Religion
In the North Caucasus
Vakhabism
and the Chechen Conflict
While the focus
of this study has been the North Caucasus region, the impact of
religion on the region's conflict has been most dramatic in Chechnya.
In contemporary Chechnya, as noted above, traditional Islam is challenged
by a new phenomenon called vakhabism. Originally, this movement
emerged in the 18th century and was named after its founder Al-Vakhab.
He claimed that Islam was distorted and called his followers to
"purify" it and return to Islam's fundamentals. Nowadays
vakhabism is spread across the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia,
where it is accepted as an official ideology of the royal family.
Vakhabism in Chechnya (as well as Tadjikistan), however, does not
relate directly to vakhabism as it is understood by Sunni Muslims
in the Middle East countries. Although the main idea is the same-the
purification of Islam from both "pagan" and modern influences-Chechen
vakhabism has a set of characteristics that distinguish it from
religious values and practices in Saudi Arabia.
The Vakhabite
movement has deep implications for Chechnya's religious, social
and political life. Its call to purify Islam challenges Chechnya's
traditional Islam , something which is heavily influenced by the
local system of beliefs and norms, as well as an elaborate structure
of religious communities and brotherhoods. In fact, Vakhabism attempts
to "return" the population to what it views as "original"
Islam, rejecting Chechnya's unique historical experience. The key
to this transformation is the application of rules, norms and practices
accepted among the radicals in the Middle East to the Chechen social
and political life. Hence, traditionalists (who constitute the overwhelming
majority of the population) associate Vakhabism with foreign influence,
which poses a threat to their religious customs and identity. For
their part, the Vakhabites view the supporters of traditional Islam
as backward sectarians who distort Islam. The conflict between fundamentalists
and traditionalists, along with less sharp but nevertheless significant
divisions among Sufi sects, since the early 1990s has had a profound
impact on Chechen politics, including the ongoing Russian military
operation in the region.
During the 1994-1996
military operation, the Russian federal troops were a common enemy
for most Sufi brotherhoods and Vakhabites. Both were mobilizing
the population against the federal government (most Chechen leaders
identified themselves with Sufi brotherhoods to secure the support
of their members; for example, President Dudayev declared that he
belonged to the Kunta-Hadji brotherhood). Therefore, their differences
were temporarily put aside. Moreover, the Vakhabites managed to
strengthen their position in Chechnya. Money, armament and fighters
provided by their radical counterparts from abroad were crucial
to the Chechen resistance against the federal forces and enabled
Vakhabites to become an influential group in the republic. The relations
between Sufi brotherhoods and Vakhabites deteriorated dramatically
after the end of the 1994-1996 campaign. Their religious differences
spilled over into politics.
In the political
realm, traditionalists and fundamentalists disagreed over how the
Chechen state ought to be organized and what its policy towards
Russia should look like. Sufi Muslims advocated a secular state
that would preserve Chechnya's traditional social structure and
its unique Islamic culture. Their position on the future of Russian-Chechen
relations was not uniform and ranged from calls for independence
to the development of a "special status" within the Russian
Federation. There is no evidence that Sufi brotherhoods had any
interest in protracting the conflict or extending it beyond Chechnya's
borders. Vakhabites were determined to build a "pure"
Muslim society which would be organized and regulated according
to the Shariat law (as opposed to adat - traditional norms developed
in Chechnya before the adoption of Islam). "Just Islamic order"
as they believe it had existed in the times of the Arabic khalifat
became the goal of Chechnya's religious extremists. Furthermore,
they embraced the idea of creating a larger Islamic state in the
Northern Caucasus which would include Daghestan, Ingushetia and
possibly other Russian regions. Since those regions chose to stay
in the Federation and their predominantly Muslim population did
not sympathize with fundamentalism, the only means of achieving
this objective was aggression against Russia and then gazavat (or
jihad) - holy war against non-believers (in Daghestan, since the
early 1990s the population rejected the ideas of vakhabism and the
leadership declared them "undesirable" in the republic.
In June, 2000 all Vakhabite organizations were prohibited in Daghestan
by an act of its parliament).
Thus, Vakhabites
challenged the official Chechen leadership (President Maskhadov
and its supporters) and posed a serious threat to the foundations
of the Chechen society. As a result, official Grozny was becoming
more and more critical of vakhabism in its statements and declarations.
However, Maskhadov took no decisive action, as he feared that would
exacerbate the situation in the republic. Confrontation between
traditionalists and radicals resulted in violence several times;
for instance, as noted above, Vakhabites clashed with Sufi Muslims
in May, 1998 in Gudermes and Urus-Martan and then again in Gudermes
in July, 1998 (approximately 50 people were killed that day). Fearing
that fundamentalists will destabilize the situation in the republic
and attempt to rebel against Grozny, Maskhadov declared the state
of emergency, dissolved and disarmed the Shariat Guards and Islamic
regiment, and ordered to exile the well-known warlord Khattab, a
mercenary from Jordan who allegedly cooperated with radicals. On
July 23, 1998 there was an attempt in Grozny to assassinate Maskhadov,
an attempt probably organized by Vakhabites. Observers from Russia,
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Chechnya itself agreed that at that point
the republic was on the brink of civil war.
Despite their
relatively strong positions, Vakhabites were not able to assert
their influence throughout the republic, much less impose their
ideology in its entire territory. However, they went ahead with
their plans to occupy neighboring Russian regions and invaded Daghestan
in August, 1999. Although members of Sufi brotherhoods may have
participated in the invasion as well, the idea and its implementation
are blamed by the Russian government and the local population primarily
on Vakhabites. Subsequent investigations and the fact that the officials
Grozny from the very beginning announced that they did not have
anything to do with the events in Daghestan and condemned the aggression
further convinced Moscow that fundamentalists had started their
jihad and the situation in Chechnya was out of control. Vakhabites
were perceived as a major threat to peace and stability in the Northern
Caucasus and the territorial integrity of the Federation. The invasion
of Daghestan and the Vakhabites' plans to wage a holy war against
Russia until the creation of a "purely" Islamic state
in its southern territories were the top reasons that prompted the
federal government to start a military operation in Chechnya immediately
after the defeat of those who attacked Daghestan.
As the federal
troops advanced into Chechnya, however, they had to fight not only
Islamic extremists but also the members of Sufi brotherhoods who,
like in 1994-1996, Russian control for various reasons opposed.
Unlike fundamentalists, Sufi Muslims do not fight for a religious
cause and tend to have more reasonable positions on issues. Moreover,
their dissatisfaction with the situation in the republic in the
1996-1999 period encouraged them to cooperate in a number of cases
with the Russians. As a result, many of the Sufi communities engaged
in negotiations with the federal representatives and avoided armed
conflict. Some of them openly supported the military operation and
organized volunteer troops to fight against both Sufi and Vakhabite
rebels on the Russian side.
In brief, a
certain Sufi community may or may not fight the Russians or Vakhabites
depending on their traditions, history, kinship ties, religious
idiosyncrasies and even geographic position (the population in the
mountains is generally perceived as very militant and hostile even
to fellow Chechens from the flatland, whereas the northern part
of the republic has been loyal to Moscow). On the other hand, Vakhabites
are, almost by definition, inclined to resist the Russian military
operation and subsequent restoration of peaceful life and order.
Therefore, the Russian government, the military and the population
at large view Vakhabites or any other radical Islamic movement as
the biggest obstacle to the stabilization of the situation in Chechnya.
Traditional Sufi groups are Moscow's most valuable partners in the
struggle against extremism when they choose to cooperate, and therefore
the federal government makes efforts to support traditional Chechen
institutions mentioned above - teips, tukhums, virds and tarikats.
There is a belief that they will help prevent the spread of extremism
and facilitate the return to normal life.
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