Chapter 5
Consciousness and its Place in Nature
David J. Chalmers,
David J. Chalmers
Search for more papers by this authorDavid J. Chalmers,
David J. Chalmers
Search for more papers by this authorBook Editor(s):Stephen P. Stich,
Ted A. Warfield,
Stephen P. Stich
Search for more papers by this authorTed A. Warfield
Search for more papers by this authorSummary
This chapter contains sections titled:
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Introduction1
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The Problem
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Arguments Against Materialism
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Type-A Materialism
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Type-B Materialism15
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The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Type-B Materialism
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Type-C Materialism
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Interlude
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Type-D Dualism
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Type-E Dualism
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Type-F Monism
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Conclusions
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