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By Dodge Billingsley  The
war between Georgia and Abkhazia has been officially over since the ceasefire
accords of 1994. However, the situation is still unresolved and looks like
it will get worse before it gets better. UN monitors, and those on both
sides of the conflict searching for a peaceful resolution to the dispute,
will have their work complicated by what can be called the degeneration
of the conflict zone. Technically the current conflict zone does not cover all of Abkhazia as most of the region is relatively peaceful with only two real troublespots. The first is the Kodori Gorge - the only region of Abkhazia still controlled by the central Georgian government. The second is located on the Abkhaz, or north, side of the Inguri River ceasefire line - known to UN personnel as the Gali sector. Abkhaz and Georgian people operate in close proximity to each other in both areas. There has been no real military activity in the Kodori corridor for years, although UN personnel have been kidnapped and their vehicles taken from them at times. For example, two United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) were kidnapped on 12 December 2000 and held for five days before their release. Their capture was not political but banditry by local, ethnic Svans, who control the Kodori Valley. As a result of the risk of theft and abduction, the UN has cut its patrols to the valley. There are three checkpoints, one Abkhaz and two Russian, near the mouth of the valley but they are a few kilometres from the nearest Svan outpost and are separated by a destroyed bridge, which makes road travel impossible. The Kodori corridor is not a hotspot but will continue to be the scene of widespread banditry. The overwhelming majority of all illegal activity in Abkhazia takes place in the Gali sector. This is an area bordered in the north by Ochamchiri, the military headquarters for Abkhaz forces operating in Gali, which lies near the edges of the Black Sea, eastward to Tkvarcheli, a coal mining town nestled in the Caucasus foothills, and south of the Inguri River. . . . Georgian infiltration Who is responsible for the continual harassment of Abkhaz forces and civilians in the Gali sector? Two Georgian groups are known to operate across the ceasefire line, the White Legion and Forest Brothers. The White Legion is under the direction of Zoza Samushia and seems to have been more active in previous years although Samushia claims they still operate in Abkhazia. More recently the notoriety has gone to a group known as the Forest Brothers under the direction of Dato Shengalia. Very little information is available on the Forest Brothers and their leader, except that many Mingrelians and Georgians south of the ceasefire line consider him a hero. White Legion leader Samushia says that the Forest Brothers began in 1997, but little is known about their ranks. One insight has been provided by Jaba Ioseliani, a former member of the Military Council, which assumed power after overthrowing President Zviad Gamsakhurdia in 1992. Ioseliani, the leader of the Mkhedrioni - a private Georgian nationalist militia active in the original Abkhazian conflict - claims: "At least 80% of them [Forest Brothers] were Mkhedrioni members." It is speculated that the IDP camps serve as a hotbed of potential recruits as children driven from their homes in 1993 are now adults with no future - easily persuaded to join the partisan ranks. The real question is, are the attacks to be attributed to true partisan activity or simple lawlessness? Or are the banditry and partisan attacks so intertwined that it is impossible to separate the two? It is conceivable that the partisan activity might be motivated by both crime and ideological fervour combined in one campaign. This is a fusion seen in more and more hotspots, where would-be commandos feel completely justified robbing, stealing, abducting and killing their enemy, and civilians, in a profitable quest to realise their territorial ambitions. It will be impossible to accurately quantify, describe, and thus come up with any lasting solutions to the instability in the Gali sector using conventional conflict resolution methods. This region needs a force with a mandate to keep the peace, which would mean aggressive operations against all criminal/partisan activity. However, this will not happen as any international response of this type would be politically impossible, as it would shut down Georgian activity in the region and thus be a victory for the Abkhaz. This is not a statement the international community is likely to make in the complex geopolitical environment where state sovereignty is constantly being challenged by separatist movements. To view a map of the Gali sector, Abkhazia click here To view a Combat Films Abkhazia video click here (real video player required) 770 of 2437 words [End of non-subscriber extract.] The full version of this article is accessible through our subscription services. Please refer to the box below for details.
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