July 21, 2011

Oil and Water

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Israel, Lebanon | Tags: , , , , , |
[51] Comments 

Click to enlarge. (See below for link to Google Maps)

There’s been a great deal of discussion lately on the issue of Lebanon’s maritime border with Israel, and how it will impact Lebanon’s plans for off-shore drilling.

If you haven’t been following along, I highly recommend a piece Matt Nash wrote on the subject about a week ago. (Matt, as I think I’ve said before, is one of the few journalists in Lebanon who reports the hell out of a story; I’m regularly impressed by the amount of research he does.)

Here’s the gist of the dispute:

  • Lebanon signed an agreement with Cyprus in early 2007 which established their maritime borders and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of each country. [Sibylle Rizk informs me that this is not true... Lebanon's EEZ was established in 2009, once it had set its borders with Syria as well]. The southernmost point of that border was called Point 1.
  • In 2010, Cyprus signed an agreement with Israel establishing their maritime borders, and used the same Point 1 as a terminal reference.
  • By then, Lebanon had determined that Point 1 was actually too far north and the real point of intersection between all three countries was several kilometers to the south, known as Point 23. It filed papers with the UN to that effect in July 2010.
  • Initially choosing Point 1 was a major blunder on Lebanon’s part, as admitted by the relevant officials in charge
  • Israel has, of course, taken exception to Lebanon’s claim, reminding the UN that this new border violates Lebanon’s original agreement with Cyprus.
  • The UN and the US have both gotten involved as mediators, but there have been no breakthroughs as of yet.

Based on the various sets of coordinates filed by Israel, Cyprus, and Lebanon with the UN, I drew up a Google map showing the precise area under dispute (see above).

My question is the following: what led Lebanon to revise its opinion on the location of the border? Was it based on a new survey? If anyone has any information on this score, please provide it in the comment section.

Update: Sibylle Rizk has an article coming out in Le Commerce du Levant next month which will apparently address this question.
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July 14, 2011

Grand Theater: A Tale of Beirut

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Lebanon | Tags: , , , |
[50] Comments 

Thirteen years ago, one of my oldest friends, Omar Naim, made a documentary film about Beirut’s Grand Theatre, a landmark building that once hosted the great touring theatrical groups and musical stars of Europe and the Middle East. The film was Omar’s senior project at university, and it went on to win a Best Picture nomination at the 1999 Student Academy Awards.

I composed the score for the film, and when I played it for my grandmother a couple of years later, she told me that her father had worked as a backstage grip in the theater in its heyday, and then later as a projectionist when it was turned into a cinema during the 1950s or 60s.

Apparently, during rehearsals for the production of Rasputin that is mentioned in the film, the great Egyptian actor Youssef Wahby (who played the title role) demanded that a real baby be used in one of his pivotal scenes, rather than the toy prop that he deemed not lifelike enough. According to the story, my great-grandfather stepped forward and offered up his youngest daughter for the role (my great-aunt Fadia), who was only a few months old at the time. Her siblings would always joke that her acting career had begun brilliantly with an appearance opposite Youssef Wahby.

According to the Solidere Annual Report of 2009 (here’s a PDF, see pp. 86-87), the Grand Theatre is to be turned into a boutique hotel within the next few years. This is yet another sad chapter in the history of the building, and a fitting epilogue to the film.

You can now watch Omar’s documentary on YouTube. It’s half an hour long in three parts. I look forward to hearing your thoughts about it.

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July 8, 2011

The Noe Doctrine

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Hezbollah, Lebanon, March 14, Syria | Tags: , |
[227] Comments 

My friend Nicholas Noe is on a mission. For several years, he has been arguing that Washington’s hard-line, take-no-prisoners approach to dealing with Syria and Hizbullah is completely misguided. The continuous diet of pressure and isolation tactics from the West, Noe believes, has only served to improve the fortunes of the Resistance Axis, not weaken it, and he has painstakingly documented this legacy of ashes in a variety of opinion pieces published in the New York Times, the Huffington Post, and various other outlets (including his blog).

Interestingly, Noe does not take the view of certain commentators to whom he is often compared (such as Alistair Crooke and Nir Rosen) that the West should be criticized for waging a war on parties whose resistance agenda is perfectly legitimate. Rather, his beef with Washington is that this strategy is wrong because it is not effective enough. In other words, Noe does not have a problem with the ends of US policy; he simply disagrees with the means.

Take his most recent article for The National Interest. In it, he argues that Hizbullah has been painted into a corner because of the unrest in Syria and the indictments by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). Washington and its allies have sensed Hizbullah’s weakness and are now hoping to press their advantage, which Noe thinks is a terrible idea:

…Many influential voices in Washington and European capitals need to very carefully consider the wisdom of the road that they are going down—a road that will, in all probability, bring great destruction to the region, including to Israel whose home front will undoubtedly be a main frontline. Saying this, however, does not have to mean simply withering away in the face of a threat. Instead, it could mean—it should mean—that outside actors who hold such comparatively great power…might finally have to find a means and a discourse to grant concessions to far weaker…parties—a course that would actually fatally undermine their ability and desire to exercise violence over time, either against their own people or against other nations.

In other words, now is not the time to push Syria and Hizbullah further into a corner, but rather to use one’s increased leverage over them to extract valuable (but unspecified) concessions.

I think Nick’s voice is an important one to listen to on these issues, but I also think that his policy proposals are too vague in this case, and that he is overly optimistic about the positive outcome of a so-called “third way” with regard to Syria and Hizbullah.

To take another example, here’s an excerpt from a recent post of his about the mistakes that the US and March 14 made in pursuing a “maximalist” track on the STL:

The US and M14, we can now pretty clearly see, would have done FAR better on several scores if they had allowed the Tribunal process to go forward in a manner that drew Hizbullah ever further into the process rather than stupidly alienating them at virtually every turn – this means in general that they should have traded the hard edge Tribunal stick for a more mixed one, with a less sharp edge, if you will…

I find this argument problematic for many reasons. First of all, we should note that Noe is precisely not criticizing the Tribunal for being a cynical tool used by the West to target Hizbullah. He doesn’t have a problem with that. Rather, his critique is that the STL was a tool that was not wielded in the proper way, for maximum effect. In other words, by using the STL as a bludgeon rather than a scalpel, America and its Lebanese allies missed many opportunities to force concessions out of Hizbullah that they now have lost the ability to do.

Again, this strikes me as flawed reasoning. It wasn’t the West’s “alienation” of Hizbullah that led the party to shun the Tribunal; the record clearly shows that Hizbullah was — from the beginning — totally opposed to the Tribunal. They may have paid lip service to the ideals of justice, but when push came to shove, they consistently worked to undermine the creation of the court. Let us recall the following:

  1. Hizbullah was opposed to the UN dispatching Peter Fitzgerald on a fact-finding mission a few weeks after the Hariri assassination, calling instead for a Lebanese investigation (which would have been a farce) rather than an international one.
  2. When the Siniora cabinet voted (on December 15 2005) to request that the UN establish a tribunal, the Hizbullah and Amal ministers suspended their cabinet membership.
  3. When the draft resolution establishing the Tribunal was circulated in the fall of 2006, Hezbollah began calling for a veto in the Siniora cabinet. When they were rebuffed, their ministers walked out, thereby launching the eighteen-month protest outside the Serail.
  4. During this period, there were more assassinations of March 14th figures and a great deal of tension on the streets of Beirut, culminating in the events of May 7 2008.

I am not rehearsing these events to argue that Hizbullah was acting like a guilty party. My point is, rather, that “maximalism” is not the exclusive preserve of the United States and its Lebanese allies. Noe treats the establishment of the UN investigation commission and the subsequent tribunal as if these were developments that came about effortlessly, when in fact these bodies came about via a protracted and bitter struggle, in which both March 14 and Hizbullah were active participants.

The notion that some kind of third-way accomodationist stance on the STL could have been found that would have satisfied Hizbullah, March 14, Syria, and the US is unconvincing to me. The process got ugly because everybody was playing hardball, not because the US hurt Hizbullah’s feelings.

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July 2, 2011

Nasrallah Comments on the STL Indictments

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Hezbollah, Lebanon | Tags: , |
[313] Comments 

Hizbullah Secretary-General Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah is scheduled to give an address this evening about the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s (STL) indictments against members of his party. I will attempt to live-blog it, pending the quality of the internet connection. Refresh this page to follow the translation, once the address begins.

**

8:30: Nasrallah begins speaking.

8:34: Le Figaro said a long time ago that Hizbullah members would be targeted, and we already commented on that. We have already explained what the objectives of this project are.

8:35: We know that it is impossible to annul the STL, because this is an American project anyway. Its goal is to tarnish the image of the Resistance, and even to create civil strife in Lebanon.

8:36: I’m going to speak about 3 subjects. I am in the habit, as you know, of giving you a table of contents for my speeches. The first subject is the investigation. The second subject is the Tribunal. And the third subject is our position on the indictments.

8:39: Over the past year, we have suggested to the various authorities that they investigate the Israeli hypothesis [that Israel killed Hariri]. We held a major press conference and presented all kinds of evidence, involving drone footage, witness testimony, etc. We presented all this evidence and said: “Here you go. This constitutes a lead for you to pursue.” Did they follow it? No.

8:40: The evidence we presented is circumstantial, and it is enough to suspect Israel of the crime. But they didn’t even bother looking into it, let alone taking it seriously and building a case on it.

8:42: It’s not my job or the job of Hizbullah to launch an investigation and present evidence to Mr. Bellemare. But we did, and we found once again that there was no interest because this Tribunal is completely politicized.

8:43: In 2005, Mehlis admitted to Le Figaro that he was getting information from Israel. Rather than investigating Israel, this investigation has cooperated with Israel.

8:44: I have a question with regard to the investigation. When the UNIIIC was annulled and the offices in Lebanon were transferred to the Netherlands, everything was taken out via Beirut International Airport, with the exception of the computers. There were 97 computers that were not taken out via the airport, but rather via Israel. So the question to Mr. Bellemare is: Why didn’t you take them out via the airport or the seaport? Why did you take them out of Lebanon via Israel?

8:47: [Shows a video presentation presenting information about the transfer of computer equipment to The Hague via Israel. Shows multiple documents allegedly showing transfer of computer equipment to Israel. Name on the document: Miho Hirose. (Someone please Google this...)]

8:49: This shows that the investigators are hardly objective. As you will see, one of Bellemare’s top officers is from the CIA.

8:51: [Shows another video presentation]. Nick Kaldas was involved with the CIA in Iraq. Michael Taylor, a British officer in the investigation since 2010, and former anti-terrorism officer in New Scotland Yard. Darryl Mendes, an American officer who served in the CIA and FBI and continues to coordinate with these agencies. Was also a general prosecutor for the US Navy. Durayd Bsharawi, a Lebanese officer, known to have bad relations with Syria and Hizbullah. Robert Baer, an American former CIA official who was in charge of hunting Imad Mughniyyeh. (Shows a clip from an interview with Baer, where he talks about hunting and failing to catch Mughniyyeh). In 2010, Baer turned up as an advisor to the STL. [QN: So what?]

8:59: Nasrallah: What’s the point of showing this montage? It’s simply to make the point that this team of advisors is hardly capable of investigating the Israel hypothesis, given its experience of fighting the Resistance.

9:01: Gerhard Lehmann was Mehlis’s deputy. I believe that the time they spent in Lebanon was the golden age of their life. We’re going to show you evidence of Lehmann’s complete corruption.

9:03: [Shows another video presentation] Gerhard Lehmann worked for German intelligence and was Mehlis’s deputy. During his tenure in German intelligence, he worked with Israel. He tried to make a deal with Jamil al-Sayyid. We’re showing you a video capture of Lehmann receiving payment in 2006 from someone. [Hidden camera].

9:05: We have previously talked about corruption in the STL. Did anyone investigate them? We are happy to present Mr. Bellemare with more evidence.

9:06: You have all seen, via New TV’s series “Haqiqa Leaks” how the various investigators were sitting around with the false witnesses. We have even more to say on this score, which we will save til later.

[Internet connection is acting up...stay tuned]

9:09: The worst instances of leaking happened a couple of days ago. The STL delegation meets with the Lebanese delegation. While they were sitting and talking, the Lebanese TV stations were already talking about the names, which are supposed to be secret! So who leaked them? Where is the investigational secrecy?

9:11: The indictments are being used for a political side, not for the cause of finding the truth. There were names that appeared in Der Spiegel and CBC that the indictments did not name but Bellemare said that there would be more indictments.

9:12: Do you remember when Der Spiegel came out with its report? It was just before the 2009 elections. The elections in which hundreds of millions of dollars were spent by March 14? The Der Spiegel leak was part of the electoral campaign against the Resistance.

9:13: All of the leaks and actions by the STL have coincided with key events in Lebanese politics. They want to bring down PM Miqati’s government by any means possible. The indictments were confirmed and announced to give a weapon to the other side (i.e. March 14) to bring down this government. This is the end of the first subject.

9:15: The second subject is the Tribunal. People are saying that these men who are accused should present themselves to the STL and defend themselves.

9:16: Did this Tribunal treat the four generals with any fairness or justice? Jamil al-Sayyid has been pleading his case with the STL tirelessly after being imprisoned for 4 years. Did anything come of it? No. So how do you expect this Tribunal to treat people who have fought against Israel??

9:17: Who is in charge of the STL? Mr. Antonio Cassesse. This man is a dear friend of Israel. [Shows a video presentation]. At a conference in Herzliya (in Israel), Professor George Fletcher apologized to the attendees: “One of the great heroes of our field is not able to be here today… his name is Antonio Cassesse… He is a great friend of Israel.”

9:21: Nasrallah: Cassesse believes that the Resistance is a terrorist organization. So this man is supposed to bring about justice? This man is supposed to be impartial?

9:22: [Video presentation] In 2006 Cassesse sent a letter to Israel which says things like “Israel is a democratic state, etc.” [QN: Yes, but the point of the letter was actually to criticize Israel for its acts that violate humanitarian law, if you look closely at the letter. That was a mistake by Nasrallah... someone should have caught that.]

9:26: Is it possible for a Tribunal like this, with such a president and officers and track record, to actually find out the truth?

9:27: To the final subject: the current situation. To the Lebanese people, I say to them the following: don’t worry about civil strife. Those who talk about civil strife in Lebanon actually want that to come about. There will be no Sunni-Shiite strife, and no civil war in Lebanon. Everyone should be assured that we have a responsible government and trustworthy that will confront this situation effectively. So, to the Lebanese people, don’t worry. Everything is fine.

9:29: To the March 14 forces, I say the following. You consider yourself an opposition to PM Miqati’s government, and that is your right. If you think that the international game is aiding your fortunes, that’s also your right. I have, however, two pieces of advice for you, or let us say two thoughts (since you don’t like to be advised). (1) Don’t ask PM Miqati’s government to try to arrest the indicted individuals, because you wouldn’t be able to do it yourself even if you had a 100% March 14 government. Even if you held every single portfolio, you wouldn’t be able to arrest these individuals, so don’t expect PM Miqati to do it. (2) My second piece of advice is: Don’t demand that PM Miqati be less flexible than PM Hariri was with respect to the STL. The Foreign Ministers of Qatar and Turkey gave me a document that stated that Prime Minister Saad Hariri was ready to accept a certain set of demands (with respect to the STL). I can show you this document. So don’t expect PM Miqati to refuse demands about the STL that Saad al-Hariri accepted. That document was signed by the Qataris, Turks, Syrians, Saudis, and Saad al-Hariri, and we were told that Ms. Clinton was ready to bless the agreement as well.

9:37: To the supporters of the Resistance: there has been a war waged upon us for years. This is no surprise. We have always been prepared for it. Whether the war takes the form of military conflict or media wars or psychological war or whatever, we are prepared. The path of resistance has succeeded in liberating land, and defending our country. So we will confront this issue of the Tribunal just as we have confronted other issues.

9:42: There are people in Lebanon who want to see Sunni-Shiite strife, particularly some Christians in March 14. We will not succumb to this.

9:43: Presents a summary of his speech and some concluding comments. The Resistance has never been stronger.

*

Well, there you have it folks. I’ll have some thoughts about the speech either later today or tomorrow, but right now I have to go prepare for a BBQ. Tfaddalo!

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June 30, 2011

Will Hizbullah Send Lawyers to The Hague?

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Hezbollah, Lebanon | Tags: |
[98] Comments 

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) issued an important media advisory today, clarifying the next steps in the post-indictment phase of the Hariri trial. It discusses the arrest warrants, the rights of the accused, proceedings in absentia, and other issues.

Here’s what happens next:

  1. The Lebanese government has 30 days to find the four suspects, serve them with the indictment, arrest them, and transfer them to the STL headquarters in Leidschendam.
  2. If after 30 days, no one is arrested, and “if the STL President considers that reasonable attempts to serve the indictment have been made, he may order a public advertisement after consulting the Pre-Trial Judge. The Registrar would then send an advertisement calling on the accused to surrender to the Lebanese authorities for publication in the media.”
  3. “If the accused has not been arrested within 30 calendar days of the public advertisements the Pre-Trial Judge can ask the Trial Chamber to initiate in absentia proceedings.”

The other noteworthy clarification is the following:

The confirmation of an indictment does not mean that the person(s) named in the indictment is/are guilty of the crimes of which they are accused. It simply confirms that the case put forward by the Prosecutor has met the burden of proof required at this stage of the process – prima facie evidence. In simple terms this means that if this evidence were presented uncontested at the trial, it would lead to a conviction.

Of course, the evidence will not be presented uncontested. Even if the accused individuals never show up, the STL itself would appoint defense counsel for them. On the other hand, if they are in fact still kicking around, one wonders whether Hizbullah will decide to face the charges head on by appointing their own defense counsel.

It is not controversial to recognize that the Hariri investigation has been hobbled (some would say deeply compromised) by problems of unreliable testimony, sullied crime scenes, unprofessionalism, and witness intimidation (and perhaps liquidation, in the case of Wissam Eid). If the case largely depends on evidence from telecommunications data (as the CBC account suggests), maybe Hizbullah thinks that they can beat the rap. Or, at the very least, they may find it easier to undermine the court with their own narrative from the inside, rather than standing on the sidelines and pretending not to notice as the STL sails effortlessly toward a guilty verdict.

Of course, the risks of such a venture would be considerable. By participating in it, Hizbullah would in effect be lending legitimacy to the Tribunal, and they could find their image damaged further if they fail to put up a plausible defense to a compelling case by the prosecution.

One day down, twenty-nine to go…
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June 30, 2011

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: A Primer

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Hezbollah, Lebanon, March 14 | Tags: |
[11] Comments 

The STL is the big story again, and everyone is hungry for more information. Who are the four men that the Tribunal has indicted? Will the prosecutor’s office stop here or does it have evidence connecting the suspects with higher-ups within Hizbullah or the Syrian regime, as has been previously claimed? What else is in the indictment by way of material and circumstantial evidence?

In all likelihood, there will be another waiting period before we start to get the answers to these questions. The good news, however, is that a great deal of information about the case, the evidence, the suspects, and the crime is contained in a wealth of previous reports and leaked information that is freely available on the Internet, much of which we’ve discussed at length here at QifaNabki.com over the past few years.

For those who would like to brush up on their STL knowledge and dig around for information on the identities of the suspects, I’ve assembled a list of relevant documents and posts that should keep you busy. See below.

*

2005: Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission to Lebanon (.pdf): This document was prepared by Peter Fitzgerald, an Irish police commissioner tasked by the UN to visit Lebanon just after the Hariri assassination. It provides a useful introduction to the political context and background of the crime, as well as the response of the Lebanese and Syrian security forces immediately following the explosion.

2005-08: Reports of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission: The UN commission, led by three different investigators (Detlev Mehlis, Serge Brammertz, and Daniel Bellemare) produced 11 detailed reports about the crime over the course of three years. You can find all the reports at the link above. The first one, the infamous “Mehlis Report“, cause d a huge stir when it identified key witnesses who blamed top Syrian and Lebanese politicians and security officials for being involved in the crime.

August 10, 2008: The Hariri Investigation and the Politics of Perception: An essay by Gary Gambill that explores the credibility problems of the Special Tribunal and its reliance on unreliable witness testimony.

April 30, 2009: Tribunal Releases the Four Generals: Detlev Mehlis, the first UN investigator, famously had four top Lebanese generals put into custody for their alleged involvement with the Hariri crime. Nearly four years later, they were released by Daniel Bellemare for lack of evidence. It was a big blow to the confidence of the March 14th movement, one from which it never quite recovered.

May 23, 2009: The Der Spiegel Leak: Widely dismissed as politically expedient nonsense at the time (including by yours truly), this story provided the first major indication that members of Hizbullah and not the Syrian regime were the primary suspects in the Hariri case. Note that two of the indictees who are connected with Hizbullah were mentioned by the Der Spiegel article three years ago: (al-Hajj) Salim Ayyash and Mustafa Badreddine.

August 8, 2010: Hizbullah Presents Its Case that Israel Killed Hariri: In an epic news conference, Hizbullah Secretary-General Hasan Nasrallah built a fascinating case detailing Israel’s involvement in the murder, based on intercepted Israeli drone footage, witness testimony, etc. It had to be seen to be believed; this wasn’t your daddy’s conspiracy theory.

September 6, 2010: Saad Hariri Exonerates Syria: After five years of blaming the crime on Syria, the son of Rafik Hariri publicly accepted that he and his movement had been mistaken for doing so. Nobody believed he was sincere.

November 21, 2010: The CBC Leak: Following the same basic thread of the Der Spiegel story of 2009, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation published an explosive story about the Hariri investigation, with details about the evidence it had turned up that tied Hizbullah members to the crime.

November 23-26, 2010: Qifa Nabki & Friends Dispute the Logic of the CBC Story: Several astute readers of this blog point out discrepancies in the logic of the CBC story. When this is brought to the attention of its author, Neil Macdonald, he offers this reply. Upon further investigation, I turn up even more evidence that not all is as it seems…

January, 2011: The Witnesses Come Out of the Woodwork: Lebanese TV station al-Jadid (or New TV) somehow gets its hands on a bunch of audio recordings of conversations held between Saad Hariri, STL officials, and the “false witness” Zuhayr Siddiq. This is tremendously embarrassing for the March 14 camp, and aids Hizbullah’s case that the whole investigation is a scam. (See here as well.)

January 18, 2011: The STL: Prerequisites for Injustice?: Dr. Omar Nashabe, a PhD in Criminal Justice and an editor at Al-Akhbar newspaper presents a lecture at the LSE about the problems of legitimacy, credibility, and procedure plaguing the court.

June 30, 2011: STL Indicts 4 Suspects for Hariri Murder: Six years after the crime, four individuals (two of whom we know are connected to Hizbullah) are indicted.

If you have links to other important stories about the STL, please post them in the comment section and I may add them to this list.
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June 30, 2011

STL Indicts Four Suspects in Hariri Murder

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Hezbollah, Lebanon, March 14 | Tags: , |
[19] Comments 

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon has confirmed Prosecutor Daniel Bellemare’s indictments of four suspects in the Hariri murder. While the indictment has not yet been made public, media leaks (which accurately predicted the indictment’s release) suggest that the four suspects are the following individuals:

  1. Mustafa Badreddine
  2. Salim Ayyash
  3. Hasan Aineysseh
  4. Assad Sabra
The indictment has been sealed to the public for thirty days, giving Lebanese General Prosecutor Sa’id Mirza time to arrest the suspects. I will be posting relevant reactions and news reports on this thread throughout the day. Check in regularly to read the latest, and join the conversation in the comment section.
*
(A collection of links to background reading, STL documents, UNSC resolutions, previous commentary).

BEIRUT: A U.N.-backed court probing the 2005 assassination of statesman Rafik Hariri handed over Thursday the Lebanon-portion of the indictment, which accused four Hezbollah members, a judicial source told The Daily Star.

The indictment identified the suspects as Mustafa Badreddine, Salim al-Ayyash, Hasan Aineysseh and Asad Sabra.

A three-man delegation from the Special tribunal for Lebanon met State Prosecutor Saeed Mirza before midday Thursday and submitted the sealed indictment and arrest warrants for the four suspects.

Hezbollah has denied involvement in the Hariri assassination and has described accusations as an “Israeli-American project.”

Speaking to a local radio station during a break from talks at Baabda Palace, Minister of State of Administrative Affairs and Hezbollah member Mohammad Fneish said: “When we see the [STL] indictment, we will comment on it.”

Badreddine is a cousin and a brother-in-law of Hezbollah’s slain commander Imad Mughniyeh, who was assassinated in Syria in 2008. Badreddine eventually replaced Mughniyeh as Hezbollah’s chief operations officer.

According to the indictment, Badreddine masterminded and supervised the plot to assassinate the Lebanese statesman while, Ayyash, 48, is alleged to have headed the cell that carried out the assassination of Hariri.

Lebanon, according to experts, now has 30 days to serve out the arrest warrants. If the suspects are not arrested within that period, the STL will then make public the indictment and summon the suspects to appear before the court.

Official: Tribunal Issues Indictments in Lebanese PM Hariri’s Killing (CNN)

A U.N. source familiar with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon said the people include alleged perpetrators on the ground. The next two lists of indictments are expected later this summer and are expected to include the organizers and planners of the attack, the source said.

Lebanese Politicians React to Indictment Announcement (Daily Star)

Reactions began pouring in from Lebanon’s various political factions Thursday, after a Special Tribunal for Lebanon delegation handed over an indictment over the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, reportedly accusing Hezbollah members.

Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea urged lawmakers to look at the suspects in the STL indictment as individuals accused of a crime, rather than affiliating them with their party, religion or country.

“We need to look at the accused as a person rather than link them with their party, sect, or country that he belongs to,” Geagea said, shortly after a Special Tribunal for Lebanon delegation delivered its indictment, said to implicate two Hezbollah members, to the country’s state prosecutor Thursday.

Hariri Investigation Timeline (by Aljazeera)

Some Reactions to the News on Twitter (please use #STL)

@BeirutCalling (Michael Young) — After 6 years of investigation, the Special Tribunal for #Lebanon indicts four Hezbollah suspects. The mountain has given birth to a mouse.

@rmslim (Randa Slim) — @DavidKenner Two of the names are senior level and the other two are Hezb members but not so senior. #STL #Lebanon

@nmoawad (Nadine Moawad) — The #STL has so far cost over $160 million USD – half of which was payed by #Lebanon (i.e. our tax money)

@abumuqawama (Andrew Exum) — Whew. A quick scan on those indicted in the #STL reveals I have never played soccer with any of them. http://bit.ly/mmENGL

More news reports and reactions to be updated throughout the day. Stay tuned. 

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June 29, 2011

Lebanese Lawmakers Reach Breakthrough on Pesky Tribunal Clause

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Lebanon, The Qnion | Tags: , |
[24] Comments 

While previous Lebanese governments have expressed their strong support for the U.N. Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the new government is expected to take a more equivocal stance in its ministerial policy statement. The committee in charge of drafting the statement has kept the language under tight wraps for the past two weeks, but our muckraking magicians here at The Qnion have managed to secure an advance copy of the Tribunal clause. Don’t forget where you saw it first!

*

“The Government of Lebanon, which is commited to seeking justice — here construed according to the Rawlsian acceptation of an impartial distribution system of social goods and opportunities — will spare no effort to cultivate the ideals of legality, transparency, and moral rectitude in all cases of crimes committed against Lebanese citizens, and, to this end, will deploy a broad-based array of strategies (such as statements of righteous indignation, 24-hour anonymous tip hotlines, municipal police investigations [pending budget constraints], and candlelight vigils) to ensure that the nation’s sacrifices will not have been in vain.

“As regards the U.N. Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), this government puts itself and its security services entirely at the disposal of the Special Prosecutor’s Office and will diligently respond to its every request, a responsibility clearly outlined in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1757. Furthermore, recalling that all United Nations resolutions carry the force of authoritative (if not binding) statements of international law with respect to their member-states, this government will — as a gesture of moral support for the sanctity of this most hallowed institution — make its compliance with UNSCR 1757 contingent upon the fulfillment of all heretofore neglected U.N. resolutions (with particular reference to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194 and U.N. Security Council Resolution 242).

“Failing the implementation of the aforementioned UN resolutions in a timely manner, the Lebanese goverment will, nevertheless, continue to honor its obligations to the international community by cooperating with the Special Tribunal on all matters with the exception of a few issues which will require, on a case-by-case basis, a standard internal consultative review process before they can be approved. These issues include: material evidence inquiries; arrest warrants; extradition requests; expert witness subpoenas; telecommunications data requests; immigration reports; administrative support (including but not limited to photocopying, translation services, word-processing, collating, stapling, envelope stuffing and courier services, coffee orders, late night Barbar runs, and taxi fares). Tribunal officials are kindly advised that the standard internal consultative review for each request requires 6-10 weeks for approval and is subject to an administrative processing fee, following which a decision may be appealed (subject to another 6-10 week review and processing fee). Requests not pertaining to the above list will be responded to promptly.”

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June 28, 2011

What To Read On the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Lebanon | Tags: |
[54] Comments 

I, the humble author of this blog,

NOTING that two developments related to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) are rumored to be just around the corner: (1) the adoption, by the new Lebanese government, of a ministerial policy statement that may end Lebanon’s official cooperation with the STL; and (2) the confirmation of the indictments by the STL’s pre-trial judge, Daniel Fransen;

OBSERVING that, on the first issue, what’s most likely to happen is that some kind of vague language is put in place that commits the government to “justice” in the matter of the Hariri assassination, without mentioning the STL by name;

RECALLING that even if the Mikati government were to dismiss the STL altogether or just not mention it in its policy statement, that would probably not constitute a violation of Lebanon’s Memorandum of Understanding with the STL (as the government would likely have to refuse to cooperate in an extradition or arrest request for the cooperation agreement to be considered violated);

REITERATING  that even if the indictments are confirmed by Fransen in the next few days, he is not under any obligation to make them public, and could instead order the indictment to be “sealed” until the accused are notified;

CONJECTURING that all the hoopla about the earth-shaking character of these rumored developments may actually not be so earth-shaking after all;

ADMITTING that all the hoopla is perhaps understandable given that we’ve been waiting over six years to hear this punch-line;

POINTING OUT that, just for comparison’s sake, the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, established in 1993, is only supposed to start wrapping up its proceedings in 2014;

INTIMATING that, by extension, we could still be in for a very long ride;

ACKNOWLEDGING that everything I’ve said thus far is not going to make a whit of difference to all those who remain convinced that we are on the brink of a major new phase in the STL saga;

HEREBY PROPOSE that the following links may be of some interest:

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June 23, 2011

Only the Brave

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Syria, The Qnion | Tags: , , |
[100] Comments 


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