempts to suppress Mahdism in Adamawa (see below pp.376 ff.) and the political opposition to his regime in preference to Sanda's son Iya. (see above p. 280) Thus when Mizon arrived in Yola in August 1891 he was suspected of taking military aid to Hayatu.² His cargo was subjected to a thorough search, and Mizon and his men were only allowed to land and take up residence in Yola after promising not to help Hayatu. Two of Mizon's Muslim companions, al-Hajj Meckham and Sherif Ahmed were made to swear on the

1. C.f. C.M.S. Brooke's papers, Margaret Brooke Journals 30.8.91. This would account for Zubeiru's often reference to the Company's activities in Nupe. See e.g. FO 27/3161 RNC to FO 7.9.93 enc. report of Spink, MS quoted below p. 451 .

2. There are numerous accounts of the Mizon mission in the contemporary French newspapers, the B.C.A.F. and Mizon's own published works. (see Bibliography). The original manuscript reports out of which these publications were based are in M.F.O.M. Paris. To facilitate reference, wherever possible I have cited a published source in addition to Mizon's original report.

Quran before Zubeiru and his councillors that there was no deceit.¹ On these bases, Mizon was allowed to stay in Yola for nearly five months under the care of the bero for Europeans, 'the king of Arabs'.²

Mizon's visit showed much contrast to the Niger Company. Mizon had in his party at least two widely travelled and experienced Muslims, Sherif Miloud ben Abdessalam and al-Hajj Ahmed Meckham, natives of Egypt and Algeria respectively. Considering the esteemed position which sherifs and pilgrims normally hold among Muslims all over the world, and the fact that they attended prayers at the Yola mosque, Mizon was advantageously placed to negotiate with Zubeiru. This was particularly so after the Sherif and al-Hajj Meckham had sworn before Zubeiru and his Councillors that they were not pretenders. Besides the Sherif and al-Hajj Meckham played very significant roles as intermediaries and interpreters for the mission.³ The Sherif, who understood and spoke Fulfulde well, was the principal interpreter between the Yola authorities and the Mizon mission. A former messenger of Sokoto, he had travelled a lot in Hausaland, and had accompanied the Niger Company

1. Afrigue III, 16 Mizon to U-Sec. S.C. 16.7.92; Alis, 1894, p. 223.

2. C.f. Alis, 1894, pp. 227ff. for an interesting day-to-day account of Mizon's stay at Yola.

3. Alis, 1894, p. 223 Mizon confessed that were it not for these two men his mission would have been massacred.

officials in some of their missions.¹ As Mizon's records show, Mizon maintained close and intimate relations with both al-Hajj Meckham and Sherif Miloud throughout.

Forty years earlier Barth advised that European interest in Western Sudan would best be served if the Europeans supported the established authorities and did not try to destroy their prestige. During the period Mizon was in Yola, he definitely showed his willingness to lend whatever support he could to Zubeiru's regime. For example, unlike the Niger Company,² he assured Zubeiru that he would train an army for him officered by Frenchmen, to make him superior to his neighbours as well as to avoid internal trouble. To quote from Mizon's report:

...au Sultan Zoubir, j'expliquais l'importance qu'il y avait pour un souverain, à posséder une garde armée et exercée à l'européenne, et qui dans toutes les guerres, lui donnerait la supériorité sur ses voisins, le mettrait au-dessus de ses grands vassaux et, chose qu'il comprenait très bien, le mettrait à l'abri des révolutions de palais.³

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1. Alis, 1894, pp. 206-07 Mizon met and employed him at Lokoja. For more information on Sherif Miloud see FO 27/3162, R.N.C. to FO 21.10.93 enc. Wallace report. He is described as 'the shereef our old Sokoto messenger.
 2. See FO 84/2109 'Report on the Administration of the Niger Company Territory' Jan. 1890 for the Company's policy on the Benue regions. 'The pagan tribes request the Company to come and trade with them not so much for purposes of trade, but that they know that a station means protection from the Mohammadan oppressors'. See also Kirk-Greene, 1958, p. 42.
 3. L. Mizon, Une Question Africaine, Paris, 1895, p. 34.

There can be no doubt Zubeiru was impressed at the end of Mizon's stay in Yola. He showed this by the grants he made to Mizon, concessions which, at the time, were far-reaching. He authorised him to travel in the country for the purpose of studying its resources and commercial routes. He further gave him a written permit to trade and visit any part of Adamawa during forty days of each year when the waters of the Benue are high provided he called first at Yola.¹ Much of Mizon's proposals had been in the form of promises for future action. Zubeiru therefore adopted the tone of Mizon's own diplomacy and withheld signing a treaty which he knew was like the golden fleece for the Europeans. In the same letter in which he permitted trade, he probably promised to sign a treaty with France if Mizon on subsequent voyages fulfilled the promises he had made to him. Mizon called the letter he received from Zubeiru 'un traite conditionnel de protectorat' to suit European diplomatic language.²

Zubeiru's motives in extending such privileges to Mizon are not entirely clear.

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1. Afrique III, 16, Mizon to U.Sec. S.C., 16.7.92; Mizon, Une Question Africaine, p. 35 also revealed in FO 27/3162 R.N.C. to FO 21.10.93. enc. 21 of Wallace report. Translation of an autograph letter Zubeiru to Wallace 5.9.93; FO 27/3163 R.N.C. to FO 16.11.93 enc. Wallace report.
 2. It has not been possible to find either the original or translated copy of this letter the only reference to it is Mizon's own testimony, and a vague reference in Wallace's report. '.... The French people who have written to tell you that I have made a Treaty with them are liars. If they got permission from me to trade...'
(contd. over)

But it appears that they had more to do with the internal politics at Yola than with his relations with the Niger Company. Among the non-Europeans the commercial hegemony of Adamawa was shared by Arab and Hausa traders. The Arabs directed trade towards the north, through Bornu, across the Sahara to north Africa. The Hausa traders linked Adamawa's trade with the west or the rest of the Sokoto empire, selling either to the Niger Company's factories on the Niger and Benue, or at Kano.¹ Thus the interest of the Sultan of Sokoto as far as trade was concerned was bound up more with the prosperity of the Hausa traders in Adamawa.

At Yola, Mizon, and naturally his Arab travelling companions, identified themselves more with the Arab traders so that whatever Mizon did was looked at with grave suspicion by the Hausa traders. This often gave rise to heated arguments at Court as this example shows:

Il y a eu palabre, hier vendredi, au grand conseil qui se tient chaque semaine. Le consul de Katsena, c'est-à-dire des Haoussas, a livré un assaut au sultan devant lowen, le Wouziri et le consul du Bornou. Il dit au sultan que j'avais demandé si les machands (sic) français pouvaient venir ... Après m'être promené tranquillement dans le Mayo-Kebbi et la Bénoué, je vivais tranquillement à Yola, parlant d'aller à Tibati, à Ngaoundere et il ne savait encore en quel endroit.

1. Alis, 1894, pp. 315-317; Mockler Ferrymen, 1892, pp. 124-25.

Lowen, le wouziri, et le consul du Bornou¹ soutiennent ma cause et le sultan clôt l'incident en disant qu'i la confiance en moi ... La Compagnie du Niger leur a fait une rude concurrence par les prix superieurs qu'elle donne pour l'ivoire, et, je veux encore amener des marchandise français iraient directement aux lieux de production de l'ivoire! Voila le secret de l'acharnement du consul de Katsena contre moi.²

In the crisis over Sanda's succession Lando Katsena, Abdul Salami, had identified himself, though not actively as many others, with the Sandites. He was also known to refuse, like Sanda did, any form of hostilities against Hayatu's Mahdist state in Northern Adamawa. (see below p. 384). The Sultan's representative, who was present at Yola during the dry season of 1891, was also against Zubeiru allowing Mizon to stay in Yola.³ Zubeiru therefore most probably saw the encouragement he gave to Mizon as a way of reducing or challenging the increasing influence of the Hausa traders to whom many of the Fulani had already become debtors.⁴ Also it might have been a way of demonstrating his resentment against the attitude of the Sultan towards his accession to power at Yola. (see above pp. 280).

1. Lowen or Ardo Gamawa were the local names for 'the king of Arabs'. The three personalities, Lowen, Waziri and Lando Bornu as representatives at Court for peoples from Bornu, were interested in maintaining trade with Bornu from whose merchants they would normally receive perquisites. For their further support for Mizon see below p. 348.

2. Alis, 1894, pp. 314-16.

3. Ibid, pp. 278.

4. Passarge 1895A, 'The German Expedition to Adamawa', pp. 52-53.

The encouragement Zubeiru gave to Mizon however had its greatest impact among the interested colonialist circles in France, Britain and Germany. Mizon returned to Paris in June 1892. France was at this time passing through a phase of enthusiasm in colonial expansion. It was a time when the French expansionists were ready to inflate any apparently successful colonial venture to advance their cause. Strongly backed by the publicity machinery of the Comité de l'Afrique Française, the expansionists represented Zubeiru's dealings with Mizon as having put Adamawa under French protection. Mizon had traced an effective limit to the Niger Company's eastward advance up the Benue to Bornu, Baghirmi and Wadai as well as German efforts to extend her Cameroon hinterland to the Chad Basin.¹ In many parts of France dinners were organised in honour of Mizon's success in Adamawa.

By the middle of July 1892 arrangements were well on the way to send Mizon to Adamawa and the Chad districts a second time. As a result of what was happening in France, Mizon's second journey was taken very seriously. The principal object of the mission was twofold - to establish immediate commercial relations with those territories on the Benue that were outside the Niger Company's sphere

1. C.f. contemporary French press reports especially Débats, Republique Française, Le Temps, and the B.C.A.F. for the years 1892 and 1893. Even more exciting are the verbatim recordings of 14 of the speeches delivered in one of the banquets at Paris to mark Mizon's success. See P. Dérot, Discours prononcés au Banquet offert au Mizon, Paris, 1892.

and to extend French political influence in that region and in the direction of the Chad.¹ In a circular letter to the Chambre de Commerce de France in Paris and other commercial establishments, Mizon intimated that he was undertaking a commercial mission for the second time to Adamawa, because for a long time the Lamido and people of Adamawa had been exploited by foreign traders (trafiquants étrangers) who sold them inferior goods at excessive prices.² The Lamido had decided to give preference to French products, and in Mizon's estimation, such a commercial relation and the possibilities it opened for France to further dominate the trade of Bornu, Wadai, Baghirmi etc., which together counted between twelve and fifteen million inhabitants, were enormous.³

In response to Mizon's circular, and under the auspices of the Comité de L'Afrique Française, a company Compagnie Française de L'Afrique Centrale, was formed by some men sponsored by la Société des Chargeurs-Reunis, la Société de Economique Industrielle et Commerciale, and representatives of la Banque de Grandes Industries et du Commerce.⁴ They provided the capital that was required

1. Afrique III, 16 Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mizon 2.8. 92; Alis, 1894, p. 272. In French estimation at the time Adamawa was outside the Company's sphere.

2 and 3. Afrique III, 16 Mizon to Chambre de Commerce de France (circular) 15.7.92. BCAF No. 8, 1892. p. 10.

4. BCAF No. 8, 1892, p. 10.

to equip the commercial section of the mission to the tune of half a million francs.

As far as Britain and Germany were concerned the achievements said to have been made by Mizon were of little consequence diplomatically since Mizon had not obtained a treaty which annulled their own claims over Adamawa. But what seems to have caused alarm was the forces that were behind the expedition and the support Mizon had received in France. Thus the Council of the Niger Company in London felt very uneasy about the French preparation to send Mizon on a second journey to Adamawa.¹ Having in vain tried to persuade the Foreign Office not to grant Mizon passage through the Niger-Benue, the Company alerted all its employees in the region to have no communication with the Mizon mission except of a strictly official character.²

Mizon however did not reach Yola that year, having stopped at Muri where he negotiated a treaty with Abubakar, the Emir of Muri. This had led Mizon to declare what he called 'The French Protectorate of Central Sudan' in November, 1892.³

1. J. E. Flint, Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria, London, 1960, pp. 172-75.

2. Ibid. pp. 174-75.

3. Ibid. pp. 175-177; for what looks like the best account of Mizon's own point of view see Mizon, Une Question Africaine, Pp. 39-46; also Afrique III, 17, Mizon to U-Sec. S.C., 8.1.93.

d) The Conflict at Yola

The crucial period was the rainy season of 1893. To understand the nature of the conflict at Yola, it is necessary to give a brief background of how the tensions built up during the six or so months preceding the crisis at Yola.

Early in 1893, on account of the cold attitude of the German Chancellor Von Caprivi towards Germany's colonial expansion, a private association, 'The Committee for the Protection of German Interests in the Hinterland of Cameroon against French Encroachment', was founded in Germany under the Chairmanship of Herr Ernest Vohsen. Immediately after its foundation meeting, it sent a telegram to the Niger Company for help to facilitate an expedition the Committee intended to despatch to Yola and parts of Adamawa.¹ The mission, though private, was said to have the sympathy of the Government. Goldie was elated by this move and saw in it an opportunity to begin a makeshift 'alliance' with Germany on the Mizon affair, and indeed isolate the French. He replied by inviting Vohsen to come to London at once since 'the matter was too important to be left to correspondence'.² By this time the effects of

1. FO64/1316 R.N.C. to FO 6.5.93 enc. Vohsen to Goldie, 21.4.93; also FO64/1316 Trench to FO 21.4.93.

2. FO64/1316 (telegram) Goldie to Vohsen, 26.4.93.

Mizon's actions in Adamawa and Muri were like thorns in the flesh of the Company and it was prepared to aid and collaborate with anybody in a position to thwart Mizon's schemes.

During conversations in London the Company agreed to aid the German expedition after receiving promises from the Germans that the expedition would not make treaties or take any political action in the regions which lay to the west of the 15^o east longitude and to the north of the latitude of Yola. This sphere of prohibition included 'all the north bank of the Benue up to its confluence with the river Kebbi of Ribago and also both banks of the river Kebbi even if they should prove to be in certain parts rather to the south of the latitude of Yola. The Company however added that in case the British and German Governments should (before the return of the expedition) agree upon a delimitation of the region lying between Adamawa and Lake Chad, this understanding would be no longer binding and the expedition would be free to make treaties anywhere on the German side of the new line of delimitation.¹

From a commercial point of view, the Germans would not engage in commerce especially in ivory, 'the small supply of which commodity was drawn from the extensive regions which lay beyond and on both sides of the present Anglo-German lines of delimitation'. As an act of grace, the

1. FO64/1316 R.N.C. to FO 6.5.93 encs. 2 and 3, Goldie to Vohsen 5.5.93.

Company refused to accept any payments for carriage of the expedition to Yola. But in addition to making credit facilities available to the expedition, the Company further promised to supply rice, corn and other foodstuffs, at its own expense to thirty native carriers, and to extend free hospitality to the European members of the expedition, except for liquor, while in the Niger-Benue regions.

In the meantime, before the German expedition which was to be led by Von Uechtritz, and accompanied by Siegfried Passarge and Herr Jaeger, left Germany, while both the British and German representatives affirmed the sincerity of their intention to resist French encroachments, Goldie never lost sight of the psychological necessity of demonstrating the Company's optimism and determination to succeed. To show how seriously the Company regarded the affair, he suggested that he would himself be going to Yola by a direct steamer 'with a special expedition to drive Mizon out of British territory where he had been committing acts of piracy and slave raiding'.¹ He hoped to be able to capture all Mizon's material, in which case Mizon would not put any obstacle on the way of the German expedition beyond Yola.

However, 'the French Protectorate of Central Sudan' continued to grow. For just over eight months Mizon set

1. FO64/1317 Goldie to Vohsen, 20.6.93; Vohsen to Goldie 22.6.93; Goldie to Vohsen, 26.6.93.

up more than a dozen French commercial stations, at Manarawa, Kwinini and various other parts of Muri. Mizon continued to send encouraging reports to France.¹ He put forward grandiose plans for the growth of his protectorate. He asked for sufficient reinforcements to carry out his project. His aim was to develop the protectorate so that it avoided having anything to do with the British colony lower down the river. He had deliberately made the title 'Protectorat Français du Soudan Central' vague, in order to leave in doubt the question of Adamawa, where France had only a provisional treaty. "Sous cette rubrique," reported Mizon, "Le Protectorat Français du Soudan Central pourrait être classé dans le Baghirmi, le Ouadai et de l'Adamawa."²

In Mizon's opinion this was but the start of what French expansionists have dreamt of 'the great African empire comprising Algeria, Senegal, Chad and the Congo. He demanded an official title, say, Resident or Commissioner plenipotentiary (Commissaire de pleinpouvoirs) without effecting any change in his salary or rank in the French civil service. He asked for this because he felt he was being treated as a simple particulier, head of a commercial

1. Afrique III, 17 Mizon to U-Sec. S.C. 8.1.93.

2. Ibid.

mission. His main rivals, the Niger Company, created the right psychological impact, since even the least agent of the Company had an administrative title and always wore a uniform, and posed as representative of the British Government.¹

In a letter to Wallace, Mizon speaking in his capacity as 'councillor for external affairs', rejected British claims of sovereignty over Muri and Adamawa, stating that it was a subject for his government to decide.² In Mizon's letter he demanded that from the date of the letter, all Company claims and diplomatic matters must be addressed through him for onward transmission to the Emir. Secondly, conflicts between Europeans and natives would be judged by the Emir and the French Resident sitting together. As a friendly gesture to the Company, Mizon also wrote to several chiefs, especially those around Ibi, Djebou, Tchero, Bakundi and Ibi itself not to interfere with the Niger Company stations and to consider them as equal to French stations.³

However, in January 1893 as Mizon reported home on his achievements in Muri and his intention to proceed to Yola as soon as the water level of the Benue rose in July, Mizon's party suffered a serious setback. Two members of

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1. Afrique III, 17 Mizon to U-Sec. S.C. 8.1.93.
 2. Afrique III, 17 Mizon to Wallace, 27.12.93; Wallace to Mizon 28.12.92. Wallace reminded Mizon that his actions were a contravention of the Brussels Act and Muri and Adamawa were under British protectorate.
 3. Afrique III, 17 Mizon to all Chiefs of Muri, 27.12.92.

of his party, Dr Henri Ward, born of an Irish father and French mother and M. Vaughan, doctor and engineer respectively of the mission, retired from the mission on health grounds.¹ The sources fail to reveal whether prior to their departure they had differences with Mizon, though entries in Mizon's diary would suggest that he sometimes had difficulties in maintaining unity among the white members of the mission. Four months after their arrival in France, Dr Ward gave an interview to the journal L'Intransigéant in which he bitterly attacked Mizon and his activities.²

Dr Ward's report vindicated the stand which the Company had maintained all along that the Mizon expedition would do nothing but injure British interest in the Niger-Benue regions. The Company directed its attention to bringing pressure on the British Government to insist on Mizon's recall before the rise of the water-level in July when Mizon would surely proceed to Yola. If the Company could prevent this, then it would be easy to argue a case against French occupation of Muri on the grounds of previous treaties, which, it was known, were indicated in French maps.

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1. Afrique III, 17 Mizon to any Agent of the African Association 6.1.93. In this letter Mizon asked the African Association to give 'us any assistance you may and make to them (Ward and Vaughan) easy the way to the sea. Any expense will be under my responsibility and if the Doctor Ward want money you can deliver him against a receipt fifty pounds under the same conditions. This letter will be for you a guarantee'.
 2. L'Intransigéant, 5.5.93; extracts of the interview are quoted in Memorandum on French Slave-Raiding in British Territory, June 1893 by Goldie, enclosed in FO83/1240 R.N.C. to FO 25.5.93 (The memo was dated in advance).

The critical point was Yola, where the position of the Company was different. It had no treaties with the Lamido; and the district governors, unlike in Muri, would not enter into relations of a political nature with the Company unless authorised by Yola.¹ Although for ten years it had not been allowed to build factories, it was the only European trading concern to maintain a trading hulk on the Benue near Yola. To lose Yola would gravely affect the Company's position as the only foreign riverain power on the Niger. It would disrupt a large part of its hinterland trade above Ibi as well as to the ivory markets of Banyo, Tibati and Ngaundere.

Thus in London the Council of the Company initiated correspondence in May 1893 with the Foreign Office on the Mizon affair, after a period of silence on the issue. It put before the Foreign Office a choice between securing the recall of Mizon's mission before it proceeded to Yola in July, on the basis of available evidence against Mizon from Dr Ward and Company officials, or leaving the Company to proceed with its own plans.²

On 12 June 1893 Rosebery took up the matter with the French Foreign Ministry. In a strongly worded note he put

1. see above p.313 n.29, p.316.

2. FO83/1240 Goldie to FO 25.5.93 with encs. In addition to recalling 'the whole mission', Goldie demanded compensation of £100,000 for the Kwona victims.

forward the Company's complaints that Mizon had not taken account of the assurances, given by Waddington, the French Ambassador in London, to the British Government, that Mizon's mission was 'purely scientific and commercial', and that Mizon had given considerable ammunition to the Emir of Muri with which he had levied war in British Territory.¹ In this way Mizon had abused the only condition by which he was allowed to carry arms through the Company's territories. The note made it clear that the sources of the charges against Mizon were correspondence from the Company and a member of Mizon's mission, but that the charges were easily verifiable and the British Government had decided to support the Company in whatever measures it would take to put an end to the state of war created in the Benue districts by Mizon's expedition, unless Mizon were immediately recalled.

M. Develle, the French Foreign Minister, seems to have been taken unawares, and declared his ignorance that events had reached such a state.² What prevailed with him was the threat that the French mission would be attacked and destroyed. He feared the consequence of this because of the large commercial interests which had financed the mission

1. FO27/3134 Rosebery to Dufferin 12.6.93

2. FO27/3134 Dufferin to Rosebery 15.6.93.

and placed much hope in its success through government support. Consultations with M. D elcass e at the Colonial Office showed a difference in attitude between the French Colonial and Foreign Ministries. M. D elcass e refused to recall the mission on the grounds that the charges against Mizon were 'ex-parte and supplied by unreliable witnesses'. M. D elcass e decided not to accept the charges unless they were examined by a special commissioner as had been demanded by the British Government over the disputes between French Catholic and British Protestant missions in Uganda.¹

The British Government remained unmoved and regretted the 'inadequate grasp of the situation by the French Government'. It had no option but to allow the Company to take its own measures if the French Government was unwilling to recall Mizon unconditionally.² Nothing could have been more calculated to frighten those who had vested interests in the Mizon expedition than the thought of armed conflict between Mizon and the Company, whose forces in the region were known to be considerable. The result was that M. Dovellet decided to withdraw Mizon in order to avoid 'les graves incidents que faisaient prévoir les menaces violentes de la compagnie anglaise et pour discuter ses revend-

1. FO27/3134 Phipps to Rosebery 21.6.93; same to same 24.6.93.

2. FO27/3134 Rosebery to Phipps 26.6.93.

cations'.¹ He however stressed that the recall was to Mizon personally, and was done on condition that the mission continued its original aims, which were commercial and scientific, destined to Yola and beyond.

Experts at the French Foreign Ministry took the view that France's foreign policy must take precedence over colonial policy, especially since in their reckoning Mizon's intervention in Muri fell outside the programme that had been worked out for him in his instructions.² The government had been willing to support Mizon wholly as long as his mission remained 'une entreprise pacifique'. It was hoped that owing to the admirable skill with which he had managed the first expedition he would obtain a treaty in Adamawa before any crisis developed and so strengthen France's bargaining power during the proposed boundary settlements around Adamawa and the Chad regions.

Further, before Mizon left, he held lengthy tête-à-tête conversations with M. Ribot, the then French Foreign Minister, who stressed that Mizon should observe profound circumspection and moderation such as he had amply demonstrated during his first expedition.³ The stories in the

1. FO27/3134 Phipps to Rosebery 28.6.93 enc., Afrique III, 17 Develle to Mizon 28.6.93. Another telegramme, Délcassé to Mizon 4.7.93, which apparently did not reach Mizon explained that he had been recalled because of his intervention in Muri.

2. Cf P.L. Montcil, Souvenirs Vécus (Quelques Feuilletts de l'Histoire Coloniale) Paris, 1924. p.61 reporting a conversation with M. Délcassé.

3. Afrique III, 17 Ribot to Mizon 2.8.92.

press and from Dr Ward hardly confirmed moderation and prudence. In case of any serious conflict in Adamawa, and the signs were that one was inevitable, France would find herself isolated, since already Britain and Germany were in agreement against Mizon. Even if the French Government decided to press Mizon's claims to breaking point, it would be faced with the near impossible task of transporting war equipment to Adamawa, since Adamawa was nowhere near any of its established stations. Perhaps also fearing the consequences on its European diplomacy, the French Government did not want to thrust Britain too far into the hands of Germany.¹

Considering these factors together, even later when it had received further information from Mizon personally, the French Government decided that it was in French interest to secure whatever it could through diplomatic channels. This marked an important victory for the Company in Europe. It further made the confidential negotiations between Germany and Britain on the extension of the Yola boundary to Lake Chad (see below pp. 355) worthwhile even without reference to France.

While these events were going on, Wallace, then the Company's Senior Executive Officer and the most experienced officer in situations of this nature, was on leave

1. See Langer, 1951 vol.1, pp.3-5. A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918, London, 1957.

in Britain, and his leave had to be cut short to release him in good time to go and expel Mizon from 'British Territory' during the high water of 1893. On his arrival at Ibi, the position of the Company was considerably strengthened. Besides reinforcement in armed vessels and ammunition, he had probably discussed the full implications of every possible move with Goldie and the Company's Council in London.

As the water level of the Benue rose, all roads led to Yola. It was scarcely three months since Zubeiru returned to Yola from Balda in Northern Adamawa having lost a war against Hayatu. The traumatic effect of losing a war against Hayatu's comparatively small army probably created in Zubeiru a strong sense of weakness militarily. In addition a number of factors made the region generally unstable. There was for instance the warlike activities of Rabeh to the immediate east of Adamawa. After the Hayatu war, Rabeh's activities became directly connected with Adamawa when Rabeh sent messages of congratulations to Hayatu and entered into an alliance with him (see below p. 391). On the western flank, Mizon had allied himself with the Emir of Muri and made war on behalf of the Emir for territorial aggrandisement.¹ Zubeiru

1. Cf. Mizon, Une Question Africaine, pp.39-46. This was partially the result of Mizon's conviction that European policy should be based on support for the civilizing work of the Fulani (see ibid, pp.29, 33.)

must have felt disappointed and alarmed in view of the promises Mizon had made to him during his visit to Yola eighteen months earlier.

To strengthen his position, at least against Mizon, and possibly also to forestall the Company delivering aid to Hayatu, at a time when much of the flower of Zubeiru's army had been destroyed in the Hayatu war, Zubeiru decided to throw in his lot with (or to give the appearance of leaning towards) the Niger Company.

.... I send to tell you in this my letter that I believe in you as the Governor of your Company does in you, together with our great Sultan of Sokoto. From and after this you are to know that I deliver to your sole Protection all that portion of Land belonging to Adamawa upper and lower in the River Benue, of my Boundary. You are to see it protected from all quarrel that may come in to cause by any other Powers, and that you are allowed to build Houses in any place you may think fit for your Company's Business not allowing any foreigners to come in without your consent.

There are some now in Muri Country coming up here we do not want them. None of the People in my Country want to see them, and therefore I send you this letter....¹

In April 1893 the Frenchman Ponel visited Zubeiru having been instructed by de Brazza, the governor of French Congo, to proceed from his post at Batouri through Ngaundere to Yola. At Yola he dressed as a native in a gown and turban^{and}

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1. FO27/3160 RNC to FO 15.6.93 enc. Zubeiru to Mai Gashi (Wallace) 20.1.93. Three months later this was followed up by Zubeiru signing a treaty on the Company's treaty Form 10. cf. FO27/3161 RNC to FO 14.8.93. enc. Treaty with Zubeiru.

introduced himself as the 'representative of France.' Such pretensions, rather than impressing Zubeiru, incited his anger.¹ They seemed to confirm what Company officials had often warned Zubeiru about, that the French were encroaching on his southern territory, that the French had a large military station at Gaza and Kunde and that the French 'aim was to seize Ngaundere and from there build military stations towards the north until the Chad.'² Thus Zubeiru showed nothing but mistrust of the young man's efforts, and he was forced to retrace his steps to the Congo.

Late in July 1893 however, it became clear to Wallace, stationed at Ibi that, despite Mizon's recall, despite repeated warnings that Adamawa was British Territory as conceived by European diplomacy, Mizon was determined to proceed to Yola. Wallace could not afford to take any chances. At this time the Company's relation with the new Sultan of Sokoto, Abdulrahman, was good. Wallace took steps to ensure that the Sultan's representative to Adamawa, Malam Maunde, was present at Yola to intervene once more that Mizon should not be allowed at Yola.³

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1. Hanotoux et Martineau, p.491. The French attributed Ponel's failure to the presence of the Company's customs officer Bradshaw at Yola. For the Company's account of the visit see FO27/3161 RNC to FO 28.9.93.
 2. FO27/3162 R.N.C. to FO 21.10.93 enc. Wallace report.
 3. Ibid.; Passarge, 1895 p.33.

Early in July he moved the Company's armed vessels from Ibi to Yola with all the members of the European staff including Custom's Officer Bradshaw, and the head of the Benue section of the constabulary, Lt. Carr.

Already representatives of the three competing nations were converging on Yola. Von Stetten, a veteran German colonial officer, was the first to arrive from the Cameroon coast in late June to prepare the way for the German expedition of von Uechtritz (see above p. 332). He tried to open negotiations with the district governors of Tibati, Banyo and Gashaka, but despite their hospitality, they refused as usual to parley with him without instructions from Yola.¹ He was later met at Yola by the von Uechtritz mission.

With reports of more missions on their way to Yola, Zubeiru probably sensed an impending crisis among the Europeans. He moved from Girei to Yola. On 18 August 1893 Mizon reached Yola to join his advance party as well as the Company officials who had throughout the year maintained constant communication between Ibi and the Company's hulk which was permanently moored on the Benue near Yola. Two weeks later, Uechtritz also arrived. None of the Europeans, not even the Niger Company, had

1. von Stetten, 'Expedition en pays Tikar de Balinga à Yola'. TA-60 (ANY) published in Deutsches Kolonialblatt, 1893

factories on land, so that their bases of operation were their vessels moored on the river.¹

The presence of different and competing European groups also intensified the rivalry of the Arab and Hausa traders. They began to reassess and protect their vested interests, to choose among the Europeans and to exert their own pressures. The result was a very confused and complex state of affairs where no single group seemed sure of how to achieve its objectives. The motives of the Hausa and Arab traders were primarily commercial. Those of the Europeans were mixed commercial and political.

As we have seen (see above p. 327), the Arab traders carried trade towards the north, through Bornu, across the Sahara to North Africa. The Hausa traders linked Adamawa's trade with Hausaland, selling to the Niger Company's factories. Consequently the Hausas were more favourably inclined to the Niger Company, and through more than a decade of trade with the Niger Company some of their traders had come to rely for their prosperity on that trade, especially on ivory. The Arab merchants were as before, particularly worried that should the Niger Company win in Yola the entire trade of the emirate would be

1. Cf. Passarge, 1895, pp.32-34; FO27/3162 R.N.C. to FO 21.10.93 enc; Wallace report; Afrique III, 17 Mizon to U-Sec. S.C.18.11.93.

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turned towards the coast to their commercial detriment.¹ They therefore pressed on Zubeiru not to favour the Europeans, except Mizon whom they saw as a counter influence against the Company.² The Hausa traders were on their part against Mizon and in this they were strongly backed by the Sultan of Sokoto. By the rainy season of 1893 however the influence of the Hausa merchants at Court was reduced owing to the death of their representative Lamdo Katsena, Abdul Salami, during the Hayatu war (see below p. 385). He had been succeeded by his son who as a comparatively young man did not command the same respect as his father.

The real struggle was at the political level, and here the pace setters were the Europeans. According to the agreement between the Niger Company and von Vohsen's Committee (see above pp. 333 ff.), Uechtritz and Wallace had the same objective, namely, to prevent Mizon from acquiring a treaty or any form of concession from Zubeiru.

There is little doubt that Zubeiru understood or regarded the treaty he signed with the Company in the

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1. See 'Morning Post' 9.6.91; 'The Times' 14.9.91; Monteil, 1894, p.292. After the British mission of McIntosh to Bornu in 1890, under pressure from Arab merchants, the Mai Bornu wrote Zubeiru demanding that Zubeiru should not in future open the northern route through Adamawa to Bornu for Europeans.
 2. Afrique III, 17, Mizon to U-Sec.S.C. 18.11.93; for earlier support see above pp.327-28. This point is also implicit in Wallace's reports owing to the lack of mention of 'the King of Arabs' who at least officially was the intermediary between the Lamido and the Europeans. On the contrary he received much prominence in Mizon's report.

same light as the Europeans.¹ Thus, for example after a week of hard bargaining, in which al-Hajj Meckham and the Sherif acted on behalf of Mizon, Zubeiru signed a treaty with Mizon and put Mizon in charge of his relations with Europeans.² In return Mizon provided Zubeiru with arms and Senegalese instructors who started training Zubeiru's troops to use the rifles and cannons.³

It does not appear that Zubeiru had intended the treaty with Mizon to be the signal for strife among the Europeans, but the interpretation Mizon gave to it brought the Europeans to the verge of an international crisis. On 3 September Mizon informed both Wallace and Uechtritz that 'according to a treaty signed 23 August 1893 with additional notes on 25 August 1893, Zubeiru, Sultan of Adamawa, Buba Njidda, Ngaundere, Tibati, Banyo etc. had placed his state under French Protection'.⁴ In their

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1. cf. FO27/3161 R.N.C. to FO 7.9.93 enc. report of Spink 30.5.93. He saw the treaty as a preventive measure binding on the Company not to permit its people to interfere with native women, to punish them if found stealing etc.
 2. Afrique III, 17, Mizon to U-Sec. S.C. 18.11.93. I have been unable to find the treaty. The sources however agree that Mizon received a treaty from Zubeiru. See, e.g. the arbitration verdict of Baron Lambert on the Mizon affair (appendix F); Flint, p.179.
 3. Many of the rifles and the two cannons Mizon gave Zubeiru were captured during the invasion of Yola in Sept.1901. For details see Colonel Morland Report, CO446/16; Wallace to CO26.9.1901 enc.
 4. Afrique, III, 17, Mizon to U-Sec.S.C. 18.11.93 enc. Mizon to Wallace, Mizon to Uechtritz 3.9.93. FO27/3162 RNC to FO 21.10.93 enc. 13-16.

replies both Wallace and Uechtritz maintained that Mizon's treaty could not be respected because it was contrary to European Conventions and previous treaties with Zubeiru.

Tempers rose, and Wallace sent Bradshaw, the Company's customs officer for the Benue region, to demand to inspect the papers of the French men, and now and again issued charges against them for engaging in illicit trade in the Company's Territories.¹ On more than one occasion it seemed as if open war would break out between Mizon's men and the Company officials. This state of affairs, as would be expected, was disconcerting to Lamido Zubeiru who was responsible for seeing that the Europeans went about their business in peace. He felt that perhaps a clarification of his policy towards the Europeans might be the only way of preventing hostilities.

Accordingly, on 7 September 1893 Lamido Zubeiru did what was unique in the history of Adamawa's relations with Europeans. He summoned a Conference at his palace to which he invited all European representatives, his Councillors, the Sultan of Sokoto's representative, and important Adamawa traders in Yola. Passarge has given a picturesque description of the scene which is rather reminiscent of a miniature United Nations conference:

1. Afrique III, 17, Mizon to U-Sec. S.C. 18.11.93;
FO27/3163 R.N.C. to FO 16.11.93 encs. 3, 5.

At midday, I rode into Yola, while a man with a white turban, blue gown and long sword, walked dignified ahead of me. In the house to which he led me I found Mr. Wallace and Lt. Carr already assembled together with a stately Fulani in rich clothing, who had an alert and interesting face. This was an emissary from the Sultan of Sokoto sent for at the instigation of the Company to compel the Emir to banish Mizon from Adamawa.... We entered a large round hut. By the entrance opposite sat the Emir on his mat. The mouth-veil of his dark blue turban concealed only slightly the energetic, striking features of this despot, so feared by his people on account of his severity and violence. Opposite him knelt Akal. A wooden trestle, on which lay a suit of ancient paddle armour, together with two French cannons and their ammunition cases, made up the furniture. We Europeans sat down on the ground. After countless ssanu, barka, ussoko, the conversation turned on Mizon and his expulsion. Suddenly Mizon himself entered, with a white Arab and a negro. Now began a vivid argument, interesting not only because of its participants and the many languages in which it was conducted. Mr. Wallace spoke to his clerk in English, the clerk translated to Madugu in Hausa, and Madugu repeated it in Fulfulde to the Sultan. The Shereef translated into Arabic and the Arab turned it into French.¹

From the various reports of the leading European delegates, Wallace, Mizon and Passarge, who were present, the proceedings at this conference are fairly well known.² The reports are in some parts rather garbled and very selective, but from an examination of all the reports together, and my own field notes, some points are agreed;

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1. Passarge, 1895 pp. 33-34 translation by A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, 'Von Uechtritz's Expedition', JHSN, Vol.1, no.2, 1957 pp.91-92.
 2. See Passarge, 1895, pp.33-34; FO27/3163 RNC to FO 16.11.93 Wallace Report; Afrique III, 17, Mizon to U-Sec.S.C.18.11.93.

for instance, that the Yola Conference was summoned by Zubeiru, and that the primary aim was to put an end to the rivalry and back-biting which was causing tension at Yola.

As is further evidenced from the reports, at the Conference Zubeiru interrogated the Europeans on trade matters, but since the bone of contention was not trade, but political influence, he reiterated that he had not given, and had no intention of giving, even one inch of his territory to anybody. He had given permission for all to trade at Yola, French, British and Germans, as long as they did not seek to convert the people to Christianity or interfere with local customs. He advised the Europeans to settle their differences and come to a common understanding.

Wallace and Passarge seemed satisfied with the outcome of the Conference. Zubeiru had not mentioned Mizon's appointment or the treaty of protection which Mizon had received from Zubeiru. The political outcome of the meeting was represented in a document which Wallace and Passarge, acting for Uechtritz who was indisposed, prepared for their respective governments. The document dealt with political and commercial matters in three main clauses that:

- 1) at an audience held by the Emir of Adamawa on the 7th September 1893, the Emir, most emphatically stated that he had not concluded a treaty with M. Mizon and asked him how he had dared assert in writing to the Officials, of

the Niger Government and to the leader of the German Expedition (Baron Uechtritz) that Adamawa had been placed under the protection of the French Government.

- 2) he would hold to the treaty he had concluded with the Niger Government, and that all strangers coming to his country would only be received by him when introduced by the said Niger Government.
- 3) the report which had been circulated in Yola that he had received as a present from M. Mizon the French Carbines, Revolvers, Mountain Guns and Cases of Ammunition, was utterly false, they were paid for with horses and ivory.¹

Zubeiru however put no barrier on Mizon's trade and the conference was not the end of Mizon at Yola.²

Zubeiru's tactics in the political jig-saw seems to have been to get out as much as possible from *whoever* stretched his hand until towards the end of September when the fall of the water level of the Benue would compel the Europeans to leave Yola. For Wallace such diplomacy appeared very tantalising; the desire to avoid bloodshed made his role the more difficult as he remarked to Goldie:

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1. FO27/3163 R.N.C. to FO 16.11.93 enc.3. Pascharge signed the document with reservations on clause III, which were annotated on the document itself. It appears the Germans distinguished between commercial and political matters, and while they were willing to cooperate with the Company on the political level, they were going to refrain from sanctioning anything which looked as if they were supporting the Company's claims to a monopoly of trade.
 2. FO27/3163 R.N.C. to FO 16.11.93 Wallace reports that on 8th September Mizon continued to trade as before the Conference and bought $\frac{1}{2}$ ton of ivory, mostly with Maldivé Cawries.

...If I could only have foreseen all this dreadful waste of time I would have brought up the "Katsena" with all the force and settled the affair as soon as he (Mizon) had started trading at Yola. I am sometimes afraid that you will blame me for wasting time up here, then again when I review all the circumstances I cannot blame myself; it has been a most difficult role to play, and so far we have been happily able to avoid bloodshed¹

He informed Mizon that as the 'Sergeant Malamine' had broken the Regulations of the 'Niger Government' by trading at Yola, without paying the customs duties or licences, he would send an officer legally to arrest the vessel, and if Mizon had any queries, he should appeal to the Government of the French Republic who would settle the matter with the British Government. On 23 September Mizon left Yola on one of his vessels, the 'Mosca', leaving behind the 'Sergeant Malamine' and a French trading mission under the charge of al-Hajj Meckham, Huntzbuchler and Sherif. A day after Wallace appeared in full force and arrested the French vessel early in the morning.² The quarrel was essentially among the Europeans and so Zubeiru kept silent over the affair.

The departure of all the Europeans after more than a month of tense activities was a welcome relief to Zubeiru. Little did he think that the temporary with-

1. FO27/3163 R.N.C. to FO 16.11.93 Wallace Report.

2. Ibid.

drawal of the handful of competing Europeans marked the beginning of a move by their respective governments to settle their differences and so effectively seize the initiative in deciding his future and that of his emirate.

In Europe the British and Germans were well advanced with their secret bilateral negotiations, which officially began in July 1893, for the partition of Adamawa. The result was the Anglo-German Agreement of November 1893 which gave Yola and one-quarter of Adamawa to Britain, while Germany took the remaining three quarters.¹

While these secret negotiations were in progress between Germany and Britain, the sponsors of the Mizon mission took up the cudgels and lampooned their government for having bungled the whole affair. They claimed the government had acted injudiciously. It had sacrificed Mizon and his party to the Niger Company and had condemned him without hearing his defence.² The situation was made worse for the government when the Niger Company refused to allow M. Hoellé, who was sent as a special commissioner, to ascend the Niger-Benue to meet Mizon.

1. For a detailed study on the negotiations see, J.C. Anene, The International Boundaries of Nigeria 1884-1906, (Ph.D thesis 1960, University of London); Flint, pp. 181-86.

2. *Politique Coloniale* 1.7.93; *Figaro* 2.7.93; *L'Eclair*, 3.7.93 and 10.7.93.

Hoellé's report, dated 1 August 1893 and published in the French press six weeks later, manifestly took the side of Mizon. Hoellé reported that the prevalent feeling in Europe that Mizon was wrong and the Company right in what had happened at Muri and Yola should be doubted, and above all, that there was a definite 'Anglo-German conspiracy' to have the French Government recall Mizon and,

pendant ce temps l'expédition Allemande d'Uchtritz attendit à Akassa son départ et se mettant aussitôt encompaigne favorisée par la Compagnie du Niger. Partant ainsi dans la bonne saison elle arrivait à Yola et s'y installait avec le dessein d'annuler les résultats des voyages de Maistre et de Mizon.¹

In France, with elections hanging over its head, the government was very bitter about the fiasco of Hoellé's mission and felt it had been let down by the British Government which had given assurances of facilitating Hoellé's ascent on the Niger-Benue.²

On top of all these came the publication of the Anglo-German Agreement on November 24, 1893.³ The French Government protested very strongly, because by the treaty,

1. Débat 13.9.93; also Figaro 14.9.93.
2. FO27/3134 Phipps to Anderson (private) 25.8.93; Baron d'Estournelles to FO 31.8.93.
3. For full text see Hertslet, Map of Africa, vol.III, pp.914ff.

Germany recognized the existence of British interest to the south and west of Lake Chad, an area over which France claimed she had treaties concluded between Monteil and the Mai of Bornu.¹ Moreover it was felt that in such negotiations where more than just the interests of Britain and Germany were concerned, it was essential to have included France in the negotiations. However, there was very little the French Government could do at the time without bringing about a major crisis in which it would likely find itself practically without support from any other colonial nation. Having given up the struggle by hurriedly recalling Mizon from the battlefield, it was futile to hope to achieve much against a united Anglo-German front on the issue in Europe. The significant point however was that the above series of disappointments hardened the French attitude towards the negotiations with Germany to delimit the eastern frontiers of German Adamawa.

Both the German and French Governments had an interest in settling the Adamawa question quickly. In view of

1. D.D.F Tome 10, no.448 Develle to French Ambassadors, Berlin and London 29.11.93. FO27/3135 memo Baron d'Estournelles to FO 30.11.93. Monteil's claim of a treaty with Bornu was later not substantiated. It was not put forward during the Franco-German negotiations which immediately followed the Anglo-German Agreement. See note E.p.259.

the pending general elections to the French National Assembly at the end of the year, the French Government was anxious to close the Mizon affair. A week before the publication of the Anglo-German Agreement, the German Government informed the French Government of its conclusion and demanded that both countries should settle their differences as soon as possible so as to have a common policy against the aggressive and proud tendency of the British in the colonial field.¹ In his reply M. Develle suggested that France and Germany should submit their respective claims on Adamawa for arbitration; but in Germany it was suspected that this was an attempt to expose the weakness of Germany's claims in Adamawa and in Bornu where she had no treaty with the rulers. She stood very firm against arbitration.

In December 1893 the new French Government decided to drop its demand for arbitration. This made the opening of talks possible. Haussman, a senior official at the French Foreign Ministry, and commandant Monteil represented France while Dr Kayser, Head of the Colonial Division of the German Foreign Office, and Freiherr Von Dankelmann, who like Monteil was an African traveller, conducted the

1. DDF Tome 10, 434 Herbette to Develle 18.11.93.

negotiations on behalf of Germany.¹

At the beginning of negotiations the German delegates urged that a necessary condition for the attainment of satisfactory results in the negotiations was that no attempt should be made by France to alter the provisions of the Franco-German Agreement of 1885. They tried to avoid discussion on the subject of Adamawa on the grounds that it was within the 15° east longitude, the boundary between German and French interests fixed in 1885. The basic French argument was that the delimitation of 1885 merely concerned the coastal regions and that the eastern or northern boundaries of the Cameroon were still to be defined. Each side appeared so firm on its views that the negotiations almost collapsed.

However, after the Christmas break, M. Casimir Perier, the new Foreign Minister, wished to see a quick settlement with Germany. By February 1894 an agreement was reached between France and Germany. In return for France abandoning her claims over Adamawa France was allowed the possession of Bifara, an important ivory town at the head of the navigable portions of the river Kebbi, and also a

1. Cf. Monteil, 1924 Souvenirs Vécus pp.71-76, 90-100; also H. Labouret, Monteil, Explorateur et Soldat, Paris, 1937, pp.173-92; Hanotaux et Martineau, pp.493-95. For a pioneering study based almost exclusively on French sources, see M. Thouin, Etude sur la Délimitation de Frontière du Congo-Cameroun, Paris, 1911.

part of the southern shores of Lake Chad. The Agreement was signed on 15 March 1894, but was not published until August 1894.¹

These various Agreements and Treaties left Adamawa exposed to whatever action the Germans and the Niger Company decided to take or force on the people. Though these decisions were exclusively of European making, they constituted the legal as well as a sort of moral prop for collective and individual European intervention in Adamawa.² They were the greatest single threat to Zubeiru's government, and, as never before, the Europeans would reappear not as warring groups each seeking his favour, but as a united body, strengthened by mutual Agreement to put into effect divisive measures arrived at in Europe. It is with the effect of all these on the government of the emirate that the next chapter is principally concerned.

1. Full text printed in Hertslet, Map of Africa vol.11, pp.657-58.

2. Cf. M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law, London 1926. pp.172-75.

CHAPTER VIITHE OVERTHROW OF FULANI RULE

The overthrow of Fulani rule in Adamawa is the direct result of the interplay of three major pressures on Zubeiru, the Lamido of Adamawa from 1890 to 1901. They arose firstly from the cleavage in Zubeiru's council; secondly from the development of a Mahdist state within the emirate; and thirdly from European ambitions leading to invasions. The interested groups worked with various means to achieve their objective. The fact that they did not actually coalesce into a single front against Zubeiru until after the invasions postponed Zubeiru's downfall.

Each of the three represented a fissiparous element and a potential cause of instability in the politics and government of the emirate. Thus they converged at least at the function/^{al}level, though it must be said that if the dissident councillors as a single group had their way, the result might have been different from the Mahdist and European goals which involved foreign overlordship and re-alignment. The councillors own nominee would still have perpetuated Fulani rule much in the same general direction as Zubeiru, but the councillors would have exercised much greater control over the Lamido.

a) Zubeiru and the Mahdist threat.

We have already examined the conflicts between Zubeiru and some of his councillors (see above, pp. 280ff.). These conflicts did not lead to any immediate visible decline in Zubeiru's authority. On the contrary, in a Machiavellian style they strengthened his hand, and by force of character, he attained immense power which made him appear to European visitors as a fanatic and a despot promptly obeyed by his subjects.¹

The most formidable threat to Zubeiru's patrimony was the divisive activities of the great-grandson of Uthman dan Fodio, [Hayatu ibn Sa'īd], more popularly known in Adamawa as 'Shaikh Hayatu Balda'. The career of Hayatu is one of those rare subjects of biographical interest in Adamawa history, not only because of Hayatu's noble ancestry, but also because of the wide variety of events in his career, ranging from his association with the politics of Sokoto, to his connections with the Mahdist movement as a new political, social, and religious force in Adamawa and the neighbouring emirates until 1923 when his son malam Saidu was arrested and deported to Buea, in the Cameroon.²

1. Passarge, 1895A, p.33; J.A. Burdon, Northern Nigeria. Historical Notes on Certain Emirates and Tribes, London, 1909, pp.76-77; C0446/21 Lugard to CO 9.9.1901.

2. For a detailed report on Saidu and his activities see, G.T. F. Tomlinson and G.J. Lethem, History of Islamic Political Propaganda in Nigeria, London n.d. (c.1927). The report was a result of the revival of Hayatu's Mahdist movement by his son Saidu between 1918 and 1924.

Also, like Rabeh's history, the career of Hayatu links the history of the late nineteenth-century Sokoto empire, Bornu, Wadai, and Baghirmi to the Sudan and Egypt in terms of the flow of men and ideas in these vast Islamic regions. It is interesting as an expression of a long standing tradition of viewing the histories of these regions as one entity especially at a time when European boundary demarcations were creating new political divisions.¹

Hayatu was born at Sokoto about 1840.² He had his early education from his father Sa'īd who was reputed for his scholarship and piety.³ From his youth Hayatu earned the reputation of always remembering whatever he learnt, and was admired for his receptive and retentive memory. As most of the bright and ambitious young men of his time, he would have participated in the seminars and recitations to promote learning at Sokoto. His father Sa'īd had the ambition of becoming Sultan after the death of Abubakar na Rabah (1873-1877), but he lost the election to his brother Muazu on grounds of seniority.⁴ Muazu withdrew

1. Cf. Biobaku and M.A. al-Hajj, in Islam in Tropical Africa, pp.429-30 for an attempt to connect the appearance of the Sudanese Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad, with prior Mahdist expectations to the west including Muslims in the Sokoto empire. H.J.Fisher's review of Islam in Tropical Africa in BSOAS, 1968, p. 439 however makes some reservation on this point.

2. Oral tradition, Sokoto, and Yola. It is said that he was born after Bello died, and he came to Adamawa at the age of about 40 years.

3. Last, 1967, pp.99, 122.

4. Ibid., p.122.

Sa'id from the district of Gandi, where Sa'id had for some time been governor, to live near Muazu in Sokoto.

However, Hayatu never concealed his disappointment at the election of Muazu in preference to his father, since this made his own chances of succeeding to the Sokoto throne more remote. The district of Gandi was among the most difficult to manage, and Hayatu soon ran into trouble with the principal inhabitants, and he was relieved of his duties by popular action.¹ He decided to leave Sokoto and seek his fortune elsewhere. He embarked with thirty three students and a large retinue of other attendants and came to Adamawa about 1878 during the reign of Lamido Sanda.² His reasons for leaving Sokoto, and for choosing to go to Adamawa, are not clear-cut. Some sources say he was en route to Mecca on pilgrimage;³ others, that he was going to meet the Mahdi, in order to fulfil a revelation or a dream he had that he would be ruler of a vast Muslim empire in the 'East'.⁴

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1. Last, 1967, p.122. It is not clear whether this was on Muazu's orders or on the initiative of the people of Gandi themselves. Cf. Johnston, p.202; P.M. Holt, 'The Sudanese Mahdia and the Outside World: 1881-9', BSOAS, XXI, 1958, (A) pp. 285-86.
 2. Informant 1, Yola; see also Holt, 1958A, p.285; East, p.111.
 3. Strumpel, p.38; Lemoigne, p.139; Holt, 1958A, p.286.
 4. See n.1, p.366.

Judging from Hayatu's activities while in Adamawa it is unlikely that his intention was to make the Hajj. He does not seem to have contemplated this even when his alliance with Rabeh irretrievably broke down and he was under pressure to change course. There are also some chronological doubts about meeting the Mahdi. Muhammad Ahmad did not publicly assume the role of Mahdī until 1881 and so in a sense Hayatu could not have left Sokoto to meet someone who had at that time not been declared a Mahdī. The contention of some of Hayatu's followers whom I met at Marua and Balda was that the question of meeting the Mahdi should be looked at within the wider context of Hayatu's revelation that Uthman's prediction of the coming of the Mahdī before the end of his jihad was near at hand, and that it was as a lieutenant of the Mahdī rather than as the Sultan of Sokoto that he was going to make his greater contribution to the cause of rejuvenating Islam in the Sokoto empire and in the Sudan in general. This was also advanced to explain why Hayatu so readily became a 'servant' (amil al-Mahdī) of the Mahdi and defied all who failed to answer his call.

Other more material reasons that might have suggested Adamawa to Hayatu were these: Adamawa was one of the richest emirates, with a stable regime. Adamawa's ruler, Sanda, had a special admiration for learned men and wanted them in his emirate. In Adamawa Hayatu would not only

command respect as a descendant of Uthman but on his personal merit as a learned man. The state of learning in Adamawa still offered much scope for development compared with many of the emirates in Hausaland, and in this state of affairs the need for dedicated religious teachers was compelling. Moreover it was a custom for the descendants of Uthman to visit various parts of the empire and before Hayatu came to Adamawa he had visited Katsona and Zaria, but he had not thought that the fulfilment of his mission was in these emirates.¹

His reception in Yola befitted that of one of royal blood of Sokoto. He was lodged by Hammoa Ahigjo, bero for Sokoto. (See above, p. 231). He stayed at Yola for four and a half years, living an exemplary life, teaching and visiting other parts of the emirate. He received many presents from all over the emirate and preferred to invest whatever he so received in the purchase of horses and bridles,² a fact which his critics later saw as part of the preparation for the seizure of Adamawa from its traditional rulers.³ In 1881 Muhammad Ahmad was acclaimed Mahtid in Southern Sudan, and the following year, 1882, Hayatu abandoned the comforts of Yola and said he was going to the 'East'.

1. This information and others generally on Hayatu's career is gratefully owed to Hayatu's grandson, Alhaji Garba, a widely read scholar, at present in Kaduna. Another descendant of Uthman, who left Sokoto with political ambitions is Umaru Nagwamatse who founded a new dynasty in the emirate of Kontagora in 1864. See Burdon, 1909, p. 47; Hobgen and Kirk-Greene, pp.500-11.

2. East, pp.111-113; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.142.

3. Mizon, 'Les Royaumes Foulbés', pp.358-59; Informants 1, Yola; 7, Garua.

There is no available evidence that Hayatu had started correspondence with the Mahdi when he was still in Yola, but it is likely that before he left Yola he had heard of the Mahdi either through pilgrims or traders and was curious to know more about the movement and become affiliated to it.

Hayatu reached Marua where Lamido Sali was governor. He did not stay in Marua for any length of time before he moved north-east to Bogo, the district of Lamdo Gareï.¹ Again for reasons that are undisclosed by the sources he decided to settle with his large retinue in Gareï's district. Lamdo Gareï permitted him to settle in Balda, a small unimpressive town about eight miles from Bogo. Balda at this time was one of the estates of Lamdo Bogo which served as a nursery for his eldest son to acquire experience in government.² Hamman Tukur, the eldest son of Lamdo Gareï, managed the affairs of Balda at the time and he was asked to step down for Hayatu.

Bogo itself was not a big district and had been peopled, chiefly around 1870, mostly by men from Marua.³ The Fulani here for several decades had failed to subdue the

1. Informants 12, Marua, 13, Bogo, 14, Balda; Strumpel, p.39.

2. The account on Hayatu at Balda is largely based on oral tradition I recorded at Balda, Bogo and Marua. Some of my informants were eye-witnesses to the events; my principal informant was Lamdo Bogo, malam Usumanu, whose grandfather Lamdo Gareï, was one of those actively involved in shaping the events. The recordings will be deposited at the Archives Nationales Yaoundé by agreement with Lamdo Bogo.

3. Strumpel, pp.61-65; Lemoigne, p.138.

non-Muslims of the Musgum, Massa and Sumeya tribes who surrounded them. Hayatu's force was considerable,¹ and no sooner had he settled at Balda than he embarked upon vigorous campaigns against the non-Muslims. These campaigns were in the main successful and these conquered tribes which theoretically belonged either to the sphere of Bogo, Marua or Kalfu were made to form a new district under the governorship of Hayatu. This naturally upset the political equilibrium in these northern regions of Adamawa, especially since Hayatu attracted many of the young and good fighters from these districts. His camp offered a more successful career to the young aspiring warriors, as well as giving spiritual relief. Marua as the largest district felt the loss most. Its governor Lando Sali saw his power being eclipsed by the growing force and independent action of Hayatu.

Hayatu was working to establish his own authority in spite of the 'natural rulers'.² He was proving successful where they had so long failed to spread Islamic influence. The more victories he had the more adherents he was able to draw to himself from other districts of Adamawa and Hausaland. These adherents helped to transform Balda. They built a school, market and mosque and these served as centres for

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1. Alis, p.894, p.307, Mizon estimated that Hayatu had as much as 700 guns by 1891. These were however not taken as the principal weapons during the war with Zubeiru which was chiefly fought on horse-back.
 2. Strumpel, pp.38-41; Lemoigne, pp.138-39; Beyries, 1958, pp.6-8.

disseminating Hayatu's ideas. Scarcity of water had for long hampered the development of Balda. Hayatu deepened the bed of river Balda and the people could obtain water from it all the year round. Hayatu became a teacher, conqueror, administrator and religious leader. He was believed to be a healer and his prayers were thought to be effective in a special way.¹

Having secured a base, in 1883 Hayatu sent a mission led by the Imam Arabu, a very learned man from Marua,² and Hayatu's slave servant, Adamu, to the Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad. They bore messages pledging entire submission to the Mahdi in accordance with Uthman's recommendation to his followers in the Sokoto empire 'to emigrate to you, to assist you and to help you when you were made manifest'.³ This was indeed the sort of connection the Mahdi looked forward to especially after the fall of El Obeid in January 1883 when the Mahdi definitely turned his eyes outside the Egyptian-Sudan to enlist the support of prominent Muslim leaders.⁴

1. Informants 13 and 14, Bogo.

2. The Imam Arabu of Marua joined Hayatu as soon as Hayatu reached Marua from Yola. He became one of Hayatu's right hand men on account of his learning and piety. He served as Hayatu's roving ambassador leading important missions. After Hayatu's death, he remained a loyal and faithful follower of Hayatu's son and successor, Saidu. Informant 22, Kaduna. See also Prestat, p.14.

3. MS Nujūmi, 58-59, quoted by Holt, 1958A, p.286; Lethem and Tomlinson, Vol.1, p.8.

4. Holt, 1958A, pp.267-90. See P. Alexandre, 'Islam in Cameroun', in Kritzeck and Lewis, Islam in Africa, p.275, for an erroneous view that Hayatu proclaimed himself Mahdi and that Zubeiru won the war against Hayatu (see below pp. 387ff.).

Without any attempt, on the Mahdi's part, to understand the political complexities in the Sokoto empire, Hayatu's request was granted and he was appointed the Mahdi's representative, amil al-Mahdī in the West and amīr al-mu'minīn in the Sokoto empire.¹ Hayatu took his appointment seriously and was determined to see that Mahdism took firm roots and spread in Adamawa as well as the other emirates under the Sokoto regime.

This marked the formal introduction of Mahdism in Adamawa. It introduced not only a new sect and a new approach to religious life, but also an alternative focus for new political allegiance and authority. Hayatu hoped to capitalize on two factors, namely the fact that Mahdism was a common belief in Islam, and that in the Sokoto empire, Uthman in his sermons and writings had made the belief articulate among his followers some of whom even thought he was himself the Mahdī.² He predicted that the Mahdī was going to appear in the East before the end of his jihad and he would complete his reform movement. So that Hayatu realized that for the Muslims in the Sokoto empire, Mahdism conjured a much more profound feeling with wider implications beyond an idea or a set of beliefs. It was to be in a very real way the

1. Lethem and Tomlinson , Vol.1, p.8; Vol.II, p.12; Biobaku and M.A. al-Hajj in Islam in Tropical Africa, p.434.

2. Cf. Adeleye et al. 1966, p.31; IM (Arnett) p.20.

climax of their movement.

Their anxiety to meet with the Mahdī did not die with the death of Uthman (1817). As early as 1805 on the instructions of Uthman, Bello had approached the rulers of Zamfara, Katsena, Kano and Zaria to warn them of the advent of the Mahdī.¹ When he became Sultan he made it a special duty to open up regular correspondence with Modibbo Adama on the subject of the Mahdī, since Adamawa lay nearest to the region that the Mahdī was generally expected. (See above, p. 157) An acute state seems to have been reached towards the end of Bello's reign when there was a mass movement of learned men from the Hausa emirates into the eastern emirates especially Adamawa in anticipation of the Mahdī. Although the new Sultan, Abubakar Atiku (1837-42) intervened and declared that the time for the Mahdī to appear had not yet come, throughout the rest of the century a continuous flow of Muslims from the Sokoto empire to the Sudan and Hejaz was evident.²

Conscious of this favourable disposition towards Mahdism, and his earnest conviction that the Mahdī referred

1. IM (Arnett) p.20.

2. Lethem and Tomlinson, p.31; see Nagar, pp.167 ff, 231-38 for a fuller discussion of the attitude in the Sokoto empire to Mahdism and the Hajj. He differentiates between the desire to meet the Mahdi and the desire to perform the Hajj which were often confused. See also Urvoy, p.95, for a Garua tradition which says that 'toutes les tribus doivent se retrouver un jour à la Mecque et ce rassemblement sera le signe précurseur du jugement dernier'.

to by some Muslim traditions and by his great-grandfather, Uthman, had actually appeared in the person of Muhammad Ahmad, Hayatu concentrated his efforts first to consolidate his position around his nucleus at Balda. Through lectures at his mosque, and skilful use of itinerant malams, sharīfs and learned men who passed by, Hayatu got the message across to many religious minded men. He called upon the Lambbe of the neighbouring districts of Kalfu, Marua, Bogo, Madagali, Uba and Moda to join him in his efforts to fulfil Uthman's mission. A politico-religious storm was fast building up in the north of Adamawa and the district governors of Marua and Bogo felt the palpitation most. They continually saw . . . the initiative in their districts slipping from their hands and they were faced with a choice of either resisting Hayatu or acquiescing in his pressures.

Before Hayatu became a threat to the status quo in Adamawa, many of the district governors sent their sons to be taught in Hayatu's school. Hayatu won them over and promised to make them his lieutenants (al-jaish) in their various districts of origin as his great-grandfather had done to the Emirs at the beginning of the century.¹ Lambbebe Sali and Gareï were convinced that much as Hayatu was a holy and respectable man, his conduct was not aimed at strengthening their traditional positions; if anything it was aimed

1. Strumpel, p.38-41; Lemoigne, pp.138-39.

at overthrowing them. They therefore sent a mission to Lamido Sanda at Yola. They said they were convinced that Hayatu was pursuing political power and territorial aggrandisement at their expense and called upon him to intervene and put a check on Hayatu.¹

The mission failed to achieve its desired impact on the ruling aristocracy at Yola. Lamido Sanda was not himself interested in interfering with Hayatu. His reply left no doubt about his position: even if he had the power he could not fight against the grandson (taniko) of Uthman who removed the yoke from their necks.¹ This was not surprising considering the esteem with which Hayatu had been received at Yola by everyone and considering his devotion and penetrating knowledge of Islam.

Sanda's permissive or silent attitude towards Hayatu encouraged more people to seek political, social and religious refuge under Hayatu's Mahdist banner. By 1890 a real Mahdist community had emerged in northern Adamawa covering the entire Marua-Mandara region as far south as Mubi and attracting adherents from several parts of the Sokoto empire.² There was much enthusiasm and religious rejuvenation in Balda and its environs. Hayatu's followers began to assert their own peculiar characteristics in their

1. East, p.113; Lemoigne, p.139; Informant 1, Yola, 12, Marua.

2. Lethem and Tomlinson, pp. 8, 69; Hizon, 'Les Royaumes Foulbés', pp.358-59.

mode of dress, forms of prayer and general imitation of the example of the Mahdists further east.¹ All Hayatu's followers for example, carried with them a prayer which as well as being material evidence of their attachment to the Mahdist cause summarized their aspiration:

'Oh Lord by truth and the Prophet and the Mahdi separate us from all lies. Oh Lord of the people, Lord help your faith and bring forth the Mahdi with your aid because of the words of your Prophet that a Mahdi would come.² Help the faith of Islam and destroy the infidel in one year. Do not leave us among the infidel, we desire the Mahdi'.³

Hayatu had been very careful not to make premature advances to the emirates, probably because he suspected that his cousin, Umaru, the Sultan of Sokoto, would not take kindly to a movement engineered by him taking into account the circumstances in which he had left Sokoto. But the freedom to act as he pleased in Adamawa and the rate at which he was winning adherents from all the emirates of the Sokoto empire probably assured Hayatu that the Sultan and Emirs would eventually follow the lead of their subjects.

He therefore despatched missions furnished with letters to the rulers of the Sokoto empire.⁴ The substance

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1. There was regular contact between Hayatu and the Mahdi and his Khalifa Abdullah in the Sudan. Often on their return Hayatu's messengers brought back much Mahdist literature. Cf. Lethem and Tomlinson, p.69.
 2. The attribution of the Mahdist doctrine to the Prophet is a controversial issue and all the Muslim traditions are not in agreement as to its authenticity. Cf. E.I. art. al-Mahdi.
 3. S.N.P. 17/1, 715, Mahdism... etc. 1919-29 (NAK), MS in Arabic with English translation by Palmer.
 4. MSS Hayatu to 'Uthmān (amīr Bauchi); Hayatu to Muhammad Manga. I am assured by Alhaji Junaidu that Hayatu wrote to several, if not all the Emirs.

of the letters was probably the same. Hayatu announced that the Mahdī whom their mentor Shaikh Uthman dan Fodio spoke about had appeared and that they should spare no effort to submit and join forces with him in the interest of the jihad and Islam.¹ There was complete silence from Sokoto without even an attempt to instruct the Emirs on what their attitude should be towards the new movement.² The Sokoto authorities apparently calculated that the majority of the Emirs were contented with their allegiance to the Sultan of Sokoto and would hesitate to join Hayatu without a definite word from him. They felt therefore that no action was better, especially since Hayatu was not without supporters both in Sokoto and Gwandu.³

The policy of no action against Hayatu bore its desired objective, and none of the Emirs openly espoused Hayatu's case. Many indeed appeared incensed as one of the letters to Sultan Umaru from Muhammad Manga, Emir of Gonbe,

1. See Holt, 1958, p.101 for the oath of allegiance administered by the Mahdi.
2. Last, 1967, p.138; Oral evidence, Alhaji Junaidu, Sokoto.
3. Behind this attitude was the unmistakable understanding that the Sokoto Sultanate rejected the claims of Muhammad Ahmad to be the expected Mahdī. According to Alhaji Junaidu, even before Hayatu wrote to Sokoto, the news of the appearance of the Mahdi in the Sudan had not been favourably received at Sokoto because it was felt that the signs which were to precede the Mahdi's appearance had not fully manifested themselves in the empire, and Muhammad Ahmad's genealogy could not be traced to the Prophet. See Biobaku and M.A. al-Hajj, p.435 also letter from Mariam, daughter of Uthman dan Fodio to the Emir of Kano quoted in Alhaji Junaidu, Is'af al-zā'irīn concerning the route the Muslims of the Sokoto empire were to follow to meet the Mahdī. The position of the Mahdi (Muhammad Ahmad) fell outside this route.

indicate:

To inform you of the misfortune that has overtaken us in our country so that it may be clear to you ... Hayatu ibn Sa'id sent me a letter instructing me to enter into the affair of the Mahdi in accordance with his stupidity. But I did not answer. As a result he sent flags to the famous Jibril and to Hajj Gurdi and to the learned Didari and asked them to start trouble in the land of Gombe. They have already before now commenced and I have an intention to proceed against them by your grace.¹

The cold response from the Sokoto-Gwandu rulers did not discourage Hayatu. He continued to communicate with the Mahdi's 'Khalifa Abdallah', in the Sudan and with his own supporters in the various emirates, while he strengthened his position in Adamawa.

In 1890 with the passing away of Sanda and the accession of Zubeiru instead of Iya or Hammoa Ahijo, both of whom were favourably disposed to him, Hayatu lost not only a friend, but the one man who had so far permitted Mahdism to look respectable and operate in Adamawa, though not joining it himself. Zubeiru's uncompromising view on Hayatu's movement, even before he became Lamido, was no secret to the people of Yola and to Hayatu himself. As a result when Hayatu learnt that Zubeiru had become Lamido, he summoned all his men to the mosque to pray for Sanda. He warned them that they should all go back to their homes and start preparing for war because Zubeiru would attack them.²

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1. MS Muhammad Manga to Amīr al-mu'minin, Umaru, Sokprof. IV, 24 (NAK).
 2. East, p.113.

Zubeiru no doubt sympathised with Hayatu's efforts to rekindle religious enthusiasm and establish discipline among the Muslims; but as ruler of the emirate he felt it duty bound to match these ambitions with the right of the traditional rulers to govern and maintain the initiative in their districts in their hands. Zubeiru saw that his brother's policies had allowed Mahdism to divide loyalties in the emirate between those supporting Hayatu and those against him, to the deplorable extent that those who were Hayatu's supporters disobeyed and ignored any authority which failed to toe Hayatu's line. Zubeiru made it known that he would not compromise with any pretention that undermined his authority. He regarded Hayatu as a personal challenge to his over-all leadership. He felt convinced that the method Hayatu was adopting to propagate his new faith would inevitably lead to a political conflict.¹ Hayatu already had many supporters in Adamawa mostly in the northern districts of Kalfu, Marua, Mindif, Uba, Madagali and Mubi, but despite the prominence of the Imam Arabu of Marua,² it was generally felt around Yola that those who dominated his ansar were men from Hausaland or men who did not owe allegiance to ^{the} rulers of Adamawa.³

1. East, p.113; Lemoigne, p.139.

2. See, n.1, p.369.

3. Informants l,Yola, 7, Garua. Mizon, 'Les Royaume Foulbés', pp.358-59.

Soon after the wet season of 1891, Zubeiru concentrated his efforts on the problems posed by Hayatu. He had learnt through malam Maunde that the Sultan was opposed to Hayatu's Mahdism, and so he was here assured of the support and cooperation of all of his councillors because of their reverence for the Sultan. The conflict mainly centred around political claims. In a letter to Hayatu, Zubeiru intimated that he would not tolerate division of loyalty in his emirate, that Hayatu had no legitimate claims to become ruler over Adamawa. He had been allowed to settle in Adamawa not so much because of himself, but because of Uthman. Zubeiru did not dispute that Adama had received the flag from Uthman as Hayatu asserted, but Uthman gave Adama authority over the whole emirate, and he as son of Adama was now the only rightful ruler. He suggested that Hayatu should therefore come back and settle in Yola and all would be provided for him until the throne of Sokoto fell vacant.¹

Hayatu's reply was brief: He said he was not under Zubeiru's authority but under that of the Khalifa of the Mahdi whom Uthman had foretold and commanded all of them to join and pledge allegiance.² Zubeiru was not surprised,

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1. Informant 1, Yola. The oral tradition on the steps which Zubeiru took towards Hayatu is very well known at Yola because in most cases they were discussed in the open at public conferences, in the mosque.
 2. It was probably at this point, 1891-92, that Hayatu went to Bornu and made an abortive attempt to enlist the military support of Mai Hashim of Bornu. See Lethem and Tomlinson, Vol.I, p.7.

but he knew that though the district governors would obey his call against Hayatu, he had to make it seem beyond doubt that he had been forced to the decision not through his personal temerity but because of Hayatu's ill-conceived ambition. He was determined to be firm but also patient and would resort to force only after all attempts to dissuade Hayatu to retrace his steps had failed.¹ Accordingly, Zubeiru assembled all his councillors and malams of repute to a general Conference. The subject was Hayatu's letter. After a free exchange of views, the concensus of opinion was that Zubeiru should send a mission to Hayatu to spend some months with him at Balda and study all aspects of the movement and report back.

Zubeiru appointed Modibbo Sambo, son of the famous Modibbo Nakasiri who came to Yola together with Modibbo Raji during Lauwal's reign to lead the mission. His asceticism and orthodoxy in Islam were well known. During the Conference he had spoken vehemently against immediate hostilities against Hayatu. After six months stay at Balda, he reported that he had found Hayatu and his Community to be imbued with a deep sense of religious purpose, and on political matters he observed that Hayatu had reached a stage in which he could not compromise the authority he wielded as long as the rulers of the Sokoto-Gwandu empire refused

1. Strumpel, p.40, corroborates Oral tradition, Yola which maintains that Zubeiru attacked Hayatu only after several attempts at conciliation had failed.

to acknowledge the Mahdi. Hayatu would not budge from his stand because he was convinced that should Zubeiru make war on him, he would defeat Zubeiru. This confidence was probably not unconnected with Hayatu's friendship with Rabeḥ, the Sudanese warrior, another believer in the Mahdi, who was then at Baghirmi and was already waging war against the non-Mahdist states in the region.¹

Since the time of Sanda, the idea that only the Sultan could decide on measures against Hayatu had become current and represented the official policy of the Yola administration. With Zubeiru's efforts at solving the matter through persuasion virtually unproductive of any satisfactory results, it became evident that Zubeiru had to go beyond persuasion, possibly to a trial of strength. In a move calculated both to win the support of the Sultan whose

1. See Lemoigne, p.108 for the suggestion that Hayatu was in touch with Rabeḥ before the fall of Mandjaffa, the capital of Baghirmi in 1892; also Lavers, 1967, p.28, n.1, that Hayatu joined Rabeḥ in the siege of Mandjaffa. The relation between Rabeḥ and the Mahdist authority in the Sudan is far from being clear. The Mahdi and his successor wrote several letters seeking Rabeḥ's alliance and inviting Rabeḥ to visit them, but though replying once (see O.A. El-Nagar, 'A note on source material for the study of Rabeḥ's career', Bull. African Studies Association, No.6, 1965, pp.20-23, also Gentil, La Chute de L'Empire Rabeḥ, Paris, 1902, p.235), Rabeḥ never visited the Mahdi's capital. When he conquered Bornu, he imposed many of the characteristics of the Sudanese Mahdist state (see FO 2/118 R.N.C. to FO 11.4.96 enc. 'Account of Sherif Hassan'; also Lethem and Tomlinson, pp.5-7.). It is of interest that at the French conquest of Rabeḥ, the two abandoned banners - 'el-Mahdia' and 'Haoua Mekka' - were said to have been sent to Rabeḥ by the Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad (Gentil, pp 219, 303). My overall impression is that Rabeḥ sympathised with the military objectives of the Mahdi against the British and Turks (see the letter of Khalifa Mahdi to Rabeḥ, Aug. 1886 quoted in Holt, 1958A, /cont...

orders he knew his councillors would readily execute, as well as to unite the people behind him, he wrote the Sultan a letter in which he chose his words very tactfully. He described Hayatu's activities, showing how disruptive they were to the stability of his emirate. A situation had been reached where the people wanted to know to whom they should give their allegiance, to Hayatu or to the Sultan? The new Sultan, Abdulrahman (1891-1902), had just taken office in 1891. His predecessor had refrained from acting against Hayatu, but the new Sultan could not afford the luxury; time had caught up with him.

A decision either way was bound to evoke strong passions. If he instructed Zubeiru to leave Hayatu alone, he would be blamed for abandoning his responsibilities. On the other hand, if he ordered an attack on Hayatu, many would still accuse him of sacrificing his cousin for political reasons. The Sultan sent malam Maunde with his reply instructing Zubeiru to arrest Hayatu.¹ Zubeiru called his third open Conference on the Hayatu affair and acquainted those present with the Sultan's orders. All of them agreed to support Zubeiru except Lando Katsena, Abdul Salami, the paramount leader of all Hausas in Adamawa and a permanent

F/note cont. from previous page.

p.285) but as to his adherence to Mahdism his main interest was in using other people's adherence to it as a tactical weapon to advance his military ambitions in the Central and Western Sudan.

1. Informant 1, Yola, confirmed by Alhaji Junaidu, Sokoto.

member in the Lamido's council. He prayed that God should not let him see the day when the Muslims of Adamawa would take up arms against the son of Uthman.¹

Zubeiru was however satisfied with the backing he had received from the Sultan and from his people and decided to act quickly, and to take advantage of the presence of the Sultan's representative malam Maunde to rally support for the attack on Hayatu. He sent circular letters to all district governors informing them of the Sultan's decision to fight against what Yola called the 'Khalifa Mahdi'.² He was going to inform them at a later date of where and when to assemble. In the meantime they should prepare horses and food and exercise their warriors. He left Yola together with malam Maunde, halting in several towns and collecting warriors as he proceeded. His combat strength became so great that he harrassed many non-Muslim settlements for slaves, which action earned for him the worse reputation

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1. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.142; 'History of Lando Katsena', Yola Notable Families; Lando Katsena consistently maintained this stand from Sanda's reign.
 2. There was a deliberate attempt, chiefly fostered by Zubeiru and the Yola diplomats, to present the fight against Hayatu as a fight against the spread of a politically disruptive sect. Cf. Mizon, 'Les Royaumes Foulbés', pp.358-59, for an account based on Yola viewpoint; Cardaire, pp.68-69, '... Ayatu avait positivement le diable au corps. Ecarté, par la force de lois, de la succession de son père, il passa le plus clair de sa vie à monter des intrigues pour se tailler un Empire...' (account based on Ngaundéré point of view).

among the tribes and alienated any feeling of sympathy for him ten years later when the Europeans put him on the run. Some towns like Poka and Wudda which had for a long time repelled Muslim attacks were razed to the ground and their men either incorporated into Zubeiru's army or added to the tribute to Sokoto.¹

Zubeiru had timed his journey to arrive at Marua towards the end of the rainy season and the beginning of the harvest, so that there would be enough food and sufficient water for the large force he was expecting to assemble. At Marua he met Lando Sali and discussed the strategy to be adopted concerning the war against Hayatu, before leaving for Bogo, some eight miles from Balda.² Bogo was virtually empty; all the able bodied men had abandoned the town together with Hamman Tukur, whom Hayatu had installed there as his representative after Lando Gareï, despairing of aid from Yola, had abdicated under pressure from Hayatu. Zubeiru made Bogo his war camp and recalled Gareï who was then staying at a nearby village, Mandin on the river Chokola. Troops from the various districts outside the route Zubeiru had followed started arriving. It is estimated that there were at least forty different divisions numbering over 10,000 men. The generally low contour and savanna vegetation of the region afforded the commanders ample ground for

1. East, p.115; Strumpel, pp.40-42.

2. Informants 12 and 13, Marua and Bogo.

exercising their troops and for impressing upon Hayatu the superiority of their power so that he could be induced to surrender without resort to war.

But the absolute conviction of each side about the rightness of its cause made war inevitable. Hayatu had fewer fighters, but they were more united, and Hayatu constantly encouraged them saying that the war between himself and Zubeiru had been foretold, that victory had been assured to him just as with Uthman at Gudu when Yunfa tried to destroy Uthman's community.¹ Zubeiru proceeded with his war plans. A committee for prosecuting the war was set up in which the governors of Marua, Mindif, Gudu, Bogo, Mubi and close associates from Yola played an active part. The clouds of war hung precariously over Bogo-Balda and by the end of the Harmattan season of 1892-93 all was set for the final showdown.²

Two days before the battle, that is, on a Wednesday, Zubeiru summoned the committee for war to listen to the final plans. Lando Katsena insisted that he should be given another chance to go and ask Hayatu to submit. This was granted to reassure those who like the Lando were afraid to

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1. A remarkable part of Hayatu's diplomacy consisted in constantly referring to the 'Uthman legend', his miracles, works, and prophecies, all of which had a special appeal throughout the length and breadth of the Sokoto empire.
 2. The Harmattan season usually lasts from December to February. See Maistre, 1895, p.248. He was in Yola from 29th January to 4th February. He found that Zubeiru and all the important personalities had gone to war in Marua.

fight lest they spill the blood of Uthman's family, and also to demonstrate that the fault was not with Zubeiru. This last minute bid to avert war failed. Zubeiru took the failure of Lando Katsena's mission as a declaration of war, and as it happened, that very night Lando Katsena's prayers were granted and he died.¹ This was a big blow to Zubeiru's camp: many felt touched by this seemingly mysterious event, and as was usual many saw in it divine intervention in favour of Zubeiru's opponent.²

Zubeiru could not afford to ignore the influence the death of Lando Katsena had on his camp. He therefore arranged with Lando Sali of Marua to withdraw his forces, which formed the largest division, from the actual fighting. They were to go by a roundabout route, and during the fighting occupy Balda, so that should Hayatu's troops win the field, the Marua army might attack them when returning exhausted to Balda.³ Early at dawn on Friday both sides meticulously performed the ablutions and said their prayers. Balda was very well protected on the eastern side by the Balda mountain, and Hayatu's strategy was to keep as close

1. East, p.115; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.142.

2. All efforts to go behind the straightforward explanation that the cause of his death was 'God's will', met with failure. There was no suggestion of suicide or heart failure from even those who at least for psychological reasons should have attributed the death to natural rather than supernatural causes. This is however not entirely surprising (see above, p. 86, n.1.)

3. East, p.115; Strumpel, p.40.

to the mountains as possible so that one of his flanks and the rear would be protected against his enemies. At the foot of the mountains, towards the direction of Bogo from where Zubeiru's forces were to advance, lay an open flat field ideally suited for cavalry warfare. Hayatu planned to allow Zubeiru's forces advance until they reached this region.

Although Hayatu's men were fewer, morale in his camp was quite high and they were strengthened by the feeling that they were fighting not only for Hayatu's sake, but for their very existence as a Community. Balda was completely evacuated; all the women, old men and children were taken up to the mountains from where they watched and cheered their fighters.¹ The opportunity which the mountain afforded for long range viewing was of great advantage to Hayatu. From there scouts were able to see Zubeiru's troop movements at greater distances than Zubeiru's men could see Hayatu's. Besides, secrecy was hard to maintain on Zubeiru's side, because, though the response to arms against Hayatu had been answered to show that their loyalties were still with the Sultan, many nevertheless in their private conviction felt that war against the 'blood of Uthman' was

1. It is the same sort of chanting that is heard during joyous occasions e.g. at marriages, births or a Muslim festival.

wrong.

Thus for instance, before the fighting Hayatu had been informed that Zubeiru's orders were to arrest him.¹ His troop formation in the field was therefore simple. There was a heavy concentration of Hayatu's best fighters around his person forming a virtually impregnable barrier round him. Hayatu rode on his white horse bearing no weapons except a shield. The picture of the line-up of Hayatu's forces would be like a shallow trough apparently to make it difficult for Zubeiru's men to break through and arrest Hayatu without sustaining heavy casualties. The plan on Zubeiru's side was that the attack was to be launched in two stages. One division consisting mainly of the northern districts was to attack first, and soon after, this was to be reinforced by another division mainly consisting of troops from the southern districts.² The advance force was to be led by the Mindif cavalry. The troops left the camp and advanced towards Balda.

The fighting commenced after the mid-day prayers at about 2 p.m. A recorded eye witness account describes the battle as follows:

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1. Informants 13 and 14, Bogo, Balda.
 2. East, p.115; Strumpel, p.40. These two divisions plus the Marua army constituted the three sections referred to in the sources. Strumpel's suggestion that archers and shield men preceded men with guns was not confirmed, though the possibility of some men using guns obtained from RabeH cannot be ruled out.

When the two armies were at close distance, Hayatu made one of his horsemen gallop in front of Lamdo Zubeiru's army holding a grass pot-cover (mbedu), and then threw it down in order to frighten them with his spells. Thereupon the Mindif cavalry charged down on this man, but he did not wait after throwing down the pot-cover, and the men of Mindif pursued him until they arrived in front of Hayatu. At this the men of Balda leapt forward with one accord, fell upon the men of Mindif and drove them back till they came and rushed in amongst the Yola contingent, whereupon the Yola men turned and took to their heels. The men of Balda came up and went after them, and thus there was no fighting at all, nothing but a disastrous rout. Hayatu followed behind, and his men went on killing the people throughout the night.¹

It was a brief war; and it was brief only because Hayatu had an understanding with Lamdo Mindif that his people would not fight on the battle field.² The effect of the unexpected retreat of the Mindif cavalry, which constituted the largest single unit and was thought to be the strongest, brought disaster and spread confusion among

1. East, pp.115-17.

2. The tradition recorded in R.M. East does not make this point: But my informants at Yola, Balda, Bogo and Marua unanimously agree that there existed an understanding between Hayatu and Lamdo Mindif. They support this view by stating that Hayatu's forces did not kill the Mindif men. The omission of this point which other traditions emphasise (e.g. Cardaire, pp.68-69) is surprising for a tradition which carries many of the Yola bias, e.g. the minstrel's praise-song for Zubeiru, p.117, and the error that when Hayatu wanted to leave Rabeh, he entered communications with the Chief of Baghirmi, p.117, instead of Jibrilla of Burmi near Gombe, a neighbouring emirate of the Sokoto empire. Lethem and Tomlinson, Vol.I, p.70; for a fuller account, see J.E. Lavers, 1967, pp.16-40. A possible explanation could be found in the fact that whereas the tradition in R.M. East unequivocally regards the pot-cover as a spell, the majority of those whose accounts postulate a collusion between Hayatu and Lamdo Mindif regard the pot-cover as nothing but the sign for the Mindif cavalry to begin action as planned with Hayatu.

Zubeiru's forces. Zubeiru did not himself go out to the battle field but remained at Bogo so that his forces were very much under their district governors and lacked a central commander. With the collapse of Zubeiru's first division, Hayatu took the initiative. Many of Zubeiru's side deserted or became mere spectators as the troops from Yola and its neighbourhood battled it out with Hayatu's men. This accounts for the heavy losses among the Yola men. Their casualties included over sixteen leading figures including malam Aliyu the popular extrovert, younger brother of Zubeiru, and Magaji Yakubu.¹ Meanwhile, Lando Sali's forces had occupied Balda and taken possession of all those who were left behind and their property, and were heading for Bogo after having probably set the town on fire.² When this news reached Hayatu, he immediately called off the pursuit of the Yola troops and reversed towards Balda. But he missed the Marua men who had taken another route.

Zubeiru was very shaken by the outcome of the battle, though consoled by the fact that the Marua men had

1. East, p.117; Lemoigne, p.139; Strumpel, p.40; Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp.142-43.

2. Strumpel, p.41; East, p.117; Lemoigne, p.139, but this is strongly denied at Balda. No one could recall that Balda was burnt. The reason advanced is that Hayatu did not abandon Balda to meet Rabeh immediately after the battle but stayed there for at least ten months with all his family including his new bride, Rabeh's daughter, Hawua. Whereas this is not denied (Strumpel, p.41), it was also possible that temporary tents were erected while the reconstruction from the incendiary went on a pace.

executed their assignment faithfully. The occupation of Balda seems to have been given a significance beyond proportion by skilful minstrels, and many in Yola believed that Zubeiru razed Balda to the ground, so that Hayatu, finding that he had no longer any home, proceeded with a handful of his supporters to join Rabeh in Baghirmi.¹ However, it was Hayatu Zubeiru wanted, not his property. He did not regard Hayatu's victory as the end of the affair. He was determined to go himself with the surviving Yola men and the Marua forces to arrest Hayatu. But the Yola men had become frightened at their losses and together with Lando Sali brought pressure to bear on Zubeiru to leave everything to God and return to Yola.

The battle had turned out as Hayatu, or as he claimed, his ancestors, predicted, but the prospects thereafter for his movement were perhaps not as bright as he would have wished. Although Zubeiru had lost the battle and Mahdists all over the Sokoto empire were rejoicing, Hayatu had been shown that for his movement to grow in any of the emirates of the Sokoto empire he had to start from Sokoto itself. Though many sympathised with his efforts on religious grounds, yet the feeling that he should submit to the established rulers and withdraw his allegiance from a foreign power was equally very strong.

1. East, p.117.

When Rabeh heard of Hayatu's victory over Zubeiru he sent messages of congratulation and invited Hayatu to meet him at Mandjaffa in Baghirmi.¹ Rabeh was at this time contemplating a push to the north, through Wadai to Bornu, after obtaining substantial reinforcement of ammunition through the attack and massacre of the French mission under Crampel.² Rabeh saw in Hayatu a suitable ally to realize his ambitions. Besides both of them had many things in common; both were at least sympathisers of the Mahdi's cause; they were intent on creating a Mahdist state³ and both accepted the efficacy of war, even against Muslim states, as a means to this objective. Rabeh and Hayatu entered into an alliance in which Hayatu was to bring immediate material and spiritual assistance to Rabeh in his march to Bornu and later Rabeh was to aid him to conquer the Sokoto empire. The popular phrase in Rabeh's camp was 'conquer Bornu then comes Kano'.⁴ As an assurance of his good faith, Rabeh gave

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1. Informant 13 and 14, Bogo, Balda. The initiative to form an alliance is said to have come from Rabeh. See Gentil, p.249, though his account puts the initiative after the conquest of Bornu.
 2. Gentil, 1902, pp.75, 234-38; Hanot/Aux et Martineau, pp.448-54; Urvoy, pp.127-30. For one of the most authoritative sources for the movement of Rabeh from Sudan to Bornu, see CO 537/11 Africa No.2 'A short history of Rabih Zubeir' (secret) By William Everret, 19.12.1899. The record was compiled from official correspondence on Rabeh in the FO 101 series (correspondence of the British Consul at Tripoli).
 3. See above, p.380 n. 1 for Rabeh's ambiguous attitude towards Mahdism.
 4. Freemantle, JAS, 1911-12, p.64; see also A.D. Babikir, L'Empire de Rabeh, Paris, 1950, pp.63-64; Lethem and Tonlinson, Vol.I, p.69.

his daughter, Hauwa, in marriage to Hayatu. The first success of the alliance was the conquest of Bornu in October 1893 with Rabeh becoming its ruler after inflicting a crushing defeat on Mai Hashim.¹ Early in 1894 Hayatu left Balda for Dikowa, the new capital of Bornu, accompanied by a majority of his men to become officially the Imam of the Mahdist state.²

This did not mean that Mahdism in Adamawa had been uprooted. The principal actor had transferred his base out of Adamawa territory but he had not given up his ambition for the Sokoto empire. Zubeiru and many of the rulers in the Sokoto empire were not sure of what his next move would be. It is true the Sokoto potentates avoided getting mixed up actively with the Hayatu affair, but for many ordinary folk Hayatu had become a legendary figure. The war had vindicated what he had been saying, that prophecy was on his side, that should Zubeiru war against him, he would be the victor over Zubeiru's forces. Although at Bornu

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1. Gentil, pp.235-38; Alis, 1894, p.489 reports of the arrival of messengers from Lando Bindir on September 15th, reporting that Rabeh had passed by on his way to conquer Bornu. W.K.R. Hallan, 'Rabeh the tyrant of Bornu', Nigeria Magazine, No.86, 1965, pp.167-73; A.D. Bivar, "'Rābih ibn Faḍlullāh' - The Autograph of a Despot", Nigeria, No. 68, 1961, pp.83-88 discusses the date of Rabeh's invasion of Bornu. It appears that a combination of Bivar and Mizon's account strongly recommends October as the month of the invasion.
 2. MS by Yusuf Babikir, Kadcap Box 38, item 10, (NAK). A brief history of what happened between the writer and Hayatu on the one hand, and Rabeh on the other hand upto the death of Hayatu. Cf. Gentil, p.249 for a brief description of Hayatu in Bornu: 'un personnage très sympathique, une sorte de redresseur de torts. Très pieux, il s'était élevé avec véhémence contre les crimes'.

his role as Inam gave him a secondary place in political matters, Hayatu's victory over Zubeiru's overwhelmingly large forces had marked out Hayatu as an important element in the politics of the eastern emirates and Bornu. His ambition to carve out an empire under his rule could not be taken lightly as long as he commanded support in Adamawa.

While the danger this posed to Zubeiru's regime cannot be underestimated, the full impact of Hayatu's movement was very much concentrated only on the northern districts with the rich southern districts like Garua, Ngaundere, Tibati and Banyo being largely unaffected. Also the fact that it ceased to be an Adamawa-based movement relieved much of the political pressure on Adamawa. Mahdism in Adamawa took a new form where the individual mattered more than the movement. Zubeiru probably felt that individual adherence to Mahdism did not conflict seriously with established authority, and so there was no attempt as a matter of policy to lead a witch hunt campaign against Mahdists.¹ Indeed as one of his letters to the Sultan of Sokoto (1901) indicated, Zubeiru became himself a convert to

1. This would account for why in later years when new leadership was provided to the Mahdist movement by Hayatu's son, Saidu, the response in Adamawa was amongst the highest in the entire Sokoto empire. Cf. Lehen and Tomlinson, p.69. It is also evident from the correspondence in SNP 17/1 Mahdism 1915-24 (NAK); Le Grip, 1952, pp.7-10.

the Mahdist doctrine, without actually becoming a part of the movement. (Quoted below, p. 451).

b) ~~Rabeh and Zubeiru~~. Zubeiru, Rabeh, and the R.N.C.

The new personality to watch was Rabeh. Scarcely three months after the Hayatu war was over, before Zubeiru even had the opportunity to organize his thoughts and take full stock of his losses, he was confronted by yet another even more dangerous threat to his emirate. Rather than decrease, tensions were steadily building up around him. This was the European 'race to Yola' in the rainy season of 1893. As we have observed this led to a series of conflicts among the British, Germans and French representatives, at Yola, and without Zubeiru knowing, in 1893-94 the European powers agreed in Europe to dismember his emirate and subject it to European administration. This state of affairs, when superimposed upon the Rabeh-Hayatu alliance and its aims, made the political situation precarious and unstable for the relatively smaller authorities in the regions. This was the period when the term 'effective occupation' was close to the lips of every colonial diplomat, and when 'paper protectorates' were expected to be translated into more concrete forms. Under Hanotaux at the French Foreign Ministry and Chamberlain in the British Colonial Office,

the doctrine of effective occupation was given greater significance.¹ The activities and ambitions of the French on the Congo-Chad region, that is Logone, Baghirmi and Wadai, while of no immediate threat to the position of the British on the Niger-Bonue regions after 1893, raised considerable concern to the British Government in Cairo. After the eastern boundaries of the Sudan had been settled by treaties with the Italian and German Governments, the British administration in Cairo was anxious to see that the western boundaries were established in such a way that 'strategically and physically' they would secure the Upper Waters of the Nile.² As early as 1891, two years before the race for Adanawa came to a head, the first move to forestall French ambition on the Upper Waters of the Nile had been the question of establishing relations with Rabeh. This formed the subject of correspondence between Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer) and Salisbury, but was then dropped due to uncertainty of information respecting Rabeh's real position.³

But soon after Rabeh had overrun Bornu, it was felt that his position there, so close to the Niger Company's

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1. For a general impression and detailed account of colonial rivalry and what they meant in terms of the liquidation of the sovereignty of African rulers during this period, see M. Perham, Lugard, The Years of Adventure 1858-1898, London, 1956, Vol. I, pp. 546-57; Robinson and Gallagher, 1961, pp. 395-409.
 2. F02/118, Wingate to Rosebery, 18.9.93 encl. 1, Kitchener's Memo. 5.6.91.
 3. F02/118, Wingate to Rosebery, 18.9.93.

sphere of action, would be of interest both to the Niger Company and to those committed to the defense of the western flank of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The Cairo Government apparently could not afford further delay. Both Lord Kitchener and Major Wingate, Director of the Intelligence Department, Cairo, set themselves hard at work for what they thought was a race to Rabeh. In September 1893, Kitchener, recalling past efforts to come to terms with Rabeh, strongly urged Salisbury to take prompt measures for entering into relations with Rabeh preferably through H.M. Commissioner for the Oil Rivers Protectorate.¹ The motive behind their action was the fear that if this was not done, Rabeh would be induced to come to some arrangements with the French in a sense detrimental to British interest.

This new element injected more steam into the already over-heated political jockeying for positions of dominance or exclusive rights in Adamawa and the neighbouring States to the east. There were in all, therefore, the Fulani rulers of Adamawa under the canopy of Lamido Zubeiru at Yola, Britain represented by the Niger Company and the Cairo Government, France, Germany, and the Mahdist alliance of Rabeh and Hayatu. What increased the instability of the region was that the powers feared each other, since each of the contestants was uncertain of the plans of the other.

1. FO2/118, Wingate to Rosebery, 18.9.93.

What all of them seemed not to have doubted was that fighting was inevitable.¹ Britain and Germany were aware that although arrangements between themselves had given them special claims in Adamawa, their various plans, as far as the local people were concerned, were nothing but 'paper rights'. The practical application of their Agreements would be further endangered if Zubeiru should submit to the Rabe-Hayatu alliance. It appeared he was in no position to be hostile to Rabe. Though there is no evidence that Zubeiru entered any formal agreement with Rabe, the first mission Rabe sent to Zubeiru was a success. Rabe sent a delegation to Zubeiru seeking to open up communication and trade with Adamawa. Zubeiru received the mission favourably/^{and} on its return he sent presents to Rabe.² This gesture so soon after the conquest of Bornu in a way reassured Zubeiru that Rabe recognized his sovereignty over Adamawa and wished to maintain friendly intercourse with him.

Apparently to avoid pushing Rabe into alliances hostile to the Company, its officials began moves to enter an alliance with Rabe. This would put the Company in a position, to use him not only to over-awe the eastern emirates,

1. This is evident from the reports of the 'Messengers to Rabe' (FO2/118) and the preparations in France to send military expeditions to occupy the Lake Chad region especially from 1893 (Hanotaux et Martineau pp.448-59 , 481-86; also FO 27/3301 RNC to FO 26.8.96, complaining among other things that a French expedition to the Chad through Adamawa offered 300 rifles and cartridges to the Emir of Yola to guarantee free passage of the expedition.

2. FO 2/118 R.N.C. to FO 6.11.94.

but also to make him the instrument with which to further the disintegration of the Sokoto empire, and later turn and put him in his proper place.¹ Rabeh's trading agents to the Benue districts brought Rabeh near enough to the Company; but it was not long before the agents realized how impossible it was to obtain their much needed powder from the Company. At the same time another opportunity of approaching Rabeh without itself bearing the responsibility and expenses was afforded to the Company by the Intelligence Division, Cairo, which was determined to spare no efforts to secure Rabeh's cooperation for its ambitions on the western frontiers of the Sudan.

Following letters from Wingate, Salisbury requested Goldie, who in turn instructed Flint, the Company's Agent General on the Niger, to facilitate the journey of some messengers to Rabeh from Cairo with the Company's transport as far as Yola and then by land to Dikowa, Rabeh's capital.

In Cairo Major Wingate had procured the intervention of Zubeir Pasha, foster father of Rabeh, with whom he had lived for several years in Southern Sudan. He was induced to write letters, and send messengers to deliver the letters to Rabeh.² After a long journey, through Liverpool,

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1. FO 60/497 R.N.C to FO 21.8.95. Goldie thought this was feasible because Rabeh did not possess 'a sufficient organization or religious prestige to enable him to found a similar authority over such vast regions'.
 2. FO 2/118 (Messengers to Rabeh) 1893-96, Wingate to Anderson, 26.11.93, enc s. letters to Rabeh.

England, the lower Niger and the Benue, the party of four Arabs arrived at Yola.

Just as with earlier messengers to Rabeh, Zubeiru welcomed and extended them his hospitality and made adequate preparation of horses and guides for their departure en route to Dikowa. However when their connections with the Company became known to Zubeiru, he withdrew the horses and guides and detained them at Yola ostensibly to learn more about the nature of their mission.¹ After some months, the messengers were allowed to go on condition that they did not proceed through Adamawa territory. The district governors were put on the alert and so the messengers travelled south to Ibi from where the Company provided them with escorts through Bauchi and Kano to Dikowa.²

The experience was like another red light to Zubeiru. He saw in the Company's flirtation with Rabeh a prelude to an alliance against Fulani hegemony. His suspicion against them became unrelenting and it is possible that he saw the submission of the Mai of Mandara to Rabeh and the reported campaigns of Rabeh against Zinder with the object of reaching Sokoto,³ as the beginning of such a plot.

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1. FO 2/118 (Messengers to Rabeh) 1893-96, Wingate to Anderson, 26.11.93, encls. letters to Rabeh. Mosely to Anderson, 6.11.94.
 2. FO 60/497 R.N.C to FO 21.8.95. The Company regretted not replying earlier on the position of the messengers to Rabeh. It charged the British Government £661.19.5d for expenses on the messengers. Rabeh refused any form of friendship with the British 'as a matter of providence'. Cf. FO 2/118 'Account of Sherif Hassan'.
 3. FO 2/118 R.N.C. to FO 11.4.96 encl. 'Account of Sherif Hassan'; R.N.C. to FO 31.10.95 with report of Rabeh's further progress to the south and west of Dikowa.

He could not be convinced otherwise than that the presence of the Company in Adamawa was a Trojan Horse. Zubeiru decided to act fast before the British request for an alliance with Rabeh materialized. He took very strong measures against the Company. In a memorandum on the subject of its trade in Adamawa Goldie put the onus on the Mizon expedition, but the message was clear:

In consequence of the hostilities of the Emir, brought about by Mizon's action, the Company in 1896 found it necessary to practically abandon their large trade in Yola, where it was no longer safe to leave large stocks of goods. A coloured agent is still maintained in a house at Yola to keep the British flag flying, and to collect and transmit the news brought in from various directions by the Company's scouts.... White officials continue to pay frequent visits to Yola in order to maintain relations with the Emir, but the latter bitterly complains of the British flag flying there, and asserts that his Treaties with the Company are only of a commercial character, and that they ought to pay him taxes. He makes a great parade of the pieces of artillery which Mizon presented to him.¹

At this time the use of force against Yola was contemplated, but the Company's hands were full of graver challenges in Nupe and the Yoruba state of Ilorin as well as the so called 'race to Borgu' or 'le conflit du boucle du Niger' against French ambitions in the region.

1. FO 403/285 R.N.C. to FO 25.9.99 enc. in No. 76 'Memo. on Loss of Trade in Adamawa'.

After Nupe and Ilorin, there was hardly any doubt that force would continue to be employed in the other emirates to impose British administration. Thus in September 1897 the Company wished to switch its forces from the Niger to the Benue. It informed Salisbury that it considered its position at Yola to be very unsatisfactory and was considering a military operation of the same character though not quite of the same importance as those which it carried against the Emirs of Ilorin and Nupe.¹ What aggravated the situation was that after the Company's invasion of Nupe and Ilorin, it became widely known that the Europeans were not in the emirates simply to trade but also to set up their own administration over and above the traditional authorities. The failure of the Wallace mission to Sokoto in 1897 is indicative of the feeling that the Company's action in converting itself from a trading concern to a military power through the invasion of Nupe and Ilorin was viewed with resentment, and was wholly unacceptable to the Sultan.² The Sultan had made this known to the Company, hence the sudden advice that the Foreign Office should not establish an embassy with a permanent British Resident at Wurno until the Company had had enough time to allay the fears of the Sultan over its action in Bida and Ilorin.³ The Company was however

1. FO 83/1534 R.N.C to Salisbury, 30.9.97.

2. FO 83/1539 R.N.C to Salisbury, 14.12.97.

3. Ibid.

sure that 'after the display of British force at Bida and Ilorin, the Sultan could not induce the Fulani to face the Company's artillery'.¹ The Sultan indeed did not declare war against the Company but that same year he vented his anger in a different way. In a brief but poignant circular to all the Emirs, the Sultan wrote:

You have seen what the Company has done to Bida and Ilorin - my territories. You are not to allow the Company to remain in any part of the country over which you have jurisdiction.²

The gravity of the situation, and the personal interest taken by Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, did not lead to even an attempt to relax the existing tensions between the Muslim rulers and the Company. Chamberlain's main concern was with the British tax payers who must ultimately bear the expenses of the wars. The Colonial Secretary while sanctioning an arms and troops build-up in Nigeria, by suggesting what would be in effect 'a small West African Army',³ refused to put such a force under the command of the Company. Nor did he consider it politic to allow the Company to prosecute the war against the French and all those opposed to its rule single handed and submit the bill to H.M. Government. Chamberlain and Goldie were two individuals who hardly saw eye to eye as to

1. FO 83/1539 R.N.C to Salisbury, 14.12.97.

2. Quoted in Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.49.

3. Perhan, Vol.I, pp.632 ff.; Flint, pp.274-83.

the limitations of each others powers. The result was that the tensions between them speeded up consultations between Chamberlain and his colleagues at the Foreign Office and Treasury on the question of revoking the Company's Charter.¹ This would involve drawn out negotiations, and in the interval the Company suspended all its projects of conquests, and so Yola was given a few more years to enjoy its own rule, and Zubeiru left to guess when the British invaders would visit him.

c) The German invasion.

Thus the first blow did not come from the British as was expected, but from the Germans beginning with the southern fringes of the emirate. Germany's experience in Adamawa especially in the early 1890's had left her in no doubt that the rulers of Adamawa were not prepared to stoop to colonial rule unless imposed upon them by force. This was ^{at} the root of colonialism that wherever an indigenous ruler proved strong and unbending to the whims and caprices of the colonizers his territories became the object of an invasion. During the 1890's the emphasis on effective occupation led Europeans to build up substantial troops armed with precision weapons.

In 1896 with the arrival in Cameroon of Josko von Puttkamer as the Imperial Governor in Cameroon, the pace of

1. For a full discussion, cf. Flint, pp.264-94.

German militarism or troop build-up in Cameroon was stepped up.¹ Before his arrival this was represented by a nucleus of a police force or Polizeitruppe made up mainly of Krubois, Hausa, and Dahomians. This was however considered inadequate for the large scale invasion of Adamawa and so in February 1894, the German Colonial Society again despatched von Stetten to revisit Adamawa and make a thorough study with the view of an eventual conquest of the emirate.² The results expected from the mission seem to have been only on points of detail. Already, in Germany, von Uechtritz and Dr. Passarge of the 1893 expedition to Yola and parts of Adamawa told their countrymen that European intrusion in Adamawa had made 'a war of extermination' between the Fulla and European civilization inevitable.³ On Stetten's return he strongly recommended the formation of a colonial force to be the instrument to open up Adamawa.

In June 1895, the Reichstag acceded to a proposal to enlarge the police force in Cameroon and strengthen its position with trained and well equipped men on the model of the corps (Schutztruppe) created in 1891 for East Africa.⁴

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1. Cf. Journal Officiel consacré au protectorat du Cameroun No.1, mars. 1908, TA-175 (ANY) pp.31-36;
 2. Von Stetten, Expedition en pays Tikar - de Barlinga à Yôla, TA - 61 (ANY).
 3. Passarge, 1895A, pp.50-53.
 4. Rudin, pp.192-97.

But the revolts against German rule in South-West Africa, and the fierce international struggle for the hinterland of Togo, delayed active involvement in Adanawa whose boundaries were already settled by Agreement.

Since 1894 German traders had complained that owing to lack of communications between the interior and the coast through the German sphere, the bulk of trade from the interior went either northwards to 'British Adanawa', or south-eastwards through to the Congo. Such orientation of trade away from the German coastal regions had made the German firm which won the Gesellschaft Sud-Kamerun (South Cameroon Concession) in 1897 put unnecessarily great effort into developing the concessions, and indeed forced to combine its interest with the Belgian traders on the upper Congo.¹

The year 1898 saw intensive campaigns in Germany by the Colonial Society for the occupation of Adanawa, to protect and expand German trade. In anticipation of a concession for the economic exploitation of Adanawa, Woermann, whose firm controlled the largest share of Cameroon's trade, started whipping up support for the effective occupation of Adanawa. In a series of articles in the 'Kolonial Zeitung', the organ of the Colonial Society, Woermann advocated the establishment of a station at Garua on the Benue.² The

1. Rudin, pp.291-96.

2. Kolonial Zeitung, (Feb.-April) 1898; FO 64/1448, Lascelles to Salisbury 16.4.98, also containing newspaper cuttings and summary translations.

time was felt to be particularly ripe because of rumours that changes in the position of the Niger Company were being considered, and if the British Government took over direct control, the impediments on passage through the Niger Benue system would be relaxed. Garua being situated at the meeting point of several important trade routes would, it was hoped, become a distributing point for the district to the south of Lake Chad.

The mid-year meeting of the Colonial Society held in June 1898 at Dantzig, and attended by representatives of its branches from all parts of the country appears to have been a climax to the press campaigns. It devoted a large part of its discussions to the problems of Adanawa in relation to German interest. The meeting was opened by the President of the Dantzig branch of the Society, the Duke, John Albrecht, Regent of Mecklenburgh-Schwerin. At the end of the meeting the expectations of the members were condensed into a resolution calling upon the Chancellor of the Empire to take steps on the one hand to obtain for German subjects the rights acquired under the Berlin and Brussels Acts and other Agreements regarding navigation on the basins of the Congo and the Niger, and on the other hand, to render German rule effective on the northern portion of Cameroon.¹ For

1. FO 64/1449 Viscount Gough to Salisbury, 25.6.98; also same to same, 30.6.98, reporting specially on the conference.

the latter purpose it was suggested that an expedition under an armed government steamer be sent to Garua with directions to establish a permanent station from which government control could be exercised over the trade of the interior commercial network and from which the security of communications with the coast could be assured.

The agitations of the Colonial Society bore fruit, and in the Autumn of 1898 Woermann was officially granted a concession for Adanawa, despite strong opposition in the Reichstag against the grants of such concessions to private Companies.¹ Past experience had shown how futile it was to try to fight the Niger Company on questions of absolute rights of navigation on the Niger-Benue, for example the celebrated cases of Hoenisburg on the Niger and Mizon on the Benue. Also Stetten's experience had shown that the districts which were in a position to offer serious opposition to German ambitions were those further south like Banyo, Tibati and Ngaundere on account of their allegiance to Yola.² To make his concessions profitable, Woermann decided on two methods of approach. Firstly, to enter into direct, and if possible, private arrangement with the Niger Company on matters of transit to and from German Territory, and secondly, having been

1. Cf. Rudin, p.160. It led to rumours, later denied, that there were plans to partition Cameroon and one quarter of it would be given to Woermann.

2. Von Stetten, Expedition en pays Tikar - de Balinga à Yola, TA - 61.

converted to the side of those advocating military action, to invade the southern districts of Adamawa in such a way that they would afterwards offer no opposition to German control.

In November 1898 Woermann approached Count Castell, British Ambassador in Berlin, about securing British aid to carry out his plans to form a company to exploit his concessions. Count Castell gave him his whole-hearted support and in a letter to the Foreign Office Castell expressed how anxious he was to secure for Woermann's scheme 'large cordiality'.¹ He said that the Imperial Government would be obliged if H.M. Government would use its influence with the Niger Company on behalf of Woermann's enterprise which according to him was designed for 'the further and rapid development of unopened districts in Northern Cameroon to the benefit of both German and English trade'.

Already arms were being bought and the necessary bureaucratic formalities taken for the invasion of Adamawa; so Woermann was very much in a hurry to settle whatever there was to be settled in Europe with minimum delay. Without waiting for a reply from the British Foreign Office, Woermann visited Goldie in London, on a private basis, to see what the Company could offer him. Various suggestions were made but without much enthusiasm on the part of Goldie,

1. FO 64/1454, Castell to FO 28.11.98; also FO to R.N.C. 8.12.98.

since Goldie was then uncertain about the future role of the Company after the impending revocation of its Charter. The important point was that Goldie felt he could not commit the Company though as an individual he was willing at any time to advise 'as amicus curiae as to the best method of procedure for harmonious action'.¹ Woermann however could not afford to wait indefinitely until the Company's future had become certain beyond doubt. He gave up further negotiations, and relied solely on military invasion of Adanawa from the south.

The dry season was already three months old, and the time was opportune for such an operation. In December 1898 the Imperial governor in Cameroon Jesko von Puttkamer received his awaited instructions to send an expedition to occupy Adanawa.² By 2 January 1899 all was ready at the coast for the 'Expedition-Woute-Adanawa' to set out under captain von Kamptz. From Douala, von Kamptz together with a section of the Schutztruppe embarked on the steamer 'Aline Woermann' for Kribi and Yaoundé which was then commanded by Lieutenant Hans Dominik.³ It was probably the first time

1. FO 64/1462, Goldie to FO 9.12.98.

2. The official instruction 'to punish the chief of Ngilla a relentless slave hunter' concealed the real scope of the expedition. (Cf. L. Joos, 'Note sur le traité entre l'Allemagne et le Lamidat de Tibati, Etud. Cam. Nos.53-54, 1956, pp.18-19.

3. The main source for the German invasion of southern Adanawa is two reports by the leader of the expeditions, von Kamptz to Puttkamer. 'L'Expedition Wouté-Adanawa, Ngenbe 20.4.99; TA-33 and Expedition Tibati, TA-45. Later these reports were edited and published in the Deutsches Kolonialblatt', 1899-1900. See also Mohanadou, 1964, pp.94-115 for summaries of the reports.

that such a large force had been brought together from all over the colony, and so it was considered necessary to devote at least a week for training the men in their new columns.

When the entire force left Yaounde, it consisted of about 350 soldiers divided into four columns, commanded by First Lieutenants Nolte, von Arnim, Buddeberg and Hans Doninik respectively, and with eight other German officers. There were in addition six hundred and twenty-one native porters, one hundred and fifty boys, cooks and wives of the soldiers under the over-all surveillance of Chief Sergeant Jonezyk assisted by seventeen men armed with M.71 carbines. To distinguish the porters from the soldiers, porters had red bands on their heads. The troops advanced north in two separate and autonomous sections so as to facilitate movement, and their first objective was to converge and set up advance bases south of the Muslim districts at Ngilla and then at Yoko.

On 14 January 1899, the German troops entered Ngilla and attacked it while the inhabitants were preoccupied with mourning their Chief who had died three days before. Though much dispirited by this event and recent losses in a war against the Voute, the Ngilla war leader organized a resistance force in an attempt to drive out the enemy. From a number of houses arrows, spears and missiles were aimed at the German Troops. The noise, the panic and confusion

made many of the inhabitants to flee to the bush. As the casualties on the German side increased, orders were given for the town to be burnt, while the German rifles asserted their superiority over the indigenous weapons. Although they did not find the chief's ivory treasury, the booty that was taken was enormous - twelve elephant tusks, fifteen and horses, more than seven hundred young cows -/this contributed much to the rapidity of their movement since all the European then rode on horses and there were more porters.¹ With the fall of Ngilla, Yoko was the next target, but on arrival there on 28 January von Kamptz found the town virtually deserted since its Fulani chief, a vassal of the district of Tibati, was away on a battle against the Tikar.

This state of affairs was particularly favourable to the schemes of von Kamptz. He abandoned his earlier plans of first attacking Yoko and decided to send Lieutenant Dominik to proceed at full speed towards Tibati itself and to take advantage of a surprise attack on Tibati at a time when at least a part of its army was away on campaign. He remained at Yoko to consolidate the German position in the region. However, two days before Dominik reached Tibati, the district governor at Tibati, Lando Muhammad, had received the news of German ravages further south.

1. von Kamptz, Report (1899).

But the resistance the young governor could afford was heavily affected by both the military and political situation in Tibati. Part of the Tibati army was away in Tikar on campaigns.¹ For some time since the installation of Lando Muhammad, he had steadily lost the support of the purely Fulani elements in Tibati, and the magnates under one pretext or the other withdrew with their following of able bodied men to the neighbouring districts of Tingere, Ngaundere and Banyo. One explanation of the withdrawal is attributed to the prohibition Zubeiru imposed on Muslims and traders going to Tibati when it became clear that the young district governor would neither come to Yola to have his appointment confirmed nor send the annual tribute.² Also he is said to have relied more on the non-Fulani councillors and this evoked much resentment among the Fulani.

In such a situation, Lando Muhammad seemed to have lost confidence in his ability to overcome the Germans in combat even before they arrived. On account of his difficulties with Yola and the neighbouring Fulani districts, he could not approach them for a common effort against the enemies despite the knowledge of their opposition to European rule made known through circular letters from Zubeiru to all the district governors.³ Even if Yola and the neighbouring

1. von Kamptz, Report (1899).

2. von Stetten, 1895; Mohamadou, 1964, p.85.

3. This is evident from von Kamptz's reports (1899-1900). This would have been expected following the circular letter of the Sultan of Sokoto in 1897 (see above, p.402).

districts could be persuaded to send troops, there was hardly enough time left before the invaders appeared.

For a while it was not certain what the German motives were, whether they were to impose German rule or to raid for booty.

Lando Muhammad decided on evacuating all cattle and valuable property from Tibati to Sanserni, a war camp to the west of Tibati with very strong defences. He stationed some of his troops at various parts of the route to Tibati to defend the town at all costs, while he left for Sanserni with another detachment under his personal command. The invading force left Yoko on 5 March guided by two Hausa men who had joined the Germans at Njilla.¹ After five days of forced marches on which the porters bore the brunt of the hardship, the enemy encountered the Tibati forces on the outskirts of Tibati. They easily overcame the thin defence of the Tibati force. The nature of the landscape, generally low but with high land projecting here and there, permitted long distance viewing through telescope and binoculars and thus favoured the advance of the invading army until they entered Tibati itself.

At Tibati the defence force also proved inadequate and was easily broken. The German troops sacked the town

1. von Karptz, Report (1899).

and looted whatever property they could lay their hands on. But Dominik's failure to return with the large herd of cattle which had been evacuated from Tibati disappointed von Kamptz. He felt the region would never be secure with the Lando strongly entrenched in the fortified town of Sanserni.¹ Moreover that was considered to be the critical stage of German ambition. Before the invasion, they had presented themselves to the Muslim leaders as a friendly people who were intent on establishing peaceful relations with them. The news of the attack on the Lando and the seizure of the people's property would spread fast as a warning to the rest of the governors on what to expect from the Germans.² Fear of invasion might unite them and this would consequently destroy German hopes of dealing with the districts piecemeal.

Fear of this possibility haunted von Kamptz even more than the consequences of Lando Muhammad's flight from Tibati. As a move to keep out the other Muslim district governors, von Kamptz sent Dominik's company to Ngaundere and a delegation of Hausas to Banyo to take 'tribute' to the rulers and to explain 'the good intentions of the German Government, and that the attack on Tibati had been inspired

1. von Kamptz, Report (1899).

2. During the first invasion of Tibati the Germans estimated that their booty was worth 20,000 to 30,000 marks of ivory. Von Kamptz, Report (1899).

by no other reason but to punish the governor for his misconduct'.¹ At the same time he also despatched a renowned Tibati Fulani soldier who had been taken prisoner to ask Lando Muhammad to submit and accept German conditions for a cease-fire. The conditions were that he should abandon Sanserni and return to Tibati without an escort. He should provide the Germans three hundred pieces of ivory, five hundred cows, and five hundred asses, or porters to the equivalent of five hundred asses.²

While waiting for Dominik's return, von Kamptz, in an attempt to increase his effectiveness and clear the routes to Sanserni of all opposition, sent out many of his men on raids to regions as far as fifty miles with orders to capture as many prisoners as possible. Such an ill-conceived adventure stretched the resources of the invaders to a degree which they could not possibly support. The result was disastrous and after days of both men and property hunt only thirty prisoners were brought back, having lost many men themselves in the event.

At the end of March, the delegations to Banyo and Ngaundere returned with assurances from the governors that they would allow free movement to the Germans throughout

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1. von Kamptz, Report (1899). Joos, 1956, pp.18-19 refers to the tribute as 'presents to buy the neutrality of the Lando'.
 2. von Kamptz, Report (1899); see also Mohanadu, 1964, p. 101.

their districts. As a sign of his good faith Lando Ngaunde-
re charged Audu, a Hausa man, to accompany Dominik and re-
port back as soon as the Germans built their projected com-
mercial station at Yoko.¹ Dominik felt that Lando Ngaunde-
re would not join Tibati because of rivalry between them.
He had no doubt that he would cooperate to assure that the
Fulani submitted to German rule.

Von Kamptz was encouraged and was now left with a
free hand to march directly against Sanserni. On arrival
at Sanserni, they found that Lando Muhammad had burnt down
the town and left via another route to reenter Tibati.
What finally decided the issue was the support which the
Germans received from the Nганbe people in the Tikar country².
They had for eleven years been under perpetual siege from
Tibati and to then the German invasion removed a thorn in
their flesh. Impressed by German power, the Nганbe people
submitted to German authority promising to obey whatever the
Germans ordered. With the entire force and intelligence
service of the Nганbe people at the disposal of the Germans,
victory was almost assured to them.

Nганbe territory now provided a safe base for the
German troops in the heart of Tikar country. The Nганbe

1. von Kamptz, Report (1899).

2. This is acknowledged in the report, and apparently the
Germans were not aware of the existing state of war
between the people of Nганbe and Lando Tibati until
they actually entered Nганbe.

people understood the nature of the terrain . and long years of fighting under the difficult conditions of the regions had provided them with military experience and discipline. From Ngambe, Lieutenant Nolte was sent at the head of a large force to Bukanbe a fortified Tikar village where Lando Tibati had loyal supporters. The village was razed to the ground while its chief and defenders were captured and executed. With the fall of Bukamba the whole of the Tikar country was safe in the hands of the Germans, and as a reward for his cooperation the Chief of Ngambe was installed paramount chief of Tikar on 9 May 1899 by von Kamptz.¹

Attention was once more turned to the question of actually taking Tibati. By now Kamptz was very confident. He sent back Doninik, von Arnim and Zimmermann to Yaounde bearing with them heavy loads of booty. The position of Lando Muhammad had become weaker. His people having been harrassed for over four months by the Germans wanted peace, especially since it seemed that Ngaundere and Banyo had submitted. Also, the German emphasis on opening up trade routes appealed to the Hausa traders who had much influence on account of their control of the region's trade. Probably the cooperation of the Hausa traders had been made easy by assurances from those of their kinsmen who formed the

1. von Kamptz, Report (1899).

core of the German troops, that all restrictions on trade would be removed.¹ Many of the chiefs who were under Tibati, for fear of destruction, had been submitting to the Germans and denouncing Tibati. Muhammad tried to save what was still left to him by sending a delegation to von Kamptz to demand peace. He replied that peace talks could only start when Muhammad had paid two hundred large pieces of ivory and five hundred cows.² At a time when the Germans had looted so much from the district, such excessive demands would certainly have required time. But von Kamptz was impatient and probably saw in Muhammad's delayed reply an attempt to play for time.

A second invasion was ordered against Tibati. It took the Lando and the entire population of Tibati by surprise since in their opinion no reply had been sent to the Germans refusing to comply with their demands and both parties were still in the process of arranging for a peaceful settlement. The utterly unexpected nature of the attack made any organized resistance impossible. The only resistance offered were from the Lando's body guards. On von Kamptz's orders, they were all shot down to a man. The Lando was arrested and taken to the market place where von Kamptz declared his deposition.³ After a series of unsuccessful approaches to Muhammad's near relatives to

1. von Kamptz, Report (1899-1900).

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

find an acceptable successor, only Yerina Chirona Abbo, a second cousin of Muhammad, accepted the sarauta on condition that Muhammad was not permitted to stay in the district and no breach was made with Yola whose ruler must continue to be regarded as the spiritual leader of all Muslims in Adanawa.¹

In Chirona's letter of appointment there was no mention of Yola. The reason for invading Tibati was stated to be that Muhammad had not fulfilled the conditions for peace and he had totally lost prestige among the people. The new district governor was installed as 'Sultan of Tibati in the name of H.M. the Emperor and King' (of Germany) on condition that he accepted and promised to fulfil faithfully to the best of his abilities that he would:

- (i) faithfully obey at all times the German Governor and carry out his orders unconditionally
- (ii) construct, maintain and guarantee the security of a good road from Tibati as far as the region of Chene with the object of entering into commercial relations with Yoko.
- (iii) acknowledge that the region Chene-Sohanti and Bongere were under the station of Yoko and were thus separate from the sphere of action of Tibati

1. Norddeutsches Allgemeine Zeitung, 31.7.1901 enc. in CO 446/21 Lugard to CO 9.9.1901. von Kamptz's report mentions only the first condition. It would appear both conditions were given since even after the invasion, the Germans were anxious to have the channels of communication between Yola and German Adanawa open as before. Cf. CO 446/16 Wallace to Chamberlain, 22.7.1901 reporting the visit of a German officer to Yola.

- (iv) acknowledge that all the Tikar tribes no longer belonged to Tibati, and in any case, all controversial matters on the relation of Tibati with the Tikar tribes should be submitted to the station at Yoko for a decision;
- (v) accept to pay a war indemnity of one hundred large pieces of ivory and two hundred and fifty cows. The payment in Ivory must be made within one year while the cows should be sent without delay;
- (vi) send further payments as a symbol of submission to be paid by August of each year, a tribute of three milch cows plus a bull to the station at Yoko;
- (vii) be under the protection of the German Government and he would receive a German flag. ¹

The document was signed by both von Kamptz and Chirona who retained a copy in Hausa. All the German officers appended their signatures to the document as witnesses. On 22 September 1899, von Kamptz left Tibati taking Lando Muhammad and his staunch supporters into captivity. The Lando was subjected to all forms of indignity, for instance, having to walk on foot, so that he fell sick and died on the way.

The fall of Tibati removed, as it were, the linch-
 pin/^{of} Fulani resistance to German rule in the south of the

1. von Kamptz, Report (1899-1900); see Joos, 1956, pp.42-43 for full text in French.

emirate. For a long time since its foundation by the highly successful jihad fighter Harman Sambo, Tibati remained a strong military power, perhaps equalled only by Rai in the entire Adamawa emirate. With this force she had harrassed and consequently became the enemy of the districts of Ngaundere and Banyo, and even defied the central administration in Yola succeeding during Lauwal's reign to resist being forced to submit to Yola. Its fall, though taking nearly nine months, boosted the strength of the Germans in the eyes of the indigenous population and dealt a death blow to morale in the Muslim armies.

Interdistrict communications between **one** district governor and **another** were poor even when they were ^{on} good terms. This was the result of a system which recognized only vertical links and to a large extent ignored the lateral connections. Right from Adama's time this had been encouraged as a way of establishing Yola's suprenacy over the districts. Each district therefore tried to maintain itself as an exclusive unit, independent of the others. The district governors felt proud to maintain such independence from their neighbours and calling others to one's assistance, unless it was the Lamido at Yola himself, was the exception rather than the rule.¹ Besides, the wars that the people were used to did not necessi-

1. One of such exceptions was Njobdi's appeal to Buba Njidda and Harman Sambo during his wars against Bellaka Mbun. The normal procedure would be for the district governor to appeal to Yola who in turn would instruct the neighbouring districts to proceed to aid their co-religionists.

tate such spontaneous cooperation.

The other district governors saw the tragedy that had befallen Tibati within the restrictive context of wars between a district governor and a personal enemy, and without the co-lateral channels of communication referred to above, the Germans were able to keep the districts divided, despite the threat the Germans posed to all of them as a unit. The Fulani leaders had too readily believed what the Germans said about their intentions being peaceful, and remained complacent about the German danger until the big stick had actually descended on them.

The extent of German intervention remained hidden from them; but when the news of the conditions that had been imposed on the new Tibati governor became generally known in other parts of the emirate, the Fulani leaders became scared, but even here their communications with Yola did not suggest common action. For instance in 1900 Buba Jirun, the old chief of Rai, wrote to Yola in rather angry words about the German danger. He complained that the Germans wanted to put an end to jihad against non-Muslims, and had devalued the rates of exchange¹ in the markets to Rai's disadvantage.¹ There was however no suggestion of organizing

1. MS Ardo Buba to Zubeiru, Sokprof, File II, No.36, NAK ; see also Adanaprof File I, No.3, MS Maigari to Zubeiru reporting that he had delayed coming from Nassarawo to Yola because he heard that the white men had sent troops to a town near Garua; they had killed and arrested many people. This dreadful news scared his people and scattered them.

and mobilising a massive force against the Germans in order to maintain the common ideals which all the Fulani rulers shared.

This was the typical feeling among the Fulani rulers, a mixture of doubt and anger, that was never productive of positive action to protect the emirate. Thus, after Tibati, it became evident to the Germans as never before that military action against the rulers of Adamawa would not involve any form of united action against the invaders, and with this knowledge they proceeded in a systematic way to break down by force, Fulani authority in all the districts except the district of Rai whose isolated position in the heart of stretches of woodland country made it virtually impossible to take and retain by force, until 1910.¹

d) The British invasion.

Just as the fugitives from Tibati brought the news of the German invasion of Tibati to Zubeiru, Lugard announced the setting up of British administration over the Muslim emirates early in 1900.² Recalling Zubeiru's reaction, my Yola informants said that he made an announcement at the

1. Cf. von Radtke, La soumission de Boubanji 1910, TA-24, published in Antsblatt, 1916.

2. Lugard's Proclamation apparently did not reach Zubeiru until late 1900 at the very earliest. Cf. D.J.M. Muffet, Concerning Brave Captains, London, 1964, pp.27-30.

Mosque to the effect that all who had property should begin to consume it because the Europeans were coming to take it.¹

Since July 1897, when Chamberlain first suggested the formation of 'a small West African army' paid for by Imperial Funds (see above, p. 402), the arms build up in Nigeria had proceeded apace with British ambitions to continue the invasion of the Sokoto empire partly as a means of safeguarding its interests in the empire against competition from the French, and partly as a demonstration of the 'new imperialism' operating at the British Colonial Office. The imperialist spirit which Chamberlain had introduced into British colonial enterprise found an able instrument in the person of Lugard in the Sokoto empire.²

He had shown his ability in his handling of the conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Uganda in 1893 and again in the 'race to Borgu' in 1896. Even before 1900, the Niger Company's ambition in the Sokoto empire had committed Britain to intervene militarily in order to gain control of both the trade and politics of the empire. In this way Lugard's military base at Lokoja, constituted the most dangerous single threat that the Fulani rulers had ever known.

1. Informant 3, Yola, confirmed by informant 6, Yola.

2. Perhan, Vol.II, pp.616-75.

It left the rulers a choice between peaceful submission to British rule or suffering armed intervention. Zubeiru, and indeed the Sultan of Sokoto, failed to see how British rule could be given any thought. He had known and treated the Europeans only as traders in the same way as he regarded Arab merchants from North Africa. There was in his opinion only a choice between submission or emigration (hijra) from the 'infidel' as it is commanded in the Koran.¹ In pursuing this policy Zubeiru drew much strength and encouragement from the knowledge that he was not an exception, and his actions were in accordance with the official policy of the empire.²

Zubeiru would have nothing to do with the British, nothing to do with their tutelage (disguised under the verbiage of protectorate), nothing to do with their administration.³ Naturally a very optimistic man, Zubeiru was absolutely convinced that in the event of war he could put more troops in the field than the British who had no bases in his territory. Moreover the guns and ammunition he had received from Nizon further strengthened him in his optimism;

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1. MS, Zubeiru to anīr al-mu'ninīn; letter No.112, H.F. Backwell, The Occupation of Hausaland, Lagos, 1927, 9 (henceforth Backwell, No.112) expresses in vivid form the feeling which Zubeiru maintained all along with regard to European rule. For another letter with the same message see below, p.452.
 2. Cf. Johnston, pp.230-240. In 1898 Lugard summarized it thus: 'the position regarding Sokoto is that the Sultan has ordered the British out of his country; his latest letter announces his intention of fighting the white men, and he is stated to have sent letters to Zaria, Kano, etc. with this object, while the representatives of the Company have sent a letter declaring him to be an enemy'.FO403.269

he believed that a combination of traditional tactics with European weapons would lead him to victory. None could persuade Zubeiru otherwise, not even Alkali Ahmed Joda.¹

What Zubeiru at first lacked was men sufficiently trained to handle the European weapons he had in his armoury. He saw his opportunity to acquire such personnel with the collapse of the Rabeh-Hayatu alliance followed by the murder of Hayatu early in 1898 by Rabeh's son Fadl-Allah.² At around this time Zubeiru was at Marua to mourn for the death of his personal friend Lando Sali and to install officially his son Ahmadu as the new Lando Marua.³ He was reconciled with some of the refugees from Dikowa who found it impossible to continue living with Rabeh after their leader, Hayatu, had been killed.

F/notes cont. from previous page.

No.92 enc .6 Lugard to Chamberlain. (Confidential Print).

3. CO 446/16 Wallace to Chamberlain 3.7.1901, reports of continued defiance of the 'Government' by Zubeiru.

1. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.89; Oral tradition, Yola; for the special relation between Zubeiru and Alkali Ahmed Joda, see above, p. 284.
2. The earliest mention of Hayatu's death in Europe would appear to be a report in the Parisian Journal, 'Quinzaine Coloniale' 25.1.98 as a news item received from Alexandria Cairo. See FO 27.3408 Monson to Salisbury 28.1.98. For accounts on the circumstances surrounding Hayatu's death see A.D. Babikir, pp.84-86; also SNP.10/2/8e(NAK) report by W.P.Hewby 10.8.98. Hayatu had become dissatisfied with the alliance with Rabeh. He sent letters to his principal supporters including Malan Jibril of Gonbe declaring his intentions to break off with Rabeh. When Rabeh was out on a campaign against the French, Malan Jibril sent about fifty horsemen to escort Hayatu out of Di-
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They had been in Rabeh's army and had received training in the use of European weapons. Many of them agreed to accompany Zubeiru to Yola and a special quarter called 'fatude Rabeh' was built for them.¹ The training which Zubeiru's Yola based troops had obtained from Mizon's Senegalese instructors was of short duration, and, since Mizon's departure, everything lapsed. But with the arrival of the refugees from Rabeh, Zubeiru felt that at long last he had secured the skilled men he required to make the European weapons pay dividends. This made Zubeiru feel secure and confident that he could defend Yola against any attack.

In other emirates like Nupe, Bida and Muri, British invasion had been facilitated by conflict and segmentation within the ruling aristocracy, and this served as a leverage for British intervention. But in Yola the usual approach of divide and rule could not be of assistance to the British. In the internal strife against Hayatu on

F/notes cont. from previous page.

kowa. Hayatu's wife, a daughter of Rabeh, informed Fadl-Allah of the secret behind the visit of Jibril's men. Fadl-Allah took steps to prevent Hayatu from leaving. A battle ensued and Hayatu was killed.

3. In effect Ahmadu's reign began in 1896 when Lando Sali decided to step down for him on account of age (Prestat, p.4).

1. Oral evidence, Yola. The fatude is now in ruins.

the one hand, and his councillors on the other hand, Zubeiru had been firm and uncompromising and this had no doubt disenchanted many with his general attitude to the solution of problems; but this had not destroyed faith in the supremacy of the office of Lanido and thus while he remained Lanido, he was obeyed with all the promptness that the office demanded. (See above, p. 351)

The prospects of the Company getting an immediate leverage through the councillors was further made difficult when the Sultan forbade any form of cooperation with the Company. No one, at least not the proud aristocratic Yola Fulani, would like to be called a 'munafuki'¹. This is however not to argue that differences of opinion did not arise among the ruling aristocracy at Yola on the question of Europeans changing their role from simple traders to become governors of the Land. For instance, Alkali Ahmed Joda was in favour of cooperating with the British, probably recalling his own experience in the Sudan and Egypt.² His personal relations with Zubeiru however prevented him from pressing this too hard for fear of isolating Zubeiru

1. From the Arabic munāfiq, a hypocrite - a term of abuse, occurring frequently in the Quran (8.49, 9.64 & 67, 9.101, 33.12, 33.60, 4.61 & 88, etc.).

2. Vicars Boyle, 1910, p.89.

and playing ~~into~~ the hands of Zubeiru's opponents at Court.

Also Galadina Fariku and his supporters accepted the fact that the Muslims of Adamawa as those in Egypt and the Sudan could live under a British administration. What the Muslims should do was to insist that the British should not in any way interfere with their customs and religious practices. They even went further to make a distinction between Zubeiru's wishes and the demands of their religion. They felt, as in the case of the war against Hayatu, that to fight against the British was the wish of Zubeiru and not a religious command.¹ These thoughts remained what they were, expressions of differences of viewpoints. They did not lead to divisions of a political significance, though it might have led some to become half-hearted in their resistance to European intrusion.

The first British attack was expected during the high water season of 1900, that is, after Zubeiru had indicated his refusal to break from a century-old tradition and withdraw his sworn loyalty to the Sultan of Sokoto and transfer it to Lugard. Lugard was however very much pre-occupied with the physical part of the transfer of Niger Company property to the Crown Administration.²

1. Informant 3, Yola, confirmed by informant 5 and 6, Yola.

2. Annual Report of Northern Nigeria, 1900-01.

This fortuituous diversion did not provide a breathing space to Zubeiru. On the contrary the tensions around him were increased by the wholly unexpected appearance of Fadl-Allah and a large army in Adanawa as the survivors of his father's army. In April 1900 the French forces defeated Rabeh at Kusseri on the Logone, and Fadl-Allah and the survivors of Rabeh's troops of over 7,000 men, many still armed with guns, fled southwards through Mandara into Kilba in Adanawa.¹ The question of an alliance with Zubeiru could be discounted owing to mutual suspicion, and in any case the sudden manner with which he had entered Adanawa provoked nothing but hostility from Zubeiru. Fadl-Allah's ultimate intention, as evidenced from his letters to Hewby, then British Resident at Muri, was to place himself completely under British protection.²

Zubeiru was determined to forestall this sinister move, quite apart from resenting Fadl Allah's unwelcome stay in his emirate. He ordered a total boycott of the fugitives and this was effectively implemented. Explaining Zubeiru's measures, Fadl-Allah wrote to Hewby:

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1. Gentil, pp.231-32; see J.A.C. Elder, 'Fadl-Allah -Account of Death' Gujba District Notebook, 17.8.1911 (WAK); for a good account of Fadl-Allah's movement between April 1900 and 21 October 1901, the date of his death. See CO 446/16 Wallace to CO 8.6.1901 enc. 'Account of Fadl Allah's Movement'.
 2. CO 446/15 Wallace to Chamberlain 12.4.1901 encs. 1 and 2. Fadl-Allah to Hewby 31.1.1901 translated by Sherif Audu.

Zubeiru blocked the road to me. I note him as hostile. My annoyance in the Fulani territory was the number of desertions from me, so that I returned to Bornu.... scarcity of food also drove me north... 1

Zubeiru could rejoice in his strength, yet the entire threat had not been obviated. The political situation in the region still remained fluid. Fadl-Allah's advances to the British wetted the appetite of Wallace. He spared no efforts to meet Fadl Allah and to promise him British protection with the intention of 'using him to establish British occupation over Bornu at minimum cost'.²

In his new role as British Commissioner, Lugard drew a distinction between those regions which were already under effective British occupation, as Ilorin, Kabba, Nupe, Kontagora, Borgu and Zaria, and those to be taken as soon as possible, like Bassa, Muri, Bautchi and Yola. Of the latter group, priority was given to the conquest of territories by the river banks as well as what was described as the 'eastern territories' made up of Bautchi, Muri, Yola and Bornu on the grounds of their supposed salubrity and mineral wealth.³ Additional reasons were said to be 'the necessity

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1. CO 446/15 Wallace to Chamberlain 12.4.1901 encs. 1 and 2. Fadl-Allah to Hewby 31.1.1901 translated by Sherif Audu.
 2. Ibid.; also Wallace to Chamberlain 8.6.1901 and CO 446/16 containing continuations of the correspondence on the subject.
 3. Annual Report of Northern Nigeria 1900-01.

of checking the rapid depopulation by organized slave-raiding in the eastern states and of dealing with the problem offered by the advent of the French on Lake Chad, and the arrival of Fadl-Allah in British territory'. Though the 'eastern territories' were far from Lake Chad, Lugard calculated that they would afford the British with a base from which they could keep in touch with events in Bornu, otherwise, he warned, the whole of the region would become 'a cockpit of war and desolation'.¹

Before Lugard left for England on leave towards the summer of 1901, there was no doubt at the British headquarters at Lokoja that the following rainy season would witness the invasion of Yola. While Lugard was away, William Wallace was given full powers to execute the duties of the High Commissioner. Wallace had been personally acquainted with the history of British relations with Yola, for nearly twenty years.² He was not the man to delay the invasion of Yola, for he had no illusions that Zubeiru was prepared to hand over power to the British or even entertain discussion on the subject.

Prior to 1900 for instance, Wallace had taken a personal initiative to send messengers to Zubeiru to warn

1. Annual Report of Northern Nigeria 1900-01.

2. His first visit to Yola was in the rainy season of 1883. He accompanied MacDonald on his mission to Yola and Adamawa. In 1892-93 he was personally in charge of the operations to expel Mizon from Muri and Yola.

him that he would soon be visited by 'whitemen who would not show so much patience as the Company had shown towards him'.¹ Such a provocative action, verging on impudence to a ruler from whom Wallace was seeking concessions, only went to harden Zubeiru's heart further against the British agents. On more than one occasion Wallace had boasted to Zubeiru of British power, and consequently for Wallace an invasion of Yola would be a vindication of his pride and what he had so often told the authorities at Yola.²

He seems to have had a personal stake in the matter. So that when in 1901 he found himself at the command of a large British force, he marked out Yola as the first of the 'unoccupied places' to be invaded. Even more remarkable was the fact that on 13 August 1901 Wallace gave instructions to Major McClintock to proceed without delay to meet Fadl-Allah and to take such steps which he considered necessary to bring him to Yola where Wallace intimated he hoped to meet him. Apparently this was to install him Emir of Yola immediately after the British invasion of Yola.³

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1. See CO 446/16 Wallace to Chamberlain 3.7.1901.
 2. This is evidenced from Wallace's reports during the crisis at Yola in September 1893, see e.g. FO 27/3162 RNC to FO 21.10.93 enc. Wallace Report.
 3. See CO 446/20 Lugard to CO (Haslenere) 26.7.1901. This move was strongly advocated by Hewby on the grounds that Zubeiru was 'a troublesome person, a slave raider and an exporter of slaves'; it is not unlikely that Wallace was aware of Hewby's suggestion. Fadl-Allah could not be brought to Yola since Lugard preferred delaying action on Fadl-Allah until his return from leave well after the intended invasion of Yola.

In view of the fact that September was the last month that ships could get as far as Yola, all preparation towards the invasion must perforce be completed by the end of August to permit sufficient time for the forces to move to and from Yola. At the beginning of July Wallace directed himself seriously to the question of invading Yola. Through a quick succession of despatches to London, he created an explosive situation in Yola necessitating immediate intervention. Thus on the 3rd he wrote as follows:

Yola defies the Government and recently sent a messenger through the Niger Company's Agent.... He has ordered the Niger Company to vacate their (sic) stations, but is to allow them to trade on a hulk if they chose. They have had to haul their flag down and pay to the Emir 5⁰/₁₀ on all produce bought. The Emir is bitterly opposed to the opening of the trade routes to Bornu and will do all in his power to keep them closed.¹

Although all these were simply measures of security² taken against the background of the political instability to the north of his emirate, and European interference in his emirate, yet Wallace saw in them a criminal act. He demanded therefore 'to make a demonstration in force at Yola early in September to try and bring Zubeiru to a reasonable frame of mind or to depose him and place another Emir in his place'.³ Wallace had hoped that since Lugard was in London

1. CO 446/16 Wallace to Chamberlain 3.7.1901.

2. For similar measures taken by the Sultan of Sokoto, see Last, 1967, p.139.

3. ~~Ibid.~~ CO446/16 Wallace to Chamberlain 3.7.1901

he would press the matter at the Colonial Office. But when after a month he had heard nothing, he called both Lugard and the Colonial Office, in even more inflammatory tone:

McClintock reports Emir Yola must be deposed. Supposed to be mad, recent telegrammes from Cargill report hostile attitude. Consider it necessary to take action, 250 West African Frontier Force sufficient force and can be spared. Suggest taking action simultaneously and discussion with action proposed Fadaralla. 1

A day after, Wallace sent another telegramme to the effect that Zubeiru's hostile actions have compelled him to begin action:

Report from Ibi by telegramme states that McClintock's escort under the command of MacGregor returning from Yola by land harrassed by Emir's mounted troops. Supplies not procurable. Owing to this hostile act obliged to return to Yola wharf. Am sending stream launch afford assistance. Cargill reports by telegramme owing to threatening attitude of Emir's forces close to Lau has given military protection Company's Agent. 2

These despatches and others which followed subsequently were important not only for their impact at the Colonial Office but also in underlying the operative causes for a British military intervention at Yola. They indicate that the British authority in the Sokoto empire was anxious to

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1. CO 446/16 (tel.) Wallace to Chamberlain 4.8.1901. Same to Lugard 4.8.1901.
 2. Ibid. Wallace to Chamberlain 5.8.1901.

see that its government in these territories was not defied; secondly that British traders had unlimited freedom of movement; thirdly, that slave raiding, (in this sense all wars between Muslims and non-Muslims, no matter whether they were wars of expansion, or punitive expeditions) slave trade and slavery were abolished on terms fixed by the British; finally, that both on paper and in fact, the government of Yola was controlled by the British.

In an indirect way, the anxiety of the British also reflected the standpoint of the Fulani rulers. Basically it was that all foreigners should be subject to the laws of their host countries and cease to interfere in the way the emirate was governed. To insist absolutely on these rights revealed to what extent the Adanawa rulers were unconscious about what the Europeans in general thought were their options in Africa. The Colonial Office normally relied on the British representatives for its advice and consequently their opinion mattered most. Thus on the advice of Lugard, Chamberlain finally cabled instructions to Wallace approving an immediate invasion of Yola.¹

Wallace's comic story of Zubeiru being mad was not taken seriously. What was interesting, and at the same time

1. CO 446/16. Lugard to Chamberlain 9.8.1911, and Chamberlain to Wallace 13.8.1901.

paradoxical, was the suggestion that Zubeiru should be reinstated after the invasion 'if he accepted the conditions of a letter of appointment in identical terms with those given to the new Emirs of Kontagora and Bida'. This was Lugard's suggestion which, though included in the instructions, probably caused some brow raising at the Colonial Office. Lugard, shortly after, explained that his reason was because Zubeiru had great influence throughout the country. This influence he felt, might be useful in attracting trade from German territory into British Nigeria.¹

On 19 August 1901 Wallace received Chamberlain's cable. For him as an individual this was a big triumph. He assigned Colonel Morland, Commandant of the W.A.F.F. at Jebba, to execute personally the invasion with three hundred men whose strength he considered more than enough for the task. Within a week all was ready and on 26 August 1901, exactly eight years since Wallace climbed the Benue on the Mowë to persuade Zubeiru not to receive Mizon, Colonel Morland and his men embarked on the steamers 'Liberty' and 'Nkissi' en route to Yola with Wallace accompanying to settle the political issues. This was one of the strongest forces Colonel Morland had commanded on similar missions in Ashanti and parts of Northern Nigeria. The

1. CO 446/16. Lugard to Chamberlain 9.9.1901.

total force consisted of thirteen military officers, two medical officers who had been withdrawn from Jebba to join the expedition, seven British N.C.Os., three hundred and sixty five rank and file, 2.75 m/m guns, and four maxims.¹ It took them eight days from Lokoja to Yola arriving early in the morning at 7.30 a.m. on September 2nd, 1901.

The morning worshippers were still in the mosque when the news reached Zubeiru that at last the Europeans had come to fight him. Zubeiru knew the die was cast. He summoned his councillors to his residence and despatched messengers to gallop at full speed to his war camps at Nantari and Girei as well as to the neighbouring districts to expedite all troops for the defence of Yola against the Christians.² At Yola itself the war drums were beaten and all were ordered to take up arms. The invaders had taken them by surprise and they were left with very little time to mount the best possible resistance. Everything was done helter-skelter. Moreover, they did not know the strength of the enemy, which some thought would be composed as usual of a handful of traders.

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1. SNP7, 2363/1901 (NAK), Yola Expedition or CO 446/16 Wallace to CO 26.9.1901 enc., 'Report by Col. Morland on Yola Expedition 23.9.1901 (henceforth Morland's report). The account of the invasion is largely based on two sources: the account of Colonel Morland, and oral tradition at Yola. The oral tradition is particularly helpful in stating the organization and military aims of the Yola army, which are not at all indicated in Colonel Morland's report. See also Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp.55-64.
 2. Informants 3 and 2, Yola.

Colonel Morland adopting the methods of the Fulani during the jihad when they contemplated attacking a non-Muslim settlement sent a messenger with a letter to Zubeiru calling upon him to submit to British rule. Recalling Lugard's proclamation, on January 1st 1900, he gave assurances that the British would not interfere with his people's religion. He and his people would be under British protection and the country would be opened to trade and prosperity. He however threatened that if Zubeiru rejected the British offer, he would be attacked and made to submit.¹ Zubeiru refused to open the letter and detained the messenger while he continued to make preparations to defend Yola. Later he released the messenger to take back Morland's letter unopened. At the meeting with his councillors, Zubeiru reiterated his belief that it was utterly wrong to submit to unbelievers. He would not follow their instructions because the Prophet commands that whoever joins his abode with the unbelievers, or dwells within, is among them. To yield out of fear would be to destroy his religion and his heritage and betray his trust to the Sultan, Commander of the Faithful. The councillors closed ranks and promised to cooperate with him.²

1. Morland's report.

2. Informants 3 and 2, Yola.

The two cannons Zubeiru had obtained from Mizon were mounted just outside Zubeiru's residence. They were to be manned by those Yola men who had received training in their use from Mizon's men. Behind them, and round the palace stood over one hundred men, mostly refugees from Rabeh's army armed with modern rifles. Within three hours of the call-up, horse men and infantry were converging on Yola from all directions. The military strategy on Zubeiru's side was that a massive contingent of horse men and infantry would advance first and with their superior numbers overwhelm the enemy. If however the invaders broke through the Yola line, they would come face to face with the rifle men assisted by the cannons.

The British force had anchored on a lake at a point about one mile from the centre of Yola sheltered on the right bank by rising ground. This afforded it security from any sudden rear attack while it concentrated on the left bank on which Yola was situated. One of the steamers was put to patrol the lake on the eastern side of the town, near fatude Hausa with orders to seize all canoes. The troops were ferried ashore in five smaller boats. One of their guides who knew Yola very well climbed up a baobab tree, locally known as 'Bokki Hamman Petel',¹ and showed

1. This still stands on the north-eastern side of Yola and it is regarded as one of the historical sites of the town.

major McClintock the strategic spots in the town and where they were likely to meet with much resistance. His descriptions were ascertained with the aid of binoculars.¹

At about 10 a.m. Morland ordered the town to be shelled from the steamer. This was soon abandoned and a landing effected about 700 yards north of Yola. There ~~was~~ ^{was} much excitement in the town. The Yola troops were already moving in the direction of the enemy; they rained arrows at them, but the longer effective range of the firearms frustrated their efforts. For a while there was a stalemate and the invading force decided to close up the gap and to march into the town as the line of cavalry thinned, due to death and possibly the confusion caused by the noise of the guns. Just then Zubeiru's fighters from Girei and Nantari came to swell the numbers of the Yola regiment. Colonel Morland realized that continued fighting on one front was not yielding immediate results. He sent Major McClintock to open up another front along the eastern side and, as the opportunity offered itself, to enter the town from this side.²

This move proved very useful to the British. Passing through fatude Hausa, Major McClintock flanked by his Hausa, Yoruba and Ashanti soldiers encountered practically

1. Morland's Report.

2. Ibid.

no resistance since at this time the entire fighting force, including the reinforcements from Giroi and Nantari, was concentrated either around the palace or was moving resolutely towards Bokki Hamnan Petel. The detour took about thirty minutes before Major McClintock entered the centre of Yola. He opened fire on the rifle men who fired back. By a series of quick actions the British forces set fire to the Yola mosque and Zubeiru's council chamber.¹ The effect of this was catastrophic. With the mosque and part of Zubeiru's residence on fire, the entire population became sorely frightened. The bulk of Zubeiru's army was foot-soldiers armed with bows and arrows and sticks. These were of practically little use in this battle where speed, range and experience were the deciding factors.²

The fires at the centre of Yola suggested to those in the town that the British had penetrated through the thick cavalry line. After about one hour of firing around the Lamido's palace, Major McClintock realized that he could neither dislodge the defenders nor capture the palace. He turned and started attacking the cavalry from the rear. at this point much initiative was required from the Yola

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1. Morland's report to the CO omitted reference to the burning down of the mosque but the report at Kaduna says the fire was caused by a stray bullet. From expert advice I am told it would have been highly improbable for a bullet to start a fire on contact with a nat wall.
 2. In this respect the British had overwhelming advantage as a result of similar battles elsewhere in the Sokoto empire; Bida, Ilorin, Zaria for example.

Commander of the rifle men, but he failed to seize the opportunity of chasing and putting pressure on Major McClintock's division from the rear. His orders had been to defend the palace. But this immobility of such an important section of the Yola forces with the right type of weapons to match the British force placed the Yola army at a great disadvantage. The cavalry line of the Yola forces was completely broken, ^{and} with no new reinforcements arriving, ^{with} and ^{the} pressures both in front and behind being too much to sustain, Bobo Ahradu and others sped towards the palace where Zubeiru and his councillors were assembled. He reported the state of the battle and suggested that the only cause of action opened to Zubeiru was either to submit or fly from the town.¹

He decided to leave Yola. He left ~~secretly~~ through a door on the east side of the over twenty feet high wall, that surrounded the palace, followed by all his councillors and bodyguards. This virtually brought the resistance at the entrance of the palace to an end. The British were in occupation of Yola, an empty Yola, deserted by all its responsible inhabitants except Iya and his brothers of the House of Sanda.² Going through the Kofa Bai, Zubeiru and

1. Informants 2 and 3, Yola.

2. Ibid.; Barclay, 1907;
Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.58.

his retinue passed fatude Hausa, Fufore, and turned towards the direction of Gurin. But the river Beti was flooding at this time and so they turned back and passed the night at Sebore.¹

Though Zubeiru was firmly resolved about what he did not want to do, that is, submit to the Europeans, he did not seem equally certain about what he wanted to do. His councillors continued to confer among themselves throughout the long and dreary night. Galadina Fariku felt a situation had been reached where a compromise was necessary. Supported by others, he informed Zubeiru that the councillors had decided to go back to Yola.² This was an attempt to persuade him to change his mind and abandon his determination to continue his flight under the bad weather conditions.

It was at this point that the old conflicts over the succession came to influence the turn of events. Because of his past conflicts with Galadina Fariku, Zubeiru read in this an attempt by the Galadina to return to Yola and have Iya appointed as Lamido.² Zubeiru gave then his final word that he preferred to die in the bush than submit. He however entrusted his brother Bobo Ahmadu/^{to}the care of Alkali Ahmed Joda to return to Yola and act in his place.²

1. Barclay, 1907, provides a good account of Zubeiru's flight until his death; see also Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp.58-64.

2. Informants 2 and 3, Yola.

This decision tipped the scales of the conflict for ever in favour of the British because it meant that Zubeiru of his own accord had abdicated, even if he did not intend it to be a permanent measure. Psychologically and otherwise the councillors now felt free to act as they thought fit without the stigma of bad faith to Lamido Zubeiru.

However this was not all. Zubeiru and his councillors were there to govern and to lead the people. No doubt whatever they decided was of tremendous importance. But for any government at the time to command the respect and cooperation of the population, it was important that the disruption from the past should not be seen to be drastic, or a gross departure from established traditions. It was unusual in Adamawa politics, to accept another Lamido before the official deposition or death of the former. Indeed all the Lamido had held office for life. Only the Sultan had the powers to depose an Emir for the act to be constitutional, and for this the Sultan needed to be satisfied that the Emir had been guilty of gross misbehaviour and his people did not want him.¹

This was not the case against Zubeiru; on the contrary, his fate had been due to his uncompromising stand

1. For a discussion of the role of Sokoto in the appointment and deposition of Emirs, see Last, 1967, pp.180-81; and as applied to Zaria, M.G. Smith, 1960, pp.74 ff.

against what he described as infidel rule.¹ The situation which had been created in Yola by the invasion scarcely gave time for rational discussion; there was hardly any precedent. It was a tragedy for the Muslims, many of whose relatives and friends, had fallen in the war,² and what was probably uppermost in the minds of the people at the time was the personal losses they had sustained in the war and the virtually unbelievable thought that it had all happened so suddenly.

The first move of the councillors was to accept that the Europeans (nassara)³ had by the invasion become a factor in their lives and politics. On re-entering Yola, the councillors found the British still in occupation. A meeting was immediately arranged between the councillors and British representatives. The councillors were interested in putting an end to further hostilities, but the British felt that once the question of succession had been satisfactorily arranged the cause of hostilities would have been removed.⁴ Each of the rival factions in the internal politics, that is to say, Galadira Fariku and the Sandites on

1. Gazetteer, 1927, pp.20-22.

2. Morland's report put the figure of Yola dead at 50 and those wounded at 150. On the British side only two men were killed and 37 wounded. Oral tradition is not specific on any figures. The informants say 'very many died, about 400 fighters'.

3. Christians, from the Arabic naṣārā.

4. Informants 2 and 3, Yola; CO 446/16 Wallace to CO 23.9. 1901. British strategy during the negotiations with the Yola representatives consisted in assuring them that the invasion had been directed against Zubeiru personally.

the one hand, Alkali Ahmed Joda and Bobo Ahmadu on the other hand, (see above, pp.284 ff) took the British demands as an occasion for a renewal of their decade-old rivalry for the sarauta.

Galadina Fariku nominated Iya to succeed Zubeiru, but Bobo Ahmadu and Alkali Ahmed Joda opposed the nomination arguing that the population would not accept Iya because it was contrary to tradition for a grandson to succeed when a son was still alive. They feared that there would be civil strife and a demand to re-instate Zubeiru, or the house (sudu) of Adana.¹ Alkali Ahmed Joda further counselled that while Zubeiru still lived it was risky to ignore him completely; before they parted with him he had expressed the wish that he would not mind if Bobo Ahmadu succeeded him at Yola. The path of continuity would be seen to have been left intact and that would be evidence to the people of the good intention of the British.

Wallace who had taken direct charge of the negotiations was in a dilemma because he apparently preferred Iya.² Like his father he was shy and rather reserved in his manners. He already had a basis of support among the people and for many years he had remained estranged from

1. Informants 2 and 3, Yola.

2. In Chamberlain's cable to Wallace, approving the invasion, Wallace was instructed, following Lugard's recommendation, to reinstate Zubeiru after the conquest, or failing that either Zubeiru's brother Bobo Ahmadu, or Iya. See n. 1 above, p.437.

Zubeiru and his policies.¹ On the contrary Bobo Ahmadu was too closely identified with Zubeiru and so he could simply become his mouth-piece; and in the event of Zubeiru planning to come back, the British were not convinced that Bobo Ahmadu would take active steps to prevent him.

Wallace had expected a unanimous appointment, but in the face of such grave divisions, no firm decision was taken; instead Dr. Cargill, who was to remain as Resident, sent messengers to Zubeiru with offers that he would be allowed to settle in peace on his farm at Girei if he returned to Yola.² When the messengers arrived at Gurin, the people refused to give any information concerning Zubeiru. The British were therefore forced to accept the appointment of Bobo Ahmadu after a week of uncertainty and bargaining, installing him as Emir of British Adamawa on 8 Sept. 1901.³ Two days after, the ceremony marking the formal imposition of British rule was held at Yola in which Wallace read the conditions under which the British were installing Bobo Ahmadu. These conditions included: obedience to the laws of the Protectorate so far as possible, obedience to

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1. E.g. during Sanda's reign Iya was Sarkin Yaki, but less than a year after Zubeiru became Lamido he appointed Hammoa Petel (so called to distinguish him from Hammoa Ahijo) to replace Iya as Sarkin Yaki. Cf. Alis, p.321. It is mistakenly stated that the appointment was in succession to the Galadina, although it might probably be that when Zubeiru became Lamido Iya resigned and the Galadina acted as Sarkin Yaki until the new appointment.
 2. Barclay, 1907; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.59 puts this after Bobo Ahmadu's appointment.
 3. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.58; Barclay, 1907.

the Orders of the High Commissioner, no restriction on trade, assistance in public works, mineral and uncultivated land to become the property of the Crown.¹ If the Lamido adhered faithfully to all these, the British like the Germans on the southern districts of Adamawa promised 'protection' and support. This broke the link between Yola and Sokoto as well as between Yola and three quarters of its dependencies.

With this, British rule had come to stay in Yola, but the position of the British was a delicate one. Like all innovations it had to prove its worth before the people could accept it, as against simply acquiescing to it. There was still the fear that Zubeiru might come back with a force drawn from other districts. The British took no chances and Wallace decided to leave an occupation force consisting of two officers, two N.C.Os and one hundred and twenty men of Captain Baker's F. Company, 2nd Northern Nigeria Regiment, at Yola.² They constructed an encampment at Jineta, seven miles to the northwest of Yola, where it was proposed a station would be built to house the European officers who were to administer the emirate for the British.

No matter how much the British officers rejoiced at the official levels, those in Yola felt worried about

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1. CO 446/16 Wallace to Chamberlain 26.9.1901 enc. 2
'Letter of appointment of Bobo Ahmadu son of Adana.
 2. *Ibid.*, Wallace to Chamberlain 26.9.1901; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.58.

their lack of information of Zubeiru's plans. While at Sebore Zubeiru wrote the Sultan of Sokoto and his letter provides us with an indication of his thoughts after the conquest of Yola. He spoke of 'the terrible trouble' which had befallen his emirate in obvious reference to the German and British invasions of Adamawa. He lamented that Fulani rule had become ruined by the Christians, and continued:

We were warned and believed not, but I heard this news last year from Nupe.... Further to tell you that the rule of the Christians has reached our town Yola, only but not over me as I escaped and those with me, or over our dependent villages. But I have left and now to-day there are three days between me and Yola, and I am seeking a place to hide from the severity of the earth's dampness, until it dries. You will learn, if Allah wills, of the position between us and the Christians. I will not be double-faced towards you and the Christians. My allegiance is to you by Allah and the Prophet and after you to the Imam Mahdi. ¹

As regards his plans for the future, he re-affirmed that he would not follow the unbelievers even after the capture of his towns against the command of the Prophet. He concluded: 'We are begging aid from Allah. I have send you thirty cows by Barau, my present to you. Peace'.

It is not altogether clear what Zubeiru hoped to achieve by this letter, but perhaps he felt that at a time when all the Muslims were faced with a common threat, if he had the Sultan actively behind him, the Sultan would

1. Backwell, 1927, Zubeiru to Amīr al-muminīn, Letter No. 112.

refuse to confirm the appointment of a successor as had been the case in Bida in 1898¹ and so initiate resistance which would make his comeback to Yola easier. At least it was in his interest not only to win the support of the Sultan, but also to inform him that he was still alive and determined to continue the struggle against European aggression.

While he sought to win the sympathy of Sokoto he continued to work strenuously as Lamido to explain his objectives and warn his people about the inherent dangers to their religion and customs in submitting to European rule. In a circular letter which he requested to be read in the mosques throughout the emirate, no reference was made to his abdication; instead he declared:

I am going to Marua, I shall return and we will drive out the heathen. If they prove too strong, leave Yola and follow me to a new country. The Koran forbids you to sit down with the heathen. What do the mallams think of the burning of our Mosque? The heathen wish to obtain our Kingdom. Have no dealings with them. 2

Unfortunately for Zubeiru's resistance movement, the information reached the ears of Dr. Cargill through an informant at Girei. Rather than frightening the British, it intensified their counter-measures against Zubeiru. Dr. Cargill

1. For a full account see R.A. Adeleye, 'The Overthrow of the Sokoto Caliphate 1879-1903', (Ph.D. thesis, Ibadan 1967). Chapter IV.

2. Gowers, 1905; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.59.

informed the Germans of Zubeiru's intension to proceed to Marua. He ordered Bobo Ahmadu to send back three of the captured circulars to Zubeiru without comment. He observed in his report that though further letters from Zubeiru to Yola need not be taken seriously, they should not be entirely disregarded.¹

The response to Zubeiru's circular would seem on the whole to have been favourable. From Sebore Zubeiru had gone through Tuki, Linadi, Hibango, Nassarawo, Yeli and then across the Faro to Chebowa. This was one of the rich and populous districts. Its head, Lando Ahmadu, was a man after the heart of Zubeiru in his opposition to European rule. He had recently been involved in fighting the German forces under Dominik on their way to Garua.² He accordingly welcomed and celebrated Zubeiru's arrival. Zubeiru made Chebowa his administrative headquarters and with the support he received from the neighbouring districts he launched a surprise attack on the German position at Garua under the command of Dominik in March 1902. The German troops opened fire on Zubeiru's men and beat back the attack.³

1. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.59.

2. H. Dominik, Rapport relative à la marche de l'expédition Dominik de Yaounde à Garoua 27.1.1902 (TA-27, ANY); L'Adanawa - Rapport du 1er-Lt. Dominik 1.10.1902. (TA-25, ANY) Both these reports provide details of German military actions subsequent to the fall of Tibati. His published account incorporating the reports is Von Atlantik zum Tschadsee, Berlin, 1908.

3. Rapport du 1er-Lt. Dominik, 1.10.1902; Strunpel, pp.41-42; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.60.

As soon as it became obvious that victory had eluded them, Zubeiru and his survivors retreated and turned northwards since most of the southern districts were already in the hands of the enemies. Among all the northern districts Marua was the most populous and the place where he was assured of much support having visited there only four years ago when he came to mourn the death of Lando Sali and installed his son Lando Ahmadu.

But when the Germans learnt he had fled northwards they pursued him, and at Marua, before Zubeiru had sufficient time to rally the neighbouring districts, the Germans fell upon Zubeiru and over 400 defenders who had vowed to die for what Zubeiru stood for. Again Zubeiru and his supporters including Lando Ahmadu made a secret escape to the southwest to Guduk in British Adanawa through Madagali and Kilba.

It was already another rainy season since Zubeiru left Yola, so there was very little he could do to gather together his forces. As a result, he decided to settle in Guduk about twelve miles from Song in absolute secrecy. For the eight months that he was at Guduk he avoided direct confrontation with European guns, but he worked to paralyse the alien administration by fostering acts which would instill fear in the minds of the European authorities.

For instance, in January 1903, he sent agents to wreak vengeance on the Germans by assassinating the German Resident, Graf Fugger at Marua. Having sought audience

with the Resident, one of the agents wounded him in the leg with a poisoned arrow and Fugger died within twelve hours.¹ The climax of Zubeiru's campaigns seemed to have been reached when his agents dropped two letters, concealed in the hollow of a cornstalk in Zubeiru's hand writing in the newly constructed Yola Mosque during Ramadan of that same year. In the letters he announced that he was intending to go to Mecca.²

These measures caused much worry to both the British at Yola and the Germans at Garua especially since Zubeiru's whereabouts were at the time unknown, and after the German carnage at Marua the German authority felt convinced that Zubeiru was dead.³ Zubeiru's campaigns simply confirmed a belief among the local population that Zubeiru was not yet dead, but had in fact gone to Mecca, where after receiving inspiration, he would come back in full force to continue to fight the Europeans.⁴ The European authorities

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1. Strumpel, pp.41-42; Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.61. These sources fail to mention whether the assassin was apprehended or not, and on whose evidence they attribute Fugger's murder to Zubeiru. Oral tradition, Marua, however states that the assassin was never caught, but that it was clear that he was an agent of Zubeiru since he had come from and had fled to British Adanawa.
 2. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.61. These letters have not been recovered. They would have most likely been found among Backwell's collection since documents of that nature would normally have been forwarded to the Office of the Chief Secretary of State. Nevertheless, the story is confirmed by oral tradition at Yola. (See below, n.4 for further observations on Zubeiru's intending visit to Mecca.)
 3. Strumpel, p.42.
 4. Strumpel, p.42. Confirmed by informant 12, Marua. Even today some still believe Zubeiru had come back from Mecca
/cont...

ordered all the district governors to report the whereabouts of Zubeiru and not to maintain any correspondence with him. The British Resident offered a reward of 'cloth to the value of ten slaves or £15 for the capture of Zubeiru.¹ At Madagali, the Germans shot the district governor, Ardo Bakari for having given Zubeiru free passage through his district and not informing the German authority about Zubeiru's movements.²

It was already eighteen months since Yola was invaded and the ruling aristocracy were beginning to be accustomed to live with the British. Even when some felt strong resentment about what had happened and were optimistic about the degree to which European rule could truly become effective, they nevertheless recognized that their defences had never been designed for the sort of wars the Europeans waged. The nature of European warfare was entirely foreign to what the majority of them were accustomed to. Their best weapons were made obsolete before European guns and tactics, besides the Europeans having a better organized

F/note cont. from previous p.

and he is living as a saint in a mountain near Guduk. At that time it does not appear that the local population considered the other possibility as was the case with Adana (see above, p.199) that Zubeiru intended to retire finally to Mecca (see below, n. 3 p.460) for later scares about Zubeiru's return.

1. Lugard's refusal to sanction the Resident's offer of reward came rather late, after Zubeiru had been reported killed. (See Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.63)
2. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.60; Strumpel, p.42.

governmental machinery to cope with the problems arising from their intervention.

All had been witnesses to the tragic fate of so many brave warriors during the invasion of Yola. So that a strong feeling of helplessness in resisting Europeans had spread very rapidly among those districts that lay close to Yola.¹ The district governor of Girei who was supposed to be next only to Yola in his attachment to the Lamido, worried by the number of men who had been killed in battle, refused even to read Zubeiru's letter in which he earlier on indicated he was going to Marua.² The British presence crippled the slave trade, formerly a source of wealth, power and prestige for Adanawa's rulers, and as the years passed their dependence on the new administration for perquisites increased their commitments to the Europeans, as it decreased their acquisition of more dependents.³

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1. I enquired whether the Fulani saw any difference between their jihad wars and the wars brought by the Europeans. All expressed the feeling that it was no use fighting the whitenen, 'because you never really engage in combat with them. Before you reached them you were dead. There was no fighting, the guns killed you'.
 2. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.59.
 3. Masson, 1939, p.8, makes this point in relation to the spread of Islam by the Fulani. He argues that the loss of prestige and wealth from slave dealings weakened the enthusiasm of the non-Muslims and even the partially converted 'pagans' to become clients to their former Fulani rulers and consequently the need to become Muslims. This was true in Adanawa where Islam was 'monopolized' by the Fulani and made almost synonymous with being Fulani, and generally the role of the Hausa traders in the spread of Islam was ignored by the Fulani ruling aristocracy.

In February 1903, Zubeiru decided to re-establish his position at Yola probably working on past experience that during that season it would be difficult for the British to send reinforcement to Yola through the Benue. Consequently he sent verbal messages to the district governors through whose districts the expedition would pass and solicit their support.¹ This proved fatal because Lando Song, who was just eight miles from Guduk, was one of those governors who had since the fall of Yola been convinced that it was suicidal to fight against guns. He refused to side with Zubeiru but obeyed G.N. Barclay's instructions to report all communications with Zubeiru.

Having ascertained the validity of the information, Barclay lost no time and on 16 February despatched Dr. Meal with Sergeant Lowe of second Northern Nigeria Regiment and twenty-eight rank and file to proceed to Song. On the night of the 18th another division of O.C. Troops and twenty-five mounted Infantry were sent out on forced marches to join the first party at Song.² In the morning messages were sent asking the Guduk people to surrender and hand over Zubeiru

1. A detailed account of Zubeiru's stay at Guduk was narrated to me by the retired district governor of Song whose father was deeply committed in the events. He was just over twenty years old at the time. I am grateful to him not only for an account of Zubeiru, but also for making it possible for me to meet eye-witnesses of the British attack on Guduk in February, 1903. The accounts were recorded on tape and will be deposited at the Archives Nationales, Yaoundé.

2. Kirk-Greene, 1958; p.61.

to the British. This was refused. After morning prayers they made special ablution, like those of a corpse before a funeral, to render themselves clean in the eyes of God and awaited the invasion with a firm resolve to either overcome the enemy or die in defence of their religion.¹ Some ambushes were laid against the British force, but the open nature of the savanna made such tactics less effective and so the invaders forced their way until they reached the town of Guduk.

Zubeiru's fighters had taken position on a hill which dominated access to the town, to increase the effect of their bows and arrows. After several hours of fighting the British took the hill,² and made straight for the palace, but as they approached, the defenders broke beehives which threw the enemy into confusion and enabled Zubeiru to be rushed out of the town in the direction of Sinterere in Gaanda district.³ Lieutenant Nisbet reporting from Song to the Resident at Yola said:

The Guduk people fought very bravely and the bayonet was used with effect before we cleared the hill. [The enemy lost 33.] Zubeiru had a tremendous influence over them but unfortunately

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1. Informant 9, Song. Much stress is given to the determination of the Guduk people and the fact that they felt threatened that their religion was in danger under European rule.
 2. Kirk-Greene, 1958, p.61.
 3. Informant 9, Song.

for them our bullets did not turn to water...
 I am now waiting for more ammunition and
 the maxim as I hear Zubeiru has reached Gaanda;
 I am determined to chase till we kill, capture
 or drive him out of the country.

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For two weeks, having received new reinforcements from Yola, the British troops roamed and terrorized the region in search of Zubeiru in defiance of the Resident's advice that the troops should return to Yola.² But Zubeiru was never again heard of and since then many stories have been advanced to explain Zubeiru's disappearance.³

This brought to an end almost a century of Fulani rule in accordance with their ideals and through their own agents. However, it is true to say that generally, the personnel of the new administration was essentially the same, influenced and dominated by the Fulani ruling aristocracy. It was not their government which had been discredited, but what the British saw as the 'wholly irreconcilable attitude of their fanatical chief'.⁴ From then onwards the

1. Quoted in Kirk-Greene, p.62.

2. Ibid., pp.61-62.

3. The most popular belief was that Zubeiru had gone to Mecca. Before Zubeiru left Guduk he handed a gown and cloak to a certain man to preserve them until his return. In 1908 there was a scare when he was thought to be on his way back to turn the Europeans out of his emirate. The rumour of his return caused considerable anxiety to the British administration because of a coincidence of two related events. The return to Kilba of many of Zubeiru's devoted followers, and a warning from the military Commandant at Fort Lamy that Zubeiru was reported to have passed through Wadai and he was heading for Yola. (Cf. Annual Report Yola Province 1908. NAK No.21327.)

4. Annual Report of Northern Nigeria, 1902.

important goals and standards of government were set by the Europeans and the Fulani rulers became the agents of British authority. Lugard, writing in his report to the Colonial Secretary, clearly indicated the fundamental difference that was introduced in the emirate at the overthrow of Fulani rule.

The Government utilises and works through the native chiefs and avails itself of the intelligence and powers of government of the Fulani caste in particular, but insists upon their observance of the fundamental laws of humanity and justice. Residents are appointed whose primary duty it is to promote this policy by the establishment of native courts in which bribery and extortion and inhuman punishment shall be gradually abolished..... If an Emir proves unamenable to persuasion or to threats and will not desist from such actions he is deposed and in each case a Fulani or other successor recognized by the people has been installed in his place. The traditional tribute (except that in slaves) paid by villages to their chiefs is insisted upon and its incidence and collection are being regularized so as to prevent extortion or an undue burden on the agricultural and trading classes. 1

The early reaction of the people to this policy, which has since been interpreted as 'Indirect Rule', and the effect it had on Adamawa, is another fascinating study which falls outside the range of the present work.

1. Annual Report of Northern Nigeria, 1902.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTESA. PRIMARY SOURCES:1. General Remarks:

The greatest problem in research on Adamawa^{wa} is the scattered nature of the sources and the number of languages involved. Broadly speaking the sources fall into two periods - the pre-European period, i.e. before the Europeans became an important factor, and the period of European intervention. For the pre-European period I have relied principally on two categories of sources. 1) The accounts and oral traditions recorded by early British, French, and German officers. These are chiefly to be found in administrative reports in archives in Nigeria and Cameroon. II) My own field notes and tape recordings of oral tradition during a year's (1966-67) field work in Adamawa.

In addition I have also drawn substantially from contemporary travellers' journals especially Barth and Mizon. The motives these men sometimes imputed for people's actions were mistaken, but their observations have proved invaluable and I have quoted from them liberally. The sources for the second period pose comparatively few archival problems. The main depositories are in Britain, France and Germany.

2. Oral Tradition

Before I set out for field work, I had completed much of the archival work in Britain and France and given a preliminary account of my work as a paper for discussion at the Postgraduate African History Seminar at S.O.A.S. This made it possible for me to locate the areas to which I would be directing the greatest attention in the field.

While in Northern Nigeria, Professor H.F.C. Smith and Dr. D.M. Last very kindly introduced me to the authorities and friends at Yola. This was necessary to establish my identity as a bona fide student, especially in view of the political disturbances. In addition, I had the good fortune to travel to Yola from Kaduna in the company of a distinguished Yolan, Alhaji Ahmed Joda. Within a few days, he introduced me to practically everybody who mattered and this was of particular advantage to me.

I was based at Yola for nearly five months, the longest period I spent in any one station. For the first two months my emphasis was on developing my knowledge of Fulfulde which I had started learning three years before during vacations spent at Bogo, Northern Cameroon. I also examined local archival material at the Provincial and District Archives. During this initial period my enquiries were more of a general nature taking up points in the traditions with the administrative records as my basis,

and feeling, as it were, for those informants upon whom I could place the most reliance.

The other three months were taken up by recording interviews in Fulfulde on tapes (see Appendix 'Oral Tradition, Tibati', for an example of the nature of the recordings). On some topics, especially the description of the Adamawa administration, the recordings from Wakili Kawu were played back to a group made up of the Galadima, Nenne Manu, Marafa, and Muhammadu Song. The original ideas were discussed and useful additions were sometimes made.

Throughout I found it necessary to work with interpreters, men of repute who commanded much local confidence and were deeply rooted in the society and its customs. My principal informants in all the towns and villages I visited were those who were known to be the 'historians' in the region. Unlike say in Dahomey, Akan and Yoruba societies, in Adamawa the preservation of oral tradition has never been officially organised nor centralised in the hands of professional narrators. In the past, just as now, those who narrated the traditions acquired their knowledge through personal efforts and interest, and one cannot refer to an 'authorized version'. The best informed men on particular events were usually those nearest the scenes of the events. Such a situation necessitated considerable touring in search of such men for each particular

topic, and visiting the areas directly connected with the major events. As I travelled from one town to the other, I cross-checked information about one district which I had heard from another district.

There was no preference for either group or individual interviews. Indeed very often I had no control over the informants and I had to incline to their wishes. Before I visited any town I endeavoured to send ahead a questionnaire indicating the sort of problems I was enquiring about, to reach the town a few days in advance. The questionnaire was in three languages, English, French and Fulfulde. This approach saved me much time, though at Rai it seemed to have been mistaken for an official document and for a while the informants would not answer questions that were not specifically mentioned in the questionnaire. On the other occasions it served the double purpose of announcing my pending visit and enabling the lambe or government officials to make some prior preparations, for example, to secure informants.

From my experiences I believe that no general rule could be drawn for the purely archival work of collecting the most useful traditions for ones work (see Curtin, JAH 9 (3)). Much depends on the personality of the researcher, the time of his visit. (I chose the period just after the harvest and before the planting season began) and above all luck and commonsense. My recordings will be deposited at the Archives Nationales, Yaounde.

LIST OF PRINCIPAL INFORMANTS

Yola:

1. General view among all informants.
2. Wakili Kawu, 75; has travelled extensively in Adamawa; over fifteen years stay at Ngaundere; very learned and generally held to be the best historian at Yola.
3. Nenne Manu, 77; related to the Yola royal family; has spent his entire life at Yola; he spoke mainly from personal remembrance and what he learnt from his father and grandfather.
4. Galadima Aminu, 76; the Lamido's most senior councillor; learned man; grandson of Modibbo Raji b. Ali who came to Adamawa from Gwandu during Lauwal's reign.
5. Ahmadu Marafa, c. 44; has travelled extensively in British Adamawa in the early days as an interpreter to District Officers and Residents; very interested in history and story telling; for his published work see A. Marafa, Ranar Tabbatad da Lamido Zaria, 1955.
6. Malam Sambo, 67; a learned man whose grandfather was a close associate to both Zubeiru and Bobo Ahmadu.

Garua

7. Comité Historique made up of Lamdo Garua, Alhaji Abdullah; learned in Arabic, received French education.
Modibbo Hamadou Bassoro, 54; very learned; Chief Alkali Garua.
Waziri Sali
Lawan Hamadou; 54 very widely read, reputed to be the best Arabist in Garua.
Lawan Babale, 57; the grandson of Ardo Bakindu who was K. Strumpel's chief informant.

Song

8. General view among all informants.
9. Lamdo Song Tukur (retired); over 85; he knew Zubeiru and could recollect much about the British invasion and current attitudes.
10. Lamdo Song Saadu

Gerin

11. Group summoned by District Head.

Marua

12. Modibbo Bakari and group summoned by Lamdo Marua and the Mayor of Marua, Modibbo Bakari; one of the most learned men in Adamawa; already revered as a saint; a descendant of the Imam Arabu, Hayatu's messenger to the Mahdi.

Bogo

13. Lamdo Bogo, Usumanu, 52; grandson of Lamdo Garie who welcomed Hayatu and gave him the district of Balda; Member of the Federal House of Assembly, Yaounde.

Balda

14. Group of seven men and women who belonged to Hayatu's community, assembled by Lamdo Bogo.

Rai

15. Alhaji Umoru and group summoned by Lamdo Rai. Alhaji Umoru, 60; most learned man at Rai; Secretary and chief adviser to Lamdo Rai; received French education.

Ngaundere

15. General view among all informants.
17. Alkali Ibrahim; 42; received his advanced education at Yola and Marua; has travelled widely in Adamawa and has read the works of many local authors. Certainly a good source for 20th and perhaps 19th century Islam in Adamawa.

18. Modibbo Usumanu dan Yajo; 62; famous teacher maintaining schools at Tignere and Ngaundere.
19. Bellaka Mbum; 62; descendant of Bellaka Koiya.

Tibati

20. Comité Historique made up of Lamdo Tibati, Alkali Mohamadou Dalahilou, Waziri Aboubakar Bounou, Hamman Gowla.

Banyo

21. Group summoned by Lamdo Banyo, Umaru.

Kaduna

22. Alhaji Garba Saidu; grandson of Hayatu; a reputed scholar; has travelled extensively in Northern Nigeria and Cameroon; very good authority on the local sources in Arabic, Fulfulde, Hausa and English.

3. Unpublished Written Sources:

a) Cameroon; Archives Nationales, Yaounde (ANY)

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- TA - 21, Lt. Von Duisburg, Contribution à l'histoire du Sultanat de Mandara, 1911.
- TA - 24, Radtke, La Soumission de Baubandjida, 1910.
- TA - 25, Lt. Dominik, L'Adamaoua - Rapport - Impression d'un voyage effectué en Adamaoua au Bornu et dans les territoires du lac tchad, 1902.
- TA - 27, Lt. Dominik, Rapport relatif à la marche de l'expédition Dominik de Yaounde à Garua, 1902.

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b) Nigeria: National Archives, Kaduna.i) Arabic MSSSokprof

File II, no. 36. Ardo Buba son of Buba Joda to Lamido Zubeiru.

File IV, no. 24. Muhammad Manga to Sultan of Sokoto.

Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University

A40, Hayatu b. Sa'id to Uthman (Amir Bauchi)

A6 Hayatu b. Sa'id to Muhammad b. Manga.

Adamaprof

File I, no. 2. Aliyu Babba to the people of Adamawa.
(see text and translation in Appendix)

no. 3. Maigari to Lamido Zubeiru.

no. 6. Bello to Adama (A) 'Outline of duties of district governors'.

no. 7. Bello to all Moslem Communities.

Bello to Adama (B) in 'Abd al-Qadir b. Gidado, Majmu al-rasa'il.

Bello to Adama (C) in my possession to be deposited at ANY.

Bello to Adama (D), GOK Box 2, no. 94.

Abdullah al-Kanawi, Nubdha min Dhikr Awsaf al-Bilad Adamawa, IAS/AR/128, University of Ghana, Accra.

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H. Wilkinson).

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District Office, Yola.

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since its inception by W. F. Gowers, 1905.

2) History of Yola by K. V. Elphinstone, 1905 (inc-
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- 3) History of Yola Province by G.N. Barclay, 1907.
- 4) History of Yola Emirate by J.M. Freemantle, 1908.
- 5) Notes on the Yola Fulani by C.V. Boyle, 1909. (published in JAS, Vol. X, 1910-11.
- 6) General Notes on Adamawa Province by C.W. Alexander, 1931.

c) London

i) Public Records Office Archives. The relevant series are:

- 1) Africa (FO/2) under 'France' and 'Germany', 1899-1900; FO2/118, the entire file is taken up by correspondence on Rabeh including the report of Sherif Hassan, one of the messengers sent to Rabeh under the auspices of the Intelligence Division, Cairo. In addition the FO/2 series contains correspondence on Baikie's expedition, duplicated letters of the CO/446 series from the CO on the expedition against Yola, 1901, and R.N.C. treaties with chiefs.
- 2) France FO/27 under 'Africa' and 'Africa Various', 1893-98.
- 3) Germany (Prussia FO/64) under 'Africa' and 'Africa Various' 1893-98.
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- 5) Slave Trade Papers (FO/84) under 'Domestic Various', 'France' and 'Germany', 1883-92.
- 6) Africa (FO101) under 'Central African Mission'.
- 7) Northern Nigeria (CO446), 1898-1901.

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ii) British Museum

Lugard F. D. Annual Reports of Northern Nigeria 1900-02.

d) Paris

i) The main depository is the Archives de la Ministère des Affaires Etrangères- Section d'Outre Mer, 27 rue Oudinot, Paris, 7^e, under 'Mission Mizon'. The documents cover Mizon's two expeditions to Muri and Adamawa (1890-93). The most useful files are Afrique 111, 14-17. Unlike the diplomatic exchanges between France and Britain on the Mizon Missions, which appear in the 'Mission Mizon' files, those between France and Germany have not been included in the collection. The interesting documents include Mizon's manuscript reports to the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, reports to Harry Alis, draft speeches to organizations, and Mizon's diaries.


One of his diaries contains 100 letters written (in pencil) between Dec. 1892 and July 1893. Some of these were instructions to members of his expedition; others were letters to the agents of the African Association and the R.N.C., the Compagnie Française de l'Afrique Centrale

and the famous French shipping Company, Chargeurs Réunis. Another diary of special importance is entitled 'L'histoire du Muri et de l'Adamaoua'. This was an attempt to record the history of both emirates from Oral Tradition. His principal informants for the history of Muri, were Abubakar, Emir of Muri, and the chief of Bachama; For Adamawa history, Lamido Zubeiru, his brothers and the Arab chiefs in Yola. This account was edited and published as an article, 'Les Royaumes Foulbés - du Soudan Central' (see published sources below).

ii) Centre des Hautes Etudes et d'Administration Musulmane (CHEAM).

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APPENDIXA'Memorandum on the Jihad in Adamawa'

by

Uthman dan Fodio

Na fara da sunan Allah Ubangijin Talikai, dukkan godiya ta tabbata ga wanna Sarki wanda bashi da abokin taraiya. Tsira da amincin Allah ya tabbata ga Annabin mu da Shabban sa da Alayan sa, Ubangijin Allah ya karbi rokon mu ya cikamu da Imani Amin. Ya kai Modibbo Adama a yau na shugabantadda kai daga cikin jama'ar Fulani da kake tare da su ba domin ka fisu ba, sai tai amincin ka da suka daidaita a gareka. Ni ma nayi na'am da kai, hak ika shugabanci a lokacin da muke ciki na wannan gurbataccen zamani yana da wuya ka fahinci wasiyyata ka kuma rike su sosai, ka sani dukkan kasar kudu baka da iyaka da kowa, sai iyaka tsakanin ka da Buba Yero da Gwani Mukhtar; Na horeka ka karfafa sunan manzon Allah, kuma kuyi Jihadi ta fi Sabillillahi, duk lokacin da kuka yi nasara a Yakin Jihadi ku kyautatawa bayin da kukka kama, ku musuluntadda su, kada ku sasu aikin da yafi karfin su, ku kyautata masu gayar kyautatawa ku fara yi masu alheri in an samu kafin ku yiwa kanku, idan kun nuna masu karatu sun sauke sun kuma fahinci Addinin Musulunci kuyi auranya tsakanin su ku yanta wadanda suka sami daidaiduwa ga Addinin Allah kamar yadda take a cikin littafin Alkur'ani mai girma, kuma a wurin yaki kada ku kashi mata da yara da tsofaffi, banda ku bata gonaki da itatuwa masu amfani na abinci in ba domin ci ba,

kada ku fadawa Arna da yaki watau hari, ba tare da sun ha'ince muku ba kamar yadda littafin Allah ya fadi. Har ila yau ina maka wasiyya kada ka chi arnan Batta da Verre da Yaki ku kama yayan su ku bautar, domin ko sun zalum ce ku ba a hana kuyi ramuwar gayya ku kwace abinda suka zalunta daga gareku da yaki ba. Amma in har Allah ya baku nasara akan su ku barsu suyi zaman su kada ku watse su kwata kwata, in sun nemi sulhu ku amsa.

Bayan haka ya kai Adama lokaci ne mai wuya da shike ka shaida mani wasu manyan Fulani basu zo tare da kai ba sun aiko ka ne ka karbi tutan Jihadi gareni ka kai musu; Na umurce ka ka shida musu ni na baka kaine na ba wannan tutar Jihadi kuma ka shaida masu duk wanda ya bika ya bini, kuma wanda yayi mubaya'a gareka kamar yayi mini Mubaya'a duka daya ku hadu ku shirya ku kuma manyan Fulanin nan da shike dama su sarakuna dukkan su a karkashin Mulkin kafirai da muke so su shiga Addinin Allah, su kuma ka daurawa ko wannen su Tuta kamar yadda na daura maka ka yanke masa wurarendda kowa zai iya rekewa gwargodon darajan su su ci gaba da Jihadi ta fisabilillahi ka zabi nagari gaga cikin ? su wadinda zasu iya taimakeka da shawarwari ku ci gaba. Na foreku ku nisanci zalun ci, barna, zubda jini ba tare da alhakin Shari'a ba son kai da banbanci dangi, domin in har kun soma nuna bambancin dangi da darajar haifuwa al'amanin ku zai tsinke; wannan kuwa zai lalata dangan taka da gamuwar hankali, in ko an yi rashin gamuwar hankali Yakin Jihadi zai raunana har yakin basasa ya shiga, wannan kuma zai kawo baci bayan gyera. Ka saurari shawar warin manyan Fulani daka basu tutoci ku shirya

bakinku ya zama daya bisa shirin gaskiya da aikata alheri tsakanin ku da Allah ka girmama su ka kyautata musu. Koma zaka yi kayishi da gaugawa yawan maganganu shike bata niyyoyi ka sani tsoron Allah ya taru cikin abu biyu bin Umurnin sa da barin Sabon sa Allah Ubangiji ya taimake mu Amin Amin.

Wannan takarda an rubuta shi a ran 5 Muh. AD 1225 -
watu a shekarar 1909.

1809?

TRANSLATION:A. 'Memorandum on the Jihad in Adamawa'.

by

Uthman dan Fodio

I begin in the name of God the Lord of Creation; all thanks be to this Lord who has no rival; peace and blessing be on our Prophet and upon his friends and kinsfolk. May the Lord God receive our prayers and fill us with faith.

Modibbo Adama today I have made you leader from among the Fulani people with whom you are, not because you are superior to them, but because of the trust which they have in you.

I too accept you.

Certainly leadership in these disturbed times in which we are is not easy. You are to understand my injunction and hold fast to it. You are to know that as regards all the south-lands, you have no boundary with any one, apart from the boundary between you and Buba Yero and Gwoni Muhkta.

I adjure you to strengthen the tradition of the Messenger of God and conduct Holy War for the sake of God. Whenever you gain victory in the Holy War, you should give good treatment to the slaves you capture, make them Moslems, do not force them to any task that is beyond their powers, treat them as well as you possibly can, do good to them first if possible before you do it to yourselves.

If you teach them how to read, and they complete the Koran and they acquire understanding of the Moslem religion, you may intermarry with them, and liberate those who have had the opportunity of becoming true Moslems, as it is written in the Holy Koran. And in war you are not to kill women and children and old people, and you should not destroy farms, and useful fruit-trees except for eating.

Do not attack, that is make raids, on the pagans unless they break faith with you, as God's Book says.

Furthermore I enjoin you not to conquer the pagans of the Batta and Verre or enslave their children. Because even if they oppress you, you are forbidden to retaliate in force and recover by force what they seized from you. But if God grants you victory over them you must let them live their own lives and not disperse them completely, and if they ask for peace you should agree.

Now Adama, the times are difficult, since you tell me that some of the Fulani did not come with you, but they sent you to come and receive the flag of the Jihad from me and take it back to them, I instruct you to tell them that it is you to whom I have given this Jihad flag, and tell them that whoever obeys you obeys me, and whoever swears fealty to you, it is exactly as if he had sworn fealty to me. You should meet and come to terms with these Fulani leaders, since they have all been chiefs under the rule of the infidels since we want them to spread God's religion; you can give to each of them a flag as I have given you; you should allocate to them districts that each can hold, appropriate to their rank. They should carry on the holy war for the sake of God. You should choose virtuous ones from among them who will be able to help you with advice and so continue.

I warn you to avoid oppression, wanton damage, spilling of blood without the sanction of Law, and, nepotism, because if you indulge in partiality and class distinction, your authority would be broken, and this would destroy satisfaction, understanding, and good relations, and if good relationship is lacking, the Holy War would suffer and a destructive war would start, and this would bring harm even after it has been settled.

You should listen to the advice of the Fulani leaders to whom you have given flags; and you must see that you are in agreement with them on just courses and right

actions as between you and God; you should respect them and behave correctly to them without deceit.

Whatever you do you should do it promptly, for too much discussion ruins the best intentions. You should remember that fear of God depends on two things: following his orders and eschewing disobedience.

May God the Lord assist you.....amen amen.

This letter was written on the 5th. day of March (Mul), 1225 i.e. 1809.

B. 'Aliyu Babba to the Muslim Community (Adamawa).'

In the name of God the Merciful the Beneficent, and thus, praise be to God for His bounties, and blessing and peace upon Muhammad, his family, his companions, and those who followed them, in the measure of His heaven and His mountains.

(seal)

Greetings from us to the community (jama'a)! Written with the unalloyed substance of love, compassion, and sincerity. And may God, in fullest satisfaction and reward, lengthen your pleasure and enjoyment for the Day of Resurrection.

And including the inquiry about your resolution and determination in your present circumstances, with regard to your frontier and the evil of your enemy, as well as about your sleep and negligence, owing to your preoccupation with a luxurious life and comfort. Just as the poet said:

Alas! I see how your affairs are

scattered, while that of the people is united.

Do you not fear a people lest, towards your property

they become suddenly like wolves?

Each year they prepare to fight you

they are not negligent while the careless one slumbers.

Nothing satisfies them, nay! they do not consider

anything, short of your property, to be satisfaction.

While you plough the earth in widths,
 in every employment hoping for a harvest.
 But I see you slumbering in luxury
 though you see war's meteor shining.
 You are not like him who spends the night anxiously
 who, when it is said 'Do not worry', persists.
 Look after your horses and polish your swords
 and flex the bows for the arrow and string.
 Cure your diseased one by means of a sound judgement
 a fragrance with which his heart is soothed and made
 content.
 Stand up solidly upon your feet
 then attack and the affair will be saved.
 Do not be concerned with cattle for you have none
 indeed the enemy has more property than you have.
 But use your property as a safeguard for yourselves
 and for your womenfolk and you will not perish of greed.
 Oh people, do not trust, if you are jealous
 of your women, in Chosroes and all he possessed.
 Behold! I give you freely of advice without interference
 so pay attention for, indeed, the best wisdom is
 that which can be of use.

And an inquiry also about your oath of allegiance and
 ʔbediencē to your leader (ʔmir), and about your adherence
 (luzūm) to your community (jama'a), and about your abandon-
 ment of your own kind, which will lead to your failure,
 resulting in turn in the dispersion of your power (rih).
 And God has said 'and dispute not one with another, lest
 you get weak-hearted and your power depart'. And He has also
 said 'and hold fast by the covenant (habl) of God altogether
 and be not disunited'. According to Ibn Mas'ud 'the covennat
 of God is the community (jama'a)'. And according to Ibn
 'Abbas 'the community (jama'a) abides and only separated
 nations (umam) perish, owing to their dispersion; have you
 not heard the word of God: 'hold fast by the covenant of God

altogether and be not disunited"?' And according to Abu Huraira the Messenger of God said 'God is pleased with you on account of three things and displeased with you on account of three things: He is pleased with you if you worship Him and associate nothing with Him and if you hold fast to the covenant of God and do not become disunited, and if you act in good faith towards him whom God has put in charge of your affairs. And He is displeased with you for bearing tales, for asking too many questions, and for squandering property'. And (it is written) in the Sahih 'He who withdraws obedience will meet God on the Day of Resurrection without evidence (hujja) in his favour, and he who dies without having taken an oath of allegiance dies a pagan death (mita jahiliyya)'. And in his Bahjat al-nufus, Ibn Abi Jamra says 'The oath of allegiance (bay'a) is obedient to the command of God and of His messenger, since it is part of what has been commanded by Holy Law (shar'an), and nothing other than that is meant by it'. According to the words of the Prophet 'There are three men whom God will neither speak to nor look at on the Day of Resurrection, nor will He declare them innocent, and theirs will be a grevous punishment'. And he counted among them a man who takes an oath of allegiance to another but only for the sake of this world. Whether he fulfils it or not it will not be reckoned in his favour. And since the basis (asl) of the oath of allegiance is God it is the support of Muslim solidarity (kalimat al-muslimin). And in support of solidarity lies the authority derived from the faith/law (din) and the Holy War (jihad) against the enemy. But if the oath of allegiance is to the things of this world and to its vanities and personal pleasures all will come nought. And by support for Muslim solidarity (dittography) the enemy will be brought low and the ordinances and laws of God established. And for that reason fighting the enemy has been enjoined, under the command of any authority,

be he pious or impious. And keeping to the oath of allegiance has been enjoined, though the leader (amir) be black and ugly (? with a foam encrusted mouth and swollen nose), he shall be heard and obeyed, even though he may have oppressed and robbed (his people). And it was said 'Oh Messenger of God, what is your opinion about leaders ('umara') placed over us who demand their rights from us but refuse to grant us our rights?' He replied 'Give them their rights and seek yours from God, Who will surely hold them to account for what He imposed upon them.' And traditions (ahadith) in this vein are abundant. And Al-Haytami said in a tradition (hadith) 'Counsel rests with the imams of the Muslims, who are the caliphs and their deputies (nuwwab), in matters concerning right/duty/truth (haqq), such as ritual prayer behind them, Holy War with them, remission of alms to them if they request it or are just, refusal to rebel against them even if they are unjust, prayer for their correct conduct and help for them towards it, making them aware of it and reminding them of its roles, exhorting them but with mildness and kindness, pointing out their oversights, and avoid leading them astray with lying praise. Al-Turtushi said 'And guiding them when they err, and teaching them what they do not know, and warning them against those who seek evil ends by means of them, and informing them of dissent among their subjects from their actions and conduct, And aiding them in their need, and assisting them in the gathering of solidarity (kalima), and in returning to them those souls who stray'. In short, the oath of allegiance (bay'a) is just as Ibn Abi Jamra, the friend of God, said in Bahjat al-nufus 'it is especially a renewal of the oath of allegiance to the Prophet, and a confirmation of it. And the oath of allegiance to the Prophet (bay'at al-nabi) is to God, as He Himself has said "Those who swear allegiance to thee do but swear allegiance to God. The hand of God is above their

hands", (and "And God enjoins justice and doing good and giving to near relations, and he forbids impurity and evil and rebellion (baghy), He admonishes you that you may be mindful".')

May God direct us and you to that which is correct and pleasing to Him, and may He place us among those who take the oath of allegiance to God and observe its duties, and may He not impede us with the disappointments reserved for those whose course in this world goes astray, who think that they are acting correctly. And he who wishes to meet his Lord, let him perform good works and in the worship of his Lord let him associate no one else. That is all.

من الله عز وجل انما بعد حمد الله على ما فعله والصلوة والسلام
على محمد وآله الطيبين الطاهرين وصلى الله عليهم جميعا
وسلم

عننا والجماعة سلاما بسواد خالها الوداد والرافة والنصيحة مكتوب
بهاتم الهمم بعينون ام الله لكم بنا والسرور اليه وما تشدود محبوب
يليه السؤال عنكم وعنكم وبيما كنتم عليهم من امر الله فيكم وشر
عدوكم وعرفوكم وغفلتم بالفتنة لكم في رفاهينكم بيلهينكم كما قال الشاعر
يا ليتنا نعلم ان كاننا اموركم شتوا وجميع امر الناس جمعنا
الا نحن نعلم اننا لا ابالكم امسوا اليكم كما مثال الذباير على
في كل عام يستنور اليكم لا يتنور اذا ما غفلت عن
لا شئ يتشبههم بلا يور لهم مردود بينكم ريبا ولا شيعا
وانتم في ثور الارض عشر في كل ما عملت في جور في ذرعا
مالي اراكم في امان ببلهينية وقد تروا شهداء الحرب في سدا
ولا تكونوا فيكم فذباته مكننا اذا يقال له اذ وقع تحت كنعنا
صوننا جيا بكم واجلوا سيوركم وخذوا النفس النبل والشرعنا
واشبهوا النبل بساى منكم قيسر يسرى فواد له ويار فذفينا
فوهوا في امانا علمنا شاهد ارجلكم ثم جزعوا فديان الامر من قذرا

لا تلهكم بغيري ليعتدوا ان العدو يعظم منكم في عسا
 وانتم واترسلواكم في حوز انفسكم وجزا منسوتكم لا تهاكوا صلحا
 يا قوم لا تاملوا ان كنتم عبيد اعلو نساكم كس ورجل
 ان فعلت لكم نصح بلاه ضل واستيفطوا ان حبي العالم انفعنا
 والسؤال ايضا مما يعتدكم وعمر ما اعتدكم لا ميني كم وعمر ان ومتم جبا عظم
 وعمر ككم منا اعتدكم التي تؤدي الرضا لشككم الذي يودي الرضا هاب ويحكم
 والله تعالى يقول ولا تنازعوا فتعبدوا او تذهب ربحكم وقال عن وجب
 واعتصموا بحبل الله جميعا ولا تفرقوا ابر مسعود رضي الله عنه حبل الله
 الجماعة وعابر عباد من رضي الله عنهم الجماعة الجماعة انما هلكنا الا من
 الخالية بتبعي هذا ما سمعت فوالله واعتصموا بحبل الله جميعا ولا تفرقوا
 وعابر في بيعة رضي الله عنه ان رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم قال ان الله يرحم
 لكم ثلاثا وبسخط لكم ثلاثا يرحمكم لغيركم ان تعبدوه ولا تنفروا بوجه
 شيئا وان تعتصموا بحبل الله ولا تفرقوا وان تلتاحوا امرؤ الله اللطامكم
 وبسخط لكم فيك وقال وكثيرة الاسوال واضاعة المال وبالصحيح
 من خلع يوما من جماعة لغى الله يوم القيامة لاجنة له وقرمات ليعرف عنفة
 بيعة مات صينة جاهلية قال ايراب حصة في بيعة النور من البيعة
 تكورا متشالا امر الله عن وجل وله رسوله صلى الله عليه وسلم انما من جماعة
 الامور به تشعلا ايراد بها عيني ذلك لقوله صلى الله عليه وسلم ثلاثا
 لا يكلمهم الله ولا ينظر اليهم يوم القيامة ولا يذوقهم ولا هم عند اب اليم
 وعنده فيهم رجلا بايع رجلا لا يبايعهم الا للدين يا جبار وولع والابن يروي
 له ولا البيعة اصلها ان تكور الله لا تتلاق كلمة السلمير وباتتلاق

الكلية

الكلمة بكون الخب عن الدين وجماعة العدو واذ كانت البيعة لدرنا
 وخطابها وخطوط النعير فشد جميع الامور وبتلاو كلمة المسلمين
 وما تعلق كلمة المسلمين تحمل نكايه العدو وافامة احكام الله
 وصدود من لاف الامم بقتال العدو مع كل من وواجب من الغلظة وامن بحفظ
 البيعة وارتاد الامم اسود ذاز يستثير بنجوخ الخيشوم وينسج له
 ويكاع وارضرب الفاني واخذ المال وقيل يا رسول الله ارايت اقولى علينا
 امرا اطلبون منا حقوقهم ولا يعطونا حقوقنا فقال عليه السلام اعطوهم
 حقوقهم واطلبوا حقوقهم من الله فان الله سائلهم عما استحقوا هم
 والاحاديث في هذه الامور كثيرة وخال الهيته في حديث النصيحة
 لاينة المسلمين هم النجباء او نوابهم فيما يوافقون في الصلوة عليهم
 والجهاد معهم واداء الصدقات اليهم اطلبوها او كانوا اذ يرون في
 الخروج عليهم واجاروا والدعاء بالصلاح لهم ومعاونتهم عليه
 وتشبيهم له وتذكيرهم واحكامهم واعطيتهم لكثر في ربي
 والحق واعلامهم بما غطوا عنه وعوم اعوا بهم بالتشياء الكاذب
 عليهم فالله طوبى وارشادهم عند الدعوة وتعليمهم ما جهلوا
 وتذكيرهم مما هم يجهلون السوء واعلامهم باخلاق عمالههم وسبيهم
 في الهمة وتذكيرهم عند الحاجة ونصرتهم بجمع الكلمة عليهم وزجر
 القلوب الكافرة اليهم والحاصل ان كلمة بيعة كما قال ولي الله ابراهيم
 في بيعة النجوس انما هي تجديد لبيعة النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم وتأكيد
 لها وبيعة النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم لغوله تعالى ان الذين يسلمون
 انما يسلمون بوجه الله جووا بوجههم اتقوا الله يا من بالعدل والاحسان
 وايتساءلوا في ونبير عن العجشاء والمنكح والبغى بعلمكم لعلمكم فذكر في

وعيننا الله واياكم الى ما يحب ويرضاه وجعلنا من بايع الله ويري اعلى
 حفر فيها وارلاي عفتنا بالاضحى يراعى الا الذي ير ضار سعيهم
 الحيوه الدنيا وهم يجلسون انهم يجلسون صنعوا ويرعان من جوا الفاء
 ربه وليهم اع ملاحا ولا يشركا بعبادة ربه احدا

والسلام

CAward Given by Baron Lambermont in the Question of the "Sergent Malamine".

Having agreed, with the King's consent, to undertake the functions of Arbitrator, which his Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the French Republic have done me the honour to confer upon me, in a question caused by the passage of a French Mission through the basin^s of the Niger and of the Benue in 1893, and by the seizure by the British authorities of a French vessel, the Sergent Malamine, and her cargo;

Being animated by a desire to respond by a careful and impartial award to the confidence reposed in me;

And having, to this end, duly examined the documents produced by the two High Parties;

I have decided and do decide as follows:

Seeing that the duty of the Arbitrator is thus defined in the Arbitration Convention signed by the two Governments on the 3rd April, 1901: "The Arbitrator shall give a final decision in regard to the amount in the indemnity for the loss of the "Sergent Malamine", which sum shall not be less than £5,000, nor more than £8,000";

Seeing that, according to the Case and Counter-Case furnished by the French Government, the indemnity should be calculated on the value of the vessel, on a part of a postal subsidy lost by the charterers and on the value of the cargo, while, according to the Case of the British Government, the indemnity should correspond only to the value of the vessel;

Seeing that the question has under various aspects, and without ever reaching a solution, formed part of the negotiations, which for a number of years have proceeded between the two Governments with a view to a general settlement of their relations in Africa;

Seeing that the documents produced by the Parties in support of their respective Cases, refer to different phases of the litigation:

I consider it necessary to clear the grounds on which my conclusions are to be founded, and with this object, to examine the conventional law involved, and to inquire into the questions of liability, without reopening controversies which have remained undecided.

The Berlin Conference proclaimed and provided for the free Navigation of the Niger and of its tributaries: equally of all flags; no differential treatment; no toll based on the mere fact of navigation, those taxes alone being collected which are in the nature of payment for services rendered to navigation; free transit for ships and the merchandise which they carry; executive Regulations in accordance with the spirit of these stipulations - these are the chief guarantees assured to the navigation of the Niger and its tributaries.

But the General Act of Berlin does not confuse trade with transit. It does not extend to the territories watered by the Niger and its tributaries, Article IV., which exempted from import duties merchandise imported into the conventional basin of the Congo. Merchandise imported into the territories of the Niger and its tributaries, or exported from those territories, may, unless it merely passes in transit over the river or its tributaries, be subject to import and export duties: Certain ports are opened exclusively for this purposes.

Every customs system is protected by penalties for infractions of its laws.

The traffic in arms is prohibited in principle. Exceptions are allowed in certain specified cases only.

Such being a summary of the system, it remains to be seen whether the British authorities had power to put it into force, and whether the other party violated it.

By the General Act of Berlin, two conditions are necessary for taking possession of a new territory or of a Protectorate: notification to the other Signatory Powers of the General Act, and the existence of authority sufficient to protect existing rights.

The Rules as they apply only to territories situated on the coast of the African Continent, did not affect British authority on the course of the Benue. Nevertheless the British Protectorate on the banks of the Benue as far as Ibi was notified on the 5th June, 1885.

Another Notification, of the 18th October, 1887, was based on, and referred to, the Charter granted to the Royal Niger Company.

The same Notification declared the territories of the Niger or its tributaries, which were or might be under the government of the Niger Company, to be under British protection.

This Company exercised in 1893, over the course of the Benue as far as Yola, authority supported by means adequate to insure the accomplishment of its task. This was indeed shown by what befell the French expedition.

This system was defective neither in notification nor in means of execution.

Other stipulations related to the position of British authority in these same regions.

A list of the native chiefs, with whom the Company had concluded Treaties, was annexed to the Charter of the Niger Company, notified on the 18th October, 1887. The Sultan of Muri was included in this enumeration.

On the 5th August, 1890, the French and British Governments entered into an Agreement by which the spheres of action of the two countries were separated by a line starting from Say, on the Niger, and passing along the northern frontier of Sokoto to the town of Barruwa on Lake Chad. No exception was made as to the Benue, on

which are situated Muri and a considerable part of Adamawa. This was the position of things in 1893, at the time of the French expedition.

It should be observed that the Treaties concluded by Lieutenant Mizon with the Emir of Adamawa and the Sultan of Muri were signed at a time when the system described above already existed on the Benue.

The French expedition acted contrary to this system by carrying on commercial operations at various points which were not open to trade, or by refusing to pay the import or export duties imposed by the Regulations in force.

The Brussels Conference paid especial attention to the traffic in arms. "The experience of all nations who have intercourse with Africa," says Article VIII. of the Act of the 22nd July, 1890, "has shown the pernicious and preponderating part played by fire-arms in Slave Trade operations, as well as in intestine wars between native tribes; and this same experience has clearly proved that the preservation of the African populations, whose existence it is the expressed wish of the Powers to safeguard, is a radical impossibility if restrictive measures against the trade in fire-arms and ammunitions are not established."

Consequently, the importation of fire-arms, and especially of rifle and improved weapons, was forbidden in a zone which embraces the basin of the Benue. An exception was made in individual cases in favour of persons who offer a sufficient guarantee that the arms and ammunition delivered to them will not be given, assigned, or sold to third persons, and for travellers provided with a declaration of their Government, stating that the weapon and ammunitions are destined exclusively for their personal defence.

The declarations made by the French Ambassador in

London, and by the head of the French expedition himself, were conceived in this spirit.

But the arms transported by the French Mission were handed gratis to the Sultans of Muri and of Adamawa.

This proceeding is incompartmentable with the spirit of the Brussels Act. The matter would be doubly serious if the gift served as a means of negotiation with the native Chiefs, who eagerly desire improved weapons.

From this statement it follows, on the one hand that by engaging in commerce in the basin of the Benue, without regard to the customs system there established, the French expedition exposed itself to the penal consequences of its infractions of that system, and, on the other hand, that by delivering improved weapons to two native Chiefs, it acted contrary to the provisions of the General Act of Brussels.

But, in inquiring into the liability incurred, it is only fair to take into consideration the times and surroundings in which occurred the events above recorded. When the centre of Africa ceased to be a blank space on the map, all eyes were turned with increased interest to the economic and political chess board which was being opened out to the world. Explorations and expeditions under various flags increased in number and crossed each other. Territory was taken possession of under various forms; sovereignty, Protectorates, spheres of influence. In 1893 matters were still in a state which often rendered it difficult to have a distinct and uncontested conception of the debit and credit account of each Power in Africa. Such considerations may belong to the sphere of politics, but they cannot, on that account, be neglected in judging of action taken under their influence.

It must, moreover, be borne in mind that the object of the Convention is to close the incident submitted to arbitration in a manner corresponding to the sense of equity and of conciliation with which the two Governments are imbued.

Finally, it must be remembered that the principle of an indemnity is admitted by the Convention of the 3rd April, 1901, and that difference of opinion bears only on the ground which it is to cover.

It is necessary to keep all these points in view in dealing with the various elements involved in the final assessment of the indemnity.

1.--The Vessel

Whereas the British Government offered to restore the vessel, and when it foundered offered to repay its value:

Whereas as regards the vessel it is thus merely necessary to estimate its price:

Whereas the French Case reckons the expense of building the "Sergent Malamine" at 151,833fr. 75c., and, calculating the rate of depreciation at 5 per cent, estimates the value of the vessel at the time of its seizure at 125,267fr. 80c.;

Whereas, although the price of construction can be taken as correct, sufficient allowance has not been made, in fixing the rate of depreciation, for the fact that the ship was sailing on the West Coast of Africa on the waters of the Niger and its tributaries, and had not the facilities for repairs afforded by European harbours:

In these circumstances I decide that the rate of depreciation must be raised to 7 per cent.

2.--Objections raised in the British Case respecting Postal Subsidies and Cargo.

Whereas the British Case admits as basis of the indemnity merely the value of the ship itself, excluding all other elements: such as the loss of postal subsidies or of cargo;

Whereas the British judicial authorities ordered the confiscation both of the "Sergent Malamine" and also of all merchandise belonging to the French expedition;

Whereas, subsequently to this order, the Convention of 3rd April, 1901, stipulated for the payment of an indemnity for the loss of the "Sergent Malamine";

Whereas this Diplomatic Act neither decides what is meant by the loss of the "Sergent Malamine", nor who is to benefit by the indemnity;

Whereas if the text of the Convention is ambiguous, the two Contracting Parties are equally responsible for this lack of clearness:

I consider that there is no need to reject a priori claims relating to the subsidies and to the cargo;

And I decide that the question of interpretation raised by the British Case must, in the first place, be settled in accordance with the above-mentioned considerations, and in connection with the liability involved.

3.--The Postal Subsidies.

Whereas the "Compagnie des Chargeurs Reunis," owners of the "Sergent Malamine", received from the French Government a yearly subsidy of 38,475fr. for twelve trips a year;

Whereas the "Sergent Malamine" was, with the consent of the French Government, placed at the disposal of the "Compagnie de l'Afrique Française" for a period of one year, to expire on the 15th October, 1893;

Whereas at this date the "Sergent Malamine" not Having returned, the "Compagnie des Chargeurs Reunis" made a new Contract with the French Government, by which the number of trips a year was reduced from twelve to six, and the subsidy reduced by one-half from the 1st February, 1894;

Whereas the plaintiff demands two indemnities;

(a) An indemnity for the period between the day on which the "Sergent Malamine" should have returned, and the date on which the new Contract with the Administration of the French Posts came into force;

(b) An indemnity for the period between the coming into force of the new Contract and the signature of the Convention of Arbitration -- that is, from the 1st February, 1894, to the 17th July, 1901.

(a)--Period from the 15th October, 1893, to the 1st February, 1894.

Whereas the charters had no part in the actions and the liabilities with the seizure and detention of the "Sergent Malamine":

I declare it just to indemnify them for the injury which they suffered owing to the absence of the "Sergent Malamine" at that time, a loss calculated in the French Case at 11,221fr. 88c. Nevertheless, I am of opinion that the amount claimed under this head should be somewhat reduced, as postal subsidies are not a profit pure and simple to those who contract for them, but are to an amount which they reach about half the total, so calculated as to cover the risks and charges of public services which Governments desire to stimulate or to maintain.

(b)--Period from 1st February, 1894,
to 17th July, 1901.

Whereas in virtue of their new Contract with the Administration of the French Posts the "Compagnie des Chargeurs Reunis" was only bound to perform half the number of trips at first stipulated and whereas they retained the postal subsidy corresponding to that half;

Whereas as regards the other half, one and the same Contract cannot have had the effect both of reducing expenses and of maintaining intact the right to payment:

I decide that there is no foundation for the claim to an indemnity for this second period.

4.--The Cargo

Whereas, under their Contract with the "Compagnie des Chargeurs Reunis," the "Société Française de l'Afrique Centrale" had the sole management of the running and of the trade of the "Sergent Malamine";

Whereas the conditions under which they carried on trade in the basin of the Benue made them liable;

Whereas they are, therefore, liable for wrongful acts done;

But, whereas the consideration mentioned above, tending to extenuate their responsibility in a certain measure, can be applied to their case:

I consider that there are sufficient grounds for a decision which would alleviate in part the loss which they suffered:

For this reason, and having regard for all the considerations successively brought forward:

I fix the total indemnity to be paid by the British Government at the sum of £6,500.

(Done at Brussels, in triplicate, the 15th July 1902.)

(Signed) BARON LAMBERMONT.

D

Oral tradition, Tibati - 1st session, 25.4.67.

Tape 12.

Informant: Group summoned by the Lando Tibati at his palace; cordial atmosphere.

Sous-Prefet: M.Njeuma studies in England. He is interested in the history of Adamawa. He comes from Cameroun there in Buea, where Foncha, who follows President Ahijo rules. He has travelled to all the countries, there in Nigeria, to Sokoto, Yola and then to Garua, Rai, all Adamawa.

Njeuma: At Tibati my main interest is to learn the history of the Kiri'en; all their history from Gombe to Muri to Chamba and then here Tibati.

Alkali: Shehu gave a flag to Buba Yero to go to Gombe and make jihad. Other Fulbe left Gombe to Jalingo in Muri, then to Chamba.

Njeuma: Why did the Kiri'en leave Gombe?

Alkali: Why the Kiri'en left Gombe - ? to make war, because Shehu began war. Buba Yero was the leader of the Kiri'en at Gombe. Hamman Sambo was leader to Chamba. Also Hamman Ruwa lead at Jalingo Muri. No! not Buba Yero sent them - Sambo and Hamman Ruwa, Lando Jalingo Muri, left Gombe first, then Sambo also rose from this group and led his people to Chamba. Sambo did not come from Gombe to Chamba; first it was Jalingo, then to Chamba. Sambo was a strong man; he wanted his own town; so he did not stay at Jalingo.

Njeuma: Was there, as some have said, that Buba Yero did not live well with Hamman Ruwa and Sambo - this is the reason they left Buba Yero and went to Jalingo?

Alkali, Waziri: No, not so; not misunderstanding, but war.

Waziri: Sambo and Hamman Ruwa were great warriors. They were not given flags. They went to Jalingo to fight for themselves not for Buba Yero. When they conquered Jalingo, Sambo rose and came to Chamba. Here he built a town. What he wanted was to be ruler.

All the Fulbe are called Kiri only because they lived with Kiri Habe in Gombe. Before they were like Wollarbe. They (Wollarbe) are now at Ngaundere, Turuwa, - the Kiri'en in Gombe, Jalingo, Chamba and Tibati. Wherever they go they take cattle, but it was war which made them come to Tibati. They fought the Chamba, they defeated them; then Modibbo Adama appeared. Buba Yero did not rule Chamba, but he ruled Muri. Modibbo Hay was Kiri. He was the first to come to Chamba - yes isn't it - before Sambo. When Adama brought the flag, only Sambo he gave a flag.

Alkali: Yes there is something important in that history. Sambo was not a son of Modibbo Hay. Modibbo Hay was his uncle. Hamman Jam was father of Sambo. Sambo, Hamman Jam and Modibbo Hay were all from Muri. Modibbo Hay was the first to come to Chamba but Adama gave a flag to Sambo because there was a dispute among their children, Modibbo Hay and Sambo. Sambo's son was killed by Modibbo Hay's family. When they went for judgement, at Yola, Sambo received the flag. It was to compensate him when Sambo's man was killed. Sambo asked Modibbo Hay to give him one of his children. He gave him Ardo Hammadu. Sambo made him Galadima.

Njeuma: How about the disagreement between Adama and Sambo?

Waziri: There was much, until Sarkin Musulmi Atiku gave Sambo a flag. He said he too should become ruler - Sambo. The disagreement between Adama and Sambo was because of Laro and Banyo. Sambo was the first Pullo to come to Tibati, even to Ngaundere, Banyo, Tignere - Sambo ruled all. After him then the Wollarbe also came. Adama was not a warrior, only he was learned. Adama did not rule Tibati. Shehu gave Adama a flag because they (Shehu) wanted only learned men. Shehu was only a religious reformer, a great man; many people in Sokoto followed him. He brought religion; he said they (Muslims) should make jihad in every land. Adama also gave Hamman Dandi a flag. Dandi was the son of Sambo's uncle. Sambo said to Adama, 'I'll go to the place you got the flag since you have given my brothers the same flag as mine'. Atiku turbaned him, gave him a flag. Adama said he was going to follow Bornu. Atiku died forty days afterwards, and the new Sultan Ahmadu said Sambo should again follow Adama.

Njeuma: Why did Sambo leave Chamba to go to Tibati?

Waziri: Isn't it that Adama gave Laro a flag? Yes - Sambo wanted a big town so he left Chamba with many warriors.

Njeuma: When? About how many years after Adama brought the flag?

Alkali: Nearly ten years.

Waziri: Then Bello was Sarkin Musulmi: Shehu had died. From Chamba, Sambo came to Ngaundere. He conquered Ngaundere; he settled there for four years before he left Umaru with Bellaka Mbum - he was called Koiya. Njobdi came; he said to Sambo, 'We want land to rear our cattle'. The Wollarbe had many - very many Cattle, but the Kiri'en had only a few cattle. Sambo gave him just grass and water, but no territory or Habe. Wherever Sambo fought he won. He built a mosque and left followers, then he passed. He fought because Shehu said they (Muslims) must fight for the religion. Sambo conquered Ngaundere, Banyo, all over the Adamawa plateau (lesdi hosere). Then he went until he reached Fumban. He won. Wherever he won he took many Habe and brought them to Tibati. So Tibati became rich. This is the reason Sambo went to Sokoto so that he too might become a great ruler. The man who conquered Ngaundere was Ardo Njobdi. Ardo Njobdi called Buba Njidda, Lamdo Rai; also he called Sambo so that they could conquer Ngaundere. They fought and they won Ngaundere. Ngaundere began to grow until it surpassed Tibati with wealth. One day when Ardo Issa (second Lamdo Ngaundere after Ardo Njobdi) went to war in Baya country, Hammidu Nyambula (son and successor of Sambo) took his warriors to Ngaundere and cut the feet of Ardo Issa's mother. They fought and they fought, and Ardo Issa pursued Nyambula. Ardo Issa did not enter Tibati but he returned to Ngaundere. Lauwal said he would go to war against this Nyambula. Nyambula dug a trench round Tibati and so Lauwal could not enter Tibati.

Njeuma: Now, can I still see the trench?

All: Yes! It is there, not far from here.

Alkali: Yes we shall show you. The trench goes round Tibati, so that no horse can come into Tibati. Before (the war with Lauwal) Nyambula ordered his men to cut down all the fruit-trees and to stay inside Tibati. Lauwal came with warriors from Tignere, Banyo, all Adamawa, but they did not conquer Tibati. We stop here so that you come we show you the trench. If I say that, is it not correct?

All: Good.

(We broke-off and I was shown portions of where the trench passed).

EList of flag-bearers, by districts, by Wakili Kawu (1966).

1. Agorma	21. Gamsargu	42. Mayo Farang
2. Bame	22. Garua*	43. Mayo Luwe
3. Bandake	23. Gebake	44. Mbasengi
4. Banyo	24. Gebore	45. Michika
5. Baseo	25. Gembenchi	46. Moda
6. Be	26. Gola	47. Mubi
7. Beka	27. Golombe	48. Mugulbu
8. Bibemi	28. Guduk	49. Ngaundere
9. Bindir*	29. Guidder	50. Pariya
10. Bogo	30. Hamdala	51. Rai*
11. Burha	31. Holma*	52. Ribadu
12. Chamba/Tibati*	32. Joboli*	53. Song*
13. Cheboa*	33. Kilba*	54. Sorau
14. Daware*	34. Kontcha	55. Uba
15. Dembo	35. Lakdo	56. Yadafa
16. Demsa	36. Laro	57. Zummu*
17. Digino Hodango	37. Madagali	
18. Digino Jubawo	38. Malabu	
19. Durum	39. Marua	
20. Figil	40. Mayo Jarendi	
	41. Mayo Bantaji	

List of Adama's flag-bearers, by districts,
by Ahmadu Mafafa & Nenne Manu (1966)

1. Agorma	22. Lakdo
2. Bandake	23. Laro
3. Banyo*	24. Madagali
4. Baseo	25. Malabu
5. Bibemi	26. Marua *
6. Bindir	27. Mayo Luwe
7. Bogo	28. Mbengi
8. Burha	29. Michika
9. Chamba/Tibati	30. Moda
10. Cheboa*	31. Mubi*
11. Dembo	32. Mulgulbu
12. Demsa	33. Mindif*
13. Garua*	34. Ngaundere*
14. Gebake	35. Rai*
15. Goila	36. Ribadu
16. Golombe	37. Song*
17. Gorau	38. Sebore
18. Guidder	39. Uba
19. Holma*	40. Yadafa
20. Kilba*	41. Zummu*
21. Kontcha	

*Their leaders were among the first to receive flags.

List of flag-bearers: C.Vicars Boyle 1910 (JAS, Vol. X)


Hamman Sambo - Chamba/Tibati
 Ardo Njobdi - Ngaundere
 Buba Njidda - Rai
 Hamman Dandi - Kontcha, Banyo and Gashaka
 Buba Kubachi - (district not known)
 Bi Bani - (district not known)
 Umaru - Bongi
 Malam Sabana - Zummu
 Mallam Dembo - Holma
 Shebora - (district not known)
 Mallam Dau - Billa Kilba
 Mallam Buba Bindir - Bindir
 Mallam Buba Birona - Mindif
 Mallam Hamman Damraka - Marua
 Sai'd - Maundi
 Mallam Hamman - Mubi
 Jauro Sambo - Bogo
 Mallam Hamman - Song
 Hammidu - (Adama's son) Hibango
 Ardo Abba - Ribardo
 Mallam Dembo - Malabu
 Jauro Tairu - Maifaran
 Yaiya - Uba
 Bakari (Adama's son) given flag but no territory.

FSketch Chronology of Events

1300-1350	Fulani arrive at Kanem as envoys of the king Malle.
c. 1452-63	More Fulani reported entering Hausaland with Islamic books and some passing on to Bornu
18th. century	Many Fulani groups entered Adamawa from
c. 1770	Birth of Adama probably at Beltunde (Weltunde)
1808	A group of Fulani lead-assembled and sent Adama Uthman to report on the jihad.

- March 1809 Uthman gives Adama flag and appoints him leader of the jihad in the 'Southlands'.
- 1810-1811 Adama leads campaign against Mandara
- From c1818 Hamman Sambo conducts campaigns to the south and founds Tibati
- 1826 Adama makes one of his many visits to Sokoto.
- c1829-30 Adama wars against Njidda of Rai.
- 1831 Adama leaves Gurin to settle in Ribadu.
- 1835-1837 Njobdi establishes Fulani rule in Ngaundere.
- 1841 Adama settles at Yola which becomes the capital of Adamawa.
- 1842 Sambo of Tibati receives a flag from Atiku, Sultan of Sokoto making Sambo independent of Adama.
- 1842-1843 Sambo returns Atiku's flag to Adama and renews his loyalty to Adama.
- Feb. 1847 Adama dies, Lauwal his eldest son succeeds as Lamido.
- 1851, 20th-23rd. June Barth visits Yola under the auspices of Bornu.
- 1872 Lauwal dies, Sanda succeeds after a disputed succession.
- 1879 Huchisson, Ascroft and Flegel visit Yola from the Niger Coast.
- 1883 Wallace, Agent of the National Africa Company, visits Sanda and was granted permission to trade and build factories at Yola.
- 1886 Ahmed Joda returns to Yola after a period of travel in the Sudan, Egypt and Mecca.
- 1889 The German, Zintgraff reaches Yola from the Cameroon Coast.
- 1889 The British Commissioner, Claude MacDonald, visits Yola and parts of Adamawa; Sanda refuses to see him.

- Sept.-Oct
1890.
1891 Sanda dies and Zubeiru succeeds him.
Zubeiru sends spies to report on
the nature of the activities of the
Niger Company at Nupe.
- 1891 Mizon visits Yola and parts of Adamawa
and obtains a permit to trade at Yola
annually.
- 1891 Macintosh makes an abortive visit to
the Mai of Bornu through Adamawa.
- 1892-93. (dry
season)
7 Sept. 1893 Zubeiru wars against Hayatu at Balda.
Zubeiru summoned a Conference at Yola
to settle the conflict among German,
French and British representatives.
- Oct. 1893 Rabeih conquers Bornu
1894 Messengers to Rabeih sent at the insti-
gation of the British Intelligence
Division, Cairo arrive Yola en route
to Dikowa.
- Jan. 1898 Death of Hayatu
- Dec. 1899 German invasion of Southern Adamawa
- April 1901 Death of Rabeih and Fadl-Allah's flight
into Adamawa.
- 2 Sep. 1901 British invasion of Yola
- 10 Sept. 1901 Bobo Ahmadu is installed first British
Lamido of Adamawa under British
protectorate.



The Sokoto Caliphate c. 1890