




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Why Congress Must Repudiate the Nuclear Talks with Iran

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Why the Nuclear Talks With Iran Will Produce an Agreement Harmful to U.S. National Security

- Iran will still be capable of making enough nuclear fuel from its enriched uranium stockpile for at least eight nuclear weapons.
- Iran will be able to construct its first nuclear weapon in four months or less.
- Iran will not be required to halt construction of the Arak heavy-water reactor which will be a source of plutonium.
- Iran refused to cooperate with the IAEA during this year's talks, allow IAEA inspectors full access to its nuclear sites or answer outstanding questions about military dimensions of its nuclear program.



The Obama Administration Has Made Dangerous Concessions on Iran's Uranium Enrichment Program




Changes in U.S. Policy on Iran's Uranium Enrichment Program, 2009-2014

2003-May 2012	May 2012	November 2013	Fall 2013
<p>Iran must suspend all uranium enrichment per UN Security Council resolutions.</p> <p>Iran must cease installing new uranium centrifuges per UN Security Council resolutions.</p>	<p>Iran may enrich uranium to reactor-grade as long as it ceases enriching uranium to the 20% level.</p>	<p>Iran may enrich to reactor-grade but any new uranium enriched to this level must be converted to UO₂.</p> <p>Iran must cease enriching uranium to the 20% level and dilute its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium to reactor-grade.</p>	<p>Iran may enrich to reactor-grade using 1,500-6,000 centrifuges as long as any new uranium enriched to this level is converted to UO₂.</p> <p>Iran may install new, advanced centrifuges.</p>



Time for Iran to Produce Weapons-Grade Uranium




Note: these figures use a low-end estimate of centrifuge output of 6,860 SWU. Many experts believe this figure could be 10,800 SWU (37% higher).

Sources: Institute for Science and International Security. See slide 18 for the assumptions behind these estimates.



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Iran's Uranium Enrichment Has Surged Since 2009




Source: Institute for Science and International Security; Harvard University Belfer Center, Institute for Science and International Security. See slide 18 for the assumptions behind these estimates.



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The Danger of Allowing Iran to Do Any Enrichment



Number of centrifuges needed to enrich to weapons-grade

The U.S. reportedly has proposed letting Iran operate as many as 6,000 centrifuges.



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The Obama Administration Has Made Dangerous Concessions on Iranian Plutonium Production



Changes in U.S. Policy on Iran's Arak Heavy Water Reactor, 2003-2014

2003-November 2013	November 2013	November 2014
<p>Iran must cease construction of the Arak heavy-water reactor and heavy water production per UN Security Council resolutions.</p>	<p>Iran may continue work on the Arak reactor but may not activate it.</p>	<p>Iran reportedly will be permitted to complete construction of the Arak reactor under one of two schemes to limit its plutonium production.</p>



Outlook for the Arak Heavy-Water Reactor

- Iran's Arak heavy-water reactor is expected to be completed by 2016.
- Iran will be able to produce about two weapons-worth of plutonium per year from the Arak reactor's spent fuel rods.
- Since Iran refuses to halt this project, negotiators have discussed alterations to this reactor or its fuel so it produces less plutonium. Iran has rejected alterations that cannot be easily reversed.



Other Serious Problems with the Iran Nuclear Talks

- The talks have ignored Iran's ballistic missile program – including ICBMs – which Tehran is believed to be developing as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons.
- The talks have offered Iran billions in sanctions relief and will lead to significantly more relief from U.S. sanctions shortly after a final deal is negotiated.
- President Obama reportedly plans to implement a bad deal with Iran without consulting Congress despite strong bilateral congressional opposition.



**Iran has Defied Two Crucial
Requirements of the
Nuclear Talks with Iran: Cooperation
with the IAEA and Transparency**



Despite agreeing to do so in last November's interim nuclear agreement, during this year's nuclear talks Iran has refused to:

- Fully cooperate with the IAEA
- Permit IAEA inspectors full access to nuclear sites
- Answer outstanding questions about possible nuclear weapons research and development.



Iran Has Cheated on the Interim Agreement

- Iran continued to develop and install advanced centrifuges late last year even though it agreed not to in the interim agreement.
- To resolve this issue, the U.S. and its European allies agreed to allow Iran to test certain advanced centrifuges without feeding them with uranium.
- The IAEA said in a November 7, 2014 report that Iran has been testing advanced centrifuges with uranium.



**Congress Must Repudiate
the Nuclear Talks with Iran and Any
Agreement Resulting from Them**



The United States has made so many one-sided concessions to Iran that the nuclear talks cannot be salvaged.

- The talks are certain to result in a weak, short duration agreement that will not stop or significantly slow Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons
- Congress must reinstitute a responsible U.S. policy on the Iranian nuclear program by approving new sanctions against Iran.





New Sanctions Against Iran

- New sanctions should keep the pressure on Tehran until it provides the IAEA with full access to its nuclear facilities and answers outstanding questions about the military dimensions of its nuclear program.
- New sanctions should also pressure Iran to halt construction of the Arak heavy-water reactor, halt all uranium enrichment and stop installing and testing advanced centrifuges.



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Questions?

Assumptions and Sources

Slides 3 and 5: Timelines for Iranian uranium enrichment are based on a June 17, 2014 report by the Institute for Science and International Security by David Albright and Andrea Stricker, “Iranian Breakout Study Drastically Overestimates Time to Nuclear Weapon,” page 4. Albright and Stricker assume 9,000 IR-1 centrifuges at 6,820 SWU/year. Some experts believe the output of Iran’s centrifuges is higher than 6,820 SWU which would mean the actual timeline may be shorter.

Slides 4 and 5: Amos Yadlin, former head of the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate, and Mark Hibbs, a senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment and nuclear proliferation expert, both believe it would take Iran only about two weeks to convert uranium dioxide or triuranium octoxide (U₃O₈) powder back into uranium hexafluoride for possible additional enrichment. See Mark Hibbs, “Reconverting Iran’s U₃O₈ to UF₆,” Arms Control Wonk, April 27, 2013, <http://hibbs.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1748/reconverting-irans-u3o8-to-uf6>

Slide 6: The Harvard University Belfer Center, Institute for Science and International Security estimates Iran could make 8-9 nuclear weapons from 10,357 kg of uranium enriched by Iran to reactor grade. (This figure was from November 2013; a September 2014 IAEA report said it had increased to 12,772 kg.) The Belfer Center said Iran could make an additional 1-2 bombs from its “medium enriched” 20% enriched uranium and 6-7 bombs from its “remaining LEU” stockpile