AMERICA'S LEADING MAGAZINE ON AFRICA

AFRICA REPORT

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

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Photo Credit:
The cover photograph of President Julius Nyerere was taken by Camerapix.

Interview

Julius Nyerere

Former President, the United Republic of Tanzania

A month before handing over power to his successor, Julius Nyerere reflected on the disappointments and triumphs of his 24 years as president of Tanzania. In a candid discussion with *Africa Report*, Mwalimu reveals his unwavering commitment to socialism and to a free and united Africa as he prepares to play a new role in his country's future.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI and BOB BOORSTIN

Africa Report: During the period shortly after independence, many people looked very hopefully at Tanzania's efforts to implement African socialism. But in recent years, many have held up Tanzania as the example of the "failure of African socialism."

Nyerere: As the "unique failure!"

Africa Report: In light of your recent comments on privatizing the sisal estates, some have even gone so far as to suggest that perhaps you are abandoning some of your socialist economic principles. Given your experiences over the last 24 years, how appropriate has socialism been as a philosophy for Tanzania's economic development, and in hindsight what might you have done differently?

Nyerere: That's a very small question! It can be answered, or at least an attempt can be made to answer it. As far as socialism is concerned, there is nothing that we would not do in the same way. We announced socialism in the Arusha Declaration. If I was asked to rewrite it, I would change some commas, but nothing else. If possible, I would simply strengthen our re-commitment to socialism.

But in the course of building socialism—and especially in a poor, underdeveloped country—naturally you are groping in the dark. You make some decisions that are right and others that are not. So there are certain decisions in the actual attempt to implement our programs of socialism which I think I could have looked at differently if I was starting over again; for instance, the example I gave when I was talking about privatization. I think we rightly decided to put the sisal industry, which was the biggest industry in Tanzania, in the public hands. Actually, I think we had no choice, because the private owners of the estates were not investing at all because the price had gone down.

In spite of our ideology, we had no choice but to take over. But we did not have the management capacity—how could Tanzania have had the management capacity in 1967? We didn't have much industry in Tanzania. Whenever we established an industry, or even in terms of the little ones which we nationalized, we were aware of our own lack of management capacity. Sometimes we asked the capitalist owner of the industry we had nationalized to go into partnership with us, or we signed a management agreement with them. It takes money from us, but what can you do if you are going to establish an industry that you can't manage? You buy management. We are so import-dependent that we import even the management ability. In the case of sisal, somehow we assumed that we could just manage, because it was farming. We went wrong, and we haven't done very well. If I were to do it again, we would pay more attention to management. And we may have had actually to hire management from outside. We did not do it.

But we are committed to socialism. I don't believe myself that the answer is to privatize. Some of those farms that are not doing well may have to be privatized. But what we really ought to do is to pay attention to the problem of management,

This interview was conducted jointly by Margaret A. Novicki, editor of Africa Report, *and Bob Boorstin, reporter for* The New York Times, *during President Nyerere's visit to New York in late September to address the United Nations General Assembly.*

because that is a skill we have not developed. We now have first-class doctors, first-class teachers, first-class engineers, and so forth, but we didn't think that management was a skill we lacked. If I was starting again in the actual implementation, I'd be looking at various areas and asking, do we have the management capacity there?

We're better organized now than we were in 1967. So the problem is not socialism. The problem is the process of implementing socialism. Socialism has served us very well. In a poor country like Tanzania, if we had not opted for socialism, we would have had some chaos. Even our critics cannot avoid saying, "That country has the highest rate of literacy in Africa." It wasn't the highest when we took over—it was one of the lowest. Eighty-five percent of our people are literate. When we started, 85 percent were illiterate. We have universal primary education. When we took over, we had 400,000 children in primary schools and primary school education was four years. We now have 5.5 million children in primary schools. Every child can go to school and primary education is seven years. This is a tremendous achievement.

Our health service is one of the best on the continent. We are poor and sometimes our health dispensaries don't have all the drugs that are needed because we don't make the drugs, we import them. Even for some of the drugs which we make locally, we must import some of the raw materials. So it's a problem. If you don't have the foreign exchange, you don't get the raw materials. But even our critics always refer to this, even if they end up by saying that we are a total failure. But how they explain our success in the social services if socialism has failed in Tanzania, I don't know. We are a very united country, one of the stablest countries on the continent, or even in the Third World. How have we achieved that? We are a poor country. Poverty is destabilizing. How is it that poverty has failed to destabilize Tanzania? And there was not a lack of efforts—people did try to exploit poverty to destabilize Tanzania. How did they fail? Because socialism has given hope to our people.

Africa Report: A lot of commentators are saying that socialism is on the decline in many African nations and that they are turning toward more mixed economies. Do you agree?

Nyerere: Most economies in the world are mixed. It depends upon the emphasis. The British economy is a mixed economy and even the American economy has some public sector. The question is where you put the emphasis, on the private sector or the public sector? Our economy is a mixed economy, but our emphasis is on the public sector. There may be some African countries which went for socialism and didn't think there was any place for private enterprise in their system, but they're discovering that that was a mistake. There is a place, especially during the transition, and perhaps not only during the transition, as Eastern European countries are finding now. There are key areas which ought to be public, but there are some areas which don't have to be public and to try and make them public is to make socialism very difficult because the scale of activities sometimes can be too small. Agriculture is one of them.

So it is possible that a number of African countries which, in the rhetoric about socialism, had neglected the important role that can be played by private enterprise, are now paying attention to that transition. But when those who are basically opposed to socialism in Africa or the Third World see that, they say that Africa is abandoning socialism. That is not true. Certainly we have not abandoned socialism.

Africa Report: Your running battle with the IMF is well-known. Nevertheless, over the last year or so you have adopted some of the IMF's prescriptives such as devaluation, higher producer prices, and a reduction in the number of parastatals. Are these moves in your view consistent with your vision of socialism? To what extent has the IMF been successful in imposing what you've been resisting all along?

Nyerere: Had they actually imposed what we had been resisting, by now we would have an agreement with them! We have no agreement with them. Naturally, life is tough for our people. We can't fool our people that somehow life is going to be easy. Life is going to be very tough. We are bound to go through a very difficult period, but what is the purpose of the sacrifice? Is the purpose of the sacrifice to establish some kind of capitalist system? Abandon our goals? Or to buy us time in order to continue with our objectives?

We oppose devaluation—but not on some socialist grounds. At present there are 18 Tanzanian shillings to the dollar. When we started the debate with the IMF some six years ago, it was 8 shillings to the dollar, but now they want 35. There is no socialist value of the Tanzanian shilling in relation to the dollar. It could be 100 shillings to the dollar, it



Julius Nyerere: "Socialism has given hope to our people" does not matter. The problem is that I want to see the effect of devaluation at that time on our people, what it will mean. With the IMF, it is not simply devaluation; they will say: "Devalue, remove subsidies, and don't increase wages."

We devalued last year. At one time, we removed subsidies. But it was our own program and we put up the minimum wage. If it was an IMF program, we would not have been able to put up the minimum wage. When I have discussed with the IMF over these years, I have said I'm very pleased that the IMF has discovered the African peasant, because there was a time when we used to talk about the African peasant and these fellows didn't know what we were talking about. Today, the IMF comes and tells me: "You must pay a good price to peasants." I feel with that we've made some wonderful converts! There is never an argument between ourselves and the IMF about paying the peasants a good price. No problem. I want to pay the peasants a good price.

What is the debate we had recently with the IMF? They come to us and say: "Give the peasant a very good price." We say: "What is a good price in your estimation?" They say: "Give them a 40 percent increase in real terms." Well, I'm not an economist, so I have to find out from the economists what this means. And they explain to me. And I said that cannot be done. It simply cannot be done. It's ridiculous. How can we? Our country is a peasant country. Most of our people are peasants. When you say give the peasants an increase of 40 percent in real terms, that means a transfer of resources from one sector of Tanzania to the other. It's real wealth you are transferring. Agriculture is the major sector of the country. I love that sector. I've been working for that sector all the time. But how do you transfer this? It's really nonsensical. It cannot be done at all.

And we discover what they're really doing—their eye is not on the peasant farmer, their eye is on the Tanzanian shilling. If you agree to increase the price paid to the farmer at this



Sisal plantation: "I think we rightly decided to put the sisal industry in the public hands"

fantastic rate of 40 percent in real terms—and our inflation is very high, about 30-35 percent—that means increasing the prices by 70 or 75 percent. If you do that, where do you get the money? How do you do it? You devalue the shilling! Massive devaluation! But a massive devaluation in Tanzania raises costs and inflation. We are an import-dependent country. We import everything. Devaluation in Tanzania does not help us to export. It simply makes imports very expensive. We don't import luxuries. We don't! We have cut down our imports and we import only what is absolutely necessary. And then you make it as expensive as possible, by decree. So we have taken some very tough measures. But our own tough measures are unsatisfactory to the IMF and therefore we have no agreement with the IMF.

Africa Report: Do you think there's a hope for an agreement?

Nyerere: No. I do want an agreement with the IMF. I'll tell you why I want an agreement with the IMF. There are two very good reasons. Government revenues are very bad. Reagan has a deficit. We have a deficit, too. The IMF is worried about our deficit, although our deficit doesn't cause anybody any trouble except us in Tanzania. They're not really worried about Reagan's deficit. Because we don't have the foreign exchange to buy the spare parts and the raw materials for our factories, our factories are running at 30, 40, 50 percent of capacity. We get a lot of revenue from sales taxes, from what is produced by the factories. If I can get the money to import the things we need for the factories so that they can run at 60, 70, 80 percent, the government deficit will be wiped out in no time at all. Well, I want to do that. I would like to get that deficit wiped out. That's one reason—any government would want to do that.

The second reason is obvious. We argue about the prices of the commodities which the peasants produce. And we think there's no debate; we want to put up the price. But having put up the price, what does the peasant do with that money if there are no goods in the shops? The real incentive is not the paper money, but goods in the shops. If I had an agreement with the IMF and I was able to get the resources that enable us to import the things we need, there'd be goods in the shops and a tremendous incentive for the peasant. Those are two of the objectives I would like to achieve. The trouble is the price I would have to pay for them. The price I would pay for them if I sign an agreement with the IMF would be riots in the streets of Dar es Salaam!

Africa Report: How long do you give the white regime in South Africa? How many more years do think it will last? And do you think that it's inevitable that liberation in South Africa will lead to a socialist government there?

Nyerere: I don't know how long it's going to take before we see the end of apartheid. The apartheid authorities there have all the machineries of oppression. From the surface they look very strong—they have the police, they have the army, and basically they have the economy which can keep them in power for a long, long time. They appear determined to stay in power. So if you look at it purely from the outside, you see that these people can stay for a long time. The African opposition inside can organize the masses, but they have no fire power. The government has the monopoly on fire power.

These young men and women who defy the state have nothing except their courage and when you see that kind of confrontation you say, how can they do anything? These people can go on for a long time.

I don't know how long it's going to take. But I say again, you cannot be sure when you look at the structures. Do you have termites in the United States? Sometimes you look at a structure from the outside and it looks solid. But internally, the termites have been eating. And you don't need [hurricane] Gloria to get rid of the building! Some determined push will bring the structure down. The people are now putting that structure to the test. For decades, we haven't seen this kind of pressure mounting from the inside and from the outside. Even Reagan eventually had to yield to popular pressures here that he must do something—not this constructive engagement business, but really some pressure to see if we can end apartheid with less violence.

I've watched some of these people on television defending the system, and I must admit, I've not seen it defended with conviction. I can see Bishop Tutu speaking with absolute conviction. Seeing Botha on television, he puts on a brave face, but I can't see that it's coming from his inside. I've seen some of the real right-wingers who speak with tremendous conviction. But these people in power now, I don't know whether they believe in what they are doing. It's possible at one time they did. There are lots of whites in South Africa—most of them English-speaking—who have accepted the system because it was producing the goods. It was protecting their wealth, their standard of living, and so forth. That's why they supported it, not because they believed in it as a philosophy. Some of them are ashamed of it as a philosophy. But it protects their high standard of living. When it ceases to be a protector of their high standard of living, it's beginning to be a threat. How long can it go on? I don't know. I cannot really answer your question.

It's not inevitable [that a change of government will bring socialism] and, let's remember, they are not working for socialism. The ANC is working for the end of apartheid. South Africa has one of the oldest communist parties—it's one of the few African countries with a communist party. They have a small communist party, which works with the ANC because they are opposed to apartheid and they have ideas that when the country eventually becomes independent, certainly they will want to work for socialism or for communism. But the ANC and the masses of the people basically are working against apartheid.

And quite frankly, whatever the rhetoric, I don't believe that post-apartheid is going to be a socialist South Africa. It's not going to be that way. How socialist is Zimbabwe? It serves Botha to say, "We are protecting this country against socialism, communism and so forth, and when the country becomes independent, it is going to go socialist." Actually, I don't believe it. For instance, in the case of Mozambique, what went socialist, what they nationalized, was what had been abandoned by the Portuguese settlers. They abandoned factories, farms, buildings, and those—the abandoned ones—were nationalized. They never nationalized anything which had not been abandoned. What has Mugabe nationalized? He has bought off some farmers—he's actually paid them against his principles in order to make land available to the people. What have they nationalized? I think the ANC will nationalize what will be abandoned. I can't see them nationalizing something viable, on-going. They will find it extremely difficult to interfere with that. South Africa will become Africa's first welfare state, not a socialist state.

Africa Report: What would you say to those who maintain that mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa will cause the neighboring states to suffer first and therefore they shouldn't be imposed?

Nyerere: Sanctions will hurt. They are bound to hurt. They are intended to hurt. Your people are resisting sanctions because correctly they see that they will hurt—they will hurt

"I am a permanent actor until I die on the question of the freedom of my continent."

some businesspeople here. The British are resisting sanctions because they are the biggest investors in South Africa, because they realize sanctions will hurt. They will hurt British interests. And that's why Mrs. Thatcher is resisting, because it will hurt. So if sanctions are likely to hurt businesspeople here and in Britain, sanctions are bound to hurt businesspeople in South Africa. They will also hurt the African states. Sanctions will hurt the frontline states. We had a meeting in Arusha and we discussed this.

We had sanctions against Rhodesia, and while the Portuguese were still occupying Mozambique, they helped Rhodesia to break the sanctions until Frelimo won and Frelimo applied sanctions. They hurt Mozambique very much. They were almost sanctions against Mozambique. But Mozambique is better off now with independent Zimbabwe than if it had not helped and had allowed Rhodesia to continue. So we have discussed sanctions, they will have an impact, they will hurt some of these countries. A few days ago before I came here, we had another meeting of the frontline states and we discussed sanctions and there was again unanimous agreement of all of us that sanctions will hurt, but sanctions must be applied because sanctions will end apartheid much quicker. And if people are concerned about the hurt that sanctions might cause to the frontline states, they should consider what to do to reduce the impact of sanctions on the frontline states.

Africa Report: The Reagan administration continues to uphold its policy of constructive engagement although it appears that it has failed in its objective to reduce regional tensions. What steps would you like to see the Reagan administration take at this point in time and how do you perceive their policy?

Nyerere: The Reagan administration was very polite when it came into power. It sent Dr. Crocker to our part of the world to explain this new policy of constructive engagement. I'm sure they believed in it, that you can bring about change to the South Africans if you are nice to them. We said, "They will use you if you are nice to them." These people want to cling to power, it is a racist country, these are racist policies, they will cling to power. And if you simply verbally say to them, "We don't like your policies, please change," they will be very happy that a superpower is condemning them verbally, but otherwise they are accepting it. It won't hurt them at all, they will just stay. But they thought differently.

Dr. Crocker was here this morning, and I said, 'You did four years, lost, what have you? Four years of constructive engagement, nothing! You are in the second year of the second term, nothing! Nothing to show for constructive engagement!' But the threat of sanctions is very different. Over the last few months, the threat of sanctions is at least producing promises. The South Africans are producing promises of virtually ending the bantustan idea, giving citizenship to those from whom they should never have taken it away, and so forth. The threat of sanctions. . .now these people call it active constructive engagement! We did warn, "The South Africans are very tough, they will use you, they will not want to get out of Namibia, they will not want to change apartheid. The international community will have to work with the internal forces against apartheid to put tremendous pressure on South Africa to change." They said, "No, be nice."

"We announced socialism in the Arusha Declaration. If I was asked to rewrite it, I would change some commas, but nothing else."

And this blessed idea that the South Africans are the defenders of Western civilization there! Really, how can the U.S. accept the idea that racist South Africa is a defender of Western civilization? What kind of civilization? And the nonsense that they are fighting against communism! Where are these communists in Africa? We have 51 African states, how many of them are communist? This blessed idea that this huge country wants to protect Africa against communism! These African countries cannot protect themselves against communism? Where are these communists in Africa? They mention Angola. . .they just refuse to admit how the Cubans got into Angola in the first place and why now they must remain there—because Reagan will not accept the implementation of resolution 435. These people came determined to get the Cubans out of Angola and their policies are such as to make it absolutely certain that the Cubans will not leave Angola. How can a big nation behave like that? If they don't want Cubans in Angola, fine, that's their policy, it's their own business. But why then don't they follow policies which will help the Cubans to leave Angola? Because these it looks to me like a policy which had either been actually announced or was supposed to have been announced by Kissinger: "Let's turn Angola into Cuba's Vietnam. Let them stay." These policies to me are not policies which will help Cubans to leave Angola, but stay there. Well, if that is the policy, it's working. But if these policies are intended to get the Cubans out of Angola, no! The Cubans went there in 1975 because South Africa invaded Angola, because the U.S. panicked, they thought the little communist party of Portugal was taking over Portugal, they linked that communist party with the MPLA, they thought they'd jump in quickly and prevent communism from taking over Angola, and they joined the South Africans. And that's how the Cubans got there.

Africa Report: Do you think the U.S. is doing anything right in its Africa policy?

Nyerere: They did a tremendous job in helping us with the famine. They have been extremely generous with Africa. They have not bothered about ideology. There are some phrases that this government cannot help the communists in Africa, but overall, they have done extremely well in helping famine-stricken Africa. But they went wrong the moment they began to refuse to see African struggle as a struggle for self-determination, when they began to see it purely in terms of the East-West conflict. The whole thing went wrong there. And they don't want us to say it. And I say, look why do you want to be fooled by Africa? I don't help your great country if I fool them. They should know what we think. We want our continent to be free. We don't want to sell our country to the Soviet Union. How much influence does the Soviet Union have in Africa? Where? And where they are, the United States is keeping them there. So I say these things, and when I say them, it's as if I create them. But I don't create them. I say to them, we want to be free. We really believed in the United States, a democratic country, a powerful country which fears nothing from Africa. I believe the United States really should be the ally of Africa. It is not, because they think somehow we want to embrace the Soviet Union!

What do we want to embrace the Soviet Union for? These are superpowers, they want to divide the world among themselves. Africa is in the sphere of influence of the West. My problem is the Western world. We are not in the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. This powerful country, instead of seeing our problem of apartheid as a problem of apartheid—that African people cannot love apartheid—they want us to see apartheid through Moscow. How can we see apartheid through Moscow? If the Soviets give arms to the ANC, is it expected that I would denounce them? Supposing your country arms apartheid, and the Soviet Union arms the ANC, I am expected to denounce the Soviet Union? Why? And intelligent people here say, "Why don't you denounce the Soviet Union?" On what? I can denounce them on Afghanistan, we do. But on Namibia? How can I denounce the Soviet Union on Namibia? Or on apartheid? And I am expected to do that. If I do that, I am a dishonest fool! Where we feel the Soviet Union is acting wrongly with regard to the interests of the Third World, we don't fear, we say so. We are not under the influence of the Soviet Union. We are never afraid to speak freely. But our problems in Africa at present come from the Western world which is led by your country. We shouldn't say so?

Africa Report: With all these problems, why are you stepping down now when so much remains to be done?

Nyerere: I leave it to the young. I'm not saying enough is enough, but I am simply stepping out. I am a permanent actor until I die on the question of the freedom of my continent. It is my life, but I can change the stages. I don't have to remain at the same stage.

Africa Report: What do you plan on doing in your retirement?

Nyerere: I remain the chairman of my party. That's how I started. When I started the freedom of my country, I was not head of state, so I don't really have to continue the fight as head of state. That job can be done by others. I've done it for 24 years. It is plenty. They say, "Mr. President, but you are still young. . ." I say yes, if I were starting today, I'd be elected this year at the age of 63 and at the end of 10 years, I'd be younger than Reagan! But it is not a problem of my age.

I've been there for 24 years and the priority really for this young country is establishing a system, which I think we've done reasonably well. We are a reasonably stable country, united, with clarity of what we want. But it is a young country and we want to establish a system that can work, and I want to participate in establishing the system that can work. We are changing the top leadership. It's a change that needs to be made and we are making it. In our case, we are a single party. It is an important change in this country from one head of state who has been leading the country for the last 24 years to another. It is perceived as being important. And it is important because that change must be made, but not in policies, because we are a single party. Our policies are determined by the party and carried out by the government.

Africa Report: Is there room for another party in Tanzania?

Nyerere: No, not yet. It will come when we have achieved what the United States has achieved, when you have two major parties and both of them are conservative! That's a kind of single-party system, so the basic capitalist system is not being challenged at all! It's a pleasure, I wish I had that kind of system. We'll get there.

Africa Report: So you expect your successor to follow in the same path as your policies?

Nyerere: He will not come with his own policies. I didn't have my own policies. I have helped in the definition of those policies. He will carry out party policies. But he is the head of state, he is going to be the leader of the government. And a government is a government—its style of doing things, its appointments, its emphases are not likely to be my kind of emphases. People matter even if they are all socialists, because they determine the emphases. So style might change, emphases might change, but the policy will remain the same. Even the rhetoric might change!

Africa Report: Your country has been very involved in Uganda's political affairs for some time, but the country still seems to be very unstable. What are the prospects for stability in Uganda?

Nyerere: I don't know. We had hoped that a new era of stability had been established. I don't know what is going to happen, because at present, as we understand it, the new government very correctly asked all Ugandan citizens who were exiles to come back. That is correct because it is a method of building stability. As long as you have large num-

United Nations/B. Wolff

Rice farming in Dodoma: "I'm very pleased that the IMF has discovered the African peasant, because there was a time when we talked about the African peasant and these fellows didn't know what we were talking about"

bers of refugees outside the country opposed to the system, that does not help. So they decided correctly to say to all refugees to please come back and forget the past. But to say that is one thing. To get ex-Amin soldiers back into the army and in positions of responsibility, that's a very different thing. That is not going to help stability. That I understand is happening and that is a worry. That is a worry to the people of Uganda and to its neighbors. That is not an element of stability, it is an element of almost permanent instability and as I understand it, President Moi is working very hard to reconcile the government and the main guerrilla group there led by Mr. Museveni to get everybody to look at this new problem of instability that can come if Amin's former soldiers are allowed in the army, because their record is well-known. I think that is one of the problems that President Moi is asking both the government and the opposition to address themselves to. I hope he succeeds.

Africa Report: What would you like to have remembered as the greatest achievement of your presidency and what was your biggest disappointment?

Nyerere: My greatest success is also my greatest disappointment. We have established a nation—Tanzania—that is some achievement. Stable, united, proud, with immense clarity of what it wants to do, committed to the liberation of our continent. It has played an immense role—poor as it is—in the liberation of our continent and it will continue playing it. So that is what I think is our greatest achievement. But it is also our failure. I never wanted a Tanzania. I really did not believe that these African colonies should establish different sovereignties. They are artificial creations, all of them. And I thought Africa should use the opportunity of decolonization to build more viable units. One of the most viable units we had was the East African area which had been under the same administration under the British. And the infrastructure was there, the system of administration was there, the language was there, both English and Swahili, and we could have established a more viable single state there.

If you are going to give yourself to building a new nation, you could just as well give yourself to building that nation than building a smaller one. In that I failed, and in the whole movement of African unity, in spite of the fact that we have the Organization of African Unity, unique in the world, which gives us some voice. Without the OAU, I don't know what voice the African countries would have. It helps us, it keeps the vision of possible unity and cooperation. But that's not really what we are working for. What we really wanted is a united Africa. We haven't achieved it. But perhaps it would have been ridiculous to think that we could achieve it in these 20 years. The agenda is long and some items of that agenda must be taken up by the young generation in Africa. There is tremendous awareness in Africa of the weaknesses and the potential, and the young generation must take over. □

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Demonstration in Dar es Salaam: "If people are concerned about the hurt that sanctions might cause to the frontline states, they should consider what to do to reduce their impact"

What Prospects for Peace?

Former President Milton Obote's legacy is a nation in disarray. Only by unifying Uganda's sharply polarized society will Gen. Tito Okello's fledgling military government be able to surmount the severe economic, political, and military crises which continue to hold the country's future to ransom.

BY MARY ANNE FITZGERALD

Fourteen years after a little-known soldier by the name of Idi Amin overthrew Dr. Milton Obote while he was attending a Commonwealth conference in Singapore, Uganda seems no closer to settling its internal differences. Some might accuse Obote of being careless—he is the only African president to have been deposed twice—but the reasons for his downfall have far deeper roots. Despite efforts at national reconciliation, the country's prospects for forming an effective government and building a stable economy are remote.

At independence in 1962, this fertile country showed every promise of living up to British expectations of a prosperous East African state. That it has not can be traced to deep-seated ethnic divisions exacerbated by religious differences. Since Amin came to power in 1971, social violence has become endemic, accepted as the norm by an unruly army and encouraged by a clique of officers and politicians. And the economy has been continually battered by years of abuse and neglect.

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Tentative peace formulas agreed to between the warring factions may prove to be worth no more than the paper they are written on. There are no leaders sufficiently strong to implement contentious policies. Obote's legacy is a nation in disarray. More than three months after Acholi troops carried out a military coup, there is still a power vacuum in Uganda's political machinery.

Camerapix

Yoweri Museveni, leader of the NRA: "The fragile peace-making process is in jeopardy and along with it the country's prospects for reconstruction"

The fragile peace-making process that drags on between Uganda's fledgling military government and the rebel National Resistance Army (NRA) is in jeopardy and along with it the country's prospects for reconstruction. While both sides referred optimistically to progress when the third round of negotiations were adjourned October 3, observers are less sanguine. Certainly, if previous efforts to arrive at an equitable solution for cooperation between the two parties are symbolic of prospects for agreement, the prognosis is gloomy. Discussions were initiated August 26. The first three rounds have been adjourned inconclusively.

While both sides have expressed a willingness to negotiate a settlement, their respective demands overshadow options for compromise. Yoweri Museveni, an Ankoli from western Uganda, has spent far more time in exile, from where he conducted his bush war, than in Uganda. He was briefly defense minister in the military commission that masterminded the elections that returned Obote to power in 1980. When he lost at the polls in the December 1980 elections, he took to the bush with 26 other renegades to form the kernel of the National Resistance Movement. Soon after, its military wing, the NRA, initiated a nagging war of hit-and-run attacks against the government's Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), which was named for its role in ousting former dictator Idi Amin in 1979.


Tom Lansner

NRA guerrillas: "Sympathies for the NRA are strong among the rural peasants"

Museveni has put forward a series of tough proposals which center around equal representation with UNLA on the ruling Military Council and integration of his 5,000-odd troops into the armed forces. Initially the government offered the NRA one-third of the seats. During the third round of talks, its terms became more generous—six seats in an expanded 20-man council. Of these, eight were reserved for army representatives with the chairmanship retained by the head of state, Gen. Tito Okello.

The other four dissident groups that opposed the Obote regime have already accepted positions on the council. The Uganda Freedom Movement, the Uganda National Rescue Front, and the Uganda National Army that served under Amin each have one seat. The Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda has two.

Museveni, however, has been seeking seven seats for each side on an even larger 22-man council. He has also suggested that Uganda's four political parties be represented. He himself wants the post of vice-chairman, currently held by Col. Gad Wilson Toko. According to NRA proposals, decisions made in the absence of council members would be reached jointly by the chairman and the vice-chairman. This effectively gives the rebel group a blocking vote when it comes to formulating policy.

It is interesting to note that of the two sets of proposals that were tabled in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi, where the talks have been held, those of the NRA are far more detailed. They range across several subjects including human rights and a program for reconstructing the economy. Unlike the current members of the Military Council, who are soldiers first and foremost, NRA leaders tend to be drawn from the professional class and include teachers, lawyers, and economists. In general, their level of education is higher than that of the UNLA officers. The NRA does not have ranks within its forces.

Another major issue is what to do with all the soldiers that have been fighting each other for the past five years. Museveni has proposed integration of his men into the UNLA with ranking positions for his field commanders. This is impractical, as the UNLA is already bloated, underfed, and sporadically paid.

There are no official statistics on the size of the army, but it is believed to number about 20,000. There is not even a payroll that could indicate how many men are enlisted. Past practice has been for headquarters to send lump pay packets to barracks around the country where they are distributed at the whim of the officers in charge. Even feeding the men is a problem. They subsist on matoke, the savory banana that is Uganda's staple food. Occasionally, their rations are bolstered with the unbutchered haunch of a cow.

Uganda's already stretched public expenditures could not withstand the strain of several thousand dependents. Another irritation is the animosity between the two forces. The NRA foot soldiers are largely drawn from the Bagandan people in the south. Most are supporters of the Democratic Party, which was trounced by Obote's Uganda People's Congress in 1980 elections that were widely criticized as being rigged. The field commanders, like Museveni, come from the west. The army is dominated by Obote's Langi peoples and Gen. Okello's fellow Acholis, both from the north.

In the past, they have executed brutal massacres against the NRA and their supporters. These ideological and tribal differences are likely to surface if the two forces are integrated, even though NRA and UNLA soldiers mixed freely in several towns to the west of Kampala in the hiatus after the July coup. During the informal ceasefire, they sometimes shared the same barracks and could be found lolling side by side at road blocks.

A compromise that both parties have scrutinized is to demobilize both forces and recruit a new national army. However, the mechanisms for this exercise will prove to be daunting. Presumably, a large portion of the soldiers would have to return to civilian life and be resettled by the government. Uganda has neither the administrative apparatus nor the central government authority to implement such an ambitious program.

There are suggestions that the exercise be supervised by the 13-man British military training team stationed at Jinja with the assistance of Kenyan and Tanzanian troops. But even this solution has been cast into doubt. Uganda needs a smaller rather than a larger military profile. Tanzanian troops helped overthrow Idi Amin in 1979 and have a mixed reputation among Ugandans. During the months they remained in the country, much of the responsibility for the looting and murder that took place was laid at their door.

The future of the British team is uncertain. Fearful of antagonizing anyone while the power balance remains unsteady, Britain suspended its training program despite Ugandan requests that it continue. If internal fighting does not abate, British sources say, the team will be withdrawn altogether.

Another issue that rankles is the reintroduction into the army of several hundred soldiers who formerly fought under Amin. Most are Muslims from Amin's Kakwa tribe in the West Nile area. During the Obote regime, they were organized into guerrilla groups. Their rehabilitation has proved unpopular with both the NRA and civilians who remember only too clearly their brutal extermination of some 50,000 Ugandans during Amin's reign of terror in the 1970s. Ruthless fighters, they have been deployed to counter NRA attacks west of Kampala. Others guard government offices in the capital. Kampala residents speak with distaste of soldiers setting down their guns during the lunch hour and prostrating themselves in the direction of Mecca. Southern Ugandans are Christians, most of them staunch Catholics.

"While both sides have expressed a willingness to negotiate a settlement, their respective demands overshadow options for compromise."

Since mid-September, fighting between the NRA and the UNLA has flared up, lending new urgency to the need for an equitable solution in Nairobi. Highly placed Kenyan government sources have spoken privately of Col. Muammar Qaddafy's decision to provide the NRA with armed support. Unconfirmed reports say that arms were dropped behind NRA lines September 25. This is believed to have prompted the official Ugandan delegation to the Nairobi talks to adopt a more conciliatory position. Until now, it was thought the NRA had no outside backing, deterring it from mounting an offensive. Nevertheless, the NRA position is the strongest it has ever been.

Museveni does not seem inclined to compromise, a position that is bulwarked by his current ascendancy in the field. The NRA operates freely throughout about one-third of Uganda. Its troops have surrounded Kampala to the north, west, and southwest and have cut off some vital supply routes. The front line is the trade route from Kenya to Rwanda and Zaire. If this main artery is cut, it will have regional repercussions.

Underlying the Ugandan government's conciliatory stance is its tenuous hold over the country. Last April, the NRA expanded its front westward. Shortly before the July coup, it took control of Fort Portal, 200 miles west of Kampala on the Zaire border. This small farming town is being used as a supply base for NRA operations in the area.

The NRA now has 2,000 troops in its traditional stronghold of the Luwero triangle, bush country to the north of Kampala. It has also established bases as close as five miles from Kampala. In late September, Masaka fell to the NRA. It is 80 miles southwest of the capital and Uganda's third largest town. Mbarara, further away, was taken in mid-September. The next stage of the offensive, according to the NRA is to take Entebbe, only 20 miles from Kampala. If the peace talks collapse, the NRA has vowed to take the capital itself.

This is no idle threat. It appears that Museveni has lost control of his troops in the field, whose morale is unusually high following their latest round of victories. According to reliable Kenyan government sources, Museveni issued an order to stop fighting on September 27. It was ignored. Museveni was absent from the third round of talks in Nairobi, leading to speculation that he had returned to Uganda in a bid to reassert his command. His brother, Salim Saleh, is in command of the forces that seized Masaka.

There is considerable discontent with Museveni among many Ugandans who view him as the major stumbling block in the peace-making process. In early October, Godfrey Binaisa, who briefly served as one of the presidents during the interregnum between Amin and Obote, voiced the opinion of many urban Ugandans. "Whom are they resisting? Are they resisting the collective voice of 14 million Ugandans who are calling on them to lay down their arms or are they resisting the efforts of the government to raise funds for the development of our country?"

Even so, sympathies for the NRA are strong among the rural peasants. Their Robin Hood feats have won them acclaim among these people, who shelter them and provide them with food. Aid workers whose dispensaries are emptied by NRA troops describe them as "very polite." One nurse said she found an empty cupboard with a note, "For the liberation of Uganda" on the shelf. When the NRA robbed a bank at Kabale of $700,000, they bought the townspeople lunch and shoes before disappearing into the bush to count their change.

The army, on the other hand, has a tendency to shoot first and rob afterwards. Reports of atrocities have been mounting, underlining the absence of discipline among the ranks. Two Asian shopkeepers were shot dead and a third wounded outside Jinja when soldiers held them up at a roadblock and robbed them of $5,800. Their commanding officers took no action simply because there is no machinery for court martials.

Camerapix

Gen. Tito Okello, "a soldier's soldier who commands the respect of his subordinates"

In September, troops went on a looting and raping spree around the Langi areas of Lira and Apac. In early October, troops in the Luwero triangle were responsible for several instances of abducting women and school girls, shooting and knifing onlookers to death, and robbery.

At a press conference in Nairobi in early October, Col. Wilson Toko laid the blame for these acts on "army deserters." The Ugandans gathered in the room booed loudly, an unusually overt display of emotion among people who are accustomed to show respect toward their leaders.

It seems that while Uganda's putative leaders are searching for peace, their troops are otherwise inclined. It is this lack of leadership that is the crux of the present stalemate between fighting factions.

Gen. Tito Okello, 71, is a simply educated but well-intentioned man. He has a poor command of English, a fact that is misleading as he is very lucid when speaking in Swahili. He is a soldier's soldier who commands the respect and affection of his subordinates. He is not interested in politics and is unlikely to direct the country on a course toward reconstruction.

Lt.-Gen. Basilio Okello, who led the troops that overthrew Obote into Kampala, may be the one who will ultimately emerge as Uganda's newest strong man. Chief of the defense forces, he has been variously described as "clever," "ruthless," and "capable of being very cruel." He has been touring the barracks throughout the country, presumably to instill discipline in the ranks.

This is necessary if the UNLA is to make an effective stand against the NRA. Motivation is nonexistent and fighting capabilities are questionable. Under Obote, engagements against the NRA were led by North Korean military advisers who manned the artillery in the front lines. Their expulsion has filleted the army's spine.

And whoever does emerge at the top will need the strength of the military to underpin his own power. Ugandans have long ago learned that in order to survive, they must adapt to rapidly changing circumstances, for there is ultimately no forum for accountability other than the next coup. □

The North-South Divide

Seven months after the overthrow of former President Nimeiry, chances for a negotiated solution to the civil war in southern Sudan appear to be slipping away. As Sudan's political and economic future hangs in the balance, the hoped-for dialogue between the Sudan People's Liberation Army and the government of Gen. Abdul Rahman Sawar-Dahab has yet to materialize.

BY CAROL BERGER

More than 40 bodies were found in the desert of northwestern Sudan in late September. Part of a caravan from the famine-stricken province of Kordofan, they are said to have lost their way and then died of thirst and starvation. Perhaps they were on their way to Libya in search of better times. No one has suggested that they were dissidents bound for Libyan exile. Not so long ago, some might have said they were.

But times have changed. Libya and Sudan have renewed diplomatic relations, albeit uneasy ones. The current villain of Sudan's internal unrest is Ethiopia. And with the alleged outside interference, the case for strong military action against southern Sudanese dissidents has gained the upper hand.

In the same week that the scattered caravan gave grim testament to Sudan's rural impoverishment, there was a small but significant uprising in the military barracks of Khartoum. For the first time in 14 years, there were cries of mutiny in the streets. Between September 26 and 27, fighting at army stations in the capital city claimed the lives of at least four people. The violence was apparently sparked off by plans to send unwilling troops into the southern war zone.



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Maj.-Gen. Abdul Rahman Sawar-Dahab: "The longer political instability continues, the less likely it is that democratic elections will be held"

As the mutiny was put down, the city's more than 2 million residents were reminded that the state of emergency imposed during last April's coup was still in force. A curfew was announced and more than 160 people arrested. Of these, more than 50 were low-ranking soldiers from western and southern Sudan. Observers note that the mutiny was not as widespread as the arrest figures would suggest, nor was it as far-reaching in its political motives as the rhetoric coming out of government offices would have us believe.

The official line is that an unnamed foreign country was behind the action by the soldiers—all of whom originate from the culturally black African regions of Sudan. The "attempted coup" was described as "ethnic." The unnamed country is understood to be Ethiopia. From there, fighters of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) have waged a guerrilla war in southern Sudan for the past two years.

But was the mutiny part of any "ethnic" threat? The people of western and southern Sudan are among the poorest of Sudan's many cultures. They also make up the largest proportion of the Sudanese armed forces. For this reason, it is not surprising that those who mutinied were in fact from the west and south.

They would not be the first members of Sudan's military force to refuse orders to fight in the south. There have been many before them—notably within the Sudanese airforce where pilots have regularly refused to carry out missions which would take them into high-risk areas. Guerrilla fire has already taken too many planes and helicopters.

Carol Berger has recently returned from Sudan where she reported for The Times *of London, the BBC World and Africa Services,* The Economist, *and other publications and news services.*


Carol Berger

Malakal, southern Sudan: "In large parts of southern Sudan, the tenuous line between subsistence and hunger is threatened by civil war"

While the country's southern region has become largely ungovernable, the more developed Arab north is fraught with political rivalry and interference from its more powerful allies. Power struggles within the ruling military council have left the government virtually paralyzed. A hardline group, including several northern political parties, is pressing for tougher military action against the unruly south.

Only days before the mutiny, the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood in Khartoum organized a demonstration in support of this policy. Two men were killed in the ensuing confrontations and more than 25 others were arrested and flogged. The dead and arrested were all black Africans from southern Sudan. It is not surprising then that tensions were running high in the days leading up to the soldiers' armed dissent.

Those who call for a show of force appear to forget that the unilateral ceasefire the government says it observes has been ignored since its announcement. They also forget that the army has virtually no means to step up the war. Troops are sent into large-scale battles without adequate medical or air support. Already the army has resorted to using tribalist government militias to fight rebels in the south. Also ignored is the fact that most southern Sudanese opposed the civil war only a short while ago.

If the southern Sudanese are feeling pressured, northern Sudanese can only lament what they now see as a missed opportunity. Their promise to hold elections next April is slipping away. The longer political instability continues, the less likely it is that democratic elections will be held. Radical parties, such as the Iraqi-backed Baathists, the Communists, and the Muslim Brotherhood, would benefit from continued military rule, and their contributions to rising north-south tensions could help to insure it.

In 1972, former president Gaafar al-Nimeiry achieved what no other African leader had when he reached a negotiated peace with his then-secessionist ethnic minority, the southern Sudanese. It came after 17 years of bitter and bloody civil war. That peace was lost long before Nimeiry's ousting. All signs point to its continued degradation.

* * *

In large parts of southern Sudan, the tenuous line between subsistence and hunger is threatened by the presence of war. There were no rains in many parts of the south's Upper Nile province last year. Now the staple food of 'dura,' or sorghum, is in scarce supply. Already several hundred people have died of starvation. With the civil war accelerating, the situation is expected to worsen.

The Nilotic people of the Upper Nile call May to August "the hungry months." During this period, fish supplies from the White Nile are limited and the dura and maize crops are still ripening. It is also a season of heavy rains. Unlike last year, this summer's rains were good and the mid-August harvest of maize showed high yields. But despite the good harvest, famine remains a threat. The militarization of their homelands has left the people with no means to transport or market their produce.

For more than two years, the province has been the center of heavy fighting between government troops and Ethiopian-backed rebels. As the predominant Nuer tribe says, hunger and war are bad companions. The region's inaccessibility has made it virtually impossible to estimate the total number affected. Flights into the region are few. Most main roads are impassable because of the torrential rains or rebel-laid land mines. The most common form of transport is by foot along bush paths and by dug-out or reed canoe through the rivers and massive Sudd swamp.

"Hunger is all over," Sister Rita of the Roman Catholic Comboni Order told me in Malakal, the provincial capital. She, like the few other missionaries in this city of 40,000, is providing an admittedly small amount of food for the hungry.

Resident in Sudan since the mid-1940s, she recalled, "The drought in 1945-46 was also bad, but the effects were more isolated. Then people were able to go to the north for work. Now it is not so easy.

"If they move around, they meet thieves. In addition to the hunger, they have rebels. If the rebels come to a family, the rebels eat first. The people can say nothing because the rebels have guns."

The SPLA is firmly entrenched in Upper Nile. They move in small groups through the countryside or concentrate in large numbers around main towns. There are also several splinter groups competing with the SPLA for territory and scarce food.

Anti-government guerrillas in the Christian-animist south first began attacking police and army posts in 1982. Many of those who took up arms were veterans of the bitter 17-year civil war between the Arab north and African south which ended with the Addis Ababa Accord in 1972. In the early 1980s, discontent was growing in the underdeveloped region once more. Subsequent decisions by former President Nimeiry—including the violation of the peace agreement and imposition of Islamic law—spurred the formation of a well-armed guerrilla force. Today, reliable estimates put the SPLA troop strength at 20,000.

The main hunger areas—Nasr, along the Ethiopian border, and Bentiu, further to the west—have been the sites of heavy clashes between the army and rebels over the past two years. The population there has been displaced by both the heavy demands of guerrillas and the razing of villages and crops by government troops as they retreat from operations.

In the summer months, people from the surrounding countryside poured into the provincial capital. Unable to tend their small plots in home villages, they ringed Malakal with new crops. But the toll in some villages was high. One district official sent a list of more than 300 names to the provincial government. All of those listed had died of hunger between May and June.

For those who reach Malakal after walking up to six days, there may still not be much relief. The price of sorghum there has risen to five times the official price. The regional government has made no attempt to regulate the booming black market monopolized by Arab traders and members of the 5,000-strong army garrison.

Shortly after taking power in the April 6 coup, Maj.-Gen. Abdul Rahman Sawar-Dahab declared southern Sudan a "disaster zone." Yet no measures have been taken to alleviate the hunger. At least one major aid agency has reported that the Khartoum-based government has discouraged aid groups from beginning work in what has become a war zone.

Informed sources describe the government's actions as "a policy of starving out the rebels." The army has prevented traders from entering at least one area of Upper Nile for several months. The only food which reaches the district is through the army. A short-lived airlift was carried out by one Western agency in early June. No more than 12 tons of aid were moved before the project was halted. The airlift was later described as "a mistake" by one aid spokesman. The rebels, meanwhile, do not guarantee safe passage for humanitarian relief.

Remote military posts are also suffering from food shortages. The main means of transport is by water, and steamers traveling both north and south of Malakal are routinely stopped and looted by the SPLA.

In the main towns, the army has used its privileged position to cash in on current shortages. According to regional officials, the northern-led army is controlling the black market in basic commodities. Because they have some mobility in the rural areas, they have been transporting grains into the towns for sale. People in the villages have little recourse against the low prices offered by the military.

In the first two weeks of July, soldiers from the Malakal garrison carried out ground operations along the banks of the White Nile north of Malakal. During times of hunger, the people traditionally move closer to the river. According to the acting military commander, Brig. Mohamed Zein el Abdeen, the army was responding to SPLA movements. Local residents denied this, however. They described the actions as "intimidation." The army reportedly burned several villages and at least ten people were killed.

Renk, to the north of Malakal, is one of the country's main dura-producing regions. But food is in scarce supply there as well. In the nearby town of Kodok, people had begun robbing anthills for grain. I met one woman who had walked from there with her severely malnourished baby. After four days, she was in a state of exhaustion. A widow, she would have joined the family of a brother-in-law in normal times. But she had been turned away. The man could hardly feed his own family, let alone two more mouths. Like many women without a husband, she was destitute.

The garrisoned town of Malakal, set along the east bank of the White Nile, has been described as "the end of the world." Remote, impoverished, and rife with arms, the area has become a kind of no man's land. Its waterways are open to the reed canoes of the Shilluk tribesmen, but carry the threat of attack for steamers transporting cattle or supplies to army posts up river. Just 150 miles to the east lies the Ethiopian border where the SPLA rebels have established several base camps.

When I flew into the town for a two-week stay in late July, our landing was almost abandoned because of low cloud cover. The pilot understandably wanted no part of rebel gunfire at low altitude. As it was, our light plane sported a patched wing from a shooting incident only weeks earlier.

One year ago, this town came under attack by the SPLA. Today it remains more isolated and threatened than ever. To move outside Malakal—even by foot—is done with caution. Until dusk each night, when the streets become deserted, there is a semblance of normal life.

On Sundays, the churches are filled to capacity. The rich sounds of a barely recognizable hymn, "Jesus Loves Me," sung in the Shilluk language rang out over the muddied streets. Small children wearing their best clothes, women in brightly colored dresses and headscarves, and serious young men spilled out into the churchyard. There was a feeling of warmth and celebration as they waited in turn for the sermon to commence in their language—Shilluk, Nuer, or English.

The serene picture gave no hint of the violence of the night before. There was no mention made in any of the churches that the sustained army artillery fire of Saturday night was out of control and had endangered civilian lives. Many in the congregation had spent the night crouched under their beds, as one woman told me, "praying for morning to come."

But accusations against the army and an investigation into the wounding of two civilians by the army would wait until the following week when senior military officers arrived from Khartoum to investigate earlier complaints about the army's indiscipline and intimidation of local citizens.

Instead, on this sun-filled morning, people greeted each other with a reassuring hand and the question, "Did you sleep well?"

In 1984, a Jordanian priest was expelled from Sudan for a poem he had written about Malakal. Describing the town as a suffering woman, the poem spoke of the corruption of local government, the hoarding of food by Arab merchants, and the backwardness of the villagers. More recently, a British priest was taken in for questioning by the local secret police because his sermon on the need for unity within the family was considered too political.

With more than 4,000 army troops stationed in and around Malakal, local residents describe the force as "an army of occupation." It is well known that the military has assumed all power in the local government.

Whether moving from one end of the town to the other or bound for outside operations, the soldiers raise the battle cry and sing raucous songs as they rumble by in military trucks. Sometimes a small red flag is dropped—the signal for war. Small boys race to be the first to reach it.

Along the river bank, where the laborers or "backbreakers" gather for their evening wash, it is not uncommon to hear singing. And sometimes, as on the nights I passed by, their song was the theme chorus of the SPLA.


Earthscan/Mark Edwards

"The militarization of their homelands has left the people with no means to transport or market their produce"

Until early this year, the army could not claim a single victory over the well-armed and highly motivated SPLA. The fighting, particularly along the Ethiopian border, has been described as "a man-eater." But under former President Gaafar Nimeiry, peace talks with the SPLA's main rival—the Anyanya II—led to joint operations. Considered a secessionist group, the Anyanya II takes its name from the original Anyanya forces which fought in the 1955-72 civil war. In exchange for ending attacks on government posts, the government is providing ammunition and supplies for the Anyanya II to fight the larger SPLA.

There is no question that the army's creation of "government militias" is promoting anarchy in the south. Residents speak of "brother killing brother." The general consensus is that more lives have been lost in fighting between the "militias" and the SPLA than in the recognized civil war.

But the army may soon find the Anyanya II difficult to control. Early this year, the group split in two following a major joint operation inside Ethiopian territory last March. As one Anyanya II spokesman told me, "Perhaps we can kill two birds with one stone. Today the army gives me bullets to fight the SPLA. Tomorrow I may turn my gun on the army."

Opinion toward the war is both indifferent and bitter in the north. The anger of northern officers sent to southern posts is apparent. "We give our blood and sweat here and for what?" a senior officer told me. "For nothing. My son will be fighting here."

Ethiopia appears committed to a long-term engagement. Young southerners, often only teenagers, are being trained at military schools in Addis Ababa. There are also reports of a newly-formed "Red Army Brigade" comprised of 1,200 boys between the ages of 12 and 18. If—as it is often said—the present rebels lack political grounding, tomorrow's armed men should be well-indoctrinated.

SPLA leader Col. John Garang has proven unapproachable. His post-coup intransigence has left many southerners confused about SPLA aims. The rebel reliance on Soviet-backed Ethiopia has ensured a Marxist bent in stated SPLA policies. Southern intellectuals, who have traditionally looked to the West for their political models, largely reject this.

Whether because of Ethiopia's influence or his own distrust of the Arab north, Garang has shown no willingness to negotiate. In the demonstrations and mutiny of late September, it became apparent that north and south have become more polarized than ever. □

Sudan's Hidden Tragedy

The devastation from the drought and famine in Sudan might have been minimized had donors and the former government foreseen the mammoth logistical problems the relief effort would encounter. Now that the drought appears to have subsided, international and domestic efforts must focus on addressing the country's basic infrastructural and developmental needs to prevent a repeat of the disaster.

BY ROBERT WATKINS

International relief agencies operating in Sudan are breathing a guarded sigh of relief now that it appears, at least by most accounts, that the "unparalleled disaster" that was predicted only a few months ago for Sudan's drought-ravaged western regions has been averted. Those who have been involved in the relief effort since its belated inception realize that for the most part, the disaster was averted mainly because of the dramatic reversal in climatic conditions which had prevailed in the northern part of the country for the last five years, and almost in spite of international relief efforts.

Abundant rainfall in the western regions of Darfur and Kordofan and in the east in the large grain-producing areas around Gedaref has enabled farmers to sow a crop that should reach harvest by mid-October to mid-November. Lands that only a few months ago were parched, devoid of vegetation, and subject to scorching mid-winter temperatures as high as 120 degrees fahrenheit are now grown over with a dense, verdant cover. In some areas of Darfur where rain has been particularly plentiful, 'dura' (sorghum) crops have already reached a height of five to six feet, covering the dessicated remains of camels and donkeys that once littered the landscape. Many agriculturalists are even predicting a second crop in some areas before the coming of the dry winter weather in early December.

Robert Watkins is a freelance journalist.

Despite the more optimistic outlook for Sudan, questions remain about the speed with which the former Nimeiry government recognized and admitted to the world that it was confronting a situation beyond its control, and the efficacy of the international community in responding to Sudan's appeal. For although large quantities of food aid—relative to the requirements of the population—have been allocated for Sudan since November 1984 (1.475 million metric tons had been pledged as of August 1985 according to UN sources), only a small portion has actually made its way to those in the most affected areas. In human terms, this has meant that the entire population of Darfur (2.8 million) and Kordofan (2.9 million) has been receiving only 20-35 percent of the targeted food aid.

People living in the remote areas of these two western regions have unquestionably suffered the most during the drought. The amount of grain and medical supplies that reached them—most notably in the isolated regions of northern Darfur—was so small as to be insignificant in many cases. Perhaps most disturbing is that the magnitude of the disaster in these areas will never be fully known. Although estimates that put the death toll in Darfur alone at 100,000 may be exaggerated, there is no doubt that the loss of life has been substantial. As during past periods of drought and deprivation, those villagers living far from large settlements have quietly died in the desert far from the view of relief workers and television cameras.

Responsibility for this 'hidden' tragedy could easily be attributed to the former government of Sudan for its reluctance to sound the alarm that would have helped draw world attention away from Ethiopia to its own plight; or to the international relief organizations which failed to respond quickly enough to the crisis; or to the international donor community at large which would not listen attentively enough to the organizations which were already predicting disaster

AID/Kay Chernush

"The virtual breakdown of the western railway link meant that the truck or 'souk lorry' was the only viable surface connection"

in Sudan more than a year ago. Finger pointing at this stage, however, would serve no useful purpose. But the transport and logistical problems must be examined if similar mistakes are to be avoided in the future.

During the early stages of the emergency, when the primary concern of relief agencies was to focus world attention on Sudan in order to procure food aid supplies, those involved in food distribution assumed that the country's transport facilities were adequate to meet the large requirements of the population in the west.

The U.S. Agency for International Development and the European Economic Community (EEC), the two main donors responsible for the supply and distribution of food aid to the west, relied on the Sudan Railways Corporation (SRC) and private trucking firms to transport supplies from Port Sudan to the region. From the offloading process at the port to the distribution centers in the west, the Sudanese transportation system has been subject to numerous unforeseen bottlenecks. Yet people with only limited experience in the country predicted these problems, especially the inability of the railways to cope with the needs during the May to August rainy season.

By all accounts, expecting the Sudanese railway system to deliver the 1,200 metric tons of cereals required in Darfur alone was totally unrealistic—even if the railway rehabilitation schemes planned by the major donors had been implemented. The torrential rains of the summer months have habitually hampered the operation of the railways. Although the rains had been insubstantial for the last few years throughout the country, any scenario involving transport should have considered the devastation that the rains can wreak on the rail lines. Some realistic contingency planning should have been undertaken in the event that the rains did arrive.

By July, it was obvious that the railway system was completely incapable of coping with the transport of food to the west if only because of weather conditions. Not only were tracks washed out in almost a dozen places along the line, but a major bridge collapsed between Kosti and Nyala, 700 miles outside Khartoum, halting the already insufficient number of train shipments to the west. Two locomotives and seven railway wagons valued at $1 million each were lost in the accident.

The rains thus immobilized the railway transport system for some time, as the equipment needed to replace the washed out bridge and repair the line was hundreds of miles away in Atbara. It is unlikely that the railway will contribute much to transportation of food relief deliveries this year. The EEC, among others, is helping to rehabilitate and upgrade the tracks, rolling stock, and communication system of the SRC, but these efforts cannot be expected to revitalize the system for a few years yet.

Despite the unpredictable weather conditions, a number of factors could have been assessed, but were ignored by those organizing the rail shipments. While the political turmoil would have been difficult to predict, the former government's commitment to expediting food aid through the SRC was overestimated. Improving the management capability of the SRC was not seriously considered until it was far too late, and even then the organization demonstrated little interest in self-examination and improvement.

It was clear that if any important managerial changes were to be made, they would have to be at the direct and firm behest of the new Transitional Military Council led by General Rahman Sawar-Dahab. In an effort to improve the railways, senior government officials and the SRC itself have recently indicated their willingness to implement the necessary managerial reforms, restructure the trade unions, and accept foreign technical assistance.

The virtual breakdown of the western railway link meant that the truck or 'souk lorry' was the only viable surface connection. Yet, once again because of the rains, food deliveries by truck—normally taking anywhere from six to ten days during optimal, dry season conditions—took up to six weeks in some cases. During the critical summer months, a time when the last harvest runs out and the current one is not yet in, very little food aid reached Darfur. It is estimated that of the 1,200 metric tons per day needed, only 250 metric tons arrived during this period.

Many people have claimed that Sudan's trucking facilities are adequate to transport the necessary volume of food supplies. Regardless, with the breakdown of the railway system, truck transport prices escalated, rapidly depleting the resources many donors had set aside to cover transport. Truck transport prices to the west traditionally increase during the rainy season. Not only is the journey more arduous and time-consuming, but truck owners risk damaging or even losing their vehicles. It is clear, nevertheless, that the trebling of truck transport prices between March and July was the result of the increased dependence on their services after the railway broke down.

To make matters worse, some aid agencies—eager to move their food and medical supplies at the expense of other agencies—offered large sums of money to Sudanese trucking firms, thereby increasing the market rate. Greed on the part of some trucking firms undoubtedly played a role in the rate increase, as the market forces of supply and demand came into play. At the same time, many truckers were bitter about the huge profits made by the Sudanese-American cargo transport company, Arkel-Talab. Earlier in the year, USAID granted the firm a concession on the transport of American grain to the west. The transaction was questioned by many. While a lavish sum was paid to the company, the rates actually received by the truckers, especially on the long haul trips to Darfur, were considered very low.

In any case, much of the private trucking sector, and to some extent the military, has been involved in the relief effort. It became clear, however, that even their efforts were not enough to move the required volume of food to the west. Concerned by the complete failure of the local transportation infrastructure to cope with the amount of food aid entering the country, some bilateral donors and international agencies requested outside assistance. The Italian government, for example, donated 103 Fiat trucks with a seven-ton carrying capacity. Only 53 had arrived by the end of August.

Many of the other trucks which were pledged for Sudan were not expected to arrive and become fully operational until the end of October at the earliest. By the time the trucking fleet is assembled to transport badly needed food supplies to the west, those who needed the food will have perished. Those lucky enough to have planted and who received enough food to last until October-November will be harvesting their crops—that is, providing the rains continue at their present level.

It would be wrong to assume, however, that the international fleet of trucks moving full steam to the west will be unable to reach those still in need. Many lives can still be saved if the food is distributed from centers in Nyala and El Fasher in Darfur province. Although it is abundantly clear that the relief effort was started too late and has been out of step with the needs, a certain momentum has been established. World attention must continue to focus on Sudan's plight.

"Those villagers living far from large settlements have quietly died in the desert far from the view of relief workers and television cameras."

Proper health care, water and sanitation facilities, reforestation projects, and other rehabilitation and development efforts must now replace emergency work. This can only be done if the world follows developments in Sudan. Moreover, it cannot be assumed that because there was rain this year, there will be rain next year. Buffer food stocks must be built up and adequate storage facilities constructed if a similar tragedy is to be avoided.

At the same time, as food aid stocks are replenished in key distribution centers in the west, close attention must be paid to the impact of food aid on local market prices. Agricultural economists have pointed out that many farmers found themselves without seeds, not only because they were forced to eat the stock which they normally reserve from each harvest, but also because local merchants had artificially raised prices through hoarding. The interplay between food aid and local market prices is complex and needs to be seriously addressed in the Sudanese context.

There will also be a problem when it comes time to dismantle the trucking operation. It is expected that once the rains subside and the trucks that have been pledged arrive, trucking costs will decrease. The international fleet will undoubtedly compete to some extent with private local operators. The impact on the economy needs to be examined. Clearly, the fleet should be disbanded as quickly as possible so that transportation work can be handled uniquely by local expertise.

The new Sudanese government has moved to create its own Relief and Rehabilitation Commission modeled after a similar organization in Ethiopia. Although it is suffering from an acute lack of funds and has yet to clearly define its mandate, the commission could go a long way in preparing the country for another major relief operation should the drought continue or recur in a few years time.

The relief aspect of the emergency may be nearly over, but given the nature of the drought that has afflicted the entire Sudano-Sahelian region for the last decade, much work remains to be done. This is especially true if the country is to develop the ability to face the prospect of recurring drought without relying on the vicissitudes of international assistance. □

Changing Equations in the Horn

While Ethiopia's historical and strategic ties with the Soviet Union remain strong, its food aid requirements have brought the Mengistu government in closer contact with the West. A subtle shift in the tenor of the U.S.-Ethiopian relationship may be the unintended consequence of the politics of hunger.

BY JACK SHEPHERD

For better or worse, the United States and Ethiopia are linked together for the foreseeable future. Ethiopia continues to require emergency food aid, and the United States continues as Ethiopia's primary emergency food donor.

This fact is re-shaping that relationship, which was formed by events that followed the drought and famine of 1972-74. This time, however, the changes are coming slowly and with far less violence—although the results may be as dramatic.

A United Nations report this autumn states that despite the rainfall which has eased the food crisis across Africa, 21 of 50 nations on the continent will still require aid. But only five of those states will continue to need emergency food aid. At the head of the list is Ethiopia. The others are Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, and Sudan.

Last year, Ethiopia became a symbol of Africa's food crisis. Today, it remains the largest African client of U.S. emergency food aid. Ethiopia's ambassador to London recently announced that in 1986, the government would seek another 1.6 million tons of emergency food.

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Margaret A. Novicki

Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam: "Beneath the rhetoric and party line, observers note a widening flow of goodwill toward the West"

Juxtaposed with this continuing need is the United States' role as Ethiopia's major food donor. The U.S. now supplies more than one-third of all the relief food entering Ethiopia. The most recent figures show that the U.S. has pledged an unprecedented $243.2 million to Ethiopia, the largest single food aid program ever granted to that nation, providing more than 425,000 metric tons of emergency food.

Beyond this, there is an increasing American and Western presence in Ethiopia: The U.S. Agency for International Development, the Live Aid Foundation, the Band-Aid Trust, and the UN Office of Emergency Operations in Africa have jointly announced a donation of 250 trucks and some $3.7 million for transportation of food aid, requiring hundreds of additional relief personnel.

Already the private volunteer organizations are operating large staffs both in Addis Ababa and in the field, although the Mengistu government is attempting to hold down the number of relief workers fanning out among its hungry peasantry. Catholic Relief Services (CRS), for example, employs 15 expatriates among its staff of 250, while World Vision has 125 expatriates and a staff of 775 scattered between the capital and 10 health camps and feeding centers.

This foreign presence and the continuing food aid are slowly re-shaping Ethiopia and its revolution. To be sure, President Ronald Reagan and Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam continue to exchange bitter rhetoric. Moreover, Ethiopia has yet to acknowledge in its controlled press or in its leaders' speeches the enormity of Western and U.S. emergency aid. Nor does the Ethiopian revolution appear to be weakening, or the Soviet influence diminishing. While Cuba has cut its troop contingent in Ethiopia by more than half, the number of North Korean, Soviet, and East European advisers remains about the same as two years ago.

But beneath the rhetoric and party line, some observers in Ethiopia note, there lies a widening flow of goodwill toward the West. U.S. relief workers, medical specialists, and other aid technicians report a hospitality and openness in professional and personal encounters with their Ethiopian counterparts. And there is the recurring feeling that Mengistu and the radical ideologues around him may have learned a basic lesson from this drought and famine—that the politics of starvation may be drawing Ethiopia back toward the West.

To understand these subtle shifts, some of which are only now beginning, they must be placed in a historical context, and against that background, several recent internal Ethiopian events must be examined.

To this day, there are two basic and centuries-old realities that continue to shape the nation and its politics: Ethiopia has been an authoritarian society for more than 3,000 years; and peasants always starve. In both cases, history bears these points out. Haile Selassie was only one of a long line of Ethiopian rulers who drew strength and political power from feudal armies under their command. Mengistu has changed the equation only slightly.

With the authoritarian society has also come persistent hunger. The first recorded Ethiopian famine occurred in the 9th century. Ten major famines cut down the Ethiopian peasantry between 1540 and 1724, and the Great Ethiopian Famine of 1888-1889 swept across four provinces, killing 50,000 people. Two severe famines have struck Ethiopia in recent times. In 1965-66, one out of every two Ethiopians in the Waga and Lasta districts of Wollo Province starved to death. In 1972-74, drought followed by starvation spread through the provinces of Wollo, Tigré, and Eritrea, and perhaps as many as 250,000 Ethiopian peasants died from hunger. This toll has already been exceeded by the famine of 1982-85, in which some 300,000 have so far starved to death.

Since the drought and starvation of 1972-74, Ethiopia has drifted along the edge of both social and political disaster. Ten years ago, Haile Selassie's silence during his people's worsening starvation contributed to his overthrow. After "Bloody Saturday" (November 23, 1974) and almost two-and-a-half years of coups and counter-coups, Major (later Lt. Col.) Mengistu Haile Mariam emerged to lead the National Coordinating Committee, or Dergue. After he was named chairman, Lt. Col. Mengistu proceeded to hammer together a Marxist-Leninist government, nationalizing private companies and banks, including several American firms, and redistributing land. A New Democratic Revolution Program was announced, calling for the foundation of a People's Democratic Republic.

Mengistu inherited severe economic and development problems, continuing hunger in the provinces, guerrilla warfare in Tigré and Eritrea—where Africa's longest continuous war has bubbled since 1962—and confrontation with Somalia in the Ogaden. By 1977, he found himself fighting on two fronts—in the north against the guerrillas and in the south against the Somalis. This quickly brought the largest air and sealift of arms in Africa's history from the Soviet Union. Mengistu still faces an unpaid bill exceeding $2.5 billion for these arms and military equipment. The arms did not arrive as much in support of ideology as in response to a rather acute material need. By early 1977, Mengistu and the Dergue had abandoned the idea of convincing the United States—Selassie's patron—to provide the arms needed to counter Somalia's incursions into the Ogaden.

The Soviet presence in Ethiopia during the late 1970s was not unusual nor unprecedented. Here too, Ethiopian history offers lessons. One would be mistaken in viewing current Soviet relations with Ethiopia as representing a new sphere of interest for both nations. The Russian presence in Ethiopia predates the revolution of 1917, and has not evolved solely from ideological support by Soviet leaders for liberation movements or anti-colonialist regimes.

In fact, Russian interest can be traced as far back as three centuries, when St.



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Addis Ababa: "By 1979, the Soviets were pressuring Mengistu to form a revolutionary vanguard party to lead Ethiopia to communism"

Petersburg sought to forge links with Addis Ababa as a means of undermining the Ottoman Empire. Russian interest in Ethiopia, therefore, must not be viewed as a mid-20th century response to Western capitalism, but as a long and patient cultivation of early African leaders that has produced specific policy precedents.

At least three long-term Soviet objectives in Africa have motivated Russian involvement in the continent throughout its history: efforts to take advantage of local unrest to steer African political development in a direction compatible with Russian global interests; the desire to thwart Western influence in Africa; and strategic imperatives to establish military facilities along Africa's shores that would support Russia's emergence as a world maritime power and cut the distance between the Baltic and Far Eastern ports for the Russian navy.

Current Soviet interests in Africa in general have their roots in Russian activity on the continent beginning in 1723, when Peter the Great dispatched two Russian vessels to make contact with the King of Madagascar. But it was Ethiopia that attracted the attention of the 19th century tsars, who pursued the theory that they could counter British interests in North Africa by establishing Ethiopia as a cornerstone of Imperial Russia's presence in Africa. Russia's pursuit of this policy was accelerated by Britain's purchase of a controlling share of the Suez Canal Company in 1875. The tsars viewed the undisputed British control of the canal from 1882 on as a threat and free access to it as essential to Russian security.

Tsar Alexander III undertook the anti-British game in the Horn. To establish a presence along the Red Sea that might thwart British interests in connecting a sea route through the Suez to India, the Russians repeatedly sought to gain protectorate status over the Danikil region of Ethiopia—the area now largely Eritrea.

Tsar Alexander also believed that Russian domination of the sources of the Nile might accomplish—or at least give the perception of threatening—the long-held scheme of controlling Egypt. Tsar Alexander's plan, perhaps the first evidence of any "Russian Grand Design" in Africa, evokes present-day Western fears of Soviet-controlled straits and Soviet-inspired uprisings. The tsar's strategy included a Russian blockade of the Suez Canal, diverting the Nile from Egyptian use, setting 100,000 Sudanese against the British, and inciting uprisings in India and Afghanistan.

UNICEF/Campbell

Health clinic: "The United States is using its position as donor to demonstrate to the Ethiopians who their real benefactors are"

As part of this anti-British scheme, the Russians cultivated the Ethiopians, creating a military alliance on the Horn. In the early 1890s, St. Petersburg sent out a military mission headed by Lieut. V.F. Mashkov with what might be termed Russia's first successful aid program to Africa. Lieut. Mashkov was welcomed by Ethiopia's Emperor Menelik II, thus also becoming the first Russian to hold official talks with an African head of state.

The aid that Lieut. Mashkov offered the Ethiopians—arms, advice, and advisers—is relevant in the present Soviet-Ethiopian context. In fact, Russian arms and on-the-ground military advisers are thought to have helped Menelik defeat the Italians at Adowa in March 1896. A Russian naval officer was awarded an Ethiopian title for duty during that conflict, and was asked to represent Menelik with the Italians.

Following Adowa, the Russian Red Cross, established around Addis Ababa, built the Russian hospital that remained in use until after World War II. Russia also maintained a diplomatic mission at Menelik's court, and when the Emperor organized 250,000 Ethiopian troops for the Nile campaign, he invited Russian officers to accompany them. Officers from the Russian Imperial Guards retained prominent commands in Menelik's army, providing strategic and technical assistance. Russian officers also explored the Nile area, supplied the Ethiopian army with topographical data, and helped establish Ethiopia's boundaries which remain much the same today.

After the revolution in 1917, the Soviet Union withdrew into itself. There were few direct links between the USSR and Africa until the late 1950s. During the 1930s, however, the Soviet Union traded with Eritrea and provided the region with one-third of its imported wheat. But by 1955, the USSR had no formal diplomatic relations with any country south of the Sahara.

Decolonization across Africa provided the opportunity for the Soviets to introduce their brand of socialism, but it was not until the mid-1970s that they had openings in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. During this period, Soviet economic commitments to Africa totalled a little more than \$1 billion. During the same period, Soviet military aid reached \$3.6 billion, the bulk going to Ethiopia.

By 1979, the Soviets were pressuring Mengistu to form a revolutionary vanguard party to lead Ethiopia to communism. Mengistu dragged his feet for five years, first creating the Commission for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia, and then forming and disbanding cadres. Not until September 1984 was the Workers' Party of Ethiopia finally launched, and then it was overshadowed by the drought and starvation sweeping the north and the celebration of the 10th anniversary of Haile Selassie's overthrow.

In this context, Ethiopia's history teaches another lesson: No foreign power has enjoyed a long period of domination over this nation or people. Ethiopians are proud of the fact that their country was never colonized, and they see themselves as superior to other people, including Africans, Europeans, and perhaps especially Russians.

Mengistu's speeches reflect this view. Any individual speech may have three versions: Russian (with the anticapitalist rhetoric), English (a softer version), and Amharic (ignoring Marx altogether). A speech delivered in September, for example, contains almost 10,000 words (broadcast in Amharic over three days)—and not one mention of the Soviet Union, Marx, or Lenin. There is, however, a lot of talk about how to improve agricultural output and new marketing procedures.

In fact, on the eleventh anniversary celebration of Selassie's overthrow and the first annual Revolution Day to be held since Western aid flowed into Ethiopia in huge amounts, two important features were evident. First, there was little mention of the one-year-old Workers' Party of Ethiopia. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Mengistu did not use the occasion to attack the United States, as he had done in the past.

This small favor was matched by one of slightly larger size. In September, after a year of quiet negotiation, Ethiopia began to allow hunger relief agencies to provide food to people living in rebel-held areas of the country. This effort, initiated by Rep. Jim Wright (D-Tx) in November 1984, involved direct contact between Vice President George Bush and the Ethiopian foreign minister, Goshu Wolde, in Geneva last spring. Now, the Ethiopian government has agreed to allow Western relief agencies to expand their distribution programs, making food available to almost 2 million people in Wollo, Tigré, and Eritrea provinces.

The significance of this policy shift cannot be overstated. As recently as April, the Mengistu government had refused to allow any food into areas controlled by the Eritrean Liberation Front or the Tigré People's Liberation Front. Mengistu referred to the guerrillas as bandits and turned down American overtures seeking to establish a cease-fire and/or an open roadway for food aid.

Two points are clear. First, over the last year, the U.S. has made a significant policy adjustment in terms of its relations with Ethiopia. After two years of delays in sending emergency food aid, and after being pushed by Congress and the press into action, a new, less dogmatic and more pragmatic policy is emerging. The U.S. has decided to use its food aid as an instrument of its foreign policy to attach itself to Ethiopia, and to create the basis for a new U.S.-Ethiopian relationship.

Second, the U.S. is using this new food aid relationship with Ethiopia to press several arguments home, and they appear not to be lost on Mengistu and his government. The United States is first of all using its position as donor to demonstrate to the Ethiopians who their real benefactors are. For example, Bush has attacked the Mengistu government for giving priority to military cargo over "food for starving millions" at its port of Assab, coupling this with an attack on the Soviet Union for its stinginess.

"The Soviets were fully capable of putting a billion dollars worth of military hardware and nearly 20,000 Cuban troops into Ethiopia between November 1977 and March 1978," the vice president said. "Yet they and their allies have donated only about $7 million in food, medical equipment, and logistical support to the relief drive—10 percent of what Americans have donated privately." The United States has also used its position as a major food donor to quietly push Ethiopia to increase its own efforts in combating the famine, to reduce the pace of forced resettlement of peasants from Tigré and Wollo provinces, and to undertake a "more humane" evacuation of the hungry from the relief camps.

To be sure, Mengistu has not embraced Ronald Reagan. He still may accelerate the resettlement of his people from the north to the south, and try to win the guerrilla war with stepped-up combat operations. This autumn, for example, a new government military offensive recaptured the town of Barentu in Eritrea and dealt a major blow to the guerrilla efforts to grow their own food by seizing a 5,000-hectare mechanized and irrigated farm at Ali Ghidir.

For the foreseeable future, however, Ethiopia does not seem inclined to halt U.S. food aid nor kick out Western relief workers. On the contrary, it appears that both the emergency and long-term aid programs are continuing and perhaps expanding, and the number of workers increasing. Moreover, both the United States and Ethiopia seem to be settling into a relationship which, while nettlesome, may be long-lasting. Most importantly, events in Ethiopia are making clear that food plays an important role in politics—a role that may change the lessons of history. □

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Soviet personnel carriers in Addis Ababa: "Arms did not arrive as much in support of ideology as in response to a rather acute material need"

Barre's Balancing Act

President Siad Barre has undertaken efforts to revitalize an economy reeling under the effects of bad management, corruption, war, and drought. But Somalia's uneasy relations with its neighbors and inter-clan rivalry continue to threaten Barre's economic liberalization program.

BY ANTONY SHAW

President Mohammed Siad Barre has been getting a rather bad press lately. The president himself is reportedly ill—heart disease, throat cancer, liver problems, and depression are some of the suggestions. For the first time, the media has been speculating on the country's future, with headlines referring to "a nation in tatters" and "patriarch about to depart."

There has also been a rash of allegations—as of yet without foundation—that South Africa will be allowed a base; that Israel will provide security experts, pilots, and equipment; and that the United States will dump nuclear waste in central Somalia. While it is true that Somalia has agreed to let South African Airways overfly the country, and Air Comores—whose planes are staffed by South Africans—may pay for landing rights at Mogadishu, there have been no suggestions of a base. While there may be some truth to suggestions that President Barre is feeling his age—he is over 60 and a heavy smoker—and that some younger men have political ambitions, the president remains fully in charge and is still the most skillful manipulator of Somalia's convoluted clan politics.

This year, inter-clan tensions and fighting have intensified. Barre's Marehan clan in particular has been embroiled in such disputes with the Ogaden and the Hawiye, which had both generally supported the president in the past. The recent clashes have given credence to claims that the president has been concentrating power in the hands of his own clansmen over the last couple of years, as his support has weakened elsewhere.

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President Mohammed Siad Barre: "Publicly at least, his alliance with the U.S. is close"

The alienation of other clans has strengthened the main Ethiopian-based opposition movement, the Somali National Movement (SNM). Largely an Issak organization, the SNM has opened a second front for guerrilla activity in Hawiye areas in the south and is beginning to look like a genuine national force rather than simply a northern clan opposition group.

At the same time, President Barre has been attempting, with some success, to undermine the SNM's northern support through the judicious distribution of favors and his inimitable skill at political manipulation. Several well-funded government delegations have been sent to the north to investigate the security situation. More importantly, his policies of economic liberalization have succeeded in dampening northern traders' criticism of the central government and undercutting their financial support for the SNM.

Of course, the president isn't the only one who suffers from the all-pervasive inter-clan rivalries of Somali politics. The SNM has also been affected. One row within the front led to the detention of a number of SNM militants for a couple of months earlier this year. Now released, this group—all from one Issak sub-clan—are likely to make common cause with other critics of the present SNM leadership, making the SNM central committee meeting scheduled for November a stormy affair.

The present leaders are also under fire as a result of the death of 15 Issak and Ogaden elders who were reportedly picked up by SNM units after they had crossed the border from Somalia into Ethiopia, apparently hoping to wean away SNM supporters. Accused of espionage, they were executed by the Ethiopian authorities. The SNM leadership has been blamed.

The other main opposition movement, the Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS), has also been suffering from divisions after last year's assassination of a central committee member, Abdurachman Adyeed. Other leftists and many of his clansmen promptly pulled out of the DFSS. Now another organization, the Somali Patriotic Front, has been set up in Aden. Relatively insignificant in terms of size and fighting strength, the new front will nevertheless weaken support for the DFSS and diminish its attraction in the eyes of Ethiopia's Workers' Party.

And since the DFSS, like the SNM, is based in Ethiopia, what the Ethiopians think is of some relevance. With money from Col. Muammar Qaddafy cut off after the recent rapprochement between Libya and Somalia, the problems of the DFSS seem likely to grow. Even so, it is unlikely that Barre will get much more from Qaddafy, given the Colonel's somewhat mercurial approach to international affairs and his continued friendship with Ethiopia.

Ethiopia is still trying to push the two opposition movements toward unity. Serious agreement is improbable, despite the continued and considerable pressure, as both organizations are distracted by their respective internal problems. They may talk frequently about unity, but neither DFSS chairman Col. Abdullahi Yusuf, nor SNM chairman Ahmed Silanyo, nor their respective central committees, are in any mood to acknowledge the other's supremacy.

Despite these distractions, the opposition's operations have continued, although at a somewhat lower profile. Both continually misrepresent the size of their operations, though the DFSS in particular exaggerates its activities and the number of defections from the Somali army. When larger-scale operations occur, Ethiopian forces are generally involved, operating from the enclaves of Balamballe and Geldegob which they have held since July 1982.

In July, the DFSS claimed to have attacked the government military base of El Modan in central Somalia, killing nearly 300 men of the 43rd Brigade and wounding another 200. They claimed a mere 70 killed and wounded among their own men. According to the Somali government, El Modan was attacked by Ethiopian troops who lost 60 men and a number of artillery pieces before outnumbered Somali troops forced them back.

The government version is certainly closer to the truth. Similarly, in September, after an Ethiopian air attack on Abudwaq in central Somalia and artillery bombardments of several northern villages, it was the SNM's turn to claim that the northern attacks were really their work and that they had overrun a government base at Labisagaleh, killing 380 troops.

Guerrilla claims, of course, need to be treated with caution, and their casualty figures should perhaps be ignored. Even so, it is clear that the army is unable to stop guerrilla infiltration. Last year's large-scale SNM operation in northern Somalia, especially around

UNHCR/Y. Muller

Ethiopian refugees in Somalia: "Effects of the recent drought are compounded by the influx of several hundred thousand refugees"

In the 12 of 18 provinces that have been declared drought-affected, livestock losses have been serious

Sheikh, involved several hundred men, yet it was not the success the guerrillas anticipated or claimed. However, it did catch the government off-guard, for it had no idea that the SNM had either the capability or the numbers to carry out such an attack. More recently, the SNM has concentrated its operations in the southern regions of Bakool and Hiran where their "southern front" has been gaining ground due to Hawiye support.

Ostensibly, Somalia can look to the United States for help in countering Ethiopian aggression and guerrilla incursions. Publicly at least, the alliance is close. Somalia took part in the Bright Star exercises this year as it has in the past, and Lt.-Gen. Robert Kingston, commander of the Central Command of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), visited Somalia in early August. One-hundred-forty U.S. soldiers took part in operations and training for engineering and artillery personnel.

The exercises, centered around the Somali town of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden, were designed to incorporate new port and air defense facilities provided by the U.S. into the Central Command's operational planning. The port improvements, completed three months ahead of schedule, involved constructing a new quay, doubling the port capacity, deepening the harbor, and providing facilities for roll-on, roll-off ships of the type used by the RDF. At the airfield, the refueling facilities have been improved and new radar defenses provided.

But the U.S. still refuses to supply the offensive capabilities the Somali army has demanded since 1978. U.S. security assistance to Somalia for 1986 exceeds $75 million, nearly $20 million more than in 1985. More air defense systems, some artillery and armored vehicles, and a wide range of communications equipment will be provided—but not the tanks and fighter aircraft the Somalis really want.

While this aid is certainly useful, the impact of U.S. advisory and training missions and equipment has yet to be felt. The Somali army is still incapable of ousting the Ethiopians from Balamballe and Geldegob, or controlling the SNM and DFSS guerrillas.

The government has been looking further afield for both military and civilian assistance. Early in 1985, First Vice President Gen. Mohammed Ali Samatar held talks with Italian security officials in Rome. In July, the Italian deputy foreign minister was in Mogadishu to discuss Somalia's emergency aid needs; he also heads Italy's technical committee which is implementing a 2 billion lira emergency aid program for drought-affected countries.

In September, Prime Minister Bettino Craxi made the first visit to Somalia by an Italian head of government. On the whole, it was a successful trip despite Italian criticism of the Somali government's human rights record. Recent Ethiopian attacks caused Craxi considerable embarrassment, and he seized the opportunity to reiterate his desire to mediate between Ethiopia and Somalia. But the Ethiopians cancelled his planned stopover.

Despite such irritations, Somalia was promised some 500 million lira in economic aid, as well as additional military aid. However, Craxi was not prepared to supply the modern West German Leopard tanks Somalia requested. These, he told his hosts, would have to be paid for. Italy might provide more anti-air defenses, personnel carriers, and training, but no equipment for offensive operations.

In fact, Somalia does well by Italy, which supports the country's biggest development scheme, the $600 million Bardhere Dam on the Juba river. Other Italian-backed projects include the national university, oil prospecting (through Agip), and a 50,000 ton urea plant. Future possibilities include uranium prospecting and expanding Mogadishu's oil refinery.

Italian aid is expected to increase, as are investments by other countries, now that economic liberalization policies are beginning to take effect. In February, the IMF finally announced that it had agreed to a one-year standby credit for Somalia, which together with a compensatory finance facility for the loss of cattle exports to Saudi Arabia, amounted to just over $52 million. The negotiations had been long and difficult, depending in part on the Somali government's success in raising $100 million at a special donors' meeting in January to close the gap in its 1985 balance of payments. Other problems arose over the government's reluctance to accept a package of financial measures, which included further devaluation, reductions in parastatals, and reforms of the banking system.

Soon after the agreement, the Paris Club of Western creditor nations agreed to reschedule some $120 million of debts over 10 years with a five-year grace period. This of course does not solve the debt problem, as the bulk of Somalia's external debt (an estimated $1 billion in total) is owed to the USSR and Arab donors. The next donors' consultative meeting in November is vital.

In the meantime, the government is reluctantly liberalizing the economy, though it has refused further devaluation and made clear its displeasure with the effects of the two-tier exchange rate imposed in January. The free market rate is 81 shillings to the dollar; the official rate for UN agencies and embassies is 36 to the dollar. This has seriously affected the operations of the United Nations agencies, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, which has threatened to suspend some programs in Somalia if it is not exempted.

On the more positive side, the government has made some progress in introducing a free market economy and encouraging agricultural and livestock production. Early in the year, the government initiated a policy of allowing private exporters to keep 65 percent (rather than 35 percent) of foreign currency earnings to encourage imports.

The results are already evident, with more goods available in the shops of Mogadishu, Berbera, and Hargeisa. There is still a tendency, however, for imports of luxury consumer goods such as video cassette recorders and other electrical items. But locally produced goods, freed from price controls, can now compete with imports.

In addition, employment in the parastatals has been cut back. In March, 45 senior officials were retired, and by mid-year, about 2,500 government employees had been "directed into the fields of agriculture or fishing," to use the government euphemism. More are likely to move, though few have done so in the last few months. Although the government is still resisting the closure of additional parastatals, the U.S. has provided a number of university experts to look into further rationalization of public sector employment policies.

Both the foreign investment code and a new employment law in which salaries are tied to the productivity of the organization rather than fixed by the government are being revised. The employment law, published in September 1984, currently applies only to factories, but it already seems to have had a beneficial effect on employment, or so the government claims.

An economic revitalization committee has been established, but its membership—government officials and representatives from the state sector—gives rise to considerable skepticism about its effectiveness. More important is the agreement to license privately-owned banks and allow private firms to import oil—though they will have to use parastatal distribution. In June, a commodity import agreement was signed with the U.S. which allows private traders and the government to import $27 million worth of oil, food, agricultural implements, and industrial spare parts. A similar deal is planned for 1986, to offset the probable loss of Saudi Arabian oil supplies. In August, a new tax ministry was set up under Col. Abdullahi Warsame, previously the deputy finance minister, to control tax evasion.

All these efforts should help revitalize an economy reeling under the effects of bad management, corruption, war, and drought. The recent drought has not hit Somalia as badly as many African countries, but its effect is serious enough and is compounded by the influx of refugees. Somalia has several hundred thousand Ethiopian refugees, about 100,000 of whom have arrived over the past year, although at least that many have returned to Ethiopia.

The Somali government's appeals for aid have not been ignored, but they have been answered slowly, almost grudgingly. Last year, Somalia imported just under 300,000 tons of grain; of this, 230,000 tons was in food aid. This year, it is estimated that the government will buy 92,000 tons and receive an additional 270,000 tons in aid. But as of early August, there was no indication as to when over one-third of this aid might arrive. Somali officials feel the media's concentration on Ethiopia and Sudan has been largely to blame for the delays.

Livestock losses have been serious, with thousands of animal deaths due to lack of water. In March, the government declared 12 of 18 provinces—the entire north and center of the country—to be drought-affected. Recent light rainfall has improved conditions somewhat. Although it is unclear how much livestock was lost, there is no doubt that future export earnings will be lower.

Exports to Saudi Arabia were valued at about 90 percent of earnings when they were terminated due to fears of a rinderpest epidemic. Although camel, sheep, and goat exports were quickly restored, cattle exports—which had been about half of the total—were not. There is little hope that the Saudis will resume cattle imports, despite the Somali government's appeals to its Arab League fellow member and the implementation of an extensive (and very successful) Arab language program to woo the Saudis. An improvement in livestock exports remains the critical factor for the Somali economy. Without it, the economic situation can only remain fragile at best. □

Interview

El-Gizouli Dafaalla

Prime Minister of Sudan

Faced with an inherited economic crisis, drought, and continuing civil warfare, the Sawar-Dahab government has taken steps to reorder relations with its neighbors, traditional allies, and creditors. But, as Sudan's prime minister explains in this *Africa Report* exclusive, a negotiated solution to the southern problem remains the critical issue facing the Sudanese leadership.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: Among the most urgent of Sudan's problems at this time is the civil war in the south. What solution does your government envisage to this problem?

Dafaalla: Under the new government after the popular uprising, the Sudanese people all agreed that we should resolve our national problems through dialogue and with respect for democracy. The problem in the south is being given top priority. It is an urgent problem which interferes with the process of democracy and with economic development. From the very beginning, the Sudanese army declared a unilateral ceasefire and then there was an amnesty. Then I wrote a letter to John Garang early in June, asking him to join in the dialogue since he too was fighting against the Nimeiry regime, as were all of us. Now that that regime is no longer in power in Sudan, I think it is the right time for all of us who believe in democracy, in unity, and in dialogue to come together and sit around a table to thrash out our problems and come to an agreement. Fighting is no longer necessary—it is not logical or rational.

To make things easier, we declared a political manifesto enunciating the framework through which our national problems can be solved, recognizing our different cultures, different historical origins, discrepancies in development and in the distribution of services, and underlining that we respect human rights and the various religions, etc. We worked out a framework in this political manifesto so that all of us can discuss our problems within this context. Now we are preparing the ground for a national congress to discuss the southern problem mainly, but other problems as well. We think this is also a forum where all of us can contribute, share our points of view, and develop a very constructive dialogue. Hopefully we can come out with a consensus on our national problems. Therefore all these steps have been taken.

Lately, I heard that John Garang said he is willing to enter



United Nations

Prime Minister El-Gizouli Dafaalla at the UN's 40th anniversary session: "There are many problems in the Horn of Africa and it is in our interests to solve these problems through peaceful negotiations and dialogue"

into dialogue. I hope that he is going to prove by his actions that he is for dialogue. But even if he doesn't come, the political forces in the south and in the north have already accepted this dialogue. Therefore we will go to the conference to discuss our problems and if we come to a consensus and agree about the solutions, then it becomes very apparent that there is no logic in fighting. The people who are fighting in a part of our country are Sudanese. They can be convinced that what they are fighting for has already been achieved and agreed upon. Any guerrilla movement that doesn't have the support of the local population is just like a fish out of water.

Africa Report: Since the coup attempt in September, some reports have indicated that your government is leaning toward a military solution for the civil war.

Dafaalla: Not at all. We have never changed our direction because military means have been tried for the last 30 years and they didn't work. But at the same time, we differentiate between two aspects, the security situation and the political solution for the southern problem, and until we come to a political solution, we are not going to allow the guerrillas to kill innocent citizens. It is our duty to protect our citizens and that is why we separated the two issues. We are still for dialogue, we are still for democracy, we are still for a political solution. But we are not going to allow anyone else to compel us to try to solve the problem through military means. Our direction has always been the same. We have never changed.

Africa Report: Do you still view the Addis Ababa Accord as the basic framework for resolution of problems between north and south?

Dafaalla: The charter for our popular uprising recognized the Addis Ababa Accord as a framework for running the affairs of the south until we come to an agreement. Therefore, we recognize Addis Ababa as a working framework, and it is now being applied in the south.

Africa Report: Some reports have indicated that President Mubarak of Egypt may play an intermediary role between your government and the SPLM [Sudan People's Liberation Movement].

Dafaalla: A delegation of the SPLM visited Cairo, saw President Mubarak, and he told them there is no alternative for them except to renounce force and to enter into dialogue. So far nothing concrete has come out of that.

Africa Report: Are your government's relations with Egypt on better terms than after the coup or does the fact that former President Nimeiry is in exile there continue to pose problems?

Dafaalla: Former President Nimeiry is still in Egypt and the Sudanese government still maintains its position that it wants Nimeiry extradited so that he might have a fair trial in his own country under an independent judiciary and under the rule of law. From its side, the Egyptian government says that Nimeiry was granted asylum and their constitution is such that they think Nimeiry was eligible for asylum. We respect their point of view, but we hold to our point of view. But I think that the relations between the two countries are so intricate and so important that you cannot put our relationship with Nimeiry and our relationship with Egypt on the same scale.

Therefore we mean to maintain our relations with Egypt, but of course it would make our relations much better and it would remove a point of friction if Nimeiry was extradited to Sudan. But nevertheless, I think our relations with Egypt are quite good. I passed through Cairo before coming to New York and I met with President Mubarak and the Council of Ministers. We discussed matters of bilateral interest and there was complete agreement.

Africa Report: How are your relations with the United States given that the U.S. was one of the former president's strongest allies? How has your rapprochement with Libya affected relations?

Dafaalla: Our relations with the United States are very friendly since the coming of this government. Relations have been progressing very smoothly. I think our friends in the U.S. understand that our new revolution is non-aligned. We say at the same time that we are very pragmatic; we know that we have traditional friends and we intend to maintain our relations with them, especially friends who came to our assistance in time of need, like the U.S. during the famine. They gave us a great deal of help. Now that we have opted for a multi-party democracy, we share a common ideal and this is a cementing factor. I see no real prospect of frictions. Of course I am not saying that our points of view are the same on all aspects of international politics—we have our own reservations about what is happening in the Middle East and in South Africa.

"If the Third World countries go deeper and deeper into debt, if their economies don't grow, this will backfire on the developed economies."

Concerning our relations with Libya, it is only natural for a country to have good neighborly relations, and Sudan is no exception. The United States is very much at ease if its relations with Canada or Mexico are cordial. Geography is very important. During the Cuban missile crisis, when it was thought that the Soviet Union was introducing missiles into Cuba, the United States took it very seriously and was going to go to war—because of proximity. There are historic relations between Libya and Sudan.

Apart from that, we have a problem in our south and it is no secret that the Libyans were involved in that crisis. Therefore it is only good common sense to have good traditional relations with Libya. I always say that if a superpower like the United States, which is a thousand miles away from Libya, is concerned, what about Sudan? A country next door to Libya, as vulnerable and weak as it is! It is only common sense that we have good relations with Libya. Moreover, having good relations does not mean that you are going to adopt the stance of your neighbor. It doesn't mean that you are going to see through his own eyes, nor is it a zero-sum. It does not mean that because you have good conventional relations with Libya, this will detract from your relations with Egypt or the U.S. This is the way we see it.

Africa Report: Some recent reports have said that Libya is still supporting Col. Garang's forces.

Dafaalla: We have no evidence to support this.

Africa Report: What are the prospects for solving the southern problem if your relations with Ethiopia continue to be poor, with Ethiopia accusing you of supporting the Eritreans and you accusing them of supporting the SPLM?

Dafaalla: Earlier on, what applied to Libya also applied to Ethiopia—that we intended to have good relations with Ethiopia. We extended many feelers to the Ethiopians. We said that we are traditional friends, we see no reason why we shouldn't have very good relations. True we have got a problem in our south, true you have got a problem in your north, but we recognize our problem and want to solve it through dialogue. And if John Garang and his people come to Sudan, they will be accepted as citizens. They are not going to be punished. Earlier, they would have been received as heroes—it may be now that we are going to accept them as citizens. And we told the Ethiopians that mutual terror is no basis for good relations. We told them that we recognize our problem, and asked them if they recognize their Eritrean problem. We accept the prevailing borders and we don't want to interfere in Ethiopia's affairs. We don't want to fragment Ethiopia and we don't want anybody to try and fragment Sudan. But within a unified Ethiopia, within a unified Sudan, if you accept these problems and deal with them through dialogue, then there will be a possibility of helping each other.

Camerapix

Sudanese army: "Until we come to a political solution, we are not going to allow the guerrillas to kill innocent citizens"

Then we told them frankly that we are not helping the Eritreans. They have no bases in our land. They are not broadcasting from our land. They have no offices in Sudan, whereas the southerners have bases in Ethiopia, they are being trained there, and they have a broadcasting system that cannot be denied. We said, "Let us form a joint committee from both sides and thrash out these problems." Initially, they accepted it, but lately they are dragging their feet.

I think the door is still open for both of us. It is in our interests to solve these problems through peaceful negotiations and dialogue, perhaps within a regional context. We would like the Horn of Africa to be an area of peace. There are many problems in the Horn—in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Perhaps if we really face these problems, recognize them, and try to solve them within the existing boundaries through dialogue, then a solution is achievable. It can be done. Therefore we are not going to stop trying to have good relations with Ethiopia. I hope they are going to respond in equal respect.

Africa Report: After Nimeiry was overthrown, why was John Garang not asked to join the new government? Could that not have avoided the ensuing violence?

Dafaalla: I don't think that at that time, anybody was in the mood to invite anybody. It was our change, we were all involved, we all have an equal stake, and therefore nobody was master or boss. It was expected that John Garang would have taken the initiative and joined voluntarily. But in the first week even before the government was formed, he took a stand [against the new government]—he said it was "Nimeiry the second," even before we assumed responsibility. He made up his mind too early. I think it was equally his duty as a Sudanese who had some part in toppling the Nimeiry regime to come forward. He didn't need an invitation. This is our country. After the tyrant was gone, who was going to invite whom?

Africa Report: Your government has pledged to hand over to a civilian government by next April. Do you still expect that to be the case, or is it contingent upon solving the southern problem?

Dafaalla: No, I think this is still feasible. And I think this is also an added guarantee for democracy. Interim periods are always very vulnerable and volatile and therefore the shorter the better. Once you make a commitment, it would be best to uphold that commitment. If you are seen to be just making a commitment and then extending it, this will leave the door wide open for other people who want to extend the period for other purposes. Therefore, it is still our commitment to carry out the elections during the interim period, and it is my belief that it is attainable, achievable, and possible.

Africa Report: What is the status of your negotiations with the IMF?

Dafaalla: We have had several meetings with the concerned committees. We are still bargaining. We have reached some agreements in some areas. All of us want to cut down extra-budgetary spending. All of us want to cut down excess money and all of us want our projects running better with higher efficiency. That much we agree upon. What we don't agree upon is devaluation of the Sudanese pound, because the Sudanese pound has been devalued four or five times over the last 15 years on the instruction of the IMF. Therefore either the formula did not work, or it was not adhered to. We think it was not workable in the sense that in a developing economy, the purpose behind devaluation is to encourage exports, but if your economy is not very elastic, you are not going to increase exports because you devalue the pound. Imports are already controlled under our policies. We only import necessities, therefore devaluation of the pound is neither here nor there.

Therefore we say that if the recipe didn't work, it ought to be changed. If the recipe was correct and the conditions were not implemented, why was the previous regime being given money again and again by the West? Legally we accept the obligations, but we object to the way money was given to Sudan. I think they understand now that after 16 years of belt-tightening in a country that is facing famine, strife, and a refugee load, the people have no leeway, their backs are to the wall, and they cannot tighten their belts further. They are living on only 19 percent of what they used to live on in the 1970s because the Sudanese pound in 1970 was about $3 and now it is less than a third of a dollar!

However, the indications from Seoul are that perhaps the World Bank and the IMF are more receptive to the political and human situation in the Sudan. They are now convinced that we have done what is possible in our circumstances and hopefully we will strike an agreement.

Africa Report: What is your government's position on your $9 billion debt?

Dafaalla: This is another headache. Although it is not seen in absolute terms as a big debt, by Sudanese standards and our present economic capability, it is very big and the service on this debt covers almost all of our exports. At the same time, even with the money that has been given to us, we have been running a negative growth rate for the last three or four years. If we are compelled to pay the arrears and the service, this will



United Nations

"Now that we have a promise of a fairly good crop and the acute famine stage might be over, people might relax—but the real work needs to be done"

mean stifling the Sudanese economy and probably also stifling our budding democracy. There is no way in which we can pay it. Not that we don't want to, but we are unable to. Therefore, from our point of view, we think that abrogation of these debts is the best for us and for our creditors—at least the officially granted or guaranteed debts. The debt that belongs to commercial banks can be rescheduled and we can have a moratorium—they can give us a breathing spell. About 33 percent of these debts belong to the Arabs, and I think they understand the situation in Sudan.

Therefore this is a plea we put forward to the concerned creditors and donors. To us, it is quite a viable position, because paying these debts right now is just impossible. If the Third World countries go deeper and deeper into debt, if their economies don't grow, this will backfire on the developed economies. Therefore unless we create a new economic order, and unless the developing countries find a way to economic growth, then this will have a negative effect on the developed economies in the northern part of the globe, because there is a reciprocal relationship.

Africa Report: Despite the recent rains and generous donor assistance, the food situation is still precarious given your immense infrastructural and logistical problems. What is being done by your government and by donors to alleviate these problems so that a repeat of the recent crisis can be avoided?

Dafaalla: As you have correctly stated, the acute famine relief went on very well, but often when a people are in stark starvation—you see very dramatic scenes in films of children and the elderly dying—then it is very easy for the international community to sympathize and to send relief materials. Now that we have a promise of a fairly good crop and the acute famine stage might be over, people might relax. But the real work remains to be done, as even a good crop is posing some problems. How are we going to get the cash to reap it? Where are we going to store it? How can we transport it to the needy areas, because the harvest is not uniformly good? Where are we going to get the jute sacks for the grain? All this needs cash, let alone the infrastructure—the roads, the railway lines, the bridges.

Whole communities were uprooted and moved to other areas. They want to go back to their own areas or else that land will be reclaimed by the desert. This is in a very vital and productive belt, the gum arabic belt, and unless the population moves, the desert is going to take over. You can see the sand dunes choking the trees, the trees just die like a child and this is very tragic. We need to resettle these communities. We need infrastructure for that—water supplies and health services. Therefore a lot remains to be done and it needs foresight, it needs vigilance, it needs a much greater degree of consciousness by the international community than was needed to combat the acute famine. I wouldn't say that so far we have had that sort of support, but our expectations are that the international community is going to accept the challenge and is going to rise up to it. □



Camerapix

Camp for Sudanese refugees near Gambela, Ethiopia: "We don't want to fragment Ethiopia and we don't want anyone to try and fragment Sudan"

UPDATE

South Africa on the warpath in Angola and Mozambique

As South Africa stepped up its financial and economic support for rebel movements in neighboring Angola and Mozambique, the Reagan administration is considering providing funds to Unita forces.

That prospect prompted Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos to warn that aid to Unita, cut off 10 years ago by the Clark amendment which was repealed last summer, could jeopardize American economic interests in Angola and damage the tenuous negotiations for Namibian independence.

Angola unilaterally cut off talks with the U.S. when the repeal passed Congress. The State Department insisted the administration had no intention of resuming aid to Jonas Savimbi's rebel organization, but the CIA, the Pentagon, and members of the National Security Council have been lobbying hard for covert military support. Congress, moreover, is considering providing \$27 million in "humanitarian aid" to Unita.

Dos Santos was conciliatory over the Namibia negotiations, which are a cornerstone of the administration's "constructive engagement" policy and involve a parallel withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and South African troops from Namibia. Dos Santos resumed diplomatic contacts with the U.S. in October, conferring with Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker—the architect of the four-year-old policy.

South Africa's growing involvement with Unita included a major land and air foray deep into Angola that helped the rebels thwart an Angolan government offensive. Dos Santos charged that a heavy South African air attack prevented government forces from breaking through to Jamba, Unita's headquarters in southern Angola. The advance of Angolan troops had threatened to drive a wedge between Unita's rear base area and the Namibian border, cutting the guerrillas' main supply route from South Africa.

Pretoria denied that it had clashed with Angolan forces, billing its second invasion of southern Angola since officially withdrawing its troops in April as a "pre-emptive strike" against Namibia's Swapo guerrillas based in the region. South African security forces claimed to have "irrefutable evidence" of Swapo plans to attack major targets in Namibia.

In reality, it was the prospect of a Unita defeat that prompted South Africa to become more aggressive in its support for Savimbi in recent weeks. Defense Minister Magnus Malan admitted for the first time that Pretoria was providing aid to Unita, after years of denial by the South African government. Describing it as an "open secret," Malan said South Africa's aid was still restricted to "material, humanitarian, and moral support," but that the situation was changing rapidly and that "military intervention cannot be excluded."

In October, Botha all but admitted that South African troops were helping Unita as Pretoria could "hardly sit still" in light of the Soviet and Cuban advance. Observers pointed out that South Africa's crack 32nd battalion, made up mainly of Portuguese-speaking blacks, had already been fighting alongside Unita rebels. Moreover, Captain Wynand du Toit, a South African soldier captured during the aborted commando raid on the Gulf Oil refinery in Cabinda earlier in the year, recently admitted that members of the security forces have been involved in repeated cases of sabotage previously attributed solely to Unita.

Continued on next page

IMF creates \$2.7 billion concessional loan pool to help sub-Saharan nations

A \$2.7 billion lending pool for the world's poorest countries was the brightest spot for Africa on the agenda of the World Bank/International Monetary Fund (IMF) annual meeting in Seoul in early October.

The lending pool, approved by the IMF policy-making committee, will make loans to countries that meet the eligibility standards of the World Bank's concessionary lending arm, the International Development Agency (IDA)—which includes almost all 40 nations of sub-Saharan Africa. China and India, also eligible, volunteered not to tap the fund, leaving the bulk of the money for Africa.

The austerity measures usually required for IMF loans will not be imposed, though IMF general approval of the borrowing country's economic program will be necessary. While the IMF executive board has yet to work out the final details, it is expected that repayment will be at extremely concessionary terms—perhaps as low as 0.5 percent over five years, with a five-and-a-half year grace period. The fund will be financed by repayments to the IMF Trust Fund due between 1985 and 1989.

The lending pool was initially discussed as part of the U.S. plan to ease the international debt crisis. U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker had proposed that the IMF and the World Bank would jointly manage the fund. But developing countries charged that joint administration would mean more outside control over their economies with the possibility of "cross-conditionality" if both major financial institu-

Continued on next page

LOAN POOL. . . continued

tions imposed conditions on the borrowing nations. They also said that the proposal was a poor substitute for the major increase in World Bank lending capacity called for by the Group of 24 developing nations.

Another significant development for African nations was the U.S. endorsement of a "speedy and adequate replenishment" for the IDA. Thirty-two other countries also agreed to provide new funds by autumn 1986 for the eighth replenishment—with a goal of $16 billion set by the World Bank. Two years ago, U.S. opposition to an IDA increase kept the seventh replenishment at $9 billion, although the special World Bank facility for drought-stricken countries brought the total to $10.3 billion. Outgoing World Bank President A.W. Clausen said his main priority during his remaining months on the job will be to secure an agreement on the next replenishment.

The Baker Plan

The U.S. debt crisis plan calls on commercial banks to increase their lending to the 15 major debtor nations by $20 billion over the next three years. In addition, the World Bank and other development banks should increase their funding for Third World countries by $9 billion during the same period. Baker said the U.S. will back an increase in the World Bank's capital base to enhance its capacity to deal with the debt crisis. And the major debtor countries should adopt policies that reduce inflation and promote economic growth and adjustments in their balance of payments.

Observers noted that the plan represents a major policy shift for the U.S., signalling a new U.S. willingness to play an activist role in solving the international debt problem. The Reagan administration acknowledged that responsibility for restoring growth and stability in the international financial system must be shared by governments, creditors, debtors, and financial institutions. Baker's speech also reflected a more positive attitude toward the World Bank than the U.S. has shown since Reagan took office.

Bankers and government representatives, however, were skeptical about the proposal's impact on Third World economies. The $20 billion target represents an increase of only 2.5 percent over the current level of lending to developing countries. Commercial banks questioned where they would find the extra resources, especially at a time when auditors and regulators are warning them to adopt more prudent lending policies.

The Group of 24 was particularly critical, noting that the plan included no reduction in conditionality, no increase in IMF special drawing rights, and no provision for the surveillance of industrialized countries' economic policies.

However, banking and government representatives, motivated by a fear that the major debtor nations will simply default if action is not taken, agreed that they should try to make the plan work and that the World Bank should play a greater role in monitoring the economic performance of debtor nations. ■

SOUTH AFRICA. . . continued

South African intervention on Unita's behalf underscores how crucial Savimbi's forces are to Pretoria's security interests. Unita's control over southeastern Angola effectively seals off much of the long border with Namibia, making infiltration by Swapo guerrillas more difficult. The conquest of Unita might also enable the dos Santos government to send home the 30,000 Cuban troops on its territory, eliminating South Africa's only remaining pretext for not granting independence to Namibia.

Meanwhile in Mozambique, government forces combined with Zimbabwean troops attacked MNR headquarters in Sofala province, uncovering hundreds of photographs and documents that proved Pretoria was still supporting the rebel movement despite the Nkomati Accord.

South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha flew to Komatipoort—site of the signing of the non-aggression pact—for emergency talks with Mozambican officials. The detailed evidence of South African military support for the rebels forced Botha to concede that "the allegations in broad terms are correct," but constituted only "technical" violations of the Nkomati Accord.

Mozambican President Samora Machel described South African involvement as "more than a breach" of the pact and informed the foreign minister that he would suspend the joint security commission set up to monitor the agreement. Botha said, however, that he would continue to press for further high-level contacts with Maputo aimed at restoring cooperation between the countries. ■

WESTERN AFRICA

Security issue strains African summit

A special summit of the 25-year-old Entente Council in Yamoussoukro, Ivory Coast, recently brought to the fore growing tensions between Burkina Faso President Thomas Sankara and his neighbors.

The heads of state of Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Niger, and Togo—who usually meet to promote economic development in the region—this time focused on the issues of security and regional destabilization, following a series of bombings in Lomé, Togo, and an armed invasion by Tuareg nomads in north-west Niger earlier in the year. A final communiqué called for ministerial-level consultations to stamp out sabotage and terrorism and extended sympathy to the people of Togo and Niger.

Sankara, who refused to sign the communiqué, explained that although Burkina Faso expressed solidarity with the Togolese, such support "does not allow us to interfere in the internal affairs of Togo. . . If these explosions were done by Togolese opponents against the Togolese regime, then it was a matter for the Togolese people." Alluding to President Gnassingbé Eyadema's insinuations that Ghana was responsible for the bombings, Sankara added, "Conversely, if these explosions were staged by a third party, another state, another people, then we should clearly be told the name of that state. . . so that we Burkinabé can take a clear stand."

Rawlings and Sankara: Close relations

Speaking at a rally in Ouagadougou, Sankara pointed out that Burkina Faso had been "threatened many times." "There have been explosions. Some of our comrades have died. Never was there a tear shed for our dead. Never was anything done against these many and multiformed aggressions against our country. Never did the Entente Council feel the necessity to call a summit in order to give us support."

Summits, he said, would never be enough to bring about security, as long as member-states continued to support each other's opponents. For example, he added, Ivory Coast President Houphouët-Boigny harbors many of Burkina Faso's foes, who could be extradited if Entente Council leaders seriously sought to end regional insecurity. Sankara thereby proposed the creation of a "Revolutionary Entente Council" comprised of the people of the member-states "who have understood that only revolution will help them to get rid of all those who, inside and outside their countries, prevent them from attaining the freedom, dignity, peace, and security" they need.

Houphouët-Boigny reportedly has been instrumental in funding a virulent international press campaign against the Sankara government over the last two years. More recently, he allegedly sent a group of Ivorian secret agents to Ouagadougou to distribute anti-government leaflets and spread false rumors to discredit the ruling National Council of the Revolution.

During the summit, a government communiqué issued in Ouagadougou criticized Abidjan for supporting opponents of the Sankara government and condemned the mistreatment of Ghanaian nationals in Ivory Coast. The statement said that "good neighborliness, the cornerstone of the Entente Council policy, should be extended to Ghana despite the linguistic barriers set up by colonization."

Several hundred Ghanaians were beaten by street gangs in Abidjan after an African Cup elimination football match between the two countries in early September, prompting thousands to return to Ghana in fear of further attacks. Josephine Ouédraogo, the Burkina minister of family affairs and national solidarity, announced the creation of a special fund for "harassed Ghanaians resident in Ivory Coast" and said that any assistance and contributions would be forwarded to Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings' government.

As further evidence of the close relations between Accra and Ouagadougou, Sankara received a two-member delegation led by Maj. Assasie Gyimah, deputy director of national security, in a joint effort to combat destabilization schemes in the region. At the close of the meeting, Gyimah told the press, "We want our enemies to know that any attack against Burkina is an attack against Ghana. That is essentially the significance of my visit." ■

BENIN
Oil struggle heats up

The Norwegian government embarked on an effort in early October to forestall the takeover of Saga Petroleum's oil operations in Benin by Pan Ocean Oil Company (Panoco).

The Norwegian move followed Cotonou's disclosure that it had cancelled its three-year service contract with Saga, a Norwegian company, transferring all rights for exploration and mining of the Sémé offshore oil field to Panoco, an operation owned by Vittorio Fabbri, a Swiss-based Italian entrepreneur.

The Beninese government said a lack of revenue from the oil field and harsh terms for repayment of development loans to the Norwegian government had motivated the decision to change partners.

Under the new contract, Panoco is committed to increasing production from 7,000 to 25,000 barrels a day by the end of 1986, in exchange for exclusive rights to explore the country's hydrocarbon resources and a controlling interest in the management and development of the Sémé field.

In addition, Panoco promised to embark on joint development ventures with the government including an oil refinery, a fertilizer plant, an international airport, and hydroelectric dams, and to develop housing and irrigation projects. The contract also calls for Panoco to explore and develop Benin's mineral resource potential.

Observers regard the exclusivity of the pact as highly unusual and the promise to increase production as unrealistic, given the slow progress and limited success of Saga, a more established company.

The new contract also calls into question the status of debts Benin has incurred in developing the oil field. The Norwegian government and international banks have backed Saga's operations. World Bank and European Investment Bank development loans to Benin were thought to be linked to Saga's continued involvement in the country's oil operations.

The Sémé oil field was discovered in the late 1960s but exploration was abandoned a few years later for lack of profitability. After oil prices rose in 1973-74, Benin commissioned Saga to do a feasibility study and later signed a contract with the firm to develop the offshore field. ■

IVORY COAST
Still no successor

The National Assembly has abolished the post of vice-president, leaving President Félix Houphouët-Boigny without a running mate in the presidential election of October 28 and the country without a successor.

The change was made through a constitutional amendment after delegates to the Democratic Party of Ivory Coast (PDCI) congress, held in early October, urged that the position be eliminated. The amendment provides that if the president leaves office, the chairman of the National Assembly will run the country for a period of from 45 to 60 days and arrange for presidential elections.

At the time of the congress, Henri Conan-Bedié, former ambassador to the U.S. and finance minister, was National Assembly president, but legislative elections scheduled for early November could remove him from office.

For months, the 80-year-old president had indicated that he would name his successor at the congress. Five years ago, he had created the post of vice-president and transferred the role of constitutional successor from National Assembly president to the new position. At that time, he announced the vice-presidency would not be filled until the 1985 elections.

Competition among presidential contenders grew fierce in the interim, particularly among members of the party's executive committee. Houphouët-Boigny, who has led the country since independence in 1960, made clear that he disliked the open rivalry. ■

Coup and riot risk insurance offered

A new political risk insurance agency, approved by the World Bank at its annual meeting in early October, could provide a desperately needed boost to private investment in Africa.

The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) will insure investments in developing countries against non-commercial risks including military coups, war or civil unrest, expropriation, breach of contract without effective recourse, and limits on the transfer of currency. The creation of MIGA is regarded as a major accomplishment—a development which the World Bank and other international agencies have been seeking for nearly 30 years.

Programs and treaties providing such insurance already exist in most developed countries, but their coverage contains loop-holes and restrictions imposed by governments or the private sector. Together they cover less than 20 percent of direct investment in developing countries.

MIGA is expected to complement existing coverage. According to World Bank Vice-President Ibrahim Shihata, MIGA will offer wider geographic coverage, a greater capacity to evaluate projects and risks, and a mandate to promote international development. In addition to insurance coverage, policy advice and technical assistance will be provided to help governments attract investment that will contribute best to their own development objectives. MIGA will also provide a forum for discussion of investment policy cooperation between developed and developing countries, Shihata said.

MIGA is particularly needed in Africa where private investment has been declining in recent years from an already dismally low level, due in part to investors' fears regarding political instability. To attract foreign investment, many African nations have been denationalizing public enterprises and providing a variety of incentives.

MIGA, which will be an independent agency with a separate board of directors, is expected to start operations in 1986 or as soon as 20 member countries ratify its operating principles and provide one-third of the capital toward the authorized goal of slightly over $1 billion. Membership is open to all 148 World Bank members and Switzerland. No investment will be guaranteed without prior approval of the host country. Projects will be eligible only if both countries have joined MIGA and contributed capital.

MIGA will provide host country nationals with coverage if they make local investments with foreign assets. This policy was adopted partly in response to criticism that MIGA would give foreigners an unfair advantage over local investors.

LIBERIA
Samuel Doe declared winner

The Special Elections Commission (SEC) announced on October 29 that President Samuel K. Doe won the presidential election with 50.9 percent of the vote, following a ballot count marred by charges of fraud and blatant ballot manipulation.

A vote count taken on election day, in the presence of opposition party observers, gave the victory to Liberian Action Party (LAP) candidate, Jackson Doe. The president then appointed 50 persons—mostly members of his party or ethnic group—to a new committee charged with recounting the ballots in private. The Liberian media reported election irregularities on almost a daily basis during the second vote count. Newspapers published photographs of a pile of ballots found burning 40 miles north of Monrovia. Opposition parties charged that ballots for their candidates were replaced with ballots for Samuel Doe.

Two weeks after the election, SEC Chairman Emmett Harmon declared that Samuel Doe had taken 10 of Liberia's 13 counties. The ruling National Democratic Party of Liberia reportedly won 44 of 56 seats in the House of Representatives and 22 of 26 seats in the Senate, while the LAP took nine House seats and three Senate seats.

One of the Senate seats went to LAP candidate Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf who was recently tried and convicted on sedition charges but released two weeks into a 10-year prison term, after protests from U.S. officials. She said, however, that no LAP member would serve in the new legislature. Jackson Doe had earlier declared that LAP would not accept the election results.

The announcement of Samuel Doe's victory was expected to create widespread disenchantment in the country. Voter turnout was high as people walked for miles and waited in line for hours to participate in the first multi-party elections based on universal adult suffrage in the country's 138-year history.

U.S. embassy teams, stationed at polls throughout the country to observe the voting, reported that the elections were essentially very orderly, despite some irregularities in Monrovia—which included an unauthorized polling place in an army barracks where people were allowed to vote more than once. The State Department said in an official statement that it had no independent information on vote tallies. "The Liberian courts will have to assess charges of misconduct in the tabulation of votes which have been levied by the government and the opposition."

The discrepancy between the two vote counts is expected to stir controversy in the U.S. Congress. Approximately one-third of the funding for the Liberian budget comes from the U.S., and Liberia is the world's largest per capita recipient of American aid.

Plans were underway for congressional hearings on the elections, which will affect appropriations for Liberia in the fiscal year 1986 foreign aid bill. In September, Congress passed an amendment making disbursement of U.S. aid to Liberia for the last fiscal year contingent on the holding of free and fair elections and the return of full civilian constitutional rule. However, the amendment would not automatically apply to funding for the next fiscal year.

In the year leading up to the elections, the government repeatedly detained opposition party leaders and placed numerous financial and bureaucratic obstacles in the way of party registration. The two most popular challengers for the presidency—Gabriel Matthews, head of the United People's Party, and Amos Sawyer, head of the Liberian People's Party—were not allowed to stand for election. Two minor parties and the LAP were the president's only competition. ■

NIGER
Nigeriens fight desert

President Seyni Kountché launched a massive reforestation campaign on the 25th anniversary of independence in August, as part of the country's struggle against desertification. Trees must be planted in the courtyards of all administrative, industrial, and commercial buildings, he said, as well as at schools and dispensaries.

Niger's limited woodland is disappearing at the rate of 32,000 acres per year, however, while replanting covers less than 1,000 acres. The demand for firewood from the fast-growing population is the primary cause of the loss. Earlier this year, Kountché called on the people to stop felling trees and to cook with gas, kerosene, or coal instead.

The worst drought of the century has exacerbated the disappearance of brush and woodland. Although the recent wet season brought the first heavy rains in years, the Niger River had already dried up in Niamey for the first time since water level records were started in 1922. There was hope that the flow would recommence if sufficient rain


Camerapix

Kountché: "The beginnings of a solution"

fell in the Gourma region of Burkina Faso. The government has stepped up the digging of new wells to supply water to the capital.

In addition to treeplanting and well-digging, Kountché is implementing counter-season cultivation—planting fruits, vegetables, and tubers in any area that has water during the seasons following harvests. The practice, introduced on a massive scale in 1984, has helped sustain many Nigeriens through the famine. In some areas, relief supplies are reportedly distributed only to families who grow off-season crops.

"Eventually, with off-season crops, which demand a deliberate commitment on the part of the people and authorities, we may have found the beginnings of a solution to all action in the rural world," Kountché said in an interview with *West Africa*. ■

NIGERIA
The great IMF debate

In his address to the nation marking Nigeria's 25 years of independence October 1, President Ibrahim Babangida declared a state of economic emergency for the next 15 months, adding fuel to the already heated debate over whether the new government should strike a deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

While Babangida has pledged to

break the long-standing deadlock in negotiations with the financial institution, he has invited all Nigerians to take part in a national debate over the IMF's proposed recovery program. But the press, together with important sections of the armed forces, trade unions, and students, have already voiced strong opposition to any IMF-inspired austerity package, preferring instead to opt for economic nationalism and self-reliance.

Since seizing power in a bloodless military coup in late August, the Babangida government has freed nearly 150 people detained under Maj.-Gen. Muhammadu Buhari. It has also revoked Buhari's notorious Decree Number 4 which provided for up to two years in jail for journalists who ridiculed the government or made "false allegations" against public officials.

However, the new military leader has made clear that his top priority is to turn around the country's crumbling economy. An IMF loan amounting to about $2.5 billion over three years would provide a much-needed financial boost, according to Western creditors. An agreement to abide by IMF conditions would pave the way for up to $1.5 billion in structural adjustment loans from the World Bank, and another $1 billion from commercial banks. It would also allow Nigeria to reschedule medium and long-term debt estimated at $22 billion.

In return, the IMF has insisted on a 60 percent devaluation of the naira, which currently trades at about one-quarter of its official value on the black market. Other conditions include a freeze on wages and salaries in the public and private sectors, cuts in domestic petroleum subsidies, and an easing of import restrictions. Buhari had rejected these measures as politically unpalatable and an infringement of Nigerian sovereignty.

Two key appointments to the new 22-member cabinet are likely to sway the government toward a compromise with the IMF. Both Finance Minister Kalu Kalu and Petroleum Minister Tam David-West, who retained his post, have favored such an agreement in the past.

The Babangida government has also announced its decision to put an end to the Buhari regime's controversial practice of counter-trading crude oil for consumer goods and food. Faced with falling oil prices and an economy which relies on oil exports for 95 percent of its foreign exchange earnings, Buhari concluded $2 billion in barter deals with Brazil, France, and Austria as a means of avoiding the IMF's conditions. Babangida criticized the policy as costly and open to corruption, and said that in the future such contracts would be considered only for long-term development projects.

As for the central issue of the IMF loan agreement, Babangida has stressed that his government would follow popular demand. "Whatever decision we take, whether for or against, I maintain that it is going to be a decision based on what the Nigerian populace wants." ■

TOGO
Bombing spree rocks Lomé

In late September, President Gnassingbé Eyadema announced that security forces had detained more than 30 individuals allegedly responsible for the series of bombings that shook his administration a few weeks earlier. He assured a mass rally of 150,000 militants organized by the ruling Togolese People's Rally (RPT) that the detainees would be severely punished if found guilty. RPT activists had marched to the presidential palace with placards calling for the death penalty and "justice without pity."

The bombings are believed to be the first such incidents since Eyadema seized power 18 years ago. An initial explosion preceded the visit by Pope John Paul II in early August. Three blasts followed on August 16, including one at RPT headquarters during a high school and university singing competition. The final two occurred simultaneously a week later when one bomb was discovered in Lomé airport and detonated safely by airport security officers, while another blew up outside the National Social Security Bank.

Although no injuries were reported and property damage was relatively minor, the blasts were the first overt signs of an underground opposition to Eyadema. A commission of inquiry was established and a massive security force operation launched to put an end to the bombing campaign.

Following the second series of explosions, Eyadema replaced the head of the national police, Kodjo Akeroume, with Madji Kodjo Ayakou, a former prefect of Tchamba.

Leaders of the exiled opposition in Paris, the Togolese Movement for Democracy (MTD), condemned the arrests and challenged the government version of events. The MTD said that the government had "unleashed a wave of repression" and that innocent people were being tortured. Amnesty International confirmed that at least one detainee had died. ■

EASTERN AFRICA

No time for famine relief complacency

In a rare interview with Western journalists in mid-October, Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam said that nearly 6 million Ethiopians will still need food assistance amounting to 1.2 million tons in the coming year. Despite world-wide relief efforts, only 5 million out of an estimated 8 million famine victims will benefit from the 1.3 million tons of food distributed in the country this year. Although scattered rainfall has helped break the three-year drought in some parts of the country, Mengistu said it has not eliminated the crisis and warned of the dangers of "donor fatigue."

Mengistu also called on Western donors to end their opposition to the government's controversial population resettlement program in which more than a million people from drought-affected areas in the north are being moved to more fertile land. The scheme, he explained, was "an integral part of general development" and a "strategic long-term objective." Western governments charge that families have been forcibly removed, and that Mengistu's primary aim is to deplete the population in areas controlled by anti-government rebels.


UNHCR/Sarah Errington

Eritreans: Displaced by war

A few weeks earlier, the Reagan administration condemned Ethiopia's human rights record and accused the Mengistu government of deliberately adopting policies that have "no doubt caused vast and unnecessary human suffering, including starvation." But the U.S. stopped short of proceeding with its threat of a trade embargo, concluding that the Dergue was not conducting a "deliberate policy" of starving the people in rebel-controlled Eritrea, Tigré, and Wollo provinces.

The decision was influenced by Peter McPherson, administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, who had reported that the Dergue was allowing "a few truck-loads of relief food" to be distributed in Eritrea. In reviewing this year's $300 million U.S. relief program in Ethiopia, he pointed out that the delivery of emergency relief had "greatly improved" since earlier in the year, but that the embattled regions of Eritrea and Tigré continued to be the most severely affected because of the war.

Fighting intensified in late August when the Ethiopian army launched a major offensive into Eritrea and recaptured the strategically important towns of Barentu and Tessenei from the guerrilla forces of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front. According to the EPLF, 110,000 government troops, backed by helicopter gunships, took part in the massive two-pronged attack from the south and east, forcing the guerrillas to withdraw. As a result, famine relief efforts temporarily ground to a halt, causing more than 20,000 Eritreans to flee across the border to the refugee camp at Wad Sherife, Sudan. ■

COMOROS
Smaller and smaller

President Ahmed Abdallah dissolved the government and reduced the cabinet in late September, the second such reshuffle since he was reelected in September 1984.

Only two ministers—Said Kafe (foreign affairs) and Ali Nessor (finance)—survived the reorganization, which reduced by four the size of the cabinet. In the reshuffle last January, Abdallah also abolished some cabinet posts, including the position of prime minister, held by Ali Mroudjae. This time, Mroudjae was dropped from the cabinet.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is stepping up its presence in the archipelago with plans to open a diplomatic mission in Moroni. China and France are the only other countries with missions there. An American radar station to survey shipping traffic in the Mozambique Channel is also reportedly being planned. The increased U.S. interest in the Comoros comes at a time when President France Albert René of neighboring Seychelles is reviewing the presence of the U.S. radio transmission base there. ■

KENYA
Coup plotters executed

Twelve Kenyans convicted of leading the 1982 abortive coup against the government of President Daniel arap Moi have been executed.

The Kenyan government has not confirmed the executions, which occurred in July, nor were they covered by the press, so the news did not filter out of the country immediately.

Although the coup attempt was a serious blow to the stability of the Moi administration, the president had not been expected to proceed with the executions—believed to be the first since independence. The death sentences of hundreds of air force personnel who participated in the rebellion were commuted. However, the High Court rejected the appeals of the 12 coup leaders.

The first to be executed was Hezekiah Ochuka, an air force pilot who, with Pancras Oteyo Okumu, had received political asylum in Tanzania after the coup failed. The two alleged ringleaders were later returned to Kenya in an exchange of political exiles, reportedly with the understanding that they would not be executed.

Two others were initially charged with treason in connection with the coup—Raila Odinga, son of former Vice President Oginga Odinga, and Otieno Mak'Onyango, a prominent journalist. They remain in detention without trial although the charges against them were dropped in March 1983.

All but one of those executed were Luos—Kenya's second largest ethnic group and a source of political opposition to both Moi and the late President Jomo Kenyatta.

In a cabinet reshuffle a few weeks later, two Luos were promoted to important positions. Robert Ouko, former labor minister, became planning and development minister, a position newly created to reinforce the government's increased emphasis on economic planning. For the past two years, planning had been included in the finance minister's portfolio. In addition, Peter Oloo Aringo, who was active in opposition politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s, was promoted from assistant education minister to labor minister.

Both men had been demoted in past reshuffles. Their promotion at this time may indicate the Moi administration's willingness to allow the emergence of new Luo leadership. The efforts of Oginga Odinga, also a Luo, to return to national politics have repeatedly been thwarted since the 1969 banning of the opposition party which he led. ■

SOMALIA
Dealing with toxic waste

Several hundred people were evacuated from their homes in late September when a Greek-owned and Panamanian-registered ship, the *Ariadne*, carrying 2,000 tons of deadly chemicals and highly toxic cargo, exploded in Mogadishu harbor. The vessel—which had run aground a month earlier—broke in two, forcing the government of President Siad Barre to seal off the port and close all shops and seafront hotels.

Although no casualties were reported, the government admitted that the chemicals, which included "organic phosphorous compounds," could seriously endanger the local population. Interior Minister Brig.-Gen. Ahmed Suleiman Abdalla reported that the government had taken steps to deal with the crisis, including sending a Somali delegation to London to negotiate with the ship's insurers who had "concealed" the existence of dangerous chemicals aboard the ship "in violation of international law." Pollution and fire-fighting experts from Britain, France, and West Germany arrived in Mogadishu in response to Barre's appeal for help.

In a separate development, the Somali National Movement, the Ethiopian-based rebels fighting the Barre government, called for a worldwide protest over "the dumping of poisonous chemicals in Somalia." The opposition claimed that the government has accepted a $600 million deal in exchange for U.S. rights to dispose of its nuclear waste in the central regions of Mudug and Hiran, near the Ethiopian border. Barre allegedly held a series of talks with U.S. officials, including Deputy Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, to finalize the agreement.

Even though the Somali government refuted the allegations as "cheap baseless propaganda," the *Weekly Review* in neighboring Kenya reported that the claims were disturbing enough for Kenya's Foreign Minister Elijah Mwangale to request an urgent meeting with the Somali chargé d'affaires, Abdi Shiyre Warsame. No details of the discussion were released, but Mwangale subsequently called for a United Nations resolution forbidding nuclear powers from dumping toxic waste in other countries. Faced with growing domestic antinuclear and conservationist lobbies, the U.S. is allegedly pressuring developing countries to allow waste to be dumped in their countries in exchange for financial or military assistance. ■

CENTRAL AFRICA

GUNT wrestles with the Libyan factor

Relations between Goukouni Oueddei's Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) and its Libyan backers are severely strained following reports of heavy clashes in northern Chad. The government of President Hissène Habré claimed that GUNT soldiers led by Goukouni Guet, head of the Popular Armed Forces, rebelled against their Libyan allies in early September.

The Chadian information ministry said that the fighting had left several hundred dead or wounded, but a representative of Col. Muammar Qaddafy's government dismissed this disclosure as "mere fiction." He denied that Libyan troops were in Chad, insisting that events in the country "concern solely the Chadians themselves."

The latest alleged shoot-out between anti-Habré forces and Libyan military detachments came only days after a number of GUNT leaders publicly accused Qaddafy of interfering in northern Chad. The divided GUNT leadership met in Cotonou, Benin, for a 10-day conference to restore unity among the anti-Habré forces as a prelude to a new round of peace talks with Ndjamena.

They charged Libya with meddling in GUNT affairs and accused Qaddafy of resorting to "financial manipulations," playing the factions off against each other. In a document presented to the Libyan delegation, they denounced attempts to hinder the free movement of GUNT militants in Libyan territory and Qaddafy's establishment of a replica of his own administration in the GUNT-controlled north of the country.

Goukouni Oueddei, who described the meeting as a "family housecleaning," announced that the GUNT was "more willing than ever to begin serious reconciliation negotiations with our compatriots in Ndjamena." He was elected to preside over a newly-created Supreme Revolutionary Council (CSR). Consisting of 65 representatives of the eight factions present in Cotonou, the CSR will be headquartered in Bardai in rebel-occupied territory.

Although formal unity was achieved at the conference, the largest faction within the GUNT—the Revolutionary Democratic Council (CDR)—refused to attend. The CDR demanded the release of its secretary general, Acheikh Ibn Omar, who has been detained by the Libyans in northern Chad since last November and insisted that this "remains an unchangeable precondition to any discussion." In condemning the "Libyanization" of Chad, the CDR stressed that the "unity of the opposition is necessary for any national reconciliation, but this unity must be achieved on two clear principles: the territorial integrity of Chad, and its sovereignty." ■

BURUNDI
Churchmen challenged

The government of President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza detained more than 150 local priests in August. Defiance of a recent ban on church services between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m. on weekdays triggered the recent crackdown, but observers said it was part of an ongoing government attempt to curtail the influence of the Catholic church.

More than 100 Catholic missionaries have been deported so far this year, and others, whose visa renewal applications have been rejected, are preparing to leave the country.

Government spokesmen denied press accounts that Archbishop Joachim Ruhuna of Gitega had been arrested and described Amnesty International allegations that at least one priest had died due to harsh prison conditions as "slanders and lies."


Camerapix

Bagaza: Tensions with the church

Minister of External Relations and Cooperation Laurent Nzeyimana said on Burundi radio that one of the deported missionaries had described the Catholic church as the sole force of opposition in Burundi.

"There are of course problems between the church and state. . . but they are unavoidable and normal," Nzeyimana said. "If the foreign missionaries consider themselves as invested with a mission other than that of religious apostolate, there is no doubt that the country will get rid of them," he added.

Tensions between the Roman Catholic church and the government date back to missionary work among the Hutus, the ethnic group comprising 85 percent of Burundi's population. The Tutsis, making up the remaining 15 percent, control the government. In 1972, the suppression of a Hutu-led coup was followed by a brutal crackdown, resulting in the death of 100,000 Hutus. The government has charged that the missionaries inject politics into their health and education work by supporting the Hutus. More than 60 percent of the population is Catholic. ■

CAMEROON
All the president's men

President Paul Biya sacked 12 ministers and ushered 14 new members into the cabinet in a sweeping shake-up designed to bolster his promises of a "New Deal." The cabinet reshuffle, announced in late August, had been widely anticipated since the ruling Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) Bamenda national congress last March. The broad scope of the restructuring, however, came as more of a surprise.

Biya consolidated his position by promoting hand-picked technocrats to the cabinet at the expense of the country's old guard. Moreover, a major preamble to the reshuffle involved a decree expanding presidential powers. Biya will now be directly responsible for the general secretariat, the civil cabinet, the presidential security, and most significantly, the ministry of defense headed by a minister delegate. By taking over the defense portfolio, Biya expects to keep a watchful eye on the army—his central concern since 1984 when he narrowly survived a bloody coup attempt by members of the Republican guard.

The most prominent victim of the shake-up was Armed Forces Minister Gilbert Andze Tsoungui, who had gained much influence for his role in helping the loyalist army squelch the mutiny. Other significant casualties included Justice Minister André Ouandji Ngangong, Planning Minister Youssoufa Daouda, and Information Minister François Sengat-Kuoh, who had each served several years in government under Biya's predecessor and rival, Ahmadou Ahidjo.

In line with the mood of the Bamenda congress, Biya named key technocrats Edouard Koualla and Njike Kamga to the respective ministerial posts of finance and public contracts. Together with Jerome Alondo, new minister delegate in charge of defense, and career diplomat Ferdinand Oyono, the de facto prime minister, they are the principal beneficiaries of the shakeup. As members of Biya's most cohesive cabinet since he assumed power, they will be called upon to carry out the well-publicized New Deal program of "rigor and moralization." ■

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Guéret gets 10 years in jail

A special government tribunal has sentenced François Guéret, former high commissioner for state enterprises and joint ventures, to 10 years in prison for allegedly threatening internal state security.

The public attorney and the attorney-general of the court of appeal had jointly recommended last April that Guéret be released from prison because of insufficient evidence to support the minor charges against him. But President André Kolingba issued a new order containing a more serious charge—that he had attempted to overthrow the government with the help of foreign mercenaries. The evidence was a letter that Guéret allegedly wrote last February to Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, son of the French president, criticizing Kolingba's military government and asking France to help liberate the country.

Guéret, leader of a moderate opposition party—the Movement for Democracy and Independence—had been a vocal advocate for returning the country to a multi-party system. Formerly a magistrate and minister of justice, he was widely respected for his insistence on investigating the affairs of associates of Jean-Bedel Bokassa after the self-proclaimed emperor was overthrown in 1979.

Kolingba had appointed Guéret to a panel of eight civilians in the military government. But his standing in the regime became shaky when he refused to obey a presidential decree requiring that all civilians associated with the government wear military uniforms.

Guéret's case is one in a series of detentions of prominent individuals in the country. All political activity has been banned since the coup of

1981. Guéret was considered the most respected civilian in the government, and his imprisonment seriously weakens the credibility of Kolingba's promise to return the country to civilian rule. ■

GABON
Plane grounded

Swiss authorities seized President Omar Bongo's personal plane in Zurich in mid-September at the request of a U.S. advertising firm, Hill and Knowlton, creating a stir in Libreville. The company's Swiss office accused the African government of failing to settle an alleged debt of $450,000 and asked that Bongo's DC-8—which had landed at Zurich airport for an overhaul—be grounded until the dispute could be settled. Swissair subsequently suspended its flights to Libreville for several days, anticipating retaliation by the Gabonese government.

First Deputy Prime Minister Georges Rawiri said he was "outraged" by the move, pointing out that Switzerland had nothing to do with litigation between Gabon and the American company. Although he admitted to an "administrative delay" in paying for a Hill and Knowlton publicity campaign, he added that he found little justification for stranding a plane worth 30 times the amount due. The Bongo government has brought the issue to court in Geneva. ■

ZAMBIA
Currency auctions initiated

In a dramatic economic policy shift, President Kenneth Kaunda introduced a foreign exchange auction system in early October. The central bank in Lusaka has begun selling fixed amounts of hard currency to the highest bidder at weekly auctions. The rate thus established will apply to all foreign exchange transactions in the country, including government imports.

The immediate effect of the new system will be to devalue the kwacha by about 60 percent. Kaunda pleaded with Zambians to peacefully accept the reform measure, which will cause substantial increases in the prices of staple foods and fuel. He acknowledged that the cost of living is already "unbearably high" for most Zambians, but stressed that even more "belt tightening" is imperative if the precipitous decline of the economy is to be halted.

The country's trade arrears and other debts will be subject to the exchange rate prevailing prior to the October 4 announcement rather than to the new rates, according to the central bank.

The auction is part of a three-year reform program supported by the International Monetary Fund. Other recent IMF-backed measures include a 50 percent increase in the price of maize meal, reductions in the civil service, and decontrol of domestic interest rates.

An IMF team was scheduled to meet with Zambian financial officials in late October. Negotiations over the renewal of loan payments had bogged down due to the IMF demand for a devaluation of up to 70 percent. A new IMF standby facility of SDR 100 million is expected to be approved soon. ■

NORTHERN AFRICA

Labor expulsions polarize the Maghreb

Libya's selective labor expulsions have antagonized its North African neighbors, whose shaky economies are incapable of absorbing the tens of thousands of returnees.

The expulsions, which began early in the year and peaked in August, precipitated diplomatic crises with Tunisia and Egypt. Col. Muammar Qaddafy deported an estimated 30,000 of some 90,000 Tunisian workers, and ordered 100,000 Egyptian workers out of the country, though not all of them left. Thousands from Mali, Mauritania, and Niger were also sent home.

Many returnees said their property had been confiscated and their bank accounts frozen in Libya. Some also claimed that they were detained and tortured or denied food before being deported.

President Habib Bourguiba charged that Qaddafy's aim was to destabilize the Tunisian government. But instead, outrage over treatment of the workers united Tunisians—at least temporarily. The General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) postponed scheduled strikes, and newspapers strongly condemned Libya.

Relations deteriorated further when Tunisia intercepted four Libyan fighter jets that had flown 30 miles over Tunisian territory. The incident prompted Algerian President Chadli Benjedid to reaffirm a 1983 friendship pact with Tunisia, exacerbating Algerian-Libyan relations—another source of tension in the Maghreb.

Bourguiba called home the remaining Tunisian workers and expelled more than 280 Libyans, including four diplomats accused of sending mail bombs to Tunisian journalists who had criticized Qaddafy. In late September, Tunisia severed diplomatic ties with Libya.

It was not the first time the two countries had broken off relations. Their enmity dates back to 1974 when Bourguiba signed a declaration to merge Tunisia with Libya in an Arab republic but quickly backed out of the agreement, arguing that Algeria should be part of any such union. Diplomatic ties were severed two years later, but reestablished the following year.

The expulsions also exacerbated the already poor relations between Libya and Egypt. The two nations have been at odds since the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. President Hosni Mubarak challenged Qaddafy to admit to his countrymen that he has "exhausted his country's wealth on adventurism and terrorist acts which he takes pride in supporting and financing everywhere." The Egyptian daily, *Al Ahram*, reported that 43 senior Libyan army and air force officers had mutinied at dawn on September 30 when Qaddafy demanded that they invade Tunisia.

Migrant workers from Morocco and Sudan were not affected by the deportations. Sudan's new government is linked to Libya by a cooperative agreement in which Qaddafy renounced support for the Sudanese People's Liberation Army, the guerrilla force fighting the Sudanese government. And Morocco and Libya are still on friendly terms because of the August 1984 Treaty of Oujda. There is little evidence of tangible cooperation resulting from the pact, but it seems to have succeeded in its unstated purpose of presenting a united front against Algeria.

Economic motive denied

Qaddafy denied that economic problems were behind the expulsion of foreign workers, who comprised 45 percent of the Libyan labor force in 1983. He said the real reason was to make the country more self-reliant and insisted that he was merely implementing a decision made two years ago by the people's congresses. In early September, however, at a celebration marking the 16th anniversary of the coup that brought him to power, he stressed the need for Libyans to work harder, to eschew luxuries, and to accept austerity measures.


Camerapix

Qaddafy: Discord in the Maghreb

Most Libyans had already learned to do without luxuries, and they are now contending with shortages of basic goods as well. Prices have risen by 15 percent since the start of the year, and state-subsidized stores in Tripoli are frequently out of staple foods, including rice, sugar, and flour. Bread is in such short supply that consumers spend hours waiting in line outside of bakeries.

In addition, Qaddafy has cancelled a large number of road, rail, and other construction contracts drawn up with foreign firms in the 1970s. Libya is heavily in arrears on payments for these projects, although the country's resources are still flowing heavily into Qaddafy's "Great Manmade River" project.

Both the contract terminations and the expulsions eased the drain on Libya's foreign exchange reserves, which sank to $3.5 billion last May from over $13 billion in 1983. Oil production, which accounts for almost all of Libya's revenues, has dipped to under 900,000 barrels a day from a peak of 3 million in 1980, and much of that output is being bartered or sold at a discount. Oil revenues are down to $8 billion a year from over $20 billion. ■

ALGERIA
Islamics go on offensive

President Chadli Benjedid's government initiated a country-wide search for Islamic fundamentalists in mid-September, following an armed raid on a police school in which one officer was killed and a large supply of ammunition stolen. A hitherto unknown group called the Islamic Jihad of Sheikh Sadeq el-Moundhiri claimed responsibility for the attack in what was believed to be the first evidence in three years of fundamentalist activity in the country.

In late 1982, fundamentalists attacked policemen near Algiers and captured explosives during a raid in Cap Djinet. About 30 people were detained, although the alleged leader of the group, Mustapha Bouyali, remained in hiding. Five months ago, the courts released many of the detainees, while others received lenient sentences. The government suspects that Bouyali and a number of the others were involved in the latest attack against the police school in Soumaa, south of Algiers, launched during a religious festival to take advantage of the reduced guard.

The group also claimed responsibility for a bomb explosion outside the Algerian embassy in Beirut in early September, which caused considerable damage but no casualties. Other unconfirmed incidents included an attack on a police station in the coastal town of Oran and the killing of six policemen in a separate armed operation.

The fundamentalists criticized the Chadli government as "a band of atheists" and for "transforming Algeria into a Marxist-materialist society." They also condemned the authorities for encouraging the violation of Islamic law and morality, insisting that Islam no longer exists in Algeria. ■

EGYPT
A change of guard

When President Hosni Mubarak called on Ali Lutfi to head a new cabinet, following the resignation of Prime Minister Kamal Hassan Ali in early September, he vowed to continue the uphill battle to revitalize the country's faltering economy.

Lutfi, a leading economist and finance minister under the late President Anwar Sadat, was assigned the unenviable task of reforming the economy without placing additional financial burdens on the people.

Ali, prime minister since 1984 and one of the country's most experienced political leaders, had attempted to tackle Egypt's economic ills without endangering social stability. In recent months, however, the government had come under growing criticism for failing to push through the sweeping austerity measures considered necessary to revive the economy.

Mubarak's reshuffle put several technocrats in charge of finance and development and brought "new blood in the new cabinet," according to Lutfi. As one government official explained, "Mubarak feels that things are not moving fast enough. . . and that there is a need for a younger and more dynamic leadership."

The new government was quickly tested when the open market value of the Egyptian pound plunged against the U.S. dollar in what local bankers described as a "crisis of confidence." The currency depreciated by 25 percent in the space of one month, following widespread rumors that a devaluation was imminent. There was also concern that Lutfi intended to enact severe import restrictions, leading to a surge in demand for already scarce foreign exchange. Compounding the problem was a substantial drop in remittances from Egyptians working in the Persian Gulf because of the economic downturn in oil-exporting countries.

Lutfi's cabinet faces daunting economic challenges. The primary sources of foreign exchange—oil exports, tourism, workers' remittances, and Suez Canal fees—are all declining, while the International Monetary Fund estimates the balance of payments deficit at $1.3 billion this year. With a total external debt of $31 billion and a debt service ratio of 35 percent of total current account receipts, the new prime minister will have to take bold steps to bring economic order while remaining within the boundaries of what is politically and socially acceptable.

Lutfi has been an outspoken critic of the subsidy system, which costs the country as much as $3 billion a year and places a heavy burden on the state budget. He has favored instead greater promotion of the private sector and tax increases to generate more revenue. ■

Africa speaks out at the United Nations

An impressive number of world leaders gathered in New York to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the United Nations in October. Among them were several African heads of state who used the occasion to make candid remarks to the General Assembly.

President Julius Nyerere, Tanzania: "Perhaps the most blatant example of international authoritarianism is the growing practice of threatening adverse consequences to small nations which use their United Nations votes in a manner displeasing to a strong power. We know from experience that this has been happening privately for some time. But now even the sense of propriety has gone; small and poor countries are being publicly threatened that they will be punished if they do not vote in accordance with the wishes of a member of this organization.

"We were colonies once; we are not colonies now. And speaking for Tanzania, we refuse to become a neo-colony of any country under the sun. We Third World countries did not win our independence—in Tanzania's case with the help of the United Nations system—in order to sell it to the highest bidder, nor even to buy off trouble by voting in the General Assembly at the behest of a veto power. We will use the only right our weakness leaves to us—the right to scream a protest at international bullying."

President Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia: "It is most regrettable that after 40 years of the existence of the United Nations we are saddled with an irrationally over-armed world; while nuclear weapons threaten the existence of mankind. Indeed, most of the resources, both human and financial, allocated to scientific research and technological development are directed to serving military ends. How can we avoid the charge that we are all the time preparing for war? We call upon those who direct scientists and others now engaged in preparing for the destruction of the world to change direction and thence expend their efforts and ingenuity on mankind's survival and on how best to fight the 'wars' against underdevelopment and the various inequalities that outrage the dignity of hundreds of millions of people."

President Abdou Diouf, Senegal: "The heads of states and governments of the OAU recognize that the external debt is an obligation which they must honor, but the deteriorating international economic situation means that Africa is faced with the paradox of being the least developed continent, in need of the most basic development needs, and yet one which contributes net financial resources to the developed countries. Such a state of affairs cannot continue without irreversibly jeopardizing the recovery of an entire continent.

"Until now, the only concession has been to negotiate the rescheduling of the debt, whether in the context of the Club of Paris or London. Even if rescheduling provides temporary relief, it is in effect merely a stop-gap measure, which in the medium-term is a burden on the budget. Moreover, in our view, the rescheduling extends over too short a time span.

"For these reasons, the African continent proposes to initiate serious and in-depth discussions to best prepare for an international conference concerned with the external debt of African countries. Such a conference would

MOROCCO
Coping with massive debt

The Paris Club has agreed to conditions considered favorable to Morocco for rescheduling 90 percent or $1 billion of the country's debt to Western governments. Repayments due from September 1985 to February 1987 will be stretched over nine years, with a four-year grace period.

The rescheduling represents only a fraction of the country's massive $13 billion debt, however. In October, Morocco rescheduled $550 million in debts to foreign commercial banks, covering most of the principal that fell due in 1983 and 1984.

The reschedulings followed the International Monetary Fund's mid-September decision to grant Morocco SDR 315 million. The IMF credit, replacing one that expired last March, includes SDR 200 million in support of the government's 1985-86 economic reform program and SDR 115 million available immediately.

Austerity measures initiated over the past two years paved the way for the loan and reschedulings. Most recently, the cabinet decided to raise the prices of sugar, flour, and cooking oil. In 1981 and 1984, similar price increases elicited public protests. This time, however, there was no outcry, partly because guaranteed minimum wages were raised at the same time, the second allow international creditors and African debtors to urgently set forth short, medium, and long-term measures to resolve Africa's external debt."

King Hassan II, Morocco: "Today, I confirm, before you, the commitment to accept, on the one hand, the organization of a self-determination referendum in the Western Sahara and, on the other hand, the result of such a referendum, whatever it may be.

"The first commitment relates to the cease-fire which Morocco has unilaterally decided to put into effect as of this very moment, and that it would call it off only in case of aggression against the territories under its responsibility, in which case Morocco would exercise the right of legitimate self-defense. Morocco is even prepared to receive neutral observers wishing to verify, on the premises, the respect of such a cease-fire.

"The second commitment relates to Morocco's predisposition and acceptance to hold, under the auspices and control of the United Nations, a referendum in the Sahara, and that in the early part of January of next year. The United Nations is naturally free to request, at any time, the assistance of any regional organization likely to help in the realization of the process."

Prime Minister Anerood Jugnauth, Mauritius: "The current tragedy in many African countries underlines the case for new initiatives to resolve the most pressing problems confronting the world economy. It would be wrong to interpret the call for new initiatives merely as a plea for the transfer of resources. For the South to benefit, it is not necessary that the North should lose. The North-South debate on economic cooperation is increasingly being cast in the same vein as the political and military relationship between East and West. The language used and policy choices made are often confrontational. We want to stress the view that the rhetoric and policies notwithstanding, the reality is one of inescapable interdependence."

President Samora Machel, Mozambique: "The Namibian people continue to be subject to colonial domination, illegal foreign occupation, and ruthless exploitation of their wealth and natural resources.

"South Africa is the cause of this situation. South Africa has been frustrating the efforts of the international community to bring about Namibia's independence. In the long process of negotiations to liberate this territory under United Nations mandate, we have repeatedly been faced with South African intransigence. Pretoria persists in defying and flouting the purposes and principles of our Charter and the relevant resolutions and decisions of the Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly.

"This challenge attained its maximum expression with the introduction of so-called linkage. This deplorable concept is as baseless as it is offensive to the right of the Namibian people to self-determination and independence. Long before Cuban troops arrived in Angola, the United Nations General Assembly had taken the decision, in October 1966, to end the South African mandate over the territory.

"It is both absurd and irrelevant to invoke 'linkage' to delay the decolonization of Namibia. 'Linkage' must be rejected. It is nothing but a thinly veiled disguise intended to protect the political, economic and strategic interests of South Africa and some Western countries, to the detriment of a sacred right we all prize and defend."

such increase this year.

The new center-right cabinet has reiterated the government's commitment to increasing the efficiency of Morocco's approximately 600 public enterprises and transferring some of them to private ownership. Progress toward privatization has been made in the hotel and fishing industries, and French settler land that was nationalized in 1973 is being transferred to private hands.

The new government has also signed a trade treaty with the U.S. that gives American investors the same legal rights and access to local courts as their Moroccan counterparts and provides for free transfer of capital and profits. Morocco is attempting to develop new trade links in anticipation of the loss of European markets when Spain and Portugal join the European Economic Community in 1986. ■

TUNISIA
Raid reaction rankles

The Reagan administration's response to the Israeli raid on Palestine Liberation Organization headquarters outside Tunis provoked bitter protests from the government of President Habib Bourguiba.

There was also strong public reaction in Tunisia and other Arab countries. Tunisian opposition parties called on the government to break diplomatic relations with Washington, while newspapers strongly criticized U.S. policy. The newspaper of the ruling Socialist Destour Party compared the U.S. to Libya, claiming that both countries act in ways "that totally belie their public comments."

Bourguiba expressed "great astonishment" at the White House statement that the attack was "legitimate" and an "expression of self-defense." He said the U.S. position contravened "international law and existing relations between the U.S. and Tunisia."

The White House subsequently toned down its official comments, describing the attack as "understandable," rather than "legitimate." In addition, Reagan later praised Tunisia's efforts to encourage peace in the Middle East and called Bourguiba "a gifted statesman and a true friend of America for decades."

Sixty Palestinians and 12 Tunisians were killed in the October 1 raid when Israeli planes bombed the PLO headquarters, located south of Tunis in a residential area inhabited by Tunisians, and Palestinian refugees who reportedly have connections with the PLO. Israel said the raid was a response to terrorist acts against Israelis, and in particular, in retaliation for the killing of three Israelis on a yacht in Cyprus six days earlier.

Tunisia called for an urgent UN Security Council meeting to discuss the incident. The Security Council, in a 14-0 vote, condemned the raid as "an act of armed aggression perpetrated by Israel against Tunisia in flagrant violation of the Charter of the UN." The U.S. abstained.

Tunisians said that Reagan's reaction was particularly difficult to understand because only a few weeks earlier the U.S. had reiterated its commitment to respect and defend Tunisia's territorial integrity after Libyan fighter jets overflew Tunisian territory. Since Tunisia gained independence in 1956, the two countries have had close relations, with Washington promising security during crises and Tunis taking a moderate position on Israel.

Bourguiba allowed the PLO to establish headquarters in Tunis in 1982, after it was forced out of Beirut. He has tightly controlled the movement of PLO officials in Tunisia. ■

WESTERN SAHARA
Spain kicks Polisario out

The Polisario Front's attacks on two Spanish boats in late September have soured its relations with Madrid.

The Spanish government, describing the incident as "extremely serious," closed Polisario's offices in Madrid, Barcelona, and Palma, deported all Polisario officials, and expelled 21 Saharan students from Ceuta, a Spanish enclave on the Moroccan coast.

Polisario had opened machine-gun fire on a fishing trawler September 20, killing one Spanish fisherman and capturing six others, who were later returned to their homes in the Canary Islands. The Spanish navy patrol boat that came to assist the trawler was also attacked, and a naval petty officer killed.

Polisario representatives said the fishing boat was attacked because it was flying a Moroccan flag. They said the crew had ignored appeals for fishermen to stay outside a war zone extending 12 miles out from the Western Sahara coast as well as warnings that Polisario reserves the right to attack anyone who violates its territorial integrity.

Spain's relationship to Polisario has always been ambiguous. Although it has never extended diplomatic recognition to the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic —Polisario's self-proclaimed government—it has allowed Polisario's offices to operate in Spanish cities. But Spain has also cultivated relations with Morocco, which has fought Polisario for control of the territory for the past nine years. Spanish officials said they would maintain their past policy of supporting self-determination for the people of the Western Sahara.

The attack on the trawler is the latest in a series of incidents in which foreigners who stray into the war zone have been captured or killed. Earlier this year, Polisario shot down Belgian and West German light aircraft, killing five people. Polisario has repeatedly blamed the Moroccan government for these incidents, claiming it encourages tourists, business representatives, and other foreigners to enter the territory by making false claims concerning their safety.

The guerrilla force was particularly incensed at Morocco's signing of a contract in July for a Club Mediterranean tourist center in El Ayoun, capital of the territory. Describing the business deal as a "declaration of war," Polisario reiterated that it cannot guarantee the safety of tourists in the area. ■

SOUTHERN AFRICA
Emergency order clamped on Cape Town

President P.W. Botha extended the state of emergency to Cape Town and seven surrounding districts in late October after two months of unrest in Western Cape Province. He also cracked down on the press, banning journalists from Soweto under the emergency regulations.

The tough measures were viewed as a gesture of defiance, not only to South Africa's critics abroad, but also to groups within the country calling for talks with the outlawed African National Congress (ANC). When a group of eight student leaders from the Afrikaner University of Stellenbosch attempted to meet with the ANC Youth League in Zambia, their passports were seized. The student body later voted overwhelmingly to back the student leaders, and the major Afrikaner newspapers supported the students' initiative.

Botha also took action to stop seven pastors of the powerful Dutch Reformed Church from meeting with ANC leaders in Zambia. The opposition Progressive Federal Party (PFP) and the ANC issued a joint statement calling for the release of Nelson Mandela after their leaders met in Zambia. In late October, Justice Minister Kobie Coetsee warned that South Africans who meet with the ANC could be charged with treason.

The state of emergency—first imposed on 36 districts last July—was intended to quell urban unrest but has instead fueled the violence. The daily casualty rate has doubled and blacks' anger has intensified. Security forces have virtually unlimited powers of search, arrest, and interrogation under the emergency regulations. Nearly 5,000 arrests have been made since July. In one of the latest rounds of arrests, the homes of United Democratic Front leaders in Cape Town were raided at dawn on October 25, and many individuals were detained. The PFP pointed out that these detentions create a leadership vacuum which is increasingly filled "from the streets."

The unrest began spilling over into urban business districts in late October, directly affecting the white community for the first time. Violence erupted in downtown Johannesburg as blacks turned on whites after a memorial service for Benjamin Moloise, a poet and ANC supporter. Moloise was convicted of the 1983 killing of a policeman and executed in mid-October, despite international pleas for clemency. A few days later, rioting and looting again broke out in the downtown district of Johannesburg.

Youths overran a white shopping district in Cape Town after police ambushed and killed three children in the city's mixed-race township of Athlone. Police had hidden in boxes in the back of a truck, leaping out to fire on the children when they began stoning the vehicle. A few days later, the unrest spread to the Cape Town city center. After whites in civilian clothes began firing into crowds of blacks, the police issued a warning against the formation of vigilante squads. The violence is expected to increasingly affect white residential areas, with the ANC reportedly urging black household servants to steal guns and attack white homes and holiday resorts.

Escalating tensions connected with the state of emergency triggered a strong reaction at a meeting of bankers held in London on October 23 to discuss South Africa's $24 billion debt. Bankers told South African representatives that it would be extremely difficult to reach a settlement in the present political climate. South Africa is expected to extend into 1986 the four-month debt repayment moratorium imposed earlier this year.

Meanwhile, Bishop Desmond Tutu and Beyers Naude, general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, have called on South Africa's creditor banks "to make the rescheduling of the country's debt conditional upon the resignation of the present regime and its replacement by an interim government responsive to the needs of all South Africa's people." ■

Pretoria's work: $10 billion in damages

South Africa's destabilizing activities have cost neighboring countries more than $10 billion during the past five years, according to the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

Among the major costs have been $3 billion for extra defense, $2 billion in lost economic growth, and $1.6 billion in direct war damage, SADCC reports in a paper initially prepared for the Organization of African Unity summit and released to the public in September.

SADCC stresses the close connection between economic sanctions and South Africa's efforts to destabilize its neighbors. The imposition of sanctions would hurt the frontline states, the reports says, "But if it accelerated the ending of apartheid, it would be well worth the additional cost."

"If SADCC states were free to use the most convenient and cheapest ports and railroads, and free to buy fuel and other goods on the world market, their dependence on South Africa would be sharply reduced. Then sanctions would not hurt the neighboring states so much."

The report details major costs of destabilization including the following:

- Direct war damage: The most obvious examples of destabilization are the major attacks on such targets as Thornhill air base in Zimbabwe, the oil refinery in Luanda, and the oil storage depot in Beira. In reality, however, most of the damage is not from single large explosions but from the destruction of hundreds of houses, schools, and trucks.
- Additional military expenditure: SADCC states have been forced to increase their military budgets for larger and better equipped armies as well as expanded people's militias.
- Higher transport and energy costs: Damage to the region's railway network has been especially significant. Sabotage of power lines and oil installations has forced frontline states to use more expensive fuel or to pay extra to have it transported.
- Lost exports and tourism: Exports of cement, coal, crops, iron, steel, oil, and sugar have been disrupted. Tourism, an important foreign exchange earner, has been adversely affected.
- Boycotts and embargoes: Because of disruption to regional railways, most SADCC cargo still passes through South Africa. Pretoria cuts the flow of goods to its neighbors when it wants to apply additional pressure.
- South African penetration of the region: South African companies engage in improper practices to take goods and money from SADCC states. They block the development of independent SADCC industry and trade routes. South African boards of directors have blocked the expansion plans of local managers in subsidiaries operating in SADCC states.
- Undermining investment: One of South Africa's objectives has been to undermine confidence of member-states in their ability to manage their own affairs. Pretoria's massive propaganda program aims to foment unrest and distort perceptions of events in the region. Too often, multinational companies believe the South African version. Even when they do not, the destabilization activity makes them reluctant to invest or expand their activities.

LESOTHO
An electoral dud

Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan called off what was scheduled to be the country's first general election in 15 years after all seven opposition parties refused to participate. In 1970, Jonathan suspended the constitution and declared a state of emergency when it appeared that the ruling Basotho National Party would be defeated.

During the recent electoral campaign, only BNP candidates were nominated for the 60 seats. The unopposed return of the government—which amounted to little more than a cabinet reshuffle—was described by Jonathan as "a record in the history of elections in a multiparty democratic system." As a result, the prime minister said there would be no need to go to the polls on September 17 and 18.

The opposition parties, including the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) and the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) earlier had called on the international community to declare the upcoming election null and void, insisting that they had been unable to nominate candidates because of the obstacles the BNP placed in their way.

MFP leader Bennett Khaketla criticized BNP supervision of the electoral process and accused the government of denying opposition groups access to the voter rolls. The opposition, moreover, alleged that the elector rolls were not released in time for the campaign and that several registered voters—including some opposition leaders—subsequently discovered that their names were left off the register. It also criticized amendments to the 1968 Electoral Act that significantly raised the deposit fee for candidates and required them to name 500 supporters. ■

MOZAMBIQUE
Diary yields evidence

The government presented powerful evidence in September that South Africa has continued to support the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), forcing Pretoria to admit to violating the Nkomati Accord. For months, the government had insisted that Pretoria was still supplying arms to the MNR but lacked the documentation to back up the charges. The evidence was found in a diary and notebooks at Casa Banana—MNR headquarters at the base of Gorongoza Mountain—captured during a joint Zimbabwean-Mozambican offensive.

At a press conference on September 30, Mozambican Security Minister Sergio Vieira revealed that South Africa's violations included regular supplies of arms and ammunition, deliveries of "humanitarian aid," construction of an airstrip for the MNR, smuggling rebel officers out of Mozambique, several meetings between South African Defense Force Chief General Constand Viljoen and MNR leaders, and visits to guerrilla headquarters by Louis Nel—then deputy foreign minister.

South African President P.W. Botha admitted to "technical violations" of the accord, but claimed that the purpose of the contacts with the MNR had been to encourage the rebels to attend peace talks in Pretoria.

Vieira said that Mozambique would not abrogate the pact but instead would use the violations as a lever to press Britain and the U.S. to restrain Pretoria. President Samora Machel discussed the violations during a mid-September meeting with President Ronald Reagan, who said he was "distressed" about the transgressions. Reagan also praised Machel for recent economic initiatives including a new emphasis on the private sector. Five conservative senators strongly protested Machel's visit, questioning whether Washington's efforts were succeeding in their purpose of weaning Mozambique away from Moscow.

Conservative opposition to closer ties with Mozambique surfaced earlier during congressional debate on the 1986 foreign aid bill. An amendment was introduced to make non-emergency aid conditional on holding free elections and a reduced Soviet presence, but it was later removed from the bill. ■

ZIMBABWE
Putting the chips on the table

Leaders of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-PF) and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) reportedly reached general agreement on a proposed merger in early October. But the initial breakthrough in the unity talks was achieved against a background of strong-armed government tactics to bring the opposition into the fold.

Following ZANU-PF's resounding victory in the country's first post-independence elections, Home Affairs Minister Enos Nkala intensified the crackdown against ZAPU in August and September. Hundreds of ZAPU supporters, including six members of Parliament and seven Bulawayo city councillors, were arrested, while Nkomo's houses were raided repeatedly, and his passport confiscated. He was also briefly detained without charge and ordered not to leave the country while he was under investigation.

To ease the pressure, ZAPU agreed to take part in a unity committee of three-man delegations from both sides to break the two-year merger deadlock. Previous talks had collapsed in July 1983 when ZAPU was reportedly demanding greater representation in the cabinet and the post of deputy prime minister for Nkomo. ZAPU blamed the failure of the talks on the ruling party, accusing Mugabe of attempting to "swallow" the opposition.

Since then, however, ZAPU's bargaining position has been further weakened, prompting Nkomo to initiate the present talks with President Canaan Banana, as a prelude to an audience with Prime Minister Robert Mugabe. According to the draft agreement, Nkomo agreed in principle to a new party to be called ZANU—dropping "Patriotic Front" from the name—while accepting the largely titular ranking as second vice-president in the new party hierarchy—behind Mugabe and Deputy Premier Simon Muzenda.

Although Nkomo said the unity talks were "very objective discussions—the best we have had," several key issues still have to be ironed out. One possible sticking point concerns the representation to be granted to ZAPU members in an enlarged version of ZANU-PF's ruling bodies—the 90-man central committee and the 14-member politburo.

Another obstacle is likely to be the opposition's demand that ZANU-PF release ZAPU's political prisoners, including Dumiso Dabengwa, former leader of ZAPU'S military wing, and Lookout Masuku, ex-deputy commander of the Zimbabwe National Army. Both have been imprisoned for several years, despite their acquittal on treason charges. ZANU's concession on this issue would be a giant step toward helping the dissidents accept national unity.

To create a durable and viable merger—a goal that has eluded the two parties for more than 20 years—Nkomo will have to be offered more than a few government positions for his close advisers. His ability to retain the allegiance of his supporters in Matabeleland could be seriously jeopardized if effective power is left completely in ZANU-PF's hands.

Mugabe, on the other hand, is likely to push for a merger for two main reasons. A final unity of the two parties would help to undermine and perhaps even end the dissident war in Matabeleland. Secondly, an agreement would undermine Nkomo's power base and allow ZANU-PF to move far closer to its long-term goal of establishing a one-party state. ■

Seven Years of Nyayo

President Daniel arap Moi's government appears to have weathered the turmoil and uncertainty which surrounded Kenya following the attempted coup and the Njonjo affair. However, Kenya's current challenge is its explosive rate of population growth, which, if left unaddressed, will undermine its development efforts.

BY ABEL NDUMBU

In October, Kenyans celebrated the seventh anniversary of the inauguration of President Daniel arap Moi confident that the country was gradually coming of age and that Kenyans were finally beginning to assume full control of their affairs.

When Moi took over the leadership of the country after the death of Jomo Kenyatta, the image of the late president dwarfed every politician in Africa. And even as Moi was promising to follow in Kenyatta's footsteps, adopting the *nyayo* philosophy, the political interpretation was that at best, that was all he could be—a follower.

But Moi has confounded his detractors and political analysts alike. His critics were vocal, through the rumor mill, in maintaining that Moi had become president by default and predicting that his tenure would be brief. That at least seemed to be the wish of a group of politicians who orchestrated a campaign to change the constitution in 1976-77 to bar Moi, who was then vice-president, from assuming the presidency.

During the past seven years, Kenya has undergone considerable change—a large part of it due to the style and content of President Moi's leadership. The first problems that Moi addressed related to establishing himself as the new boss. In the initial years, he appeared to rely on a circle of trusted friends, led by the former minister for constitutional affairs, Charles Njonjo.

In August 1982, four years into Moi's presidency, the country was rocked by a coup attempt organized by members of the Kenyan air force. The attempted coup was crushed within hours, but the fact that it had come so close to succeeding meant that the government had considerable work to perform toward the pursuit of political stability. Although the average Kenyan deplored the attempt because of the destruction it wrought on Nairobi, the government had to do more than condemn.

A careful scrutiny of the loyalty of personnel, not only in the armed forces but in the government and the parastatals, was undertaken. But rather than conduct a massive purge, Moi judiciously winnowed out persons clearly known to be unsympathetic to his leadership and replaced them with individuals whose dedication to the national interest is unquestioned.

Barely a year after the coup attempt, Moi stunned Kenyans by announcing at a public rally that one of his ministers was colluding with a foreign power to overthrow the government. That announcement signalled the start of a process that ended the colorful civil service and political career of Kenya's first attorney general, Njonjo, as well as those of a large number of politicians who had supported him in his intricate maneuvers aimed at alienating Moi and paving the way for his downfall.

Njonjo and his collaborators were disgraced by a lengthy commission of inquiry that found him guilty of collaborating with South Africa to overthrow the government of Seychelles (during Moi's chairmanship of the OAU), misusing public office for political gain, and embezzling public funds. The Njonjo affair came to an end on Jamuhuri Day, December 12, 1984, when President Moi pardoned Njonjo, but insisted that he refund all misappropriated moneys from the self-help projects he initiated.

Among the changes in personnel surrounding the Njonjo affair was the retirement of Jeremiah Kiereini, former head of the civil service and one of those cited in the Njonjo inquiry, and his replacement with Simon Nyachae, a man known for his energetic management of public affairs and much respected for his fairness, hard work, and firmness. He is the architect of the government's newly introduced focus on rural development, which he hopes will help decentralize government power away from Nairobi. The goal is to work toward an equitable distribution of development resources throughout the country. In the past, favoritism to certain ethnic groups and regions has been the cause of much dissent and protest.

Nyachae has attempted to create a

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balance in regional and technical representation in the public sector. His emphasis on merit has also muted some of the criticisms of nepotism in the civil service. Nyachae's effective management of the civil service has given Moi time to deal with policy issues in the government and the party. It has also given the president an opportunity to travel more widely both in rural Kenya, where his nickname, *Nyayo*, is becoming more and more popular, and in foreign countries where he has sought to promote economic and political cooperation.

Moi proclaims that his ambitions are to create a climate of tolerance among the countries of East Africa and to improve the quality of life for Kenyans. The suspicion and near hatred that characterized relations between the governments of Tanzania and Kenya has been halted and the border between the two countries has reopened. Certainly in Dar es Salaam, the Tanzanian leaders say that Moi understands and tolerates their socialist leanings better than Kenyatta did, although it is clear that in the recent years, it was Njonjo's influence that institutionalized the antipathy between Kenya and Tanzania.

More important, however, has been the growing friendship between Kenya and Somalia, which for years has made claims to the northeastern territory of Kenya. There may be suspicions that President Siad Barre has warmed to Moi's overtures because he is faced with guerrilla operations against his government from Ethiopia, with whom Kenya has a defense pact. But in recent political speeches, Barre has stated, after many years of open support for a Somali-based guerrilla operation in Kenya, that Somalia has no territorial ambitions in Kenya.

Camerapix

August 1, 1982, Nairobi: "After the coup attempt, the government had considerable work to perform toward the pursuit of political stability"

Internally, the biggest problem has been the inability to cope with increasing demands for public services. Although the drought last year was nowhere near as devastating as in Ethiopia, it did set the country behind in its efforts to attain food self-sufficiency. But it is perhaps in the area of unemployment that the economy is most troubled. Well over 50 percent of the youth leaving school every year is unable to find employment—a phenomenon that led Moi to institute a presidential commission on unemployment, whose recommendations, ranging from diversification of the agricultural and industrial bases to greater availability of capital for rural business ventures, have yet to be implemented.

It was also the preoccupation with unemployment problems that led to a review of Kenya's education system, changing it from the inherited British system to a system of four years in primary, four in secondary, and four in university, in hopes of reducing the number of school leavers who enter the job market with little skills to offer. The school curriculum has been changed to include a new emphasis on technical education for the same reason.

The economic and financial problems associated with education, health, nutrition, and unemployment focus attention on one of Kenya's greatest handicaps—rapid population growth. Kenya has a population growth rate of 4.1 percent—the highest in the world. Although the rate of economic growth has been better than in other developing countries, the economy is unable to cope with the galloping increase in population. Both President Moi and Vice President Mwai Kibaki have publicly exhorted Kenyans to opt for smaller families, but in a country where a larger family confers a higher social status, and where members of Parliament and other national leaders have two to three wives and an average of 15 children, it will be years before the message takes effect.

For many years, the ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), was a moribund organization for all practical purposes. By an act of Parliament, Kenya is a one-party state, and most political observers would have bet that KANU would continue to be of little consequence. But throughout 1985, the party machinery has been seriously overhauled and revitalized to a point where party decisions are beginning to be incorporated into government policy.

As president of the party, Moi took a keen interest in a country-wide membership recruitment exercise that enlarged the support base for political activity at the grassroots. Moreover, for



Camerapix

Presidents Julius Nyerere and Daniel arap Moi: "The suspicion and near hatred that characterized relations between Tanzania and Kenya has been halted"

the first time, the exercise included compulsory membership for employees of the civil service and parastatals. Party elders bluntly told those in these two categories who raised questions of freedom of choice that the party and the civil service were but two sides of the same coin and that working for and benefiting from one without supporting the other was not justified.

But in the rural areas, Moi found himself at times having to warn overzealous administrative officers to persuade rather than coerce rural populations into party membership. The result of the increased membership—about 5 million members—is that party officials can claim to be true representatives of the majority of the people of Kenya. It also meant that the party could call for the expulsion of members who were known to have collaborated in the Njonjo-led aborted campaign to undermine the *nyayo* government. However, there is the genuine fear that party officials' new-found enthusiasm for encroaching on policy-making and administration could result in more red tape at a time when the head of the civil service is attempting to increase efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector.

Kenyans' desire to take greater control of their affairs is perhaps exemplified by two recent developments. One is the increasing confidence of the senior government officials to tell international aid agencies, including the World Bank and the IMF, that while they will accept advice on development, they are not prepared to swallow wholesale the conditions attached to the aid packages. To their own colleagues, the officials confide that they feel that Kenyans are capable, after 22 years of experience in running a government, of determining what is best for their country.

The second development has arisen from the increasing number of foreign advisers and expatriates in both the public and the private sector. Recent public comments by Moi and senior government ministers have indicated that they want the trend reversed. Labor Minister Peter Oloo Aringo has called for a reduction of dependence on expatriates in every sphere of Kenyan life. A more reasoned approach has come from the head of the civil service, Simon Nyachae, who has advised Kenyans not to believe that expatriates have superior abilities.

On balance, Kenya's future looks promising, but it will require a lot more than public statements to maintain stability in the face of ethnic interests competing for a greater share of the national cake, increasing unemployment, inadequate educational and training facilities, and the regrettable tendency for public servants to regard public property as a free-for-all field to be plundered for personal gain. □

High Stakes for Babangida

Caught between the need to strike a deal with the IMF and the desire to make the Nigerian government more accountable to its citizenry, Maj.-Gen. Ibrahim Babangida's government faces hard policy choices which may well determine whether it retains the good will it has thus far earned.

BY LARRY DIAMOND

The coup that toppled the government of Maj.-Gen. Muhammadu Buhari on August 27 was widely expected and broadly welcomed by the Nigerian people. The economy had remained mired in depression and deep indebtedness during his 20-month rule. Prices of basic foodstuffs and consumer goods soared at an annual inflation rate of 40 percent, and shortages abounded. Tens of thousands of urban workers lost their jobs as a result of continuing retrenchments in government and industry. Medical services were crippled by severe shortages of drugs and ongoing conflict between the government and doctors, who struck for several weeks earlier in the year. Regressive new taxes and user fees cut the access of many poor families to schooling and social services.

The economic crisis was the legacy of massive corruption and mismanagement under the civilian Second Republic, whose overthrow by the military on December 31, 1983 was greeted with enormous popular relief and celebration. But no change of government could erase the other underlying factor in the crisis—the collapse of the world oil market. Despite years of talk of diversification, Nigeria continues to depend on oil for 95 percent of its export earnings.

André Astrow

Maj.-Gen. Ibrahim Babangida: "His self-confidence and more modest personal ambition seem to preclude the paranoia of opposition that made a monster of the previous regime"

Larry Diamond, a senior resident fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the author of numerous articles on Nigerian politics and a book on the first Nigerian Republic to be published by Macmillan (London).

The Buhari government made considerable progress in balancing Nigeria's chaotic external payments—but only by pushing the economy into even deeper hardship. Failure to reach agreement with the IMF on a $2.5 billion program to restructure Nigeria's debt left the country desperately short of foreign exchange. In the crunch, Buhari devoted 44 percent of foreign exchange earnings to debt service in the 1985 budget, leaving only 3.15 billion naira for imports—less than half the 1984 level and less than a third of peak levels during the oil boom. This virtually foreclosed the recovery of industrial production in Nigeria, which depends on imports of raw materials, machinery, and spare parts. After three years of an almost 10 percent annual decline in GDP, the economy seemed hard-pressed to even meet the faint 1 percent growth target in the 1985 budget.

This grim economic performance would have been enough to bring down any government, but in fact, the Buhari government might have survived if it had sought to involve the people in the decision-making process and to build a popular consensus around a long-term strategy for recovery. Instead, it governed with unprecedented arrogance and disdain for public opinion. Having pledged to run an open and accountable government, it proceeded to suppress critical commentary and interest group representation with a zeal that displayed gross insensitivity to the pluralism of Nigerian society and the deep attachment of its people to personal freedom.

Particularly odious was the shackling of Nigeria's vigorously independent and increasingly sophisticated press by Decree Number 4, which forbade the publication of anything that might bring government officials into ridicule or disrepute. Under this and other decrees, several prominent journalists and editors were arrested, including Tunde Thompson and Nkuka Irabor of *The Guardian*. The two journalists spent nearly a year in prison and were adopted as prisoners of conscience by Amnesty International. This repression not only offended a national tradition of free criticism and open debate, but also cut off the regime from the growing disaffection with its policies and style of rule, and so produced a dangerous illusion of stability and calm.

Equally hated was Decree Number 2, which provided for the detention of any citizen deemed to constitute a security risk. The sweeping authoritarian measure enabled the regime, under the signature of its domineering second-in-command, Maj.-Gen. Tunde Idiagbon, to lock up any Nigerian for any reason it chose, since its action could not be questioned in a court of law.

In its implementation, the Nigerian Security Organization (NSO) was given literally carte blanche, through blank arrest orders signed by Idiagbon, to jail critics and dissidents. Some of Nigeria's most important and creative social commentators, including Tai Solarin, Haroun Adamu, Rufai Ibrahim, and numerous other writers, editors, intellectuals, and political activists, were imprisoned. Others fell silent in a growing climate of fear, as reports filtered out of harsh treatment and even torture in NSO detention centers.

The Buhari regime had won early popular support by moving to investigate and punish the criminal misdeeds of the politicians and bureaucrats of the Second Republic. But this support turned increasingly to resistance as the regime became more arbitrary and dictatorial. The Nigerian Bar Association boycotted the corruption trials when it was announced that they would be held in secret by military tribunals. The Nigerian Medical Association was banned when it supported a strike by government doctors for better conditions of medical care. Student associations and their campus meetings were also suppressed, and trade union members were alienated by the continual demands for sacrifices. Toward the end, even public discussion of the country's political future was banned.

Although many Nigerians initially welcomed the tough image projected by the new government, as reflected in its "War Against Indiscipline," the desire for firmness gave way to disillusionment with its excesses and inconsistencies. While many Nigerians were cheered by the criminal convictions of notoriously corrupt officials (including a dozen former governors), support was dissipated by anomalies in the administration of justice, which seemed to barely touch the northern power base of the former ruling party, the National Party of Nigeria, and which saw a number of suspect figures released while some who were widely admired for their integrity, such as former Lagos Governor Lateef Jakande, remained in prison without charge.

Misgivings also grew over the harshness of the penalties, typically more than 20 years in prison. And Nigerians were especially horrified by the execution in Lagos last April of three persons convicted of cocaine possession under Decree 20. Not only did the penalty seem to the public (and to prominent religious and legal opinion) cruelly out of proportion to the crime, but the execution of one person, whose offense was committed before the promulgation of the decree, violated a basic principle of natural justice.

Previous military regimes had locked up journalists, harassed interest groups, and become corrupt and domineering. But never had military rule in Nigeria sought to put itself so completely beyond the reach of public scrutiny and dissent, and to institutionalize a legal justification and organizational apparatus for dictatorship. This expanding repressive apparatus had begun to jeopardize the significant democratic infrastructure that survived the Second Republic: a vigorous press, an autonomous judiciary, a rich array of business and professional associations, and diverse artistic and intellectual critiques of the Nigerian situation.

Perhaps most fatally of all, the arrogance of the Buhari-Idiagbon regime led it to ignore critical opinion and the need to develop a broad base of support even within the military. It had long been rumored that many members of the Supreme Military Council resented the increasing monopoly of power by Generals Buhari and Idiagbon, and this open secret did much to fan the widespread expectations of an impending coup. This suspicion was pointedly confirmed by the coup-makers in their subsequent public statements.

The new Nigerian military president, Maj.-Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, condemned Buhari for being "rigid and uncompromising" and Idiagbon for "using the machinery of government as his tool." The sensibilities of the more idealistic and principled officers were also offended by the reappearance of corruption at high levels. Maj.-Gen. Sanni Abacha (who announced the December 1983 coup) was perhaps speaking for this segment of the officer corps when in his broadcast naming Babangida as the new president, he denounced "glaring fraud" in the negotiation of recent huge "counter-trade" (barter) deals for Nigerian oil and in the issuance of import licenses.

With the suppression of criticism and debate, both in public fora and in the regime's military councils, discontent was building to an explosive level. As during the Second Republic, there were continuous rumors of foiled coup plots or attempts, including a credible report of a failed plot by radical junior officers in July. Like the 1983 coup, the most recent coup may have been partially intended to preempt a seizure of power by radical officers from the middle and junior ranks. Without question, such officers exist. Their anger and disillusionment with the country's course is real, reflecting the broader frustration of society as a whole and of the intellectual and professional circles with whom many of these younger officers interact. Equally real is the prospect of a social convulsion or coup attempt that would bring such radical officers to power if President Babangida cannot reverse the economic and political decay.

Nigeria's new president appears to comprehend acutely what is at stake, and to appreciate that only responsive and accountable government can succeed where dictatorship has failed. In his maiden address to the nation, he announced the repeal of Decree Number 4 and the immediate release of all journalists in detention, promising, "We do not intend to lead a country where individuals are under fear of expressing themselves." Committing his government to uphold human rights and fundamental liberties, he said, "We recognize that a government, be it civilian or military, needs the consent of the people if it is to govern effectively."

These impressive words were quickly followed by actions. Scores of former politicians who had been in prison for 20 months without charge or trial (including one who was twice tried and acquitted) were released, many to a hero's welcome. The detention centers of the NSO were thrown open to the press, and public exposure of NSO human rights violations were welcomed. A high-powered commission was appointed to investigate the activities of the dreaded organization, and its top leadership was disbanded. Former NSO Director Mohammed Rafindadi remains under arrest.

The composition of the new government is perhaps the clearest indication of its commitment to open debate and respect for independent and critical thinking. Among the six ministers who remain is one who would probably soon have been replaced for his recent candid and forceful criticism of the Buhari government's counter-trade agreements. Widely admired for his intelligence and probity, Minister of Petroleum Tam David-West had won high marks domestically and internationally for his effective representation of Nigeria's interests within OPEC.

Now he will be joined by a number of other prominent and outspoken civilians. These include Professor Bolaji Akinyemi (Foreign Affairs), who condemned the recent expulsion of illegal immigrants; retired Lt.-Gen. Alani Akinrinade (Agriculture), one of several influential Yorubas to float a proposal for a "confederation" as a warning signal of the dangers of authoritarian rule; Dr. Kalu Idika Kalu (Finance), who called for Nigeria to agree to an IMF loan when the Buhari government backed away from the IMF's terms; Bola Ajibola (Justice), who, as president of the Nigerian Bar Association, led that organization's boycott of the military tribunals; and Professor Koye Ransome-Kuti (Health), whose younger brothers—the vice president of the proscribed Nigerian Medical Association and the iconoclastic singer, Fela Anikulapo Kuti—were both imprisoned by the Buhari regime.

Equally striking are the gubernatorial appointments. Only six of the 19 incumbent military governors were reappointed (two to different states). As a group, the new governors are younger and less senior in rank (only two rank as high as colonel). Several of them are politically well to the left of the average military officer. The reappointed Lt.-Col. David Mark in Niger State and Group Capt. Gbolahan Mudasiru in Lagos are vigorous critics of the old order who have displayed a populist concern for the provision of free education and other services. The new governor of Kaduna State, the nerve-center of power in the north, is Maj. Abubakar Umar, previously administrator of the Federal Housing Authority, a frequent site of scandal, which he ran with high integrity.

Maj. Umar recently called for a socialist state, and strongly criticized the system of import allocation under Buhari's minister of commerce, Dr. Mahmud Tukur (a leading Kaduna figure), who is allegedly being held in detention. Some expect the young major to challenge the powerful Kaduna establishment in the radical manner of Governor Balarabe Musa during the Second Republic. By appointing such restless young men to the executive positions in the states, President Babangida gives them not only a share of power, but also a share of the frustrations of power, and so perhaps an appreciation that fundamental change will be slow and painful in coming.

At the core of the government, there are also some significant changes. First and foremost is the personality of the 44-year-old president, a tough and demanding officer who is admired for his courage and professionalism and well-liked for his sociable and relaxed manner off-duty. As someone who has been instrumental in the success or failure of every Nigerian coup since the civil war, Babangida understands the volatility of power better than most. At the same time, his self-confidence and more modest personal ambition seem to preclude the kind of paranoia of opposition that made a monster of the previous regime. As army chief of staff in the previous regime, Babangida (a native of Niger State) spent considerable time touring bases and speaking with younger officers. Probably no one understands the pressures and aspirations of the contemporary Nigerian Army better than he.

Changes in the structure of military rule indicate a more consensual and less domineering style. The Supreme Military Council (SMC) has been expanded and renamed the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC)—all references to "supremacy" in military rule have been removed. The functions of the chief of staff, Supreme Headquarters (the traditional number two position), have been divided between a new chief of General Staff to handle political administration, and a new Joint Chiefs of Staff for military administration. The latter will be chaired by the reappointed Defense Minister Domkat Y. Bali, who like half the 28 members of the AFRC, hails from the "middle belt" of the north populated by ethnic minorities.

The new number-two man in government is Naval Commodore Oko Ebitu Ukiwe, 45, an Igbo who remained loyal to the federal side during the civil war. Ukiwe served in the last SMC and as governor of Niger and Lagos States during the late 1970s. Replacing Babangida as army chief of staff is Maj.-Gen. Sanni Abacha, from Borno State, who is expected to be a powerful figure in the new government and something of a watchdog of its performance.

The new government has won popular support for the coup and its initial reforms, but faces devastating policy choices ahead. With its foreign debt now at $22 billion and oil prices and production sagging—production is still below the OPEC quota of 1.45 million barrels per day—the country is desperately short of foreign exchange.

With the Central Bank more than three months behind in releasing foreign

Beryl Goldberg

Kano, Nigeria: "Nigeria may be forced to choose between the loss of national sovereignty from agreeing to the loan and the loss of virtually all capacity to import goods and services"

exchange for payment of short-term trade debts, the country's ability to import is drying up. The only relief would seem to lie in reaching agreement with the IMF for a $2.5 billion three-year loan, which would unlock an equivalent amount in loans from the World Bank and commercial banks. But this requires swallowing the orthodox IMF medicine—a steep devaluation of the currency (by an estimated 60 percent), along with cuts in petroleum and other consumer subsidies—which is broadly and bitterly opposed in the country.

President Babangida assumed office indicating his intention to negotiate an agreement with the IMF, but has subsequently said that any decision must have public support. Hence, he has opened the question to public debate in an unprecedented fashion for a military government. This debate underscores the breadth and intensity of popular opposition to the IMF loan, not only because of the sharp decline in living standards that would result from devaluation and removal of subsidies, but because of widespread cynicism over the country's capacity to manage the new infusion of cash honestly and efficiently.

Very soon, Nigeria may be forced to choose between the loss of national sovereignty from agreeing to loan and the loss of virtually all capacity to import goods and services. Although the case for the loan seems compelling to economists on paper, it may be impossible for the Babangida government to survive its imposition over such intense opposition. With the new president declaring a 15-month economic emergency and warning of a further steep decline in the price of oil, Nigerians are increasingly aware that grim times and greater hardships lie ahead, with or without new loans. As an intelligent and pragmatic administrator, Babangida understands the urgent need to restructure Nigeria's foreign obligations. But as a shrewd politician with democratic instincts, he appreciates that no policy can work if the organized elements of the society are united in opposition to it.

After 20 months of dictatorship and repression and many years of massive corruption and mismanagement, the manner of government may well be more important to Nigeria's recovery than whether or not it signs an IMF loan. The new government must put a halt to the continuing disastrous leakage of domestic resources and foreign exchange through fraud and waste. This cannot be done unless Babangida goes beyond the restoration of press freedom to set up independent structures for monitoring, investigating, and punishing corrupt public conduct.

Similarly, Nigerians must realize that the glory days of oil wealth are gone, that for the foreseeable future they will be left largely to their own devices, and that the only way out of the deepening crisis will be through greater productivity and reduced consumption, especially of non-essential consumer goods. Every segment of society, and especially the import-intensive upper classes, must be prepared to do with less—to share in the sacrifices. Babangida has already indicated the readiness of the armed forces to do so. And government must be prepared to offer the price incentives and freer competition that will make greater investment and productivity possible.

The situation is not hopeless. In response to higher producer prices, agricultural production increased during the Buhari regime. Babangida believes that the pent-up capacity in Nigerian agriculture can make the country food self-sufficient in 12 months. Boldly, he has declared this his goal and has banned imports of maize and rice, which are locally grown. The new president also understands that the urban bias in government policies must be removed and priority given to the infrastructural and input needs of small and medium-scale farmers if food production is to rise as he envisions. And he appreciates that citizen participation may determine the acceptability of the hard choices that lie ahead—hence his pledge to revitalize the system of local government.

Over and above the long-term economic depression, Nigeria's immediate financial crisis is acute, and will become all the more so if the price of oil drops again soon. But in the growing consensus that Nigeria's problems cannot be solved by simply finding more money somewhere, there is also a glimmer of hope. What the country is going through may represent a fundamental change in its national psyche. The cargo cult is over. The hard search for solutions from within has begun. And a conviction has been renewed that only through the free flow of ideas and a government that is open and accountable to the people can solutions be found. □

The IMF Logjam

Facing declining oil revenues and a heavy debt burden, Congo has devised its own structural adjustment program to address its economic woes without recourse to the IMF. But without a rescheduling of its public debt—contingent on an IMF program—are President Sassou-Nguesso's efforts doomed to fail?

BY TONY HODGES

Like so many other Third World oil producers that were encouraged by burgeoning oil revenues and the ease of borrowing to finance ambitious development plans, Congo now faces the dual challenge of falling oil earnings and a crippling debt burden. It is one of several African countries, including most notably Nigeria, to have spurned the idea of seeking the aid of the International Monetary Fund.

Instead, it has embarked on a homegrown "structural adjustment plan," launched by the central committee of the Congolese Worker's Party (PCT) last June in hopes of restoring the country's financial health. But despite this apparently bold initiative, the recovery effort is doomed to fail until Western creditors agree to reschedule Congo's debts—and this they say they will not do unless President Denis Sassou-Nguesso swallows his objections to dealing with the IMF.

Congo emerged as sub-Saharan Africa's fifth largest oil producer (after Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, and Cameroon) as a result of a string of offshore oil strikes by France's Elf and Italy's Agip. By 1980, output had reached 63,000 barrels a day (b/d) and by 1984 it had almost reached 116,000 b/d (5.9 million tons), pumped from four fields operated by Elf (Emeraude, Likouala, Yanga, and Sendji) and one by Agip (Loango).

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This year, there has been a slight fall in production, as all the fields except Sendji are now in decline. Production in the first half of the year was 3.2 percent less than in the equivalent period of 1984, suggesting an output of 5.7 million tons for the year as a whole. The PCT's structural adjustment plan is a little more optimistic, forecasting 5.8 million tons for 1985, but anticipates a steeper fall to 5.4 million tons in 1986.

This decline will prove only temporary. Exploration continues, with two U.S. companies, Amoco and Conoco, recently joining Elf and Agip in the offshore oil search. Several promising new discoveries have been made. The most important is the Tchibouela field, found by Elf, which is to be brought on stream by the end of 1986 at a cost of \$308 million, contributing over 1 million tons to national production in 1987. Agip, for its part, is planning to invest \$318 million to develop the Zatchi-Marine field, which should start flowing by the end of 1987, building up to 0.75 million tons a year. Along with investments to sustain production in some of the existing fields, notably Agip's Loango, these development projects will raise Congo's total production to about 6 million tons in 1987 and keep it there for several more years—without the constraint of OPEC quotas, as Congo is not a member.

Production will not rise any higher than this in the absence of major new commercial discoveries or a radical reversal of world oil market trends to permit exploitation of a huge currently untappable reserve of 600 million tons of heavy viscous oil in Elf's Emeraude field. Elf recently began a technologically pioneering experiment in steam injection to force the oil's extraction, but even if this \$75 million pilot project proves successful, steam injection is unlikely to be commercially viable at oil prices below \$35 a barrel.

Oil is no less important to the Congolese economy than it is to Nigeria or Gabon. In 1984, it contributed 43 percent of gross domestic product, 85 percent of exports (89.5 percent if refined products are included), and 68.5 percent of revenue for the government's recurrent budget.

Not until this year did the government have to face the prospect of a decline in oil earnings. In 1984, the 11.3 percent increase in oil output and the appreciation of the dollar against Congo's CFA franc, which is tied to the French franc at a fixed exchange rate, more than outweighed the erosion of dollar oil prices on the world market, resulting in a 29 percent rise in crude oil exports, from \$937 million in 1983 to \$1.05 billion. Likewise, there was a 28 percent increase in the government's revenue from taxes and royalties paid by the oil companies, from \$474 million to \$528 million.

Now the trends are reversed, as oil production, dollar oil prices, and the value of the dollar all point downwards. But for Congo's planners, the economic danger signals were visible even in 1983-84 when oil earnings were rising. The current financial crisis stems in large measure from a huge increase in government investment inspired by the country's new-found oil wealth. In 1981, government investment more than doubled to \$370 million, from \$232 million the previous year. In 1982, the first year of an ambitious \$4.1 billion development plan for 1982-86, government investment virtually doubled again to \$604 million. Along with increased investment by the petroleum companies, this lifted Congo's real GDP growth rate to 21.3 percent in 1981 and 18.9 percent in 1982, higher than anywhere else in Africa.

Much of the finance for this investment boom was raised abroad, where banks and official lending agencies were as impressed as the Congolese authorities by the rise in oil revenues. Congo had a low debt service ratio at the time (9.5 percent in 1981) and a favorable credit risk rating, so there was no difficulty raising loans. Drawings under loan facilities to finance the government's investment budget rose by 158 percent to \$226 million in 1982. In addition, the growth in oil revenues enabled the government to pursue a policy of guaranteeing state employment to newly qualified graduates, with the result that the state payroll expanded, inflating ordinary recurrent expenditure.

It did not take long for Congo to accumulate a large debt burden, which is now weighing heavily on public finances. By the end of 1984, disbursed direct public debt amounted to \$1.08 billion, of which \$892 million was external debt. In addition, the state-guaranteed debts of parastatal companies totalled an estimated \$198 million. Public debt service, which had totalled only CFA 18.2 billion (21 percent of the recurrent budget) in 1980, had grown to CFA 123 billion (46 percent of the recurrent budget) by 1984.

Over-ambitious development objectives were not the sole cause of the high level of government borrowing. Inadequate mechanisms of control over investment decisions and the contracting



of loans also played a part. Credit deals, sometimes on unfavorably hard terms, were concluded without the knowledge of the Caisse Congolaise d'Amortissement (CCA), the government body which is supposed to monitor all public borrowing. Furthermore, there was a tendency for investment expended to exceed the project allocations in the budget. In some cases, investment proceeded without any budget allocation at all. The upshot was that investment overruns (\$92 million in 1984) accentuated the state's financial disequilibrium and along with revenue delays, created cash flow problems that forced the government into arrears (\$55 million in early 1985) on payments for investment projects and also obliged it to contract expensive short-term debts.

Another factor has been the chronically poor financial position of almost all the country's several dozen state companies. The parastatals had a combined deficit of \$36.5 million in 1982 and more than twice as much (\$64.1 million) by 1984. Only two state enterprises (a bookshop chain and the national drugs company) currently operate at a profit and the government has been obliged to take on board the parastatals' debts.

While devouring an ever larger proportion of government resources, debt service has also weighed heavily on the balance of payments. Despite increased oil exports, the balance of payments showed an overall deficit of \$58 million in 1984, up from \$24 million in 1983.

This poor result was recorded despite the fact that the large rise in oil exports boosted overall export earnings by 29 percent, while imports fell by 15 percent due to falls in investment by both the public sector (by then, acting more cautiously) and the petroleum companies. Indeed, there was a record trade surplus of \$757 million, more than twice as high as in 1983. With the net

OIL & CONGO'S ECONOMY

	1981	1982	1983	1984
Oil production (b/d)	79,000	89,000	104,000	116,000
Oil exports* (billion CFA)	258.5	321.0	375.2	485.0
Oil as % of total exports	88.7	88.1	92.3	89.5
Oil taxes & royalties (billion CFA)	133.2	150.8	180.8	230.9
Oil taxes & royalties as % of government recurrent revenue	68.4	61.9	65.6	69.5
Oil sector value added (billion CFA)	212.8	274.8	324.2	395.9
Oil as % of GDP	39.3	38.6	40.6	43.0

* Including refined products

Sources: *Ministère des Finances et du Budget, Ministère du Plan.*

outflow on services down by a third due to reduced petroleum sector service needs, the current account swung handsomely from a deficit of $393 million in 1983 to a surplus of $302 million in 1984—a commendable performance by any standards.

However, this was wiped out by negative trends on the capital account. Including both long and short-term capital, it moved from a surplus of $298 million in 1983 to a deficit of $367 million in 1984. One reason was a sharp fall in capital inflow, due to the reduction in investment by the petroleum industry and the government's attempts to reduce foreign borrowing. The other was the increased burden of principal repayments by both the public sector and the oil companies on their external debts. Total external debt service, including both interest and principal payments, was about $550 million, equivalent to just over 40 percent of exports of goods and services.

The most recent data from the IMF indicates that by the end of February 1985, Congo's external reserves had shrunk to just $3.51 million—theoretically enough to cover less than three days imports. Such a position would be untenable were Congo not a member of the franc zone, which in effect enables Congo to draw on the common pool of foreign exchange held by France and the other members of the zone.

Congo's account at the French Treasury is heavily in deficit. At the same time, the country's banks have been forced to borrow increasingly from their corresponding banks abroad in view of the spiraling growth of their credits to sustain the deficit-ridden parastatals. The net foreign assets of the banking system deteriorated from $82 million to negative $77 million at the end of 1984. Under the statutes of the franc zone's regional bank, the Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (BEAC), corrective measures would be demanded of Congo if these trends continued unchecked.

Since 1983, the Congolese government has gradually come to recognize the urgency of correcting the country's financial disequilibria. Even before the adoption of the structural adjustment plan in June 1985, the government had scaled down the 1982-86 development plan and cut the investment budgets in both 1983 and 1984. Although its targets were overshot in both years, public investment was sharply reduced from the record level of 1982. With development spending in the oil industry also declining by then, gross fixed capital formation fell in real terms by 37 percent in 1983 and 19 percent in 1984.

This brought about a sharp deceleration in Congo's real growth rate, from 18.9 percent in 1982 to 3.4 percent in 1983 and 2.9 percent in 1984—well below Congo's high population growth rate (3.5 percent). That there was any growth at all in 1984 was due entirely to the expansion of oil production. Non-petroleum GDP actually declined by 2.3 percent in real terms, according to the ministry of planning.

By mid-1985, however, it was evident that the measures already taken by the government were insufficient. The country was heading remorselessly toward a financial crisis. This year, public debt service has soared to $393 million, no less than 55 percent of the government's recurring budget. At the same time, government oil revenues are falling—by 11 percent according to the revised 1985 budget—because of the fall in oil production and an agreement with the oil companies, effective from May, to reduce the fiscal oil price used to calculate oil taxes and royalties from $29 to $26 a barrel in view of the slide in the spot prices at which the oil companies sell Congo's relatively low quality crude (now about $25 a barrel).

In the past few months, government oil revenues have also been hit by the depreciation of the dollar. Together, these adverse trends mean that for the first time in years, Congo will run a deficit on its recurrent budget. This has been put at CFA 16.2 billion (CFA 53.1 billion if a contribution to the investment budget is included) in the revised 1985 budget estimates. The factors that swelled the overall balance of payments deficit in 1984 are even more present now and the regression in the oil industry (albeit temporary) makes a real decline in GDP inevitable both this year and next.

The "deterioration in the world petroleum context, the growing burden of debt service, and the continuous degradation of the state economic sector," acknowledged the structural adjustment plan (SAP) adopted last June, have resulted in an "enormous" budget deficit in 1985, a "permanent disequilibrium of public finances resulting in an explosive level of debt up to 1990" and "a tendency to general stagnation in the economy of which one of the important causes has been the channeling of the country's resources to unproductive public enterprises." In the view of the SAP's authors, "the scale of disequilibria is important enough and their trend so pronounced that there is not a shadow of doubt about the need to redress the situation." The measures they proposed were not only "urgent" and "obligatory" but were also "global" because economic recovery required "a series of coordinated measures in numerous realms of economic and social life."

The first set of measures was designed to halt the growth in recurrent spending, which, excluding debt service, had been increasing annually at a rate of 12.8 percent. The government payroll was to be frozen at CFA 75 billion a year until 1987. To this end, a census of government employees would weed out fictitious recipients of salaries, among them civil servants who have retired or in some cases have died. The census would also enable the government to pension off employees who had reached retirement age.

Other measures to contain the government payroll were submitted for study before the end of the year. These included incentives to leave the civil service, closer control over the awarding of scholarships and expenditure on foreign training, and—potentially the most sensitive of all in political terms—abandoning the principle of guaranteed recruitment of graduating students.

The SAP went on to list what it called "drastic measures" to reduce expenditure on materials by 30 percent in each ministry, thereby saving CFA 7 billion. The biggest cuts, however, were projected in spending on transfers, notably for cultural and sporting activities. In addition, the SAP laid down the principle that henceforth all spending under the recurrent budget would be subject to rigorous control within the framework of set budget allocations. By the end of the year, an inventory of buildings, equipment, and materials held by each ministry would be made, and from 1986 a "zero base budget" would be employed, abandoning the past habit of automatic indexation in determining budget allocations.

Implementing these guidelines inevitably proved difficult for 1985, as half the budget had already passed and of the CFA 311 billion allocated to the recurrent budget (including CFA 112 billion of debt service), over two-thirds (CFA 206 billion) had alredy been spent, leaving only CFA 106 billion. CFA 20 billion worth of cuts were identified in the revised recurrent budget drafted on the basis of the SAP guidelines, but these were outweighed by supplementary allocations totaling CFA 69.9 billion, required almost entirely (CFA 64.8 billion) to meet additional debt service obligations, which had been swollen by short-term borrowing and arrears.

The SAP included a parallel set of measures to constrain government investment and improve controls over project spending and the contracting of debts. According to the plan, the challenge "is not so much to define *a priori* a global sum for investment, which theoretically should be nothing, as to establish what is the unavoidable minimum given the projects now in progress." Thus, only a limited list of projects was to be retained, while some particularly onerous contracts were to be renegotiated. Even some projects already under way might have to be abandoned or deferred. No state investment outside the framework of the budget would be tolerated unless it was on concessional terms (with repayment over a minimum of 12 years and interest below 7 percent).

As with the 1985 recurrent budget, there were immediate difficulties in cutting back this year's investment outlays half-way through the budget year. Some projects which had been included in the initial investment budget were dropped, but investment over-runs on other projects earlier in the year resulted in the revised investment budget (set at CFA 125 billion) exceeding the initial investment budget by CFA 15 billion. The real test of the government's ability to translate the SAP's budgetary measures into reality will not come until the 1986 budget is published.

Another set of measures is envisaged by the SAP to tackle the drain of state resources into the loss-making parastatals. In certain cases, it is envisaged that unprofitable state companies will be dissolved or converted into mixed companies. Some of the larger parastatals will be broken up into smaller enterprises, while several of the monopolies held by the state sector will be re-examined in the light of the inefficiency of the companies holding them (an example is the Office National du Commerce which has proved hopelessly unable to fulfill its role as a distributor of basic necessities) and the existence of more effective parallel markets.

The SAP notably calls for a reduction of the state role in agriculture. The state, which currently owns several large farms through the Office des Cultures Vivrières (OCV), is to restrict its role to research and development of new crops and will sign management contracts with private companies to run the existing state plantations.

There will also be some liberalization of the prices charged by state companies. A challenge here will be to identify which companies should be subsidized to meet legitimate social needs—bus and rail services have been cited by officials—and which should be expected to run their businesses on strictly commercial lines. As for investment by state companies, there will be a general moratorium on all projects which had not started by July 1, and henceforth all loans contracted by state companies will have to receive prior government approval. However, the politically most courageous proposal once again concerns employment. Whereas the salary bill is to be frozen in the civil service, in the parastatals it is to be reduced by 10 percent—and it is not excluded that this will involve firing superfluous employees.

Another component of the SAP is a restrictive monetary policy aimed at containing the level of credit made available by the banks to loss-making companies. Rigorous lending criteria have been established and a two-year deadline has been given to troubled companies to improve their finances or risk forfeiting their present credit facilities.

Finally, steps are being taken to improve the government's budgetary controls. The CCA is being restructured to ensure better management of the public debt, and a special watchdog body is being set up to oversee investment expenditure and credit agreements in the light of the SAP's guidelines. The overall effects of the SAP will be heavily recessionary, due to the curbs on public investment and consumption, as well as a decline in the purchasing power of urban households caused by the real cuts in the public sector salary bill and the inflation generated by price liberalization measures.

Nonetheless, the SAP measures will not, in and of themselves, be enough to restore financial equilibria. Even if the SAP is implemented in full, it will leave a large overall budget deficit. The only solution, the SAP acknowledges, is to reschedule the public debt. In particular, it suggests, the rescheduling of about $60 million of publicly guaranteed debt service due in 1985 and a further CFA 23 billion in 1986 would be sufficient, in conjunction with full implementation of the SAP, to resolve the government's financial difficulties.

The SAP warns, however, that "it seems no rescheduling solution is available, at least with France, without the intervention of the Paris Club." Indeed, when requested recently by Congo to discuss bilateral debt rescheduling, France, the country's largest creditor, flatly refused to do so without going through the normal rescheduling channels of the Paris Club, which groups all the main Western creditor nations. The catch here is that the Paris Club considers agreement with the IMF, which Congo opposes, a standard pre-condition for its debt rescheduling operations for Third World countries. This is because the IMF can normally exert some disciplinary control over the implementation of economic reform measures—by disbursing tranches of credit upon the fulfillment of pre-set targets.

It is ironic that the SAP contains virtually all the measures that would be required by an IMF/World Bank recovery program. In fact, the plan was drafted with the aid of consultants funded by the World Bank. However, without an external mechanism of control, Western creditors appear to lack confidence in the Congolese government's ability to implement the SAP in full.

"President Denis Sassou-Nguesso does not want to be forced into measures by the IMF that would prove unpopular and could be exploited by his enemies"

The cuts in parastatal employment and the ending of recruitment guarantees to graduating students will, of course, prove politically difficult to put into effect. Budgetary austerity measures could also undermine the means of patronage traditionally available to Congolese politicians—and the means by which public sector employees can fulfill commitments to dependent kin. Furthermore, the investigations into unfavorable contracts are allegedly proving politically embarrassing, since they risk uncovering corruption at the highest levels of the government.

It is too early to judge how resolute the government will be in implementing the SAP. However, it is this concern about countervailing political and social pressures that worries Congo's creditors. Another consideration is the problem of setting a precedent. Many other African countries would dearly like to bypass the IMF, or in the case of ex-French colonies, bypass the Paris Club and reschedule bilaterally with France.

Congo adamantly refuses, however, to reach an agreement with the IMF. The PCT, which officially adheres to Marxism-Leninism, says Congo will not be "dictated" to by the IMF, which it paints as a tool of imperialism—although Congo is an IMF/World Bank member. Since the PCT has already swallowed IMF/World Bank medicine in principle, by adopting the SAP, is ideology really the stumbling block to a deal with the Fund? "The real problem," says one Western aid official in Brazzaville, "is that Sassou-Nguesso does not want to be forced into measures by the IMF that would prove unpopular and could be exploited by his enemies within the party." Full implementation of the SAP could expose the ambiguity of the president's policies and expose him to charges of betrayal, like his predecessor Joachim Yhombi-Opango, whom he deposed in an internal party power struggle in 1979.

Is there a way out of this logjam? Could the IMF give the green light to the Paris Club's endorsement of the SAP's good intentions? Might these good intentions be enough to convince the Paris Club that it should make an exception for Congo, despite the risks of precedent-setting, in order to avoid subjecting President Sassou-Nguesso to unacceptable political risks? After all, what can the Paris Club governments gain by undermining a government which, despite its Marxist rhetoric, has drawn increasingly close to the West in recent years? An imaginative compromise, suggested a senior French diplomat, might be for the Paris Club to take on the regulatory function of the IMF by arranging a "conditional rescheduling." It might be possible, he ventured, "to do the work of the IMF without the IMF." □

Feeling the Heat

By virtue of geographic proximity, Botswana is linked to the South African economy and to the increasing violence spilling over its borders. While sanctions against Pretoria will inevitably affect Botswana's economy, President Quett Masire's government has little choice but to support their implementation in hopes of bringing a quicker end to apartheid.

BY VIVIENNE WALT

Shopping in Gaborone is a disorienting experience. The supermarket shelves are lined with goods labeled in Afrikaans. The manager is from the northern Transvaal. By noon, the Johannesburg morning newspapers have been unwrapped at the bookstore. Tied to the South African economy by the Rand Monetary Agreement and the Southern African Customs Union, Botswana's fate is intimately bound up in the turmoil to its south.

For many years, this relationship has limited Botswana to mouthing relatively academic protests against the apartheid government. While the West has begun to use economic sanctions to voice its discontent with Pretoria, countries like Botswana are holding out for alternatives.

"We appreciate why certain countries want sanctions, but we ourselves cannot impose sanctions," Geoffrey Garebamono, external affairs secretary, said in Gaborone in September, just days before President Reagan announced limited economic sanctions against South Africa.

But the alternatives to sanctions could be even worse. Added Garebamono, "If the situation in South Africa is not corrected, and corrected soon, in the long run there will be a revolution, which would affect us even more.

"It would certainly be more serious than sanctions, more disruptive," said Garebamono. "So if we were forced into a situation where we had to choose between revolution or sanctions, we would choose sanctions."

Vivienne Walt, a freelance journalist, has worked on the foreign desks of The Times *of London and the* Financial Times.

Nobu Arakawa

President Quett Masire: "Botswana stood its ground, rejecting any agreement of the kind that Mozambique and Swaziland have signed in the past two years"

Put another way, Ponatshego Kedikilwe, minister of presidential affairs, said: "There's no doubt we will suffer some effects. The question is, if those sanctions were to be such that [they] would arrest the situation in South Africa, it would be worth the suffering."

Botswana's predicament on the divestment issue has been put to good use by opponents of sanctions, particularly at U.S. embassies in the frontline states bordering South Africa. American embassy officials have correctly pointed out that disruption of essential goods to South Africa would have a disastrous effect, at least on Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Mozambique.

"The Botswana economy might be in great peril," said James Young, second secretary at the U.S. embassy in Gaborone. "If there's a real civil war in South Africa, and it disrupted shipping or cut off transport to neighboring countries, development and daily life will be imperiled."

Nearly 95 percent of Botswana's imports either originate in South Africa or arrive at the country's ports before being shipped north. Although there is talk of exploring possible petroleum deposits, Botswana imports its entire oil supply—crucial for the smooth operation of the diamond mines—and it is refined at Durban before being pipelined to the Transvaal Reef and carried north.

Phillip Steenkamp, managing director of Shell Oil Botswana and former head of

Botswana's civil service, estimates the country's oil reserves at three months. "We might well get into a situation where we would need to bring in rations," he says. And President Botha's threat to deport foreign workers, including 18,000 Batswana, from the South African mines should far-reaching sanctions be imposed is being taken seriously.

Despite the prevailing economic links between the two countries, the political relationship between Pretoria and Gaborone is probably at its lowest point ever. The wounds from South Africa's recent invasion of Gaborone are not yet healed. Claiming that Botswana was harboring ANC guerrillas in the capital, commandos raided the town on June 14, killing 12 people and destroying several houses. In the aftershock, Gaborone's 60,000 residents saw houses flattened by explosives, and learned that citizens of Botswana were among the victims.

After that, says Garebamono, "It can't be business as usual. We cannot trust them anymore. We take everything they say with a pinch of salt."

The prelude to the June raid was a series of meetings between South Africa and Botswana, in which Gaborone insisted it would not enter into an Nkomati-type agreement with Pretoria. In frustration, South Africa threatened to make Botswana's new soda ash project unworkable. For the project to be a success, South Africa would have to shift its soda ash imports from the U.S. to Botswana.

But Botswana stood its ground, rejecting any agreement of the kind that Mozambique and Swaziland have signed in the past two years. "We saw no point in that," says Garebamono. "We have never been at war with South Africa and by signing, we are admitting we have aggressive intentions.

"We also emphasized that we have never allowed ANC bases here. We have provided a standing invitation to the South Africans for a long time to come show us the ANC bases, but they know there are none, so they don't come," he adds.

So eager, in fact, has Botswana been to show its hostility to any ANC guerrillas that the South African refugee community has been feeling the heat in Gaborone. Botswana has reportedly given a list of undesirable refugees to the ANC leadership, asking that they be stationed elsewhere.

Early in September, the senior reporter at the Botswana *Guardian*, a South African refugee, was deported. In strident comments after the June raid, he had intimated that the Masire government and army were forewarned of the invasion.

However, Botswana is sincerely opposed to apartheid, and to its credit has shunned South Africa's offers of badly needed food aid, instead accepting U.S. sorghum and Canadian beans distributed by the World Food Programme. The food supplies reach Botswana via Durban port in South Africa.

Governments and aid agencies have warmly praised the country's drought management. Unlike many countries in the region and in the Sahel, Botswana has the capacity to quickly analyze drought conditions and to implement a fairly comprehensive drought policy. Its relatively stable democracy helps ensure its favored status in the international aid community.

A nutritional surveillance program, funded by UNICEF, has helped establish the country's early warning system, which monitors the nutritional status of children to indicate possible famine.

Scholastica Kimaryo, UNICEF's resident program officer in Gaborone, says that although the country's food production is down to a small percentage of its total needs, Botswana has survived the drought "without loss of life." Indeed, if UNICEF's figures are accurate, the country is in the unique position of having less malnutrition now than in predrought years.

Under normal conditions, says Kimaryo, the malnutrition rate is 25 percent. Since December, the rate has dropped, and it may now be as low as 15 percent, although some of that decrease might be due to a change in the way these statistics are gathered. Any area of the country where 20 percent of children are found to be malnourished is identified as

Vivienne Walt

Pay-day at agricultural offices: "Batswana who can no longer survive on subsistence farming are employed on government projects for five pula a day"

Vivienne Walt

Corn-soya-milk provided by the U.S.: "Governments and aid agencies have warmly praised the country's drought management"

eligible for food assistance. At the moment, that category includes nearly 60 percent of the country, or 630,000 people.

Aside from direct food distribution, Botswana has begun many small labor-based relief projects to cope with the thousands of people displaced by the drought. Under these schemes, Batswana who can no longer survive on subsistence farming are employed on government projects, such as clearing roads and de-stumping fields, for five pula (about $2.10) a day.

"We aren't treating this drought as a one-time thing," says Emelda Mathe, coordinator of rural development. "It has to be understood in the whole development context. We are working on a national food strategy to be self-sufficient some day in certain basic items. Right now, we're about 95 percent sufficient in poultry.

"No one has died as a result of the drought," says Mathe, a statement which few governments in Africa could echo. "What is more, we are mounting a series of programs addressing the human and livestock needs to make sure that when the weather improves, people are better prepared for the next drought."

With diamonds having only recently overtaken cattle as the country's major export, the dying herds have been a cause of great concern to the government. Since the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in 1978, the cattle stock has dropped from 3 million to 2.4 million head.

Much of the loss during the drought has been borne by peasant farmers who own only one or two head of cattle. But the decrease also reflects systematic culling by the government, after the European Economic Community froze purchases of the country's meat while the disease prevailed.

United Nations sources in Gaborone claim that the country is still overstocked with cattle and should drop its herd to 2 million to preclude further erosion and over-grazing. Meanwhile, the controversial Tribal Grazing Lands Policy (TGLP) is in its seventh year. Critics of the policy, which has fenced off grazing land for the first time, say it has ended all attempts by the Basarwa (Bushmen) of the Kalahari to subsist by hunting game. Environmentalists also argue that the policy is virtually destroying the country's famous wildlife.

But the government continues to defend TGLP. "The whole question of buffer zones began to take shape after the foot and mouth outbreak," says Felix Mokobi, director of the food resources department at the ministry of agriculture.

"The EEC wanted cordons," he says. "But it was our idea, as a result of discussing how to improve our herd. This year we are beginning to see some positive results, with more and more commercial farms."

Like many assets in Botswana, cattle ownership is distributed very unevenly, with the great majority of head on large established ranches owned by a handful of cabinet ministers, South Africans, and other wealthy individuals. Such skewed distribution is not taken into account in the normal economic indicators. Indeed, Botswana has a healthy 5 percent annual growth rate.

However, such growth is overwhelmingly attributable to one factor—diamond mining. The country is now the world's second or third largest diamond producer after South Africa. (The Soviet Union's precise production figures are unknown.) Jwaneng mine, in the south of the country, produces more diamonds than Kimberley, but with low world prices, Botswana is stockpiling much of the output.

Likewise, the copper-nickel mine at Selebi Pikwe has suffered from poor prices and has never been able to turn a profit. But this could improve soon, since the American corporation Amax has sold its copper-nicker refining deal to Falconbridge of Canada, shifting the process from Norway to neighboring Zimbabwe, for significant savings on transport costs.

The government recently presented its sixth National Development Plan to parliament, recognizing that the country's economy was too dependent not only on South Africa but also on a very narrow set of production activities.

Diversification will thus be the thrust of the next few years. Peter Mmusi, President Masire's deputy, led a trade mission to the U.S. early in September to open new markets and consolidate a few old ones. For example, one of the stranger trade links with the U.S. is Botswana's teddy bears, made from local wool at Tiro Ya Diathla in Lobatse, and exported duty free to American children at the rate of 6,000 a month.

"In the next couple of years," says Young at the U.S. embassy, "the relative stability compared to other countries in southern Africa will make Botswana a very attractive prospect for investors."

The government's Financial Assistance Policy offers five-year benefits to new foreign investors. In fact, Young sees a time when manufacturing could be established in Botswana for export to South Africa as a way of beating sanctions imposed by the West.

But such schemes are hard to figure without considering South Africa's tendency to undermine any regional initiatives which exclude them, or which are designed to reduce their economic dominance.

The prime example has been the five-year history of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), headquartered in Gaborone, in which nine countries are united in an effort to reduce dependence on South Africa. SADCC now has projects worth nearly $5 million. But as Emang Maphanyane, SADCC administrator, points out, "Intra-SADCC trade is only 5 percent of the region's total trade. Production structures are very weak, limited by a shortage of foreign exchange and manpower."

The central problem, however, is South African attacks on Botswana, Angola, and Mozambique over the past five years, which have almost completely disrupted trade routes to ports on both coasts.

"It's clear that a strong SADCC isn't compatible with apartheid, especially the development of an independent transport system," says Maphanyane. In fact, in the end apartheid might be incompatible with Botswana's financial stability, as recent events have shown.

The rocky path of South Africa's currency has forced the Bank of Botswana into a seesaw of devaluing and revaluing the pula over the past year. Following South Africa's lead, Botswana suspended trading for a week in late August.

But nearly a third of the country's internal revenue still comes from the Pretoria-dominated Southern African Customs Union, and links with the south are at least as beneficial to Botswana as is its new relations within SADCC.

Some form of peace with South Africa will have to be found during the momentous times ahead. Meanwhile, relations with Pretoria—surely the dominant factor in Botswana's situation—are strained. As Shell Oil's director, Phillip Steenkamp, says: "South Africa used to be one of those neighbors you could live with, but once they start invading your territory, it's a different story altogether." □

Africa and Japan

Rising Sun Over Africa?

With Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe's recent African initiative, expanding private sector involvement in the continent, and media coverage of the drought and famine, possibilities for a new Japanese-African relationship have emerged. But given its limited aid infrastructure and chronic trade imbalances, what role can Japan play in the continent's economic development?

BY TORU KOTANI

In Kinshasa in March last year, a group of Zairean children singing a Japanese children's song, "*ware wa umi no ko*" (I am a child of the sea), welcomed the royal prince and princess of Japan during their second trip to Africa in as many years. Along with the recent symbolic royal visits, the Japanese government has been increasing its foreign policy emphasis on Africa, a trend which culminated in Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe's May 1984 announcement of a new effort to strengthen ties between Japan and Africa.

Abe's enthusiasm brought him to Africa in November last year. Some $100 million in food and agricultural aid to Africa was announced and "Africa Month" was declared in Japan. The Japanese government also sent an economic mission to five African countries in June 1984. The Japanese media covered the African drought and famine with unprecedented vigor, and many citizens organized charity events and donation campaigns.

Although a Japanese official in charge of African affairs confirmed that there was no change in the government's foreign policy priorities, namely the U.S. and Asia, his response contrasted with the foreign minister's African thrust. Abe is considered a strong contender for a future prime ministership. An ambitious politician, he made headlines in the past by announcing his intention to mediate the Iraq-Iran war. The current African emphasis seems to owe much to his idiosyncratic activism.

From the African point of view, this new interest is good news, as African governments are well aware of Japan's importance as an aid donor and trade partner. For that reason, many have reinforced their diplomatic representation in Japan, although economic difficulties have forced cutbacks in other parts of the world.

While some observers might view Japan's new enthusiasm as part of its effort to overcome an image as economic giant but political dwarf, this interpretation leaves some major questions unanswered. Why has Japan's attention turned to Africa at this time? Are relations between Japan and Africa truly entering a new era?

An attempt to answer these questions requires a sense of the history of Japan's relations with and perceptions of Africa. After abandoning isolationism under Western imperialist pressure in 1868, Japan entered the international arena with a largely agrarian economy and backward technology. Under such circumstances, there was nothing surprising about Japan's sympathetic attitude toward colonized peoples apparent in its earliest literature on Africa, reflecting the country's own difficulties in maintaining independence against Western powers.

Eventually, Japan itself became a colonial power in the aftermath of victories in wars with China (1894-5) and Russia (1904-5), and its attention shifted to Africa in a search for models of colonial administration. However, administrative interest was superseded by economic interest in the 1920s and 1930s. During this period, many official and private reports were written characterizing Africa as a potential market and source of natural resources.

In fact, the influx of cheap Japanese goods in the African colonies became a headache for British capitalists who lobbied for protectionism against Japanese exports. The Japanese even opened a match factory in Tanganyika in the late 1920s, an effort that threatened the colonial government's revenue from import duties on matches. The attempt—not welcomed by the colonial government—eventually failed.

World War II curtailed Japan's relations with Africa, and it was not until the 1960s that its interest revived. Having recovered from war damage, the Japa-

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nese economy required global markets and resources. To date, Japan's interest in Africa remains economic. It is significant that the first visit by a Japanese foreign minister to Africa took place in October 1974, as part of Japanese "resource diplomacy"—a direct result of the oil crisis.

In May 1984, the Japanese government announced it would provide $35 million for emergency food aid to 25 African countries and $28 million for food self-sufficiency efforts in 16 countries. However, whereas officials used these figures as evidence of Japan's new commitment to Africa, closer scrutiny reveals that these sums did not reflect an actual increase in Japanese aid to Africa. Rather, a decision was made to give the African portion of the overall food aid budget of that year in one installment at the earliest possible date, instead of over the course of the year.

Secondly, there was little concern over how the emergency aid would be used. Although even African section officials of the foreign affairs ministry had the surprising misconception that Japan was giving food aid in kind to Africa (a consequence of fragmented jurisdiction over aid), the money was in fact deposited in Japanese banks (a usual practice) for recipient governments.

Then the government chose Japanese trading companies to procure the goods with the deposited funds with the approval of recipient governments. Japanese trading companies are usually given a free hand in this manner because under the government's strict annual budget system, the money must be spent before the end of the fiscal year, and it is only the trading companies that have the capacity to carry out such a large procurement in such a short time.

Among the problems that the deadline factor creates is a lack of accountability. Claiming that its responsibility ends when the money is deposited, the Japanese government says that the trading companies are serving the recipient governments and should be accountable only to them. In reality, the receipts sent by recipients to the Japanese government upon arrival of the goods are usually written by the companies themselves. Because of the involvement of such largely autonomous agents in carrying out the purchases, it is unclear how well they are integrated into the overall aid effort.

Another problem caused by Japan's annual budget system is the government's inability to draw up a long-term aid plan. Both emergency food aid and aid for food self-sufficiency require careful cooperation with recipients in order to achieve results. In fact, in response to Africa's request for $1 billion worth of food aid, a Japanese representative to the World Food Council meeting in Addis Ababa in June 1984 emphasized that unplanned aid would be a disincentive to farmers and consequently harmful to food production in developing countries, "but for those countries which have a strategy for improved food productivity, we will not hesitate to provide aid."

However, the real question is whether Japan has a coherent aid strategy. In December 1984, several months after the announcement of the new policy, the cabinet instructed the ministry of foreign affairs to compile a comprehensive aid program as a matter of urgency. The ministry sent a fact-finding mission last April. After data collection, the plan will go through a long bureaucratic process, as it must be acceptable to the ministries of finance, foreign affairs, international trade and industry, agriculture, economic planning, and others whose jurisdictions it touches.

The government's lethargic interest in the implementation, supervision, and impact assessment of aid is also a result of Japan's very weak aid administration infrastructure. The government relies on private business for the implementation and supervision of aid. However, in the area of technical cooperation, private business is keenly aware of its own lack of expertise in tropical agriculture and is not enthusiastic about becoming involved in that sector unless the government guarantees the risk. Whether the government is willing to do so remains to be seen.

A major part of Japan's food aid to developing countries in the past five years came from an enormous domestic rice surplus. The rice export program recently achieved its goal of clearing out the surplus. As the government was preparing to terminate it, a protest was lodged by its beneficiaries, leaving the program's future undecided.

While much of the rice given by Japan as food aid is now purchased from southeast Asian countries, Africa's famine has inspired the ministry of agriculture to propose that the long-standing policy of

The Japanese Crown Princess with students at Kenyatta University College in Nairobi, built with Japanese aid

controlling rice production should be reversed and that rice should be stockpiled in the event of international and domestic shortages. In reality, however, this is yet another example of the domestic interest approach of the Japanese bureaucracy. The consequences of such a policy would definitely be more beneficial to Japanese farmers than to starving Africans because the domestic price of rice is almost three times the current international price.

The most obvious feature of the African-Japanese economic relationship is that Africa (excluding Egypt and South Africa) is Japan's least important regional trading partner, accounting for 2 percent of Japanese exports and 1.1 percent of imports in 1983. Africa's limited importance in Japan's trade balance is in part behind Japan's sluggish response to African affairs. Trade between Japan and Africa is weighted considerably in favor of Japan. In 1983, Japan exported \$2.9 billion to Africa, while imports from the continent were valued at \$1.3 billion. The 1982 surplus amounted to \$2.5 billion.

African-Japanese relations have been dominated by private business activities. The government role has been to provide a favorable environment for such activities. Its latest effort was an official economic mission—which included some prominent business leaders—to Zambia, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zaire. The trade imbalance is particularly serious for Nigeria and Kenya, and leaders in both countries expressed their strong concerns to the Japanese mission. President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya even suggested the possibility of an import restriction against Japanese products. His anger was understandable, because when he had discussed the problem with then-Prime Minister Suzuki during a 1982 visit to Japan, Suzuki had pledged that the Japanese government would encourage private business to increase imports from Kenya, a promise that turned out to be without substance.

The Japanese government's power over business is often exaggerated abroad, as the government has little control over the direction and volume of the trade flow. The only remedial action that the government can take to directly affect the trade imbalance is to send an official "shopping" mission to deficit countries.

The main reason for the trade imbalance is that Africa produces few items that are essential to the Japanese economy, apart from some minerals. In addition, the Japanese government is very reluctant to open its market to imports in general because of vested domestic interests. Markets are liberalized for specific items from specific countries only when such countries exert strong enough pressure to force the government to overcome domestic resistance. Africa's lack of political leverage over Japan, therefore, does little to alleviate the trade imbalance.

The protracted debate over trade liberalization in favor of goods from developing countries provides a good example of the political dynamics of the issue. The idea of liberalization was broached in early 1983 before Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to ASEAN member countries. The government then took 18 months to consult with domestic interest groups in order to produce a preliminary list of 29 items (for example, boneless chicken from Thailand and bananas from the Philippines) for liberalization.

To date, the government is still dragging its feet because of stubborn domestic resistance. Even so, African interests have not been reflected in the trade liberalization debate, which has been targeted at Asian countries and some influential less developed countries such as Brazil and India.

Even within Africa, priority is placed on certain countries which most affect Japanese interests. The 1984 economic mission recommended that the resource-rich countries of Nigeria, Zaire, and Zambia be exempted from the suspension on yen credit loan provisions and export insurance coverage, despite their debt problems. Instead, the Japanese government's priority is likely to be the rescue of its overseas affiliates which are currently suffering from the deterioration of African economies. The mission suggested that Japanese yen loans should be provided to maintain Japanese affiliates' importation of raw materials and spare parts. This kind of "aid" has been given in the past and is likely to continue.

While investment is another important aspect of economic relations, neither government officials nor business people are optimistic about the prospect of Japanese investment in Africa. In 1983, Africa attracted only 4.5 percent of Japan's total overseas investment. Lack of experience in Africa, the political instability of many countries, and long-established European interests provide sufficient reasons for Japanese investors to be cautious.

With Africa's current economic difficulties, many Japanese affiliates are on the verge of collapse. Generally, Japanese investment strategy in Africa is to secure a market by circumventing the wall of protective regulations. This "export substitution" nature of Japanese investment has been severely hit by the foreign exchange constraints of African countries. Because many investments are small and take the form of joint ventures, the pull-out cost is low enough for Japanese investors to make a quick decision. If Japanese investors opt for stability, Africa is the place they are least likely to invest.

In a meeting with Japanese ambassadors to Africa in June last year, Foreign Minister Abe emphasized Africa's importance in the East-West context, asserting that Japan should use its economic influence to help entrench African countries in the Western camp. This "security aid" argument has received increasing attention in the 1980s. Japan and the U.S. are discussing joint aid projects for countries where security issues are paramount, such as Pakistan and Thailand.

For Japan, the idea of security aid clearly aims at killing three birds with one stone. First, by jointly formulating aid projects, Japan can make use of the U.S. aid infrastructure without having to develop its own. Secondly, emphasizing security *aid* demonstrates Japan's commitment to Third World development. Thirdly, by stressing *security* aid, Japan can defuse "free ride" criticism by Western alliance members, particularly the United States.

An anonymous official cited in *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* said that security aid was Japan's effort at closer global security cooperation with the United States. According to the official, the once-waning U.S. interest in Asian security has been revived under the Reagan administration. While there are both domestic and external factors that prevent an increase in Japan's security contribution to Asia in cooperation with the U.S., Japan can reinforce its presence in Africa, thus alleviating the burden of U.S. commitment to the continent and complementing the U.S. effort.

Where is Japan's new African interest heading? Although the 1985 budget shows a slight increase for Africa in the geographical distribution of aid (20 percent more for Africa, while the overall aid budget is up by 10 percent), it certainly cannot be considered a drastic change. This cautious approach is not surprising, as the ministry of finance espouses "balance" and "gradualism," avoiding drastic change.

In the past, the ministry of foreign affairs also attempted to maintain the traditional distributional balance because a major change would arouse political furor among negatively-affected recipients. When Japan decided to provide aid to China in 1979, the government had to assure other Asian countries that their aid would not be reduced. A drastic shift of aid from Asia to Africa would certainly provoke protest from Asian recipients. In the 1985 aid budget, concessional aid is surpassed by the more business-oriented yen loan. Concessional aid to Africa is up from \$200 million to \$240 million, while the yen loan component is doubled from \$80 million to \$160 million.

Japan is rather a reluctant participant in the multilateral effort to assist Africa. In 1984, when the U.S. decided to cut back its contribution to the International Development Agency (IDA)—the World Bank's concessional loan window for the poorest countries—Britain, France, Germany, and Japan attempted to set up a fund to make up for the consequent financing shortfall. Japan yielded to U.S. pressure, however, and pulled out, thus missing a golden opportunity to show its commitment to the African cause. The plan consequently collapsed. And while it is true that Japan committed \$300 million over three years to the World Bank's special facility for Africa, the money is not to be administered directly by the Bank, as Japan wants to retain control over its share.

Japan is attempting to coordinate its aid with the U.S., the World Bank, and other donors. Of particular concern is the relationship with the United States. But without a clear, international platform for coordination, Japan's attempt could amount to nothing more than integration into U.S. aid policy. Who decides which African country should receive aid? What criteria should be used—humanitarian or security concerns? If Japan simply goes along with the security-conscious U.S. policy because of the need to ease security or trade-related tensions between the two countries, those countries not favored by the U.S. would lose a potential donor.

In reviewing Japan's relations with Africa, one persistently senses, as one Japanese Africanist put it, an "Africa without Africans" approach. For Japan, Africa briefly provided an alarm signal against Western imperialism, and then a model of colonial administration. From the 1920s to the present, however, Africa has been the source of large markets and rich resources. It is about time that Japan pays attention to Africans' development needs. However, if Japan considers Africa in terms of the East-West conflict, or as a pawn in Japan-U.S. relations, it will repeat its age-old mistake of regarding Africa as a continent without Africans. □

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Books

Covering the Continent

Sanford J. Ungar, *Africa: The People and Politics of an Emerging Continent*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985, 527pp., $19.95

From the title onward, this book is an ambitious undertaking. Ungar at once fails to live up to the magnitude of the task and succeeds in collating and conveying an amazing amount of information. The end result is a primer on Africa, meticulously researched and gathered from standard sources and his personal experiences. What it does not provide, to the disappointment of old Africa hands and others with long-term interest in the region, is new information or fresh insights.

This is unfortunate, for Ungar is a veteran journalist whose observations can be vivid and penetrating and who could and should have been more daring with his prescriptions, criticisms, and analyses. He is reluctant to add his own reactions and feelings, instead maintaining a distance from his subject. Too often he fails to reach conclusions, or leaves a story incomplete or unfinished. Ultimately, the book lacks guts and conviction. Ungar plods cautiously through the political maze, often letting quotes from unnamed government officials or others do his talking.

When Ungar does make judgments, the book comes alive. He takes the U.S. to task for its policy of "constructive engagement," and criticizes the Organization of African Unity for its "empty rhetoric [and] inability or unwillingness to deal with crises, and a failure to address the important issues concerning Africa's future." Whether the reader agrees or disagrees, it makes for more interesting reading.

The book generally lacks the nuances and explanations necessary to develop a deeper understanding of the continent. Corruption is mentioned in the discussion of almost every country, but Ungar never analyzes why it exists, how it comes to be so accepted, and why it persists. Likewise, we never get a sense of how Africans feel about their leaders, their economic problems, the world, or the United States.

The book begins and ends with U.S. relations with Africa. Sandwiched in between are 32 country sketches. The chapters on Liberia, Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa (including Namibia), and Zimbabwe—the countries which Ungar is obviously most comfortable discussing—are by far the best part of the book. Facts and anecdotes are interwoven to provide cohesive portraits of the countries—their people, leaders, histories, and economies. He does an exceptional job of untangling the complex web of South African politics, placing the emotion-charged issue in a firm historical and cultural context.

Perhaps he should have stopped and reflected after those chapters, for what follows is really too brief to do justice to the other countries and leaves the impression that Senegal, for example, which receives only a few pages, is less important than Liberia, which gets an entire chapter.

A chapter called "French Connections" provides thumbnail sketches of Senegal, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Guinea, and then lumps together Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The next chapter, "American clients," includes Zaire, Somalia, and Sudan. "Fallen Stars" discusses countries that have not lived up to their great potential: Ghana, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia. "Desperate Cases" includes Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Benin, Congo, the Gambia, Togo, Djibouti, Mauritius, Rwanda, and Burundi.

There is no point in quibbling over definitions, but to bring up only two examples, Sierra Leone is hardly a fallen star on the scale of Ghana or Uganda (in that it didn't have nearly their potential to begin with), nor are Togo and Congo desperate cases in a league with Chad or Central African Republic.

What is at fault here is not Ungar's classification system per se—even organizing African countries by region results in sticky problems—but the size of the task he undertook, which forced him to classify the countries.

Had he viewed the book as more of a personal exploration, it would have been a more honest account—for indeed, the countries with which he is most familiar receive the most attention. It also would have given him a focus for this rambling epic which sometimes seems like soup—too many random facts and observations which don't fit into his story but were undoubtedly part of his experience.

The book lacks the historical perspective of Martin Meredith's *The First Dance of Freedom*, the personal warmth of David Lamb's *The Africans*, and the exquisite anger and piercing observations of the much-overlooked *Fantastic Invasion* by Patrick Marnham. Each of these books was much narrower in scope than Ungar's, and each provided greater insights into a somewhat narrower field.

I do not mean to detract from what is otherwise a tremendous achievement in scope. Ungar's book is really a chronicle of recent history. He focuses on the last five to seven years with some good historical background for support. As a quick portrait of contemporary Africa, it is excellent. As a repository of historical, economic, and sociological information, it is unsurpassed. In the final analysis, the book is essential reading for anyone with an interest in international affairs and politics who feels shaky about Africa and its modern history and who plans on reading other books to answer the questions that Ungar raises but never answers.

—Michael Maren

The Mythology of Nation-building

John Obert Voll and Sarah Potts Voll, *The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multicultural State*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985, 159 pp., $28.00.

Sudan has become a land of slogans. Long referred to as a "bridge between Africa and the Arab World," and more recently as a "melting pot," it was for a time in the 1970s called the potential "breadbasket of the Middle East." After the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement that ended the Sudanese civil war, the notion of "unity in diversity" became popular, expressing as it does the country's varied ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious composition.

That slogan is both a theme and a framework for John Obert Voll's and Sarah Potts Voll's *The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multicultural State*. Although the theme is somewhat exaggerated (and asserted much too repetitively), it is a convenient starting point for the general introduction to Sudan that this book attempts to provide.

The contents of the book may be briefly summarized. A chapter entitled "The Basic Profile: Unity in Diversity" describes the land and the people, while another, "The Heritage of the Past," is an historical overview from neolithic times to the end of the Mahdia. "[The] Sudan in the twentieth century," concludes the historical summary, and chapters on the economy, international relations, and "Culture and Identity" complete the book. Suggestions for further reading are appended.

The difficulty in defining a Sudanese identity has been that, having surveyed the country's enormous human variety, one is left to conclude only that a Sudanese is one who says he is Sudanese. Perhaps that is enough. But to detect even in neolithic times, as the authors do, "the Sudanese characteristic of developing a distinctive local synthesis of varied elements" (p. 27) seems an over-strenuous exercise in the mythology of nation-building. The same diversities and essential unity may be said to exist within the boundaries of most African states, and indeed, in Africa as a whole. There is nothing peculiarly Sudanese except the perception of *being* Sudanese.

In listing diversities, the authors emphasize geography, ethnicity, language, and religion, but they totally exclude consideration of class. In today's Sudan, diversities in wealth, availability of education and other public services, status and mobility, indeed access to political power, have become much more significant than they were in the past. In fact, to a great extent, the obvious cultural variations have obscured (and have been used to obscure) a growing differentiation between the interests of the elite and those of the great impoverished mass of the people. To many articulate Sudanese, this dichotomy has emerged as the central issue, proving at least that the barriers to unity posed by socio-cultural differences have not proved insurmountable. The question remains as to whether those barriers will continue to fall or be perpetuated and even strengthened for economic advantage. To have recognized this issue as at least one of many deserving attention would have clarified what may otherwise seem a rather bewildering array of diversity.

Even on the socio-cultural level, "unity in diversity" may be too hurriedly adopted as a formula that ignores rather than diminishes real or potential divisions, for while it may be seen as a solution to a problem, it may as easily be viewed as a problem itself. This has become clear in the debate over Sudanese identity: Is it Arab, African, or, as the current vogue has it, Afro-Arab? The debate has reached no satisfying conclusion, in part because it too ignores the economic factor, implicitly accepting that uneven economic development is the result of geography, colonial policy, even possibly of racial or religious prejudice, but not of the deliberate economic self-interest of those who determine its course.

As an example, the record of social and economic development in southern Sudan since 1972 can be cited. In 1980-81, Sudan had 31 technical schools, one of which was in the south; of 220 health centers, the south had five. In 1980, there were 1,285 licensed heavy trucks in Sudan; seven of these were in the south. In 1981, the University of Khartoum admitted 1,860 students, a mere 17 of whom were from the south. While such statistics do not tell a complete story, they do reveal a pattern of neglect. The question is whether the familiar reasons adduced for that neglect are fundamental. Can we not rather discern the simple exercise of economic power? How long can a state be united in the face of such glaring economic diversity?

Some of the factual assertions and conclusions of *The Sudan* may also be questioned. The date given for the birth of the Mahdi (p. 40) is not the one usually accepted; General Gordon was not "Sir Charles Gordon" (p. 41); that "The *proportion* [emphasis added] of the Sudanese population with a modern education grew significantly during the interwar period" (p. 58) is questionable unless one provides reliable population figures to support the contention, and these do not exist; and that the Mahdist State was a "national state" depends on a definition of terms. The relative significance of Sudanese art as a unifying factor may also have been misjudged (pp. 156, 158).

It would be wrong to exaggerate the importance of such matters of fact and interpretation in what is meant to be an introduction for non-specialists. Several omissions are more serious. Had the book gone to press later, the disastrous famine now afflicting Sudan would doubtless have been treated, as would the overthrow of President Nimeiry in April 1985. But the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (mis-named in this book) should have received more than one general paragraph (p. 91), while the American role in supporting the Nimeiry regime was not addressed at all.

The Sudan may adopt too optimistic a tone in dealing with that country's multiple problems. Like so many others, the authors clearly have a high regard for the Sudanese and wish them well. In introducing the country to a general audience at a time when Sudan is so much in the news, they perform a useful service. But the severest test for Sudan's unity may still be in the future. While people of good will hope for the best, diversity, whether of political opinion or economic power, or culture or identity, bears within it seeds of unknown potential.

—M.W. Daly
Arkansas State University

Books Received

(Inclusion in this list does not preclude the review of a book at a later date.)

Arhem, Kaj. *Pastoral Man in the Garden of Eden: The Maasai of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Tanzania.* Uppsala, Sweden: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1985, 110pp.

Bender, Gerald J.; Coleman, James S.; and Sklar, Richard L. (eds.) *African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy.* Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1985, 339pp., $40.00 cloth, $9.95 paper.

Bingen, R. James. *Food Production and Rural Development in the Sahel: Lessons from Mali's Operation Riz-Segou.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985, 123pp., $18.50.

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Letters

To the Editor:

Mass flows of refugees streaming from Ethiopia to seek sanctuary in neighboring countries have long been a sad feature of the northeast African scene. The sacrifices made by, among others, the Somali people have been on such a scale that even our nation's development program has on occasions been jeopardized. It is distressing, therefore, to read the inaccuracies and snide comments carried in the September-October 1985 issue of *Africa Report* (under the title "Somalia: Doctoring the figures," page 46).

It is not a Somali government "claim," for instance, that there is cholera among the refugees—it is a tragic *fact*. Nor has any attempt been made to "obfuscate" it, as even your own report makes clear. My government has never "ignored" any refugee flows or settlement camps. To state otherwise, is a complete falsehood. The camp at Ganed is specifically mentioned: Far from being "ignored," Ganed was, for example, made subject of a long and frank article in issue 411 of *Heegan*, the weekly English publication of the Ministry of Information in Mogadishu, on June 28, 1985.

The high death rates and the cholera are related to the persecution and suffering which has been inflicted on the unfortunate refugees—which was responsible for their flight in the first place—and to their dangerously low caloric intake which is caused not only by reducing UNHCR relief, but by the late or non-arrival even of the food aid that has been pledged.

Far from concealing these factors, my government has never shirked its responsibility to bring the sad plight of the refugees, and its root causes, to the attention of the wider world. Last year, for example, the General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously noted, at my request, "serious shortfalls. . . which have resulted in critical ration restrictions and extreme hardship in refugee camps in Somalia." The General Assembly consequently appealed to all to "fulfill the pledges. . . as a matter of urgency." (A/C.3/39/L.32 of November 14, 1984).

The announcement by the National Refugee Commissioner in Mogadishu, on May 12, 1985, that 150,000 refugees from Ethiopia had entered Somalia as of that date, was not questioned by the United Nations High Commissioner's local office. Indeed, the figure was also published in the news section of the July issue of *Refugees*, published by the UNHCR in Geneva. On the other hand, it may well be that my government makes "no mention" of refugees leaving camps. There could be two reasons: Firstly, our camps are not, after all, prisons, so such statistics are hard to come by, and secondly, what is the possible point of so doing, when—whatever the exact refugee population statistic might be at a given time—it is indisputable that there has long been insufficient food for all those who are there—hence also the disease and mortality which you, rightly, deplore.

In conclusion, may I reassure your readers—many of whom I am sure have been individually generous to refugee causes—that all Somalis pray for the day when every refugee can return to his or her home in dignity and peace.

Abdillahi Said Osman
Ambassador & Permanent
Representative of the
Somali Democratic Republic
to the United Nations

To the Editor:
Africa Report replies:

"Update" did not suggest that it was a Somali government "claim" that there is cholera among refugees. We wrote that "the epidemic in northwestern Somalia had claimed more than 1,000 lives among famine victims."

Nowhere did the article imply that the Somali government was "concealing" the hardships of refugees in the camps, but rather that international aid agencies and Western governments had expressed skepticism over the years concerning government figures on the actual number of refugees in the camps.

The "inaccuracies" that you challenge in your letter were well-documented in several articles on this issue appearing in other publications, including the following, which provided some of the basic information for our article: *The Times* (London), April 2, 1985; *The Washington Post*, July 5, 1985; and the Nigerian *Concord Weekly*, June 13, 1985.

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

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Music and dance were the first African arts to attract the attention of travelers and historians. A shield from ancient Greece depicts an African trumpet player. African sculpture was not appreciated until the end of the 19th century.

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By the way, if you like hotels with air conditioning and swimming pools, you will find a hotel to your liking in virtually every West African capital city.

Masks & martinis.

The Cross of Agadez, one of the most famous silver jewelry designs in all of Africa, is worn by the Tuareg people of the south Sahara desert in Niger.



The Bateke people of the Republic of the Congo have a tradition where, upon the birth of a boy child, a statue is carved by a talented villager. The purpose of this statue is to protect the boy until he reaches puberty. Although the quality of these statues is very inconsistent, the best of them are worthy of a place among the great works of African art.

Ancestors appear frequently in the sculpture of the West African people. This emphasis reflects a basic fact about the nature of African existence, that is that each African is what he is and has what he has as a member of a family, i.e., the descendant of an ancestor. It is this ancestor sculpture that so amazed European cubists at the beginning of this century.

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