On the thirteenth anniversary of the first prisoners brought to Guantanamo Bay, a report from the Seton Hall Law Center for Policy and Research examines how the United States government used the facility as a “battle laboratory.” Prisoners were treated like “test subjects” as personnel, including medical officers, engaged in experiments to develop new interrogation techniques. Numerous detainees were drugged upon arrival to help interrogators break them. One prisoner, Mohammed al-Qahtani, was treated like a “lab rat” and monitored closely by medical personnel to determine if his body could continue to be tortured.
The report was first covered and published at VICE by journalist Jason Leopold. It is based on unclassified government documents and statements from government officials and military personnel and co-authored by Joseph Hickman, a former Guantanamo guard.
“Every lab must have its test subjects,” the report declares. Guantanamo was “no different” except “its rats were human beings, detainees.”
The report not only makes the case that the torture techniques developed through experiments to “exploit intelligence” were exported to other facilities, such as Bagram and Abu Ghraib, but also highlights the disturbing reality that medical personnel were involved in “human subjects research” and conduct that likely constituted crimes against humanity.
According to Colonel Britt Mallow, the commander of the Criminal Investigative Task Force, [Major General Michael] Dunlavey and later [Major General] Geoffrey Miller referred to GTMO as a ‘Battle Lab’ meaning that interrogations and other procedures there were to some degree experimental, and their lessons would benefit DOD in other places. While this was logical in terms of learning lessons, I personally objected to the implied philosophy that interrogators should experiment with untested methods, particularly those in which they were not trained.”
“Enhanced interrogation techniques,” or torture techniques, were renamed “counter-resistance techniques” to make it easier to defend their use. Beginning in January 2002, the standard protocol was to give arriving detainees 1250 milligrams of mefloquine, an anti-malarial drug, which was “five times greater than necessary for the stated prophylactic use” and put them at risk of “severe psychological effects.”
As described in the report, “Mefloquine’s side effects commonly include hallucinations, anxiety, paranoia, aggression, psychotic behavior, mood changes, depression, memory impairment, convulsions, loss of coordination (ataxia), suicidal ideation, and possibly suicide, and they can last for weeks.” The side effects can be greater in “patients with personal history or family history of mental illness.” The drugs were given before prisoners were “tested for malaria,” suggesting the “excessive dose” was deliberate. [Previously, journalist Jeffrey Kaye has done extensive reporting on the use of mefloquine on detainees.]
It is highly unlikely that mefloquine was used for malaria. Much more possible is that military personnel were aware of the side effect and wanted them to occur in prisoners so they could modify their behavior and use the drug to aid in making them compliant.
…[Office of Legal Counsel] memos drafted by John Yoo did allow for the use of mind-altering drugs, maintaining that it was not torture unless it caused “permanent” or “profound” mental harm or damage. It argued that only drugs that “penetrate to the core of an individual’s ability to perceive the world around him, substantially interfering with his cognitive abilities, or fundamentally alter his personality” would qualify as torture. This would be satisfied by “the onset of ‘brief psychotic disorder’” or “delusions or hallucinations” lasting an entire day. The memo also cited, as an example of a profound disruption, a drug or action “pushing a person to the brink of suicide, particularly where the person comes from a culture with strong taboos against suicide.” The memo, however, claims that in order to satisfy the intent standard of the criminal statute, the administration of the drug must specifically be intended to cause such prolonged harm. Under this logic, torture would not result from the use of a drug with intent to cause lesser forms of psychological harm, such as anxiety, paranoia, aggression, depression, memory impairment, or mere suicidal ideation, all known side effects of high doses of mefloquine…
On October 2, 2002 at Guantanamo, personnel at a “Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting” discussed using “controlled chaos” at the facility. “Controlled chaos included taking steps to discover how to find and manipulate phobias, such as ‘insects, snakes, [and] claustrophobia.’”
Behavioral Science Consultation Team members Major Paul Burney and Major John Leso told the group, “[W]hat’s more effective than fear based strategies are camp-wide, environmental strategies designed to disrupt cohesion and communication among detainees . . . .[The] [e]nvironment should foster dependence and compliance . . . .We need to create an environment of ‘controlled chaos.’”
Two psychologists and one psychiatrist were a part of BSCT. Their mission was to monitor detainees’ behavior during interrogations and detention. They were to develop “psychological operations.” In some cases, they “simply made up” some of the torture techniques that were used against prisoners.
There was discussion about “new experiments,” including whether to use “truth serum” to manipulate the “camp environment” and “foster dependence and compliance.”