

UFOs - Documenting The Evidence

Don't Just Believe Me, But Do Look At The Evidence. By Paul Dean. Contact: pj_dean@hotmail.com

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"Foreign Aerospace Threats", "Emerging and Disruptive Technologies", "Potential Capabilities", "Technological Surprise".....

AAWSAP and AATIP Dwarfed by the Air Force's Massive National Air and Space Intelligence Center

For over a year, the so-called "UFO community", and the wider population in general, has been consuming a constant diet of frequently startling information regarding a 2007 to 2013 partnership of American military intelligence programs that were largely based at America's Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). Managed first by a James T. Lacatski, and then by a Luis Elizondo, the larger, more formal of the two was known as the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program (AAWSAP). The smaller, less solidified program was known as the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program (AATIP). These efforts, from what we know thus far, analysed unexpected aerospace threats, breakthrough physics, associated foreign developments, and even the possible application and use of next generation principles in America's military apparatus. Also studied, at least within AATIP, was the issue of Unidentified Flying Objects (UFO). In fact, the more we find out about the entire AAWSAP/AATIP affair, the more it seems that the study of the core UFO phenomena very much overlapped with the investigation of these foreign aerospace developments, emerging technologies, and cutting-edge physics. For the purposes of this piece, it is paramount that we look at some of the precise wording contained in the available information on the AAWSAP/AATIP saga.

An 18th of August, 2008, DIA solicitation for tenders regarding work on AAWSAP included this passage in Attachment One:

"One aspect of the future threat environment involves advanced aerospace weapon system applications. The objective of this program is to understand the physics and engineering of these applications as they apply to the foreign threat out to the far term, i.e., from now through the year 2050. Primary focus is on breakthrough technologies and applications that create discontinuities in currently evolving technology trends. The focus is not on extrapolations of current aerospace technology. The proposal shall describe a technical approach which discusses how the breakthrough technologies and applications listed below would be studied and include proposed key personnel that have experience in those areas."

Just over a year later, a letter from Senator Reid, dated the 24th of June, 2009, which was sent to the Deputy Secretary of Defence, stated:

"Beginning this past September [2008], the US Senate has mandated the Defense Intelligence Agency assess far-term foreign advanced aerospace threats to the United States... ..In order to further our efforts in recognising emerging disruptive aerospace technologies..."

In May, 2018, Swedish researcher Roger Glassel engaged in a series of email communications with Major Audricia Harris who was based at the DoD Headquarters in Washington DC. On the 3rd of

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May, Glassel received an email from Major Harris which confirmed the existence of the AATIP effort, and, presumably referencing some of the aforementioned Senator Reid letter, further stated that AATIP's mandate was to:

"...assess 'far-term foreign advanced aerospace threats the United States', including anomalous events (such as sightings of aerodynamic vehicles engaged in extreme manoeuvres, with unique phenomenology, reported by U.S. Navy pilots or other credible sources)..."

During a "To The Stars Academy" (TTSA) press conference, dated the 11th of October, 2017, Elizondo stated:

"However, by far the most interesting effort I was involved with was the topic of advanced aerial threats. For nearly the last decade, I ran a sensitive aerospace threat identification program focusing on unidentified aerial technologies".

Obviously, some commentators keenly noted that much of the available information regarding AAWSAP/AATIP has centred around the aforementioned subjects of "far-term aerospace threats", "breakthrough technologies", "threat identification", and "emerging" or "disruptive" foreign aerospace developments. These tantalising phraseologies aren't just repeated loosely or occasionally. There is consistency and purpose to much of what has been released. Moreover, some critics have effectively proclaimed that it should be no surprise whatsoever that someone, somewhere, in America's military-intelligence community would be looking into foreign or threatening aerospace developments, or emerging aerospace technologies. This is entirely true, but the notion that such investigations could be solely handled by just one single under-resourced person, who in this case was DIA employee and AAWSAP/AATIP manager Luis Elizondo, is of course preposterous. Even with outside contractual assistance, the workload would be insurmountable.

Students of the UFO topic are well aware that the United States Air Force's (USAF) old UFO investigation programs, like Project Sign and Project Blue Book, were largely placed within the old Air Technical Intelligence Center (ATIC), and its successor, the Foreign Technology Division (FTD). Based at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, these entities served as the USAF's focal point for technology development and technical intelligence. Importantly, this included the assessment of foreign aerospace systems and the exploitation of foreign hardware. In other words, the UFO problem was being handled at precisely the same location as where ever more advanced military technology was being developed, and where breakthroughs were being made on foreign capabilities. This organisation, after numerous name changes, exists today as the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC). Knowing already that some of NASIC's core mission seemed like that of a portion of what AAWSAP/AATIP apparently did, I wanted, at first, to demonstrate that NASIC may have been doing what AAWSAP/AATIP did, albeit on a much larger scale. Further, when I began reviewing official documentation and other reasonable sources of information, it became evident that AAWSAP/AATIP and Elizondo frequently use identical language to that of NASIC and its recent predecessors.



NASIC, like its predecessors, is based at Wright-Patterson AFB, and serves as one of America's premier intelligence organisations. According to the "AboutUs" section of NASIC's website, the organisation is the Defence Department's "...primary source for foreign air and space threats..."

information. Further, NASIC creates “...integrated, predictive intelligence in the air, space and cyberspace domains enabling military operations, force modernizations and policymaking...”. With over three thousand staff, NASIC’s mission ensures that “...the nation is at the cutting edge of understanding foreign threats to US air and space operations...”, and their “...all-source analysts are national experts on threats that span air, space, and cyberspace domains...”. Quoting from a July, 2017, booklet, titled “*NASIC: An Overview*”, which was published by their Public Affairs office, NASIC’s responsibilities include the generation of “classified intelligence products” to assist the US military in “...evolving with, and combatting, future air and space threats...”. Further, a 2014-era USAF “Order of Battle” volume, titled “*USAF/AFHRA Order of Battle: National Air and Space Intelligence Center*”, states that NASIC “...aids in shaping national and defense policy...” and plays “...a key role in ensuring that US forces avoid technological surprise...”.

NASIC is currently and directly assigned to the USAF’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AS/A2). Earlier, from June, 2007, to September 2014, NASIC was assigned to the USAF’s Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency (AFISRA). NASIC’s contemporary organisational structure comprises of four “Intelligence Analysis Groups”. Currently, these are the Air and Cyberspace Intelligence Group, the Geospatial and Signatures Intelligence Group, the Global Exploitation Intelligence Group, and the Space, Missiles and Forces Intelligence Group. Subordinate to these four groups are a total of eighteen squadrons, the exact and current make-up of which I am yet to finally ascertain. Moreover, this organisational configuration is supported by four Directorates. These are the Communications and Information Directorate, the Human Resources Directorate, the Logistics Directorate, and the Plans and Programs Directorate. Finally, NASIC also oversees the Civil Aviation Intelligence Analysis Center, though this center is now physically located at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling in Washington DC.

As mentioned, an official, current and detailed overview of NASIC’s internal structure is yet to be provided to me formally. A similarly detailed description of their current and varied missions has likewise been difficult to obtain. NASIC does, however, provide a *general* summary of its varied missions across the organisation. This information can be found in the “*About Us*” section of the NASIC website, and there are certainly several items of interest. The first mission of note is that of “Air and Counterair”, which aims to “...assess the capabilities of foreign aircraft, air-launched weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles and the likelihood of their employment against US forces...”. The second mission worth highlighting is “Space and Counterspace” which, amongst other things, develops “...integrated, all-source space and counterspace threat assessment and provide detailed understanding of foreign threats...”. The third mission of note is “Disruptive Technologies” which assesses “...emerging technologies that could potentially be used in an air, space and/or cyberspace warfighting capacity...” against America. A fourth mission is that of “Ballistic Missiles”. Here, NASIC assesses “...land-based foreign ballistic missile systems with a range of 1000 km and greater, their subsystems, operational capabilities, effectiveness, proliferation, and technology transfer...”. Evidently, it should be obvious where these missions are likely placed within NASIC’s group structure. For instance, the “Ballistic Missile” mission is likely handled by the Space, Missiles and Forces Intelligence Group. Nevertheless, a detailed breakdown of the entire NASIC organisational diagram, with a focus on the individual squadrons, and, especially, their mission focused activities, is sorely needed to precisely grasp what NASIC is doing. There are, nevertheless, other sources of information which are invaluable to this piece.

For example, it appears that some, if not all, of NASIC’s squadrons are further broken into small “Flight” units. The Space, Missiles and Forces Intelligence Group contains the intriguingly titled Future Threats Analysis Squadron. One of the Flights that make up this squadron is designated the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Flight. This comes to us from an SRI International science conference, which was held California in March, 2018. Headlined as “*Bio-Convergence and the Soldier 2050*”, the event listed two speakers who came from the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Flight. One of the speakers was titled as a “Disruptive Technology Biological Materials Analyst”, and the other was titled as a “Disruptive Technology Information Science Analyst”.

Back in November, 2011, a US General Services Administration “*Performance Work Statement, Solicitation 5TP57110034*”, which related to externally-contracted technical support for certain NASIC squadrons, stated that the “...increasing complexity and sophistication of foreign space threat systems, coupled with an uncertain and rapidly changing threat environment...” were placing “serious demands” on NASIC’s personnel. Further, the document states that some highly classified NASIC projects can include:

“...analyses of emerging threats based on new physical principles, special intelligence collection programs, and highly sensitive planning, operations, and/or acquisition programs...”.

Further, for contacted work to be completed, firms were to have "...a sufficient number of Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) cleared personnel..."

Aside from NASIC's traditional group-and-squadron structure, there are other internal entities which may be central to this discussion. An article in *"The Asia Times"*, dated the 9th of July, 2009, and titled *"Mixed Signals Over Chinese Missiles"*, quoted a series of statements made to a Congressional sub-committee by General Claude Robert Kehler, USAF, who was Commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) at the time. In his testimony, General Kehler mentioned a NASIC entity known as the Defence Intelligence Space Threat Committee which was "...established to oversee and coordinate a wide variety of complex space/counterspace analytical activities...". This committee still exists today as the Defence Intelligence Space Threats and Operations Committee.

Researcher Jeffrey T. Richelson, in the seventh edition of his book *"The US Intelligence Community"*, found that NASIC's Global Exploitation Intelligence Group consisted, in 2016, of three squadrons. One of those was the Foreign Material Squadron which "...analyses foreign aerospace systems or systems components that the United States has acquired or obtained access to...". This citation comes directly from an October, 2013, organisational chart, titled *"Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency: ISR Organizational Chart"*. In fairness, this shouldn't be a surprise. NASIC's predecessors were often the recipient of so-called "Moon Dust" items which had been secured, and further transported to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, from all over the globe. As per an Air Force Chief of Staff for Intelligence (AFCIN) draft letter, dated the 3rd of November, 1961, often cited as the "Colonel Betz Letter", these "Moon Dust" objects were designated as any "... unidentified flying objects, or known Soviet/Bloc aerospace vehicles, weapons systems, and/or residual components of such equipment..." which the USAF felt worthy of squirrelling back to Wright-Patterson AFB. This effort involved highly trained field agents from a small unit which traces its lineage back to the old Air Defence Command's (ADC) 4602nd Air Intelligence Service Squadron (4602nd AISS) in the 1950's. The unit last *known* to be responsible for special "Moon Dust collections activity" was the Air Force Special Activities Center (AFSAC) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. AFSAC was stood down in 1991, and beyond that time the trail goes cold. Recent investigations by myself, however, indicate that AFSAC's "Moon Dust" collection activities were absorbed by the 696th Intelligence Group by 1992, and, further, were overtaken by the 67th Operations Support Squadron in 1995.

The issue of clandestinely obtained aerospace hardware is raised in a rather stunning [article](#) published in *"Airman Magazine"* and presented on NASIC's website on the 21st of November, 2016. Written by Technical Sergeant Brandon Shapiro, USAF, the piece was simply titled *"Acquire, Assess, Exploit"*. The article tells a seemingly hypothetical yarn of gun-carrying "covert agents" who purchase an "advanced aeronautical component" from a shadowy foreigner in the dead of night. Apparently, however, there is nothing fanciful about it. The author categorically states that NASIC and its predecessors "...have procured intelligence on foreign air and space forces..." for decades. The article goes on to say that:

"...obtaining data or equipment is integral to assessing a potential foe's true capabilities and defining their future intentions. The mission's goal is to assure that United States forces avoid technological surprise and can counter existing and evolving foreign air and space threats..."

Further stated is that the military's "...most qualified, knowledgeable and tech savvy sleuths..." begin the work of analysing and "reverse engineering" these goldmines of foreign technology, in some of the "...most heavily fortified, controlled, and monitored facilities in the military...". The rest of the article drifts off into what it takes to be a NASIC scientist, and then gives a general overview of NASIC's proud history.

By now, it should be apparent that some of what AATIP/AAWSAP did was the similar to what modern day NASIC does. Despite not having detailed mission overviews, or a breakdown of specific programs, NASIC is clearly involved in the study of "advanced aerospace" regimes which originate from outside the American theatre. Isn't this at least close to, if not identical, as what some of AATIP/AAWSAP studied? A key NASIC responsibility is to understand "foreign threats", and long-term ones at that. Again, we've seen *exactly* the same language from AAWSAP/AATIP. As I have carefully outlined, key NASIC missions include the examination of "foreign aircraft", "unmanned aerial vehicles", "emerging technologies", "disruptive technologies" and "aerospace threats". NASIC's squadrons systematically analyse "emerging threats" based on "new physical principles", and their personnel work to ensure the America avoids "technological surprise". All these phrases are *precisely* what the AAWSAP/AATIP effort seems to be, at least in part, about. Even the *names* of some of NASIC's units, like the Future Threats Analysis Squadron, and the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Flight are a near-exact match to certain AAWSAP/AATIP phraseology. Of course, none of this is to imply that far-off future threats and ultra-advanced aerospace developments are *all* NASIC

does. In fact, their mission and budget allows for a huge array of products and developments. Obviously, though, we're only curious about anything that lines up with AAWSAP/AATIP, and even UFO's.

As for the records that NASIC actually produces, one can only imagine. This is an area I have only just started working on, and my aim is to submit numerous Freedom of Information (FOI) requests on top of those already sent. When attempting to narrow down the categories of records held at any particular agency, I often start with its official "doctrine". Doctrine includes "Instructions", "Directives", "Handbooks", "Regulations" and the like. Regarding NASIC publications, a reasonable item to highlight is a USAF Handbook, titled *"Air Force Handbook, 14-133, (Intelligence) Intelligence Analysis"* (AFH 14-133). It was published on the 27th of September, 2017, outlines the types of "products" that the USAF's Office of the Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AF-ISR) requires from their subordinate agencies, of which NASIC is one. Of the several categories of documents listed, the most auspicious are *"Intelligence Assessments"* and *"Threat Studies"*. AFH 14-133 describes an *"Intelligence Assessment"* as a "...Strategic, longer-term, analytical publication; focused on future capabilities and intentions; usually broad in military and/or political scope..." A *"Threat Study"* is described as a "...Longer-term analysis that is more narrowly scoped than an assessment; usually focused on a threat system or category of threat systems; generally strategic or operational in scope...". Another document which briefly lays out what NASIC produces is the aforementioned USAF's 2014 "Order of Battle" volume, entitled *"USAF/AFHRA Order of Battle: National Air and Space Intelligence Center"*. It states that NASIC's intelligence products "range from one or two page executive summaries to multiple volumes in comprehensive studies, and from briefings and presentations to innovative video simulations".

In composing this piece, I wanted to appraise how NASIC was structured both today and a decade ago. In 2008, NASIC was, like today, comprised of four intelligence groups. Subordinate to them were seventeen squadrons, which is one less than the eighteen that exist today. A USAF "Fact Sheet", published on the 22nd of November, 2008, with the title *"US Air Force, Fact Sheet, 'National Air and Space Intelligence Center' September, 2008"*, offers the names of the intelligence groups and their respective squadrons. This information is backed up by an [article](#) dated the 23rd of April, 2008, titled *"NASIC Holds Group and Squadron Activation"*. The piece was written by the 88th Air Base Wing (88ABW), at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, for the Public Affairs Office of the 25th Air Force (25AF). NASIC's four intelligence groups were the Air and Cyberspace Analysis Group, the Space and Missiles Analysis Group, the Global Threat Analysis Group, and the Data Analysis Group. Listing all seventeen subordinate squadrons is unnecessary as many of them appear irrelevant to my discussion. Some, however, are clearly notable, as we shall see.

The Air and Cyberspace Analysis Group, for example, contained the Aircraft Analysis Squadron, the Engineering Analysis Squadron, and the Integrated Air Defence Analysis Squadron. The Space and Missiles Analysis Group contained the Ballistic Missile Analysis Squadron, the Counterspace Analysis Squadron, the Space Analysis Squadron, and the Special Analysis Squadron. Again, any one of these squadrons could have been doing advanced air and space threat analysis with a focus on the long-term future. The Global Threat Analysis Group contained the Future Threats Analysis Squadron. With a squadron designation containing *only* the terms "future", "threats" and "analysis", one is bound to ask what sort of projects were undertaken here. Finally, the Data Analysis Group had under it the Foreign Material Exploitation Squadron. This is the same unit as the current Foreign Material Squadron, which duly analyses "foreign aerospace" hardware, as noted by Jeffrey T. Richelson as late as 2016.

The NASIC we see today was formed on the 15th of February, 2003. Beforehand, the organisation was the National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC). A USAF Public Affairs "Fact Sheet", titled *"US Air Force, Fact Sheet 95-10, 'Air Intelligence Agency', September, 1995"*, details what was then the recent history of NAIC in considerable detail. NAIC was created on the 1st of October, 1993, when the Foreign Aerospace Science and Technology Center (FASTC) was merged with the USAF's 480th Intelligence Group (480th IG). Also, the new NAIC entity fell under the direct command of the old Air Intelligence Agency (AIA). The AIA was assigned to Air Combat Command (ACC) at the time. Soon afterwards, on the 7th of July, 1994, the 497th Intelligence Group's (497th IG) Directorate of Assessments, which "...produced a variety of general intelligence products...", was integrated into the new NAIC structure. Regarding NAIC's mission, a USAF Handbook, titled *"Weapon Systems Intelligence Integration (WSII) Handbook"*, which was promulgated in June, 1999, stated that NAIC was "...the Air Force's General Military Intelligence (GMI) and Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&TI) production center...". Jeffrey T. Richelson, in the fourth edition of his book *"The US Intelligence Community"*, quoted extensively from an official NAIC Public Affairs pamphlet titled *"National Air Intelligence Center Pamphlet 38-101, NAIC: Mission and Organization"* (NAICP 38-101) which was published on the 8th of March, 1996. Specifically, NAIC:

"...acquires, processes, analyses, and integrates intelligence data and information on foreign weapons systems, subsystems, technologies and forces into products and services required to support the

NAIC Commander, and selected external intelligence community customers..."

An undated history of NAIC, which was published by a USAF intelligence and security veterans group called "Silent Warriors", states that NAIC played a key role in:

"...assuring that American forces avoid technological surprise and can counter the foreign air and space threat. NAIC and constituent units provide Center customers a broad range of integrated, tailored assessments and information operations products and services..."

As for NAIC's organizational structure, Richelson further found that, by 1995, there existed seven Directorates, and, as previously stated, the 480th IG. Other internal entities included a Representative to the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Office of the Chief Scientist. NAIC's seven Directorates were the Directorate of Data Exploitation, the Directorate of Global Threats, the Directorate of Intelligence Analysis, the Directorate of Mission Support, the Directorate of Production Operations, the Directorate of Communications and Information, and the Directorate of Technical Assessments. Further, each Directorate contained several Divisions. The Directorate of Data Exploitation, for example, contained four Divisions. Of these, the Programs, Requirements and Foreign Material Division is surely of interest. The Directorate of Global Threat, which produced "complete threat assessments" and "tailored intelligence assessments", contained six Divisions. The most curious, in my opinion, were the Acquisition Division and the Air Capabilities Division. The Directorate of Technical Assessments, which produced intelligence products on "...foreign offensive aerospace systems, foreign space systems, foreign technology development, and electromagnetic systems developments...", contained Divisions like the Aerodynamic Systems Division and the curiously titled Advanced Programs Division. The Directorate of Intelligence Analysis, with Divisions such as the Global Analysis Division and the Special Projects Division, was "...responsible for providing substantive military, political, scientific and technical intelligence support..." to top echelon customers including the Secretary of the USAF (SECAF) and the Chief of the Staff of the USAF (CSAF). None of the other four NAIC-era Directorates, nor any of their Divisions, appear to be of importance to this conversation, so I have chosen not to elaborate on them.

Going further back still, the same picture emerges. A full treatment of ever older mission statements and internal structuring will unlikely aid us regarding AAWSAP/AATIP. Briefly, however, NAIC was previously known as the Foreign Aerospace Science and Technology Center (FASTC) which was organised under the old Air Force Intelligence Command (AFIC) as of the 1st of January, 1992. An undated USAF Information Office "Fact Sheet", titled *"Air Force Intelligence Command: Fact Sheet"*, states that FASTC was the "...focal point for the scientific and technical intelligence mission..." of the USAF. Further, FASTC published "...studies on current aerospace capabilities and potential threats posed by possible adversaries..." which included everything from aircraft and missiles to "directed energy weapons" and "new technological advances". FASTC was short-lived, and was borne of the Air Force Foreign Technology Center (AFFTC). During a huge USAF command shake-up, AFFTC was inaugurated on the 1st of October, 1991, and, like FASTC, was placed under the command of old AFIC. Before this turbulent period, right back to July, 1961, it was known as the Foreign Technology Division (FTD), and was located within the huge Air Force Systems Command (AFSC). No matter how far we go back, it is clear that organisation has been at the cutting edge of future military technology development, foreign aerospace capabilities assessment, and scientific and technical intelligence.

I haven't found any direct evidence that the modern day NASIC, or the former NAIC and FASTC, have investigated or otherwise dealt with the core UFO phenomena. However, if we go back to a period of 1970 to the very early 1990's, there are a few tantalising examples where the UFO issue, and other very peculiar aerospace issues, came up. It's worth mentioning here that I'm not raising the fact that the USAF's last major UFO study, Project Blue Book, was placed within the FTD in the 1960's. I'm aiming here to look well beyond that era to a time when the USAF supposedly relinquished any interest in the UFO problem.

In the 1990's the UFO community latched on to the curious term "Fast Walker". Firstly, enthusiasts claim that "Fast Walkers" are alien spacecraft which are detected in space by American reconnaissance satellites. Secondly, the USAF's Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) are the entities who are tasked with assessing "Fast Walker" events. Thirdly, the entire thing is apparently very highly classified, never to be revealed. In actual fact, some of these assertions are true. Indeed, "Fast Walker" is an official term for objects in space which have unexpectedly come into the imaging range of American Defence Support Program (DSP) satellites, and AFSPC and NORAD are at the receiving end of the data. The "Fast Walker" issue is indeed highly classified, with almost no documentation ever released in thirty years, and not hardly an official comment made about it. The part about "Fast Walkers" being other-worldly spacecraft, of course, is totally unsubstantiated.

On the other hand, some “Fast Walker” object trackings are apparently never solved. Jeffery T. Richelson, in his indispensable 1999 book, *“America’s Space Sentinels: The History Of The DSP And SBIRS Satellite Systems”*, states:


“...Most Fast Walkers have been routine observations of foreign spacecraft. The infrared readings obtained by DSP, resulting from the reflection of sunlight off the spacecraft, provided analysts at the CIA, DIA and Air Force Foreign Technology Division (now the National Air Intelligence Center) with data on spacecraft signatures and movements...”

Note that Richelson states “most” of these objects are observations of foreign spacecraft. What about the objects that aren’t? More importantly, Richelson specifically mentions that it is the FTD that analysed such data at the time, along with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DIA.

On June the 20th, 1989, Captain Richard P. Osedacz, USAF, published a thesis for the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) which discussed “Fast Walkers” at length. Carrying the title *“Orbit Determination of Sunlight Illuminated Objects Detected by Overhead Platforms”*, Captain Osedacz states that:


“...The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) tasked the Foreign Technology Division, Flight Performance Division (FTD/SQDF) to analyze these 15 to 30 minute data tracks and determine the element set, identifying the object...”

Thus it is established that the an area of the FTD called the Flight Performance Division was handling “Fast Walker” data for identification purposes. One can’t help but wonder what was discovered. The Introduction page of Captain Osedacz’s thesis, which mentions the FTD, is imaged below.




In the early 1980’s, the FTD was sourcing Chinese publications about UFO’s. The first item is *“The ‘UFO’ Of July 24, 1981: A Discussion With Comrade Zhang Zhousheng”*, and is cited as coming from *“Taimwen Aihaozhe, Nr. 9, September, 1982”*. The internal FTD reference number is “FTD-ID(RS)T-0231-83” and the date of FTD translation and production is the 11th of April, 1983. The “requestor” of the work is listed as “FTD/SDBS”. The piece highlights a mass witness aerial phenomena sighting that occurred on 24th July, 1981 over much of China. The publication essentially interviews Zhang Zhousheng, who was staffed at the Yunnan Astronomical Observatory at the time, and

Zhousheng goes into the dynamics of the event, the astronomical angle, and other matters. The case looks, to me, more like an out-of-control-missile test, but that's not the point. The FTD were evidently interested in this sighting, and, while not of high-level importance, it demonstrates that the line between UFO events and decidedly foreign aerospace systems is blurred. I have imaged the front cover of the FTD document below.



The next item is titled "First UFO Incident For Our Country", and is cited as coming from "Hangtian, Nr 4, 1982, pp. 12-13". The internal FTD reference number is "FTD-ID(RS)T-1019-83" and the date of FTD translation and production is the 9th of September, 1983. Again, the "requestor" of is listed as "FTD/SDBS". This short work also discusses the mass witness sighting of July, 1981, and offers numerous untenable solutions including spy planes, satellites, meteors, and even "flying saucers". Again, the FTD wanted this publication translated and filed, so someone was picking up on unidentified aerospace activity abroad. Imaged below is the front cover of the FTD document.



In a particularly unusual chain of events, the FTD apparently investigated a series of suspicious and wide-spread aerial phenomena off the coast of the former Soviet Union in late 1988. Robert Hopkins, a former USAF pilot, and author of the highly regarded non-fiction book *"The Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker: More Than Just A Tanker"*, was tasked with flying long-range intelligence gathering missions for the 24th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron (24th SRS), which was then subordinate to the 6th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing (6th SRW) in Alaska. The purpose of these flights was to collect telemetry intelligence (TELINT) and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) data from enemy ballistic missile test. Speaking to *"The Drive"*, Hopkins recounts how, on *two* separate occasions, he and his co-pilot "experienced something incredibly bizarre" while monitoring a provocative Soviet missile trial off the coast of the Kamchatka Peninsula. The events ostensibly drew "extreme interest" from America's intelligence community, including the FTD, and would become known as "Domes of Light".

According to Hopkins:

"As our crew prepared for the re-entry of the SS-20's three re-entry vehicles (RVs), we climbed to our prescribed collection altitude and began our timing track to ensure that the right side of the airplane, where all the sensors were located, was pointed toward the re-entry event to the west of our orbit... ..The stars were out that night and I don't recall any moonlight, so we anticipated a nice light show by the RVs as they re-entered the atmosphere. As with any 'take', or collection, there was a general buzz of excitement as the back-end crew verified that their sensors and recorders were fully operational and ready for what would be less than a minute of valuable intelligence. As we looked for traffic, we noticed what appeared to be a translucent, milky white wall moving from the left, over the USSR, to the right, toward the Northern Pacific Ocean. It covered the entire sky from ground level to as far up as we could see looking out the front windows of the airplane. It moved very quickly—far faster than crossing airplane traffic—and rapidly approached us. The wall of light passed across our flight path and then continued eastward, leaving the empty and dark night sky in its wake. Our programmed turn time arrived, and we began our bank to the left to collect on the RVs. Once we rolled out southbound the wall of light was no longer visible to the east.

After the mission, the other pilot and I discussed what we had seen and could offer no explanation. As we had both seen it, we concluded that it was not a hallucination and was likely some kind of auroral event neither of us had ever seen, despite their common presence at the high latitudes where we routinely operated. Interestingly enough, the same pilot and I saw the phenomenon again,

behaving in the same fashion and, coincidentally, also prior to the collection for an SS-20 launch. By this time there was official interest in this event, which had now acquired the name 'Dome Of Light'. This accurately described its appearance as a flash of light that began at the SS-20 launch site and then radiated outward in all directions at high speed. Guesses as to the velocity of the Dome of Light were determined by the time it took the SS-20 to travel from the launch site at either Drovyanaya or Kansk to Klyuchi. This yielded a back-of-the-envelope speed around 6,200 miles per hour!

Scientists at the Air Force's Foreign Technology Division (FTD) at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, could not explain the origin or purpose, if there was one, for the Dome Of Light. Some concluded it was caused by special fuel used in the first stage of the SS-20. Others argued that it was something external to the SS-20's propulsion system, or possibly a part of its transporter-erector-launcher or TEL, that provided an initial flash of light designed to temporarily blind American defence warning that detected foreign missile launches or a pulse that would interfere with incoming warheads. FTD placed the highest collection priority on SS-20 launches and even planned one mission over the Sea of Okhotsk to attempt collection from "behind" the dome as it passed by, but this produced no meaningful results."

No wonder the FTD was interested. The SS-20 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) was considered an especially effective and destabilising nuclear strike option for the USSR. Further, the very idea that the Soviets were trialling this "Dome of Light" system to hide the movement and launch of missiles would be of grave concern to all. Whatever the situation, the FTD put "the highest collection priority on SS-20 launches" and "even planned one mission over the Sea of Okhotsk to attempt collection from 'behind' the dome as it passed by". Ultimately, the FTD couldn't explain these "Dome of Light" events, but some had already decided that it was indeed part of a Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system to hide SS-20's. Volume 15, No. 7, of "The Executive Intelligence Review", which was published on the 12th of February, 1988, said that intelligence analysts had determined that the "Dome of Light" was "a temporary ABM effect, already tested, which could shield the launch of a first strike". I have imaged the relevant page below. This admission was nearly a year before Hopkin's and his crew would see the huge light phenomena themselves, so it was evidently something tangible. Whatever the situation, the Soviets were saying nothing, and very little has been discussed by anyone else.

need to remove the Pershing IIs if his doctrine is to be fully implemented.

Through new force alignments and operational changes, the Soviet Union is constructing a military which they believe to be capable of conducting strategic deep encirclement operations to occupy Western Europe in a new "lightning war. . . . As Chief of the General Staff, Ogarkov was responsible for developing and implementing the strategy, plans, organizational changes, and revisions of Soviet operational art. . . .

As the INF treaty currently stands, the Soviet Union does not sustain a parallel loss [to the Pershing IIs] in its deterrent capability. . . . The consequences of this situation is an asymmetry in intermediate range nuclear missiles exacerbated by the very significant asymmetry between NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces. . . . In such a situation, the NATO alliance is dangerously vulnerable from an objective military standpoint. Such vulnerability can be manipulated by the Soviet Union through psychological operations in order to neutralize Western Europe. . . . With Western Europe neutralized and Finlandized, the Soviet Union is able to devote its attention and power more fully to the confrontation with its "main enemy," the United States.

From the introduction by Gen. Bernard Rogers, who retired in June as NATO Supreme Commander in Europe.

First and foremost, I am concerned over the elimination of the PIs, the theater-based system that the Soviets fear most. . . . Secondly, elimination of the GLCMs [ground-launched cruise missiles] and PIs reduces the number of escalatory options available for use by the political authorities, should circumstances dictate. The total impact of losing these two key tools is that the credibility of NATO's deterrence is reduced in the Soviet mind, and the future of security of the West—including the U.S.—will be affected.

Another concern is that the potential agreement puts NATO on the slippery slope of denuclearization of Western Europe, which is what the Soviets want. Such denuclearization would make Western Europe safe for Warsaw Pact conventional aggression with no fear of nuclear escalation. More likely, however, in view of the imbalance in conventional forces, it would result in accelerating the achievement of the Soviet objective of neutralizing Western Europe without having to fire a shot.

The Soviets will be giving up only about 3 percent of their current nuclear warheads; almost all of the remaining 97 percent—thousands of warheads—can strike Western Europe if the Soviets wish. . . . And what is NATO giving up? The only theater weapons system, that, in the eyes of the Soviets, makes NATO's deterrent highly credible—the PI. . . .

My final concern is that NATO, following the apparent accelerated timetable of the United States, is about to sacrifice the long-term credibility of its deterrence on an altar of

short-term political expediency and image enhancement of some of its leaders. And all because of a 1981 proposal that close analysis over time has proven we should not have offered, especially if we did not expect, or want, the Soviets to accept it. Unfortunately, when the full adverse impact of this accord is felt, today's leaders and their governments will be long gone. And who will bear the brunt of this short-term approach? The people of NATO's nations, especially those in Western Europe."

From "Issue Three: Militarily Significant Advantages: Can the Soviet Union gain any militarily significant advantages by cheating on compliance with the treaty?"

The United States does not know how many SS-20s have been produced. Unclassified DIA estimates for years have assumed that the SS-20 force was close to and even over 1,000. Yet, the Soviets in the Memorandum of Understanding accompanying the INF Treaty have declared that they have only 650. . . . If U.S. intelligence

Soviets are already violating the treaty obligations, and we can assume they intend to cheat on a massive scale.

Moreover, the situation may be even worse. . . . Some intelligence analysts believe the Soviet SS-20 force could be as high as 2,250. . . .

There are at least three uses for a covert fleet of SS-20s [each of which] could have a tragic, catastrophic effect upon the United States and NATO. . . .

1. The Surprise Party: a sudden revelation of covert, massive, over-kill capability to force the United States and NATO to accept decisive geostrategic changes.
2. Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare: the MIRVed warhead is ideal for the strategic dispersal of chemical, bacteriological, and biological agents from a distance that would not contaminate Soviet troops.
3. The "Dome of Light": a temporary ABM effect, already tested, which could shield the launch of a first strike. . . .

The Ogarkov Doctrine relies heavily on military tactics that will achieve victory without engaging in nuclear war. Since the time of the great Soviet strategist Sokolovsky, Soviet war doctrine has included the concept that a nuclear war is winnable if the steps toward war are accomplished prudently and the strategic components are correctly analyzed. The Soviets consider the rejection of such analysis to be an irrational act. The fact that the West rejects such a concept completely is a critical element crucial to the doctrine of nuclear victory.

The Ogarkov Doctrine contemplates a situation in which the Western horror of nuclear war will be so great as to lead the West to permit wars to occur without escalating to the level of a nuclear holocaust. . . . From the Soviet point of view, such Western horror merely puts a ceiling on practical escalation, allowing wars to be won by superiority of forces below the ceiling.

66 National EIR February 12, 1988

Regarding UFO's, even if the FTD wanted to wash their hand of it, they couldn't. Just one year after Project Blue Book was officially terminated on the 30th of January, 1970, the FTD's Commander was still "stuck with the UFO problem". Dr. Jacques Vallee's classic "Forbidden Science - Volume Two" contains an interesting diary entry for the 28th of January, 1971. Discussed in this passage is the

outcome of a meeting Vallee had just had with the Dr. Josef Allen Hynek, who was, of course, the official astronomical consultant to the USAF for Project Blue Book. Vallee states:

“Allen also told me about his latest talk with Weinbrenner, the new commander at the Foreign Technology Division, who confessed to him after conferring with four–star general Brown that the Air Force was indeed still stuck with the UFO problem. Military sightings have started again.”

When Vallee penned this dairy entry, Colonel George Weinbrenner was indeed the new Chief of the FTD. As we know, the FTD was organisationally located within the USAF’s massive Air Force Systems Command (AFSC). At the time, the Commander of the AFSC was General George S. Brown. Beyond 1971, Gen. Brown would become the Chief of Staff of the USAF for a short time. Further, in July, 1974, he was appointed as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

In conclusion, AAWSAP/AATIP’s myriad catchphrases are emulated, sometimes *precisely*, in NASIC’s core vernacular. Currently, one could be forgiven for assuming that phraseology like “foreign aerospace threats”, “disruptive technologies”, “new physical principles”, “potential capabilities”, and “technological surprise” were all AAWSAP/AATIP terms. In fact, they are all NASIC references, and have been for a very long time. Indeed, NASIC contains *entire squadrons* seemingly dedicated to such efforts. What do we make of the Threats Analysis Squadron? Or its Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Flight? Even one of NASIC’s fundamental “missions” is that of “Disruptive Technologies”, and it’s aim is to assess “emerging technologies” in the air and space domain. One could argue that the terminology used by AAWSAP/AATIP and NASIC may *seem* to refer to the same sort of concepts, but in fact mean very different things. Does NASIC only have a vision of, say, ten years versus AAWSAP/AATIP’s forty years? Maybe, but the 18th of August, 2008, DIA solicitation for AAWSAP tenders stated “from now through the year 2050” in regard to understanding advanced applications, foreign threats and new physics. Having said that, the same document also states that AAWSAP’s focus “is not on extrapolations of current aerospace technology”, so how does one really know? Indeed, it’s difficult to verify anything at the moment. One thing is for certain: The line between AAWSAP/AATIP and NASIC may be very fuzzy. And the line between UFO’s and everything else going on here may be fuzzier still.

Posted by [Paul Dean](#) at [02:29](#) [No comments:](#)

Saturday, 25 August 2018

Bombshell Emerges: United States Air Force (USAF) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Investigated UFO Cases Years After Project Blue Book Closed

Up until the end of 1969, the United States Air Force (USAF) was the United States government’s focal point for the collection, evaluation, and investigation of UFO cases. Of three formal UFO projects, the longest running was Project Blue Book. Controversial from its beginning in 1952, the Blue Book effort was a frequent public relations nuisance for the USAF, and was hardly the technically competent outfit it should have been. On several occasions the USAF tried to shuffle the program elsewhere, or shut it down entirely. Finally, on the 17th of December, 1969, the Secretary of the USAF, Dr. Robert C. Seamans Jr., announced that Blue Book had finally concluded. The decision to close the project had been formalised in a memorandum to the USAF’s Chief of Staff, General John D. Ryan. This news was circulated by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence (OASD) in an “Immediate Release” Public Affairs statement. From that day forth, anyone who enquired with the USAF, or the Department of Defence (DOD) in general, would receive a short USAF–issued publication which reflected their final stance on the UFO’s matter. Over the years, this publication has come in several guises, including “Fact Sheet, Unidentified Flying Objects”, “UFO Fact Sheet”, and “Fact Sheet, Information on UFOs”. Despite slight differences in title and layout, the information contained within these publications has been more–or–less the same for nearly five decades.

I have chosen, for reasons that will become embarrassingly clear, two sections of text found in these well–worn “Fact Sheets”. The first states:

“On December 17, 1969, the Secretary of the Air Force announced the termination of Project Blue Book, the Air Force program for the investigation of UFOs. The decision to discontinue UFO

investigations was based on an evaluation of a report prepared by the University of Colorado entitled 'Scientific Study of Unidentified Flying Objects'; a review of the University of Colorado's report by the National Academy of Sciences; past UFO studies; and Air Force experience investigating UFO reports during the past two decades."

The second passage worth quoting claims:

"Since the termination of Project Blue Book, no evidence has been presented to indicate that further investigation of UFOs by the Air Force is warranted. In view of the considerable Air Force commitment of resources in the past and the extreme pressure on Air Force funds at this time, there is no likelihood of renewed Air Force involvement in this area."

These statements were supposed to be absolute. The USAF had made the "...decision to discontinue UFO investigations...". There is certainly no vagueness there. Equally unambiguous is that proclamation that "...no evidence has been presented to indicate that further investigation of UFOs by the Air Force is warranted...". Finally, though not utterly unequivocal I suppose, is an assertion that "...renewed Air Force involvement in this area..." was very unlikely.

Digging a bit deeper, there are two issues with the above-mentioned statements that seasoned researchers eventually discover. The first involves the question of *centralised* UFO case investigation. Some scholars of the UFO topic have argued that what the USAF actually *meant* to say was that there would be *no formal project* to systematically filter and investigate UFO reports. That line of reasoning would have ample merit if it wasn't for the numerous *other* statements made by the USAF. I possess, on file, literally dozens of 1970's and 1980's-era statements which specifically assert that UFO case investigation was being not undertaken *at all*, regardless of a Blue Book-like UFO project or not. Thus, the argument that the USAF intended to go on investigating UFO cases, just without a formal project focal point, is almost certainly wrong. Closely related to that issue is a second matter worth highlighting. It revolves around the *receiving* of UFO reports versus any further investigation efforts. It has been occasionally claimed that the USAF refused to *even accept* UFO reports after Blue Book closed. This assumption is entirely incorrect. I will briefly cover this issue in due course, but, the reality is that branches of the US military have maintained several reporting channels that can be, and have been, utilised for reporting UFO sightings, and, moreover, several of these channels have been designed *specifically* for UFO's. Thus, the *reporting* of UFO events after the conclusion of Project Blue Book is rarely in question. Rather, it's the formal *investigation* of UFO events that has been long denied. Simply put, there is a very big difference between UFO reporting and UFO case investigation.

My interpretation of the DOD's officially stated posture on UFO investigation can be exemplified in a pair of reply letters sent to researcher Robert G. Todd in early 1975. On the 27th of March, 1975, Lieutenant Colonel Huger G. Waite, who was assigned to the US Army's Office of the Chief of Information, Washington DC, told Todd that:

"The US Army does not investigate UFO reports, and as you probably know, the Air Force has terminated their project in this area. I have enclosed a fact sheet prepared by the Air Force which provides information regarding their discontinued involvement in Project Blue Book, code name for UFO sightings, and also where these records are now stored."

Unsatisfied with this answer, Todd pushed the matter further with Lt. Col. Waite in a forceful reply dated the 14th of April, 1975. A few weeks later, on the 8th of May, 1975, Lt. Col. Waite came back with more detailed answers to Todd's enquiries. Succinctly, he stated, in part:

"As to your request for information about 'reporting procedures' for UFO sightings and Army procedures for investigating UFO's, I assure you that no such procedures exist. The Army, the other services, and the Department of Defense, endorse the position taken by the Air Force described in the attached fact sheet. To the extent that formal investigation of alleged UFO sightings occurs, it is done by private organizations, not by the U.S. military services. I regret that the Army can be of no further assistance in this matter."

Lt. Col. Waite's statements in these letters cannot be any clearer. Neither the US Army, nor anyone else in the US military, were investigating UFO sightings in the 1970's. Unequivocally, he claimed that, "...the US Army does not investigate UFO reports...". Further, he says that, "...to the extent that formal investigation of alleged UFO sightings occurs, it is done by private organizations, not by the U.S. military services...". Lastly, he attempts to shut down the matter by tersely declaring, "...the Army can be of no further assistance in this matter.". These authoritative proclamations by the Army sound final, and, moreover, would have been difficult for researchers to argue with.

It has now emerged, however, that the USAF, with contribution from the Federal Aviation Administration, engaged in UFO case “investigation and findings” well after Project Blue Book closed. And that is what this piece is about.

Todd’s reason for engaging the Army in the first place can be explained by a series of events which had occurred two years earlier. During the early 1970’s, the Army was involved in numerous unsolved and startling UFO cases. The most renowned incident occurred on the night of the 18th of October, 1973, near Mansfield, Ohio. Often referred to as the “Coyne case”, the crew an 83rd Army Reserves Command helicopter was apparently buzzed by a large, elongated object during a training flight. Several pages of official Army records were released soon after the event. Barely two months prior, on the 8th of September, 1973, the 298th Military Police Company at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia, endured a close encounter with a large, unidentifiable object while on a routine security patrol. The local Provost Marshall’s Office at nearby Fort Stewart generated a “Serious Incident Report” (SIR) for Army Headquarters. There were other UFO cases involving the Army, most of which are almost entirely unknown, and I aim to highlight them in the future. No sooner had these intrusive, multi-witness sightings occurred than the Army had another problem to deal with. Researcher Robert G. Todd, of Ardmore, Pennsylvania, was the most prolific Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) user in the history of the UFO controversy. Todd’s tireless work has helped shape our understanding of governmental response to the UFO problem. Many of the thousands of pages of military records he obtained are only being analysed *now*. In February, 1975, Todd embarked on a dogged campaign of FOI requesting and general letter-writing correspondence with two dozen US Army entities. From the Pentagon, right down to Battalion-level units, everyone was forced to humour Todd’s demands for straight answers.

This mountain of correspondence included a series of back-and-forth letters with the US Army’s huge Army Aviation Center at Fort Rucker in Alabama. In the 1970’s, the facility was responsible for developing aviation doctrine and aircraft technology for the Army, and, moreover, it provided education and training to a large fraction of the Army’s core aviation and flight specialists. On the 17th of February, 1976, Todd had evidently posed a number of questions regarding Army policy on UFO’s, as well as enquiries regarding specific UFO cases. While we do not have a copy of Todd’s letter, we do have a copy of the Army Aviation Center’s *reply*. And a significant reply it was. Dated the 20th of February, 1976, and signed by the Center’s Deputy Public Affairs Officer, Herbert C. Strickland, Todd must have been rather taken aback by its candid and detailed admissions. Referencing Todd’s letter of the 17th of February, Strickland stated, in part:


“The agency responsible for the investigation of reports of Unidentified Flying Objects (UFO’s) is the Senior Aviation Service, the United States Air Force (USAF), as designated by the Department of Defense. The USAF coordinate their investigation and findings with the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA).

The responsibility of this installation for investigating aviation mishaps is limited to those accidents/incidents involving assigned aircraft which result in damage to property and injury or death of aircraft occupants. Investigations of aviation mishaps which do not involve damage, injury or death, such as the UFO incidents you mention, are the responsibility of the unit owning the aircraft involved. For that reason, your previous two queries were forwarded to the two military units involved in purported UFO incidents for direct response to you. In the case of UFO incidents, the USAF and FAA accomplish detailed follow-on investigations, if required.

Your question ‘Why was no investigation conducted in either case?’ should, therefore, be directed to the USAF or FAA.

As to your second question, ‘Is it official policy to ignore reports of UFO’s made by Army personnel?’, I can only advise you that if damage, injury or death occurred, such an accident/incident would be of major concern to safety investigators from the United States Army Agency for Aviation Safety (USAAVS) and would be investigated...”

Strickland’s letter continued into a second page and advised Todd to study the work of anti-UFO debunker Phillip J. Klass. Further, Strickland offered Todd brief guidance on approaching the applicable Judge Advocate General of any Army units that happen to be involved in a UFO event. I have imaged Strickland’s two-page letter below.



Quite simply, the contents of Herbert C. Strickland's letter are extraordinary. Firstly, it is revealed that the USAF is indeed the "agency responsible" for the "investigation" of UFO cases. This goes far beyond a situation where USAF entities had to begrudgingly accept the odd report. Secondly, we learn that "the USAF coordinate their investigation and findings with the Federal Aviation Authority

(FAA)...". Again, we see a clear reference to the "investigation" of UFO's by the USAF. The added twist, obviously, is that the USAF further "coordinate" their "investigation and findings" with the America's civil aviation authority, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA)! We then see additional clarification, in second paragraph of the letter, concerning the investigation of UFO events by the USAF and FAA. Confessed is the fact that "the USAF and FAA accomplish detailed follow-on investigations, if required". Thirdly, Strickland's letter also discusses the investigative obligations of the Army Aviation Center. Importantly, we learn that the handling of UFO cases is not part of their mission, and, rather, they only deal with serious aviation accidents and other grave mishaps "which result in damage to property and injury or death of aircraft occupants". However, Strickland does clearly state that UFO incidents involving Army aircraft "are the responsibility of the unit owning the aircraft involved".

Before going further, one passage of Strickland's letter caused me some initial confusion, and it worth clarifying this issue lest it causes readers any misunderstanding. Strickland mentions uses the phrase "Senior Aviation Service", and I first thought that this was an actual USAF controlled entity, such as a cell within a larger USAF agency, or a specific office within one of the USAF's many commands. However, I understand now that Strickland meant that the USAF *is* the "Senior Aviation Service", and its main aviation service of the DoD. Strickland perhaps could have written something like, "The agency responsible... ..is the Department of Defence's senior aviation service, which is the United States Air Force (USAF)". Whatever the exact wording, Strickland makes it quite clear that the USAF embarked on UFO case investigation, and the FAA followed closely.

These admissions utterly fly in the face of what the USAF, and other areas of the Department of Defence (DOD), were peddling after Project Blue Book ended in late 1969. Researchers have been asking the USAF, and the other branches of the Armed Forces, for information on UFO case investigation, as well as doctrinal policy regarding the UFO issue, for decades. Rarely has there been such candid and specific statements made on official letterhead. The DOD was, in the 1970's and onwards, mailing out their "Fact Sheet" on UFO's to anyone curious enough to ask. One passage of text, which I highlighted previously, begins with the statement, "the decision to discontinue UFO investigations...". This is nonsense, clearly. Another issue is the fact that the DOD, and especially the USAF, have ceaselessly encouraged researchers to simply review existing Project Blue Book files, plus the even older Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) records, as they were quickly becoming available at Maxwell Air Force Base. There has never been any mention of newer UFO investigation files from the 1970's or beyond, and this is an issue which needs urgent attention. In fact, there are *so many* issues here that one barely knows where to begin.

For starters, one is bound to ask where the Army Aviation Agency got their information, and why it was spelled out so clearly for Robert Todd, who was, after all, a civilian. In later correspondence with Herbert C. Strickland's office, Todd learned that the Army Aviation Center had received their information from a Col. Samuel P. Kalagian. Based also at Fort Rucker, Col. Kalagian was the Deputy Commander of the Army Aviation Safety Board. Upon ascertaining this connection, Todd further discovered that Col. Kalagian had communicated, at some length, with the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force (OSAF) regarding the UFO issue. I will further detail these threads of correspondence in future reports, but it's fair to say that Strickland's letter to Todd was accurate and well informed. Why the OSAF was so candid with Col. Kalagian, who was subsequently just as candid with the Army Aviation Center and Strickland, is unknown. Most likely, the OSAF didn't realise that Col. Kalagian's enquiry was eventually going to find its way to Todd. If that explanation isn't correct, then it's possible that the OSAF staffers who handled Col. Kalagian's UFO enquiry didn't appreciate that there was a standard response about UFO's which everyone seemed to get, no matter who they were. Whatever the reason, someone, at some point, was simply too forthcoming.

As stated, the USAF was "responsible" for the "investigation" of UFO reports, and they "coordinated" their "investigations and findings" with the FAA. In all these years, we have yet to see more than a *very* few examples of USAF-driven UFO investigation after Project Blue Book closed shop in late 1969. Likewise, we have hardly seen any investigative efforts by the FAA, with or without the USAF's input, into UFO cases no matter what the time frame. The FAA investigation and report into the infamous Japan Airlines UFO incident over Alaska, which occurred on the 17th of November, 1986, is a rare exception, and it was primarily done, rightly or wrongly, to debunk the case. So, with the Army's admissions to Robert Todd in mind, we must ask, and quite urgently, where are these "investigations and findings" into UFO cases in the 1970's? Were they led solely by the USAF, and thus on USAF letterhead? Or were they joint USAF-FAA efforts by a combined committee or board? Were these "detailed follow-on investigations" highly classified? Were these investigations, and their "findings", handled as aviation safety events? Or were they considered an intelligence and security matter? Or both? Where were the actual files generated? And which agencies were on the distribution lists?

Moving away from the USAF and FAA connection, Strickland's letter also talks specifically about the US Army. Robert Todd had previously asked the question 'Is it official policy to ignore reports

of UFO's made by Army personnel?', and the answer Strickland gives is that "...if damage, injury or death occurred..." it would be a "...major concern to safety investigators from the United States Army Agency for Aviation Safety (USAAAVS) and would be investigated...". One could ask how many of *those* sort of cases have there been? One would assume that such a scenario would be rare indeed, but how would we know? The US military haven't been exactly honest with the public in the past, and that's putting it mildly. I have not yet been able to review the history of the Army's USAAAVS, but I do have some information about an agency with a similar mandate and mission, and it has occasionally dealt with major aerial mishaps where UFO's were possibly involved.

For four decades, the USAF's vital Air Force Inspection and Safety Center (AFISC) was located at Norton Air Force Base, California. Currently known as the Air Force Safety Center (AFSC), and now operating out of Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, the organisation has historically been charged with investigating aircraft accidents and other safety incidents for the USAF. I aim, in future, to discuss this agency at some length. For now, it's worth mentioning that the old AFISC completed several air accident investigations in the 1950's and 1960's that possibly involved UFO's. A handful of AFISC accident investigation files where UFO's are discussed were released under the FOI Act in the 1970's and 1980's, but those few releases were massively incomplete. Entire portions of the files were stubbornly withheld. One particularly promising section in any AFISC investigation file is a segment titled "Board of Investigation Proceedings". It gives the most complete and detailed account of the circumstances around a crash or other major air safety incident. So far, *not one* AFISC air accident file involving UFO's has contained its "Board of Investigation Proceedings" section intact. So, if the USAF's old AFISC was dealing with UFO-related aircraft accidents, why not the Army's aforementioned USAAAVS? As we know, Strickland's letter to Robert Todd raised the matter in the first place, and one wouldn't be remotely surprised if the Army had dealt with major aviation mishaps where UFO's were somehow part of the case.

Another issue raised in Strickland's letter revolves around potential Army aviation mishaps that *do not* result in a major incident but are investigated nevertheless. Specifically, Strickland stated that "...investigations of aviation mishaps which do not involve damage, injury or death, such as the UFO incidents you mention, are the responsibility of the unit owning the aircraft involved...". This implies that an Army unit, such as a Company or Battalion, would evaluate any non-serious incident that happened to involve UFO's. This, I would hypothesise, doesn't mean that every single UFO sighting from an Army owned aircraft was investigated. At the same time, however, it was Strickland who brought up the issue, and it can't be brushed aside. Myriad questions arise from all this. If a UFO investigation was conducted at Company or Battalion level, say, who had jurisdiction over the files? Did higher commands wish to be notified? Were preliminary investigations done by the Commanding Officer of the Army unit? Was each case handled on an ad hoc basis? The list of questions is long indeed.

As for the actual paperwork generated during an Army unit-level UFO investigation, no matter how measly, it is highly likely that such files have now been destroyed. The Army can't keep everything, and there are concise, detailed regulations instructing Army personnel on what records should be permanently archived, and what records should be destroyed. One example of 1970's-era records management doctrine was "*Army Regulation 340-16, Office Management, Safeguarding 'For Official Use Only' Information*" (AR 340-16). It was promulgated by Headquarters, Department of the Army, on the 1st of May, 1970, and offers guidance on everything from how long records should be security classified before being downgraded, to how many years different categories of records should be retained before being shipped out to a more long-term facility for eventual archiving. Regarding records destruction, the news isn't good. Military Police Reports, for instance, are destroyed after two years, or, when the unit owning such reports is deactivated. Serious Incident Reports, such as the one used during the Hunter Army Airfield UFO sighting in September, 1973, must be kept for three years before being declassified, and, then, can be destroyed providing the report isn't being used in an investigation or for some other specific purpose. If, by chance, any Army UFO investigative files have survived, researchers would be now burdened with identifying what such paperwork was originally titled, and in what category of records they would have been stored. In sum, the Army were so good at convincing everyone that UFO's weren't in their jurisdiction, at unit level or otherwise, that hardly anyone bothered them over it.

That the US Army would task itself with investigating UFO events, either at unit level or at the United States Army Agency for Aviation Safety (USAAAVS), is one thing. Quite another is all this business about the USAF and FAA. The USAF was "responsible for the investigation" of UFO's, and that the FAA participated. Both entities jointly embarked on "detailed follow-on investigations". Yet, time after time after time, researchers and other interested parties, including the odd Congressman, were being fobbed off with the USAF's lying "UFO Fact Sheet". What about the United States Navy (USN)? Were they conducting any UFO investigations after Project Blue Book ended? In the 1970's, researchers periodically asked the USN about their policy on UFO sightings and investigation. Their replies, of

which we thankfully still have in hardcopy form, were often worse than the baloney coming out of the USAF. In fact, there is substantial evidence that the USN had far more involvement with the UFO matter than has been ever published, and I aim to report on this soon.

As I have mentioned, the US military always intended to maintain formal reporting channels for UFO sightings after Project Blue Book ended. This fact was admitted quite early on, but only through direct and repeated correspondence, and often inconsistently. For example, sometime in May of 1970, researcher George Earley sent a letter to Headquarters, USAF, asking which military entity would be now “responsible” for UFO sightings since Blue Book had been closed. Colonel William T. Coleman, who was the Chief of Public Information for the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force (OSAF), replied to Earley on the 26th of May, 1970, and stated the following:

“The Aerospace Defense Command (ADC) is responsible for unknown aerial phenomena reported in any manner, and the provisions of Joint Army–Navy–Air Force Publication (JANAP) 146 provides for the processing of reports.”

So, the Aerospace Defence Command (ADC) was “responsible for unknown aerial phenomena reported in any manner”. Further, a specific military–wide publication provided up–to–date guidance on “the processing” of UFO reports. Col. Coleman’s letter, of course, doesn’t mention anything regarding the *investigation* of reported UFO events. The last thing the USAF wanted in 1970 was another decade of public UFO debate or allegations of cover–up.

Another illustration of the US military’s post–Project Blue Book stance on UFO reporting is exemplified in a series of Congressional correspondence letters from early 1977. Boston–based researcher Barry Greenwood had, on more than one occasion, asked the USAF for some clarification on how they, or anyone else within the DOD, were handling UFO sightings since Project Blue Book had ended. Like most people, Greenwood received the standard “UFO Fact Sheet” and nothing whatsoever more. This, of course, utterly failed to answer his specific and fair questions about post–Blue Book military UFO cases. To get more forthright answers Greenwood wrote to Massachusetts Congressman Edward Markey to see if *he* could obtain more information from the USAF on Greenwood’s behalf. On the 20th of April, 1977, Lieutenant Colonel John Farr, who was with the USAF’s Congressional Inquiry Division, sent his reply to Congressman Markey. It stated, in part:

“With regard to Mr. Greenwood’s desire for reports of current UFO sightings, a Joint Army–Navy–Air Force Publication, (JANAP 146) requires radio reports of any sighting which the pilot feels could be a threat to national security. Guidance in this directive could result in reports of UFOs. However, if such reports were made, they would be transient in nature with no permanent record or file maintained.”

Lieutenant Colonel Farr’s reply, as well as previously mentioned Col. Coleman letter, both mention a publication called “JANAP–146”. This refers simply to a piece of old doctrine known as “Joint Army–Navy–Air Force Publication No. 146”. Though now superseded by other publications, it contained a series of “*Communications Instructions for Reporting Vital Intelligence Sightings*” (CIRVIS) procedures. Promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and applicable to all branches of the US military, CIRVIS listed “Unidentified Flying Objects”, or “UFOs”, as being reportable by US military personnel. Other reportable sightings included “Missiles”, “Unidentified Aircraft” and “Formations of Aircraft”. Such reports were electronically submitted through nearby air defence installations to the Commander–in–Chief of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (CINC–NORAD). In late 1995, JANAP–146 was cancelled, and CIRVIS instructions were placed in an evolving series of newer doctrine, which started with “*Air Force Manual 10–206 Operational Reporting*” (AFM 10–206). UFO’s were still, even in the 2000’s and 2010’s, listed as CIRVIS–reportable objects. In September, 2011, CIRVIS procedures appeared to vanish. In future reports, I will discuss where they are now placed.

Going back to the Lt. Col. John Farr’s letter to Congressman Edward Markey, there are several important issues that need addressing. Firstly, Lt. Col. Farr states that reports would be “...transient in nature with no permanent record or file maintained”. This statement somewhat matches what other researchers have been told. For instance, Armen Victorian, a British–based researcher, was told that by NORAD’s Directorate of Public Affairs that copies of CIRVIS reports were routinely destroyed after six months. Destroyed or not, UFO’s were almost certainly being reported using the CIRVIS system. If they *weren’t*, it would have been advantageous for the USAF to just say so. As for the *investigation* of UFO events, it is entirely possible, especially considering the US Army’s staggering admissions to Robert Todd, that the USAF and the FAA were studying CIRVIS–submitted UFO sightings all along. They likely had no choice. After all, CIRVIS reporting dealt with what the military termed “vital intelligence sightings”. The reports themselves went through frontline air defence installations, and on to NORAD and ADC. Someone had to be watching.

I have raised the JANAP-146 CIRVIS issue because its existence was always an easy “go to” policy for the USAF when researchers asked questions about post-Blue Book UFO reporting. There were, however, numerous other channels that military personnel had available to them for UFO sightings. Another source of UFO reports were US and Canadian naval vessels. Since the early 1950’s, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) have issued a series of “*Merchant Ship Intelligence*” (MERINT) instructions. Almost identical to CIRVIS procedures, MERINT requested that “Unidentified Flying Objects” be rapidly reported through a specific channel. A submitted MERINT report had to include a description of the sighting, which included the object(s) shape, size, color, any discernible features, associated sounds, direction of travel and duration of sighting. Historically, these reports went to the likes of the Commander-in-Chief, North American Air Defense Command (CINC-NORAD), the USN’s Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the Canadian Navy’s Commander, Maritime Command, and the USN’s Director, Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center, (D-NOSIC). Though MERINT instructions were sometimes amalgamated with CIRVIS instructions into a single section of JANAP-146, some regional or command-level versions of MERINT were issued as well. For instance, the Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service, Far East, San Francisco, issued MERINT instructions throughout the Asia-Pacific region in June, 1967, within a publication titled “*Military Sea Transportation Service, Far East, Instruction 3360.1A*”. How many UFO sighting reports did such policy generate? And of those, how many were investigated?

Yet another source of UFO reports worthy of investigation was the US military’s “Operational Report [3] Serious Incident/Event” channel. Usually shortened to “OPREP-3”, these urgent, high level reports have, since the late 1960’s, been used by base commanders, unit commanders, and other frontline officers to alert the NMCC, CJCS, the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (SJCS), the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the White House, and any applicable Major Commands (MAJCOM) of a rapidly developing incident or event which may affect national security, or become the source of considerable unwanted attention. Indeed, on at least five occasions that we know of, the OPREP-3 channel was used to report UFO’s that had intruded over military installations in the 1970’s. Moreover, the employment of OPREP-3’s for the reporting of alarming UFO events should have been known to us all along. Project Blue Book’s closure was partly authorised by Brig. Gen. Carrol H. Bolender, who was, at the time, the Deputy Director of Development, for the Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development, USAF. Brig. Bolender’s contribution to Blue Book’s demise was his infamous three page “Bolender Memo”, or “Bolender Air Staff Summary”. Dated the 20th of September, 1969, and classified SECRET, Brig. Gen. Bolender stated that:

“Moreover, reports of unidentified flying objects which could affect national security are made in accordance with JANAP 146 or Air Force Manual 55-11, and are not part of the Blue Book system... ..as already stated, reports of UFOs which could affect national security would continue to be handled through the standard Air Force procedures designed for this purpose.”

We already know about JANAP-146 and its CIRVIS UFO reporting procedures, but what about the reference to “Air Force Manual 55-11”? During the late 1960’s “*Air Force Manual 55-11, Operations, Air Force Operational Reporting System*” (AFM-55-11) detailed the vital “Air Force Operational Reporting System” (AFOREPS). The AFOREPS network included several operational reporting categories, and one of them was the OPREP-3 channel. In May, 1971, the OPREP-3 system was migrated to the other branches of the US military. As stated, OPREP-3’s were been used to report UFO’s near military installations. Brig. Gen. Bolender’s stipulation that “...unidentified flying objects which could affect national security...” be reported using such a system was evidently taken up.

On and on it goes. CIRVIS reports, MERINT reports, OPREP-3 reports, Serious Incident Reports... The USAF and, apparently, the FAA, had numerous, classified sources of UFO cases to investigate. Again, the US Army told Robert Todd that the “...USAF coordinate their investigation and findings with the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA)...”, and together they accomplished “...detailed follow-on investigations, if required...”. During the course of my research I have discovered several other channels utilised for UFO reporting. These include “Daily Spot Intelligence Reports” (DSINTREP), which are swiftly lodged at the Headquarters of the Numbered Air Forces, and “Unit Reports” (UNITREP) which are submitted by US Coast Guard ships. There are more. The North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) has, or at least had, numerous instructions and command directives that specifically mention “Unidentified Flying Objects”, “UFOs” and “Objects”. This would be fine if they were solely talking about stray aircraft, unknown aircraft, balloons and the like. But those more mundane aerial events were *already covered* in other doctrine. The old Air Force Intelligence Service (AFIS) was involved, at minimum, in the logging and preliminary assessment of UFO cases. Specifically, AFIS’s small Aerospace Intelligence Division (AFIS/INZ) handled UFO events for the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the 8th Air Force in 1975. Likewise, and unsurprisingly, the USAF’s Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (ACS/I) dealt with UFO conundrums.

Specifically, ACS/I's highly classified Scientific and Technical Branch, which was located within the Directorate of Resource Management, was tasked with keeping track of USAF generated UFO sightings in the 1970's. And this is just the tip of the iceberg.

In some ways, the US Army's revelations to Robert Todd should be of little surprise. The signs were there all along. The military was still dealing heavily with the UFO topic after Project Blue Book ended. But now we have evidence of wider, multi-agency UFO "investigation" rather than just the receiving of reports. The USAF and the FAA, in hindsight, were should always have been considered the most logical combination of bodies to investigate UFO events, at least within the United States. NORAD too has investigated UFO events, and not merely of the unidentified airplane flavour. Further, we now know that the US Army was quite prepared to deal with UFO's too. Experience tells us that the declassified records we have thus far acquired will be dwarfed by what is not yet available. The entire history of governmental UFO secrecy is likely far richer than anyone initially envisaged.

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